Friday, October 12, 2018

Hallmark flowers

It came not long after Lisa and her husband visited Auschwitz, the infamous concentration camp in Poland and were feeling especially aggrieved over the sheer amount of evil in the world.  
https://relevantmagazine.com/issues/issue-94/the-evolving-faith-of-lisa-gungor/

Did they never read the Book of Judges? Why do they act like encountering evil is surprising? 

The OT is a common target for atheists. But one reason Christians need to read the OT is to disabuse themselves of a Hallmark card version of Christianity. Life is not a Disney Princess movie. 

It's not as if the Bible presents a sanitized view of the world, then there's the shocking contrast when you compare the Bible to what really happens. There's nothing slightly inconsistent about Auschwitz in light of Bible history. That's to be expected. The world is a jarring mix of awesome beauty and horrifying ugliness. 

Thursday, October 11, 2018

The Green Hornet

Recently I watched a couple of presentations by Matt Chandler on race and religion:

1. There's a certain paradox in these presentations. If I want to hear a minority perspective, why would I listen to a white guy presume to educate me on the minority experience? There are black American Christians, black African Christians, Latino Christians, East Indian Christians, Chinese Christians, Chinese-American Christians, Korean-American Christians, &c., I can turn to to get a minority perspective or Third World perspective. There are Bible commentary series by Third World contributors.

2. I agree with Chandler that evangelical pastors can preach hard-hitting sermons on safe issues. We saw that failure in the Jim Crow South.

3. Chandler's presentation was basically a feel-good message. That's because it was so lacking in particulars. He gave very few details about how contemporary black Americans are ongoing victims of racism. Perhaps that's because, if he ventured to be more specific, that would make his indictment easier to challenge. Maybe he didn't take the risk of inviting factual refutation.

4. Instead of rational persuasion, he repeatedly dismissed people who don't share his viewpoint as "fools". He said the 300 members of his church who left when he starting preaching these messages were "fools" or "ignorant fools". But that means he's not making a serious effort to convince people.

5. He preemptively discounted conservative blacks. He says they're probably "trying to win approval or position".

6. He pedaled equivocations about African history and church history in reference to Egypt and North Africa. But that doesn't mean church fathers who were Roman colonists were black Africans. He might as well say Francis Nigel Lee was African. For a corrective to some of his equivocations, read Edwin Yamauchi's Egypt and the Bible.

7. He mentioned the Ethiopian church. That has a fascinating history, but the black experience in America is far removed from the history of the Ethiopian church. Weren't most slaves from West Africa rather than Egypt or Ethiopia?

8. He said most Americans are ignorant of African history. True, but then, most Americans are fairly ignorant of world history. And it's not as if most folks outside the USA have in-depth knowledge of American history, so that cuts both ways. Is Matt Chandler an authority on world history?

9. He made sniping remarks about football fans who resent players who refuse to salute the flag. But that goes to the issue of whether the narrative promoted by Black Lives Matters is factually accurate. You can't sidestep that issue. If Chandler's going to use that example, he needs to take a position and back it up.

10. Finally, he discussed "white privilege" in terms of his growing up at a time and place where he was surrounded by people who looked like him. In real life, on TV, in magazines.

i) It isn't clear how that amounts to white privilege. Is it Korean privilege to grow up in a predominately Korean-American enclave? Or Chinese or Japanese or Latino?

ii) Perhaps what he's groping at is that if most people you see on TV or film are white while you're a minority, then you have no role models or heroes with whom you can identify growing up. I suppose there's a grain of truth to that.

But does that mean that only members of your own race can be heroes and role models? I recall watching The Green Hornet as a kid. Bruce Lee as Kato was way cooler than the square Van Williams–titular star of the show. Was a white boy like me unable to relate to a minority actor? No. And I doubt I was exceptional in that regard. Lee is the only reason anyone remembers the short-lived show.

iii) Say you're white and most movie and TV dramas are by and for a white audience. Is that white privilege? But if most of the character are white, that means most of the villains are white. Is that still white privilege?

iv) From my reading, "white privilege" is defined in terms of "unearned advantages and benefits". Suppose, as a white man, I know hardly any minorities, I know little about minority cultures or Third World cultures. But is that an advantage or disadvantage? Isn't there a sense in which I'm disadvantaged if my experience is that provincial and ethnocentric? Wouldn't I benefit from having cross-cultural experience? Aren't I intellectually deprived if all I know is my own ethnic heritage?

v) Hollywood didn't have any significant roles for Asian-Americans until Bruce Lee single-handedly popularized martial arts in the west–as well as popularizing the kung fu film genre. Instead of complaining and waiting for Hollywood to take the initiative, he took the initiative. Not only is he a role model for Asian guys, but for many young men generally. That's not specifically Christian, but it shows the difference one man can make.

What is man?

I recently read What is Man? (Elm Hill, 2018) by Edgar Andrews. It's a witty, erudite, wide-ranging monograph that defends biblical anthropology in light of modern scientific challenges. The book has a scientific emphasis, but that's integrated into a broader philosophical and theological context. 

PART 1. MAN AND THE COSMOS
Ch.1. Who Do You Think You Are? 13
(What is Man? A summary)

Ch.2. The Cheshire Cat Cosmos 33
(Can a universe create itself from nothing?)

Ch.3. Small Flat Bugs 51
(Where is Man?)

Ch.4. The Cosmic Cookbook 75
(A fine-tuned universe)

Ch.5. Deutsch’s Dauntless Dinosaurs 103
(Exploring the mega-multiverse)

PART 2. MAN AND THE BIOSPHERE
Ch.6. Death And Taxes 125
(Human uniqueness)

Ch.7. The Devil In The Details 145
(Digging deeper into genes and genomes)

Ch.8. Dem Dry Bones 169
(What fossils really tell us about the rise of Man)

Ch. 9. Aristotle And The Snowball 193
(On human consciousness)

PART 3. MAN AND THE BIBLE
Ch.10. Worldviews At War 217
(On the nature of reality)

Ch.11. Adam And The Apple 239
(The historicity and fall of Adam and Eve)

Ch.12. The Image Of God 263
(Why Man is unique)

Ch.13. The Second Adam 287
(Jesus Christ, the perfect man)

Ch.14. The Resurrection: Fact Or Fiction? 307
(The claim, the evidence, and the implications)

Sheltering Jews

https://www.chambon.org/sauvage_chambon_ten_questions_en.htm

Revolution in Rome

Francis has a process in place to fast-track his next wave of theological innovations:


Instant official teaching. 

Wednesday, October 10, 2018

What's the problem of unanswered prayer?

The "problem of unanswered prayer" is often discussed in apologetics. There's really more than one problem:

1. At the most abstract level is the issue of whether unanswered prayer throws doubt on the existence of a prayer-answering God. That's a philosophical and theological issue. I've discussed that objection on multiple occasions.

2. At a more personal level, some professing Christians suffer cognitive dissonance, a crisis of faith, or loss of faith because the NT contains some unqualified prayer promises which don't seem to live up to experience. That's a hermeneutical issue. I've discussed that objection on multiple occasions.

3. But at the most existential level is the ordeal of professing Christians who pray in vain for something they desperately need. They pray their heart out but nothing changes. 

i) I do think there are reasons why two Christians can offer equally needy, equally legitimate prayers, yet God answers the prayer of one rather than the other. This intersects with theodicy. For instance:



ii) Unanswered prayer can be spiritually damaging if you ask for the same thing day after day, week after week, month after month, year after year. Every day your request is rebuffed. Every day you leave yourself open to disappointment. That has a cumulative effect. 

If you pray for something that never happens, the outcome is the same as if you never prayed at all. You'd get the exact same outcome by not praying. In that situation it doesn't make a dime's worth of difference whether or not you prayed. So that can erode confidence.

In that respect, giving it a rest may be a way to protect yourself from cynicism. You might revisit the prayer request at a later time, but it's not necessarily a bad thing to take a break. Otherwise, the exercise becomes too punishing. 

That said, there are different kinds of prayer, viz. confession, thanksgiving, intercession, petition (for yourself). If petitionary prayer for yourself becomes too disillusioning, you might take a break from that but not from, say, intercessory prayer. 

iii) If you pray for something and it happens in a timely fashion, it's easier to identify that outcome as an answer to prayer. If, however, you eventually get what you pray for years later, that fosters the suspicion that it happened naturally. It was going to happen anyway. Given enough time, odds are what you ask for will happen every now and then. 

That may be another reason to give it a break. In the interim you might forget about the prayer request. If what you prayed for then comes to pass, it's a pleasant surprise. Indeed, an unexpected answer to prayer may be more encouraging than praying daily for the same thing. 

The correspondence theory of truth

http://joshualrasmussen.com/articles/correspondencetheory.pdf

Thielman on Rom 9

I was recently reading Frank Thielman's new commentary on Romans. His analysis of Rom 9 is a mess. I'll quote some representative statements, then comment:

Before the plagues descended on the Egyptians, God told Moses twice that he would "harden" Pharaoh's hear and that as a result Pharaoh would not grant Moses's request to let Israel go into the wilderness to sacrifice to God (Exod 4:21; 7:3). Throughout the subsequent narrative, we read either that Pharaoh "hardened" his heart (8:15,32; 9:34), that Pharaoh's heart "was hardened" (7:13; 8:19; 9:7,35), or that "the Lord hardened" the heart of Pharaoh (9:12; 10:20,27; 11:10; 14:8; cf. 10:1; 14:4). 

The interplay in Exod 4:14 between God's initiative and Pharaoh's initiative is helpful in understanding what Paul meant when he said that God "hardens' certain people such as Pharaoh. Paul believed that God punishes people for their own sin, not that God forced people to sin and then punished them for it. Otherwise, God would be acting nonsensically when he endured the rebellions of the wicked "with much patience" and stretched out his hands in appeal to disobedient Israel (Rom 9:22: 10:21). No patience is necessary for enduring the behavior of people doing what one wants them to do, and a lengthy appeal to people not to do what one has designed them to do is obviously fruitless.

When Paul says here, then, that God "hardens" people he must mean that God justly punishes people who, like Pharaoh (Exod 8:15,32; 9:34) and everyone else (Rom 1:18-3:20; 5:12-19), are already in rebellion against him. God punishes them by calcifying this rebellion, or, to put it another way, he further hardens resistant hearts. This second level of resistance, which God himself initiates, is Paul's concern here, and it corresponds exactly to God's judgment in 1:24,26, and 28 when he hands people over to their lust, dishonorable passion, and worthless thoughts [457-58].

Interpreters of this passage [9:21] often explain the image of God as a potter shaping clay as a reference to God's creation of human beings and his determination of their eternal destinies at creation…Paul does not, therefore, picture God as creating people in order to destroy them but as dealing sovereignly with a body of human beings who, without exception, are sinful. He mercifully saves some but justly punishes others [460]. 

One can describe the idea that God decides who will believe the gospel in a way that makes God not only responsible for the salvation of human beings but also for evil since he seemingly creates certain human beings in order that they might sin and that he might then destroy them for his glory. A variation on this idea depicts God as within his rights even to destroy innocent human beings, if any existed, simply because he created them. 

To read Rom 9:7-23 in these ways, however, is to read the passages in a one-sided way, without the balance provided by the context…The idea that this passage teaches God created people in order to destroy them, moreover, attributes conduct to God that God himself finds sinful in human beings. It depicts God as forcing people to sin and then condemning them for it or, worse, condemning the innocent…But he [Paul] tempers the entire concept with the notion that God endured the vessels of wrath that he made with much patience and by speaking of the fitting out of these vessels in the passive voice (9:22). By doing this, he indicates that one must not misread the illustrations to make God the author of evil and sin. 

Paul's illustration of the potter in 9:19-23, then, is not about God predestining certain people to sin, nor is it about the relationship between the entry of sin into God's creation and God's predestining will. It is instead about God's response to already sinful human beings. 

This does not mean that human sin took God by surprise and was somehow outside the scope of God's original design for the universe. It simply means that the answer to such questions lies beyond human understanding.

[Quoting Bavinck] Sin and its punishment can never as such, and for their own sake, have been willed by God…They can therefore have been willed by God only as a means to a different, better, and greater good…Sin is not itself a good. It only becomes a good inasmuch as, contrary to its own nature, it is compelled by God's omnipotence to advance his honor. It is a good indirectly because, being subdued, constrained, and overcome, it brings out God's greatness, power, and justice. 

God is not willing "that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance" (2 Pet 3:9) [468-70]. 

Tuesday, October 09, 2018

Who's the speaker in Rom 7?

A perennial crux in the interpretation of Rom 7 is the identify of the speaker. Is this rhetorical fiction, autobiographical, or something else (e.g. the history of Adam, the history of Israel)? I don't have a definitive answer, but I have a few suggestions:

i) We should make allowance for the possibility that Paul uses hyperbole in this passage.

ii) It may be a fictional persona. That doesn't mean it can't be realistic. A fictional persona may represent real people or real experiences. But it's more flexible than one actual individual.

iii) There are different potential readers in Paul's target audience. Jewish converts to Christianity. Gentile converts to Christianity. Jews and gentiles who haven't converted, but might be susceptible to Paul's argument. 

So it's possible that the persona in Rom 7 represents a composite persona. An anonymous fictional character who functions as a mirror. By holding up a mirror to the reader, different readers see different things. Depending on their individual experience, different readers may recognize themselves in some of what Paul says, just like moviegoers may identify with a particular character. 

We shouldn't necessarily expect the persona in Rom 7 to be consistent if the function is to sketch composite character with varied experiences in whom different readers may see themselves. Paul might well incorporate elements of his own experience in the composite persona. No reader has to check every box. Rather, it's sufficient broad to cover a range of readers without matching every reader's particular experience across the board. The persona may intersect with a reader's experience without coinciding with their experience. There's something there for every reader. 

Inside and outside

Thomistic simplicity, as I understand it, isn't a single claim but a set of claims. It includes the claim that God's attributes are mutually identical. 

We might begin by asking what it means for something to be a composite object. What makes it composite? What are parts? 

Suppose we begin with this example. Take a block of cheese. It has an inside and outside. Cut it in half. The halves have an inside and outside. Cut the halves in half. The quarters have an inside and outside. Up to a point, the process is repeatable, although cheese isn't indefinitely divisible. There's no subatomic cheese! To be cheese, it must exist at a certain scale and complexity. There are no quarks or atoms made of cheese. 

The point, though, is that we can think of a composite object as an object with an inside and outside. Objects with surface boundaries. These can be taken apart. And the parts have surface boundaries. So the process of disassembling a composite object into its components is a progressive miniaturization, where the inside/outside relation continues at ever lower scales of magnitude. Where does it end–or does it? In physics, the Plank length is the lowest bound, although that's an artificial stipulation. 

That raises the question of whether every object, however small, has an inside. That's a philosophically and scientifically important, interesting, and difficult question. However, I don't have to answer that question since I'm merely using this illustration as an opening gambit. 

I began with an example of a physical object or solid object. But proponents of Thomistic simplicity subscribe to classical theism. In classical theism, God is akin to an abstract object. Timeless and spaceless or illocal. 

Suppose that God's attributes are distinct. Not mutually identical. Does that make God a composite being? Are attributes parts? 

It doesn't make much sense to say God has an inside and outside. It doesn't make much sense to say the divine attributes, even if distinct, have an inside and outside. So they can't be parts in that sense. So in what respect is an object a composite object if it lacks an inside and outside? In what respect can parts be parts if they lack an inside and outside?

If we view God as a discarnate mind, then you might say minds are insides without outsides. It's all on the inside (so to speak). Minds are essentially internal or interior. Self-referential. They have no surface boundaries. That's not what individuates and differentiates one mind from another. 

Admittedly, I'm using a spatial metaphor. If we drop the metaphor, then the inside/outside relation is literally inapplicable to minds. 

Likewise, if God is a discarnate mind, then divine attributes are mental properties. But even if distinct, mental attributes aren't parts of a composite entity. Mental properties have no inside and outside. 

This is also germane to the Trinity. In the case of concrete individuals or particulars, one individual is external to another individual. So the inside/outside relation reasserts itself in that context. 

But the Father isn't literally external to the Son and Spirit. In fact, there's a sense in which (albeit figurative or analogical) each member of the Trinity is "inside" the other two persons, and vice versa. 

Monday, October 08, 2018

Nazis and SJWs

In the past I've noted the ironic fact that Jewishness was more important to Nazis that it was to many Jews. For many European Jews were nominal Jews, assimilated Jews, secular Jews–interchangeable with their Aryan neighbors. But for Nazis, Jewish identity was all-important. It was the target.

The same irony holds true in identity politics. Whiteness is far more important to SJWs than it is to many whites. For many whites, what's central to their personal identity is their biological sex, heterosexual orientation, religion, family, and nationality. Their biological race is peripheral compared to those other indicia. But for SJWs, white identity is all-important, because that's the target. 

Redefining rape

It's important that conservatives force liberals to be consistent. During the Kavanaugh hearings, liberals were reading from an old script. According to that script, biological men rape biological women. 

But according to transgenderism, those categories are defunct. According to the new script, a "transgender woman" (i.e. biological male who self-identifies as female) can rape a biological woman. But if you're supposed to believe women, which woman are you supposed to believe–the biological woman or the "transgender woman"? 

Or suppose, before "she" transitioned, the "transgender woman" was convicted of raping a biological woman. But according to GLAAD, transgender identity is retroactive:


So the rapist was never a man. But in that event, which "woman" are you supposed to believe? 

Or suppose a "transgender woman" rapes a gay adolescent boy. Who are you supposed to believe–the "woman" or the homosexual? 

Brains in a vat

By the same argument, ‘vat’ refers to vats in the image in vat-English, or something related (electronic impulses or program features), but certainly not to real vats, since the use of ‘vat’ in vat-English has no causal connection to real vats (apart from the connection that the brains in a vat wouldn’t be able to use the word ‘vat’, if it were not for the presence of one particular vat — the vat they are in; but this connection obtains between the use of every word in vat-English and that one particular vat; it is not a special connection between the use of the particular word ‘vat’ and vats). Similarly, ‘nutrient fluid’ refers to a liquid in the image in vat-English, or something related (electronic impulses or program features). It follows that if their ‘possible world’ is really the actual one, and we are really the brains in a vat, then what we now mean by ‘we are brains in a vat’ is that we are brains in a vat in the image or something of that kind (if we mean anything at all). But part of the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is that we aren’t brains in a vat in the image (i.e. what we are ‘hallucinating’ isn’t that we are brains in a vat). So, if we are brains in a vat, then the sentence ‘We are brains in a vat’ says something false (if it says anything). In short, if we are brains in a vat, then ‘We are brains in a vat’ is false. So it is (necessarily) false.  Hilary Putnam, ‘Brains in a vat,’ Reason, Truth and History, (Cambridge 1981), 14-15. 

i) Even though this is a famous science fiction scenario, in the future it may be a realistic scenario:


ii) As an anti-skeptical argument, I don't think Putnam's argument succeeds. The argument, if successful, is counterproductive. It would mean that even if you are a brain in a vat, you won't be in a position to recognize your predicament because you lack the language and concepts to entertain that possibility. But surely that's the non plus ultra of global skepticism. 

iii) However, I don't think his argument works at another level. It's true that to recognize your predicament as a brain in a vat, you need an external frame of reference. However, the lab could have a camera trained on the transparent vat, with tubes and wires. That information could be fed into the brain so that a disembodied brain could see itself in the vat, with the neurointerface. 

iv) From a Christian standpoint, the source of consciousness is the soul, not the brain. And even if (ex hypothesi) brains were harvested in the womb and deposited in the vat, spending their entire lives in the vat, God could reveal himself directly to the embrained but disembodied soul–just as God intervenes in human history. Take revelatory dreams, where God gets right inside the mind of the dreamer. If need be, God could enter the mind of the embrained but disembodied soul. Bypass the neurointerface. Make himself known from within.  

Qualia and creationism

The stock objection to mature creation is that mature creation implicates God in a scheme of deception. I've often discussed that objection from various angles. Here's another approach: take the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, or physical properties and phenomenal qualia. The point is not that secondary qualities are merely psychological impressions. But these require a relation between the percipient and the sensible object. It isn't just the object in itself that generates these properties, but in combination with the mind or senses of the observer. (In addition, that's an argument for indirect realism). 

Yet for prescientific observers, these properties seem to be external to the observer. Seem to inhere in the sensible object. 

And this isn't an exceptional experience, but a systematic feature of how we perceive the physical world. Does that implicate God in a scheme of deception? 

Perhaps a critic of mature creation would say that's not deceptive in the same sense or relevant sense. If so, an objection based on divine deception will need to be considerable refined. Below is an illustration of the distinction at hand:

The distinction between ‘primary qualities’ and ‘secondary qualities’ was developed during the rise of modern science. In the first instance, we can think of this as a distinction between properties that science says objects have – size, shape, motion; and properties that depend upon particular ways of perceiving objects...But these theories – that colour is frequency of electromagnetic radiation, that smell and taste are chemical compounds – suggest that the world as we experience it through our senses and the world as science describes it are quite different. We experience all the wonderful properties of the senses; the world ‘as it is in itself’, as described by science, is ‘particles in motion’ and empty space.

Do secondary properties exist ‘in the object’ or ‘in the mind’ of the perceiver?...We could reply that physical objects aren’t ‘really’ coloured or don’t ‘really’ have a smell, because physical objects are made of molecules without colour or smell. But this misinterprets what it means to say that something is coloured or smells. To say that the table is brown is not to say that it must be composed of microscopic particles which are also brown. It is to say that the table looks brown to normal observers under normal conditions. The subatomic particles that make up a table don’t have to be brown for the table to be brown! 

Take another example: solidity. Science tells us that solid objects are, in fact, mostly empty space; the distances between atoms are huge compared to the size of the subatomic particles themselves. Does this mean that a table, because it is mostly empty space, is not solid? Of course not; atoms forming this rigid pattern, even with a great deal of empty space, comprise a solid. This is what the word ‘solid’ means.

Special providences

I often write about coincidence miracles. In an earlier age these went by the name of special providences. Here's a nice compact definition:

What used to be called "special providences," in which the extraordinary element lies not in any obvious violation of the causal closure of the physical world but rather in the auspicious timing of apparently independent events. Timothy McGrew, "Arguments from Providence and from Miracles: The State of the Art and the Uses of History," J.Walls & T. Dougherty, eds. Two Dozen (of so) Arguments for God (Oxford 2018), 345.

Crisis of doubt

There's an extensive literature on deconversion. Indeed, narratives of apostasy tend to occupy a stereotypical genre. A formulaic plot. I believe this got started in Victorian literature.

There is, however, the neglected phenomenon of reverts. Just as there can be a crisis of faith, there can be a crisis of doubt. The traffic goes both ways. Converts, reverts, and deconverts:

https://www.booksandculture.com/articles/2007/julaug/1.9.html?paging=off

Apostates and androids

Apostates and atheists are like androids in science fiction stories who don't initially know that they're androids. They've been programmed with false memories so that when they're switched on, it's like waking up from the day before. 

Then they discover that they're androids. They have a built-in expiration date. Their programming is arbitrary. They can be reprogrammed. There's no one way they ought to be. Nothing they're supposed to be. A blank slate that can be anything. Programmed to fall in love or programmed to kill. 

Is there a correlation between homosexuality, pedophilia, and/or hebephilia/ephebophilia?

Somewhat dated, but scroll down to 

¶IV. The Problem of Pedophilia




Dark night of the soul

It's sometimes said that failure to experience the presence of God is normal because even saints and mystics like Teresa of Avila, John of the Cross, and Mother Theresa sometimes (or oftentimes) suffered from the same sense of divine absence or abandonment. 

However, that's an artificial standard of comparison. To my knowledge, Catholic mystics aspire to having a continuous sense of communion with God, and practice spiritual techniques to cultivate that experience. But that doesn't represent normal biblical sanctity. It's more like Tibetan monks and whirling Dervishes who use psychosomatic techniques to trigger an altered state of consciousness. Likewise, psychedelic drugs. 

If successful, is that communion with God…or self-induced psychosis? 

Sunday, October 07, 2018

Greek in Palestine

Pertinent to Ehrman's claim about the rarity of Greek-speaking Palestinian Jews:


Scroll down to p110. 

Credible testimony

https://www.proginosko.com/2018/10/credible-testimony/#more-3493

Unemployable


Although Kavanaugh has been sworn in, there are some ethical reverberations that continue to merit discussion. Here's the viewpoint of Arminian theologian Randal Rauser (see above). By way of comment:

1. It's silly to use Susan Collins to frame the issue. She's not my standard of comparison.  

2. Risk assessment involves two factors: (i) how likely it is to happen; (ii) how harmful if it happens. We counterbalance these factors in risk assessment. 

3. Given Rauser's soft views on homosexuality, what's his position on known homosexuals as kindergarten teachers?

4. Of course, little kids are especially vulnerable, but that's not equally analogous to every other group.

5. Where does Rauser drawn the line on banning people from jobs based on uncorroborated allegations of sexual assault? To what extent are they still employable at all, given his position? 

6. What about ex-wives who accuse the husband of child molestation in a custody battle. Given the potential for harm, if true, would Rauser say a father should be denied custody or even visitation rights based on unsubstantiated allegations of child molestation? That would mean every ex-wife and mother would automatically win a custody battle by merely alleging child molestation. Is that Rauser's standard?

7. Should Rauser be terminated as a seminary prof. if an uncorroborated charge of sexual misconduct with a student is lodged? 

Saturday, October 06, 2018

Symmetrical or monarchical Trinitarianism?

According to Orthodox analytic theologian Dr. Beau Branson the right way to understand the Trinity is that the one true God is none other than the Father, although there are three divine persons. There is no triune God, no tripersonal God. In his view, this is the Eastern Orthodox understanding of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Dr. Branson also explains what he calls the doctrine of the monarchy of the Father, which in his view, is a key to correctly understanding the Trinity. He also explains what he calls “egalitarian” or “symmetrical” views on the Trinity, which he contrasts with “monarchical” views.


I'm not qualified to say if this is the Greek Orthodox paradigm in every particular, although elements of it certainly reflect the Nicene paradigm, as I understand it. Unwittingly, this confirms my preference for a symmetrical model of the Trinity rather than a monarchical model of the Trinity. The Nicene paradigm leaves a foothold for unitarianism. Although "not made" and "consubstantial" rule out Arianism, the Nicene paradigm is an incomplete response to the unitarian alternative. By saying there is no triune or tripersonal God, by saying that only the Father is the one true God, that paradigm still has a unitarian center of gravity. It tries to finesse monotheism by making the Father the source. The Son and Spirit are reduced to projections of the Father.

A while back I was walking at a cemetery. The entrance is a high brick wall with cast-iron gates. When open, the gates are perpendicular to the wall. As I was exiting the cemetery before sunset, I saw an interesting phenomenon. The direction of sunlight low on the western horizon, in relation to the gates, at right angles to the wall, made the gates cast a shadow on the wall, as if there was a second gate, flat against the wall. Of course, that was an optical illusion. The second gate was just a shadow. If you put a barrier between the sunlight and the cast-iron gate, the image would instantly vanish. Only the iron-gate has positive existence. A shadow is merely the absence of light at that spot. A patch of nothing that only exists by virtue of light (and some opaque object in-between). That's what Branson's Trinitarianism amounts to. 

Punishment for abortion

As of Saturday night, just hours after the confirmation vote, Brett Kavanaugh has been sworn in as a Justice of the Supreme Court. It's not clear yet that he would vote to overturn Roe vs Wade (and turn the decision about abortion laws over to the states), but we can be certain that there will be howling about punishment for abortion, back-alley coat hanger abortions, etc.

There won't likely be any jail time at all for having an abortion, anywhere, but one thing we should do is to spread the word that for each person who procures an abortion, the thought that "I killed a living, growing human child for my own convenience" should be impressed upon them as a kind of life sentence. If any punishment is to be imposed, each person who participates in getting an abortion should at least live with that thought.

The Magus

The bastard son of a magus, Logan MacGaraidh was born in Aberdeenshire in the seventeenth century. He never knew his actual birthdate. The Old Religion maintained an underground presence despite the Christian overlay.

Logan was raised Catholic, which sublimated the witchcraft of his Pictish ancestors under the pious veneer of sacramental priestcraft. Yet the underlying affinity was clear: both were religions of magic potions, incantations, and enchantments. A magus in Catholic vestments. Although Logan was not a devil-worshiper, he inherited the powers of his shadowy father, whom he barely knew.

Logan adored the wild misty landscape: the lochs, bluffs, rivers, and coastlines. He hiked the length and breadth of Aberdeenshire.

It was a hazardous time to be alive, for Catholic and Covenanter alike. The balance of power shifted and shifted, with fatal results for the losing side–and each side lost.

Raised by his mother's kinfolk, they were massacred while Logan was hiking. When he returned to his hamlet, bodies and burning buildings were left.

Always something of an outsider, life in his beloved Aberdeenshire became unbearable with all his youthful friends and relatives dead. So he crossed the sea to Connecticut.

While not exactly tolerant, religious life in Colonial Connecticut wasn't a life-and-death affair. For the first time he was able to consider the Protestant faith with a certain detachment. In seventeenth-century Aberdeenshire, conversion would betray your kith and kin. Religious affiliation was as much more of a statement of clan solidarity and loyalty than doctrinal conviction. But with all his relatives dead, and living in a new land, he no longer had that duty to uphold.

He never took Catholicism seriously. A camouflaged version of his heathen ancestors. But Colonial Puritans presented a dramatic point of contrast. Reactionary, perhaps, but bracing.

For the first time he could see more clearly how sorcery fit into a larger narrative. His father represented a mutinous band of fallen men and fallen angels while Christ and his saints represent the winning side.

He didn't see the need to renounce his powers. All power ultimately derives from God, and he figured that he could use it for good.

Owing to his natural affinity with the aboriginal heathens, he became a missionary to the Mohegan, Pequot, Nipmuck, and Narragansett tribes. At his first encounter he was attacked by Pequot braves, but he extended a finger to draw a ring of fire around the charging braves. Encircled by the wall of fire, glowing in the twilight, the assailants were subdued, and escorted him to their village. Rumor made him an instant legend among the tribes.

Yet he was still an outsider. Colonial Connecticut never felt like home. His alienation was less about place than time. He left Scotland because it was too late to feel at home there, after the loss of his kinfolk. And he was now a stranger in a strange land.

Rather than moving in space, he began to move in time–traveling into the future. He could always make a living as a history teacher, drawing on his firsthand knowledge of the past–although he had to disguise his source of knowledge.

Finally, out of curiosity, he returned to Connecticut in 2020. Apart from a few historic buildings, the populated areas were unrecognizable. He went back to a historic cemetery.

There he met an archeologist and historian. As luck would have it, Effie had Celtic coloring–emerald eyes and flaming hair–which reminded him of pretty girls he knew from his long-lost homeland.

She never felt at home in her own century, which is why she became a historian with a personal interest in Colonial America. Which is why she was poking around this cemetery.

Many of the original graves were covered over, but from the remaining graves Logan could tell where to find the hidden graves. He pointed to a spot of ground, gave names and dates.

Scraping away the layers revealed the forgotten graves and flattened tombstones. She was puzzled by his uncanny knowledge. He also explained how one family was related to another. At first she was incredulous, but as she followed up on his leads in historic records, she received confirmation.

Eventually he let her in on his secret, which would be unbelievable were it not for his inexplicable knowledge of the past. Not the past in general, but pockets of the past. Deep rather than wide. Provincial but detailed.

A romance blossomed. Effie asked him if he was homesick for the Aberdeenshire of his youth. Did he ever hanker to return?

He said he no longer felt at home there after all his kinfolk were massacred. It was a ghost town.

She asked him if he could take her back into the past. Back to the Aberdeenshire, but during a more peaceful time. There they could both start afresh. Make a life together.

And so they did. They led a quiet life, so as not to unweave the future from whence she came. And when they died, they were buried unto a Celtic cross, to await the resurrection of the body.

Hotbed of sodomy

The Kavanaugh controversy has shed light on the infiltration of the gay mafia into elite Catholic educational institutions. Not surprisingly, the media downplayed that dimension of the controversy. Once again, we're witnessing the absolute collapse of Catholic institutions. Not through lack of oversight by the hierarchy, but sympathy with that development:

http://www.beliefnet.com/columnists/viamedia/2006/04/man-and-boy-and-woman-and-boy-at-georgetown-prep.html

Friday, October 05, 2018

Synchronicity

Recently, I happened to be thinking about the sound track of a movie I saw years ago. Then, when I was at a pizzeria a few days later, I heard the same sound track in the background. 

Now, it was probably a coincidence, although this isn't a recent or famous film, so it's rather unlikely that they'd play that particular soundtrack. And I haven't heard it before at that pizzeria. A coincidence is an apparently significant convergence of causally independent events. 

A naturalistic explanation is that if I hadn't been thinking about the movie in the first place, I wouldn't even register what music was playing. It only stood out for me because I was already primed.  

And there's a causal asymmetry. Hearing the music reminded me that I'd been thinking about that very film. By contrast, thinking about the movie didn't cause that music to be played at the pizzeria, when I was there. That would only be possible if I have psychokinetic abilities–which I don't.  

But suppose every time I went to that pizzeria, it played music I happened to be thinking about a few days before. The reason can't just be that I notice it because I already had that on my mind. If it keeps happening, that can't be random. So the naturalistic explanation is quite limited. 

But here's another possibility: suppose God sometimes gives Christians little signs. Not unmistakable signs, but just enough to get your attention. You can't rule it in or out. But maybe that's just enough to give you a pat on the back, a bit of timely encouragement, to nudge you along. Get you through another day, another week. 

Something you didn't pray for. Something unexpected. A pleasant surprise. Maybe it's just a fluke–but maybe not. Less then a miracle but more than a wish. Because it's not a directive, nothing you must act on, it needn't be unambiguous. We can live with uncertainty but we can't live without hope. 

The metaphysics of original sin

I'm going to revisit the issue of whether original sin is fair. It's a topic I've discussed from various angles. For instance. 


1. In the Genesis narrative (Gen 2-3), as I construe it, humans are naturally mortal but with a potential for immortality, contingent on access to the tree of life. When Adam and Eve are expelled from the Garden, they lose their shot at immortality. And that's a lost opportunity for their posterity as well. To be born outside the Garden is to be consigned to morality, as the default state of humans, absent the tree of life. 

For Adam and Eve, the lost opportunity of immortality is punitive. But is it punitive for their posterity, or is that merely a side-effect of what their ancestors did?

To take a comparison, suppose a businessman becomes rich through hard work, but squanders his fortune through compulsive gambling. As a result, his kids inherit nothing. But they aren't being punished for their father's gambling debts.

Now, a common objection is that it's unfair for humans to suffer the dire consequences of what was done by a second party (Adam and Eve), without their consent. But whether that's unfair depends on whether humans are entitled to immortality. 

To revert to my comparison, it's not a miscarriage of justice if the kids of the impoverished rich man inherit nothing. They didn't earn the money. It wasn't theirs to lose.

The question is whether the imputation of Adam's guilt is directly punitive, or more in the nature of a hereditary liability, for something humans never had a claim on in the first place.

Likewise, the question of whether original sin is damnatory, or whether that's reserved for actual sin.

2. Is it fair to be born with a sin nature? Not only do kids inherit physical traits from their parents, they inherit psychological traits from their parents. And I think that's evidence for traducianism. I'm a Cartesian dualist traducian.

If alcoholism runs in your family, you may have a chemical or genetic predisposition to alcoholism. That's unfair, but you wouldn't even exist if the deck was reshuffled. 

Likewise, you might inherit a bad psychological trait. Suppose your dad has a short temper, which you inherit. You might say that's unfair, but you wouldn't even exist without the father you had. That's part of your psychological makeup, and your origination depends on it. Some psychological traits can be modified or eradicated, but that's after the fact. They can't be eradicated in advance without eliminating you! 


Must we earn the right to be heard?

In a recent interview with Christianity Today, Tim Keller said:

Because the church has got so many of its own skeletons and so much coverup of sexual abuse and so on, I don't know how we can adjudicate…right now we don't have any kind of credibility for a lot of reasons…As the church tries to speak publicly to social issues…we have to do it with repentance.  
https://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2018/october-web-only/tim-keller-politics-news-midterms-united-states.html

That's true at the level of public perception, which makes it necessary to correct that misperception. I disagree with how Keller frames the issue. Christians don't need to apologize for "the church". I'm not "the church". I don't speak for "the church". And I shouldn't be saddled with what "the church" did before I was born. Moreover, I don't control "the church". I'm just one guy. 

It suffers from a fallacy of personification, as if the church is just one thing, as if the church is identical in time and space, so that whatever was done at one time or place somehow transfers to "the church" at another time or place.  

"The church" is an an abstraction. That's a necessary abstraction for ease of reference, but it's becomes an overgeneralization when individual distinctions in time, place, and person are swallowed up by an indiscriminate category. 

I don't speak and act as a representative of "the church". My positions should be evaluated by whether they are right or wrong, true or false, backed by reason and evidence, rather than fallacious guilt-by-association, which is a lazy anti-intellectual shortcut. 

The situation is rather different with Catholics since they do acquire a corporate identity in a way that Protestants don't. Catholicism is fundamentally and pervasively institutional in a way that the Protestant faith is not, so Catholics can't disassociate themselves from what their denomination does in the same way Protestants can disassociate themselves from institutional Protestantism. 

Thursday, October 04, 2018

The argument from numbers


However, if it’s a divine idea, then we could all be talking about the same idea, God’s idea. Divine ideas would have to be relevantly different from our own. They’re at least different in that they can secure the infinity and necessity of numbers. 

It could be that God would always have had the ideas of 2 and 4, and it could be that God would always have had the idea that 2 + 2 = 4, no matter what. But perhaps it could be that God would not necessarily have the ideas. Why should he have them? If God could have had quite different ideas (or none at all), it would be a cosmic coincidence for him to choose just those ideas, no matter what.

Let’s focus on the main subject of Leibniz’s argument first: the necessary truths of mathematics. Whenever we try to ground some domain in the divine, there’s a Euthyphro-style dilemma lurking. A comparison here between morality and mathematics might be illuminating. The traditional Euthyphro dilemma: Does God command it because it’s obligatory? Or is it obligatory because he commands it? If the former, then there’s some morality independent of God’s say-so. If the latter, then God could with as much reason command murder as he could forbid it. Does God think that 2 + 2 = 4 because 2 + 2 = 4? Or does 2 + 2 = 4 because he thinks it? If the former, then the truth is independent of God’s say-so. If the latter, then God could with as much reason have decided that 2 + 2 = 5.

Does God have the idea of 2 because it exists? Or does it exist because he has the idea? If the former, then the number is independent of God’s intellect. If the latter, then God could with as much reason never have had the idea of 2, so that it never existed.

But I wonder: Why would God’s rational nature ensure that 2 + 2 = 4? Unless there’s something intrinsically rational about 2 + 2 = 4, unless there’s something about the numbers that God’s rationality is tracking and that isn’t up to anyone, God could have dreamt up something else. But, if God’s rational nature is tracking something, then that is what mathematics is about. That is where the numbers live. It might be a luminous Platonic realm. It might be next to nothing at all. There might even be something divine about it.


This poses some interesting challenges to the theistic foundations of math. 

1. I don't know what he means by saying God might not have certain ideas. 

2. Suppose we can't explain what makes mathematical truths necessarily true. That would still leave intact an argument based on God to embed mathematical infinities. 

If, likewise, numbers are ultimately mental entities, and only a timeless divine mind can ground them, then that argument remains whether or not we can explain what makes mathematical truths necessarily true. 

3. Is 2+2=4 necessarily true in isolation, or in relation to an interlocking system of mathematical relations? If the latter, then it's necessarily true within that system. 

4. Maybe there's no room for 2+2≠4 because the interlocking system is exhaustive. An infinite, transfinite totality that edges out any alternatives. Divine reason takes that as far as it can go, to ultimate internal closure. 

In order for 2+2≠4, that requires a systematic readjustment to all other equations. Maybe there can be no structure in which 2+2≠4 because there's no infinitely consistent, mutually entailing alternative. 

5. Suppose there is an alternate system, like non-Euclidean geometries. The equations would be necessarily true within those alternate system, rather than contingent or arbitrary. 

Wednesday, October 03, 2018

Calvinism meets Street Epistemology

Recently, Leighton Flowers linked to an exchange between apostate/Street Epistemologist Douglas Letkeman and lay Calvinist Chris Williams:


Flowers prefaced the link with the following claim:

Soteriology 101
This video demonstrates how one’s Calvinistic theology negatively impacts their Apologetic methodology. This Athiest [sic] is able to make the Calvinist appear completely irrational and contradictory. This only hurts our evangelistic and apologetic efforts as a church and I believe it’s the reason Calvinism always dies back out after it resurges. It can’t hold water against an honest critique and must eventually be abandoned by objective and rational Bible believers who desire to engage the unbelief of others.

To begin with, it's easier to ask questions than answer questions. That format puts the atheist at a tactical advantage. If Flowers bothered to watch other video exchanges between Street Epistemologists and garden-variety Christians, the same imbalance would be on display. That's equally true when the Christian respondent is a freewill theist. 

Creationism and idealism

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2018/09/does-physics-lead-to-god.html#more

Here's a striking example of a philosopher of science who rejects young-earth creationism but subscribes to theistic idealism to explain quantum mechanics. That's quite ironic since idealism is far more antirealist than mature creation.


The Boltzmann brain paradox

Last Thursdayism is a famous thought-experiment by Bertrand Russell:

There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal past. There is no logically necessary connection between events at different times; therefore nothing that is happening now or will happen in the future can disprove the hypothesis that the world began five minutes ago.

Of course, most folks, including most philosophers and scientists, don't think those skeptical scenarios are realistic. However, Last Thursdayism has a counterpart in modern physics: 

It could be the weirdest and most embarrassing prediction in the history of cosmology, if not science.

If true, it would mean that you yourself reading this article are more likely to be some momentary fluctuation in a field of matter and energy out in space than a person with a real past born through billions of years of evolution in an orderly star-spangled cosmos. Your memories and the world you think you see around you are illusions.

This bizarre picture is the outcome of a recent series of calculations that take some of the bedrock theories and discoveries of modern cosmology to the limit. Nobody in the field believes that this is the way things really work, however. And so in the last couple of years there has been a growing stream of debate and dueling papers, replete with references to such esoteric subjects as reincarnation, multiple universes and even the death of spacetime, as cosmologists try to square the predictions of their cherished theories with their convictions that we and the universe are real. The basic problem is that across the eons of time, the standard theories suggest, the universe can recur over and over again in an endless cycle of big bangs, but it’s hard for nature to make a whole universe. It’s much easier to make fragments of one, like planets, yourself maybe in a spacesuit or even — in the most absurd and troubling example — a naked brain floating in space. Nature tends to do what is easiest, from the standpoint of energy and probability. And so these fragments — in particular the brains — would appear far more frequently than real full-fledged universes, or than us. Or they might be us.


Lately, Sean Carroll has tried to debunk the Boltzmann brain paradox, but his solution is questionable:


This poses quite a dilemma for atheists–if naturalism and modern physics commits them to a scientific version of Last Thursdayism. 

From a traditional Christian standpoint, one way to relieve the dilemma is to deny physicalism. Minds aren't brains.

In addition, why would a benevolent God make ephemeral conscious beings? Beings with our mental complexity, emotional life, and memories–if that's a trick? False memories–like the malevolent aliens in Dark City. But atheists don't have those countervailing resources. 

Tuesday, October 02, 2018

Plantinga on the life of faith

Outside my study window at home there is a kind of ravine with lots of beautiful trees in it and birds flying around and the like. Those things I think are used by God to sort of help us see his presence, and the like. God sometimes also comes to people–for example Jonathan Edwards, seems often to have a very vivid appreciation of a very vivid sort of personal relationship with God. And people often talk about a personal relationship with God. I think for many people,  though, there isn't a whole lot of that. It isn't that you just sort of do anything like perceive God–maybe under some relatively rare circumstances–but during much of one's life, it seems to me, you sort of coast on a kind of momentum. You've got this strong inclination to believe in God, which is much stronger on some occasions than it is on others for many people, including myself. But there are these dry periods that many Christian saints have talked about. Periods when the heavens are as brass and when it seems God isn't present. And this shows up in the Psalms, "God, why are you so far from me?" and the like. It seems to me there's a kind of persistence that a believer in God needs, a kind of living on past capital, so to speak.

The experience of reading the Bible is for me crucial. I mean, reading the Bible–maybe not every part, but many parts–is a powerful impetus to belief in God, to renew belief in God, and the like. And also going to church and listening to sermons. Sometimes sermons work in the wrong direction…but I think such things as regular Bible reading, regular prayer, regular church attendance, regular talking if you can with other Christians and the like. J. Walls & T. Dougherty, eds. Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford 2018), 458-59.

The Effect of Naturalism on the Church

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZiZBWI-cpaU