Showing posts with label James Anderson. Show all posts
Showing posts with label James Anderson. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 03, 2021

We live in a novel, not a computer simulation

Here's a great interview with James Anderson on the simulation hypothesis and the authorial analogy for the God-world relation. By the way, Parker Settecase's Parker's Pensées podcast is fun and interesting if you enjoy musing on philosophy, theology, and/or philosophical theology from a Reformed perspective. Not to say these are always the subjects under discussion in his podcast, but I think that's his inclination. Parker has had a number of fascinating guests as well as topics on his podcast. He seems like a good guy to grab a beer with too.

Friday, February 19, 2021

Friday, May 22, 2020

The afterlife

Saturday, May 09, 2020

James Anderson on presuppositionalism

Here's an outstanding exposition and defense of Van Tilian presuppositionalism: 


I'll venture a few observations:

1. Let's begin with some definitions:

As standardly conceived, transcendental arguments are taken to be distinctive in involving a certain sort of claim, namely that X is a necessary condition for the possibility of Y—where then, given that Y is the case, it logically follows that X must be the case too.


Transcendental arguments are partly non-empirical, often anti-skeptical arguments focusing on necessary enabling conditions either of coherent experience or the possession or employment of some kind of knowledge or cognitive ability, where the opponent is not in a position to question the fact of this experience, knowledge, or cognitive ability, and where the revealed preconditions include what the opponent questions. Such arguments take as a premise some obvious fact about our mental life—such as some aspect of our knowledge, our experience, our beliefs, or our cognitive abilities—and add a claim that some other state of affairs is a necessary condition of the first one. Transcendental arguments most commonly have been deployed against a position denying the knowability of some extra-mental proposition, such as the existence of other minds or a material world. Thus these arguments characteristically center on a claim that, for some extra-mental proposition P, the indisputable truth of some general proposition Q about our mental life requires that P.


2. Apropos (1), Anderson defines presuppositionalism partly in terms of presenting an internal critique of non-Christian worldviews. One way of putting this is that non-Christian worldviews lack the metaphysical resources to provide the necessary enabling conditions for coherent experience or the possession or employment of some kind of knowledge or cognitive ability. 

3. Is presuppositionalism circular? In a sense, but not viciously so. Take a transcendental argument which posits that knowledge/truth/human rationality possible, and Christian metaphysics provides the necessary enabling conditions. That's circular in the sense that it takes for granted the possibility of knowledge/truth/human rationality, but there's nothing fallacious or question-begging about that assumption. After all, what's the alternative? How would a critic argue that knowledge/truth/human rationality are impossible? Such a denial would be self-refuting. Although you can debate the degree to which knowledge is obtainable, or the degree to which human reason is truth-conducive, it would be self-referentially incoherent to deny those claims wholesale. 

4. Anderson classifies transcendental arguments as deductive arguments. Once again, let's provide a definition:

A deductive argument is an argument that is intended by the arguer to be deductively valid, that is, to provide a guarantee of the truth of the conclusion provided that the argument’s premises are true. This point can be expressed also by saying that, in a deductive argument, the premises are intended to provide such strong support for the conclusion that, if the premises are true, then it would be impossible for the conclusion to be false. An argument in which the premises do succeed in guaranteeing the conclusion is called a (deductively) valid argument. If a valid argument has true premises, then the argument is said also to be sound. 

An inductive argument is an argument that is intended by the arguer to be strong enough that, if the premises were to be true, then it would be unlikely that the conclusion is false. So, an inductive argument’s success or strength is a matter of degree, unlike with deductive arguments. 

Although inductive strength is a matter of degree, deductive validity and deductive soundness are not. In this sense, deductive reasoning is much more cut and dried than inductive reasoning. Nevertheless, inductive strength is not a matter of personal preference; it is a matter of whether the premise ought to promote a higher degree of belief in the conclusion.

Because deductive arguments are those in which the truth of the conclusion is thought to be completely guaranteed and not just made probable by the truth of the premises, if the argument is a sound one, then we say the conclusion is “contained within” the premises; that is, the conclusion does not go beyond what the premises implicitly require. 

Because the difference between inductive and deductive arguments involves the strength of evidence which the author believes the premises provide for the conclusion, inductive and deductive arguments differ with regard to the standards of evaluation that are applicable to them. 


5. This is often a sticking point between evidentialists and presuppositionalists. For instance, Bahnsen is highly critical of the fact that inductive arguments only yield degrees of probability. They fall short of certainty. But a basic problem with Bahnsen's position is that inductive and deductive arguments from Christianity differ in scope. Inductive arguments include the Resurrection, the canon of scripture, the argument from prophecy, the biographical accuracy of the Gospels, the reliability of the Greek/Hebrew text of Scripture. Christian apologetics can't afford to eliminate inductive arguments of this kind. Christian transcendental argument are limited in scope. So Christian apologetics requires a combination of inductive and deductive arguments. 

6. That may seem to leave a unsatisfying gap between the two kinds of argument. However, they're not essentially at odds or separate. Christian transcendental arguments provide the necessary backing for Christian inductive arguments. They justify the enabling conditions on which inductive arguments depend. So you can still have certainty at that foundational level. 

7. Finally, Anderson draws a distinction between knowledge and proof. Due to natural revelation, we intuitive know certain things independent of formal argumentation. So there's a kind of certainty that's not contingent on our ability to formulate sound arguments.

Sunday, April 26, 2020

Has presuppositionalism evolved?

Has presuppositionalism evolved? By presuppositionalism I mean the Van Tilian tradition, not the Clarkian tradition–which is a different animal.

Van Til championed the transcendental argument. And think that's due in large part do his eccentric view of divine incomprehensibility (which builds paradox into his definition of divine incomprehensibility). If God is incomprehensible in Van Til's sense, then you can't argue directly for his existence. Rather, you argue that God's existence is a necessary condition for everything else. Van Til's view is similar in that respect to transcendental Thomism. 

So Van Til's argument was essentially an epistemological argument for God's existence. Transcendental arguments are epistemological arguments, to refute skepticism.

However, in the hands of Greg Welty and James Anderson, the argument has shifted to modal metaphysics. So there's been some evolution and reorientation in the argument. 

It may be the case that Kant's argument is more epistemological, in part because he doesn't have a robust theology to ground it. Kant might even be a closet atheist. And he's skeptical regarding our knowledge of the external world. So he can't say much of anything to back it up in terms of bedrock ontology. 

Although Van Til's version is partly epistemological, he tries to ground it in the metaphysics of Reformed theism. Greg Welty and James Anderson develop that neglected potential in more detail. This is also because there's been a lot of work done on modal metaphysics which wasn't on the horizon in Van Til's time. In addition, Welty was never a champion of theological paradox. And that's conspicuously missing from Bahnsen as well. 

Wednesday, March 11, 2020

Sorting out presuppositionalism

The silly contest between Josh Rasmussen and SyeTenB demonstrates, once again, the need to do some sorting:

Regarding the YouTube interview:


There are at least three different things flying under the banner of "presuppositionalism"

1. There's the position of SyeTenB. He's a hack with a rabid internet following among a clique of pop Calvinist groupies.

2. That's not to be confused with academic versions of presuppositionalism. For instance:

Greg Welty, “The Conceptualist Argument,” in Colin Ruloff (ed.), Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology (Bloomsbury Press, forthcoming).



3. From another angle is the presuppositionalism of Vern Poythress. For instance:


4. There are roughly two competing schools of thought that call themselves presuppositionalists:

i) One derives from Cornelius Van Til. Second-generation Van Tilians include John Frame, the late Greg Bahnsen, and Vern Poythress. We might classify James Anderson as a third-generation Van Tilian. 

However, he's been exposed to some other influences, like Plantinga and modal metaphysics.

Theistic conceptual realism belongs to a family of transcendental arguments. It's interesting how that's evolved. Kant's argument is more epistemological, in part because he doesn't have a robust theology to ground it. Kant might even be a closet atheist. And he's skeptical regarding our knowledge of the external world. So he can't say much of anything to back it up in terms of bedrock ontology. 

Although Van Til's version is partly epistemological, he tries to ground it in the metaphysics of Reformed theism.

Greg Welty and James Anderson have done a lot to embed the epistemological side of the argument in modal metaphysics. I think it's a transcendental argument with an epistemological side, but they've done more to model and detail the necessary metaphysical conditions that make it possible. 

ii) The other derives from the late Gordon Clark. Clark as an anti-empiricist. 

Clark's followers make second-order knowledge necessary for first-order knowledge. You don't know anything unless you know how you know it. They make the justification of knowledge a necessary ingredient in knowledge itself. Here are two examples:



It's important to keep these two schools of thought separate, even though they both use the same designation. When you're accused of not understanding presuppositionalism, part of the problem is that there are competing schools of thought as well as different exponents with varying views.


I don't think Josh is under any obligation to understand SyeTenB's positionbecause  there's not much there there. 

Tuesday, January 21, 2020

Was Jesus self-deceived?

Tentative Apologist
@RandalRauser
I had a nice exchange with @RTB_FRana but I was disappointed to learn that he holds Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. That thesis is to biblical studies as young-earth creationism is to geology. When Christian apologists endorse fringe views they weaken their credibility.

James Anderson
@proginosko
Replying to @RandalRauser @RTB_FRana
Yeah, it's so embarrassing when Christians endorse the sort of fringe views that Christ himself held!

Tentative Apologist
@RandalRauser
Tentative Apologist Retweeted James Anderson
James should try this out at the Society of Biblical Literature. That will surely put all those liberal "scholars" in their place.

Tentative Apologist
@RandalRauser
Replying to @proginosko @RTB_FRana
I suppose you also think the mustard seed is the smallest of all seeds?

James Anderson
@proginosko
Replying to @RandalRauser @RTB_FRana
I think whatever Jesus affirmed about the mustard seed is true. I also think whatever Jesus affirmed about the OT scriptures he quoted is true. Moreover, I believe I have good rational justification for these beliefs, despite what the fine folk at SBL might think of me.

Tentative Apologist
@RandalRauser
Jesus said the mustard seed is the smallest of all seeds (Matthew 13:32). So it's settled for you then?

James Anderson
@proginosko
If Jesus affirms p, I take that as decisive grounds to affirm p. Does that shock you? Of course, there's a reasonable question here about what p is in the case of Matthew 13:32. I take it that "all" is qualified by the conversational context.

1. Wow. Rauser actually trots out the mustard seed objection to inerrancy, as if that's comparable to Mosaic authorship. The mustard seed statement is proverbial or hyperbolic. It's not erroneous to use hyperbole or proverbial sayings (e.g. "a fish rots from the head down").

And it's not remotely analogous to the question of Mosaic authorship.

But this also goes to Rauser's kenotic Christology, where Jesus, as a child of his times, unwittingly taught falsehood. 

The issue is whether the target audience recognizes hyperbolic or proverbial expressions. Then analogy would then be whether the same audience recognized that Mosaic authorship was just a conventional attribution. There the comparison breaks down. 

I'm sure Rauser's real position is that 1C Palestinian Jews believed in Mosaic authorship, but modern scholars know better. 

2. While Jesus may have held false beliefs qua his human nature, that's in union with the divine nature, and in his capacity as a teacher, the divine nature would inform, correct, or censor false beliefs of the human nature/mind when it came to teaching others.

One issue is whether the divine nature would function, among other things, as a screen or quality control mechanism, to preempt Jesus from unwittingly misleading billions of Christians over the centuries. It's serious business to say Jesus was an unintentional deceiver, due to his fallibility.

But if anything, it's worse than that since on Rauser's theory, Jesus is self-deceived. If he's fallible in the way Rauser says or allows for, then he could be self-deluded about his mission, about his understanding of God, about who he himself is, about salvation and damnation. 

3. Regarding Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch:

i) If the Pentateuch was actually compiled during the Babylonian Exile, how did the entire Jewish community forget the origins of the Pentateuch? Is social memory that weak? How did Mosaic authorship ever become the unquestioned tradition in 2nd Temple Judaism?

ii) The most natural assumption is that Genesis-Chronicles are written in chronological order. It's a continuous history, so you'd expect books recounting later events to be written later than books recounting earlier events. But if the Pentateuch was compiled during the Babylonian Exile, then doesn't that push the composition of the other books into the Intertestamental period? It really bunches up, like a log jam.

iii) What were pre-exilic prophets talking about when they indict Israel as covenant-breakers and threaten the curse sanctions of Deuteronomy if, in fact, the Pentateuch was compiled after the fact?

iv) If the Pentateuch is pious fiction, why say the Israelites are carpetbaggers who invaded Palestine from Egypt, and ultimately go back to a progenitor from Babylon? Why not just make the Israelites indigenous to Palestine? 

v) For that matter, if the Pentateuch and Historical Books were really written during the empires of neo-Babylon, Assyria, Persia, Alexander, and Republican Rome, why people them Canaanite adversaries?