From physics to cosmology

Physics began with a question: what is everything made of? Is everything made of the same underlying stuff? 

Physical things are different on a human scale (e.g. solid, liquid) but if bigger things are composed of parts, and parts of parts, then at the bottom of that process, is everything made from the same thing?

That was originally a question about matter and the ultimate constitution of physical things. But eventually, physics (particle physics, relativity) shaded into cosmology. The nature of time, the origin, evolution, and fate of the universe. Attempting to answer a question about what things are made of led to further questions about the ultimate nature of time and space, past and future. 

Clock management

I'll comment on this:

https://www.premierchristianity.com/Blog/10-questions-to-ask-a-young-earth-creationist

Here are 10 questions I’d like to ask of young earthers:

1. Can we start by agreeing that the Gospel is more about the Rock of Ages than the ages of rocks?

The centre of the Gospel is the crucified and risen Christ, and everything in the Old Testament leads up to that. Jesus, and not the age of my rock collection, is the heart of the Christian faith. 

Cutesy but disingenuous–as is clear from the next question (#2). 

What is man?

I recently read What is Man? (Elm Hill, 2018) by Edgar Andrews. It's a witty, erudite, wide-ranging monograph that defends biblical anthropology in light of modern scientific challenges. The book has a scientific emphasis, but that's integrated into a broader philosophical and theological context. 

PART 1. MAN AND THE COSMOS

Ch.1. Who Do You Think You Are? 13

(What is Man? A summary)

Ch.2. The Cheshire Cat Cosmos 33

(Can a universe create itself from nothing?)

Ch.3. Small Flat Bugs 51

(Where is Man?)

Ch.4. The Cosmic Cookbook 75

(A fine-tuned universe)

Ch.5. Deutsch’s Dauntless Dinosaurs 103

(Exploring the mega-multiverse)

PART 2. MAN AND THE BIOSPHERE

Ch.6. Death And Taxes 125

(Human uniqueness)

Ch.7. The Devil In The Details 145

(Digging deeper into genes and genomes)

Ch.8. Dem Dry Bones 169

(What fossils really tell us about the rise of Man)

Ch. 9. Aristotle And The Snowball 193

(On human consciousness)

PART 3. MAN AND THE BIBLE

Ch.10. Worldviews At War 217

(On the nature of reality)

Ch.11. Adam And The Apple 239

(The historicity and fall of Adam and Eve)

Ch.12. The Image Of God 263

(Why Man is unique)

Ch.13. The Second Adam 287

(Jesus Christ, the perfect man)

Ch.14. The Resurrection: Fact Or Fiction? 307

(The claim, the evidence, and the implications)

Infinite regress

Is an infinite regress incoherent? This crops up in debates over the cosmological argument. But it depends on what the cosmological argument is used to prove. Did the universe begin to exist? Is the universe contingent? Even if (ex hypothesi) the universe is eternal, it may still be contingent.

That said, suppose I'm standing in a hallway with an infinite row of dominos left and right. The dominos on my left have fallen. The dominoes on my right are standing, but about to fall, as the chain reaction continues apace.

But if an infinite number of dominoes has already fallen, why haven't all the dominos fallen? Why are any dominoes left standing? Given an infinite domino effect, why isn't the effect complete by now? Does it take more time? But an infinite amount of time already elapsed. Does it take more time than infinite time for the chain reaction to terminate? Why the break between past and future? Why is it not all in the past? 

The Mormon multiverse

This is related to a recent post I did, but I'd like to narrow the focus. It's my impression that some Mormon apologists invoke the multiverse to sidestep monotheistic passages in the Bible. The argument is that passages about idolatry pertain to the god of our universe. Yahweh is the god in charge of our universe. As members of this universe, we must confine our worship to Yahweh. But other gods have jurisdiction over other worlds in the multiverse. The monotheistic passages don't apply outside our universe. 

i) To my knowledge, the scientific evidence for a multiverse relies on one particular interpretation of quantum mechanics. Because quantum mechanics conflicts with the theory of relativity, there's the question of whether quantum mechanics is a final theory. And even if quantum mechanics is a final theory, there are competing interpretations. 

The multiverse might be true or it might be false. So it's a precarious foundation on which to build theology.

ii) I'm sympathetic to a version of the multiverse, but the same God who made the multiverse. One Creator of the multiverse. 

iii) In classical theism, God preexists the world he made. In Mormon theism, the world preexists the gods. The gods are contingent rather than necessary beings. The gods are products of a preexistent reality. A Mormon multiverse fails to explain the origins of the multiverse. It simply pushes the cosmological argument back a step.

iv) Is the idea that each god only exists in one universe? No god exists in more than one universe?

But according to the logic of the multiverse scenario, each parallel universe corresponds to changing one variable, with whatever adjustments that requires, while leaving other things intact. In one timeline I'm raised by my parents. In an alternate timeline I'm an orphan. In another timeline I'm raised by my dad. In another timeline I'm raised by my mom. In one universe I have a brother, in another universe I'm an only-child. In one universe my hometown is New Orleans, in another universe my hometown is Albuquerque. 

However, it wouldn't be a different god for each parallel universe. Changing the god is one variable, with a parallel universe (or more) corresponding to that altered variable. But many altered variables don't entail changing the god in charge. So the same god would exist in more than one universe. Even if we play along with the thought-experiment, Yahweh will have jurisdiction over a vast number of parallel worlds. 

Just run through OT history and mentally change a variable. Suppose Yahweh calls Abraham's brother out of Ur rather than Abraham. Suppose Isaac runs away rather than submitting to sacrifice? That creates alternate timelines, but Yahweh is the same deity in those alternate world histories. 

Cyclic cosmology

If we discovered evidence for cyclic cosmology, would that disprove biblical cosmology? For the original audience, Gen 1-2 describes the world they could see. The earth and the visible stars. Modern readers have a greater sense of scale. 

Yet that doesn't mean Yahweh only created what naked-eye astronomy can observe. It doesn't mean that if the universe extended far beyond what ancient Jewish readers would be able to see on a starry night, God was not the creator of what lay beyond the reach of naked-eye astronomy. What you could see was a synecdoche for what you couldn't. It was all of a piece.

Genesis sets the stage for human history, and God's activity in human history. In so doing, it places humans in a larger cosmic context, but that's undeveloped.

If, say, there are extraterrestrials tucked away in some indetectable corner of the universe or multiverse, their existence wouldn't mean God didn't make them, even if that falls outside the immediate purview of Genesis–or NT counterparts (e.g. Col 1:16). 

A cyclic cosmology is to time what a multiverse is to space. In both you have multiple worlds, but in a multiverse these are spread out over space whereas in cyclic cosmology these are spread out over time. A diachronic rather than a synchronic ensemble. But the principle is the same. God would be the creator of all–whether one or many. 

Mind you, I'm not aware of any evidence for cyclic cosmology. If such turned up, it would require Christian philosophers to retool some of their cosmological arguments, yet cosmological arguments from contingency (e.g. Leibniz, Pruss) would apply with equal force to cyclic cosmology.

The boy in the barbershop

1. I'm noncommittal on the antiquity of the universe. I'm open to old-earth creationism and new-earth creationism in that regard. A stock objection to mature creation is that it's deceptive. For instance, if the universe is only about 6-10K years old, then when we see a supernova, we're witnessing a nonevent. There never was a supernova corresponding to what we see, because the universe isn't old enough for the light to travel from the point of origin to earth, measured in lightyears. 

2. However, that objection poses a conundrum for the critic of mature creation. It posits a discrepancy between appearance and reality. We see something in the present, but in reality, we're witnessing the past, like a photograph of an event taken from the distant past. So the "deception" is relative to the background knowledge of the observer. According to modern astronomy, the supernova we see may no longer exist. Yet an ancient observer would assume that if he sees it, it must be there. So the objection of deception cuts both ways. 

3. This raises the problem of the observer in science. If physicalism is true, the observer is the brain, connected to sense organs. This means the observer never perceives the external world directly. Indeed, he can only see eyes with eyes. He can't directly observe the instrument he uses to make observations with. So he has no way of independently  confirming that he even has sense organs. The observer can't observe himself apart from himself. He can't assume the role of an outside observer. He can't step outside of himself to observer what he's really like, or what the world is really like. All he has to go by are his impressions. 

4. If anything, the problem is more acute regarding the origin of the world. Since that starts from nowhere, it could start anywhere. An absolute beginning is bound to be artificial. There's no right or wrong way to begin. 

5. As a young boy, I remember sitting in a barbershop. I was sitting in the barber chair, having my hair cut. It was one of those neat swivel pump chairs. Behind me was a mirror all along that side of the shop. In front of me was another mirror. The combination of the two mirrors generated an infinite=y mirror. Sitting in the chair, I could see my reflection multiplied, receding into the never-ending distance, in ever smaller images. Boxes within boxes. 

Of course, that's an optical illusion, but I knew it was an illusion because I was seeing myself. I enjoyed a privileged perspective. 

Yet science is all about reducing the first-person viewpoint to a third-person viewpoint. Eliminating that indexical perspective to produce a universal viewpoint.

But in that event, what counts as the unbiased observer? What's the true frame of reference?

Which of those images in the infinity mirror is the correct representation of reality? We can't say the boy in the chair is the unbiased observer, because that's a unique and unrepeatable viewpoint. An outside observer can't tap into his experience. As the boy in the chair, who sees his own reflection, I know that there's an asymmetrical relation between the observer and the images. Yet that's not a third-person viewpoint. That's not the perspective of an outside observer. 

In theory, the entire system–the boy, the mirrors, and the barbershop–could be boxes within boxes of an even larger image, like a picture on a wall. The observer could be standing outside the picture, looking at the picture of the boy in the barbershop. 

As creatures within the universe, who's the objective observer? Who's the outside observer? Who sees things as they really are? Is the supernova like reflections in a cosmic infinity mirror–or the object producing the reflections? 

6. Modern physics is very strange. The theory of relativity is counterintuitive. And quantum mechanics is even more baffling. There are multiple interpretations of quantum mechanics, and it's a choice between one weird interpretation and another weird interpretation. 

John Lennox on Stephen Hawking

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=If4XisIJNA4

Why God Cares About Us in Such a Huge, ‘Empty’ Universe

https://stream.org/answering-god-cares-huge-empty-universe/

Inflationary cosmology

https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/is-a-popular-theory-of-cosmic-creation-pseudoscience/

For God so loved the worlds

In general, Christian philosophers and apologists are hostile to the multiverse, because that appeal is often used to nullify the fine-tuning argument or the strong anthropic principle. Two notable exceptions are Don Page and Jeff Zweerink.

I don't object to the idea of a multiverse. By that I mean I don't think there's anything antecedently unfitting about God creating an ensemble in which alternate timelines play out. 

The problem is when a multiverse is derived from a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics. The theological problem with the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is that rather than having a selection of parallel worlds based on divine wisdom and benevolence, you have an indiscriminate totality based on physical determinism. The result is that many parallel worlds will suffer from pervasive gratuitous evil. If every physical possibility happens, then there will be actual universes in which everybody is damned. Fallen worlds without redemption. Fallen worlds with no compensatory goods. I think that's incompatible with divine wisdom and benevolence.

Is the world a brute fact?

Graham Oppy is a cream of the crop atheist philosopher. His book The Best Argument Against God (Palgrave Pivot, 2013) is a state of the art attack on theism. I'd like to evaluate one of his arguments. 

…the initial causal state might have been other than it actually was–even though God could not have failed to exist–because God's initial disposition to make other things could have been other than it actually was (either because God could have failed to have an initial disposition to create, or because God could have had initial dispositions to create that differed from the particular initial dispositions to create that he actually had in the initial state.) (13).
The first piece of data that we introduce is the observation that there is a global causal structure: the world is a network of causal relations. One of the standard philosophical questions is, "why is there something rather than nothing?" In the present context we interpret this question to mean "why is there causal stuff, rather than complete absence of causal stuff"? 
How Theist answers this question depends upon the view that Theist takes of the scope of possibility. If Theist supposes that every possible world is one in which God engages in causal activity, then Theist can say: it was impossible for there to be complete absence of causal stuff. In other words: there is causal stuff because there had to be causal stuff. If Theist has a more relaxed view of the scope of possibilities–and, in particular, if Theist supposes that it is possible that God might have engaged in no causal activity–then Theist will say: there is no reason why there is causal stuff rather than complete absence of causal stuff–it is a brute fact that there is causal stuff (23-24).
…there is a serious problem for proponents of cosmological arguments that arise with the question "from whence came the causal order?" Once we focus our attention on the global causal order–and not on the question whether the natural causal order itself has a cause–we see clearly that considerations about the shape of the global causal order do not differentially support either Theism or Naturalism (26).
Could God have chosen to make a universe that lasts for less than a second? Could God have chosen to make a universe that blows apart so rapidly that it is mostly empty space? If we suppose that the answer to either of these questions is affirmative, then we cannot also say that God must have all-things-considered reason to prefer a "life-permitting" universe to one of these "non-life-permitting" alternatives. But, if God needn't have all-things-considered reason to prefer a "life-permitting" universe to one of these "non-life-permitting" alternates, then, on the assumption that God's choosing is a brute fact, it surely does turn out that Theist has no better explanation that Naturalist for why it is that relevant cosmic parameters take the values that they do (29-30). 

i) Broadly speaking, I think Oppy is saying both theism and atheism must admit that reality is ultimately arbitrary. You run out of explanations. You bottom out with brute factuality. Therefore, theism has no greater explanatory power than atheism–although it may have less explanatory power, given other considerations. In addition, Oppy is targeting the fine-tuning argument in particular, as well as cosmological arguments generally. 

ii) I think that much is clear. However, the detailed reasoning by which he attempts to justify his conclusion is obscure. What makes him think "why is there something rather than nothing?" is synonymous with "why is there causal stuff, rather than complete absence of causal stuff"? The phrase "causal stuff" is hardly self-explanatory. Indeed, that's a good deal less clear than the Leibnizian question. 

iii) It's unclear what he means by "every possible world is one in which God engages in causal activity". Does he mean the metaphysical relationship between God and possible worlds? If so, a standard theistic explanation is that possible worlds are divine ideas. God's compete concept of possible world history. Possible worlds are constituted by the mind of God. By God's infinite imagination. And in that respect, possible worlds are necessary ideas. 

On that construction, possible worlds aren't brute facts. Rather, there's an underlying explanation for their existence. A dependence-relation. They exist because God exists. 

iv) However, the point he seems to be driving at isn't the ontology of possible worlds, but why some possibilities are reified while other possibilities remain unexemplified. Not so much, why are there possible worlds, what's the explanation for possible worlds–but what caused this set of possibilities to be actual rather than another?

That's certainly where Leibniz is coming from. When Leibniz asks, "why is there something rather than nothing," what he has in mind is more specific. Not just in general why is there something rather than nothing, but why does this particular something exist rather than something else. Why does the real world exemplify this set of possibilities rather than an alternative set of possibilities? What selects for that when other possibilities were available? 

For Leibniz, this implies personal agency. Someone (i.e. God) had to make that selection. Given the number of possible worlds, God had to choose which possible world to instantiate. 

v) Now, Oppy's contention seems to be that if the real world is contingent rather than necessary–contingent because it might have been otherwise–then God's choice (if there is a God) is arbitrary. A brute fact. Like rolling the dice. And in that event, theism has no more explanatory power than atheism. 

But if that's what Oppy has in mind, then his comparison is fallacious. God could have a reason for preferring one possible world over another because different possible worlds are…different. Different possible worlds have different histories. God opts for one rather than another because one world history is more interesting than another. Has greater values. The way some novels and movies have more interesting characters and more meaningful plots than other novels and movies. 

vi) Perhaps, though, hovering in the background of Oppy's discussion is a point of tension in Leibniz. For Leibniz, God had sufficient reason to instantiate this world because this is the best possible world. That's why God chose this world over some other world. But that seems to be necessitarian. God had to choose the best. His hands were tied. 

But of that's what underlies Oppy's argument, I'd make two observations:

vii) We can deny that there is one best possible world. Different possible worlds have different histories. Different histories have different goods. No one possible world combines all goods because no one possible world combines different histories. Each possible world exemplifies a single history. There is no best possible world, for each possible world has some goods absent from another possible world. (There may be some possible words devoid of good, but God wouldn't choose one of those.)

viii) In addition, it isn't clear that God is confronted with a binary choice, where he must choose just one option to the exclusion of others. In principle, God could create a multiverse that exemplifies many alternate histories. 

Finally, let's consider Oppy's view of what possible worlds are:

I think that the best position for Naturalist to adopt is one according to which theism is impossible. All possible worlds share an initial segment in the actual world. All possible worlds evolve according to the same laws as the actual world. It is impossible that the actual laws could oversee a transition from a purely natural state to a state in which there are supernatural entities. There have never been any supernatural entities. So supernatural entities are impossible; and hence, in particular, gods are impossible. Graham Oppy, "Arguments for Atheism," S. Bullivant & M. Ruse, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Atheism (OUP, 2013), 57-58.

i) I agree with him that "it is impossible that the actual laws could oversee a transition from a purely natural state to a state in which there are supernatural entities." But, of course, that only follows from a naturalistic definition of possible worlds.

ii) It's unclear what he means by evolving possible worlds. If, say, we view possible worlds as abstract objects (or divine ideas), then they are static. Each possible world has a complete history. Perhaps, though, Oppy is using "evolve" as a synonym for the succession of events. 

It's like shooting a movie. Once you shoot the movie (and edit the movie), the movie is complete. It has a complete plot. But that allows for plot developments within the movie. Likewise, viewing the movie takes time. 

iii) Why does Oppy think "all possible worlds share an initial segment in the actual world"? Maybe because, as an atheist, he thinks the physical universe is all there is. That's the whole of reality. So possibilities must be variations on the physical universe or actual world.

Mind you, that fails to solve the problem that possible worlds were invoked to explain in the first place. In the nature of the case, what might have been didn't happen in the actual world. So what makes counterfactuals true? It can't be a fact in the actual world. For that alternate course of events never took place in the actual world. 

iv) From the standpoint of Christian metaphysics, the actual world is not the standard of comparison for possible worlds. The actual world is just one possible world among many. It's is simply distinguished from other possible worlds by actuality. God chooses to objectify that particular idea in time and space. 

Some possible worlds have overlapping histories. Up to a point they have the same past, then split off in different directions. Other possible worlds have histories that don't intersect. A different past as well as a different future. So they have nothing in common. 

Ex nihilo nihil fit

http://www.shenvi.org/Essays/QuantumFluctuations.htm

Let's harmonize Genesis with a fake universe

BioLogos has a stable of scientists to defend deistic evolution, viz. Denis Alexander, Louis Ard, Francisco Ayala, Stephen Barr, Sean Carroll, Francis Collins, Darrel Falk, Karl Giberson, Denis Lamoureux, Clarence Menninga, John Polkinghorne, Dennis Venema.

Likewise, it has a stable of Bible scholars to reinterpret the Bible, or simply nix the authority of Scripture, to accommodate the scientific establishment, viz. Peter Enns, Kirk Daniel, Charles Halton, Tremper Longman, Scott McKnight, Kenton Sparks, John Walton, N. T. Wright.

They consider it essential to the survival and credibility of the Christian faith for theology to adapt to mainstream science. 

But when they labor to harmonize Gen 1-9 or Rom 5 with the hard scientific evidence, with the "real world," what's the frame of reference? Consider the following?

I began bemused. The notion that humanity might be living in an artificial reality — a simulated universe — seemed sophomoric, at best science fiction.  

But speaking with scientists and philosophers on "Closer to Truth," I realized that the notion that everything humans see and know is a gigantic computer game of sorts, the creation of supersmart hackers existing somewhere else, is not a joke. 

I asked Marvin Minsky, a legendary founder of artificial intelligence, to distinguish among three kinds of simulations: (i) brains in vats, (ii) universal simulation as pure software and (iii) universal simulation as real physical stuff. 

"It would be very hard to distinguish among those," Minsky said, "unless the programmer has made some slips — if you notice that some laws of physics aren't quite right, if you find rounding-off errors, you might sense some of the grain of the computer showing through." 

If that were the case, he says, it would mean that the universe is easier to understand than scientists had imagined, and that they might even find ways to change it.  

The thought that this level of reality might not be ultimate reality can be unsettling, but not to Minsky: "Wouldn't it be nice to know that we are part of a larger reality?" [Incredible Technology: How Future Space Missions May Hunt for Alien Planets ] 

For a reality check, I visited Martin Rees, U.K. Astronomer Royal, a bold visionary and hard-nosed realist. "Well, it's a bit flaky, but a fascinating idea," he said. "The real question is what are the limits of computing powers." 

Astronomers are already doing simulations of parts of universes. "We can't do experiments on stars and galaxies," Rees explained, "but we can have a virtual universe in our computer, and calculate what happens if you crash galaxies together, evolve stars, etc. So, because we can simulate some cosmic features in a gross sense, we have to ask, 'As computers become vastly more powerful, what more could we simulate?' 

"It's not crazy to believe that some time in the far future," he said, "there could be computers which could simulate a fairly large fraction of a world." 

http://www.space.com/30124-is-our-universe-a-fake.html

What if they are harmonizing the Bible with a cosmic computer simulation? 

Consider, too, how this theory cuts the ground right out from under historical geology or evolutionary biology. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that genetics and paleontology do indeed point to the evolution of man from microbes. Ah, but that's virtual evidence. The Grand Canyon is Virtual Reality. The population bottleneck is Virtual Reality. And so on and so forth. 

They scoff at mature creation, yet entertain a cosmic computer simulation as a realistic possibility. It's incredible that God would make the world "mature," but a serious scientific conjecture that an advanced alien civilization might simulate earth. 

I don't think it's true. I'm just responding to them on their own ground. 

The trail went cold

Dr. Craig: He is saying what is the situation now is that we’ve reached the limits that are humanly possible for having any higher energy experiments or for probing more deeply into outer space. He is saying that there is a kind of in-principle reason for thinking that we’ve pretty much got the full physical story. That is really remarkable. 

Kevin Harris: You don’t hear that very often. 

Dr. Craig: No! No! It is astonishing! It is highly significant, I think, because what do skeptics so often say when confronted with evidence for the beginning of the universe or the fine-tuning of the universe? They say, “Future scientific discoveries will explain this.” They appeal to a naturalism-of-the-gaps and say just because we haven’t answered it yet, someday physics will explain the origin of the universe or the fine-tuning. I think what Ellis is implying is that that is not going to happen. He thinks that we have pretty much reached the limits, and therefore the worldview that contemporary science delivers to us right now is fundamentally correct. The rest will simply be ironing out the details. That means you can’t escape things like the finitude of the past or the fine-tuning of the universe by just punting to the future discoveries of science. 

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-end-of-the-discovery-of-physics

I think that's a seriously flawed inference. The fact that physics and cosmology may have hit an evidentiary wall doesn't mean "we're pretty much got the full physical story" and "the worldview that contemporary science delivers to us right now is fundamentally correct." Rather, we may not have anything like the full story. It's like saying "Nothing exists beyond what I can see through my binoculars. That's where the world ends." But, of course, that reflects the range of the binoculars, not the range of reality. 

If physics and cosmology have hit an evidentiary wall, then their quest for ultimate answers will be forever frustrated. They never will discover the ultimate explanation, because that depends on having additional empirical evidence which is forever inaccessible. Hence, for all we know, worldview which contemporary cosmology and physics delivers to us might be fundamentally misleading, but we're in no position to correct it. 

We haven't reached the logical terminus of the explanatory process. Rather, we've reached an arbitrary stopping-point, short of the goal, due to technical limitations in what we are able to detect. Physics and cosmology will remain essentially incomplete. The destination is out of reach. 

To take a comparison, a homicide detective asks the medical examiner how the decedent died. He's told the decedent died from a heart attack. Was he poisoned? No. He had heart disease. Death by natural causes. For purposes of ruling out foul play, that's an ultimate explanation. 

Conversely, suppose it is a case of homicide. But he doesn't have enough good leads to track down the killer. So the trail goes cold. He knows how the victim was killed, but how who killed him. It's an unsolved crime. 

If Ellis is right, then that's the predicament of contemporary cosmology and physics. That's a serious problem for physics and cosmology. It's permanently provisional. Frozen in midstream. 

That also disarms one side in the "warfare" between science and Christianity–at least in reference to the origin of the universe. The cosmologists and physicists ran out of ammo. They never found the answer they were looking for, because they ran out of evidence. Or, put another way, the evidence outran them. They have more questions than answers. And the answers are unavailable. 

Ex nihilo nihil fit

One presupposition of cosmological arguments for God's existence is the axiom that nothing comes from nothing. 

Unsurprisingly, in order to attack cosmological arguments, some atheists deny the axiom. 

However, to deny the axiom is to deny causality. If something can come from nothing, then you have uncaused effects. 

But that instantly dissolves many things that atheists typically hold dear, like induction, the uniformity of nature, and scientific explanation.

Discworld

If this is how ANE peoples (e.g. the Israelites) conceived of cosmology...

...then not only would the sun have cast a shadow on the Earth, but couldn't the sun have likewise cast a shadow backwards against the firmament? If so, then couldn't this shadow be discernible at least at certain locales and/or at certain times of the day or year?

The menorah

3 And God said, “Let there be light,” and there was light. 4 And God saw that the light was good. And God separated the light from the darkness. 5 God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And there was evening and there was morning, the first day. 

14 And God said, “Let there be lights in the expanse of the heavens to separate the day from the night. And let them be for signs and for seasons, and for days and years, 15 and let them be lights in the expanse of the heavens to give light upon the earth.” And it was so. 16 And God made the two great lights—the greater light to rule the day and the lesser light to rule the night—and the stars. 17 And God set them in the expanse of the heavens to give light on the earth, 18 to rule over the day and over the night, and to separate the light from the darkness. And God saw that it was good. 19 And there was evening and there was morning, the fourth day. 

31 “You shall make a lampstand of pure gold. The lampstand shall be made of hammered work: its base, its stem, its cups, its calyxes, and its flowers shall be of one piece with it. 32 And there shall be six branches going out of its sides, three branches of the lampstand out of one side of it and three branches of the lampstand out of the other side of it; 33 three cups made like almond blossoms, each with calyx and flower, on one branch, and three cups made like almond blossoms, each with calyx and flower, on the other branch—so for the six branches going out of the lampstand. 34 And on the lampstand itself there shall be four cups made like almond blossoms, with their calyxes and flowers, 35 and a calyx of one piece with it under each pair of the six branches going out from the lampstand. 36 Their calyxes and their branches shall be of one piece with it, the whole of it a single piece of hammered work of pure gold. 37 You shall make seven lamps for it. And the lamps shall be set up so as to give light on the space in front of it (Exod 25:31-37). 

20 “You shall command the people of Israel that they bring to you pure beaten olive oil for the light, that a lamp may regularly be set up to burn. 21 In the tent of meeting, outside the veil that is before the testimony, Aaron and his sons shall tend it from evening to morning before the Lord. It shall be a statute forever to be observed throughout their generations by the people of Israel (Exod 27:20-21).

i) I suspect the first thing most modern readers think about when they read Gen 1 is how it comports with science. That's unfortunate. When reading an ancient text, we should try, as best we can, to clear our minds of modern preconceptions and consider what it would have meant to the original audience. What's significant to a modern reader may often be insignificant to the original audience, or vice versa. 

I'm not saying we should ignore the relevance of Gen 1 to scientific debates. Just that that should not be driving our interpretation. 

ii) One leading motif in Gen 1 is the recurrent emphasis on light, as well as the alternation between daylight and darkness. God's first creative command results in light. 

It's easy for modern readers to lose sight of the significance of light and dark, day and night, in Gen 1. The advent of electrical lighting has radically changed our dependence on natural light sources. 

At the same time, it isn't that hard to turn back the clock. If you go camping in the desert or the woods, you rise at sunrise. At night you only have a campfire for light. 

iii) Unlike ordinary firelight, sunlight is unusual for its constancy. It doesn't flicker. Doesn't very in its intensity. Doesn't require constant refueling. 

Apart from sunlight and occasional moonlight (on a full moon), ancient Israelites were dependent on firelight for illumination. Fire serves other functions as well. For cooking. For keeping predators at bay. 

iv) The Solomonic temple was more magnificent than the tabernacle. Yet in one respect, the tabernacle was more impressive. For the tabernacle was translucent. The tabernacle was essentially a series of curtains, enclosing and screening the sacred furniture. 

The Pentateuch was originally written for the Exodus generation. As one commentator (Stuart) notes, the menorah made the tabernacle the brightest object at night in the Hebrew encampment. It as like a symbolic solar system. The illuminated tabernacle, like the sun, surrounded by the tents of the Israelites. 

v) In what passes for modern scholarship, it's a cliche to think Bible writers viewed the divisions of space in vertical terms. The three-story universe. 

Yet the emphasis in the OT is not on vertical space, but horizontal space. Concentrical spacial divisions representing degrees of holiness. Eretz-Israel was holy in relation to the world outside Eretz-Israel. The tabernacle was holy in relation to the encampment. The sanctuary was holy in relation to the outer courtyard. The inner sanctum was holy in relation to the sanctuary. Likewise, separation is a recurring theme in Gen 1. 

vi) The menorah had a practical function. It illuminated the work space within the tabernacle. But over and above its utilitarian function was the symbolism. 

The flame was supplied by olive oil. That's the highest grade of oil, because it burns brightest with the least smoke. The menorah was kept alight from dusk to dawn.

It symbolized the presence of God. The menorah was an artificial Shekinah. If the Shekinah was a preternatural emblem of God's presence (a phosphorescent theophany), the menorah was a natural emblem of God's presence. The Shekinah filled the tabernacle to dedicate the tabernacle (Exod 40;34-38). But most of the time the Shekinah was presumably absent. The light from the menorah was reminiscent of the Shekinah. 

There's a sense in which the Shekinah (in Exodus) is to sunlight (in Gen 1) as the menorah is to sunlight. A twofold parallel. 

vii) It's probably not coincidental that the menorah was a seven-branched candelabra. The seven lights of the menorah correspond to the seven days (i.e. daylights) of Gen 1. In Gen 1, days are measured by daylight and darkness. 

Likewise, the tabernacle was assembled on Rosh Hashanah (Exod 40:1,17). The timing harkens back to Gen 1. A new beginning: the creation of the world and the Jewish New Year.   

Cosmos reboot

http://www.evolutionnews.org/2014/03/cosmos_with_nei083031.html

http://www.evolutionnews.org/2014/03/cosmos_revives_083061.html

Cosmos, Giordano Bruno, and Getting it Right

http://www.christianapologeticsalliance.com/2014/03/11/cosmos-giordano-bruno-and-getting-it-right/