I’ve been reading some choice things that an atheist as to say about Rhology:
http://specterofreason.blogspot.com/2008/11/losing-patience-with-scum.html
“The problem is, your scumminess prevents you from understanding what a moral position actually looks like. I’ve been trying to explain this to you, but your mind has been so infiltrated by scum that you can’t see beyond the scum. You are trapped in a mental web of scum. It’s sad, because I think there is an intelligent and well-meaning person underneath all those layers of scum. But maybe I’m wrong, and you’re just scum to the bone.”
Notice the finality of his condemnation. But I thought he also told Rhology that morality is a “process of negotiation” (see below). Did he work with Rhology to establish this charge? Did he enter into negotiations with Rhology over his alleged scumminess? Shouldn’t the charge of scumminess be open to further negotiation?
Looks like Jason Streitfeld being very “dictatorial” and “fascistic.” Issuing a unilateral condemnation. That’s very scummy of him, is it not?
“Now, this view is so patently stupid and absurd, it’s hard to decide where to begin. Let’s begin by comparing your scumminess to that of the Nazis. You see, as I mentioned, they had a book, too.”
While we’re on the subject, let’s begin by comparing Streitfeld’s scumminess to that of the other atheists. You see, they had a book, too. Mao’s Little Red Book.
“And they thought it told the truth.”
Ditto: Maoist atheists.
“They killed millions of people because of the ideas written in that book.”
Ditto: Maoist atheists.
Other scummy atheistic titles also come to mind, such as the Marquis de Sade’s Les 120 journées de Sodome, ou l'École du libertinage.
“Now, on what grounds do you embrace your Bible, and not Mein Kampf?”
Now, on what grounds does Streitfeld embrace the Humanist Manifesto, and not Mein Kampf?
And on what grounds does Streitfeld condemn Mein Kampf? Surely he’s not trying to “end all negotiations” on the morality of Mein Kampf?
“Why should anyone take one book as a guide to moral absolutes, and not another book?”
Maybe because one book is right while another is wrong.
“The fact is, scum, your allegiance to the Bible is wholly arbitrary. It’s no better than the Nazis’ allegiance to Mein Kampf.”
Only if you disregard all of the evidence for Scripture.
“You blindly assert that, if atheism is true, then morality is impossible.”
Rhology probably got that idea from reading scummy atheists like Richard Dawkins:
For the first half of geological time our ancestors were bacteria. Most creatures still are bacteria, and each one of our trillions of cells is a colony of bacteria.
What are all of us but self-reproducing robots? We have been put together by our genes and what we do is roam the world looking for a way to sustain ourselves and ultimately produce another robot a child.
We are survival machines—robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes.
This is one of the hardest lessons for humans to learn. We cannot admit that things might be neither good nor evil, neither cruel nor kind, but simply callous - indifferent to all suffering, lacking all purpose.
The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind pitiless indifference.
http://www.simonyi.ox.ac.uk/dawkins/WorldOfDawkins-archive/Catalano/quotes.shtml
If it's true that it causes people to feel despair, that's tough. It's still the truth. The universe doesn't owe us condolence or consolation; it doesn't owe us a nice warm feeling inside. If it's true, it's true, and you'd better live with it.
http://www.beliefnet.com/News/Science-Religion/2005/11/The-Problem-With-God-Interview-With-Richard-Dawkins.aspx
Sounds like we’re all a bunch of evolutionary scumbags. Returning to my fellow scum:
“You see, morality is a process whereby justifications are established. It is an ongoing process, and it requires discourse.”
Like the way a philandering husband (or wife) justifies his adultery, you mean? Speaking of which, here's one example of negotiated morality:
http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/19981220/REVIEWS08/401010313/1023
“It is based on the very need for people to establish common notions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’.”
Like Nazi Germany.
“Morality is thus based in human need, and it is the product of biology and civilization.”
What if I need to murder someone?
“You seem to think that, without a book to tell us exactly what is right and wrong, we would all be lost. We wouldn’t be able to do anything. We would, in short, be ignorant and confused savages.”
Like Jason Streitfeld.
“And yet, we have reason.”
So did the Unabomber. Indeed, serial killers are very clever. That’s why it takes so long to catch them.
“We can work together to establish social systems based on our ability to reason and negotiate values together. That is what morality is. It is a process of negotiation.”
Reminds me of a scene in The Godfather:
VITO CORLEONE
Don Barzini, I want to thank you for helping me organize this meeting here today. And also the other heads of the Five Families—New York and New Jersey. Carmine Corleone from the Bronx and ah…Brooklyn—Philip Tattaglia. An' from Staten Island, we have with us Victor Strachi. And all the other associates that came as far as from California, and Kansas City, and all the other territories of the country—thank you.
How did things ever get so far? I don't know. It was so—unfortunate—so unnecessary.
Tattaglia lost a son—and I lost a son. We're quits. And if Tattaglia agrees, then I'm willing to—let things go on the way they were before...
BARZINI
We're all grateful to Don Corleone for calling this meeting. We all know him as a man of his word—a modest man -- he'll always listen to reason...
TATTAGLIA
Yes, Don Barzini—he's too modest. He had all the judges and politicians in his pocket. He refused to share them...
VITO CORLEONE
When—when did I ever refuse an accommodation? All of you know me here—when did I ever refuse?—except one time. And why? Because I believe this drug business—is gonna destroy us in the years to come. I mean, it's not like gambling or liquor—even women—which is something that most people want nowadays, and is ah forbidden to them by the pezzonovante of the Church. Even the police departments that've helped us in the past with gambling and other things are gonna refuse to help us when in comes to narcotics. And I believed that then and I believe that now.
BARZINI
Times have changed. It's not like the Old Days when we can do anything we want. A refusal is not the act of a friend. If Don Corleone had all the judges, and the politicians in New York, then he must share them, or let us others use them. He must let us draw the water from the well. Certainly he can present a bill for such services; after all, we are not Communists.
ZALUCHI
I also don't believe in drugs. For years I paid my people extra so they wouldn't do that kind of business.
Somebody comes to them and says, "I have powders; if you put up three, four thousand dollar investment, we can make fifty thousand distributing." So they can't resist. I want to control it as a business, to keep it respectable. I don't want it near schools—I don't want it sold to children! That's an infamia. In my city, we would keep the traffic in the dark people—the colored. They're animals anyway, so let them lose their souls...
VITO CORLEONE
I hoped that we would come here and reason together. And as a reasonable man I'm willing to do whatever's necessary to find a peaceful solution to these problems...
BARZINI
Then we are agreed. The traffic in drugs will be permitted, but controlled, and Don Corleone will give up protection in the East, and there will be the peace.
TATTAGLIA
But I must have strict assurance from Corleone—as time goes by and his position becomes stronger, will he attempt any individual vendetta?
BARZINI
Look, we are all reasonable men here; we don't have to give assurances as if we were lawyers...
VITO CORLEONE
You talk about vengeance—is vengeance gonna bring your son back to you? Or my boy to me? I forgo the vengeance of my son. But I have selfish reasons. My youngest son was forced to leave this country, because of this Sollozzo business. All right—and I have to make arrangements to bring him back here safely, cleared of all these false charges. But I'm a superstitious man—and if some unlucky accident should befall him—if he should get shot in the head by a police officer, or if he should hang himself in his jail cell, or if he's struck by a bolt of lightning—then I'm going to blame some of the people in this room. And that, I do not forgive.
But—that aside—let me say that I swear on the souls of my grandchildren that I will not be the one to break the peace that we have made here today...
Continuing with Streitfeld:
“You wish to end all negotiations and condemn those who do not adopt the views written in your very old book. That is one way to approach the process whereby moral questions are negotiated—it is a dictatorial, fascist way to approach the process, because it denies the very possibility of negotiation. You are therefore unreasonable and potentially dangerous to the very possibility of morality.”
But I thought that Streitfeld just condemned Rhology as scum. He didn’t even open negotiations with Alan over the charge of scumminess—much less terminate them. That makes Streitfeld an unreasonable person, and potentially dangerous to the very possibility of morality, does it not?
“By claiming that morality cannot be negotiated, and that it can only be embraced as the word of ‘God,’ you are denying the very process whereby morality is established. You are against morality.”
I’m sure the philandering husband would appreciate Streitfeld’s definition of morality. Adultery can be negotiated. The husband of the wife he’s banging is “scum” for feeling that he’s the wronged party in this transaction.
“Why should anyone think that the writings in your very old book are of any more value than the ramblings of any idiot on the street?”
Yeah, old books like…Euclid. Geometry is so old hat. Newer is truer. Like the latest Paris fashion.
“I embrace morality, because I embrace that process whereby people work together to try to justify their decisions.”
Like Hitler and Himmler and Goebbels.
“It is not a perfect process, but it’s success is not predicated upon any supposed infallibility. It leaves room for error, but it works.”
Like the Third Reich.
“Now, please, give us all a single reason why we should abandon morality and embrace your Bible. Why should we value that book any more than we value Mein Kampf or other such insults to humanity and reason?”
Why not do some rudimentary reading in Christian apologetics?
Christ lovingly sacrificed Himself for Streitfeld.
ReplyDeleteIt's an offer Streitfeld has (so far) refused.
My unilateral condemnation?
ReplyDeleteThe finality of my condemnation?
Apparently you're not interested in understanding or faithfully representing what I've written.
I've explained what morality is, how it is objective, and how it can be approached rationally. I've explained why notions of "God" are meaningless, and why they cannot be used to justify any moral arguments.
I have not expressed any dogmatic allegiance to any texts, not even the Humanist Manifesto, contrary to your suggestion.
Now, if you'd like to actually engage my ideas, instead of pretending like you have the moral high ground here, let me know.
In any case, thanks for drawing attention to my blog. Hopefully some of your readers will find some of my arguments of value.
By the way, you are totally misreading the point about "selfish" genes. The point is that human altruism can be explained as the product of natural selection, as the result of genes that are not interested in our own well-being, but which just go about replicating themselves as much as possible. That does not mean that human beings are all scumbags.
The point is that human altruism can be explained as the product of natural selection, as the result of genes that are not interested in our own well-being, but which just go about replicating themselves as much as possible.
ReplyDeleteActually it can't be explained by natural selection, for atheism is committed to:
1. Physicalism. Physicalism can't account for abstractions.
2. Not all human beings are altruistic. Indeed, if altruism can be explained by natural selection, then why aren't all human beings altruists? How long, exactly does it take to weed out the scumbags, or is scumbaggery just the emergence of a recessive trait?
I have not expressed any dogmatic allegiance to any texts, not even the Humanist Manifesto, contrary to your suggestion.
1. First, Steve did not suggest you profess dogmatic allegiance to any particular text. Rather, if you read carefully, he's merely pointing out that you've embraced The Humanist Manifesto in taking the position you take - but it could be any other representative text as well. On the one hand, you're quick to condemn allegiance to the Bible, yet on the other, you may as well accept any other book, for, according to your own argumentation, if you'd bother to follow your own argument, one book isn't any better or worse than another - yet you condemn certain ideas expressed in some and yet not others - upon what basis? Where's the epistemic warrant? Indeed, he was quite happy to point out that you have no nonarbitary epistemic warrant for your beliefs about morality.
2. In which case: Then all you're left with is what, exactly? You see, you're the one accusing Rho' of an arbitrary allegiance, yet if that's true, your position fares no better...but apparently you've exempted your own claims about Rho's position and, indeed, your own claims about morality from classification as "arbitary."
>“And yet, we have reason.”
ReplyDelete>So did the Unabomber. Indeed, serial killers are very clever. That’s why it takes so long to catch them.
The Unabomber had so much reason he wrote a book called the Unabomber Manifesto.
I suspect many atheists (or atheist types, let's say) thought it was cool.
You are very ill.
ReplyDeleteGene,
ReplyDeleteThanks for at least making some coherent arguments.
You say atheism cannot account for abstractions. Sure it can, and we can talk about abstractions without postulating any non-physical realm.
Take Microsoft Word, for example. The computer program exists in the physical world. And yet, the computer program is an abstraction, an algorithm or set of instructions which can be instantiated in a variety of mediums. This is what abstract thought is--sets of instructions or algorithms which are instantiated in brains and other mediums.
See? No problem.
Second, you say that, if altruism could be explained by natural selection, then all human beings would be altruistic.
That is like saying that if natural selection could account for dark skin, everybody should have dark skin. That's not the way it works. Of course, altruism is more complex than skin color, but that is irrelevant for my point.
As for the Humanist Manifesto, I haven't given it much thought. I imagine I'd probably find some faults with it, but maybe not.
The point is, what I value and respect--what I regard as morally right--is based on rational argument. That means I weigh reason and evidence and align myself with the prevailing rational argument.
Of course, the evidence can change, and so the prevailing rational argument might change. But that's how it works.
It's not arbitrary, because it responds to evidence and reason. And it is justifiable by definition, because all I am pledging allegiance to here is the ability to rationally justify our positions. All I am criticizing is the desire by some (including Rhology) to deny the need to justify their positions.
Today, we know a lot more about life and the world than people did when they wrote the Bible. That's why we need to be a little more open-minded when we explore moral questions. Claiming that the Bible expresses the final word on moral questions is not only ignorant--it's very dangerous.
Take the abstraction known as the laws of logic, then - if there are no brains to perceive and reason by use of them, do they still exist?
ReplyDelete"Claiming that the Bible expresses the final word on moral questions is not only ignorant--it's very dangerous."
ReplyDeleteExcept if it really IS the final word on moral questions...
Well, in that case, it's still dangerous...to Jason and others of his persuasion.
ReplyDelete"You say atheism cannot account for abstractions. Sure it can, and we can talk about abstractions without postulating any non-physical realm.
ReplyDeleteTake Microsoft Word, for example. The computer program exists in the physical world. And yet, the computer program is an abstraction, an algorithm or set of instructions which can be instantiated in a variety of mediums. This is what abstract thought is--sets of instructions or algorithms which are instantiated in brains and other mediums."
Granted that you can get abstraction from algorithms (isn't that assuming minds such as ours?), I do not think that you can account for why the laws of logic have a binding universality on all thinking beings.
For instance, human beings are limited in what they know, yet we have this thing called reason/logic. Logic seems to be universal, but we cannot test its universal claims, they seem to be self-evident. Just how did human beings "discover" the a priori/ universsal nature of thought?
Rhology asked, "Take the abstraction known as the laws of logic, then - if there are no brains to perceive and reason by use of them, do they still exist?"
ReplyDeleteIf there are no systems which instantiate the rules of inference, then the rules of inference do not exist.
When something exists that does instantiate the rules of logic, then the rules of logic exist.
I wouldn't assume that human brains are the only systems capable of instantiating the rules of logic, of course.
Before you respond to this, consider how mundane my point here actually is. What I am saying about logic can be said about anything at all. Like apples, for example.
If there are no entities which structurally correspond to what we call "apples," then there are no apples. It is conceivable that we could live in a universe in which all apples have ceased to be. Yet, apples could grow again.
Thus it is with logic, and even tomatoes.
Now, there is this question, "what if the Bible really is the final word on all moral questions?"
There are several reasons why any rational person should reject that possibility, reasons which do not require us to make any unwarranted assumptions about morality, humanity, or the world. I will list these reasons on my blog soon.
So before there were minds, it was not just possible but equally probable that a=non-a than a=a?
ReplyDeleteAnd at the same time? In the same way? And light traveled in curly-qs right after it didn't exist before?
And jell-o had no bones and the further they eight the much?
And how long into evolution did it take before these laws were instantiated? Up until 30,000 yrs ago? 100,000 yrs? How do you know?
How is it that evolution both occurred and didn't occur up until that time?
Or maybe the universe sprang into existence at that moment that a mind instantiated the laws of logic. Which would make evolution both difficult and perfectly easy at the same time.
And if you're going to refer to a blogpost, would you mind linking to it? Your blogger profile is unavailable. Of course, before minds existed, it would have been both unavailable and unavoidably obvious, but fortunately minds exist now.
Oh, that was Jason. In my screen, it said "Asia" and linked to an unavailable profile page. Never mind.
ReplyDeletegatesofsplendor,
ReplyDelete"Logic seems to be universal, but we cannot test its universal claims, they seem to be self-evident."
You're making the mistake of thinking that logic makes any claims at all about the universe. Logic doesn't make claims. Rather, logic is the formalization of the rules of inference. It formalizes the rules, but it doesn't make any claims about them.
"Just how did human beings "discover" the a priori/ universsal nature of thought?"
Well, I wouldn't say logic is the a priori, universal nature of thought. But maybe you're using the term "logic" in a way I'm not familiar with.
"I do not think that you can account for why the laws of logic have a binding universality on all thinking beings."
I don't think you're talking about logic here. What does it mean to have a "binding universality on all thinking beings?"
Again, it's all about the rules of inference. There are three separate questions here: why do brains instantiate the rules of inference? How do they do it? And, how did we figure out the rules?
As for the first question--why we use logic--I think the answer is evolutionary in nature. I don't have an ultimate understanding of how it happened that brains evolved to instantiate logic, but I see no reason to think that the answer to this question will forever remain outside of scientists' grasp.
As for the second question--how it works--again, I don't have an ultimate understanding, but I see no reason to think that neuroscientsts and cognitive scientists won't figure out all the details one day.
As for the third question, I wouldn't say we've figured out all of the rules of logic. The fact is, there are an infinite number of possible logical systems. We've developed a good many logics, but we haven't discovered all of them.
This is not to say that the others actually exist in some non-physical realm. Rather, it is to say that they exist only as possibilities.
Now, if anybody wants to do a better job of explaining these things by postulating some non-physical realm, go for it. However, so far I haven't seen anyone describe a non-physical realm in a way that made sense. So far, all talk about non-physical (or "supernatural") realms is incoherent, because there are no means provided which would allow us to tell the difference between one realm and the next, and there is no explanation for how these two supposedly different realms interact or relate to each other.
So, like I said, I don't have all the answers about how logic came about on planet earth, but I don't see any plausible or coherent alternatives on the table. And the fact remains that evolutionary theory has all of the evidence in its favor. So I'll stick with the evolutionary model until something better comes along.
gatesofsplendor,
ReplyDeleteI think I can do a better job of answering the third question, actually. I mean, the question about how we discovered logic in the first place.
First, we evolved the ability to use language. Then we were able to develop metalanguages--languages that allowed us to observe the defining characteristics of language itself.
Language is, of course, a tool. With the development of language came the development of abstract reasoning. And with the development of abstract reasoning came the ability to reason about reasoning. Thus it was that the first attempts at logic were made.
More advanced logics have explored many of the possibilities abstract reasoning affords, and I wouldn't assume that the full potential of reason will ever be exhausted.
Sorry. I accidentally posted as my wife because she was logged in on my computer. So I deleted the post and reposted it again as myself.
ReplyDeleteRhology,
ReplyDelete"So before there were minds, it was not just possible but equally probable that a=non-a than a=a?"
This question, and the rest that follow it, don't seem to make sense.
It's kind of like asking, "before there were apples, it was not just possible but equally probably that banana peel and lemonade?"
If you can rearrange those thoughts into a coherent point, please do so.
They don't make sense b/c I was just playing off of what you said.
ReplyDeleteYou seem not to understand the whole "take the other guy's thought to its logical conclusion" thing. It's quite a handicap.
Rhology,
ReplyDeleteI don't see anything incoherent about what I wrote. If you think disagree, try to forumate your words into a coherent point.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“If there are no systems which instantiate the rules of inference, then the rules of inference do not exist.__When something exists that does instantiate the rules of logic, then the rules of logic exist.”
i) Jason fails to grasp the concepts he verbally manipulates. A “rule” is normative, not descriptive. If the “rules of inference” merely describe the way in which “brains” (allegedly) draw inferences, then you lose the necessity of logic.
And that that point you can only longer distinguish a valid inference from an invalid inference since both inferences describe brain events (according to Jason’s reductionism).
One can’t speak of brain event x as valid and brain event y as invalid. Each description is an accurate description of a brain event.
ii) In addition, physical states lack intentionality. Physical states can be assigned a symbolic meaning, but, in and of themselves, they aren’t about anything other than themselves. They don’t refer.
iii) Jason also fails to grasp the concept of “instantiation.” “Instantiation” involves an exemplar/exemplum relation, in which the exemplum is a concrete instance of the abstract exemplar.
But, according to Jason’s materialism, there can be no unexemplified universals.
“Before you respond to this, consider how mundane my point here actually is. What I am saying about logic can be said about anything at all. Like apples, for example.”
No, it can’t be said about anything it all. This fails to distinguish between truths of reason and truths of fact. A contingent object like an apple can fail to exist. No big deal.
But if you say that a mathematical truth or logical truth can fail to exist, then you will quickly run into self-referential incoherence.
Let’s play along with Jason’s scenario. Before the evolution of brains to instantiate logical or mathematical concepts, was it true that there were no brains to instantiate logical or mathematical concepts? According to Jason’s evolutionary conceptualism, there could be no truths before there were sufficiently involved brains—since truth is a mental property (a true belief about something). Hence, there were no truths about the universe before there were sufficiently evolved brains. Hence, there was no universe before there were sufficiently involved brains, since there was no truth about the universe to be known (e.g. its existence) before there were sufficiently evolved brains to know it.
Truths about the universe are simply a projection of brains that can instantiate truths about the universe.
No brains>no truths>no universe.
For example, if mathematical truths are merely mental constructs, then the universe had no mathematical structure before our brains evolved to a sufficient degree.
“I don't have an ultimate understanding of how it happened that brains evolved to instantiate logic, but I see no reason to think that the answer to this question will forever remain outside of scientists' grasp.”
A leap of faith.
“As for the second question--how it works--again, I don't have an ultimate understanding, but I see no reason to think that neuroscientsts and cognitive scientists won't figure out all the details one day.”
Another leap of faith.
Jason is a secular fideist.
“The fact is, there are an infinite number of possible logical systems.”
From a materialistic standpoint, in what does infinity inhere? What’s “out there” that corresponds to infinity?
Likewise, in what does possibility inhere? What‘s “out there” that corresponds to possibility?
What’s merely possible isn’t actual. So what is Jason’s frame of reference?
“We've developed a good many logics, but we haven't discovered all of them.”
“Discovered” them? So they exist apart from our mental processing?
“This is not to say that the others actually exist in some non-physical realm. Rather, it is to say that they exist only as possibilities.”
And how do possibilities exist? Are they physical? But if they’re physical, they actually exist (according to Jason).
So do possibilities exist in an immaterial mode of subsistence?
“Now, if anybody wants to do a better job of explaining these things by postulating some non-physical realm, go for it.”
“Better job of explaining”? Jason hasn’t given us an explanation. He’s given us a series of IOUs. His childish faith in scientific discovery.
“However, so far I haven't seen anyone describe a non-physical realm in a way that made sense. So far, all talk about non-physical (or "supernatural") realms is incoherent, because there are no means provided which would allow us to tell the difference between one realm and the next, and there is no explanation for how these two supposedly different realms interact or relate to each other.”
I don’t know what reading he’s ever done in modal metaphysics or dualism.
“And the fact remains that evolutionary theory has all of the evidence in its favor.”
A tendentious claim if ever there were one.
“So I'll stick with the evolutionary model until something better comes along.”
Something better came along some time ago. Try divine creation.
“First, we evolved the ability to use language. Then we were able to develop metalanguages--languages that allowed us to observe the defining characteristics of language itself.__Language is, of course, a tool. With the development of language came the development of abstract reasoning.”
i) Of course, this is just an evolutionary bedtime story. Very imaginative. But there’s no evidence to back it up.
ii) In addition, language presupposes abstract universals, such as the ability to use one word to denote many concrete instances. So Jason has the cart before the horse.
Language is inherently abstract. It’s a symbolic mode of discourse. A code for thoughts and objects.
First off, I posted those reasons not to trust the the Bible is the final word on all moral questions:
ReplyDeletehttp://specterofreason.blogspot.com/2008/11/ten-reasons-why-rational-person-should.html
Steve, I'll respond to your post in a moment.
Steve,
ReplyDeleteI bet you’re able to convince a lot of people you really know what you’re talking about. Just don’t count me in that group yet.
You say rules are normative, not descriptive. I agree. That’s what the word “rule” means. I never said the rules of logic described anything. I specifically said they weren’t descriptive, in fact.
Yet, you go to explain why the rules of inference cannot be descriptive. Way to go. You’ve elaborated upon my point!
However, you lose you grasp of the situation when you say that “physical states lack intentionality. Physical states can be assigned a symbolic meaning, but, in and of themselves, they aren’t about anything other than themselves. They don’t refer.”
Says who? This isn’t so hard to understand, Steve.
Intentionality is the result of functional properties of physical systems. When a system can represent future states of itself and organize its own behavior around those representations, intentionality is manifest.
If you think there is some evidence for a non-physical realm here, let’s have it.
You say, “according to Jason’s materialism, there can be no unexemplified universals.”
Yeah. You know, Aristotle made a similar point when he noted that form cannot exist without matter. Form and matter are conceptually distinguishable, but one cannot have an extant form without matter. Why do you challenge this point?
Apparently, you think I’m inviting “self-referential incoherence.” I don’t buy it. In fact, your argument is quite clearly fallacious. Watch:
”Let’s play along with Jason’s scenario. Before the evolution of brains to instantiate logical or mathematical concepts, was it true that there were no brains to instantiate logical or mathematical concepts? According to Jason’s evolutionary conceptualism, there could be no truths before there were sufficiently involved brains—since truth is a mental property (a true belief about something). Hence, there were no truths about the universe before there were sufficiently evolved brains. Hence, there was no universe before there were sufficiently involved brains, since there was no truth about the universe to be known (e.g. its existence) before there were sufficiently evolved brains to know it.”
Notice how you substituted the word “truths” with the word “truth” in the last sentence? Notice how that undermines your argument?
There is a difference between truths (as in, justified true beliefs) and “truth about the universe” (e.g., its existence). This is obvious. Yet, you equivocate. That’s invalid reasoning, Steve. I expect you know this.
But still, you say: “No brains>no truths>no universe.”
That’s nonsense.
Next, you say, “if mathematical truths are merely mental constructs, then the universe had no mathematical structure before our brains evolved to a sufficient degree.”
We were talking about the rules of inference, Steve. Not mathematical truths. Those are different. Mathematical truths are about the formal properties of patterns in the universe. Those patterns are not dependent upon minds. The rules of inference, however, are dependent upon minds.
Next you confuse my position with one of faith. I wrote: “I don't have an ultimate understanding of how it happened that brains evolved to instantiate logic, but I see no reason to think that the answer to this question will forever remain outside of scientists' grasp.”
A leap of faith.”
No, Steve. That is not faith. It’s called having an open mind. You see, if you actually read my words (a difficult task sometimes, I admit), you will see that I said, “I see no reason to think that the answer will forever remain outside of scientists’ grasp.” In other words, I don’t see any reason to conclude that science cannot answer such questions. It does not mean that I have faith that science will one day do it.
The position I am arguing against, Steve, is the one that says science simply cannot account for these things. I am open to the possibility that scientists can and will, given enough time, answer these questions. Do I have faith that they will do it? Of course not. But I see no grounds for denying the very possibility.
”From a materialistic standpoint, in what does infinity inhere? What’s ‘out there’ that corresponds to infinity?”
Well, I should have said that there may be an infinite number of possible logical systems. I’m not sure if it has been proven that there is an infinite number of possible systems. But even if there is, all that means is that, for every set of logical systems we can create, there is always one more. It doesn’t mean that the infinite set of all logical systems actually exists somewhere, just waiting to come out and play.
”Likewise, in what does possibility inhere? What‘s ‘out there’ that corresponds to possibility?”
Well, we can look at possibility in two different ways. First, in terms of existential possibilities. In that case, the lack of restrictions on the behavior of a system determines the possibilities of that system. Second, we can talk about logical possibilities, in which case the possibilities inherent in a system are the different ways the systems parts can be arranged without negating the integrity of the system. Both sorts of possibilities are definable in terms of the physical characteristics of systems. There is no need to postulate some non-physical realm.
Steve says, “I don’t know what reading he’s ever done in modal metaphysics or dualism.”
Oh, so you think there actually has been a coherent description of a non-physical realm, in which the means of distinguishing the physical and non-physical has been coherently described, and which explains how both realms interact and relate to each other? Please, do tell.
I wrote, “So I'll stick with the evolutionary model until something better comes along.”
Steve says, “Something better came along some time ago. Try divine creation.”
Yeah, and your argument for this is . . . ?
Steve ends by saying, “language presupposes abstract universals, such as the ability to use one word to denote many concrete instances. So Jason has the cart before the horse.”
Actually, Steve, nothing I said puts the cart before the horse. I think you’re imagining things.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete"First off, I posted those reasons not to trust the the Bible is the final word on all moral questions."
You haven't given us 10 reasons to distrust the Bible. Rather, you've given us 10 assertions. I'm still waiting for your reasons.
>I bet you’re able to convince a lot of people you really know what you’re talking about. Just don’t count me in that group yet.
ReplyDeleteTranslation: Hey, whoa, come on...I was just kidding...
You're funny, Steve.
ReplyDeleteI listed ten reasons. You can call them "assertions," if you want, but all that does it express your disagreement and your skepticism towards their validity.
And yet, all of these points are quite plainly supported by reason and evidence.
As it is, I've added a few links to guide readers to further reading on some of the points.
If you'd like to explain why you disagree with my reasons for rejecting the Bible, go ahead.
Just try to stick to rational thought here. I.e., cut down on the nonsense and equivocation.
I'm not one of the big brains in the Christian blog world, but I'll try to tackle your ten points...
ReplyDelete>1. The Bible contains significant historical inaccuracies;
Like King Saul not recognizing David who he had entertained earlier? Yes, but you know, kings have a lot of things on their plate. Actually, that would be an inconsistency, wouldn't it? I would need specific examples for this one.
>2. The Bible is full of commandments that do not have any apparent or coherent justification;
Like love your enemy? Give me examples, I mean, come on. Maybe you are so ignorant on the subject you don't know about the difference between ceremonial, civic, and moral laws, maybe you don't know Israel was a theocracy with a unique mission in God's plan of redemption that no longer is in effect after the advent of the Messiah, etc., etc. (Theonomists, calm down). Examples are needed on this one too.
>3. Our understanding of life and cosmos has expanded and developed enormously since the time the Bible was written;
Yes, mistaking devolution for evolution is great progress. But, I'll concede, as a Christian I do regret the Bible said the Moon was made of cheese.
>4. The Bible is based around incoherent notions, such as “God” and other supernatural entities;
My inner mistress Vanity and my prison guard Worldly Pride consider this 'God' to be also quite an annoying and ever-present threat. My rebellious self-will also wants to kick his you know what.
>5. The Bible was written at a time when most of the moral dilemmas we confront were not even imaginable, because civilization has changed dramatically;
The old "Child abuse is not mentioned in the Ten Commandments"? Expanding the 5th commandment to a call to be civil to superiors, equals, and inferiors won't do it I suppose... Well, I think there's something in the New Testament about being good, or acting wisely, towards children and servants? How about love your enemies? Love your neighbor as yourself?
>6. The Bible is not self-consistent;
Understanding is seeing the parts in relation to the whole. Me-suspects thou hast not taken the time and effort to get the whole.
>7. The Bible does not present a coherent account of morality;
Maybe not from a Jason-centered point-of-view, but from a God-centered point-of-view it-certainly-does.
>8. The Bible advocates actions that conflict with the values of the majority of the world’s inhabitants;
You're correct there. That's not a bug, that's a feature...as they say...
>9. There is no evidence or reason supporting the assertion that the Bible is the final word on all moral questions;
Well...it could be the Homeric epics that is the final word on all moral questions. Let's put it to the test! I just did and my conclusion is: the difference of the moral authority of the Homeric epics (which I am fond of) to the Word of God is like that of a planet to the Sun. Like that of general revelation to special revelation. Like that of the creation to the Creator!
>10. In order to rationally conclude that the final word on all moral questions has been achieved, one would have to account for every possible moral question. The Bible does not do this.
Human nature and the ways of the world are not as infinite as you seem to be saying. There is nothing new under the sun. I know: "What if somebody breaks your iPhone?" Well, what if somebody breaks King Solomon's sun dial!
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“You say rules are normative, not descriptive. I agree. That’s what the word ‘rule’ means. I never said the rules of logic described anything. I specifically said they weren’t descriptive, in fact.”
Pity you can’t follow the implications of your own argument. When you say that brain states instantiate the rules of inference, and when you also say there can be no unexemplified rules of inference (since everything that exists is physical), then there’s no distinction between the descriptive and the normative—for a rule of inference is merely the instantiation of a brain state.
Put another way, if the rules of evidence are reducible to brain states (since they can’t otherwise exist), then the rules of inference don’t stand over and above their exemplary brain states; rather, they are generated by brain states. In that case, brain states don’t exemplify the rules of inference; rather, the rules of inference exemplify brain states. The rules of inference are simply are a bunch of concrete, particular brain states.
“Intentionality is the result of functional properties of physical systems. When a system can represent future states of itself and organize its own behavior around those representations, intentionality is manifest.”
i) You’re using teleological categories. But methodological naturalism banishes teleological explanation from nature. Try again.
ii) A physical system, in and of itself, cannot represent anything. A music score is representational because musicians have assigned a conventional meaning to the notation. It’s the intentionality of the musician, not the music score, that makes it referential.
“If you think there is some evidence for a non-physical realm here, let’s have it.”
I don’t have to reinvent the wheel. For an argument, read the first chapter of The Road to Reality by Roger Penrose.
I could give many other examples, but that’s a good place to start.
“Notice how you substituted the word ‘truths’ with the word ‘truth’ in the last sentence? Notice how that undermines your argument?__There is a difference between truths (as in, justified true beliefs) and ‘truth about the universe’ (e.g., its existence). This is obvious. Yet, you equivocate. That’s invalid reasoning, Steve. I expect you know this.”
Your semantic distinction does nothing to salvage your conundrum. Once again, let’s play along with your evolutionary conceptualism.
Is there a difference between a true belief and truth about something? No. For a truth about something involves an intentional attitude. A relation between the subject and the object.
Truth is not a property of inanimate objects like rocks. A rock isn’t true or false. Only a belief about a rock is true or false. That’s a mental property. And, according to you, mental properties are reducible to brain states.
No brain states>no mental properties>no true beliefs>no truths.
So let’s go back to your evolutionary conceptualism. Suppose the universe is 15 billions years old (give or take). Suppose that intelligent life emerged 100,000 years ago (give or take).
A billion years ago, was it the case that the universe was 14 billion years old? No, not according to your evolutionary conceptualism, for there were no cognitive subjects back then to conceptualize that truth.
Rather, 100,000 years ago it became true that the universe was 15 billion years old.
“That’s nonsense.”
It’s supposed to be nonsense. Your evolutionary conceptualism leads to cosmic idealism. And without minds, nothing exists—on that scenario.
“We were talking about the rules of inference, Steve. Not mathematical truths.”
No, we’re talking abstract objects. Logical truths and mathematical truths are abstract objects.
“Those are different.”
Different subsets of abstract objects.
“Mathematical truths are about the formal properties of patterns in the universe.”
What physical properties of the universe correspond to transfinite numbers?
“Those patterns are not dependent upon minds. The rules of inference, however, are dependent upon minds.”
Really?
i) If I have 3 apples, and I eat 1 of them, how many apples do I have left?
Is that a mathematical question, or a logical question? Both.
ii) In addition, “3” is a relation. You don’t actually see “3” apples. All you see are discrete particulars. You see an apple, and another apple, and another apple.
The relation of threeness is supplied by the mind. The apples themselves don’t group themselves into “3”. We mentally group them into “3”.
Now, there has to be something about the apples corresponding to that mental judgment, but the same is true in the application of logic to a concrete situation: the application of abstract mathematical truths to the concrete structures they instantiate as well as the application of logical truths to the concrete structures they instantiate.
“In other words, I don’t see any reason to conclude that science cannot answer such questions. It does not mean that I have faith that science will one day do it.”
That’s exactly what it means. You can’t see the future. So you can’t predict what science will or will not discover. Hence, you’re acting in faith. You implicitly trust that science has the answer—not now, but in the indefinable future. It’s touching, really—like a teddy bear.
“The position I am arguing against, Steve, is the one that says science simply cannot account for these things.”
You don’t grasp the issue at hand. Science can discover things that fall within its domain. Abstract objects belong to a different category altogether.
“But even if there is, all that means is that, for every set of logical systems we can create, there is always one more. It doesn’t mean that the infinite set of all logical systems actually exists somewhere, just waiting to come out and play.”
But logic involves a logical entailment between one relatum and another. You can’t have the relation unless both relata obtain.
It’s an act of discovery, not creation.
If we created the laws of logic, then logic would be contingent rather than necessary.
“Well, we can look at possibility in two different ways. First, in terms of existential possibilities. In that case, the lack of restrictions on the behavior of a system determines the possibilities of that system.”
Possible in relation to what? The real world? But the real world is what is—not what might be, but won’t be.
Of what are possibilities true? Not the actual world. But for you, the physical world is all there is. The actual is the physical, and vice versa.
“Second, we can talk about logical possibilities, in which case the possibilities inherent in a system are the different ways the systems parts can be arranged without negating the integrity of the system. Both sorts of possibilities are definable in terms of the physical characteristics of systems.”
Same problem. Try again.
“There is no need to postulate some non-physical realm.”
Unrealized possibilities lack physicality, right? So what are they? Where are they? What are the empirical properties of bare possibilities?
They don’t correspond to this world since they represent an alternative outcome. So what’s your point of reference?
If they’re not about this world, then what world are they about? What world do they refer to? A nonphysical world?
“Oh, so you think there actually has been a coherent description of a non-physical realm, in which the means of distinguishing the physical and non-physical has been coherently described, and which explains how both realms interact and relate to each other? Please, do tell.”
i) For starters, experience distinguishes between physical and nonphysical properties. Take mental properties. In our experience, mental properties lack the quantifiable features of physical properties, viz. area, density, displacement, length, location, mass, volume, &c.
ii) And we enjoy direct access our mental properties, whereas our experience of physical properties is indirect and mediated the mental properties. Hence, there’s no presumption for materialism, and materialism can never overcome the primacy of the mind in human experience.
iii) You’re also assuming, without benefit of argument, that two substances must be alike to interact. That, in turn, involves a particular theory of causation:
http://maverickphilosopher.powerblogs.com/posts/1130548714.shtml
“Yeah, and your argument for this is . . . ?”
Consult the literature on theistic modal metaphysics (e.g. Brian Davis, Brian Leftow, Alexander Pruss, Greg Welty).
“Actually, Steve, nothing I said puts the cart before the horse. I think you’re imagining things.”
In other words, you have no counterargument. What a surprise.
i) Let’s spell it out for you. Language is representational. That already involves an element of abstract reason: symbolism. The symbolic relation between word and object.
ii) It also involves an ability to group various objects according to natural kinds, then use the same word for many members of a natural kind. That’s another exercise in abstract reasoning.
So, yes, buddy, you have the cart before the horse. You can’t use language without a capacity for abstract reason.
Jason Streitfeld said...
ReplyDelete“You can call them ‘assertions,’ if you want, but all that does it express your disagreement.”
Naturally I disagree since you’ve given me no *reason* to agree with you.
“ and your skepticism towards their validity.”
Assertions have no validity. Only an argument can have validity.
“And yet, all of these points are quite plainly supported by reason and evidence.”
Then where’s the supporting evidence? Where’s the supporting argumentation?
“If you'd like to explain why you disagree with my reasons for rejecting the Bible, go ahead.”
Nice attempt to shift the burden of proof. You need to argue for your position, not merely assert it as “plainly supported by reason and evidence.”
I’ll try to be quick and brief with this response.
ReplyDeleteSteve, it still looks to me like you don’t know what you’re talking about.
Here’s just one example of the absurdity that you think passes for argument:
“A billion years ago, was it the case that the universe was 14 billion years old? No, not according to your evolutionary conceptualism, for there were no cognitive subjects back then to conceptualize that truth.”
You think that something only exists if it exists in somebody’s mind? That’s certainly not my view. If you think that reality cannot exist without minds, then of course you’re going to make ridiculous statements like that. But why think that reality is dependent upon minds?
It doesn't follow from anything I've said.
There is a difference between the conceptualization of reality and reality itself. Yet, you use words like "truth" equivocally, failing to distinguish between beliefs about reality and reality itself. That is the absurdity, Steve, and it doesn't follow from my arguments.
Your entire, lengthy post is full of such nonsensical arguments, and you largely deflect the requirement that you produce an argument of your own. Instead, you mostly just refer to other people’s work.
I'm not as ignorant on this subject as you would like to believe, Steve. You need to make an argument here. Pointing me to your favorite authors is not going to get the job done.
You ask, “What physical properties of the universe correspond to transfinite numbers?”
I never said every mathematical object corresponds to some physical property of the universe. I said mathematical truths are about the formal properties of patterns in the universe.
I said, “In other words, I don’t see any reason to conclude that science cannot answer such questions. It does not mean that I have faith that science will one day do it.”
You replied, in utter stupidity: “That’s exactly what it means. You can’t see the future. So you can’t predict what science will or will not discover. Hence, you’re acting in faith. You implicitly trust that science has the answer—not now, but in the indefinable future.”
No, Steve. If you can’t read English, then we may as well end this discussion now.
I am not predicting what science will or will not discover, and nothing I have said suggests otherwise.
If all you can do is produce nonsense, deflection, and persistent misrepresentations of my own views, I’m will have to conclude that there is no sense in engaging you in discussion anymore.
More nonsense: “If we created the laws of logic, then logic would be contingent rather than necessary.”
The existence of logic is contingent upon the existence of systems which can instantiate it. Just like the existence of apple seeds are contingent upon the existence of systems which can produce them.
The necessity of logic is one aspect of its functionality, the way the redness of an apple is one aspect of the apple’s organizational properties. So, logic as an extant entity is contingent; but the rules of logic produce logical necessity, as an aspect of logical systems.
You confuse categories, and so confuse the discussion.
At one point, you do actually try to approach an argument for your position. You say that we can, using experience, distinguish between the physical and mental realms. You say, “For starters, experience distinguishes between physical and nonphysical properties. Take mental properties. In our experience, mental properties lack the quantifiable features of physical properties, viz. area, density, displacement, length, location, mass, volume, &c.”
What is a “mental property,” Steve?
You say it is that which lacks the quantifiable features of physical properties. Ok. So, what features do mental properties have, if they are not quantifiable?
Merely stating that mental properties lack quantifiable features doesn’t make it true.
So, again, how does experience allow us to distinguish between mental and physical properties?
This is how dualists always play their corrupt hand: define their mysterious distinction by negating everything that can be rationally discussed. All you are offering is a negation here, Steve. There's no substance to your claims.
”And we enjoy direct access our mental properties, whereas our experience of physical properties is indirect and mediated the mental properties.”
What does it mean to “access our mental properties?”
Again, you are assuming a mental/physical distinction here without explaining what it means. Such dualistic approaches to the mind are notoriously flawed and a waste of valuable resources (e.g., minds).
“Hence, there’s no presumption for materialism, and materialism can never overcome the primacy of the mind in human experience.”
Presumption for materialism? Dude, materialism is the only well-defined option on the table.
”You’re also assuming, without benefit of argument, that two substances must be alike to interact.”
No, you can’t help but misrepresent my views, can you?
Where did I say two substances must be alike to interact?
Let’s rap this up, shall we? I know I’m skipping over your elaborate and nonsensical arguments about intentionality and whatnot, but really, does anybody think you’ve made any cogent points here?
I’ll just end by pointing out how you, again, fail to understand the English language.
You said, “So, yes, buddy, you have the cart before the horse. You can’t use language without a capacity for abstract reason.”
Again, buddy, you are imagining things. I have not, at any time, claimed that one can use language without a capacity for abstract reason.
I said, "with the development of language came the development of abstract reasoning." The implication was that the two go hand-in-hand. Get it, now?
The Puritan,
ReplyDelete“I'm not one of the big brains in the Christian blog world, but . . .”
Humility! That is very much appreciated. It’s surprising how little of that I’m finding on this Christian discussion forum.
>1. The Bible contains significant historical inaccuracies;
“Like King Saul not recognizing David who he had entertained earlier? Yes, but . . .”
And like the entire history of mankind. That one’s a bit more significant, in my view. How’s that for an example?
>2. The Bible is full of commandments that do not have any apparent or coherent justification;
You asked for examples of this. Obviously, as you know, the Bible is full of commandments, so I don’t need to provide you with examples of those. My point here, of course, is not about the commandments, but about their lack of justification. Now, you want me to give you examples of this lack of justification?
Why don’t I also give you examples of all of the passages where the Bible doesn’t mention the phrase “albino jellyfish in Spain?”
Please, tell me where any of the Bible’s commandments are coherently justified. (By the way, saying that they are justified in the name of God is not going to cut it. See point 4 below for more on this point.)
>3. Our understanding of life and cosmos has expanded and developed enormously since the time the Bible was written;
”Yes, mistaking devolution for evolution is great progress. But, I'll concede, as a Christian I do regret the Bible said the Moon was made of cheese.”
Since you condeded the point, I could just let this slide. However, you do seem to suggest that no valuable scientific achievements have been made since the time the Bible was written. I wonder, then, how much you value the Internet, the telephone, and what not? I mean, if you think all these advances have actually taken us away from moral perfection, why don’t you stop using them?
>4. The Bible is based around incoherent notions, such as “God” and other supernatural entities;
Okay, here’s the most important point on the table. I written about this at length on my blog, and I’ve even engaged in Rhology over the issue. He says he’s going to respond to my latest argument on the subject, but who knows when that’ll happen.
For my argument, see this post: http://specterofreason.blogspot.com/2008/11/weak-vs-strong-atheism.html
>5. The Bible was written at a time when most of the moral dilemmas we confront were not even imaginable, because civilization has changed dramatically;
“The old ‘Child abuse is not mentioned in the Ten Commandments’? Expanding the 5th commandment to a call to be civil to superiors, equals, and inferiors won't do it I suppose... Well, I think there's something in the New Testament about being good, or acting wisely, towards children and servants?”
Oh, yes. “Be good.” That is, of course, the final word on morality. How could I have missed that?!
“How about love your enemies? Love your neighbor as yourself?”
Those don’t seem just a little general to you? It requires interpretation to apply these principles to life, and not everyone agrees on how to do that. How does the Bible resolve unforeseen disagreements?
>6. The Bible is not self-consistent;
“Understanding is seeing the parts in relation to the whole. Me-suspects thou hast not taken the time and effort to get the whole.”
If the parts don’t add up to a consistent or coherent whole, then the whole thing is problematic. And that’s putting it mildly, I’d say.
>7. The Bible does not present a coherent account of morality;
”Maybe not from a Jason-centered point-of-view, but from a God-centered point-of-view it-certainly-does.”
See point 4.
>8. The Bible advocates actions that conflict with the values of the majority of the world’s inhabitants;
”You're correct there. That's not a bug, that's a feature...as they say...”
The fact that most people disagree with you is something to celebrate, then? How is that?
>9. There is no evidence or reason supporting the assertion that the Bible is the final word on all moral questions;
Your response to this assumes that the Bible is the Word of God. First, the term “God” here is incoherent (see point 4). Second, there is no reason or evidence supporting the claim that the Bible is anything other than a book written by human beings with fallible minds and limited imaginations.
>10. In order to rationally conclude that the final word on all moral questions has been achieved, one would have to account for every possible moral question. The Bible does not do this.
“Human nature and the ways of the world are not as infinite as you seem to be saying.”
Not infinite, necessarily; just not yet exhausted.
“There is nothing new under the sun.”
Right. Except for the internet. And nuclear weapons. And . . .
One more question, The Puritan and others:
ReplyDeleteWhere in the Bible does it say that the Bible, as a single, complete work, is the final word on all moral questions?
I am sure many here have spent a lot more time than I have spent reading the Bible, so maybe you all can point to that part, since I apparently missed it.
One more question, while I'm at it:
Where in the New Testament does it explicitly say which of the Old Testament's commandments are no longer applicable, and which should still be followed today?
How does one choose which commandments in the Old Testament to follow, since many of them aren't even referenced in the New Testament?
Does the New Testament somewhere just make a blanket statement: "Ignore the Old Testament's commandments?"
I must have missed that part, as well.
Jason S. said:
ReplyDelete---
I never said every mathematical object corresponds to some physical property of the universe. I said mathematical truths are about the formal properties of patterns in the universe.
---
I think it would help, Jason, if you paused for a second and asked yourself a simple question. Why? Why are there "formal properties of patterns in the universe"?
In other words, let's play your game for a bit. Let's say that there are these patterns. Why do the patterns exist as they do?
Note carefully the chain you have to build here. You are justifying logic by pointing to these patterns. Thus, you have patterns -> logic.
But why is it that these patterns behave "logically"? Is there a meta-pattern that keeps patterns in line? If not, why do they behave as they do? If so, is there a meta-meta-pattern? Etc.
Now you haven't convinced me that you're able to follow where arguments lead, so I'll show why it's important that you ponder this. At some point, everyone must stop. That is, it's not "turtles all the way down" because at some point you have to escape the redux. (This is because logic itself does not allow for infinite redux, and logic cannot very well be substantiated by that which is its negation.)
At whatever point you stop your redux, you have to deal with the nature of reality at that point. So we can skip through all that and simply ask:
What must be fundamentally true in order for logic to be justified?
As Steve's pointed out several times, you cannot have contingent logic that transcends that it is contingent upon. Thus, you cannot have logic that is contingent upon human minds before human minds existed.
You try to escape that by pointed to patterns of the universe, but does this mean that there is no logic before those patterns were formed (even if there was no mind to grasp the patterns)? If that is so, why did the patterns form in a way that would be grasped in the form of logic? Was it ad hoc, a mistake, a fluke? Or was there something more fundamental at work?
You can try to keep it surface level and pretend your materialism can account for all this, but at best all you can do with materialism is cut your own throat. At best, all you can say is, "The patterns are the way they are because they just happened to be the way they are." In which case, there is no impulse or imperative to follow the logic derrived from those patterns, in which case it is no great loss to be irrational. Why would it be problematic to violate THOSE rules of logic? And if our arguments violate them, as you claim, so what? It's not like they're meaningful rules of logic.
If you don't hold to objective logic, why do you care whether we are reasonable or rational people? It's not like that's a real standard or anything.
(For the record, I do hold to objective logic, which is why I do care that you're being irrational in your argument. But this is an internal critique of your position.)
I listed ten reasons. You can call them "assertions," if you want, but all that does it express your disagreement and your skepticism towards their validity.
ReplyDeleteAhem, but the documentation of your claims includes links to Wikipedia and Infidels.org.
The Wiki includes references to the Skeptics Annotated Bible.
The Infidels.org links doesn't interact with the contrary position.
Ergo:
a. You're begging the question.
b. You're not dealing with actual OT/NT scholarship.
c. You're using namby pamby sources for namby pamby assertions that have long ago been answered.
It's rare to see that much incompetence wrapped up in a single post - so, why don't you actually flesh out your assertions into actual reasons. Let's see how you fare then.
Where in the Bible does it say that the Bible, as a single, complete work, is the final word on all moral questions?
a. The OT licenses a panel of Levitical judges to to that very thing. Their job, as was that of the prophets, who frequently corrected the judges as the nation fell further into apostasy, was to interpret and apply the Law to moral questions.
b. The NT teaches the sufficiency of Scripture for doctrine, reproof, correction, et.al., and it provides for an eldership to teach the people.
So, in point of fact, the Bible does make the very claim you deny it makes. Try again.
Where in the New Testament does it explicitly say which of the Old Testament's commandments are no longer applicable, and which should still be followed today?
a. Of course, we have examples of that very sort of thing. Jesus repealed the food laws.
b. You're talking to a bunch of Calvinists. You might want to try understanding the Reformed view of the Law and its uses before asking such a basic question. Try to at least make an effort.
How does one choose which commandments in the Old Testament to follow, since many of them aren't even referenced in the New Testament?
Okay, I'll play...what do you have in mind? Something like "don't wear clothes made from two fibers?" Hmmm, let's see. That's a commandment that serves as a concrete application of the commandments against idolatry. It targets sympathetic magic. Since the NT condemns idolatry and sorcery, we would follow this commandment if we lived in a culture where wearing such clothing was an expression of such a belief.
It's apparent you can't tell the difference between an application of a commandment and a commandment.
That's what you get for using sources like Wiki, the SAB, and Infidels.org.
"Where in the Bible does it say that the Bible, as a single, complete work, is the final word on all moral questions?"
ReplyDelete"All moral questions?" This is vague. Are you sugesting that we think the Bible discusses this "moral question:" "What should I do about my neighbor's dog's incessant barking?" That's a "moral question" and the Bible nowhere addresses that question. Are you suggesting that the Bible has "the final word" on that question? Perhaps it does, perhaps not. Maybe you need to explain what you mean by "final word" and "all moral questions."
"Where in the New Testament does it explicitly say which of the Old Testament's commandments are no longer applicable, and which should still be followed today?"
"Explcitly" ...? "Which"...? Nowhere. And?
"How does one choose which commandments in the Old Testament to follow, since many of them aren't even referenced in the New Testament?
"To follow" for salvation? All of them, and then he trusts in Christ's law-keeping in his place.
"To follow" in the family? The church? The civil sphere? Privately? Follow for what?
Again, your questions show your foggy mind.
How about this: we don't follow those laws that expired with that Old Testament body politic, as our Confession says. This stuff's been around for hundreds of years, Jason.
"Does the New Testament somewhere just make a blanket statement: "Ignore the Old Testament's commandments?"
No. And?
Uh-oh, someone is now forced to defend all the presuppositional baggage and question begging epithets his questions were peppered with.
JASON WRITES:
ReplyDelete"Humility! That is very much appreciated. It’s surprising how little of that I’m finding on this Christian discussion forum."
I have an astonishing level of humility. I always have. Quite a bit more than my contemporaries. I don't think my humility needs to take a back seat to anyone else in other eras as well. It's always been a quality I've excelled at. Your noticing of it doesn't surprise me, and probably won't surprise anyone who knows me.
JASON WRITES:
"...the entire history of mankind [is an historical inaccuracy in the Bible]. That one’s a bit more significant, in my view. How’s that for an example?"
Well, the early chapters of H. G. Wells' immaculate and authoritative Short History of the World don't track well with Holy Writ, but the two come into line pretty well at some point, don't you think? Here and there? A little bit?
I actually think, though, that innocence, a fall, regeneration, and glorification tracks pretty well with what I observe in this world and in human nature, as well as in the folk and collective memory of the world that we find in things like mythology and what not. But then again I discern and believe in things like evil.
JASON WRITES:
"Since you condeded the point [that the Bible says the moon is made of cheese, which, after checking some good sources, I was apparently wrong about -the Puritan], I could just let this slide. However, you do seem to suggest that no valuable scientific achievements have been made since the time the Bible was written. I wonder, then, how much you value the Internet, the telephone, and what not? I mean, if you think all these advances have actually taken us away from moral perfection, why don’t you stop using them?"
Your transition after the 'However,' left me numb. I'm trying to recollect how many universities and hospitals and what not were founded by Christians...hm, none, methinks. Absolutely zero. Of course I have to get to my reference books, but for now I'll concede your point that I as a Christian hate science and technology and engineering and discovery and invention and fixing things and adapting things and so on.
JASON WRITES:
"Oh, yes. “Be good.” That is, of course, the final word on morality. How could I have missed that?!"
Your conscience knows.
JASON WRITES:
"'How about love your enemies? Love your neighbor as yourself?'
Those don’t seem just a little general to you? It requires interpretation to apply these principles to life, and not everyone agrees on how to do that. How does the Bible resolve unforeseen disagreements?"
Those commandments require suffering. They require receiving a knife to your vanity, worldly pride, and rebellious self-will without calling 911. They don't have to be particular, as long as you are mortifying your pride and vanity and Old Man self-will. Gratitude in place of resentment. Even when it's 'unfair.' Forgive my debts as I forgive my debtors.
JASON WRITES:
"If the parts [of the Bible] don’t add up to a consistent or coherent whole, then the whole thing is problematic. And that’s putting it mildly, I’d say."
Classical Covenant - Federal - Theology. Give it a look. The great arc of the history of redemption from one pole of eternity to the other in as there in the Word of God as the massive coherence and wisdom and circularity is there in
Finnegans Wake, and maybe even to a greater extent. Maybe. But you really do have to make the effort to read the actual Bible too. Complete. No skimming allowed.
JASON WRITES:
"Your response to this assumes that the Bible is the Word of God. First, the term “God” here is incoherent (see point 4). Second, there is no reason or evidence supporting the claim that the Bible is anything other than a book written by human beings with fallible minds and limited imaginations."
You do have to develop some degree of discernment for literary influences, Jason. If you are at a level where you think a comic book and the Iliad are pretty much at the same level then you're not yet going to be able to discern the level of influence that is the Old and New Testaments. The Independent Fundamentalist Baptists say it all the time from their pulpits: you can't be a dope and be a follower of Christ.
JASON WRITES:
"'There is nothing new under the sun.' Right. Except for the internet. And nuclear weapons."
I think King Solomon knew someone would come up with a better sun dial in his day after he made that statement, but communications and weaponry, needless to say, are nothing new. Neither is anything in human nature, Jason, which includes your human nature...
Atheists lack the great essential of religion and true Christianity... "They are not broken in heart, and emptied of their own righteousness, so as to loathe themselves. Such 'lost ones Christ came to seek and save.' [Luke 19:10]" - William Guthrie
ReplyDeleteI see you all are going to try to keep me busy for a while . . .
ReplyDeleteI only have time to respond to Peter Pike at the moment.
First of all, in your post, Peter, you confuse logic (which refers to a system for representing and implementing the rules of inference) with formal patterns of the physical universe. You refer to both using the same term ("logic") and it confuses your argument a little bit.
You wrote:
"At best, all you can say is, "The patterns are the way they are because they just happened to be the way they are." In which case, there is no impulse or imperative to follow the logic derrived from those patterns, in which case it is no great loss to be irrational."
No, Peter.
The patterns--the regularities within the universe--are as they are for whatever reasons. Yes, they just happened to be that way, for all I know. But that does not mean there is no impulse or imperative to use logic (the rules of inference), to use reason and evidence.
On the contrary, the fact that the universe exhibits regularities is exactly why we need to use logic, reason and evidence. If we abandoned all logic, we would abandon our ability to understand the world.
The imperative and impulse to understand the world is born with us, because our survival (as coded by our DNA) depends on it.
In short, I must use logic, reason, and evidence, because I cannot work towards my own interests, or anyone else's interests, without them.
In a previous comment Jason responded to me thusly:
ReplyDelete["Logic seems to be universal, but we cannot test its universal claims, they seem to be self-evident."
You're making the mistake of thinking that logic makes any claims at all about the universe. Logic doesn't make claims. Rather, logic is the formalization of the rules of inference. It formalizes the rules, but it doesn't make any claims about them.]
Allow me to maybe reframe, or rephrase what I was trying to say. Everyone will have to forgive me, since I am a biblical studies major, and not a logician.
I have always had the impression that the truths of logic like: If a=b, and b=c, then a=c; a cannot be -a; etc were true in all corners of the universe, and in all possible worlds.
I have also had the impression that mathematical truths hold in all possible worlds. For instance 1+1=2 here and in the farthest galaxy. However, on Jason's view how do we know this? If truth is come to by empirical means how do we account for our knowledge of the stubbrn necessity of mathematics and logic. We cannot ever have enough examples of the law of non-contradiction to "prove it" empirically. We just seem to know this, but this seems to make a universal statement about reality that our limited senses should not be able to make. I hope this clears up my question a little more.
Blake Reas
or: How does our mind in its finite form, grasp truths that seem to be always true, if we are creatures who learned the fundamentals of logic from trial and error. How could we ever know that they are always true?
ReplyDeleteJason S. said:
ReplyDelete---
First of all, in your post, Peter, you confuse logic (which refers to a system for representing and implementing the rules of inference) with formal patterns of the physical universe.
---
Actually, you did. I was answering you on your own grounds. I don't believe logic is founded by patterns in the universe; that's your concept, not mine.
See, here's what's going on here. You make a sweeping claim. Steve asks you for specifics. You provide a weak specific, which I point out is flawed. You then claim that I have the problem because of your flawed specific.
Not a very good way to progress in discussing these things.
Jason S. said:
---
The patterns--the regularities within the universe--are as they are for whatever reasons. Yes, they just happened to be that way, for all I know. But that does not mean there is no impulse or imperative to use logic (the rules of inference), to use reason and evidence.
On the contrary, the fact that the universe exhibits regularities is exactly why we need to use logic, reason and evidence. If we abandoned all logic, we would abandon our ability to understand the world.
---
In other words, what you are saying is:
1) The universe just happened to be the way it is for no reason whatsoever.
2) That's why we can understand the world.
Is anyone else puzzled by this?
You claim there are regularities in the universe. But absent something requiring them to be the way they are, you have no assurance they will continue to be the way they are now. For all the atheists talk about how if God can change reality on a whim, you're left in the same boat. You don't know why the universe behaves the way it does, yet you assert it will always continue to do so. And then you criticize theists as being naive and irrational. At best you're a pot mocking a kettle. At worst, you're flat out wrong.
Jason S. said:
---
The imperative and impulse to understand the world is born with us, because our survival (as coded by our DNA) depends on it.
---
No it doesn't. In point of fact, this flies in the face of many of the new atheists who say that the only reason religion has stuck around is because religious belief is itself a survivability advantage. You can believe in all kinds of falsehoods that keep you alive; the fact that you survive doesn't make what you believe true. Darwinism cannot select for truth.
Jason S. said:
---
In short, I must use logic, reason, and evidence, because I cannot work towards my own interests, or anyone else's interests, without them.
---
Sure you can. If I want to take your property, I could just say that a little green alien popped up and said I could kill you and take it. That works perfectly well for my interests. If I want to protect all property to include your interests too, I could just say an alien told me to do that instead....
Or, like YOU believe, this irrational concept of God makes us do that instead.
So you obviously aren't paying attention to your own side in this debate, since you already believe you don't need logic and reasoning to accomplish these things...unless, of course, it is logical and reasonable to believe in God, in which case you still would.
Do you have a consistent answer to my first questions then?
BTW,
ReplyDeleteJason also needs to account for the fact that the human mind is very adept at finding patterns that aren't actually there.
You know, like seeing faces in clouds, the Virgin Mary in wallpaper stains, and logic in atheistic worldviews.
In which case, you have pattern-recognition that leads to logic based on false patterns that do not actually exist in the universe.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“Steve, it still looks to me like you don’t know what you’re talking about.”
What a coincidence! And here I was thinking the very same thing about you!
“You think that something only exists if it exists in somebody’s mind?”
First of all, I didn’t state my own position. I merely responded to you on your own terms. You seem to have difficulty with that concept.
“If you think that reality cannot exist without minds, then of course you’re going to make ridiculous statements like that. But why think that reality is dependent upon minds?”
You’re not even attempting to interact with the actual argument. I guess it went right over your head.
If you say the universe existed at a certain point, then that’s an existential proposition. So is the proposition true or false?
If there are no truths in the absence of brains, and if we go back in time to a point where there were no brains, then—at that time—it can’t be true that the universe existed. There are no brains to conceptualize that truth. No truth-bearers.
“It doesn't follow from anything I've said.”
Except that it does.
“There is a difference between the conceptualization of reality and reality itself.”
If brain activity is constitutive of truth, then you can’t draw that distinction. For you’re making truth-claims about reality. No brains, no truths about reality.
“Yet, you use words like ‘truth’ equivocally, failing to distinguish between beliefs about reality and reality itself. That is the absurdity.”
What beliefs about reality? True beliefs or false beliefs? According to you, if there are no brains, then there are no beliefs. Hence, there are no true or false beliefs. Hence it isn’t true that the universe is real prior to the evolution of brains with higher cortical functions. Truth is mind-dependent.
You yourself are making a claim about the world. That’s involves intentionality. No brain, no “aboutness.”
“Your entire, lengthy post is full of such nonsensical arguments, and you largely deflect the requirement that you produce an argument of your own. Instead, you mostly just refer to other people’s work.”
And what’s wrong with that, exactly?
Do you have your own argument for the solution to Fermat’s Last Theorem?
“I'm not as ignorant on this subject as you would like to believe, Steve.”
You do a wonderful impersonation. Hard to tell the difference.
“You need to make an argument here. Pointing me to your favorite authors is not going to get the job done.”
To the contrary, when I cite someone like Roger Penrose, I’m citing someone who isn’t even a Christian. It’s a standard move to cite people in support of our position who are not predisposed to agree with us.
You act as if materialism were self-evident. I have a perfect right to draw attention to standard literature to the contrary. There is no presumption in favor of your position.
“I never said every mathematical object corresponds to some physical property of the universe.”
Naturally, since that would require a level of logical consistency of which you’re incapable.
You’re a materialist. So, for you, whatever is, is physical. Therefore, an infinite set must be a physical entity. Hence, there must be some physical structure in the universe that corresponds, point-by-point, to an infinite set.
“I said mathematical truths are about the formal properties of patterns in the universe.”
Mere “patterns” won’t do it. A pattern might be a finite exemplification of an infinite set. But that assumes an actual infinite over and above its finite exemplification.
So it’s insufficient for your purposes to point to a merely partial approximation of an infinite set. You must point to an actual infinite set in nature. A given totality.
“No, Steve. If you can’t read English, then we may as well end this discussion now.”
Jason is desperately looking for the nearest exit sign because he’s losing the argument. He wants to escape with as much of his tattered reputation still intact as possible. His intellectual reputation may be in shreds, but shreds are better than stark nudity.
“I am not predicting what science will or will not discover, and nothing I have said suggests otherwise.”
Of course you did:
“I don't have an ultimate understanding of how it happened that brains evolved to instantiate logic, but I see no reason to think that the answer to this question will forever remain outside of scientists' grasp…again, I don't have an ultimate understanding, but I see no reason to think that neuroscientsts and cognitive scientists won't figure out all the details one day.”
You’re like a five-year-old boy who thinks that daddy is omniscient and omnipotent. Just give him enough time, and there’s nothing on earth that daddy can’t do.
“If all you can do is produce nonsense, deflection, and persistent misrepresentations of my own views, I’m will have to conclude that there is no sense in engaging you in discussion anymore.”
If I were losing the argument as badly as you are, I’d be in a hurry to leave the table, too.
“The existence of logic is contingent upon the existence of systems which can instantiate it. Just like the existence of apple seeds are contingent upon the existence of systems which can produce them.”
You say “just like,” as if truths of reason are analogous to truths of fact. That begs the issue.
If the existence of logic is contingent on human brains, then before there were human brains, there was no logic. And, by the same token, there was no truth.
“The necessity of logic is one aspect of its functionality, the way the redness of an apple is one aspect of the apple’s organizational properties. So, logic as an extant entity is contingent; but the rules of logic produce logical necessity, as an aspect of logical systems.”
Wrong. If the rules of evidence (=logic) are generated by the brain, whether human brains or alien brains somewhere else in the physical universe, then logic is contingent rather than necessary; for, on that account, logic is simply a description of neural activity. A description is not a norm.
And, on that account, you can’t distinguish valid from invalid inferences, since both inferences were merely descriptive of brain states. Both of them accurately describe a brain state.
“You confuse categories, and so confuse the discussion.”
You can’t think more than an inch deep.
“What is a ‘mental property,’ Steve?”
Things like propositional attitudes and representational states.
“You say it is that which lacks the quantifiable features of physical properties.”
Which, of course, I never said. What I said, rather, is that moral properties aren’t empirically quantifiable.
You can’t tell how good or evil an event is by observing it. You can even tell by merely observing an event whether it’s good or evil, much less by what “amount.”
“Merely stating that mental properties lack quantifiable features doesn’t make it true.”
Merely tilting at windmills doesn’t make your denial true.
“This is how dualists always play their corrupt hand: define their mysterious distinction by negating everything that can be rationally discussed. All you are offering is a negation here, Steve. There's no substance to your claims.”
What corrupt dualists have you read? Names and titles.
“What does it mean to ‘access our mental properties’?”
To know our own mental states.
“Again, you are assuming a mental/physical distinction here without explaining what it means. Such dualistic approaches to the mind are notoriously flawed and a waste of valuable resources (e.g., minds).”
You’re appealing to materialism without offering a noncircular definition of what makes something physical.
“Dude, materialism is the only well-defined option on the table.”
Dude, you assert what you need to prove.
“No, you can’t help but misrepresent my views, can you?”
You can’t think through your own position, can you?
“Where did I say two substances must be alike to interact?”
This is what you originally said:
““Oh, so you think there actually has been a coherent description of a non-physical realm, in which the means of distinguishing the physical and non-physical has been coherently described, and which explains how both realms interact and relate to each other? Please, do tell.”
That’s the stock objection to dualism: how can unlike substances (physical/nonphysical) interact.
“Let’s rap this up, shall we? I know I’m skipping over your elaborate and nonsensical arguments about intentionality and whatnot, but really, does anybody think you’ve made any cogent points here?”
You merely assert they’re nonsensical because you can’t make a good argument for your assertion.
“I’ll just end by pointing out how you, again, fail to understand the English language.”
I’ll just end by pointing out how you, again, fail to understand your own position.
“Again, buddy, you are imagining things. I have not, at any time, claimed that one can use language without a capacity for abstract reason. I said, ‘with the development of language came the development of abstract reasoning.’ The implication was that the two go hand-in-hand. Get it, now?”
That’s not an implication of your statement. The implication of your statement is that the development of abstract reasoning came as a result of the development of language.
gatesofsplendor,
ReplyDelete"I have also had the impression that mathematical truths hold in all possible worlds. For instance 1+1=2 here and in the farthest galaxy. However, on Jason's view how do we know this?"
"1+1=2" is true in all possible worlds, because we define it to be true. The truth of "1+1=2" is not dependent upon any state of the universe other than our own ability to formalize a language for dealing with formal patterns.
In other words, the truth of "1+1=2" is defined from within the language itself. It does not rely on any external measures to gauge it's validity. Thus, it doesn't matter what possible world you are in.
Peter Pike,
ReplyDelete"Jason also needs to account for the fact that the human mind is very adept at finding patterns that aren't actually there."
When did I ever say that pattern recognition was infallibe?
Peter Pike,
ReplyDeleteI wrote, "On the contrary, the fact that the universe exhibits regularities is exactly why we need to use logic, reason and evidence. If we abandoned all logic, we would abandon our ability to understand the world."
You replied,
"In other words, what you are saying is:
1) The universe just happened to be the way it is for no reason whatsoever.
2) That's why we can understand the world."
No, you left out the important part.
The point is, the universe does exhibit regularities, and this is why we are able to make accurate predictions and develop scientific theories.
Logic, evidence, and reason allow us to act on the universe's regularities to our advantage.
It's not such a bizarre concept, I don't think.
Peter Pike,
ReplyDeleteI wrote, "The imperative and impulse to understand the world is born with us, because our survival (as coded by our DNA) depends on it."
You say, "No it doesn't. In point of fact, this flies in the face of many of the new atheists who say that the only reason religion has stuck around is because religious belief is itself a survivability advantage."
I'm aware that some atheists have regarded that as a possibility. I don't reject it as a possibility, either. But this has nothing to do with my point.
I did not say that evolution has guaranteed that we will only use our brains to do anything in particular.
So, your claim here is beside the point: "You can believe in all kinds of falsehoods that keep you alive; the fact that you survive doesn't make what you believe true."
I never said it did. And yet, if all of our beliefs were false, we certainly wouldn't survive. If my beliefs about how to get food, maintain my health, and so on, were all false, then I would surely not survive long enough to reproduce.
While evolution hasn't guaranteed that we won't be misled about many things, it has guaranteed that we are able to maintain a functional understanding of the world.
In this way, natural selection can select for truth.
Peter Pike,
ReplyDelete"I don't believe logic is founded by patterns in the universe; that's your concept, not mine."
Um, no. That's not my concept. I never said logic is founded by patterns in the universe. I said logic is the formalization of the rules of inference.
So maybe neither of us knows what you were talking about, then.
Peter Pike,
ReplyDelete"If I want to take your property, I could just say that a little green alien popped up and said I could kill you and take it. That works perfectly well for my interests."
Yeah, you could just say that, but who would respect your justification?
Why should anyone respect your justification?
See, such an absurd action would not be in your best interests, because you wouldn't get away with what you were trying to get away with.
GeneMBridges,
ReplyDeleteI asked, "How does one choose which commandments in the Old Testament to follow, since many of them aren't even referenced in the New Testament?"
You answered, "Okay, I'll play...what do you have in mind?"
How about this one:
"Leviticus 20:10 (American Standard Version) --
And the man that committeth adultery with another man's wife, even he that committeth adultery with his neighbor's wife, the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death."
Paul Manata,
ReplyDeleteQuoting me, you said, "'All moral questions?' This is vague."
Actually, I rather think the word "all" is very specific. It leaves nothing out.
You asked, "Are you sugesting that we think the Bible discusses this "moral question:" "What should I do about my neighbor's dog's incessant barking?" That's a "moral question" and the Bible nowhere addresses that question."
I see. So, when confronted with such moral questions, where do you turn?
"Are you suggesting that the Bible has "the final word" on that question? Perhaps it does, perhaps not."
No, I'm not suggesting the Bible has the final word on any questions. But some here are suggesting it does. You seem open to the possibility, even though you just claimed that your very example of a moral question is not addressed by the Bible. So how can the Bible have the answer to that question?
"Maybe you need to explain what you mean by 'final word' and 'all moral questions.'"
By "final word" I mean that, when looking for answers, one does not look beyond the Bible. That there is no authority beyond that which is taken from the Bible.
By "all moral questions," I mean every meaningful question about what is right and wrong.
Does that clarify things for you?
Everybody, look closely here for a moment.
ReplyDeleteIn an exchange with Steve, I wrote, “I have not, at any time, claimed that one can use language without a capacity for abstract reason. I said, ‘with the development of language came the development of abstract reasoning.’ The implication was that the two go hand-in-hand.”
To make my point clear, I will break it down. Please, everyone, pay attention here.
1. I do not claim that one can use language without a capacity for abstract reason.
2. I did claim that the development of abstract reasoning came with the development of language.
3. Statement 2 implies that one’s capacity for abstract reasoning goes hand-in-hand with one’s ability to use language. (For, if it didn’t, I would have had to postulate some third thing to explain why the development of abstract reason would come along with the development of language. But I never implied that any third thing was necessary.)
That’s pretty clear, right?
Now, let’s look at Steve’s response.
”That’s not an implication of your statement. The implication of your statement is that the development of abstract reasoning came as a result of the development of language.”
So, Steve denies point 3 above. He says that I did not, in fact, imply that one’s capacity for abstract reasoning goes hand-in-hand with the development of language.
Notice that Steve’s initial objection was that the first point is false. Steve wants you all to believe that I have, in fact, claimed that one can use language without the capacity for abstract reasoning. Of course, as I have repeatedly said, this is just a mistake. Steve has misrepresented my views.
Everybody,
ReplyDeleteIf I may have your attention for another moment, consider what Steve wrote here:
"First of all, I didn’t state my own position. I merely responded to you on your own terms. You seem to have difficulty with that concept."
Steve's latest tactic is to deny that he has actually stated any position here. And yet, the facts speak for themselves. These assertions are all taken from just a few of his posts:
“physical states lack intentionality.”
“Something better came along some time ago. Try divine creation.”
I wrote, “If you think there is some evidence for a non-physical realm here, let’s have it.”
Steve responded, “I don’t have to reinvent the wheel. For an argument, read the first chapter of The Road to Reality by Roger Penrose.”
“Science can discover things that fall within its domain. Abstract objects belong to a different category altogether.”
“experience distinguishes between physical and nonphysical properties. Take mental properties. In our experience, mental properties lack the quantifiable features of physical properties, viz. area, density, displacement, length, location, mass, volume, &c.”
“we enjoy direct access our mental properties, whereas our experience of physical properties is indirect and mediated the mental properties.”
Need I find more evidence of Steve's tendency to actually state his position on the issues here?
Jason said:
ReplyDelete---
In other words, the truth of "1+1=2" is defined from within the language itself. It does not rely on any external measures to gauge it's validity.
---
In which case it's irrelevant to any concept of external reality. You cannot have your cake and eat it too, Jason.
Example: we could change 1 + 1 = 2 to "Zorpus and Zorpus is Groluf" and say that's defined true within the language itself. But it has no coherence to external reality at all. It's meaningless, even if it's true by definition.
Jason said:
---
When did I ever say that pattern recognition was infallibe?
---
You used it as your basis for upholding your concepts of mathematics, which was your basis for understanding logic. Of course you haven't claimed they were infallible. And that's why I've made the counter-claim that your concepts of violations of logic are worthless.
If I violate your concept of logic, I couldn't care less. Your concept of logic is stupid. You don't even believe in your stated concept of logic.
Jason said:
---
The point is, the universe does exhibit regularities, and this is why we are able to make accurate predictions and develop scientific theories.
---
No, the point is that the universe exhibits regularities FOR NO REASON WHATSOEVER. You're on the horns of a dilemma. If the universe has a reason to behave the way it does, then that reason is the ultimate establishment of logic. But you cannot allow for anything more than the universe, so you have to assert that the universe just does this. Why? Because it does. That's all you've got. The universe acts this way for no reason at all. It just does it.
And if something just happens with no reason whatsoever, then you'd have to be a complete idiot to trust in that to form your concepts of logic. The universe isn't logical; it just happens to at this point behave in a way that approximates logic. But there's no logical reason why it should continue to be that way, because it's not that way due to a logical reason.
This is not that difficult of a concept to grasp, unless you do not want to grasp it.
Jason said:
---
While evolution hasn't guaranteed that we won't be misled about many things, it has guaranteed that we are able to maintain a functional understanding of the world.
In this way, natural selection can select for truth.
---
Even if we grant that, at best you're left with trivial truths. You're left with "truths" that snails understand. You can't go from that to anything like reasoned thinking. Survivability does not increase because you understand why circular reasoning is invalid, for example.
And you're still left at odds with many of the new atheists. Just saying "I don't disagree with them per se because I'm too spineless to admit my thinking is flawed" doesn't cut it. (I may have added a bit of interpreting between the lines there.)
Jason said:
---
Yeah, you could just say that, but who would respect your justification?
---
Why do I need to concern myself with who respects my justification? If I assumed the alien hypothesis, then the only person who could possibly be concerned with it is you, but the alien has given me permission to kill you, so at that point I no longer care about your feeble objections.
In any case, you fare no better with your naturalistic claims. (It would help if you read the quote Steve provided from Ruse, for example.)
Everyone,
ReplyDeleteI need your attention one more time.
We need to look at Steve’s capacity for equivocation.
Steve asks, “If you say the universe existed at a certain point, then that’s an existential proposition. So is the proposition true or false?”
If we are talking about an observable point, then it is true, of course.
Steve continues, “If there are no truths in the absence of brains, and if we go back in time to a point where there were no brains, then—at that time—it can’t be true that the universe existed.”
At that time, it can’t be true that any propositions about the universe existed. So, there were no true propositions. It doesn’t follow that the universe didn’t exist.
Can everyone see the equivocation in Steve’s argument?
No?
Okay, I’ll spell it out for you.
I say: Propositions are dependent upon systems, such as human brains, to instantiate them.
Steve says: If there are no such systems, then there are no truths.
Of course, we can talk about “truths” as a way of referring to “true propositions.” If we do that, then Steve’s point and my point are the same.
But Steve also wants to use the word “truths” to talk about things which propositions are said to be about. That is, he uses the term “truths” to talk about true statements about the universe as well as the universe itself. But, if you substitute “the universe” for “truths” in Steve’s statement, then it clearly does not equate to my own position.
Only by equivocating like this can Steve claim that my view is as he says it is.
In my view, we need systems capable of instantiating propositions for propositions to exist. This does not mean that we need such systems in order for the universe to exist.
I’m sure you all can appreciate the point here. Well, most of you probably can, at least.
Steve says that I "act as if materialism were self-evident."
ReplyDeleteNo, I act like it's the only well-defined position on the table.
Steve says he has "a perfect right to draw attention to standard literature to the contrary."
"Standard literature?" Like Penrose's musings about consciousness is established doctrine?
Right.
Yes, Steve has the right to draw attention to whatever he wants. But that is no replacement for an argument.
Jason,
ReplyDeleteYou wrote:
"Quoting me, you said, "'All moral questions?' This is vague."
Actually, I rather think the word "all" is very specific. It leaves nothing out."
Actually, Jason, the word 'all' is not "very specific." You probably would know this if you weren't a freshman philosophy student trying to show off his chops.
There is such a thing, which all philosophers of language recognize, as restricted quantification. Philosopher of language William Lycan, speaking on restricted quantification, writes that, "What logicians call the domains over which quantifiers range need not be universal, but are often particular cases roughly presupposed in context" (Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction, Routledge, p.24, emphasis mine).
So, try again.
"I see. So, when confronted with such moral questions, where do you turn?
You don't answer a question with a question. You said "final word on all." Apparently you meant 'all' to function universally. So, apparently you think Christians believe that the Bible (specifically?) offers a "final word" on "specific moral questions" one might ask in the 21st century.
So, what did you mean? If you meant is literally and universally, then you've exposed your rather massive ignorance of Christian ethics.
So, try again.
"No, I'm not suggesting the Bible has the final word on any questions. But some here are suggesting it does."
Really? We haven't even figured out what you mean by your statement yet.
"You seem open to the possibility, even though you just claimed that your very example of a moral question is not addressed by the Bible."
My point was that I can't give you a specific answer because your questions are fraught with vagueness and ambiguity. Surely such an erudite thinker as yourself knows the value of being clear, cogent, not to mention, profound(!), right? So, I may give an affirmative answer, all that depends on what you mean. Based on certain interpretations of your question, then, no, the Bible doesn't give the final word on all moral questions. But on those readings, not one person here would claim the Bible offers the final word on said questions. So, you need to be clear.
Try again.
"So how can the Bible have the answer to that question?"
I don't know, what do you mean?
Try again.
"By "final word" I mean that, when looking for answers, one does not look beyond the Bible. That there is no authority beyond that which is taken from the Bible."
This is a gross caricature. I know of no respectable Christian ethicist who would claim that that they do the above, or that there is "no authority" that's not "taken from the Bible" (though that last phrase is vague as well). Do your freshman philosophy teachers teach you that it is intellectually virtuous to slander the position of your opponent? So if this is what you meant, then Christians don't think the Bible is "the final word." For starters, to give proper answers to many moral questions we will need to attend to the situation we're living in. For example, take the Moral Question:
[MQ] If we drain the swamp, then the rare bedazzled flower will be wiped out. Therefore we should not drain the swamp, should we?
To come to a "final word" on this question, for example, one thing (out of many) we will want to know is, if, in fact, the bedazzled flower will be wiped out of the swamp gets drained. To answer that we would need to "go beyond the Bible" to come to a "final word" on this question. Unless, perhaps, you have been under the opinion all this time that the Bible talks about 21st century swamps and flowers native the 21st century world I just constructed?
Is it getting through that freshman hack work isn't going to fly here?
Try again.
Just time for one more . . .
ReplyDeletePeter Pike,
"we could change 1 + 1 = 2 to "Zorpus and Zorpus is Groluf" and say that's defined true within the language itself. But it has no coherence to external reality at all. It's meaningless, even if it's true by definition."
Who says it's meaningless?
"1+1=2" has functional value irrespective of whatever possible world we live in.
"You used it as your basis for upholding your concepts of mathematics, which was your basis for understanding logic."
No, I didn't.
"if something just happens with no reason whatsoever, then you'd have to be a complete idiot to trust in that to form your concepts of logic."
Peter, that doesn't make sense. If something happens consistently and repeatedly, in a predictable manner, and there is nothing else to go on, then you have no choice but to build your understanding on its foundation.
"The universe isn't logical; it just happens to at this point behave in a way that approximates logic."
What is the word "logic" supposed to mean there, Peter?
"But there's no logical reason why it should continue to be that way, because it's not that way due to a logical reason."
As I said, I don't presume to know why everything about the universe is the way it is. And I don't presume to know how the universe will look in a billion years. I'm not claiming omniscience here. This does not in any way nullify my arguments, despite your assertion to the contrary.
Your view, apparently, is that if we simply assume that everything is the way it is for a reason, then we don't need to worry about whether or not we are wrong.
Why should we make that assumption?
Leviticus 20:10 (American Standard Version) --
ReplyDeleteAnd the man that committeth adultery with another man's wife, even he that committeth adultery with his neighbor's wife, the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death."
Wow, this is just too easy.
1. In the Law, most capital crimes could be commuted by way of repentance.
2. The wider OT, that very thing happens. David and Bathsheba come to mind.
So, it's the unrepentant adulterer who is put to death.
This penalty is also civil in nature, a civil penalty, for the OT Law functioned in both civil and moral terms. So, the commandment is "Thou shalt not commit adultery." The civil penalty was stoning, and that under certain conditions.
Hmmm, and what do we find in the NT:
In the NT, marriage is defined in monogamous terms, even by Jesus. Adultery is condemned.
The commandment is the same.
In the NT, unrepentant adultery is grounds for excommunication from the Church, and that's the NT equivalent of "stoning."
So, in terms of the moral law, there is no change, none whatsoever. In terms of civil penalty, the only difference is that there is no civil penalty called "stoning" qua stoning, since the church is not indexed to the power of the state.
Further, in the OT, adultery directly attacked the structure of the nation itself, for it was predicated on the family. So, stoning rises to the level of a capital offense, because it threatens to cut off an entire line in the future. That's implicitly a means to exclude an entire family from the covenant by cutting off the line of inheritance.
Under the New Covenant, the Covenant Community is the Church. In Hebrews, Israel is taught to be a foreshadowing of the church, the elect, the universal, invisible church, not the visible, institutional church. So there is no need to literally stone adulterers, since the existence and structure of the church is not dependent on a literal family structure. Election (inheritance) in the universal church does not depend on a line of inheritance, per Romans 9. Rather it is individual, by God by direct adoption by Him. Further, the death penalty itself is fulfilled in Christ.
Like I said, namby pamby questions a teenager in Sunday School could answer with a little thought...but that's what you get for reading the Skeptics Annotated Bible and not picking up a standard commentary or a book like The Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses by Vern Poythress, yet you, Jason, sit behind your keyboard and level accusations about the Bible while admitting you've not really read or studied it well. Tell you what, do your homework.
"I never said it did. And yet, if all of our beliefs were false, we certainly wouldn't survive. If my beliefs about how to get food, maintain my health, and so on, were all false, then I would surely not survive long enough to reproduce."
ReplyDeleteOne could form the belief that one wants to starve to death and in order to acheive that he must stuff his mouth with nutrient removing material - i.e., burgers, fries, and shakes, and such. This way you would "get food" *and* your belief wuld be false.
Also, we're getting ahead of ourselve's. Aren't your supposing that the *content* of your belief enters into the causal nexus. Given physicalism, how so?
That is, how do you escape epiphenominalism?
Paul Manata,
ReplyDelete"There is such a thing, which all philosophers of language recognize, as restricted quantification. Philosopher of language William Lycan, speaking on restricted quantification, writes that, 'What logicians call the domains over which quantifiers range need not be universal, but are often particular cases roughly presupposed in context.'"
Yes, "need not be." And, yes, of course, we must go by context. The context for my claim was clearly established. It was never an issue until you found it necessary to engage in such tedium.
"apparently you think Christians believe that the Bible (specifically?) offers a 'final word' on 'specific moral questions' one might ask in the 21st century."
That is the impression I've been given by comments made by participants in this discussion. For example, responding to my point, The Puritan wrote, "There is nothing new under the sun."
And Peter Pike wrote, "Except if it really IS the final word on moral questions..." (Or course, Peter did not actually type the word "all," but I think my interpretation was reasonable. If Peter would like to clarify that he did not mean that the Bible might be the final word on all moral questions, I would appreciate him doing so.)
More importantly, my arguments here must be understood in the context in which they arose, which was my discussion with Rhology. And Rhology's comments have been rather clear on this point. For example, in one of his own blog posts, he wrote, "Jason may not like the alternative of following the morality of TGOTB, but we do know that what he has presented here is no alternative at all."
In Rhology's view, there is no alternative to TGOTB, and he sees no possible justification for any morality other than what he calls "the morality of the Bible."
So, Paul, you can continue to engage in such tedium, ignoring the context in which my arguments arose and pretending like I've slandered those who disagree with me; or, you can substantively engage me in ideas. Either way, your assertions about my "freshman philosophy student" status are feeble, evidence only of your desperation to cover my arguments in mud and thereby avoid the necessity of dealing with them head on. I'm sure you are capable of better than that.
Paul Manata,
ReplyDelete"One could form the belief that one wants to starve to death and in order to acheive that he must stuff his mouth with nutrient removing material - i.e., burgers, fries, and shakes, and such. This way you would "get food" *and* your belief wuld be false."
Can you transform this absurd scenario into a coherent argument?
"Aren't your supposing that the *content* of your belief enters into the causal nexus. Given physicalism, how so?"
What kind of "content" do you have in mind?
The idea of mental "contents" is one of the most poorly defined concepts in the philosophy of mind. Perhaps the only concept in the philosophy of mind that is more confused is the notion of consciousness itself.
I'm not saying we can't talk about the content of our beliefs, or that we can't talk about consciousness. All I'm saying is, you need to be clear about how you're using these terms.
In my view, there is no evidence or reason supporting a discussion of mental contents (or consciousness in general) in terms that defy the very possibility of a scientific explanation.
I've argued this point at length on my blog. Here's an example, so you can better see where I'm coming from: The Nature Of Evidence
GeneMBridges,
ReplyDeleteYour interpretation of adultery in the New and Old Testaments is pretty clear, I admit.
However, it is only an interpretation, and it is not clear that the New Testament obligates us to accept your interpretation.
You say I am just sitting at my keyboard, "admitting [I've} not really read or studied it well."
Um, no, that is not accurate. What I said was that I am sure a lot of people here have spent a lot more time reading the Bible than I have.
Of course, you are free to interpret my statements in the worst possible light, and jump to conclusions about my ignorance and incompetence. That seems to be what people here generally do when they are challenged by atheists. However, there is such a thing as the "principle of charity," which states that we should read each others arguments in the best light possible. So, when I say that people here have no doubt spent more time reading the Bible than I have, it does not mean that I have not studied it well enough to engage in discussion.
I would think that concepts like "charity" should be familiar to you folks.
Steve says I'm "appealing to materialism without offering a noncircular definition of what makes something physical."
ReplyDeleteI wonder if Steve can actually point to where I defined what it means for something to be "physical."
Steve? Can you rise to the challenge?
I suspect he cannot. And yet, he accuses me of providing a circular definition.
Here's my definition of what it means to call something "physical":
What is "physical" is that which has been discovered to exist.
That's it. No circularity.
Scientists use the term "physical" to refer to whatever they have discovered. Science is the formalization of discovery itself, so it follows that anything that can be formally discovered can be discovered scientifically.
Thus, it follows that anything that can be discovered can be called "physical."
Now, maybe Steve would like to explain what he means when he says that propositional attitudes (i.e., beliefs) and representational states are not physical.
How does Steve define "physical" and "non-physical?"
I'm sure you're all as anxious as I am to hear Steve's definitions of these terms.
I guess I should point you all to the blog post in which I explain what I mean when I say that "science is the formalization of discover."
ReplyDeleteHere it is: Understanding Science, Mathematics, and Philosophy
Steve asserts that, "it’s insufficient for [my] purposes to point to a merely partial approximation of an infinite set. [I] must point to an actual infinite set in nature. A given totality."
ReplyDeleteThis is strange. What does Steve think my purposes are, exactly?
Steve begins by assuming that an actual infinite set must exist in nature, and then demands that I point to one.
I do not assume that there are any actual infinite sets in nature, so it is not necessary for me to point to any such set.
Hey everybody,
ReplyDeleteWhen you have a moment, take a look at how Steve combines two of his most flattering attributes in a single swipe. In a single shot, he lies about my views and tries to degrade me personally. Ready?
I wrote, "I am not predicting what science will or will not discover, and nothing I have said suggests otherwise."
Steve rejects my claim, saying, "Of course you did."
Steve's evidence for this rejection? He quotes me again:
"I don't have an ultimate understanding of how it happened that brains evolved to instantiate logic, but I see no reason to think that the answer to this question will forever remain outside of scientists' grasp . . . again, I don't have an ultimate understanding, but I see no reason to think that neuroscientsts and cognitive scientists won't figure out all the details one day."
Let's break down what I wrote.
1. I do not have all the answers.
2. I see no reason to think that scientists won't figure out all the details about this matter.
In other words, I do not reject the possibility that scientists can figure out all the relevant details.
What I have explicitly stated here is a rejection of the view that science simply cannot discover all of the relevant details here.
Yet, Steve says, no, I have actually claimed that scientists will discover all of the relevant details.
My comments were clearly about theoretical possibilities, yet Steven continues to claim that I was making predictions about the future.
He follows up this bastardization of rational discourse by likening me to "a five-year-old boy who thinks that daddy is omniscient and omnipotent. Just give him enough time, and there’s nothing on earth that daddy can’t do."
Steve, you should be ashamed of this behavior. It is not simply rude; it is antagonistic to reason.
Steve says, "If I were losing the argument as badly as you are, I’d be in a hurry to leave the table, too."
ReplyDeleteHa. Yes, because he has so clearly proven himself the champion here. Yes, indeed.
Notice how Steve prepares you all for his big victory speech? See, he's expecting that I will tire of this debate, that I will soon realize that responding to all of your posts is just too time-consuming, and that it will never achieve anything. So, he is expecting that soon I will just disappear. And then he will use that as an excuse to claim victory.
See, if Jason stops posting here, it means he lost, right?
It's pathetic, Steve.
I'm not going anywhere yet. Of course, I don't expect to post here forever. Maybe not even for much longer. Who knows? I have a family, I have a job, and my interests are not so wrapped up in the outcome of our discussion here.
But for the time being, you are all offering me a new venue for me to explain my views, and I find some value in that.
If and when I do stop posting here, it will probably be a practical decision based on time constraints. Of course, as Steve has indicated, he will treat it as a chance to claim superiority to atheism in general, and me in particular.
That's just sad, in my opinion.
Steve says,
ReplyDelete"If the rules of evidence (=logic) are generated by the brain, whether human brains or alien brains somewhere else in the physical universe, then logic is contingent rather than necessary; for, on that account, logic is simply a description of neural activity. A description is not a norm."
First of all, whoever has defined "logic" as "the rules of evidence?"
Maybe Steve meant to write, "the rules of inference?" I have explicitly said that is how I use the term, and Steve hasn't challenged me on that point. So maybe he just meant to write "the rules of inference."
In any case, let's look at what's going on here, because, again, Steve equivocates.
Steve uses the term "logic" to refer to rules, which are, of course, normative. Then he uses the term "logic" to refer to the system which instantiates those rules.
We can talk about the rules, and we can talk about systems which instantiate the rules. So long as some system exists which instantiates the rules, then the rules exist. That does not mean, however, that when we talk about the rules, we are simply talking about one particular system.
Steve uses the term "logic" to refer to specific systems which implement the rules and the rules themselves. This is a category error.
This error leads to confusion. He says, "you can’t distinguish valid from invalid inferences, since both inferences were merely descriptive of brain states."
The validity of an inference is determined according to the rules of logic; it is not a description of a particular state which has instantiated those rules.
By not seeing the difference between the instantiation of logic and the application of the rules of logic, Steve equivocates, and in the process misrepresents my views.
Steve asks,
ReplyDelete"What corrupt dualists have you read? Names and titles."
Corrupt dualists? That's funny. No, I said dualism is a corrupt hand. I didn't say anybody was a "corrupt dualist."
Anyway, I'm not going to play the name game with Steve. My argument is that dualism is a corrupt hand, because it rests on an undefined distinction between the physical and non-physical.
All Steve has to do is provide a clear definition of the distinction. Instead, he asks me to list all of the "corrupt dualists" I've read.
Why would he do that?
My guess is that, regardless of what names and titles I list, Steve will claim that I have missed some of the most important literature out there, and so claim that I am too ignorant to know what I'm talking about.
Rather than waste all of our time with such nonsense, I will just wait for Steve to provide a clear definition of the distinction between "physical" and "non-physical."
Steve again misrepresents my views:
ReplyDeleteI asked, "Where did I say two substances must be alike to interact?"
Steve quotes me:
"Oh, so you think there actually has been a coherent description of a non-physical realm, in which the means of distinguishing the physical and non-physical has been coherently described, and which explains how both realms interact and relate to each other? Please, do tell."
My point here was pretty simple:
First, I was asking for a description of how one could distinguish the physical from the non-physical.
Second, I was asking for a description of how they interact.
Neither question was predicated upon the presumption that two unalike substances cannot interact.
Rather, I was simply looking for an actual explanation of how Steve's dualism was supposed to work.
Yet, Steve says, "That’s the stock objection to dualism: how can unlike substances (physical/nonphysical) interact."
I ask you all: Steve hasn't got a clue, does he?
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“Neither question was predicated upon the presumption that two unalike substances cannot interact…I ask you all: Steve hasn't got a clue, does he?”
Jason hasn’t got a clue, does he? Since Jason is so clueless, we’ll have to walk him through the process real slow. He’s somebody who needs to have every little step explained to him.
This is what he originally said:
“"Oh, so you think there actually has been a coherent description of a non-physical realm, in which the means of distinguishing the physical and non-physical has been coherently described, and which explains how both realms interact and relate to each other? Please, do tell."
Dualism would only require an explanation at this point if you presume that dualism poses some impediment to interaction between the material and immaterial.
And that presumption only follows if you take an energy transfer model as your default theory of causation (e.g. billiard balls striking each other). If you start with that assumption, then you have to explain how the transfer of energy is possible between two unlike substances.
So Jason’s demand for an explanation begs the question by assuming that dualism generates a problem which dualism must explain. Hence, dualism must overcome this presumptive objection.
But unless and until Jason can justify his presuppositions, the onus is not on dualism to explain interactionism. That demand only makes sense if you assume that interaction requires common substances or a common medium.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“Anyway, I'm not going to play the name game with Steve.”
He won’t play that game because he’d lose that game. He hasn’t studied the other side of the argument. He doesn’t know his way around dualist literature.
So he raises hackneyed objections to dualism as if these have never been addressed.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“In any case, let's look at what's going on here, because, again, Steve equivocates.__Steve uses the term ‘logic’ to refer to rules, which are, of course, normative. Then he uses the term ‘logic’ to refer to the system which instantiates those rules.”
I use both because Jason uses both. This is called answering your opponent on his own grounds—a concept which Jason is terminally unable to grasp.
If this involves an equivocation of terms, then that is traceable to Jason’s usage, and invalidates his own position.
“Steve uses the term ‘logic’ to refer to specific systems which implement the rules and the rules themselves. This is a category error.__This error leads to confusion. He says, ‘you can’t distinguish valid from invalid inferences, since both inferences were merely descriptive of brain states.’ __The validity of an inference is determined according to the rules of logic; it is not a description of a particular state which has instantiated those rules.”
Jason is a physicalist and a conceptualist. For him, the rules of inference are just a transcription of how human brains draw inferences. As such, the rules of inference are reducible to brain states.
For him, logic is not an abstract norm over and above its instantiation in human brains. Rather, it has no existence apart from brains. It is generated by the activity of the brain. Hence, it cannot function as an independent norm to distinguish valid cerebral inferences from invalid cerebral inferences.
>Steve, you should be ashamed of this behavior. It is...simply rude...
ReplyDeleteJason, as you've been learning to balance on your heels through all this you've also come a long way from calling people scum.
I'm not being holier-than-thou, I've been known to call people dung much too often. It should be held in reserve for very rare, unusual cases.
ReplyDeleteJASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“Steve, you should be ashamed of this behavior.”
Why should I be ashamed of anything? Just between you and me, Jason, I’m a closet atheist. As such, I don’t believe in moral absolutes. I’ve learned from reading candid atheistic philosophers like Michael Ruse that morality is an illusion programmed into us by natural selection. But since I’ve evolved to the point where I’m conscious of my evolutionary conditioning, I’m no longer taken in by the illusion.
So, Jason, I’m shameless—utterly shameless. As an atheist, I have no shame. Even if I still had a sense of shame, I can override my sense of shame since I know my sense of shame is just a trick which natural selection is trying to play on me to make me altruistic.
Jason, when are you going to get over your quaint old notions of shame? You sound like a bloody monk! You really need to take your atheism to heart and overcome these Victorian hang-ups of yours. Don’t try to impose your inhibitions on a godless unbeliever like me!
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“I do not have all the answers.”
That’s an understatement.
"I don't have an ultimate understanding of how it happened that brains evolved to instantiate logic, but I see no reason to think that the answer to this question will forever remain outside of scientists' grasp . . . again, I don't have an ultimate understanding, but I see no reason to think that neuroscientsts and cognitive scientists won't figure out all the details one day."
“Yet, Steve says, no, I have actually claimed that scientists will discover all of the relevant details.”
Naturally, since that’s a direct implication of what you said. If you see no reason to think that scientists won’t figure out all the details one day, if you see no reason to think the answer to this question will forever elude them (“remain outside their grasp”), then this means you believe they will figure out all the details one day, that they will discover the answer sooner or later.
It’s fine with me if you want to run away from your own statements. If I said all the foolish things you said, I’d want to run away from my statements, too. But, unfortunately for your, your prior statements are a matter of public record.
And it’s a leap of faith on your part. Your faith in the inevitability of scientific progress. Your faith in the scientific method as the source of all knowledge.
Just like a five-year-old’s boundless faith in daddy.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“Steve begins by assuming that an actual infinite set must exist in nature, and then demands that I point to one.”
My you’re dense. I make no such assumption. I’m not stating my own position. I’m responding to you on your own grounds. How thickheaded do you have to be before that tactic sinks in?
“I do not assume that there are any actual infinite sets in nature, so it is not necessary for me to point to any such set.”
Your materialism logically commits you to that position—for reasons I’ve given.
One of your basic mental deficiencies is your notion that opponents should confine their analysis what you say rather than to the logical implications of what you say.
When they proceed to comment the implications of your position, you accuse them of misrepresenting you since you didn’t say that.
Of course we wouldn’t expect you to face up to the nonsensical implications of your nonsensical position. That’s why we have to do it for you. Press your position to its logical extreme.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“No, I act like it's the only well-defined position on the table.”
That’s the problem. “Acting like it is” is not an argument.
"’Standard literature?’ Like Penrose's musings about consciousness is established doctrine?”
No, not like that. Did I refer him to The Emperor’s New Mind, or Shadows of the Mind?
No, I specifically referred him to The Road to Reality.
“Yes, Steve has the right to draw attention to whatever he wants. But that is no replacement for an argument.”
It’s not as if Jason feels any obligation to present his own arguments. Remember his “Ten Reasons” post against the moral authority of Scripture. When I challenged him to actually argue for his assertions, what did he do? He referred us to a Wikipedia article, a post from the secular web, and another post from sa.net.
So he doesn’t abide by the standards which he tries to impose on others.
And what is worse, when he refers the reader to a source, it’s a third-rate source like Wikipedia.
When I refer the reader to a source, it’s a first-rate source like Roger Penrose’s magnum opus.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDeleteSteve's latest tactic is to deny that he has actually stated any position here. And yet, the facts speak for themselves. These assertions are all taken from just a few of his posts…Need I find more evidence of Steve's tendency to actually state his position on the issues here?”
It’s a shame that an ESL teacher is so illiterate. What was the scope of my statement? In context, what was I referring to?
Jason said: “You think that something only exists if it exists in somebody’s mind?”
In response, I said, “First of all, I didn’t state my own position. I merely responded to you on your own terms. You seem to have difficulty with that concept.”
I was responding to a specific position he imputed to me.
Does my response indicate that I never state my own position? No.
Stratfield has now resorted to lying, or deception at best, to deal with my questions:
ReplyDeleteI said his question about "all moral questions" was vague. He said that it was not, 'cause "all means all." But of course 'all' doesn't always mean all, as he's now forced to admit. So rather than admit his mistake, he acts as if it is just obvious that all doesn’t always mean all. But of course that was MY point, not his. And that point is crucial for investigating his vagueness.
Anyway, Jason has now admitted that he thinks the Bible says things like this:
"If your neighbors dog is barking in certain parts of suburban American, here's the final word on what you should do."
So, since Jason keeps asking for Bible verses "'cause he must have missed them," then I do the same: Jason, which verse in the Bible talks about dogs in suburban America?
If you admit that no pat does, THEN WHAT DO YOU MEAN WHEN YOU IMPLY THAT CHRISTIANS THINK THE BIBLE GIVES THE "FINAL WORD" ON **ALL** MORAL QUESTIONS?"
Here I am trying to see if Jason can even think straight before we move o an answer/examine his arguments. But Jason calls this "tedium." That translates to: "I'm to intellectually lazy to actually work through my own question begging epithets."
Moving on, Jason tries to claim that the context makes all this clear, but he just gets more tangled and convinces us all the more that he has no clue how to use that critical thinking part of his custardy grey matter up inside his noggin. See below:
I wrote: "apparently you think Christians believe that the Bible (specifically?) offers a 'final word' on 'specific moral questions' one might ask in the 21st century."
He writes: That is the impression I've been given by comments made by participants in this discussion. For example, responding to my point, The Puritan wrote, "There is nothing new under the sun."
My reply: "There's nothing new under the sun" does not translate to "the Bible mentions people and dogs in 21st century America.
Jason Wrote: And Peter Pike wrote, "Except if it really IS the final word on moral questions..." (Or course, Peter did not actually type the word "all," but I think my interpretation was reasonable. If Peter would like to clarify that he did not mean that the Bible might be the final word on all moral questions, I would appreciate him doing so.)
My reply: Jason is having trouble with his hamster running over 2 MPH on that rusty wheel inside his noggin. Remember I said that I might agree that the Bible has "the final word" on "all moral questions," ***DEPENDING ON*** how you parse that out. To just quote Pike using the same language, while you haven't even begun to get clear on how you understand it, is simply QUESTION BEGGING. Pike quotes tells me NOTHING about how you understand your question, or him for that matter. I can tell you one thing, Pike doesn't think the Bible mentions people and dogs in 21st century North America, as you apparently do.
You write: "More importantly, my arguments here must be understood in the context in which they arose, which was my discussion with Rhology. And Rhology's comments have been rather clear on this point. For example, in one of his own blog posts, he wrote, "Jason may not like the alternative of following the morality of TGOTB, but we do know that what he has presented here is no alternative at all."
My reply: Again, that doesn't ay that Rhology thinks that the Bible has a verse that mentions "people and dogs in 21st century North America." I follow the morality of "the God of the Bible," but that doesn't mean that I must think that the Bible has a chapter like this:
"Now concerning what to do if your neighbor's dog barks in suburban North America."
You write: "In Rhology's view, there is no alternative to TGOTB, and he sees no possible justification for any morality other than what he calls "the morality of the Bible."
My reply: I agree, but that doesn't mean I think I can go to the Bible and search the index under "A" for "America; specific moral questions that might be asked there and the Bible formulaic answer."
You write: So, Paul, you can continue to engage in such tedium, ignoring the context in which my arguments arose and pretending like I've slandered those who disagree with me; or, you can substantively engage me in ideas.
My reply: I am trying to engage your ideas, but we need to clear the cobwebs of your brain and help you formulate your "ideas" into coherent and proper ones.
But, you're free to run again. I wouldn't have thought it so hard to get precise about what the heck you mean, considering you're a "Bright" 'n all.
Furthermore, why should I even engage you since you've proved your have disingenuous intetions. Even if I answer you you will respond, like you did to Gene, "So what, your interpretation isn't agreed to by all other Christians." So, you have your pre-planned out. And, you have now been exposed for a fraud too.
But when we say the same about your secular morality, you say: "You can believe that, but no one will respect that justification. You'll have a hard time proving it." So when it comes to you, you expect people to back up their alternative explanations, yet when it comes to us, it works for you to just ANNNOUNCE that someone can offer another interpretation, regarldess of the exegetical merrits of such. if you do not agree that this is your phony tactic here, then go back and change your answer to Gene.
I wrote: "One could form the belief that one wants to starve to death and in order to achieve that he must stuff his mouth with nutrient removing material - i.e., burgers, fries, and shakes, and such. This way you would "get food" *and* your belief would be false."
You replied: Can you transform this absurd scenario into a coherent argument?
My reply: I thought it was rather obvious. You said one could not have "false beliefs about food otherwise one would starve." I just showed how that was false. The "argument" was self-evident, stalling isn't a proper response. Try again.
You write: "What kind of "content" do you have in mind?"
My reply: Ummmm, the belief's content. This is standard terminology in "philoosphy of mind." You pretend you're "studied" on all that over at your blog.
You write: The idea of mental "contents" is one of the most poorly defined concepts in the philosophy of mind. Perhaps the only concept in the philosophy of mind that is more confused is the notion of consciousness itself.
My reply: Of course this is an assertion. Plenty of philosophers of mind have no problem using the term. Indeed, you used it: "Food will help me survive."
So, did the content cause your behavior, or the physical neural structure - syntax.
In other words, I'm asking about syntax or semantics.
You write: "In my view, there is no evidence or reason supporting a discussion of mental contents (or consciousness in general) in terms that defy the very possibility of a scientific explanation."
My reply: And here we have the end of Jason. If there either is no such thing as the semantic content of a belief, then it is blind to evolutionary development. That is, nature then doesn't select for true semantics over against false ones.
So, what reason is there to assume that evolution selects for true beliefs over against false ones?
It doesn't care because either content doesn't exist, or it's invisible and thus superfluous for the causal nexus.
So, your initial rejoinder that rested upon the assumption that belief content (i.e., this is food, this will nourish me, etc.,) has thus been sliced and diced by you.
So, try again.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“Scientists use the term ‘physical’ to refer to whatever they have discovered. Science is the formalization of discovery itself, so it follows that anything that can be formally discovered can be discovered scientifically.__Thus, it follows that anything that can be discovered can be called ‘physical’."
Demonstrably false. Roger Penrose is a scientist. He refers to mathematical discoveries. Yet he doesn’t regard mathematical entities as physical.
“Now, maybe Steve would like to explain what he means when he says that propositional attitudes (i.e., beliefs) and representational states are not physical.”
Because they lack physical properties, viz. area, density, displacement, length, location, mass, volume, &c.
“How does Steve define ‘physical’ and ‘non-physical?’__I'm sure you're all as anxious as I am to hear Steve's definitions of these terms."
I’ve already listed some physical properties. Twice now.
As for defining mental properties, let’s take the two examples I mentioned:
Propositional attitudes “include beliefs, desires, intentions, hopes and fears, to name but a few. A common feature of such states is that we may ascribe them to subjects of experience by using…’verbs of propositional attitude’ because each of them is considered to express a particular attitude which a subject may have towards a proposition,” E. Lowe, An Introduction to the philosophy of mind (Cambridge 2003), 40.
“But what exactly is a ‘proposition?’ That is, what kind of entity is it? Many philosophers would say that propositions are abstract entities and thus akin ontologically to the objects of mathematics, such as numbers and sets. Numbers are not concrete, physical objects existing in space and time: we cannot see, hear or touch the number 3,” ibid. 71-72.
“It is true that not all philosophers are happy with this state of affairs and that some of them would like to eliminate numbers and all other abstract entities from our ontology, often on the grounds that they do not see how we could have knowledge of anything which supposedly does not exist in space and time. But it is not so easy to eliminate the ontology of mathematics without undermining the very truths of mathematics, which we may be loath to do. If numbers do not exist, it is hard to see how it could be true to say that 2 plus 1 equals 3. So perhaps we should reconcile ourselves to the existence of abstract entities. And, certainly, propositions would appear to fall into this ontological category,” ibid. 72.
“Perhaps, however, it will be doubted whether we have as much reason to believe in the existence of propositions as we do to believe in the existence of numbers. Are there undeniable truths which require the existence of propositions, in the way in which certain mathematical truths seem to require the existence of numbers? Very plausibly, there are. Consider, for instance…” ibid. 72-73.
“Here we may be helped by reflecting on the many different modes of non-mental representation with which we are all familiar. The wide variety of these modes is illustrated by the very different ways in which items of the following kinds serve to represent things or states of affairs: pictures, photographs, diagrams, maps, symbols, and sentences. All of these familiar items are, of course, human artifacts, which people have designed quite specifically in order to represent something or other. Indeed, it is arguable that ever such artefact succeeds in representing something only insofar as someone—either its creator or its user—interprets it as representing something…Interpreting is itself a representational mental state (in fact, a kind of cognitive state). One way of putting this point is to say that human artifactual representations, such as pictures and maps, have only ‘derived,’ not ‘original,’ intentionality—intentionality being that property which a thing has if it represents, and thus is ‘about,’ something else (in the way in which a map can be 'about’ a piece of terrain or a diagram can be 'about’ the structure of a machine),” ibid. 162-63.
Or let’s consider abstract mathematical objects:
“Thus, we must be careful, when considering geometrical assertions, whether to trust the ‘axioms’ as being, in any sense, actually true. But what does ‘true’ mean in this context? This difficulty was well appreciated by the great ancient Greek philosopher Plato…Plato made it clear that the mathematical propositions—the things that could be regarded as unassailably true—referred not to actual physical objects (like the approximate squares, triangles, circles, spheres, and cubes that might be constructed from marks in the sand, or from wood or stone) but to certain idealized entities. He envisaged that these ideal entities inhabited a different world, distinct from the physical world. Today, we might refer to this world as the Platonic world of mathematical forms. Physical structures, such as squares, circles, or triangles cut from papyrus, or marked on a flat surface, or perhaps cubes, tetrahedra, or spheres caved from marble, might conform to these ideals very closely, but only approximately. The actual mathematical squares, cubes, circles, spheres, triangles, &c., would not be part of the physical world, but would be inhabitants of Plato’s idealized mathematical world of forms,” R. Penrose, The Road to Reality (Knopf 2004), 11-12.
“But does the Platonic mathematical world actually exist, in any meaningful sense?…Let me illustrate this issue by considering one famous example of a mathematical truth, and relate it to the question of ‘objectivity.’…A proof [of Fermat’s Last Theorem] was finally published in 1995 by Andrew Wiles…Now, do we take the view that Fermat’s assertion was always true, long before Fermat actually made it, or is its validity a purely cultural matter, dependent upon whatever might be the subjective standards of the community of human mathematicians?” ibid. 12-14.
“The [Mandelbrot] set has an extraordinarily elaborate structure, but it is not of any human design…The point that I wish to make is that no one, not even Benoit Mandelbrot himself when he first caught sight of the incredible complications in the fine details of the set, had any real preconception of the set’s extraordinary richness. The Mandelbrot set was certainly no invention of any human mind. The set is just objectively there in the mathematics itself. If it has meaning to assign an actual existence to the Mandelbrot set, then that existence is not within our minds, for no one can fully comprehend the set’s endless variety and unlimited complication. Nor can its existence lie within the multitude of computer printouts that begin to capture some of its incredible sophistication and detail, for at best those printouts capture but a shadow of an approximation of the set itself. Yet it has a robustness that is beyond any doubt; for the same structure is revealed—in all its perceivable details, to greater and greater fineness the more closely it is examined—independently of the mathematician or computer that examines it. Its existence can only be within the Platonic world of mathematical forms,” ibid. 16-17.
“The mathematical forms of Plato’s world clearly do not have the same kind of existence as do ordinary physical objects such as tables and chairs. They do not have spatial locations; nor do they exist in time…Those designs were already ‘in existence’ since the beginning of time, in the potential timeless sense that they would necessarily be revealed precisely in the form that we perceive them today, no matter at what time or in what location some perceiving being might have chosen to examine them,” ibid. 16-17.
Or let’s consider possible worlds:
We use alethic modal language all the time. For instance, we say that someone did not do something she could have done, or that the existence of unicorns is possible, or that 2+2=4 could not have failed to be true. We make counterfactual assertions such as “Were I to drop this glass, which in fact I do not, it would fall.” We think it might have been the case that Hitler had never existed. In these locutions we are speaking about situations and things that are not actual, of ways the universe might have been but was not.
Moreover, alethic modal language could not play the kind of role it has in our lives if we did not take a realist stance towards it. For instance, to decide rationally between alternatives, we often need to consider what consequences would result from each alternative. To decide questions of moral responsibility we often need to decide what else could have been done. The laws of nature by which we navigate the world have counterfactual force. If we did not take our alethic modal claims to express objective truths, modal language could not play the role it does in these cases.
A useful way of clarifying modal discourse is to introduce the notion of a possible world, or world for short, which is a complete way that a universe might have been. The term “possible” refers here not to physical possibility, but to a broad notion of logical or metaphysical possibility, which lets one ask questions such as whether it would be metaphysically possible for a horse to beget an owl. Once possible worlds are introduced, one can say a proposition is possible if it is true at some world, necessary if true at all worlds, and contingent if true at some but not all, so that modal operators can be replaced by quantifiers. It is possible that there is a unicorn if and only if there is a possible world at which there are unicorns.
Many ordinary language modal claims seem local. “It might have been that Hitler had never been born” sounds like it is a claim merely about the circumstances around Hitler’s birth. However, in fact, it is a global claim. We do not simply mean that a world in which Hitler is not born is logically possible. What we mean is that there is a world like ours in relevant respects, for instance sharing the same laws of nature and initial conditions, or maybe even the same historical conditions up to the late 19th century, but in which Hitler is not born. Specifying what these relevant respects are may well be a global task, especially if laws of nature are global. So we need possible worlds for clarification and disambiguation.
Moreover, possible worlds can be used to clarify modal claims that one could not easily explicate in other ways. For instance, a claim that people’s having virtue or vice supervenes on natural facts is a claim that there are no possible worlds which share the same natural facts but which differ in respect of someone’s virtue or vice. Likewise, David Lewis has shown us how to explain counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds. Assuming I do not drop the glass, it is true that were I to drop the glass, it would fall provided that some world in which I drop the glass and it falls is more similar to our world in relevant ways, especially in nomic structure, than any world in which I drop the glass but it does not fall.
If we are to be realists about alethic modal truths, then the natural question is: What makes modal propositions true? What are they true of? In general, an objectively true proposition must be true of some aspect of reality. One way of spelling out this intuition is to say that in order for a proposition to be true, it must have a truthmaker, something in virtue of which it is true. The truthmaker is something worldly, and for propositions about concreta, it is something concrete. Thus, the truthmaker of the proposition that Smith is bald is the concrete baldness of Smith, or else Smith’s being bald.
Truthmaker-based arguments have been common in philosophy, starting with Parmenides who argued that there are no true propositions about the future on the presentist premise that future worldly states do not exist and hence the truthmakers for propositions about the future do not exist. Alternately, one could use modus tollens and argue that since it is true that tomorrow the sun will rise, some future worldly states do exist and make true propositions about the future true. Similarly, many have argued that there are no ethical truths, because the truthmakers of ethical propositions would allegedly have to be queer non-physical entities.
What, then, are the truthmakers of alethic modal claims? This question is deeply puzzling, since many alethic modal claims prima facie concern non-existent things such as unicorns. One proposed answer is that the truthmakers of alethic modal claims are possible worlds, and we have already seen that we have good reason to believe in possible worlds even apart from this. So this brings us to the second question: What are possible worlds?
There is hope, however, that the theistic account, once elaborated sufficiently, would end up combining the strengths of the Platonic, Aristotelian and Leibnizian accounts while avoiding most of their weaknesses. Of course this requires that there be an essentially omniscient and omnipotent necessary being, but just as Lewis thinks that the theoretical usefulness of his Extreme Modal Realism is an argument for the existence of his concrete physical worlds, so too one can argue that the theoretical usefulness of a theistic account like this provides some grounds for thinking it is true, and in particular that there is a God.
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/ActualAndPossible.html
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete"Oh, so you think there actually has been a coherent description of a non-physical realm, in which the means of distinguishing the physical and non-physical has been coherently described, and which explains how both realms interact and relate to each other? Please, do tell."
Of course, his question is a question-begging question. As one philosopher points out:
“David Hume long ago gave the decisive answer to all such conceptual objections to the possibility of dualistic mental—physical causation. This is that there are simply no a priori constraints on what kinds of states or events can enter into causal relationships with one another. As Hume himself puts it at one point: ‘to consider the matter a priori, anything many produce anything’,” E. Lowe, An introduction to the philosophy of mind, 23.
“But Steve also wants to use the word ‘truths’ to talk about things which propositions are said to be about. That is, he uses the term ‘truths’ to talk about true statements about the universe as well as the universe itself. But, if you substitute ‘the universe’ for ‘truths’ in Steve’s statement, then it clearly does not equate to my own position.”
ReplyDeleteWhen you make a statement about the “universe itself,” that’s a truth-claim about the universe itself—namely, that there is a universe in and of itself.
So Jason’s attempt to drive a wedge between the universe itself and a proposition about the universe itself is a failure since he must smuggle in a propositional attitude to make truth-valued claims about the universe itself.
“This does not mean that we need such systems in order for the universe to exist.”
Of course, that very assertion is, itself, a proposition—an existential proposition. So is this a true or false proposition?
If there are no “systems” (i.e. brains) capable of “instantiating” propositions, then it wasn’t true a billion years ago that the universe existed a billion years ago (if you accept his evolutionary conceptualism).
Steve says my "attempt to drive a wedge between the universe itself and a proposition about the universe itself is a failure since [I] must smuggle in a propositional attitude to make truth-valued claims about the universe itself."
ReplyDeleteOne wonders how a human brain could come up with such nonsense.
Steve apparently thinks that the universe is a proposition about itself. The universe is a self-referential statement. (With protons and electrons and stuff, too, right?)
And Steve says I'm making an error somehow by "smuggling" my beliefs into the argument.
Huh?
If anyone can make sense of these points, please give it a shot. I'd like to know how this looks from somebody else's perspective here.
Trying to follow my argument to what he thinks is its logical conclusion, Steve says,
ReplyDelete"If there are no “systems” (i.e. brains) capable of “instantiating” propositions, then it wasn’t true a billion years ago that the universe existed a billion years ago (if you accept his evolutionary conceptualism)."
Equivocation again!
Anyone surprised?
We can say it "was true" a billion years ago that the universe existed, if we mean that our references to a billion years ago are valid. But this does not mean that there were necessarily true propositions about the universe that existed a billion years ago.
Steve's probably still not going to get this, is he?
Do all of the theists here actually agree with Steve on this point? I mean, should I think he's speaking for the rest of you, or what?
Jason writes: "We can say it "was true" a billion years ago that the universe existed, if we mean that our references to a billion years ago are valid. But this does not mean that there were necessarily true propositions about the universe that existed a billion years ago."
ReplyDeleteDo. you. realize. the. raw. implications. of. this. statement. of. yours. if. it. were. true?
You have just undercut the foundations of rationality. You have just asserted that rationality is fictitious.
Steve has been trying to warn you (in his own way) that this is where you were heading. And now you have just jumped off that cliff.
If this is incomprehensible to you, you cannot be helped.
Your interpretation of adultery in the New and Old Testaments is pretty clear, I admit.
ReplyDeleteHowever, it is only an interpretation, and it is not clear that the New Testament obligates us to accept your interpretation.
Then you need to come up with a different interpretation.
You're the one who asked this question. If you have a different response, then you need to argue your response.
And if you resort to the "it's just your/an interpretation" tactic, then why should we accept your interpretation over mine. My interpretation has several hundred years of supporting scholarship behind it.
If you believe the NT does not obligate us to accept that interpretation, then you need to argue it, not assert it.
You say I am just sitting at my keyboard, "admitting [I've} not really read or studied it well."
Um, no, that is not accurate. What I said was that I am sure a lot of people here have spent a lot more time reading the Bible than I have.
Of course, you are free to interpret my statements in the worst possible light, and jump to conclusions about my ignorance and incompetence.
Actually, I'm not quoting you here. I'm taking your own actions at face value.
1. You asked namby pamby questions.
2. Your own post on why we should reject the Bible is larded with references to Infidels.org, Wiki, the SAB, etc. That's not even the best liberal scholarship has to offer, much less conservative scholarship.
3. And, if you had actually made an effort in this arena, you'd be interacting with Stuart and Poythress, just to name two. Indeed, you'd be at a minimum, interacting with Reformed Historical Theology, since it is no secret that this blog's default position is Calvinism, unless you are interacting with the one person here who isn't a Calvinist. You might even produce material from New Covenant Theology in order to argue against Covenant Theology. That fact that you didn't - and haven't, and have resorted to "it's just an interpretation" is an admission you don't have a clue what you're talking about and/or you already have a prefabricated notion that is impervious to correction - in which case your questions were disingenuous, therefore dishonest. There's atheological ethics for you.
That seems to be what people here generally do when they are challenged by atheists. However, there is such a thing as the "principle of charity," which states that we should read each others arguments in the best light possible.
I'm sorry, but that's a moral question, is it not? Isn't that something you need to negotiate with me and others before you cast about for it's use? Who are you to impose this "principle of charity" of which you speak upon me, Paul, Steve, or any other participant in this discussion without negotiation?
So, when I say that people here have no doubt spent more time reading the Bible than I have, it does not mean that I have not studied it well enough to engage in discussion.
On the contrary, you have yet to demonstrate that you have. You have, like so many before you, gone down the same path by proving yet again, that, when push comes to shove, you get an argument that answers you on the very terms you laid out, you resort to "it's just an interpretation" rather than mounting an actual counterarguments.
I would think that concepts like "charity" should be familiar to you folks.
Hmmm, the Bible has lots to say about false teachers, Jason. They don't automatically warrant "charitable treatment" Jason. Try again.
Well, Jason S. has proven he's nothing more than steamroller: make a bunch of wild assertions and the sheer number of errors will be too much for anyone to respond to. This gives the added bonus that when the steamroller runs away with tail between his legs, he can still say, "They didn't get me on these points!" and think he's actually won something.
ReplyDeleteSad. But par for the course for atheism.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“Of course, you are free to interpret my statements in the worst possible light, and jump to conclusions about my ignorance and incompetence. That seems to be what people here generally do when they are challenged by atheists. However, there is such a thing as the ‘principle of charity,’ which states that we should read each others arguments in the best light possible. So, when I say that people here have no doubt spent more time reading the Bible than I have, it does not mean that I have not studied it well enough to engage in discussion.__I would think that concepts like ‘charity’ should be familiar to you folks.”
That’s very noble. Touching, really.
Unfortunately, there’s a wee bit of a disconnect between your body language and your expressed sentiments. Did you apply the principle of charity to Rhology? How did you put it? Let’s see if I remember correctly. Ah, yes, it went something like this:
“You are so confused, it’s kind of scary. I’m not going to address all of your idiotic comments and questions, because it would take too much time, and it wouldn’t help anybody.”
“The problem is, your scumminess prevents you from understanding what a moral position actually looks like. I’ve been trying to explain this to you, but your mind has been so infiltrated by scum that you can’t see beyond the scum. You are trapped in a mental web of scum. It’s sad, because I think there is an intelligent and well-meaning person underneath all those layers of scum. But maybe I’m wrong, and you’re just scum to the bone.”
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“One wonders how a human brain could come up with such nonsense.”
Yes, indeed, every time I read Jason I ask myself that very question. But then I remember the doctrine of original sin.
“Steve apparently thinks that the universe is a proposition about itself. The universe is a self-referential statement. (With protons and electrons and stuff, too, right?)”
Jason is apparently too dimwitted to absorb the elementary notion of an internal critique. Answering an opponent on his own grounds. I’ve had to explain this tactic to Jason on several occasions now, but it keeps bouncing off of that thick skull of his.
I’m not stating what I think. Rather, I’m beginning with his presuppositions, then taking them to their absurd consequences.
“And Steve says I'm making an error somehow by ‘smuggling’ my beliefs into the argument.__Huh?”
Jason is making assertions about the universe. That commits him to propositional attitudes. But before the evolution of intelligent life (i.e. brains of sufficient complexity), there were no propositional attitudes (as per Jason’s evolutionary conceptualism).
Hence, it’s not the case a billion years ago that the universe existed a billion years ago—since there can be no truths without truth-bearers.
(Needless to say, Christian theism doesn’t generate the same dilemma, for God is the timeless truth-bearer.)
Bruce,
ReplyDelete"You have just undercut the foundations of rationality. You have just asserted that rationality is fictitious."
No, I have not.
You are either insane, incompetent, or simply dishonest.
But that seems par for the course around here.
Peter Pike,
ReplyDelete"Well, Jason S. has proven he's nothing more than steamroller: make a bunch of wild assertions and the sheer number of errors will be too much for anyone to respond to."
That's hilarious. Like the amount of verbiage written against me here doesn't far outweigh the amount I've produced. Like we should ignore the fact that I'm trying to cover as much of the garbage that's been thrown at me here, and couldn't possibly be expected to respond to all of it in such a short period of time.
Considering how much you've all given me to respond to, I don't see how you could possibly justify accusing me of producing too much text for you all to chew on.
But, again, I've come to expect a rather large amount of unreason here, so none of this should be surprising.
Hey, did you all know that Paul Manata is a big liar?
ReplyDeleteLook at this. Manata says that I "said one could not have 'false beliefs about food otherwise one would starve.'"
The problem is, I never said that. He used quotes to mislead you all into thinking I said something I never said.
You want to check? Search the page for that alleged remark, and you will find that the only place it appears is in Manata's corrupt text.
What I did says was this:
"If my beliefs about how to get food, maintain my health, and so on, were all false, then I would surely not survive long enough to reproduce."
Manata has not produced an argument against this position. Instead, he attacked a straw man, and now he is offering false evidence to make you all think that he was right all along.
Manata . . . you all should keep an eye on this guy. He looks as dishonest as they come.
Manata lied again here:
ReplyDelete"Anyway, Jason has now admitted that he thinks the Bible says things like this:
’If your neighbors dog is barking in certain parts of suburban American, here's the final word on what you should do.’"
Clearly Manata has his head shoved way, and I mean way up his rectum. I don’t see how anyone could possibly interpret anything I’ve said in this manner.
MAnata asks, with capital letters (to imply moral outrage, I suppose): “THEN WHAT DO YOU MEAN WHEN YOU IMPLY THAT CHRISTIANS THINK THE BIBLE GIVES THE "FINAL WORD" ON **ALL** MORAL QUESTIONS?”
Has Manata been following this discussion at all?
I am not talking about what Christians in general think. I’m talking about what Rhology thinks, and what those who have tried to defend his position here think.
Rhology has explicitly said that he thinks the Bible is "the final word. Not the only word - there is plenty of clamor from inferior, competing voices. Like Jason's."
http://rhoblogy.blogspot.com/2008/11/welcome-to-pond.html
Now Manata wants me to explain what Rhology and Rhology's defense team mean?
Please.
Now that we've seen how little regard Manata has for the truth, we shouldn't be surprised that he finds it so easy to accuse me of lying. He says I have "resorted to lying, or deception at best."
ReplyDeleteManata needs to take a closer look in the mirror. Maybe what he sees will shock some sense into him.
Manata can't get over my comment about how straightforward and obvious my use of the term "all" was.
ReplyDeleteAnyone who has been following this discussion carefully would know that there were no contextual restrictions on my use of the term "all." I was not talking about some vaguely defined subset of all possible moral arguments. I was directly responding to Rhology's direct, unequivocal statements about the Bible and morality.
So, no, I'm not going to pretend like my use of the term "all" was vague. It wasn't vague, and anyone paying attention to this discussion would know that.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“Bruce, You are either insane, incompetent, or simply dishonest. But that seems par for the course around here.”
I’m afraid that Jason is sounding ever more like a patient in a mental ward. From his paranoid perspective, he’s the only sane man on earth. Everyone else is bonkers!
Actually, for all we know, Jason really is a patient in a mental ward. That would explain a lot.
Dishonest Steve, at it again"
ReplyDelete"When I challenged [Jason] to actually argue for his assertions, what did he do? He referred us to a Wikipedia article, a post from the secular web, and another post from sa.net."
Right, because I haven't made any arguments here, or on my blog, or on Rhology's blog. Yeah, Steve. Please, come back to reality.
Can't you simply deal with the substance here, instead of continuing your feeble attempts to discredit me?
Jason Streitfeld said...
ReplyDelete“That's hilarious. Like the amount of verbiage written against me here doesn't far outweigh the amount I've produced. Like we should ignore the fact that I'm trying to cover as much of the garbage that's been thrown at me here, and couldn't possibly be expected to respond to all of it in such a short period of time.__Considering how much you've all given me to respond to, I don't see how you could possibly justify accusing me of producing too much text for you all to chew on.”
It’s pretty simple, Jason. For every action there’s a reaction. You comment and we respond.
If you have a problem with the amount of verbiage written against you, you’re always at liberty to shut your trap. It’s not as if you’re doing any of us a favors.
Steve is still hung up on my use of the word "scum."
ReplyDeleteHe says, "Did you apply the principle of charity to Rhology?"
Actually, yes. And anyone here who has read what I wrote to Rhology knows that I asked Rhology if he believed that it was okay to kill people just for having different religious beliefs than his own, and that I was under the impression that he did. It was on that basis that I levelled my moral judgment against him.
So, contrary to Steve's suggestion here, I did not take Rhology's comments in the worst possible way. I simply interpreted them directly, and asked Rhology if he agreed.
Does Steve care about these details? Probably not. He's just going to keep jumping over whatever he can to discredit me.
Jason Streitfeld said...
ReplyDelete“Manata needs to take a closer look in the mirror. Maybe what he sees will shock some sense into him.”
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Manata is a big fat liar. Do you believe that lying is intrinsically evil? For someone who denies moral absolutes, your moral outrage is quite entertaining. You should join the circus.
Steve the Stupid says,
ReplyDelete"If there either is no such thing as the semantic content of a belief, then it is blind to evolutionary development. That is, nature then doesn't select for true semantics over against false ones."
That's true. But, of course, I never said there was no such thing as the semantic content of a belief.
Everyone,
ReplyDeleteNotice that Steve has not defined what he means by "abstract object."
Instead, he lists a bunch of things that he says count as abstract objects.
We still don't know what an abstract object is, how it can be recognized as such, and how they relate to physical objects.
Steve says he doesn't need to answer the last question. He says, according to Hume, that "anything can cause anything else."
That's a non sequitor. It's like answering the question, "how did the fuel cause the airplane to fly?" with the answer, "anything can cause anything else."
It does not further our understanding of the situation.
So far, Steve is working with undefined concepts. That's no way to make an argument, Steve.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“Right, because I haven't made any arguments here, or on my blog, or on Rhology's blog. Yeah, Steve. Please, come back to reality.”
Lovely bait-n-switch tactic. In context, what was I referring to? Your failure to present your own arguments against the Bible.
You’re a big fat liar, Jason.
Jason needs to take a closer look in the mirror. Maybe what he sees will shock some sense into him.
“Can't you simply deal with the substance here, instead of continuing your feeble attempts to discredit me?”
But it’s so easy to discredit you. All we have to do is quote your own words back to you. Works every time.
You also have a bad habit of confusing “substance” with your threadbare assertions.
Jason Streitfeld said...
ReplyDelete“Steve the Stupid says,__’If there either is no such thing as the semantic content of a belief, then it is blind to evolutionary development. That is, nature then doesn't select for true semantics over against false ones’."
Unfortunately for you, I’m not the one who said that. So who’s stupid now?
Now, Penrose tries to explain why we should believe abstract entities exist in their own realm by making reference to one of Fermat's theorems. While the theorem in question was proved in the twentieth century, it was postulated much earlier. So, Penrose asks, was it true before it was proved?
ReplyDeleteWe have to be careful what we mean with this question. Steve's already demonstrated how easily one can equivocate with the word "truth" without even realizing it. (He's still doing it, even though I've pointed it out repeatedely.)
Was Fermat's theorem true? That depends on what we mean by "true."
What does it mean for a mathematical theorem to be true, anyway?
For Steve and Penrose, I suppose it means that the theorem corresponds to some entity existing in the abstract realm, whatever that means.
And yet, we cannot assume such a realm exists. (As I noted in a different post, we have good reason to suspect that such a realm cannot exist, because mathematics cannot be both complete and consistent.)
So, if we don't assume there is some other realm, then what does it mean to say that a mathematical theorem is true?
It means that the theorem can be derived from the axioms of mathematics.
If a theorem can be derived from the axioms, then it is true.
Fermat's theorem could have been derived from the axioms of mathematics centuries ago, but it wasn't.
So, it was true, but nobody had proof of that yet, because nobody had derived it. (Well, Fermat said he had, but nobody could find his proof, apparently.)
So, Penrose's example fails to make the required case for Platonic realism.
Try again, Steve.
Here's Steve's understanding of atheism:
ReplyDelete"Even if I still had a sense of shame, I can override my sense of shame since I know my sense of shame is just a trick which natural selection is trying to play on me to make me altruistic."
So now evolution plays tricks on people?
How's that, Steve?
Maybe shame is actually useful for us, Steve. Maybe we shouldn't try to override it with psychological conditioning (or drugs.)
No, Steve thinks atheists are just idiots who have no interest in living beyond the present moment, who cannot think ahead, who cannot find value in interpersonal relationships and a sense of community, who would rather live a short life of excess and self-absorbtion, instead of engaging in the sort of things that provide profound, long-term fulfillment.
Steve, you need to open your eyes.
"Jason Streitfeld said...
ReplyDelete“Steve the Stupid says,__’If there either is no such thing as the semantic content of a belief, then it is blind to evolutionary development. That is, nature then doesn't select for true semantics over against false ones’."
Unfortunately for you, I’m not the one who said that. So who’s stupid now?"
Ahh, that was a mistake. It was the lovely Paul Manata who made that stunning remark. Yes, as Steve suggests, such a mistake could only be made by a person with a remarkably low I.Q.
Steve the Presumptuous, Ignorant and Confused writes,
ReplyDelete"Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Manata is a big fat liar."
No need to suppose it. I've given you the evidence required. It's beyond a reasonable doubt.
"Do you believe that lying is intrinsically evil? For someone who denies moral absolutes, your moral outrage is quite entertaining."
You find it entertaining when members of your community engage in deception to try to discredit people who they disagree with?
Steve, I never denied the existence of moral absolutes. In fact, if you keep up with Rhology's blog (which is where this all began, remember), you'll see I've actually argued for some moral absolutes on purely logical grounds, without recourse to anything beyond the physical world.
It's in one of my responses to this thread on Rhology's blog:
http://rhoblogy.blogspot.com/2008/11/preaching-to-scum.html
Jason Streitfeld said...
ReplyDelete“Notice that Steve has not defined what he means by ‘abstract object.’ Instead, he lists a bunch of things that he says count as abstract objects.”
False dichotomy. There’s such a thing as ostensible definition, using paradigm examples. Indeed, definitions typically abstract from paradigm examples.
“We still don't know what an abstract object is.”
Of course, someone who claims to be a philosopher (albeit a “nonprofessional philosopher”) shouldn’t need to ask that question in the first place. Abstract objects are a standard metaphysical category.
“How it can be recognized as such.”
You don’t need to know how you can recognize something to recognize something. A 2-year-old can recognize his own mother without a scientific knowledge of sensory perception.
“And how they relate to physical objects.”
Abstract object: exemplar.
Concrete object: exemplum.
“Steve says he doesn't need to answer the last question. He says, according to Hume, that ‘anything can cause anything else.’__That's a non sequitor. It's like answering the question, ‘how did the fuel cause the airplane to fly?’ with the answer, ‘anything can cause anything else’.”
For an ESL teacher, Jason is remarkably illiterate. Did Hume say that anything can cause (actually, he used the word “produce”) anything?
No. Jason left out the key qualification. What Hume actually said (and I quoted him on that) is that if we consider the matter a priori, anything can produce anything.
Hence, there can be no a priori objections to dualism.
“It does not further our understanding of the situation.”
That begs the question of whether there’s something further to understand. Does Jason think that every explanation involves an infinite regress?
Some concepts are primitive concepts. They can’t be explained by something more fundamental, for there’s nothing more fundamental than the concept in question. We’ve already hit rock bottom.
BTW, notice that, for someone who’s so big on definitions, Jason hasn’t bothered to define what he means by causation. Which theory of causation does he espouse?
He also needs to define “explanation.” And he needs to define “evidence.”
Steve says,
ReplyDelete"If there either is no such thing as the semantic content of a belief, then it is blind to evolutionary development. That is, nature then doesn't select for true semantics over against false ones."
I already responded to this earlier, to point out that I never denied the existence of semantic content.
I also want to add that Steve's argument here misses the point. The point was that evolution has selected for our ability to arrive at knowledge--for our ability to established justified true beliefs about the world. This doesn't necessarily mean that evolution has selected for a particular set of beliefs, as though we were born with all of our beliefs and never had to learn them.
So, evolution need not select for semantic content. Evolution only had to select for the ability to produce true beliefs.
But maybe evolution did select for some beliefs. It seems possible to me.
Steve calls me a "big fat liar" because of my "Lovely bait-n-switch tactic."
ReplyDeleteHe says he was referring to my "failure to present your own arguments against the Bible."
And yet, I have pursued arguments here, on my Blog, and on Rhology's blog, about that very thing.
So, again, Steve accuses me of failing to produce arguments. And now he accuses me of lying about it.
Steve . . . you know, I might get addicted to shoving your nonsense back in your face. I better be careful here.
Jason Streitfeld said...
ReplyDelete“You find it entertaining when members of your community engage in deception to try to discredit people who they disagree with?”
I never conceded your interpretation of Manata’s conduct. And since Manata is a party to your interpretation of his conduct, you need to negotiate your interpretation with the interested party. Otherwise, you’re being dictatorial and fascistic.
I don’t see Manata’s signature on your social contract.
I do, however, find you to be unintentionally entertaining.
“Steve, I never denied the existence of moral absolutes.”
You said morality is a matter of negotiation. But moral absolutes would be nonnegotiable.
Moreover, if you believe in moral absolutes, then that would put an end to all further negotiation, which is dictatorial and fascistic, right?
Jason Streitfeld said...
ReplyDelete“And yet, I have pursued arguments here, on my Blog, and on Rhology's blog, about that very thing.__So, again, Steve accuses me of failing to produce arguments. And now he accuses me of lying about it.”
The record speaks for itself. When I challenged you to turn your ten assertions into ten arguments, you response was to add some links to Wikipedia, the secular web, &c.
Steve points out that, "There’s such a thing as ostensible definition, using paradigm examples."
ReplyDeleteYes, but if the nature of all of those examples is in dispute, then they are not sufficient.
I'm saying that abstract entities are algorithms. This explains all of the observed phenomena, and it does not postulate any unknowable realms or incoherent notions.
Steve disagrees, and says abstract objects must have an existence of their own. They are not just algorithms. But, then, what are they?
He won't say. And he won't say how we can distinguish between them and physical entities.
He says, "Abstract objects are a standard metaphysical category." That doesn't mean they are well-defined.
Steve says, "You don’t need to know how you can recognize something to recognize something."
That's a non sequitor, Steve. I'm not saying that one must know how it is possible to recognize abstract entities in order to recognize them. Rather, I'm saying that one must provide some understanding of how they are recognized if one wants to postulate them.
Steve is claiming that abstract objects exist, but that they are not algorithms. So what are they? How do I know when I'm looking at one?
Steve is avoiding the issue.
And, when asked how the abstract and physical interact, he says,
"Abstract object: exemplar.
Concrete object: exemplum."
That is not a description of interaction. That is itself a set of abstract cateogies. It does not further our understanding of why Steve rejects my clear understanding of abstract entities.
Now, I admit, I misquoted Hume. That was just carelessness and I'm sorry about that. But Steve's point about Hume is still off the mark. He says, "if we consider the matter a priori, anything can produce anything.
Hence, there can be no a priori objections to dualism."
That does not follow. All you can say, granting Hume's supposition, is that one particular a priori objection to dualism is invalid. It does not negate the possibility of other a priori objections.
My objection is still on the table, and it has nothing to do with Hume's comments, or about causality. (Why did Steve ask me to define how I'm using the word "causality?" Causality was never a part of my arguments here.)
Steve, about my arguments about the Bible and morality, says, "When I challenged you to turn your ten assertions into ten arguments, you response was to add some links to Wikipedia, the secular web, &c."
ReplyDeleteActually, I added those links because somebody posted on my blog asking about citations, and I wanted to just throw a few things out there to guide people towards further reading. Those links were never offered as a replacement for an argument.
And, despite Steve's denial, I have produced arguments for my ten points. I have argued some more elaborately than others, and I do not pretend that I have exhausted the possibility of argument over the matter. But I haven't had time to deal with all of the issues on the table here.
One conclusion we can draw from this is, if you want to further this discussion, don't sidetrack it with trivial attempts to discredit me. Just focus on the issues and try to faithfully represent my positions.
Stupid Steve again:
ReplyDelete"And since Manata is a party to your interpretation of his conduct, you need to negotiate your interpretation with the interested party. Otherwise, you’re being dictatorial and fascistic."
IF a person says that somebody said something, and uses quotation marks to present what they are saying that person said, but the person never said it, they are lying.
I do not need to negotiate that with Manata, because it has already been established in the civilized world. Now, you and Manata can try to change all of our minds about this simple understanding of honesty, and I wish you all the best in that endeavor, if you so choose to pursue it. But, really, you probably could find some better way to spend your time. Try thinking, for starters.
Actually, I added those links because somebody posted on my blog asking about citations, and I wanted to just throw a few things out there to guide people towards further reading. Those links were never offered as a replacement for an argument.
ReplyDeleteI'm glad you mentioned that...for that is true. You made these ten assertions without so much as an argument. Here's how this went down here: You forwarded us to an article that presented 10 assertions, no arguments. Somebody asked you a question on your own blog, and you linked to a set of 2nd and 3rd rate "sources."
So, nothing, Jason has changed here.
“And yet, I have pursued arguments here, on my Blog, and on Rhology's blog, about that very thing.__So, again, Steve accuses me of failing to produce arguments. And now he accuses me of lying about it.”
ReplyDeleteNotice how Jason has attempted to change the record:
When Steve asked for these reasons, to what did Jason refer us:
Here's Jason, in his own words:
First off, I posted those reasons not to trust the the Bible is the final word on all moral questions:
http://specterofreason.blogspot.com/2008/11/ten-reasons-why-rational-person-should.html
Did Jason refer us to any other post on his blog or elsewhere? NO.
So, what did we do, we interpreted his own words directly. Jason didn't refer us anywhere else. Therefore, we aren't responsible to look on Rho's blog or anywhere else - not when Jason himself refers us to a specific article on his own blog.
Once again, Jason can't keep up with what he says or the implications of what he says.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“I do not need to negotiate that with Manata, because it has already been established in the civilized world.”
The “civilized world”? What a beautifully tendentious appeal.
Anyway, lying is quite commonplace in the “civilized world.” Even official lies, viz. French diplomacy.
So if, ex hypothesi, Manata is a liar, he has a distinguished pedigree. He’s a very civilized liar.
Jason Streitfeld said...
ReplyDeletei) ”IF a person says that somebody said something, and uses quotation marks to present what they are saying that person said, but the person never said it, they are lying.”
ii) ”Now, I admit, I misquoted Hume.”
iii) “Ahh, that was a mistake. It was the lovely Paul Manata who made that stunning remark.”
iv) Ergo, Jason is a liar (not to mention an uncivilized person).
Jason Streitfeld said...
ReplyDelete“Yes, but if the nature of all of those examples is in dispute, then they are not sufficient…And he won't say how we can distinguish between them and physical entities.”
Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that this is a problem for dualism. If so, there’s a parallel problem for physicalism:
“The crudest formulation of physicalism is simply the claim that everything is physical, and perhaps that is all physicalism ought to imply. But in fact a large number of distinct versions of physicalism are currently in play, with very different commitments and implications. There is no agreement about the detailed formulation of the doctrine, even though a majority of philosophers would claim to be physicalists, and a vast majority of them are physicalists of one sort or another. There are several reasons for this lack of agreement: deep and imponderable questions about realism and the legitimacy of a narrowly defined notion of reality, questions about the scope of the term ‘physical,’ issues about explanation and reduction, and worries about the proper range of physicalism, particularly with respect to so-called abstract objects such as numbers, sets, or properties…the project of specifying a physicalism which plausibly integrates mind into the physical world remains unfinished, despite the huge number and diversity of attempts. It would be natural to begin the delineation of physicalism by contrasting it with the older doctrine of materialism, but this contrast is itself vague and murky,” A Companion to the Philosophy of Science (Blackwell 2001), 340.
Jason Streitfeld said...
ReplyDelete“What does it mean for a mathematical theorem to be true, anyway?__For Steve and Penrose, I suppose it means that the theorem corresponds to some entity existing in the abstract realm, whatever that means.__And yet, we cannot assume such a realm exists. (As I noted in a different post, we have good reason to suspect that such a realm cannot exist, because mathematics cannot be both complete and consistent.)__So, if we don't assume there is some other realm, then what does it mean to say that a mathematical theorem is true?__It means that the theorem can be derived from the axioms of mathematics.__If a theorem can be derived from the axioms, then it is true.__Fermat's theorem could have been derived from the axioms of mathematics centuries ago, but it wasn't.”
i) Of course, even if we accept Jason’s methodology, it only pushes the question back a step. Did the axioms exist? What’s their mode of subsistence?
ii) Likewise, what makes the axioms true? What are their truth-bearers?
iii) Finally, Jason only addressed one of Penrose’s examples. He disregarded the other example (involving the Mandelbrot set).
Jason,
ReplyDelete"Hey, did you all know that Paul Manata is a big liar?"
Jason, I owe you a big apology. I guess I also lied when I said you were a freshman philosophy student. Apparently you're in first grade and are striving to make sure everyone knows it.
Jason: "Look at this. Manata says that I "said one could not have 'false beliefs about food otherwise one would starve.'"
The problem is, I never said that. He used quotes to mislead you all into thinking I said something I never said.
You want to check? Search the page for that alleged remark, and you will find that the only place it appears is in Manata's corrupt text.
What I did says was this:
"If my beliefs about how to get food, maintain my health, and so on, were all false, then I would surely not survive long enough to reproduce."
Me: Seems the same. Moreover, as I parsed it out, I said exactly what you just said. Your attempt to throw sand and pout seems indicative of your inability to actually interact with my points.
Jason: "Manata has not produced an argument against this position. Instead, he attacked a straw man, and now he is offering false evidence to make you all think that he was right all along."
Me: I did produce said argument. I ofered a scenario where one had false "beliefs about how to get food, maintain my health, and so on" and showed that one would " surely ... survive long enough to reproduce."
Gotta a comeback yet?
Jason: "Manata . . . you all should keep an eye on this guy. He looks as dishonest as they come."
Me: Uh-oh, looks like Jason is dishonest. he's hoping the playground sand he throws will distract everyone from the fact that I gave an example of how a "false belief" about food didn't undercut one's ability to "survive."
Jason: "Manata lied again here:
"Anyway, Jason has now admitted that he thinks the Bible says things like this:
’If your neighbors dog is barking in certain parts of suburban American, here's the final word on what you should do.’"
Clearly Manata has his head shoved way, and I mean way up his rectum. I don’t see how anyone could possibly interpret anything I’ve said in this manner."
Me: Apparently Jason thinks I should be taken wooden literally. He reads me like a tothless fundy reads the Bible.
Jason: "MAnata asks, with capital letters (to imply moral outrage, I suppose): “THEN WHAT DO YOU MEAN WHEN YOU IMPLY THAT CHRISTIANS THINK THE BIBLE GIVES THE "FINAL WORD" ON **ALL** MORAL QUESTIONS?”
Has Manata been following this discussion at all?
I am not talking about what Christians in general think. I’m talking about what Rhology thinks, and what those who have tried to defend his position here think.
Me: Yeah, so? You still have yet to DEFINE WHAT YOU MEAN so that we can even see if your ARE actually representing Rhology's position correctly.
Apparently Jason thinks Rhology thinks that the Bible has a verse. Perhaps in I, or was it II Opinions 3:15 "Now, if ye neighbor's dog barketh all night in suburban America, thou shalt...."
Jason "Rhology has explicitly said that he thinks the Bible is "the final word. Not the only word - there is plenty of clamor from inferior, competing voices. Like Jason's."
Me: So. As I've said 4 times now, maybe it is maybe it isn't. That all depends on what the heck you took him to mean, now doesn't it. I'd call your hermeneutical abilities sophomoric, but I wouldn;t want to offend sophomores.
Jason: "Manata can't get over my comment about how straightforward and obvious my use of the term "all" was.
Me: All I did was say that the term 'all' is 'vague.' You've admitted that I was right. Then, you told us that you meant it universaly. Okay, and I pointed out that this means that either you think that the Bible discusses America and our dogs or you thinbk that Rhology thinks so. Either one is absurd.
So, try again.
Jason: "Anyone who has been following this discussion carefully would know that there were no contextual restrictions on my use of the term "all."
Me: That's the intentional falacy. You don't have access to their minds.
Anyway, I was trying to be charitable with you. I didin't think someone was so dense that he thought Christians thought their Bible mentioned "America," under "A". Perhaps "San Diego" under "S"?
Jason: "I was not talking about some vaguely defined subset of all possible moral arguments."
Me: Yes, you were talking about ALL and it was obvious that ALL meant ALL.
So, now you're not talking about "all?"
And....I see that you've chosen to run from the rest of my argument. Wise choice.
Jason Streitfeld said...
ReplyDelete“So now evolution plays tricks on people? How's that, Steve?”
Ask your fellow Darwinians:
“Michael Ruse and E.O.Wilson have argued that a (false) belief in the objectivity of morality fosters fitness and has been favored by evolution.[115] David Sloan Wilson has argued that a (false) belief in religion fosters group fitness and has been favored by evolution.[116] According to Scott Atran, evolution has apparently favored a (false) belief very nearly in its own denial.[117] Non-theistic evolution apparently does not merely lack an interest in truth - truth taking the hindmost, as Patricia Churchland puts it [118] - but in important instances seems to have a vested interest in falsehood.”
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/11/where-science-and-religion-fuse.html
“It is almost as if the human brain were specifically designed to misunderstand Darwinism, and to find it hard to believe.”
http://www.simonyi.ox.ac.uk/dawkins/WorldOfDawkins-archive/Catalano/quotes.shtml
“Even though I have learned to be an intellectual monist, I am a human animal and therefore evolved as an instinctive dualist. The idea that there is a me perched somewhere behind my eyes and capable, at lest in fiction, of migrating into somebody else’s head, is deeply ingrained in me and in every other human being, whatever our intellectual pretensions to monism,” R. Dawkins, The God Delusion, 180.
“It is useful for our brains to construct notions like solidity and impenetrability, because such notions help us to navigate our bodies through a world in which objects—which we call solid—cannot occupy the same space as each other,” ibid. 368.
“I think ethics is an illusion put into place by our genes to keep us social.”
http://www.believermag.com/issues/200307/?read=interview_ruse
Continuing with Jason:
“Maybe shame is actually useful for us, Steve.”
Maybe theft is actually useful for us, Jason.
In fact, if you’re a clever thief who covers his tracks, theft can be very lucrative. Would Jason therefore justify theft on grounds of utility?
“No, Steve thinks atheists are just idiots who have no interest in living beyond the present moment, who cannot think ahead, who cannot find value in interpersonal relationships and a sense of community, who would rather live a short life of excess and self-absorbtion, instead of engaging in the sort of things that provide profound, long-term fulfillment.__Steve, you need to open your eyes.”
Of course, the question at issue is not how an atheist may arbitrarily choose to live, but whether his lifestyle is consistent with his worldview.
I’ve already quoted Ruse. Here’s another example:
“I do not believe my theory differs very much from that of many or most people. There is a sense that my life, actions and consequences of actions amount to nothing when I am considering the value of an infinite universe. Our emotional responses to acts or states of affairs we believe have positive or negative value occur when we are narrowly focused on ‘the here and now’, on the people we interact with or know about, ourselves, and the animals, plants and material things that surround us in our daily lives. In our daily lives, we believe actions are good or bad and that individuals have rights. These beliefs are false, but we know this only on the occasions when we engage in second order beliefs about our everyday beliefs and view our everyday beliefs from the perspective of infinity. Most of the time, we live in an illusion of meaningfulness and only some times, when we are philosophically reflective, are we aware of reality and the meaninglessness of our lives. It seems obvious that this has a genetic basis, due to Darwinian laws of evolution. In order to survive and reproduce, it must seem to us most of the time that our actions are not futile, that people have rights. The rare occasions in which we know the truth about life are genetically prevented from overriding living our daily lives with the illusion that they are meaningful. As I progress through this paper, I have the illusion that my efforts are not utterly futile, but right now, as I stop and reflect, I realize that any further effort put into this paper is a futile expenditure of my energy.”
http://www.qsmithwmu.com/moral_realism_and_infinte_spacetime_imply_moral_nihilism_by_quentin_smith.htm
Let's also not forget Mackie,
ReplyDelete""If their were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we are aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty or moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing anything else" (J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, 1977, p.38).
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“Steve is claiming that abstract objects exist, but that they are not algorithms. So what are they? How do I know when I'm looking at one?”
That’s such a dorky thing to say. Abstract objects, being abstract, are not something you can “look at” in the first place.
“And, when asked how the abstract and physical interact, he says…That is not a description of interaction.”
You didn’t ask how they “interact.” This was your question: “and how they relate to physical objects.”
A “relation” is not synonymous with “interaction.”
An exemplar/exemplum relation is a genuine, explanatory relation. My answer was perfectly adequate to your question.
“It does not further our understanding of why Steve rejects my clear understanding of abstract entities.”
You don’t offer a clear understanding of abstract entities. Instead, you fall back on your all-purpose appeal to algorithms. You posit that abstract objects are algorithms. No actual argument for that identification.
And that’s hardly a clear explanation of how to construe possible worlds or infinite sets (to take two paradigm examples of abstract objects).
“That does not follow. All you can say, granting Hume's supposition, is that one particular a priori objection to dualism is invalid. It does not negate the possibility of other a priori objections.”
It doesn’t? Let’s see you come up with another a priori objection to dualistic interaction
“My objection is still on the table, and it has nothing to do with Hume's comments, or about causality. (Why did Steve ask me to define how I'm using the word ‘causality?’ Causality was never a part of my arguments here.)”
How does one even reason with an opponent as terminally obtuse as Jason? He can’t keep track of his own argument.
By asking how abstract and concrete objects “interact,” he’s implicitly posing a question about their causal interrelations.
"“Steve is claiming that abstract objects exist, but that they are not algorithms. So what are they? How do I know when I'm looking at one?”
ReplyDeleteThat’s such a dorky thing to say. Abstract objects, being abstract, are not something you can “look at” in the first place."
What's even more dorky is that instantiating an 'algorithm' is something that can be exemplified by multiply diverse particlars, so algorithimness is being smuggled in as some kind of an answer to this problem yet it itself calls for the same explanation.
That's part of the problem - anti-realists can't escape invoking realist assumptions in their denials of realism!
Let's at least get our bearings straight here and see what the problem is:
THE PROBLEM STATED:
There are things which agree in attributes: this blood splotch and that fire truck are the same shade of red, this coin and that ring are circular, this brown animal and this grey animal are elephants, etc. There are objective similarities among things. Suppose it to be a fact that certain objects agree in attribute, they are all, say, 'north of' America. Is there some basic fact more basic than this fact such that because the more fundamental fact holds of these objects that they are all 'north of?' What accounts for attribute agreement?
So, the question all have to answer is: a has the attribute f iff Q. Now, we need to fill in Q. How does a nominalist do so? The realist will reply that: a has the attribute f iff a exemplified f-ness. The general schema we use tells that where a number of objects, a...n, agree in attribute, there is a thing *, and a relation, R, such that each of a...n bears R to *, and, the claim is that it is in virtue of standing to R to * that a...n agree in attribute by being all 'north of,' just,' 'courageous,' whatever.
Metaphysical realists insist that an adequate account of attribute agreement presuppose a distinction between two types of categories of objects: particulars and universals. What is peculiar to a particular is that each occupy a given spatiotemporal at the same time. Universals are, by contrast, repeatable, or, multiply exemplifiable entities.
I'll now turn to subject-predicate (SP) discourse and abstract reference (AR).
SP: here are three SP modes of discourse which are examples of three different types of universals: property, kind, relation. I'll take them in that order
1. Socrates is courageous.
2. Plato is a human being.
3. Socrates is the teacher of Plato.
Sentences like these pick out, or refer to a particular and go on to say something about it-to describe or characterize it in some way, or to relate it to something else. Taking one, for example. We 'say of' Socrates that he is courageous. Does only Socrates play a referential role, this account is incomplete. Any satisfactory analysis of 1 will show the predicate term 'courageous' to have referential force, as well.
What if 1 is true? Pretty clearly, it's truth depends on two things: first, what one says and second, the way the world is. In other words, the truth of SP discourse is its linguistic structure and it corresponding to, or mirroring, some nonlingustic structure of the world. So, to be true Socrates must correspond to some non-lingustic structure of the world. But this doesn't make the sentence true. To do that, courageous must also correspond to some non-linguistic truth about the world. At this we are quick to point out that 'courageous' can be applied to many different individuals, even at the same place and time. This is a very brief account of the problem. It gets very detailed. We'll wait to see Zack's answer to these questions before we begin the heavy-duty stuff.
AR: Metaphysical realists insist that we can give a satisfactory account of abstract reference. AR makes it's obvious appearance in what we call 'abstract singular terms.' Examples are: triangularity, wisdom, mankind, courage, etc. The AR is a devise which picks out a certain property or kind and the general term is an expression true of, or satisfied by, all and only those objects that exemplify that property or kind. Unless we take these terms, abstract singular, to be devices for referring to universals, we cannot provide a satisfactory account for sentences in which they appear. Examples:
4. Courage is a moral virtue.
5. Triangularity is a shape.
6. Hilary prefers red to blue.
Realists insist that if we are to provide an account of what these sentences say, we must hold that, as they occur in these sentences, abstract singular terms are functioning in precisely the way the intuitive account tells us they function: they are playing a referential role of a straightforward sort, not "a" straightforward, but actually *the* most straightforward sort; they are functioning as names of universals. But if they play this sort of role, the sentences in which they occur can only be true only if the universal they name actually exist. So, the metaphysical realist can provide an account for this while the nominalist can't. At least, that is the contention presently.
Concerning morality with regards to evolution...
ReplyDeleteMorality can only be considered the CURRENT solution and therefore subject to whatever allows us to survive and reproduce more. Seems simple based on selection.
Therefore there is nothing absolute, whatsoever.
So any social contract is merely somthing to *beat*. If I can get away with it, there is nothing to keep me from doing what I want. If I can get away with theft and feel no shame, or if I can rationalize my shame away, then it's fine. And if I do feel shame, one could make the argument that that makes me weaker.
According to naturalitic philosophy, that we regard rape with revulsion is simply the current mode. Rape was considered a vital process in human evolution. We now consider it evil but only becuase social convention regards it as so. There is nothing inherently evil about it other than our ancestors survved and reproduced more with this belief that it's wrong, a jumble of neuronal connections that led to higher fitness. HOWEVER, if in 100 years things have changed, rape, theft, and genocide could be considered quite proper and there would be nothing to say no....
Zoe Girl:
ReplyDelete"So any social contract is merely somthing to *beat*. If I can get away with it, there is nothing to keep me from doing what I want. If I can get away with theft and feel no shame, or if I can rationalize my shame away, then it's fine. And if I do feel shame, one could make the argument that that makes me weaker."
Good point. Plato asked about the invisible man. What if you had a ring that turned you invisible so you would not get caught committing all manner of immoral acts. Why should you be moral? To answer, "because you "signed" the contract" should be an obvious textbook example of begging the question. Why honor contracts?
Bruce writes:
ReplyDeleteJason writes: "We can say it "was true" a billion years ago that the universe existed, if we mean that our references to a billion years ago are valid. But this does not mean that there were necessarily true propositions about the universe that existed a billion years ago."
Do. you. realize. the. raw. implications. of. this. statement. of. yours. if. it. were. true?
You have just undercut the foundations of rationality. You have just asserted that rationality is fictitious.
Jason writes:
Bruce,
"You have just undercut the foundations of rationality. You have just asserted that rationality is fictitious."
No, I have not.
You are either insane, incompetent, or simply dishonest.
Bruce again now:
I just thought it would be cool to see Jason's original statement, my comment on a simple and plain deduction from it, and Jason's non-referential response to that observation, all strung together.
Jason, did you deduce your assesment of my mental state from the absence of regular English subject-verb word order, or some other syntactical faux paux in my post? Can you explain any rational basis for your conclusion drawn from the post's content?
Or did I merely commit the sin of disagreeing with you, and therefore I'm one of the above? If I simply made a mistake, then you could have offered enlightenment. But with Jason, there is no forgiveness for such violations, no "judgment of charity".
Or perhaps... is that a value judgment Jason? Don't you need to negotiate that with me for your evaluation to have any meaning outside your cloudy opinion?
Anyway, he says there was "no necessarily true propositions" before minds existed to intuit them. Same thing as saying two discrete objects COULD inhabit the same space at the same time before mind existed. This is ultimate irrationality. Which produces said mind...
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“I do not need to negotiate that with Manata, because it has already been established in the civilized world.”
This kind of thinking is fascist. Jason would like to live in a dictatorship where all possible judgments about lying are nonnegotiable, and where anyone who disagrees with those social conventions is condemned.
Fascism is the negation of contracts, because it denies the right of individuals to negotiate contracts. Jason is infringing on Manata’s individual rights.
Paul Manata,
ReplyDelete"the truth of SP discourse is its linguistic structure and it corresponding to, or mirroring, some nonlingustic structure of the world."
This is a debatable point. There is no basis for assuming that the linguistic structure itself corresponds to some structural qualities in the world. Rather, the truth of a proposition is only dependent upon how it relates to the behavior we associate with a person in relation to their belief in that proposition. In other words, if beleiving X to be true produces behavior that is in line without our understanding of the world, then X is true. The linguistic entities (subject/object/preposition/qualifier/modal verb/etc.) need not have non-linguistic correlates.
"So, to be true Socrates must correspond to some non-lingustic structure of the world. But this doesn't make the sentence true. To do that, courageous must also correspond to some non-linguistic truth about the world. At this we are quick to point out that 'courageous' can be applied to many different individuals, even at the same place and time. This is a very brief account of the problem. It gets very detailed. We'll wait to see Zack's answer to these questions before we begin the heavy-duty stuff."
First question: who's Zack?
Second question: Do you see the circularity in your reasoning?
You first begin by assuming that the linguistic structure corresponds to some non-linguistic structure, and then you use that to conclude that those words which have no material referents must have some non-material referent.
You've begged the question, Manata.
My understanding of "truth" is much simpler, and it is rooted in human behavior.
Remember Wittgenstein? He asked us to think about the nature of mathematics (and all knowledge) in terms of how it is learned. How do we know that we've learned a rule of mathematics? By how we act.
Truth can be plainly understood in terms of human behavior. We don't need to beg the question about some unobservable, unquantifiable realm.
Sorry all, I have to correct this typo:
ReplyDeleteIn my last post, I meant to write: "In other words, if beleiving X to be true produces behavior that is in line WITH our understanding of the world, then X is true."
In other words, we decide whether or not X is true by the consequences of our actions. If believing in X leads us to make a lot of bad predictions about the world--that is, if believing in X leads us to expect the world to act contrary to the way it really responds to our behavior--then we should regard X as false.
Linguistic structure is the result of our cognition, and there is no basis for thinking that all of our linguistic categories correlate to non-linguistic entities.
Steve and Manata have challenged me to account for my understanding of "abstract entities," which I regard as algorithms.
ReplyDeleteAlgorithms are rules for solving particular problems, or producing specific results. So, when I say thoughts, ideas, propositions, and all those other "abstract entities" are algorithms, I mean they are rules.
Why do I say this? It's not just because of Wittgenstein.
It's because we see how rules work. We know how to program computers, for example. We don't think that a computer has to have some kind of interface with an abstract realm in order to implement our software. We simply see that, when certain material objects are structured a certain way, they can produce complex yet well-organized results in other systems.
When we talk about mathematical objects, for example, we are talking about how to use the rules of mathematics. When we learn the rules of addition, we do not simply intuit the answers. We work them out. It's a matter of learning to associate the symbolic language with behavioral processes. We, in short, program ourselves to carry out functions, just like we program our computers to carry out MS Word.
Of course, the human brain is way more plastic and complex than any man-made computer so far. But my point here holds: we learn and share linguistic, logical, and mathematical systems by associating our observable behavior with written formulas.
The formulas themselves need not refer to anything beyond the procedures implemented in us when we use them.
So, the procedure--the rules--for calculating pi are well-defined in relation to the axioms of mathematics. But that does not mean that pi exists in some abstract realm, apart from the rules and formulas we deal with when we do mathematics. No, it only means that the rules for calculating pi are well-defined, and can be run on any system properly organized.
Steve,
ReplyDelete"“Ahh, that was a mistake. It was the lovely Paul Manata who made that stunning remark.”
iv) Ergo, Jason is a liar (not to mention an uncivilized person)."
At least I apologized for my mistake. Will Manata do the same?
Manata,
ReplyDelete"I ofered a scenario where one had false "beliefs about how to get food, maintain my health, and so on" and showed that one would " surely ... survive long enough to reproduce."
Gotta a comeback yet?"
Interesting that a guy who obsesses over philosophical possibilities about the word "all" fails to respect it in my argument here.
Manata, all you claimed was that a person with one false belief about food could still survive long enough to reproduce. I never said all of our beliefs had to be true. I said all of them couldn't be false.
Manata, logic is your friend. Don't disrespect it so.
Bruce seems to think he's a whole lot smarter than me.
ReplyDeletePlease, Bruce, tell us all how you determined that the statement "You have just asserted that rationality is fictitious" logically follows from anything I've said.
What I said was that we can have true propositions about the universe a billion years ago without there having been any propositions in existence a billion years ago.
By what chain of reasoning do you infer that the lack of propositions existing at the time which our current propositions refer implies that our propositions are fictitious?
Please, do demonstrate your superior intelligence, Bruce, because so far its existence is in serious doubt.
zoegirl,
ReplyDelete"Concerning morality with regards to evolution...
Morality can only be considered the CURRENT solution and therefore subject to whatever allows us to survive and reproduce more. Seems simple based on selection.
Therefore there is nothing absolute, whatsoever."
That's not accurate, zoegirl.
Morality is not a solution, first of all. It's a process.
Moral judgments are solutions, of course. Maybe that's what you meant.
So, you want to say that, if moral judgments are based on evolutionary mechanisms, they cannot be absolute.
The problem is, your conclusion doesn't follow from your premise.
Morality has its own defining characteristics, just like anything else. We can define the properties of morality as such, without limiting ourselves to any particular moral system or community.
So, we can have an absolute, universal definition of "morality" as a process. We can thus make a priori judgments about moral judgments, at least in so far as they relate to morality itself.
As I've recently shown on Rhology's blog, this allows us to make absolute and universal moral judgments.
Here's a quote from my comment on Rhology's blog:
"Again, in my view, morality is the process of aiming for the most justifiable position available.
If one is antagonistic towards this process, then one is opposed to the very search for justifications.
If one's view is opposed to the search for justifications, then one's view is opposed to justification itself.
If one's view is opposed to justification, then one's view cannot be justified. (For, to justify it would be to present a justification, and it exactly what is being opposed.)
If one's view cannot be justified, it is, by definition, 'bad.'"
http://rhoblogy.blogspot.com/2008/11/preaching-to-scum.html
GeneMBriges says,
ReplyDelete"If you believe the NT does not obligate us to accept that interpretation, then you need to argue it, not assert it."
Two very important points here.
First, Gene is the one who is proposing an obligation here. Thus, the onus is on Gene to prove that his is not just one among many possible interpretations.
Second, Gene says he is willing to field arguments for alternative interpretations. This means that his attachment to his interpretation of the New Testament is open to argument.
This seems harmless, right? Why shouldn't he be willing to consider arguments for alternative itnerpretations?
Well, if Gene admits that his position is an interpretation (even if he thinks we are all obligated to accept it), and he admits that one could theoretically overturn his interpretation through argument, then Gene is basing his position on rational discourse.
That is, Gene is open to the possibility that rational discourse could take him away from his interpretation of the Bible.
I respect that, Gene. I really do. I hope all of the readers of this forum similarly value rational discourse, and are willing to listen to reason, even when it conflicts with their interpretation of the Bible.
That is, in fact, my primary concern here. I'm afraid of religious devotees who refuse to listen to reason when it challenges their interpretation of the Bible.
Of course, I get the impression that many people here are happy to assume that their understanding of philosophy is sufficient, and that anybody who disagrees with them is an ignorant fool. This makes it hard for them to rationally investigate the foundations for their own beliefs. So, I still have cause for alarm. But at least Gene's willing to question his interpretation of the Bible. That's a start.
Evolutionists talk about "evolutionary solutions" all the time and that's what I meant about solutions. Morality, the process of determining social contracts, in your language, is simply the current evolutionary solution for mankind. A hundred years from now, perhaps children 5 years and younger will be killed who are disabled or who are poor....who knows, the point? That might be the result of the next evolutionary solution. THerefore, there is nothing inherently right or wrong about an act, but thinking makes it so. Right now killing a 5 year old is wrong, but because of this "process" of morality, perhaps society decides that it's better off to kill them rather then have them live with a debilitating disease or poor. Who are we to say that this is wrong? Why?
ReplyDeleteJason Wrote:""Again, in my view, morality is the process of aiming for the most justifiable position available."
Zoegirl: So a rapist who "justifies" his action is imsply determing his morality perfectly fine.
Jason wrote"
If one is antagonistic towards this process, then one is opposed to the very search for justifications."
How is a rapist or thief antagonistic towards justification? In fact, their entire thought process is geared towards justifying their actions. The rapist "I want to conquer, subdue, I am stronger, they are weaker, Having sex with that woman will satisfy my feelings of lust/power, satisfy my feelings. Why should I care what she thinks? She's not my kin and I have no social contract with her....there is no one around for miles and I know that she has no family...I have no reason not to get what I want" After all, that's what humans did for the longest time according to anthropology....what makes them so bad? Many animals have forced sex. Why is it bad for us? After all, the strongest male will procreate.
The thief "I want that....I can get away with it, they are rich, they don't need it"
They have worked towards determining their morality. What gives us the right to question their justification?!??
Jason Wrote: "
If one's view is opposed to the search for justifications, then one's view is opposed to justification itself.
If one's view is opposed to justification, then one's view cannot be justified. (For, to justify it would be to present a justification, and it exactly what is being opposed.)"
Zoegirl: Again, show me how a thief doesn't search for justification? They are not oppsed to justification. The only reason that they are prosecuted is that currently the process of determing justifcation means that more poeple disagre with him that agree with him.
JASON WROTE"
If one's view cannot be justified, it is, by definition, 'bad.'""
Zoegirl....Ummm...So if I can justify my action, it's not bad?!?!? What determines justifaction?
JASON WROTE: "Morality has its own defining characteristics, just like anything else. We can define the properties of morality as such, without limiting ourselves to any particular moral system or community.
"
What are such defining charactieristics? Without getting into social contracts, you can't. It's just a matter of the current mode. And that's ok, until you atart thinking that something is bad that the current mode thinks is good. Let's hope that your idea of justification never contradicts with societies view of justification.
First, Gene is the one who is proposing an obligation here. Thus, the onus is on Gene to prove that his is not just one among many possible interpretations.
ReplyDelete1. I never said there were not other "possible," interpretations, so you've misplaced the burden of proof. The burden of proof is not on me to prove this. The burden of proof is on Jason to actually argue for a different interpretation and tell us why it's preferable to the one I offered.
The issue, Jason, isn't whether or not there are "possible" interpretations - the issue is which one is the exegetically correct one. That's why you've misplaced the burden of proof here.
Jason has yet to provide this. If he could, he likely would have done so by now.
2. Am I the one proposing an obligation here? Once again, Jason can't follow his own argument. He's the one that cast the argument in terms of obligation - not me.
Here's what he stated:
However, it is only an interpretation, and it is not clear that the New Testament obligates us to accept your interpretation.
If the NT doesn't obligate us to accept my exegesis, then what intepretation does the NT obligate to accept? Jason has already in his own statements asked questions that presume there is something in the NT that obligates us one way or the other with respect to OT "commandments."
I'm merely answering Jason on his own terms - a concept around which Jason can't seem to wrap his tiny mind.
He's the one, remember, who after I answered his question, drew back into, to paraphrase, "that's just your interpretation," not me. The onus is now on him, not me to produce the things for which he asks.
Sure, Jason, I'm open to rational discussion - unfortunately you're too irrational a person to engage.
I respect that, Gene. I really do. I hope all of the readers of this forum similarly value rational discourse, and are willing to listen to reason, even when it conflicts with their interpretation of the Bible.
Of course, the leading problem here is that the Bible does not conflict with reason unless you introduce the sort of wooly presuppositional thinking that Jason possesses upon it. The Bible is the epitome of reason, therefore nothing it would conflict with reason.
Jason has no nonarbitary epistemolgoical warrant for anything he says about "rationality," because, for him, "rationality" is the product of the mind - but minds conflict and contract each other, so rationality qua rationality must be equally conflicted and contradictory. He's been shown this a number of times, but his mind is too irrational to see it.
And let the record further show that for all his posturing, Jason has yet to produce a counterargument to the one I provided. No, not one, and I even gave him some hints with respect to how to do so. Good job, Jason.
Bible 1, Jason -10 and counting.
zoegirl,
ReplyDeleteFirst, I never said morality is the process of determining social contracts. In my view, morality is the process of negotiating values in order to determine the most justifiable course of action. Social contracts can result from the process, but I wouldn't assume they are its exclusive product.
Second, I think it's a little misleading to say that morality is "the current evolutionary solution for mankind."
You're right that we can talk about morality as an "evolutionary solution," but that doesn't have the implications you think it does.
For one thing, from an evolutionary point of view, morality is an evolutionary solution for genes, and not a solution for the species, exactly.
Also, when we talk about morality as an evolutionary solution, we need to be sure we understand what morality is. In my understanding, the best interpretation of our behavior behavior is to regard morality as a rational process informed by emotions.
This does not define morality in specific physiological terms. Rather, it defines morality in functional terms. Thus, we can abstract from the physiological and regard morality in ideal terms. (And, yes, we can do this without postulating a realm of Platonic forms, despite what some here insist.)
Thus, we can make a priori judgments about morality.
You ask, "if I can justify my action, it's not bad?!?!? What determines justifaction?"
Rational discourse decides. Just like rational discourse allows Gene to decide how to interpret the Bible.
"What are such defining charactieristics? Without getting into social contracts, you can't."
The defining characteristics of morality: any process whereby rational agents negotiate competing interests to guide their behavior towards the most justifiable behavior possible, according to the prevailing rational arguments.
"It's just a matter of the current mode."
No, because if you change it, it's not morality anymore. It's something else. Perhaps digestion.
Gene asks,
ReplyDelete"If the NT doesn't obligate us to accept my exegesis, then what intepretation does the NT obligate to accept?"
Generally speaking, myths and prose are open to interpretation. I can't imagine how any book of mythology and historical fiction could rationally obligate its readers to adopt one, and only one, interpretation. Why should the Bible be treated any differently?
In my interpretation, the Bible is a work of mythology and historical fiction which offers nothing by way of moral authority. It offers comfort and guidance to many, no doubt, but I see no evidence that it is anything more than a work of man. That's my interpretation of the Bible.
Back to you, Gene.
Gene says,
ReplyDelete"Jason has no nonarbitary epistemolgoical warrant for anything he says about "rationality," because, for him, "rationality" is the product of the mind - but minds conflict and contract each other, so rationality qua rationality must be equally conflicted and contradictory."
That's wishful thinking on Gene's part.
"He's been shown this a number of times, but his mind is too irrational to see it."
That's pure fantasy on Gene's part.
"And let the record further show that for all his posturing, Jason has yet to produce a counterargument to the one I provided."
Which argument is Gene referring to here? Anyone have a clue?
zoegirl,
ReplyDelete"How is a rapist or thief antagonistic towards justification?"
I didn't say that all immoral people are antagonistic towards morality. I said that an antagonistic attitude towards morality is immoral. There is a huge difference, and it is important.
Speaking of rapists, you say, "In fact, their entire thought process is geared towards justifying their actions . . ."
Of course people who do bad things try to justify them. A rapist can have a conscience, too. That doesn't make him right.
You ask, "what makes them so bad? Many animals have forced sex. Why is it bad for us? After all, the strongest male will procreate."
The question, I take it, is: why is rape considered immoral, if rapists spend a lot of effort trying to justify their behavior?
I'm not going to pretend to have the whole answer here, but I will make a couple of observations. First of all, the ability to maintain family lines is seriously compromised with rape. When a woman, especially a young girl, is raped, it interferes with her and her family's ability to control the bloodline. So it is possible, I think, that we are conditioned by evolution to look down on rape because we have evolved family structures which benefit from a certain degree of autonomy.
Of course I'm not sure about this answer. I don't pretend to be an expert on the subject. But it's something to think about. The point is, we can look at physiological, psychological, sociological, and other factors to answer this kind of question.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“At least I apologized for my mistake.”
Does that make you an apologetic liar?
“Will Manata do the same?”
For what? For paraphrasing your statement? As long as his paraphrase was accurate, how would that amount to a lie?
Or do you mean that your original statement was a lie, in which case an accurate paraphrase of your original statement would also be a lie?
Jason wrote " First, I never said morality is the process of determining social contracts. In my view, morality is the process of negotiating values in order to determine the most justifiable course of action. Social contracts can result from the process, but I wouldn't assume they are its exclusive product."
ReplyDeleteOkay, sorry about the mistake. I still disagree. "The most justifiable course of action" From whose perspective?!?!
Jason wrote: "Second, I think it's a little misleading to say that morality is "the current evolutionary solution for mankind."
You're right that we can talk about morality as an "evolutionary solution," but that doesn't have the implications you think it does."
For one thing, from an evolutionary point of view, morality is an evolutionary solution for genes, and not a solution for the species, exactly."
Zoegirl: What difference does that make?
The solution affects the society.
Jason wrote"
Also, when we talk about morality as an evolutionary solution, we need to be sure we understand what morality is. In my understanding, the best interpretation of our behavior behavior is to regard morality as a rational process informed by emotions."
Zoegirl: Rational is defined by whom? What emotions justify actions? Does anger? revenge? Lust?
Jason wrote"
This does not define morality in specific physiological terms. Rather, it defines morality in functional terms. Thus, we can abstract from the physiological and regard morality in ideal terms. (And, yes, we can do this without postulating a realm of Platonic forms, despite what some here insist."
Zoegirl: So how do you define ideals? What if somebody else's ideals are not yours? Let's say My ideal is to be wealthy....why should your fence and burglar alarm stop me if I know how to get around them?
Why can we?
Jason wrote"
Thus, we can make a priori judgments about morality.
You ask, "if I can justify my action, it's not bad?!?!? What determines justifaction?"
Rational discourse decides. Just like rational discourse allows Gene to decide how to interpret the Bible."
Zoegirl: So why is stealing bad...what makes it "rational" to regard another's property as so special as to make it wrong to take it?
Why is cheating bad? Why rational discourse makes cheating wrong? If I am smart enough to cheat on a test over a over again and not get caught, there is a good chance that I will be successful in life. Why is it wrong?
Jason wrote"
The defining characteristics of morality: any process whereby rational agents negotiate competing interests to guide their behavior towards the most justifiable behavior possible, according to the prevailing rational arguments."
Again, how do you define "justifiable?
"It's just a matter of the current mode."
Jason wrote: No, because if you change it, it's not morality anymore. It's something else. Perhaps digestion."
Zoegirl wrote: You completely missed my point. What we define as moral right now is completely fluid and completely up to our powers of rationalization to "justify" our actions. AS long as a group of people can get together and "justify" an action, and these people are rational enough to persuade others with their justification, what *is* moral and what is *immoral* is completely fluid. It can change.
Jason wrote:
I didn't say that all immoral people are antagonistic towards morality. I said that an antagonistic attitude towards morality is immoral. There is a huge difference, and it is important."
Zoegirl: How is the world can you claim that something is immoral when morality is completely and utterly plastic? YOu say at first that morality is a process whereby a group of rational people come to a decision about the most justifiable action.
YOu say that someone who is antagonistic towards morality is immoral, but that demands that we know what morality is. what fairness is, what justice is. If we don't, then someone who has a different set of morals than you is simply that, he is not wrong, simply different.
Jason wrote:"
Speaking of rapists, you say, "In fact, their entire thought process is geared towards justifying their actions . . ."
Of course people who do bad things try to justify them. A rapist can have a conscience, too. That doesn't make him right."
Zoegirl: And we are right back where we were....how do you define right from wrong when you *very* definition hinges upon a group decision? Especially from an evolutionary standpoint, all it would take is for more brazen, ballsy, people to start reproducing more and rape, theft would be back in fashion in several hundred years or more, and you couldn't say boo to it.
You definition rests upon an exalted view of mankind's rationality and conveniently forgets the power of rationlizing. YOu say he has a conscience. What about the common man who cheats on his IRS....completely rational, and he can justify it....
Jason wrote:"
You ask, "what makes them so bad? Many animals have forced sex. Why is it bad for us? After all, the strongest male will procreate."
The question, I take it, is: why is rape considered immoral, if rapists spend a lot of effort trying to justify their behavior?
I'm not going to pretend to have the whole answer here, but I will make a couple of observations. First of all, the ability to maintain family lines is seriously compromised with rape. When a woman, especially a young girl, is raped, it interferes with her and her family's ability to control the bloodline. So it is possible, I think, that we are conditioned by evolution to look down on rape because we have evolved family structures which benefit from a certain degree of autonomy."
Ah....but just because we have been conditioned by thousands of years of evolution doesn't mean that we can't examine it now rationally....and justify the behavior...the mind is a powerful thing, simply because *you* don't agree with my justification doesn't make *my* justifaction wrong.
Again, nothing is inherently right or wrong, but thinking makes it so.
If I can make a good case for justifying rape for *my* family, then why should I care about yours?
Why do we care about fairness? Justice?
Jason wrote:"
Of course I'm not sure about this answer. I don't pretend to be an expert on the subject. But it's something to think about. The point is, we can look at physiological, psychological, sociological, and other factors to answer this kind of question."
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“Algorithms are rules for solving particular problems, or producing specific results. So, when I say thoughts, ideas, propositions, and all those other ‘abstract entities’ are algorithms, I mean they are rules.”
So a possible world is a rule for solving particular problems or producing specific results.
There’s a possible world in which Napoleon won the Battle of Waterloo.
What problem does that solve or result does that produce?
And while you’re at it, show us the algorithmic version of Napoleon winning the Battle of Waterloo (and its historical aftermath).
“When we talk about mathematical objects, for example, we are talking about how to use the rules of mathematics.”
And what makes them rules? Are the “rules of mathematics” arbitrary rules like the rules of chess or poker or Monopoly or baseball?
Or is there something necessary about the “rules of mathematics”?
“When we learn the rules of addition, we do not simply intuit the answers. We work them out.”
No, that’s not how we work them out. Rather, some individuals are mathematical geniuses. They rely on their mathematical intuition to discover the “rules.” The rest of us simply profit from their discoveries.
“We learn and share linguistic, logical, and mathematical systems by associating our observable behavior with written formulas.”
How do you associate your observable behavior with a pseudoholomorphic curve (to take one example)?
“But that does not mean that pi exists in some abstract realm, apart from the rules and formulas we deal with when we do mathematics.”
So pi didn’t exist until we hit upon a formula for pi.
Likewise, the universe didn’t have a mathematical structure until we began to invent mathematical formulae. The mathematical structure of the universe evolved in the last few centuries as we invented ever more mathematical formulae.
For a materialist, you bear an uncanny resemblance to an idealist.
Gene asks,
ReplyDelete"If the NT doesn't obligate us to accept my exegesis, then what intepretation does the NT obligate to accept?"
Generally speaking, myths and prose are open to interpretation. I can't imagine how any book of mythology and historical fiction could rationally obligate its readers to adopt one, and only one, interpretation. Why should the Bible be treated any differently?
1. Notice that, rather than offering an exegetical response, eg. a differing interpretation, Jason runs to question begging claims about the Bible, calling it mythology and historical fiction - and without a scintilla of a supporting argument. We're back to SKA, Wiki, etc.
2. In Jason's world, there is no such thing as exegesis of the texts. No, there are just "many interprtations." Okay, fine. What makes one interpretation more worthy of acceptance than the other.
3. The issue at hand isn't whether or not the Bible is composed of mythology or historical fiction...the question is one of grammatical-historical exegesis. The GHM doesn't select for any particular result. Jason is clueless about basic hermeneutics.
4. Which gets us back to the dishonest nature of his original question. Jason already had a mind to reject the answer. We've already pointed this out many times. Jason is a dishonest opponent.
5. Jason pointed to a command in Leviticus and asked about the NT. So, what the NT says about marriage, the Law, etc. is in view. "Prose" and "didactic" literature aren't convertible categories. Even if we were to eliminate the Gospels, we'd still have to contend with the didactic literature. Jason hasn't shown that the text in Leviticus which he cited is "mythological" in nature. No, Jason, just merrily goes along his way without a clue about what's actually necessary to underwrite his response to me.
In my interpretation, the Bible is a work of mythology and historical fiction which offers nothing by way of moral authority. It offers comfort and guidance to many, no doubt, but I see no evidence that it is anything more than a work of man. That's my interpretation of the Bible.
That's not an interpretation of the text. That's an assertion about the nature of the Bible. Was Jason's original question about the nature of the Bible? No.
Once again, Jason can't keep up with his own arguments.
Gene says,
"Jason has no nonarbitary epistemolgoical warrant for anything he says about "rationality," because, for him, "rationality" is the product of the mind - but minds conflict and contract each other, so rationality qua rationality must be equally conflicted and contradictory."
That's wishful thinking on Gene's part.
On the contrary, Jason, your argument as has been shown here several times is reducible to "morality is a process of negotiation, truth is a product of the mind."
But, Jason, because he's a dilletante, can't recognize the fact that this makes his warrant for his beliefs arbitrary - for minds conflict and contradict each other. What's good and right today can be bad and wrong tomorrow. The epistemic warrant is therefore arbitrary.
That's pure fantasy on Gene's part.
This is hopelessly jejune. The record here and elsewhere is littered now with statements like these from Jason. When he has no real response, he seeks to insult his opponents. Cry baby, cry.
Which argument is Gene referring to here? Anyone have a clue?
Uh, the one in response to your question about Leviticus. Do try to keep up, Jason.
Streitfeld,
ReplyDelete"This is a debatable point. There is no basis for assuming that the linguistic structure itself corresponds to some structural qualities in the world. Rather, the truth of a proposition is only dependent upon how it relates to the behavior we associate with a person in relation to their belief in that proposition. In other words, if beleiving X to be true produces behavior that is in line without our understanding of the world, then X is true."
This is false. We can apply the tem 'courageous' to multiply individuals even if they have never heard of, or have no idea about - and hence no 'belief' about the matter - what it is to be courageous.
And, what of the subject? How is that true? Just so ling as someone believes he's Socrates he is? If believing you're Socrates produces behavior in line with his understanding of the world, then it is true that Tom is Socrates?
if npt, why does the subject have to correspond to some non-linguistic feature of the world?
"Second question: Do you see the circularity in your reasoning?
You first begin by assuming that the linguistic structure corresponds to some non-linguistic structure, and then you use that to conclude that those words which have no material referents must have some non-material referent."
No, I argued for that view.
Your view of truth is absurd since if a person believed that there was a table in front of him, and then he beahved as if there were EVEN IF THERE WERE NOT, then it would be "true" that there was a table in front of him.
The other fatal flaw of your vew is that yu've yet t show how you, as a materialist, can account for beliefs at all. You need to eliminate all this kind of talk from your vocabulary.
David Papineau believes that a robust naturalism holds a commitment to the completeness of physics such that a purely physical specification of the world, plus physical laws, will always explain what happens. This account will not include reference to mental entities that are not identical with or realized by certain non-mental properties.
You are trying to give a naturalistic answer here. And your functionalist account is subject some flaws.
There are a few arguments for this. I’ll run through a couple real quickly here. One developed by Ned Block is called the Chinese nation argument. Simply put, the argument takes a common materialist understanding of the mind, one that tries to reduce the above seemingly private and subjective experience and direct evidence to simply the communication of cells and nerves to neurons. And of course this is observable via third-person. This view is basically what is known as a “functionalist” account of the mind. It is probably the most popular materialist theory of the mind today. It claims, basically, that mental states are defined simply in terms of their causal relation. The upshot of all of this for the functionalist is that they need not identify the mind with the brain. The “identity theory of mind” has major problems and functionalism seems to avoid those problems. Entities other than the brain could fulfill the requirements. A computer, say. Or even aliens who do not have anything like what we call “brains.” So a computer could, if the chips were arranged properly and as complexly, be said to have a “mind” so long as the proper causal relations were had. Okay, so at this point Block comes along and says: Well if the receiving and transmitting of information function of our neurons could be fulfilled by silicon chips, or any other properly arranged material structure playing the relevant causal roles, what about of we had a huge group of people -- China, for example -- and they were organized to play the relevant roles of neurons, paralleling the interaction that goes on between them in the brain. They passed information back and forth, say, via cell phones. Now, say that a robot were made and hooked up by a radio transmitter to the Chinese. In the literature the robot has been dubbed, “China Head.” This robot is complex and can receive information sent by the Chinese. Okay, so say that the Chinese have all been given relevant roles or functions to play such that if the robot gets kicked in the shin this send a signal up to a few hundred thousand Chinese. They call a few hundred thousand other Chinese and relay some relevant information. Those send signals to a few hundred thousand more Chinese, and ultimately a signal is sent down to the robot that it yells “Ouch!” and rubs its shin. In none of this was there anything like a “feeling” of pain. There was also not unified conscious experience of pain. The qualia, which is a feature of the mind, would be absent.
Another argument is called the Zombie argument - all these arguments against materialist versions of the mind have been developed by atheists, by the way - and it states that it is broadly or logically conceivable that creatures known as Zombies exist. These creatures, by definition, have no conscious experience. They do not exhibit qualia in a mind, but they do have a brain. Thus a Zombie could exhibit the same behavioral, physical, and functional properties as we do yet lack any qualia. There would be no subjective experience of pain at all, yet the same neural activity would be taking place. This would mean that qualia would be something additional, over an above, anything physical.
Lastly, Frank Jackson has developed what is called The Knowledge Argument. Simply put, the argument runs like this: Say at some point in the future we have a completed physics such that we know all there is to know about everything in terms of the laws of physics. Now say that there is a girl names Mary. Mary is raised in a black and white room and never subjected to a conscious experience of red, for example. But, Mary is also taught everything there is to know about the world in terms of a physical picture. So she knows everything there is to know about colors. She knows that red is caused by light reflecting at 650 nanometers, this wavelength hits your optic nerves, in turn sending signals into your brain, activating such and such neurons firing in such and such rate, as well as everything else there is to know about “red” and the experience of it. Now, after 40 years, Mary is released. Upon being released she is given a shiny red apple. She sees red for the first time. She now knows “what it is like” to experience red. This would seem to be a new item of knowledge for her. But if it is, and if she knew everything there was to know about physics, then it would appear that the subjective experience and “felt” quality of seeing red is something over and above the physical world.
Now this is just a brief intro into all of this. I by no means want to give the impression that there aren’t responses to the above arguments, and then counter-responses, and counter counter-responses, and so on. The literature is massive and takes you almost to every philosophical field of inquiry. But at any rate, this is something like some of the arguments I would give against a materialist picture of the mind. There are other ones too that I’ll give later in the review, but these ones apply to qualia. My main point was to contrast the debate between the physicalist and the dualist. To show what a physical picture of the mind looks like, and then to maintain that I do not think physicalists can account for things like qualia and so they should eliminate them from their naturalistic explanation of things.
"So, when I say thoughts, ideas, propositions, and all those other "abstract entities" are algorithms, I mean they are rules."
Rules? How does that make sense given a naturalistic reduction of things?
Do we need to lecture everyone on what you need to do as you're playing the naturalist role here? How is a "rule" to be explained? How about "thoughts" and "propositions?"
Okay, and so what is this basic “stuff” that everything is made of or explained by? Well, it‘s not stuff like rocks, trees, tables and chairs, in one sense none of these things exist as we observe it. All of those things have been explained as ultimately being collections of molecules, atoms, electrons, protons, quarks, etc. So tables, chairs, trees, rocks, and the like are made up of colorless, odorless, tasteless, particles. Actually, the world we see isn’t anything like how physics tells us thing “really” are. Tables seem impenetrable to our hands, and doesn’t seem anything like a cloud. Yet science tells us that a cloud of sorts is exactly what this table is. It’s a cloud of unobserved particles each occupying less space than exists between them, thus this table here, apparently solid and impenetrable, is mostly empty space. So actually science has taught us that our senses are basically all wrong. In the sense that we see colors, smell flavors, feel texture, have auditory experience, this is largely wrong in the sense that it is not the touchstone of reality. That touchstone is the world of unobserved entities mentioned above. Okay, so we are doing what physicists call reductionism. A table is “nothing but” a collection of particles and the appearance that it is something other than that is simply an illusion. Its properties are likewise reduced, okay. So when Jason is feeling a table and feeling its solidity, that is not something inherent in the table apart from Jason’s touching it. All it is is the state the table’s molecules happen to be in when the field of force they generate repels the field of force associated with that other collection of colorless particles, Jason's hand.
Now above Jason mentions "thoughts." What about a thought, say, like this one: "I am feeling a pain right now."? Or what about a "rule?" How does Jason need to parse that out?
Everything real can be so reduced as in the above, and if it can’t be then it’s not real. In continuing this all-to-brief romp through the naturalist procedure I should point out, then, that it follows from the above that only objective, third-person observational explanations of events suffice. Any consideration of ultimately and irreducibly subjective, first-person accounts are not allowed. And to a certain extant this makes sense, right? When the scientist wants to give a scientific explanation of “hot” and “cold” he can’t rely on private, subjective reports. If you stick your hand in freezing water, it feels like it is burning. If you take it out and stick it in lukewarm water it still feels hot for a while. Or if your left hand went in a warm bucket and your right into a cool, and then you pulled them out after a few minutes and stuck them both in a lukewarm bucket, the left would still feel warm and the right would still feel cool. There could also be other beings, aliens maybe, that feel cold for what we feel as hot. So to get at what “hot” and “cold” really is, the scientist can’t rely on subjective accounts. So heat for example is defined or re-defined in terms of objective, mind-independent facts. Facts about mean molecular kinetic energy and the like. And these objective, mind-independent facts are simply all there is to the matter. Remember, the “real” world is simply colorless, odorless, tasteless, and we can add that it is purposeless in the sense of teleology. It is meaningless too. Nothing is intrinsically meaningful, that is. There may be what’s called “derived” or “as-if” meaning, but nothing is irreducibly meaningful.
Okay, so that’s something like a whirlwind tour of the naturalist program of explaining any and all phenomena. It follows from the above, then, that if something is irreducibly meaningful or subjective (and I use subjective simply to mean only directly verifiable by a subject, not in the sense of “relative“), that is, if some feature of common sense cannot be reduced to the above type explanation, then it is eliminated. So it’s as if you pack a suitcase and you try to shove as much as possible into that suitcase, and then you close it - perhaps by sitting on it or jumping up and down on it to get everything to fit - and some pant legs and shirt sleeves are left hanging out. One response to make would be to say, “Oh, I guess I can’t fit everything into this suitcase.” But another response would be to take scissors and cut around the suitcase and say, “See, everything does fit.” In other words, you just eliminate anything that can’t fit into the suitcase.
So what sense can be made of Jason's use of "thoughts" and "rules" and "propositions?"
A "rule" is a normative thing. Above we saw that normative explanations are illusionary, or need to be reduced to the non-normative. But of course a non-normative rule isn't a rule.
So, again, Jason smuggles in concepts and presuppositions not alowed by his materialis worldview.
Lastly, Jason wants me to show how all his beliefs could be false yet he survives. Okay, no problem:
"Perhaps [our evolutionary humanoid] is a sort of early Leibnizian and thinks everything is conscious (and suppose that is false); furthermore, his ways of referring to things all involve definite descriptions that entail consciousness, so that all of his beliefs are of the form That so-and-so conscious being is such-and-such. Perhaps he is an animist and thinks everything is alive. Perhaps he thinks all the plants and animals in his vicinity are witches, and his ways of referring to them all involve definite descriptions entailing witchhood. But this would be entirely compatible with his belief's being adaptive;..." - Al Plantinga
Got any more brain busters for us?
Steve says,
ReplyDelete"[Apologize] For what? For paraphrasing your statement? As long as his paraphrase was accurate, how would that amount to a lie?"
I've already pointed out how obviously and significantly inaccurate his misquotation was.
An accurate paraphrase of my statement would be that one could not survive long enough to reproduce if they had an entirely false set of beliefs. Yet, using quotation marks, Manata's "paraphrase" implied that one could not survive long enough to reproduce if they had a single false belief.
Manata says he doesn't see the difference, which implies that he is either continuing to lie, or that he is incapable of grasping the difference between universal and existential quantifiers.
You're such a liar, Jason.
ReplyDeleteLet's look at the reason you called me a liar. Here's what you said,
*****
"Hey, did you all know that Paul Manata is a big liar?
Look at this. Manata says that I "said one could not have 'false beliefs about food otherwise one would starve.'"
The problem is, I never said that. He used quotes to mislead you all into thinking I said something I never said.
You want to check? Search the page for that alleged remark, and you will find that the only place it appears is in Manata's corrupt text.
What I did says was this:
"If my beliefs about how to get food, maintain my health, and so on, were all false, then I would surely not survive long enough to reproduce."
*****
See, you claimed that I said that you "said one could not have 'false beliefs about food otherwise one would starve.'"
You claimed that THIS was the lie. You claim it was a lie because what you ACTUALLY said was, "If my beliefs about how to get food, maintain my health, and so on, were all false, then I would surely not survive long enough to reproduce."
What you quoted from me was diferent in no relevant way from what you wrote.
But NOW you come in and MISQUOTE YOURSELF by saying that you called me a liar because of this:
"An accurate paraphrase of my statement would be that one could not survive long enough to reproduce if they had an entirely false set of beliefs."
You claim I don't know the difference between universal and existential qualifiers (FYI, existential qualifiers can be universal, the problem arises when we supposes *existence* of things like unicorns since the classic square of opposition would imply that one end of the contradiction has to be true, so, go back and hot the intro logic text books).
But notice the ORIGINAL claim you made was that I lied about THIS: "If my beliefs about how to get food, maintain my health, and so on, were all false, then I would surely not survive long enough to reproduce." Notice there's nothing "universal" there, Jason.
So, Jason is a liar in Jason's own terms because Jason misquoted someone, namel, HIMSELF.
I'd feel sorry for you Jason, if you weren't acting like such a tool.
Anyway, I did respond to your "universal" claim, btw.
So, get to work.
Manata has gone through a few of the standard thought experiments which have been leveled against functionalism and/or physicalism. The strange thing, from my view, is that Manata specifically distances himself from these arguments, saying they are merely “something like the arguments” he “would give,” if he were so inclined as to formulate an argument of his own.
ReplyDeleteWhy, then, did Manata present these arguments? He says it is meant as a “brief intro into all of this.” Well, Manata, thanks, but this is not new territory for me.
Now, there are a few relevant points which should be noted. First, Block’s Chinese Nation is just a modified version of Searle’s Chinese room argument, and Block’s argument fails for the same reason Searle’s does. Also, Block’s argument was specifically leveled against functionalism, while Chalmer’s and Jackson’s arguments were made against physicalism. We should also note that Jackson has since rejected his own argument, preferring instead to adopt the “new knowledge, old fact” position, which is perfectly in line with physicalism.
Now, all Manata has done is show that there has been disagreement over the implications and proper understanding of functionalism and physicalism. That does not mean that either physicalism or functionalism is necessarily flawed. It only means that some people think it is flawed. As I’ve argued on my own blog, these standard objections to physicalism are invalid. Links:
On Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument
Omniscience, Testability, and the Knowledge Argument
The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Knowledge Argument
The Explanatory Gap
The Nature of Evidence
These are not hypothetical arguments that I might decide to make one day. These are arguments that I have actually made. So, feel free to treat them as such.
Manata says,
ReplyDelete"But notice the ORIGINAL claim you made was that I lied about THIS: "If my beliefs about how to get food, maintain my health, and so on, were all false, then I would surely not survive long enough to reproduce." Notice there's nothing "universal" there, Jason."
Is Manata blind?
Look closely and find the words "all" and "false" in the quoted passage.
Let's break this down, since Manata still doesn't get it.
I said, "If my beliefs about how to get food, maintain my health, and so on . . ."
That could be restated as: "For all X, such that X is my beliefs about food, maintaining health and so on."
That is a universal quantification. I am defining "for all X."
Does Manata concede this point?
Now let's look at the rest of my comment: "were all false . . ."
Okay, so now we are saying, for all X (where X = my beliefs about food and so on), X is false.
Thus, we have the conditional: For all X, X is false.
So, my comment can be simply stated as, If (for all X, X is false), then Y, where Y = the inability to survive long enough to reproduce.
Now, Manata says that a simple counterexample, in which one conceivable instance of me having a false belief about food, is sufficient to counter my claim here.
Anybody who has taken an intro course in logic should be able to explain this to Manata.
I presented a view of "truth" which is more or less operational/instrumental. Manta says it is “false.”
ReplyDeleteManata says: “We can apply the tem 'courageous' to multiply individuals even if they have never heard of, or have no idea about - and hence no 'belief' about the matter - what it is to be courageous.”
My argument was never that a person must understand the word “courageous” in order for other people to regard them using that term.
Manta says: “And, what of the subject? How is that true? Just so ling as someone believes he's Socrates he is? If believing you're Socrates produces behavior in line with his understanding of the world, then it is true that Tom is Socrates?”
Our understanding is developed through discourse, and not in isolation. If a person’s understanding contradicts that which is established beyond a reasonable doubt through rational discourse, then it isn’t true.
Manata says: “if npt, why does the subject have to correspond to some non-linguistic feature of the world?”
The meaning of this question is not clear. The subject of a sentence need not correspond to some non-linguistic feature of the world. Of course, it can. But there is no reason to think it has to. For example, what does the subject of the following sentence refer to? “The bungleberry does not exist in any way shape or form, neither as an non-physical entity nor as a physical entity; neither as a supernatural entity nor as a natural entity; neither immaterial nor material.”
I said: “You first begin by assuming that the linguistic structure corresponds to some non-linguistic structure, and then you use that to conclude that those words which have no material referents must have some non-material referent."
Manata replied: “No, I argued for that view.”
Where? You merely stated it. No argument.
Now Manata says my response is absurd, but he seems to be attacking a straw man. He says, trying to draw a logical implication from my view: “if a person believed that there was a table in front of him, and then he beahved as if there were EVEN IF THERE WERE NOT, then it would be "true" that there was a table in front of him.”
That does not follow from my argument. Rather, if a person believes there is a table in front of him, and all the actions predicated upon that belief lead to more or less predictable results from the environment, then he is justified in his belief. Now, in what situation could a person’s belief in a non-existent table produce more or less predictable results from their environment? Anyone?
Manata says: “The other fatal flaw of your vew is that yu've yet t show how you, as a materialist, can account for beliefs at all. You need to eliminate all this kind of talk from your vocabulary.”
No, I don’t. First of all, there is no reason to assume that all of our terms correspond to non-linguistic entities. Second of all, the term “belief” quite easily can be used to refer to dispositions. These can be defined in physiological terms. So, even if there is not a single disposition that we refer to with the term “belief in democracy,” for example, we can use the term to talk about a roughly defined set of dispositions.
Manata: “David Papineau believes that a robust naturalism holds a commitment to the completeness of physics . . .”
I disagree with Papineau, then. One need not commit to the completeness of physics to maintain my position here.
Manata quotes Plataniga to challenge my claim that evolution has selected for the ability to arrive at true beliefs.
ReplyDeleteYet, Plataniga's argument rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of truth.
For example, Plataniga says:
""Perhaps [our evolutionary humanoid] is a sort of early Leibnizian and thinks everything is conscious (and suppose that is false)"
Well, what makes it "false," in Plataniga's view?
What are the conditions for establishing the truth of a proposition?
Plataniga's argument is, like Chalmer's conceivability argument against physicalism, based on a false premise: that we can actually imagine a person functioning in the world, but who did not have a single true belief about that world.
In my view, the truth of a belief is determined by how it organizes our behavior in relation to our environment, and this includes the discursive community as well as other entities and systems.
If you adopt my understanding of "truth," then Plantinga's argument becomes quite obviously ridiculous and unfounded.
Jason continues his war on reason:
ReplyDelete"Look closely and find the words "all" and "false" in the quoted passage."
Yeah, "all" your beliefs about food and health and stuff.
But, not an ENTIRELY false set of beliefs.
"That could be restated as: "For all X, such that X is my beliefs about food, maintaining health and so on."
That is a universal quantification. I am defining "for all X."
Does Manata concede this point?
Now let's look at the rest of my comment: "were all false . . ."
Okay, so now we are saying, for all X (where X = my beliefs about food and so on), X is false.
Thus, we have the conditional: For all X, X is false."
But that's not ALL your beliefs, Jason. That's beliefs about eating food and health.
Now, notice I said all your beliefs about food were that they were "nutrition removers." All food "helped you starve yourself."
So, I met your "all." If it is true that all your beliefs about food are that they are nutrition removers, then all your beliefs about food are false since food is not a nutrition remover.
For any belief about food, if that belief involves the belief that food is a nutrition remover that helps you starve to death, then that belief is false.
Moreover, a "false set of beliefs about and health" is not an etirely false set of beliefs.
One would be:
b = belief
f = food
h = health
u = untrue
(x) (xBFH --> xU)
The OTHER claim you made would be
(x) (xB --> Xu)
Notice the difference, Jason?
The first doesn't include beliefs about disneyland, it's not universal.
The second does. It's universal.
The ENTIRE set of beliefs is false.
Try and keep up, Jason
Manata asks: "How is a 'rule' to be explained? How about 'thoughts' and 'propositions?'"
ReplyDeleteAm I being asked to explain all rules, or just one rule? Or am I being asked to explain how rules, as a category, should be understood?
Here's a question: How do we explain the fact that, when I install software on my computer, it runs the same program as it does when you install it on your computer?
Rules (and I include ideas and propositions in this category) are what allow systems to produce specified outcomes based on controlled inputs. More specifically, they are the structural/organizational properties of systems.
To suggest that we need some immaterial mind to explain or account for the ability to follow rules would be to suggest that computers need minds in order to run Word or Excel. And yet, I have yet to meet a dualist who claims that any personal computer has a mind of its own. Why is that?
"Yet, Plataniga's argument rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of truth."
ReplyDeleteJason doesn't the idea that Plantinga's argument rests on this. It simply is intended to show that one *could* have a entirely false set of beliefs and yet still survive.
Jason tries to repair his faulty def. of belief. He writes,
ReplyDelete"That does not follow from my argument. Rather, if a person believes there is a table in front of him, and all the actions predicated upon that belief lead to more or less predictable results from the environment, then he is justified in his belief. Now, in what situation could a person’s belief in a non-existent table produce more or less predictable results from their environment? Anyone?"
I never denied that he was "justiifed", but that's rather simplistic to use those terms in a post-Gettier era.
Anyway, the guy believes there's a table in the center of the room. he walks around the "table" every single day. Puts his feet up on it while watching t.v., (he actually holds them up due to his strong abdominal muscles). He can be counted on every single saturday to "dust" it.
We can predict the guy's behavior. He believes there's a table there. But that is false. On Jason's scheme this guy's belief is TRUE
!!
QED
"Manata asks: "How is a 'rule' to be explained? How about 'thoughts' and 'propositions?'"
ReplyDeleteAm I being asked to explain all rules, or just one rule? Or am I being asked to explain how rules, as a category, should be understood?"
Ummm, the normativity of the rule, Jason. The "first-person" aspect of thoughts. Etc.
get with the program, Jason.
Steve asks,
ReplyDelete"Did the axioms exist? What’s their mode of subsistence?"
The axioms of mathematics could have been instantiated at any time, so long as systems existed which were capable of formulating them.
The mode of subsistence for any axiom (or rule) is a computational system capable of implementing and formulating that rule.
Steve asks: "Likewise, what makes the axioms true? What are their truth-bearers?"
The truth of mathematical axioms is a matter of the functional properties of computational systems. Mathematics is not merely one way of approaching computation; rather, it is the formalization of computation itself. Any computational system must implement mathematics, and so the axioms of mathematics are definable a priori with respect to computational systems.
Steve notes: "Finally, Jason only addressed one of Penrose’s examples. He disregarded the other example (involving the Mandelbrot set)."
I think I have already offered arguments that counter Penrose's argument about the Mandelbrot set, but I'll repeat the basic points here.
Penrose's argument is that nobody, not even Mandelbrot, could have imagined the potential of his discovery. The Mandelbrot set has implications which go far beyond what any of us can imagine. Penrose says this means the Mandelbrot set must exist in the Platonic realm of forms, because no finite production could exhaust its potential. And yet, the Mandelbrot set shows the regularity of any extant entity, because "the same structure is revealed—in all its perceivable details, to greater and greater fineness the more closely it is examined—independently of the mathematician or computer that examines it."
As I argued already, all this means is that the set of possible outputs defined by the Mandelbrot set is inexhaustable. It does not mean that all of the possible outputs exist in some other realm. There is no reason to assume some other realm here.
"Manata says: “The other fatal flaw of your vew is that yu've yet t show how you, as a materialist, can account for beliefs at all. You need to eliminate all this kind of talk from your vocabulary.”
ReplyDeleteNo, I don’t. First of all, there is no reason to assume that all of our terms correspond to non-linguistic entities. Second of all, the term “belief” quite easily can be used to refer to dispositions. These can be defined in physiological terms. So, even if there is not a single disposition that we refer to with the term “belief in democracy,” for example, we can use the term to talk about a roughly defined set of dispositions."
Behaving a certain way doesn't entail truth.
When Jason says his belief in naturalism is true, he means a set of dispositions.
We can count of him to vote, etc.
But of course this means nothing.
We want to know if his belief in naturalism represents the way the world really is.
On his view, he just allowed theists to have true beliefs because of our behavior!!!!
Jason keeps kicking himself while he's down.
Paul Manata: "Jason keeps kicking himself while he's down."
ReplyDeletePaul, you're just confirming what I said in the first comment on the "Secular Scumbags" thread:
"If I were to bet, I'd bet that Streitfeld will thrash."
As he's thrashing, he doesn't realize that he's kicking himself. It's a rather comic visual. He's hopscotching around the block on one leg while throwing the other leg backwards to kick himself in the glutes. Why an atheist would want to flail about like that, I have no idea.
Jason said:
ReplyDelete---
To suggest that we need some immaterial mind to explain or account for the ability to follow rules would be to suggest that computers need minds in order to run Word or Excel. And yet, I have yet to meet a dualist who claims that any personal computer has a mind of its own. Why is that?
---
You know, it might help you if you didn't pick things that were designed by minds. I have yet to meet a computer that just popped into existence one day. No, they were all designed by human minds.
So not only do I "suggest that computers need minds in order to run Word or Excel" but I demand that they do. Absent the design and integration of parts put together by a human mind, a computer is block of sand.
BTW, you still need to account for why rules exist the way they do. Is there a reason they do? If so, then what is it? If not, then we're left with an ad hoc rule once more.
You say a lot but go nowhere.
Jason Streitfeld wrote:
ReplyDelete"Generally speaking, myths and prose are open to interpretation. I can't imagine how any book of mythology and historical fiction could rationally obligate its readers to adopt one, and only one, interpretation. Why should the Bible be treated any differently? In my interpretation, the Bible is a work of mythology and historical fiction which offers nothing by way of moral authority."
How do you get from "generally speaking" to the specifics Gene was discussing? And I don't know of any scholar who thinks that Paul's letter to the Romans, for example, was intended as fiction. If you think that some of Paul's claims in that letter are false, that conclusion doesn't change the genre of the document. How would your rejection of some of the Bible's claims make it "generally...open to interpretation"? How are you determining that the Bible is erroneous in some of its historical claims, makes unreliable moral claims, etc. if the Bible is "generally...open to interpretation"? Is every passage you rely on to reach your conclusions not open to other interpretations, whereas the passages Gene cites are open to other interpretations? Why should we think so?
You write:
"It offers comfort and guidance to many, no doubt, but I see no evidence that it is anything more than a work of man. That's my interpretation of the Bible."
What sources have you consulted other than the likes of Wikipedia and infidels.org? How familiar are you with scholarship on the evidence surrounding Jesus' resurrection or the evidence surrounding Jesus' fulfillment of prophecy, for example (whether He was a descendant of David, whether He was born in Bethlehem, etc.)?
Gene,
ReplyDelete"Notice that, rather than offering an exegetical response, eg. a differing interpretation, Jason runs to question begging claims about the Bible, calling it mythology and historical fiction - and without a scintilla of a supporting argument. We're back to SKA, Wiki, etc."
Since when is an assertion a "question begging claim?"
It's only begging the question if I attempt to prove something by first assuming it. I wasn't trying to prove anything, or even argue for the point. I was just presenting my view.
If you're going to accuse somebody of begging the question, Gene, try to be more sensical about it.
Now, if you want an argument for why I think the Bible is a work of mythology and historical fiction, how about this: because the Bible describes the history of mankind and the world in ways which go against the prevailing scientific evidence. It describes events that are so fantastical, we would require extraordinary evidence before we could consider believing them. It postulates supernatural entities and events which only make sense as figments of the imagination, and do not seem to refer to anything observable by the senses or logically deducible from pure reason.
I think this is all pretty self-evident, actually. I'm surprised you even asked for an argument.
Peter,
ReplyDelete"So not only do I 'suggest that computers need minds in order to run Word or Excel' but I demand that they do. Absent the design and integration of parts put together by a human mind, a computer is block of sand."
So, when designing the computer, the human mind transferred its powers of intuition (as Steve would have it) or whatever to the computer, so the computer could accurately run the programs fed into it?
So, when we create computers, we give them a little bit of our minds?
Is that what you mean, Peter? If not, please explain.
You say, "BTW, you still need to account for why rules exist the way they do. Is there a reason they do?"
Let's look at this broadly, okay?
First of all, the only accounting for the rules of mathematics I've seen around here is, "God did it."
That is not an accounting. It's merely an assertion. It does not explain the rules, or how they came about, or anything at all.
If your position does not further our understanding of the nature and functionality of mathematics, then it is not an explanation.
So, "God did it" does not explain anything.
Now, you ask me to account for the rules of mathematics. What if I can't? Does that mean God did it?
By what reason?
The way I see it is, mathematics is one kind of thing. It can involve different axioms, and so it is not limited to one set of rules. However, the rules we associate with mathematics are well-defined, based on what they are meant to accomplish.
Why are they defined as they are? Because of what they are meant to accomplish. The rules required by a system are dependent upon what that system needs to do.
For example, asking "why are the rules of arithmentic the way they are" is like asking, "why are the rules of tying our shoes the way they are?"
If you want to tie your shoes, you have to follow the rules defined by the task at hand--namely, loop one lace this way, another that way, and so on. If you want to do arithmetic, you have to follow the rules of arithmetic. It's that simple.
Manata doesn't understand.
ReplyDeleteHe says, "We want to know if [Jason's] belief in naturalism represents the way the world really is."
Let's parse it.
As a naturalist, I reject claims about supernatural entities. I don't simply claim that supernatural entities don't exist, or that they probably don't exist. I deny claims about them, because I have yet to see a coherent definition of the term "supernatural."
The term "natural" refers to whatever can be discovered to act in the universe. The term "supernatural," apparently, is defined to refer to something which somehow acts in or on the universe.
Now, if we can discover that something acts in or on the universe, we call it "natural." That's what scientists do.
If they didn't, then there would be some discussion among scientists about whether quarks, for example, should be considered "supernatural" entities. They don't discuss this, because the term "supernatural" does not seem to define anything in particular. It does not specify what conditions must be met for something to be supernatural.
It seems that the only clearly defined condition for something to be supernatural is that it cannot be discovered.
This definition not only fails to specify anything, it also implies that there cannot be evidence for the supernatural. For, evidence is the material of discovery itself.
The basis of naturalism can thus be understood as a allegiance to the requirements of discovery and the demands of sense.
Manata's lack of understanding is evident here:
"On his view, [Jason] just allowed theists to have true beliefs because of our behavior!!!!"
That's sad, Manata. You're not even trying, are you?
It's only begging the question if I attempt to prove something by first assuming it.
ReplyDeleteUh, huh. Then you write:
As a naturalist, I reject claims about supernatural entities. I don't simply claim that supernatural entities don't exist, or that they probably don't exist. I deny claims about them, because I have yet to see a coherent definition of the term "supernatural."
I wasn't trying to prove anything, or even argue for the point.
This is precisely the opposite of what you said. You said you were providing reasons. Assertions aren't reasons. A reason is the argument behind the assertion.
You, sir, are the one that started down this road by raising the questions. But, hey, if want to now admit your questions were disingenuous and you didn't want to argue your position, by all means be our guest.
I was just presenting my view.
Note again, rather than argue his position, Jason now resorts to claims he was only "presenting his view," yet he's been asked multiple times to argue his position. He's now tacitly admitting his questions were disingenuous from the beginning. He wasn't open to a discussion about them.
Saying the Bible is "historical fiction" and demonstrating that to be so aren't convertible. Is Romans historical fiction? Hebrews? Where is the supporting argument?
because the Bible describes the history of mankind and the world in ways which go against the prevailing scientific evidence. *snip*
Note this well. Jason is trying to move the initial question from one about Leviticus and its relation to the NT to questions about the prevailing scientific evidence. He's trying to change the subject.
Jason, Steve, and I have dealt with all of these objections in the past. There are over 4000 article in our archives - consult them and then find something specific about which to have this discussion in a separate discussion from this one - that's what your blog is for - for you have yet to present a counterargument with respect to the original issue that you yourself raised.
It describes events that are so fantastical, we would require extraordinary evidence before we could consider believing them.
1. Only if you beg the question against miracles.
2. No, take the Resurrection. It would only take reasonable historical evidence. Steve has written an entire ebook on that. Read it and get back to us.
In case the big words are hard for you to unnerstand...we don't require "extraordinary evidence" that pigs can fly. We only need either one flying pig or reasonable documentary evidence that the pig was sighted.
See also: http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/02/sifting-testimonial-evidence.html
and:
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/07/significance-of-eyewitness-testimony.html
It postulates supernatural entities and events which only make sense as figments of the imagination, and do not seem to refer to anything observable by the senses
What was from the beginning, what we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked at and touched with our hands, concerning the Word of Life--
Hmmm, that's from 1 John. Unfortunately, the testimony of the Bible is that these things about Jesus were not imagined. They were SEEN, HEARD, and TOUCHED. Sounds like sense perception to me. To you have an alternative exegetical interpretation? If so, now would be the time to present it.
or logically deducible from pure reason.
You've not demonstrated that "pure reason" leads to hard atheism. In fact, with every passing post, you're proving the exact opposite.
Jason S. said:
ReplyDelete---
So, when designing the computer, the human mind transferred its powers of intuition (as Steve would have it) or whatever to the computer, so the computer could accurately run the programs fed into it?
---
You just can't escape the teleological concepts here. Really, you make a great case for ID (albeit unwittingly).
The computer can only "accurately" do anything because A) a human mind designed it for B) a specific purpose. If there was no purpose, there is no "accuracy." So when you use the term "accuracy" you assume intelligent design.
Is your contention that the universe "accurately" does something? Is that how an undesigned accidental occurance of this universe is in any way coherent with the illustration of a designed machine with intelligent programming?
You said:
---
So, when we create computers, we give them a little bit of our minds?
---
In a sense, yes. After all, we can easily distinguish between that which was designed by a human mind and that which was not. Not that the computer itself becomes a part of the mind, but it bears the hallmarks of having been produced from a mind. And not just any mind, but a mind of a specific kind: namely, a human mind.
You said:
---
Is that what you mean, Peter? If not, please explain.
---
You have a particularly inept ability at understanding explanations. Perhaps if you paid attention the first time, you wouldn't need more explanations given to you.
You said:
---
First of all, the only accounting for the rules of mathematics I've seen around here is, "God did it."
---
That's funny. I've not seen anyone say "God did it" until you just did.
Be that as it may, if Christians do fundamentally presuppose that "God did it" is actually true, what is your counter argument? Thus far, all you've said is that "patterns did it."
I've asked twice now for your justification for them. You haven't brought any forth.
You said:
---
That is not an accounting. It's merely an assertion. It does not explain the rules, or how they came about, or anything at all.
---
Except for the fact that it does, everything else you say is right.
And for all your talk about looking at the issue "broadly" and all, you're missing the important step.
Forget what the explanation for the rules are for a moment and focus on this instead: what is it that the rules themselves require in order for the rules to be real.
I maintain that God, as defined by the Christian theist, maintains all the attributes needed to sustain those rules. This is not merely an "assertion"; this is a requirement of those rules themselves. In other words, if we assume that your rules exist, then your rules themselves presuppose the existence of God (specifically, the God as defined by Christian theism).
These rules cannot exist unless there exists something with the proper attributes to create those rules. If the rules are to have any relevance at all, they have to be transcendent; which means that which produces the rules must be transcendent. If they are to have any meaning at all, they must be timeless and unchanging; they must be true for all times and in all possible realities; they must be universal. In short, they must be eternal, omnipresent, and immutable...all attributes of the Christian God, mind you. And that's just for starts.
By the way, you also slip into ID again when you said:
---
Why are they defined as they are? Because of what they are meant to accomplish. The rules required by a system are dependent upon what that system needs to do.
---
Since you're maintaining that these rules are the basis for such things as logic, and that these rules are actually in force in the universe we experience, you are actually stating that the universe as a whole is a system that has a specific GOAL that the universe is INTENDED to achieve.
Why don't you just admit you're a theist? Your argumentation gives you away already.
Gene,
ReplyDelete"Note this well. Jason is trying to move the initial question from one about Leviticus and its relation to the NT to questions about the prevailing scientific evidence. He's trying to change the subject."
Gene, our discussion was not "originally" about Leviticus. The reason I'm not interested in offering different interpretations of Leviticus is because it would only distract us from the issues here. It's hard enough finding the time to address all of the arguments and accusations being leveled at me. Getting into a exegetical discussion about Leviticus would not get us anywhere. My interests here are much more general. I asked about Leviticus, because I wanted you to admit that you actually have to interpret the Bible in order to make your moral judgments.
That was the point of my question about Leviticus, and you made the point for me. There is no need for us to now get into an exegetical discussion about how best to interpret Leviticus. Such a discussion was never the "original" intent of this argument, or my question.
Thus, I offered my interpretation of the Bible as a whole, and not my interpretation of one particular passage. That is not me "changing the subject." It's me trying to keep our focus on the relevant issues.
Manata mangles logic and reason to his own ends. He writes, "notice I said all your beliefs about food were that they were 'nutrition removers.' All food 'helped you starve yourself.' So, I met your 'all.'"
ReplyDeleteThat is pathetic.
If is what passes for logic in Manata's brain, he needs to go back to school.
First of all, by introducing the word "all" here, Manata is adding on to his original "paraphrase" of my position. He thinks that in doing so, it will make it look like his original "paraphrase" was accurate all along. On the contrary, it makes him look like a fool.
If "all" of my beliefs about food were that "all food helped me starve myself," then I would have one, and only one, belief about food: namely, that food helps me starve myself. If that was my only belief about food, I would never be able to eat. I'd never be able to recognize food as such. I wouldn't have a coherent or functional set of beliefs about food at all.
Manata, a man who likes to hit hard, regardless of where or what his target might be.
If it is true that all your beliefs about food are that they are nutrition removers, then all your beliefs about food are false since food is not a nutrition remover.
Peter,
ReplyDelete"Not that the computer itself becomes a part of the mind, but it bears the hallmarks of having been produced from a mind. And not just any mind, but a mind of a specific kind: namely, a human mind."
Assuming Martian minds would create computers that were unmistakably non-human, I suppose.
In any case, human or Martian or whatever, I don't think you've addressed my point here.
The point is not that we can, by looking at computers, recognize them as the products of the human mind. The point is that, according to Steve's arguments for dualism, computers should interface with the abstract realm in much the same way humans do, if they are to use simple physical programs (software) to "manifest" the Mandelbrot set and whatnot.
So, while simple mechanisms (like analog clocks and tweed coats) also bear the mark of the human mind, they do not present dualists with the same question. That is, if a computer can use physical matter to produce calculations of pi to a indefinite degree, or images based on the Mandelbrot set, then wouldn't those computers need to perform whatever functions the human mind performs when the human mind produces such calculations?
In short, if Steve wants to claim that we need a non-physical mind to grasp the Mandelbrot set, then computers should need a mind, too--and not just "the hallmarks" of the human mind.
Peter asks,
ReplyDelete"what is it that the rules themselves require in order for the rules to be real?"
As I've argued, rules are functional properties of physical systems. So, for a rule to be real, it must functionally occur in a physical system.
Peter syas, "I maintain that God, as defined by the Christian theist, maintains all the attributes needed to sustain those rules."
What attributes would those be? And why should we believe that "God" (as defined by the Christian theist? what definition? which theist?) maintains those attributes?
Peter says, "if we assume that your rules exist, then your rules themselves presuppose the existence of God (specifically, the God as defined by Christian theism)."
And why is that?
Apparently, it's because of what Peter says here: "If the rules are to have any relevance at all, they have to be transcendent; which means that which produces the rules must be transcendent. If they are to have any meaning at all, they must be timeless and unchanging; they must be true for all times and in all possible realities; they must be universal. In short, they must be eternal, omnipresent, and immutable...all attributes of the Christian God, mind you. And that's just for starts."
I interpret this as follows: for a physical system to exhibit the functional characteristics we call a rule, that rule must be able to be implemented at any time and at any place in the universe, and that the rule must exist at every place and time in all possible universes. Is that right?
And, can you explain why that is the case for us?
I mean, it seems pretty clear to me that there are times and places at which no physical system capable of implementing the rules of arithmetic could exist. So your assertion here is hard to accept.
Peter says I am slipping ID into the discussion when I wrote, "Why are they defined as they are? Because of what they are meant to accomplish. The rules required by a system are dependent upon what that system needs to do."
That's silly. I did not say that the rules were defined by some supernatural creator. Rather, the rules are defined by systems capable of defining the rules. In our case, that means human beings, though other organisms are theoretically capable of defining the same rules.
And Peter accuses me of sounding like a theist. He says I am "maintaining that these rules are the basis for such things as logic, and that these rules are actually in force in the universe we experience, you are actually stating that the universe as a whole is a system that has a specific GOAL that the universe is INTENDED to achieve."
No, I did not say that the rules are "in force in the universe we experience." I said that the rules exist in the systems which implement them.
About my use of the phrase, "God did it."
ReplyDeleteSo far, I've seen people here use the phrase "Divine revelation" to explain their understanding of morality and truth.
To me, that "explanation" means that "God did it."
Peter says, "I've not seen anyone say 'God did it' until you just did."
Yet, it seems that Peter is willing to accept my paraphrase.
For example, in response to may claim that "['God did it'] does not explain the rules, or how they came about, or anything at all," Peter says, "Except for the fact that it does, everything else you say is right."
In other words, according to Peter, "God did it" does explain everything here. As I've just posted in my previous reply to Peter, I don't see how this is the case.
Peter asks, "if Christians do fundamentally presuppose that 'God did it' is actually true, what is your counter argument?"
My counter argument is that the term "God" is not well-defined, and that the arguments in favor of "God did it" do not make sense, and do not further our understanding of life, the universe, or anything.
Peter has asked me to justify the patterns that exist in nature. Why does anybody have to justify nature? Nature is what is. That's life.
As though "God did it" were a justification for anything. As though one must account for the behavior of every particle and force in nature in order to recognize the flaws in theism.
I don't buy that line, Peter.
Gene says, "minds conflict and contradict each other. What's good and right today can be bad and wrong tomorrow. The epistemic warrant is therefore arbitrary."
ReplyDeletezoegirl and others have made the same argument.
As I have shown, however, my position allows for some a priori moral judgments. For example, the requirement of rational discourse is granted a priori, according to the very nature of morality.
So, while some moral judgments remain a matter of dispute, not all of them are dependent upon the particulars of any specific mind. And by recognizing those moral judgments that are a priori, we can establish some basis for approaching those moral questions which create tension in the world.
Gene says,
ReplyDelete"Jason already had a mind to reject the answer. We've already pointed this out many times. Jason is a dishonest opponent."
What I reject from your answer, Gene, is your use of the terms "God" and "fulfillment in Christ" as a way of explaining the moral law.
Gene:
'Jason hasn't shown that the text in Leviticus which he cited is 'mythological' in nature."
But Gene's interpretation relies on the notions of "God" and "fulfillment in Christ," and I see no reason to think that these refer to coherent concepts at all. At best, such interpretations might be considered mythological. At worst, they are incoherent.
Gene says, "You've not demonstrated that 'pure reason' leads to hard atheism. In fact, with every passing post, you're proving the exact opposite."
ReplyDeleteI never said my atheism was the result of "pure reason." Rather, my argument is that atheism is required by rational discourse.
Me: "I was just presenting my view."
ReplyDeleteGene: "Note again, rather than argue his position, Jason now resorts to claims he was only 'presenting his view,' yet he's been asked multiple times to argue his position. He's now tacitly admitting his questions were disingenuous from the beginning. He wasn't open to a discussion about them."
That's farcical. I have not presented any views here which I am not willing to argue. Gene merely wants you all to believe that I am not open to discussing any of my claims. The evidence is not in Gene's favor here.
Gene says the witness testimony presented in the Bible is sufficient evidence for us to believe that a man who died was resurrected.
ReplyDeleteI wonder if Gene also accepts all of the witness testimony from people who say they've been abducted by aliens. Does Gene accept all witness testimony, no matter how much it contradicts common sense and reason? Or does he favor some witness testimony over others?
He says we would accept the claim that pigs could fly, if we had witness testimony or documentary footage.
Well, people lie, and footage could be faked. You might even be able to find a video that shows a pig flying on YouTube right now. Does that mean it's true?
Or does it mean that sometimes we can't take what people say at face value, and that we can't always trust what is presented to us as evidence.
So, why should we trust the witness testimony as presented in the Bible, when the stories presented are much more easily explained as myths. Indeed, weren't there resurrection myths before the time of Jesus?
Why should we trust in the Jesus resurrection story any more than any other myth?
Gene says Steve's written an ebook about this. Kudos to Steve. You all must be very proud of him.
Now, if anyone wants to use quotes from or referenes to Steve's book to make an argument here, please do. But I'm not gonna go read it as a homework assignment.
JASON STREITFELD SAID:
ReplyDelete“The axioms of mathematics could have been instantiated at any time, so long as systems existed which were capable of formulating them.__The mode of subsistence for any axiom (or rule) is a computational system capable of implementing and formulating that rule.”
So there were no axioms before there were computational systems.
Hence, the universe had no mathematical structure until there were computational systems.
Hence, there was no universe until there were computational systems.
“The truth of mathematical axioms is a matter of the functional properties of computational systems. Mathematics is not merely one way of approaching computation; rather, it is the formalization of computation itself.”
What is there to formalize unless the axioms are true—part from their formalization?
What makes the computations true? The computations don’t make the axioms true. Rather, the truth of the axioms is what makes the computations true (or false).
“As I argued already, all this means is that the set of possible outputs defined by the Mandelbrot set is inexhaustable. It does not mean that all of the possible outputs exist in some other realm. There is no reason to assume some other realm here.”
Are you claiming that mathematical truths are contingent truths (mere “possibilities”) rather than necessary truths?
“The point is that, according to Steve's arguments for dualism, computers should interface with the abstract realm in much the same way humans do, if they are to use simple physical programs (software) to ‘manifest’ the Mandelbrot set and whatnot…In short, if Steve wants to claim that we need a non-physical mind to grasp the Mandelbrot set, then computers should need a mind, too--and not just ‘the hallmarks’ of the human mind.”
Computers don’t “grasp” anything. They are not conscious entities.
Computers process electronic signals. Computer languages have a conventional symbolic meaning which is assigned to them by the mind of the computer scientist. The computer itself knows nothing. It has no more understanding than an abacus.
Here's a response to Peter Pike's charges against my posting habits:
ReplyDeleteA Matter Of Intellectual Integrity
More to come.