Approaching the ontological argument

Anselm proposed a famous, fascinating, controversial theistic proof. Some scholars contend that he presented two different versions of the ontological argument or two different ontological arguments. Other thinkers like Scotus, Descartes, Leibniz, Gödel, and Plantinga proposed their own versions. 

I don't have an opinion about whether or not Anselm's argument, as it stands, is successful. That's because I don't know what he means, and interpretation is prior to evaluation. I can't assess it before I understand it. 

I doubt even he knows what it means. His argument is intuitive and compressed. He had a flash of insight which he labors to sharpen. He may be onto something, but he's fumbling to articulate his insight.

Here's one thing I will say about his argument. It raises the question: is our imagination greater or lesser than reality? Does reality exceed imagination or imagination exceed reality? 

For Anselm, God is the greatest conceivable being, and that's a good definition. For Anselm, the idea of a greatest conceivable being must have a counterpart in reality.

Human intelligence is quite limited. A paradox of human intelligence is that we're just smart enough to be aware of our intellectual limitations. Even the very smartest human beings hit a wall, and the distance between their understanding and wall of reality is very short. The distance between a human with Down Syndrome and the smartest man who ever lived is incomparably shorter than the distance between the smartest man who ever lived and reality. 

It's quite counterintuitive to suppose our imagination is greater than reality. To the contrary, not only is reality the equal of anything we can imagine, but infinitely beyond what we can imagine.

Therein lines the truth of the ontological argument. Is reality greater or lesser than what we can conceive? Surely reality is much bigger than the human mind. 

I'd add a caveat. Not everything conceivable is possible because an isolated idea needn't be consistent with every necessity and truth. We imagine little pieces of things that might not be possible or realistic if developed to their logical conclusion. 

But so long as the idea of God, as the greatest conceivable being, is coherent, then the basel insight of the ontological argument must be true, however successful or unsuccessful the precise formulations. 

It might be objected that we're talking about a human idea of God. Yes, Anselm has a limited grasp of what it means to be the greatest conceivable being. But in that respect, the reality is inconceivably greater than our idea of a greatest conceivable being. 

So it comes down to the question of whether human imagination surpasses reality or reality surpasses human imagination. I think the only reasonable position to take is that human imagination is just a sample of an illimitable, superhuman reality that exceeds the reach of the human mind in all directions. 

The existence of God

https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/essay/the-existence-of-god/

Strategies for Defending the Existence of God

https://whiterosereview.blogspot.com/2019/11/on-proving-god-strategies-for-defending.html

Shapiro interviews Craig

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hL-zJzE5clA

A commenter posted a time-stamped, hyperlinked table of contents:


0:23 Welcome Dr. William Lane Craig 1:37 Why is there such a decline in religious belief in The West? 3:03 “Why should you get up in the dark and the cold to worship someone you don’t think is there?” 4:06 Nietzsche, “God is Dead”, Enlightenment sweeps away The Church 5:25 Faith backed by reason • A Renaissance of Christian Belief In Philosophy 7:40 What is the most reasonable proof of God? The Cosmological Argument (8:18) 1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause 2. The Universe began to exist 3. Therefore, The Universe has a cause The Moral Argument (9:18) (1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist (2) Objective moral Values exist (3) Therefore, God Exists 10:12 Objections/Response to The Cosmological Argument 11:55 Objections/Response to The Morality Argument 13:32 What are the strongest objections to God? Build a Steelman. Where are your objectors the strongest in their objections? 14:46 ZipRecruiter 15:46 Bertrand Russell The External Transcendent Cause Argument (16:03) 1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence either in necessity of its own nature or an external cause 2. If the Universe has an explanation of its existence, then its explanation is a Transcendent external cause 3. The Universe Exists Cn: Therefore, The Universe has a Transcendent external cause 17:25 Quantum Mechanics, Quantum Vaccum The Ontological Argument (19:13) 1. That than which nothing greater can be thought not only exists in the mind but in the real world 2. God is that than which nothing greater can be thought Cn. God Exists 21:22 Maximally Great Island 23:12 What makes God a Constant vs a Clockmaker (Deism) God necessarily exists. Can’t cease to exist. 25:23 Aquinas and Aristotle. Athens And Jerusalem 26:00 Monotheism. Who Was Jesus? 28:47 Judaism On Jesus 32:00 Religio-Historical Context (1) Jesus tomb was discovered empty (2) Seen walking around after (1) (3) The Disciples believed he had been risen from the dead 36:15 Rabbi Schneerson 37:17 “Good evidence doesn’t become bad evidence just because of the lapse of time” 38:25 The Necessity for Judaeo-Christian Revelation. Why a Personal God? - Atonement For Sin - Jesus was the ultimate sacrifice for Mankind 42:45 Craig’s 1st Debate. Craig’s rematch debate 44:03 Problem of Evil 😈 Intellectual and Emotional Suffering 46:00 The Evils of The Bible Indentured Servitude/Slavery, an Anti-Poverty program 49:10 Divine Command Theory Divorce? 51:55 It is grounded in The Creation Story. 54:00 Relativism and Objectivity 55:25 Jordan Peterson 57:20 Reeducating Religion 58:49 What made you religious William?

The argument from beauty

1. The argument from beauty is a neglected theistic proof. There are several reasons. There's a bias towards more "rigorouss" arguments based on historical or scientific evidence as well as philosophical, a priori arguments. "Beauty" is thought to be too subjective. 

There's the methodological question. Where do you begin? Must you begin with an abstract, philosophical definition of beauty? Or is it okay to cite paradigm examples of beauty? That goes to the problem of the criterion.

It's hard to break into the argument from beauty because beauty is so varied. So many different kinds and candidates. 

2. Classical definitions of beauty center on symmetry. And there's a class of beautiful things that exemplify that principle. But a limitation with that criterion is ugly symmetrical objects (e.g. skyscrapers) as well as asymmetrical natural beauty (e.g. scenic landscapes).

Because the human body has bilateral symmetry, that draws attention to irregularities. But beauty isn't reducible to symmetry.  

3. There are different categories of beauty:

i) Natural beauty

E.g. Mountain ranges. Dawn and dusk. 

ii) Artistic beauty

E.g. Gothic cathedrals. 

iii) Abstract beauty

E.g. Mathematics

iv) Moral beauty

E.g. Heroism

v) Visual beauty

E.g. The play of sunlight or moonlight on waves. The Northern lights. 

vi) Auditory beauty

E.g. Music, songbids

vii) Kinetic beauty

Figure skating. Formation flying (birds). How some animals run. Trees flickering in sunlight. 

4. Moral beauty is interesting because it may coexist with physical ugliness. In addition, moral ugliness may often be a presupposition for moral beauty. 

5. Beauty can be related in subtle ways to things that aren't directly beautiful. It's natural to think of visual beauty but not to think of tactile beauty. Yet consider the male impulse to run one's hands over the sensuous curves of a woman's body. Or stoking long luxuriant hair. There the visual element is inseparable from a tactile element.  

6. One argument for the subjectivity of beauty is variation in musical taste. And in some respects, beauty is person-variable. There is, though, a difference between liking something and finding it beautiful. Many people like music that reminds them of childhood or coming-of-age. That's not about beauty but nostalgia. If they were born a generation sooner or later, they'd like different period music. But it's not primarily an aesthetic judgment. 

7. There's a distinction between beauty and greatness. Bach's B Minor Mass is greater than any hymn, but we might prefer hymns on a daily basis. His composition is so long and overwhelming. So much of a muchness. Oftentimes we prefer something simpler. More manageable. 

8. Another issue is the burden of proof. Must the argument from beauty show that beauty directly entails God's existence? Will a process of elimination argument suffice? If there's no naturalistic explanation, then theism wins by default. 

9. Apropos (8), a naturalistic objection to the argument from beauty is that our instinctive sense of beauty is an evolutionary adaptation to promote mate selection. 

i) And there's a grain of truth to that. A half truth. Mammary endowment and "childbearing hips" confer a survival advantage. They are, in addition, visible signs of sexual maturity. It's argued that men are programmed by evolution to find that appealing. 

ii) Mind you, even that is not an essentially evolutionary argument. Natural theology can make the same basic argument. That's consistent with creationism. 

However, most of what we consider beautiful doesn't tie into sex appeal. Sex appeal can't explain the appeal of seascapes, mountainscapes, sunsets, starry skies, music, &c. 

A tiger is a beautiful animal. What's the evolutionary explanation? Why are guys drawn to sports cars? What's the evolutionary explanation? 

iii) And even at the level of sex appeal, the argument is limited. It's not as if men only find certain female body parts attractive. Although breasts and buns have more sex appeal than ears (earrings notwithstanding), the appeal of the female nude in Western art (to take one example) isn't simply because it exposes bare breasts and buns, but because a male viewer can take in the entire sweep of the female figure from head to toe. While breasts and buns are appealing in their own right, they are even more appealing when integrated into the entire figure. Compare that to Michaelangelo's female nudes, which are beefcake men with grafted female breasts. That's repellent rather than attractive. 

iv) In addition, while evolutionary psychology might explain the sex appeal of Marilyn Monroe or Brigitte Bardot, male appreciation for female form isn't confined to pinup girl looks. Men like women with shapely legs, a swan neck, beautiful hair, beautify eyes, and high cheekbones. It would be circular to say men find those features alluring because it promotes mate selection, for that fails to explain why men find those features alluring. Unlike "childbearing hips" and mammary endowment, those features have no practical value. 

v) To consider this from a female perspective, it's my impression that Brad Pitt, back in his prime, was a sex symbol to women. But from an evolutionary standpoint, wouldn't a guy built like Brock Lesnar or Shaquille O'Neal be a better protector and provider? 

vi) Although evolution might explain the appeal of flowers to pollinating birds and bees, it doesn't explain the appeal to flowers to human observers. Although evolution might explain the value of camouflage, it doesn't explain why humans find some snake skin patterns beautiful. Although evolution might explain the appeal of songbirds to birds, it doesn't explain the appeal of songbirds to humans. Yet all of that is explicable in terms of natural theology and creationism. 

10. Is the argument from beauty a direct argument for God's existence? Or is it evidence for divine benevolence, which is, in turn, evidence for God's existence? 

Is simpler better?

https://aeon.co/essays/are-scientific-theories-really-better-when-they-are-simpler

Is there no evidence for God's existence?

Recently, there was a dialogue between Christian philosopher Josh Rasmussen and atheist Tom Jump:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R8LfwMqFImc

It's a long slog. For the philosophically-inclined. It illustrates the ultimately presuppositional nature of debate between naturalism and Christian theism:

1. Jump often defaults to a kind of linguistic positivism (a la Carnap, Quine, protocol sentences) in which logic and reason are reducible to language and linguistic tokens.

2. It's ironic how Jump dismisses Josh's position as ad hoc while, in the same breath, he demotes value, mind, and logic to emergent properties or projections. It doesn't occur to him that his own position is ad hoc because it forces him to relegate things like value, mind, and logic to the realm of secondary effects or imaginary things we project onto the world. 

3. He defines simplicity, or a parsimonious explanation, as a finite thing causing another finite thing. He thinks inferring God is a more complicated explanation because God is more complex. He fails to appreciate how God can be a unifying principle. 

To take a comparison, consider the explanatory power of abstract objects like the Mandelbrot set. Even thought it's infinitely internally complex, yet just one abstract object (Mandelbrot set) can ground an indefinite number of finite simulations of the Mandelbrot set. That's simpler than an atomistic explanation where every simulation of the Mandelbrot set is caused by another concrete particular (whatever that would be). It's more economical to explain how one complex thing grounds many individual instances rather than requiring a separate explanation for each and every particular. 

4. On a related note, he fails to distinguish between a one-to-one explanation and a one-to-many explanation. The indefinite multiplication of one-to-one explanations is far more cumbersome and inefficient than a one-to-many explanation. If one thing can be the ultimate source of many things, even if the source is complex, that's a more elegant explanation than individual things causing other individual things at infinitum. 

5. In the same vein, he defines simplicity as the least thing required to account for the result ("most simple…exactly what is required"). But that's very nearsighted. Take artistic creativity. Take da Vinci's Adoration of the Magi (or Handel's Messiah). Not doubt a painting requires a painter at least as complex as the painting. But the Adoration of the Magi is just a sample of da Vinci's creative abilities. It's not a one-to-one match where that's all da Vinci is capable of doing. Da Vinci had a lot more in reserve. In general, a creator is greater than what he creates. He can't be less that what he creates. He must have enough imagination and skill to do it. But a creator brings more to the task than the task requires. That's typically the case even for human agents. 

6. To take another example: suppose a guy plays roulette once a month at the local casino. Nothing flashy, yet he consistently performs just a little better than the odds. As a result, he wins more often than he loses. Coincidentally, he makes enough each time to cover his monthly living expenses. 

By Jump's criterion, the gambler got lucky. We assess each dice throw in isolation, since that's the simplest explanation, if by simple we mean "exactly what is required" to explain each throw of the dice. 

The other explanation is that he has a subtle way of cheating. Although there's no direct evidence of cheating, the fact that he consistently beats the odds, albeit by a small margin, is indirect evidence. We're not restricting ourselves to "exactly what is required" to explain each individual throw of the dice, but how to explain the overall pattern. 

Modal metaphysics

1. There are different kinds of theistic arguments. One line of argument is the argument from abstract objects. These are a priori, metaphysical arguments. There are different kinds of abstract objects, so you have the argument from logic, numbers, properties, propositions, and counterfactuals. 

2. Here's an argument for possible worlds: 

I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit. If an argument is wanted, it is this. It is uncontroversially true that things might be otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do you, that things could have been different in countless ways...I therefore believe in the existence of entities that might be called ‘ways things could have been’. I prefer to call them ‘possible worlds’, D. Lewis, Counterfactuals (Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd ed., 2001), 84.

I agree with Lewis up to a point. However, his argument is too facile. It need to be qualified. Humans imagine how things could be different because we imagine discrete changes. Compartmentalized changes. But we lack the intelligence and foresight to consider all the adjustments that must be made to accommodate changing a particular variable. So in many cases, what we imagine could be different couldn't realistically be different because, in a case/effect world, every change must be consistent with every impacted event. 

Which is not to deny that things could be different in countless ways, but we need to be cautious about that. 

And even an omnipotent agent's field of action is restricted to some degree insofar as he chooses to operate by means of finite media. That's a self-imposed limitation.

Moreover, while God can generally bypass intervening mechanisms to produce an outcome directly, there are second-order relations that can't be produced directly. 

For instance, take atheists who harp on the alleged problem of animal suffering. An omnipotent God could just create a world without any death. Any predators, parasites, or pathogens. 

First off, I don't know if that's even true. It may well be the case that organic life is naturally impossible without organic death of some sort. 

But even if true, a world without any predators, parasites, and pathogens is so unrecognizably dissimilar to our experience that atheists have no idea what such a world would look like. There's no comparative frame of reference. 

3. Apropos (2), let's consider a potential objection to the argument from counterfactuals:

Now, per impossibile counterfactuals are rather troubling…it is not clear that they have well-defined truth values….Nevertheless, some per impossibile counterfactuals make perfect sense. Let "Gnosticism" stand for the thesis that there necessarily exists a necessarily perfectly morally good God and a necessarily perfectly morally evil God. Let us agree that Gnosticism is necessarily false. Then, the following per impossibile counterfactuals are non-trivially true…WEre Gnosticism true, then Christianity would be necessarily false. A. Pruss, Actuality, Possibility and Worlds (Continuum 2011), 141-2. 

So what's the truthmaker for the evil god of Gnostic dualism? One explanation might be that it's a composite idea. We're mentally (and verbally) combining various ideas, each of which have truthmakers, even if the entire idea, as an artificial construct, lacks a truthmaker.

Pruss also talks about the truthmaker, if any, for unicorns. Two possible explanations:

i) Unlike the evil Gnostic god, unicorns are possible. It's just a horse with a horn. There can be possible worlds with unicorns. Heck, there could be an actual world in a multiverse with real unicorns.

ii) From our standpoint, unicorns are fictional entities. A figment of the human imagination. But in that regard they are composite ideas. So even if unicorns lack a truthmaker, the individual elements have truthmakers.

4. Another issue is the ancient debate over universals. What's the basis for attribute-agreement? What makes two particulars red? 

i) Is the traditional Platonic distinction between abstract universals and concrete particulars is the best paradigm? Consider a theistic paradigm: a particular physical object has a shade of red that matches a particular shade of red in God's mind, and God created that object to instantiate that specific shade of red.

ii) That doesn't create a discrepancy between one generic color red and physical objects which reflect varying shades of red. Which "approximate" one generic color. 

In Platonism, red balls approximate an abstract universal of redness. A generic pure color. 

However, that fails to explain attribute-agreement since it's just an approximation. "Red" balls comes in different shades of red. 

iii) But God isn't operating with the concept of a generic pure color. Rather, God visualizes balls with varying shades of red. Each physical ball corresponds to a specific divine idea of a particular ball. So there's an exact match between the shade of the ball and the shade of God's exemplary idea of that particular ball. 

iv) Both Alfred Hitchcock and I possess the property of knowing Psycho. However, my knowledge of Psycho merely exemplifies the property (because my recollection is a mental copy of the original), whereas Hitchcock's knowledge is the mental blueprint or exemplar. 

By the same token, Bernini and I see the same slab of marble. But in addition, Bernini superimposes an image onto the raw marble. A mental projection. He then carves the marble to correspond to what he sees in his mind's eye. Take Apollo and Daphne.

My concept of the statue is an exemplification of the statue whereas the sculpture is an exemplification of the sculptor's formative concept. His idea is the blueprint. My idea is a copy. 

v) So what if the basis for attribute agreement isn't a common property but a common (divine) idea? Two objects are the same in X respect because the both exemplify God's idea of what they were meant to be like. They are instances of the same idea. 

v) Apropos, if it's possible for a mental image/representation of red to be immaterial, then in principle God can visualize colors. So God has a concept of a red ball. Not just a colorless idea of color, but a mental image of a red object. God creates a physical world containing a red ball that corresponds to his mental image. The red ball is a physical, concrete exemplification of God's immaterial idea. 

The argument from numbers

However, if it’s a divine idea, then we could all be talking about the same idea, God’s idea. Divine ideas would have to be relevantly different from our own. They’re at least different in that they can secure the infinity and necessity of numbers. 

It could be that God would always have had the ideas of 2 and 4, and it could be that God would always have had the idea that 2 + 2 = 4, no matter what. But perhaps it could be that God would not necessarily have the ideas. Why should he have them? If God could have had quite different ideas (or none at all), it would be a cosmic coincidence for him to choose just those ideas, no matter what.

Let’s focus on the main subject of Leibniz’s argument first: the necessary truths of mathematics. Whenever we try to ground some domain in the divine, there’s a Euthyphro-style dilemma lurking. A comparison here between morality and mathematics might be illuminating. The traditional Euthyphro dilemma: Does God command it because it’s obligatory? Or is it obligatory because he commands it? If the former, then there’s some morality independent of God’s say-so. If the latter, then God could with as much reason command murder as he could forbid it. Does God think that 2 + 2 = 4 because 2 + 2 = 4? Or does 2 + 2 = 4 because he thinks it? If the former, then the truth is independent of God’s say-so. If the latter, then God could with as much reason have decided that 2 + 2 = 5.

Does God have the idea of 2 because it exists? Or does it exist because he has the idea? If the former, then the number is independent of God’s intellect. If the latter, then God could with as much reason never have had the idea of 2, so that it never existed.

But I wonder: Why would God’s rational nature ensure that 2 + 2 = 4? Unless there’s something intrinsically rational about 2 + 2 = 4, unless there’s something about the numbers that God’s rationality is tracking and that isn’t up to anyone, God could have dreamt up something else. But, if God’s rational nature is tracking something, then that is what mathematics is about. That is where the numbers live. It might be a luminous Platonic realm. It might be next to nothing at all. There might even be something divine about it.

http://college.wfu.edu/philosophy/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/The-Argument-From-Numbers-Ty.pdf

This poses some interesting challenges to the theistic foundations of math. 

1. I don't know what he means by saying God might not have certain ideas. 

2. Suppose we can't explain what makes mathematical truths necessarily true. That would still leave intact an argument based on God to embed mathematical infinities. 

If, likewise, numbers are ultimately mental entities, and only a timeless divine mind can ground them, then that argument remains whether or not we can explain what makes mathematical truths necessarily true. 

3. Is 2+2=4 necessarily true in isolation, or in relation to an interlocking system of mathematical relations? If the latter, then it's necessarily true within that system. 

4. Maybe there's no room for 2+2≠4 because the interlocking system is exhaustive. An infinite, transfinite totality that edges out any alternatives. Divine reason takes that as far as it can go, to ultimate internal closure. 

In order for 2+2≠4, that requires a systematic readjustment to all other equations. Maybe there can be no structure in which 2+2≠4 because there's no infinitely consistent, mutually entailing alternative. 

5. Suppose there is an alternate system, like non-Euclidean geometries. The equations would be necessarily true within those alternate system, rather than contingent or arbitrary. 

What's so bad about blind faith?

"Blind faith" is a pejorative label. When atheists talk about Christian faith, they define it as believing something without evidence, on insufficient evidence, or contrary to evidence. 

Atheists don't usually begin with a theological or philosophical definition of faith. Rather, they begin with their belief that Christianity is errant nonsense, so you have to be irrational to be a Christian. The atheist works back from his view of Christianity to come up with his own definition of faith. Given his view of Christianity, faith must be believing something without evidence, on insufficient evidence, or contrary to evidence.

Christian philosophers, apologists, and theologians rightly reject that definition of faith. Of course, some professing Christians are guilty of blind faith. They simply believe whatever they were taught–the historical accident of whichever denomination they happen to be raised in. But it's unfair to assess a position by its least competent representatives. 

Blind faith is groundless faith rather than grounded faith. Uninformed faith rather than informed faith. 

In Scripture, the distinction between faith and sight is generally the difference between firsthand experience and testimonial evidence. 

However, in this post I'd like to be contrarian. Suppose, instead of repudiating blind faith, we embrace it but develop it in a different direction. 

Consider literal blind faith. Suppose I'm born blind. I have a sighted brother 2 years my senior. We grew up together. Day in and day out for 20 years. 

I rely on my brother to help me navigated my way through life. He's my eyes. Because I'm blind I see the world through his eyes. 

I have no direct evidence to back up his observations. I can't compare his observations with my own, since I'm blind. 

However, I have direct evidence that the observer is trustworthy. I have direct evidence that my brother can be trusted, which is, in turn, indirect evidence for what he tells me. For twenty years, my brother has guided me and protected me. He always looks out for me. My faith in what he tells me he sees is (literally) blind, but my faith in him is deeply informed. 

Moreover, although I can't see what he sees, his guidance and sight enable me to discover the world by other means. He says "touch this!" "Don't touch that!" "Taste this!" "Don't taste that!"

Suppose he drives me to the beach. I can't see the road. I can't see the signs. I don't know the route or the landmarks. 

But once we get to the beach, I have other ways of sensing the beach. I can feel the sand under my bare feet, feel the water, hear the surf, taste and smell the salty air.

My (literally blind) faith in my brother's verbal descriptions is an entry point. By taking what he says on faith, that puts me in a position to explore the world and find things out for myself. Faith is a necessary entry point. But the end-point is knowledge. Thanks to my brother, I can experience the beach. I rely on his eyesight to take the first few steps, but once I'm there, faith gives way to personal experience. 

Dropping the metaphor, when I pray, that's an act of faith. Suppose on one or more occasions I receive an unmistakable answer to prayer. At that point faith passes into sight. But I wouldn't arrive at sight if I didn't begin with faith. Knowledge is the final destination, but faith is the departure gate. 

The Irrationality of Miracles

Jason Engwer pointed out the following.

Gary out of one side of his mouth:

"Some of the miracle claims are just downright stupid. Any educated Christian with a college degree should be embarrassed that Keener included these claims in his book. One such claim is that a woman who had previously undergone a complete hysterectomy prayed to Jesus for a child and nine months later she delivered a healthy child. If that story is true, that is more miraculous than the virginal conception of Jesus!"

Out of the other:

"When Jesus puts back together the thousands of pieces of tissue of a victim of a bombing, or reattaches the head of someone who has been decapitated, or reattaches a severed leg from an amputee, you will have my full attention. Until then, since prior investigations of 'miracle' healings have demonstrated that there is always a possible (and more probable) naturalistic explanation (such as the previous chemo and radiation treatment finally kicked in), I'm not buying your magic tales."

So, Gary apparently wants Jesus to produce miracles that he's already dismissed as "downright stupid" in principle.

It’s a common atheist tactic to claim that to believe in miracles is irrational.  This is why Gary feels comfortable saying it’s “downright stupid” when he disparages certain miracles.  But, I argue that it’s not irrational to believe in miracles, even on purely materialistic grounds.

To be clear, when I talk about “irrational” I’m referring to something that would be logically impossible, or something that it absolutely impossible to occur.  Furthermore, when I say it’s not irrational for miracles to happen even on materialistic grounds, I’m not referring to atheist claims of “spontaneous recovery” or “we’ll eventually figure out how to pretend God didn’t do this”-of-the-gaps arguments.  I mean legitimate miracles are perfectly consistent in a materialistic universe.

First, as I pointed out in one of my previous exchanges with Atheist Lehman, atheists assume that the supernatural is an impersonal force.  But God is a person.  It’s why He has the pronoun “He” (not because He’s gendered, so feminists can chill, but because He is not an It).  When we are looking at miracles, we are not looking at something that will happen due to machine-like causality, but instead we are looking at the choices of a personal agent.

One of the arguments that Gary brought out was that there are billions of people who pray to be healed, but not all are healed.  But this would only be a problem if God was obligated to answer all prayers.  We can easily imagine a hospital ward full of patients who have a bacterial infection.  A doctor may choose to give certain patients an antibiotic that he doesn’t give to other patients.  Those who receive the cure are cured, but those who do not aren’t.  Regardless of whether one wants to debate the ethics of a doctor making such a selection, it is clearly not irrational to stipulate that a personal agent could make such a decision for his own reasons.  In other words, it’s not like gravity (which functions no matter what someone wishes or desires) and so the fact that some, but not all, people who pray to be healed actually are healed is not grounds to rule that praying for a miracle is irrational.

But let me delve into this further with my second point.  The impetus for how miraculous healing works doesn’t have to be “magical” in any sense of the word.  All it requires is the existence of a higher dimension, something which string theory already teaches.  In fact, nearly all (if not all) of the miracles that Jesus performed could be adequately explained as the actions of someone who has the ability to use the fourth Euclidean dimension (I use the term “Euclidean” here to differentiate between it and Einstein’s use of the fourth dimension as time).

The easiest way to demonstrate this is to use the example of Flatlanders.  This work examined a theoretical two-dimensional space where creatures lived on a plane.  We can imagine a square drawn on a piece of paper with a heart-shaped icon inside the square.  To a creature that exists two-dimensionally, they would see only a line in front of them (they have only the x and y coordinates, no depth).  They would therefore see just the surface of the square and they would have to dig through the surface of the square in order to get to that heart icon.

You, existing in the third dimension, can see all sides of the square simultaneously, inside and outside.  You can even put your hand over the square and touch all points within the square simultaneously.  Neither of these concepts makes sense to a two-dimensional being, however, because they can only touch the outside of the square—never the inside, unless they burrow in.

Now consider some of the miracles of Jesus.  He walked through a locked door.  Irrational?  Well, a three dimensional being can use the third dimension to bypass a two-dimensional door.  To the perspective of a two-dimensional creature, we can walk through doors.  If Jesus could access the fourth dimension, bypassing a three-dimensional door is trivial.

Jesus turned water into wine.  Well, we can imagine a locked room in two-dimensional space that’s full of a substance—say, red chalk.  We can easily imagine erasing the substance out of that space and replacing it with something else, like black ink.  To the observer in two-dimensional space, a miracle has happened whereas for us, it’s just a natural aspect to the third dimension.

Jesus healed people.  Imagine what a doctor could do if he could see all points of a human body, inside and out, without having to cut into the body.  Just as we can reach in and touch the heart-icon inside a square without digging in, a fourth-dimensional being could see our entire heart and reach in to remove plaque or to repair arterial damage, all without cutting into our body or needing to use surgery.  Gary, being in the medical field, ought to appreciate how much one could do with this ability.

Again, extra dimensions are believed by many in modern physics.  It’s certainly not prima facie irrational to hold to their existence.  And it wouldn’t take a “magical” being to do anything.  If we had some way to access the fourth dimension ourselves, we could already do all of these things and we certainly aren’t magical beings.

Now atheists still might not like God.  They might even say that just because it’s possible that there could be a being in fourth-dimensional space doesn’t mean there actually is one.  But that “rebuttal” misses the point.  Atheists are claiming that Christians are irrational for holding to beliefs that are perfectly rational even on purely materialistic grounds.

What does that say about how rational atheism is?