Ryan Mavis is a militant apostate who went on the rampage
over at Michael Patton’s blog. Since Michael decided to protect Ryan from me,
I’ll post my final responses here. (I wasn’t afforded the opportunity to do it over
there.)
Ryan:
By repeatable, I mean another scientist can either recreate
the experiment OR can examine the data him/herself and come to the same
conclusion given what we know. You are slow to catch on, man, and I tire of
this one-upmanship game of winning some random online argument.
Ryan routinely makes indefensible statements, then when he
can’t defend them, says I’m slow to catch on. Seems more like he’s the one
having to constantly revise his hyperbolic claims.
No, but another researcher can follow the same line of
reasoning another researcher uses, examine the same relevant evidence, and see
if his conclusion matches the other researchers. Someone who experiences a
miracle can't have someone else follow their chain of reasoning in this way.
Isn't that obvious?
Experiencing or witnessing a miracle is no different than
experiencing or witnessing a non-miraculous event. Same limitations when
sifting testimonial evidence for a past event, be it miraculous or
non-miraculous. Some historical events have one witness, while others have
multiple witnesses. Some miraculous events have one witness, while others have
multiple witnesses.
Physicists around the world need not be at the Large Hadron
Collider to conduct the experiment again. They can review the data collected
and verify the findings of the scientists who originally made the claim. The
Higgs Boson event was a Sigma five event, which means the probability that it was
due to chance is extraordinarily small. But you knew that, right, with all your
non-scientific, keyboard warrior activities that you engage in?
Ryan’s problem is that he fails to anticipate objections to
his claims. Then he gets miffed when he’s caught overstating his claims.
Moreover, he’s changing the argument. His original argument
wasn’t about the probability of the claim, but a “select few” witnesses.
You asked the following: if only a select few witnesses
observed a meteorite impact, would it be scientific to identify the cause as a
meteor? I responded by reminding you that science isn't just based on
first-hand eyewitness testimony, but on uncovering patterns of causation. We
know what meteorite impact sites look like, how fast they travel, what sort of
blast radius they leave (like you mentioned). So, the failure on your part was
your inability to recognize that it doesn't matter how many people observe an
event. What matters is if large numbers of scientists can reliably - and in
ways that can be repeated by other researchers - establish a causal pattern
based on what we know.
Let’s see. Ryan original said:
So, a methodological naturalist could witness a supernatural
event, and identify the supernatural as the cause. Nonetheless, he couldn't use
the cause to inform our scientific body of knowledge. The cause would have to
be repeatable, observable to more than just a select few…
Now, however, it suddenly becomes a failure on my part to
realize that it “doesn't matter how many people observe an event.”
Seems like Ryan is reversing himself without admitting
it.
It would. But when I mentioned observed by only a select
few, I mean we can only rely on those few individuals and just take their word
for it.
Actually, for historical knowledge, that’s precisely the
situation in which we often find ourselves, like oral histories. And keep in
mind that this overlaps with scientific knowledge. Scientists rely on
testimonial evidence for some natural events, like historic weather conditions
at a particular time and place (e.g. the fate of the Donner-Reed Party on the
California Trail).
We can't replicate the conditions that produced the cause,
or verify it ourselves. Is that clear now?
So how does that concession affect your objection to
miracles? For that applies to historical and miraculous events alike.
We'd still die in our thirties or forties if you had things
you're way and we based action on reason alone and not on experience.
Well, it’s nice to see you admit that Christian faith is
reasonable. However, it’s not as if Christian faith doesn’t have a place for
experience. You’re the one who’s preempting experience with miracles, answered
prayer, &c. What about the argument from religious experience?
What if the gravitational acceleration constant changed
suddenly tomorrow? What if mathematical laws changed tomorrow? It could happen,
so if you try to establish criteria for determining mathematical or physical
laws, I can rightly say that your criteria is false because of some imaginary
scenario I dreamed up that could possibly happen? Give me a break. You sound
like a lunatic.
i) You’re confusing truths of fact with truths of reason.
Mathematical truths are necessary truths, whereas gravity is a contingent fact.
At best, the gravitational constant is nomologically necessary, not
metaphysically necessary.
ii) Actually, naturalism has a problem grounding the necessity
of math. That’s why naturalists resort to fictionalism, intuitionism,
constructivism, Platonism.
Not the kind of wild, implausible thought experiments that
say: What if all natural laws changed tomorrow??
i) Miracles don’t require “all natural laws” to change.
ii) You’re also prejudging what kind of world we live in. If
miracles happen, then that doesn’t entail any change in the status quo. Rather,
the status quo allows for miracles. If miracles happen, then that’s one of the
ways in which the world operates. Nothing has changed, for that’s the kind of
world God made. God doesn’t have to alter the world to perform a miracle. It’s
not as if he first makes a clockwork universe where miracles can’t happen, then
has to smash the clock every time he wants to perform a miracle. It was never a
clockwork universe in the first place.
You aren’t engaging the case for miracles on its own terms.
What then? What
if God really exists and turned water to wine, told Abraham to kill his son…
Does God’s command to sacrifice Isaac violate a law of
nature?
…crammed Noah and his family and all animals on earth into a
large ark while the earth was flooded.
Notice how that objection is inconsistent with Ryan’s own
view of Scripture. From Ryan’s perspective, the ancient narrator knew nothing
about China, India, Indonesia, Northern Europe, Russia, North and South
America, sub-Saharan Africa, Japan, Ireland, New Zealand, Australia, &c.
That didn’t fall within his purview.
When Ryan (re-)interprets the descriptors in Gen 6-9 in
global terms, he’s unconsciously supplementing what the ancient narrator knew
with what we know. At best, he’s taking the narrator’s understanding as a
starting-point, then extending that based on what we think the world is like.
Based on our modern knowledge of world geography and biogeography.
But that replaces the original frame of reference with our
modern frame of reference, which stands in contrast to the original frame of
reference. For interpretive purposes, the frame of reference is not what we
(the modern reader) happen to think the world is like, but what the author and
his target audience thought the world was like.
To take a comparison:
Moreover, all the earth came to Egypt to Joseph to buy
grain, because the famine was severe over all the earth (Gen 41:57).
Does this mean the narrator is telling the reader that
people from Honolulu, the Yukon, or the Amazon River basin, made a trek to
Egypt to buy grain? No, that would be anachronistic. Rather, it refers to
neighboring countries.
…let a talking snake seduce Eve into eating the apple.
Actually, I agree with scholars who think the narrator is
trading on ophiomantic symbolism, viz., B.C. Hodge, Revisiting the Days of
Genesis (Wipf & Stock, 2011), 111-18.
None of this sounds like myth. None of this is the sort of
thing anthropology can better explain than just taking the writings at face
value.
I don’t think the occult, the paranormal, and the miraculous
is at odds with comparative anthropology.
Of course we can never know if the supernatural exists. But
we shouldn't have anything to say about it, because it's above nature, it's
beyond our power to observe closely and scrutinize.
Mind is above matter. That doesn’t mean we can’t observe or
scrutinize the effects of mind on matter.
No. You should have quoted my entire comment, Fox News. I
said it would probably or at least could have a natural mechanism behind it. If
it didn't, then it couldn't be used in science. Why? Because it's effect would
be different every time, and thus unpredictable. What would science say? When
witchcraft happens, anything happens?
i) Your contention is circular. You’re redefining
everything that happens in naturalist terms. You deny that witchcraft happens
because that’s supernatural. But if witchcraft is real, then you postulate some
natural mechanism behind it. You’re not allowing experience to inform your
worldview. Rather, you begin with a stipulative worldview that filters
experience.
ii) Moreover, your inference is illogical. Why would the
effects of witchcraft be different every time? To the contrary, wouldn’t there
be a correlation between what the adept intended and what happened?
iii) Why do you say, when witchcraft happens, anything
happens? How did you arrive at that conclusion?
Witchcraft involves finite agents with finite abilities.
Limited creatures.
iv) Suppose witchcraft did introduce a degree of
unpredictability into nature? So what? How does that consequence count as
evidence against witchcraft? What if nature is not fully predictable?
Your methodology is aprioristic rather than empirical. You
begin with the way you think the world ought to be. You posit a fully
predictable, mechanistic world. But what if that is not in fact the way the
world works? What if mental causation is a factor in natural events?
And who are you to know the mind of God…
If God reveals his will.