Is natural evil postlapsarian?

Although Dr. Welty discusses various objections to his theodicy, he regrettably omits any mention its greatest challenge: the widespread conviction that it has been decisively disproven by science.

Mainstream science has no place for the Biblical Adam & Eve in an idyllic Garden of Eden. Allegedly, humans evolved, via a cruel quest for survival, in a group of at least several thousand; there never were two humans from whom all other humans descend.

Even worse, fossils indicating natural evil (animal suffering from predation, disease, etc.) are allegedly dated millions of years older than the earliest humans, in blatant contrast with the notion that natural evil was caused by Adam's Fall.

Clearly, the view that natural evil comes only after Adam's Fall entails rejecting mainstream fossil dates, and thus essentially embracing Young Earth Creationism (YEC).

Unhappily,  the bulk of Christian Academia has largely accepted mainstream science, and hence disdains YEC. Some Christian scholars do uphold the traditional natural evil theodicy, while at the same time explicitly rejecting YEC, seemingly unaware of any inconsistency (e.g., Wayne Grudem, Douglas Groothuis). Most, however, embrace alternative theodicies that are more in tune with mainstream science.

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2019/01/why-so-much-evil.html

That raises a number of issues:

1. In historical theology, what phenomena did Reformed theologians classify as natural evils? Natural evil is a very broad category, with many examples. 

i) Wildfires are a natural evil, caused by lightning. Does Byl think there was no lightning or fire before the Fall? 

Campfires can start a wildfire. Was everything fireproof before the Fall? 

ii) Flooding is classified as a natural evil. Does that mean the Nile river couldn't/didn't flood before the Fall? The annual flooding of the Nile river is beneficial to Egyptian farmers.

iii) If a tsunami sweeps over an island that has no fauna, is that a natural evil? It doesn't kill anything. Is a tsunami intrinsically a natural evil, or only in conjunction with other factors?

iv) An avalanche is classified as a natural disaster. Were avalanches impossible before the Fall? If you have mountains and precipitation, that produces snowpacks that produce avalanches. 

2. This all goes to the ambiguity of "natural evil". "Natural evil" is a term of art. Many natural evils are natural goods. They are necessary to maintain the balance of nature. They are only evil if a human being is in the wrong place at the wrong time.

3. It's not as if the Bible has a list of labeled natural evils. Is it a biblical presupposition that animal death is evil? Was the sacrificial system evil? 

4. I've always thought the YEC claim that natural evil must be a result of the Fall is philosophically and exegetically naive:

i) YECs assume that natural evil is incompatible with the creation as originally "good" or "very good". That, however, is not an exegetical conclusion. Gen 1 doesn't define the goodness of creation in contrast to so-called natural evil. It doesn't speak to that issue one way or the other.

ii) The standard objection to animal suffering is not that it happened before the Fall. What atheist frames the objection that way? If we say animal suffering is a postlapsarian development, that's irrelevant to the argument from animal suffering. Atheists will say animal suffering is incompatible with divine benevolence or wisdom regardless of whether that is deemed to be a prelapsarian or postlapsarian phenomenon. God is still complicit in predation, parasitism, and disease even if that's indexed to the Fall. So it's a failed theodicy. 

iii) In addition, Byl is a Calvinist, so he believes that God predestined all natural (and moral evils) and implements his blueprint via meticulous providence. 

iv) Even within an Edenic setting, it doesn't follow that there was no predation or animal death. Although the animals are tame in relation to Adam and Eve, that carries no presumption that they are nonviolent in relation to other animals. 

v) Apropos (iv), Gen 2-3 implies animal mortality, for the tree of life is reserved for humans. And it only existed in the garden, not outside the garden.

5. YEC, if true, entails the falsity of the evolutionary narrative. However, the converse doesn't follow. The falsity of YEC doesn't entail the evolutionary narrative. 

6. Allowing for natural evils before the Fall doesn't mean innocent Adam and Eve were exposed to natural evils. God could providentially shield them from natural evils. 

7. Byl is both a geocentrist as well as a young-earth creationist. From his viewpoint, they share a common hermeneutic. The same hermeneutic yields young-earth creationism and geocentrism.

The dilemma that generates is that I don't see how he can draw a hermeneutical line between geocentrism and flat-earthism. He's scornful of Enns doe arguing that Scripture teaches a three-story universe, but it sure looks to me like the same hermeneutic that yields a geocentric cosmography yields a flat-earth cosmography as well. And the reasoning is reversible. They rise and fall together. 

Creationism and idealism

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2018/09/does-physics-lead-to-god.html#more

Here's a striking example of a philosopher of science who rejects young-earth creationism but subscribes to theistic idealism to explain quantum mechanics. That's quite ironic since idealism is far more antirealist than mature creation.

Scientific evidence and Adam

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2017/04/scientific-evidence-and-adam.html

Fountains of the deep

One more brief comment:

As to where the extra water came from, the Bible itself refers to its sources: "all the fountains of the deep burst forth, and the windows of the heavens were opened." (Gen.7:11). The atmosphere would not have provided sufficient rain for a massive global Flood. 

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-flood-and-tidal-waves.html

Yes, the Bible cites two sources for the floodwaters. For liberals, both sources have mythological overtones. The "windows of heaven" alludes to the cosmic sea above the solid dome of the sky while the "fountains of the deep" refers to the primordial abyss.

For conservatives, the "windows of heaven" is a figurative expression for rainclouds and rainwater. 

But what about the "fountains of the deep"? Some say that's poetic. Some think that refers to subterranean water. Speaking for myself:

i) The parallelism in Gen 7:11 makes the general point that the deluge had two sources: water above and water below. 

ii) "Fountains of the deep" is a poetic synonym for the ocean. 

iii) The ocean is "below" the earth, not in a subterranean sense, but in the prosaic sense that dry land is generally higher than the sea. Sea level marks the boundary between the surface of the earth, where humans dwell, and the fathomless ocean. 

That interpretation is consistent with my lunar conjecture.

iv) The primary source of coastal flooding is the ocean. My lunar conjecture would ratchet that way up. It could still be wrong, but if so, it's wrong for different reasons.

Super-tides

John Byl has an interesting response to a post of mine:

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-flood-and-tidal-waves.html#more

One potential problem with his analysis is the use of round numbers and recurrent 7-motif in the flood account. That suggests a degree of numerical stylization–especially Sabbatarian numerology. 

Defending a flat-earth

This is a sequel to my previous post:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2016/07/flat-earth-cartography.html

I'd like to revisit Dr. Byl's comment:

Sorry, Steve, but your arguments against a flat earth don’t work.

A flat earth model of the universe can easily be made empirically equivalent to a spherical earth model. Simply apply a mathematical transformation called a "geometric inversion". For each point in the universe, measure its distance R from, say, the earth’s South Pole, and move this point along the Pole-to-point half-line to a new distance 1/R. 

This transforms the spherical surface of the earth to a flat disk, centered on the North Pole, with the South Pole infinitely far away (i.e., this is the stereographic projection of geography). All points inside the Earth are transferred beneath the disk; all points in the sky are transferred above the disk. Galaxies that were infinitely far away end up a short distance above the new North Pole. 

The laws of physics are also transformed, with consequences that may seem strange for those accustomed to thinking in terms of the more conventional universe. For example, sunlight now travels in circular arcs, the sun and stars become much smaller than the (now infinite) earth, etc. See my post
Mathematical models and reality: http://reformation.edu/scripture-science-byl/pages/09-mathematical-models.htm
Terrestrial objects increase in size as they travel away from the North Pole, becoming infinitely large at the South Pole. However, since inversion is a conformal transformation, local shapes are preserved. Hence you won’t notice any changes as you travel. 

It is not my intent to defend a flat earth, but only to point out that, with some ingenuity, one can construct a mathematical model of the universe with almost any feature one wishes (the Duhem-Quine thesis), as long as one is willing to make adjustments elsewhere (e.g., sunrays become circular arcs, size is not preserved, etc.).

Since this flat-earth model is empirically equivalent to the spherical earth model, the choice between these models must be made on the basis of non-empirical factors, such as philosophical or theological considerations.

i) Several commenters, myself included, responded to Byl's argument. He never replied. That's his prerogative, but when you ignore objections, it weakens your case.

Now I'd like to discuss some additional problems. His defense has some paradoxical aspects. 

ii) When dealing with geocentric/flat-earth imagery in Scripture, mainstream inerrantists say the descriptions are poetic or phenomenological. In general, a round earth looks flat to an earthbound observer. Mind you, there's subtle evidence that that an optical illusion, even from the standpoint of an earthbound observer. 

Byl is making the same move in reverse: it's possible for a flat-earth to look round. What's paradoxical about this move is that Byl's own argument involves a phenomenological interpretation of the Biblical data or observational data. But in that event this comes down to a choice between two competing phenomenological interpretations: a spherical earth that has a flat appearance or a flat earth that has a spherical appearance. In that case, the flat-earther's appeal isn't any more straightforward than the alternative. Both positions save appearances. Both positions go behind naive realism. 

iii) Given, moreover, a choice between two phenomenologically equivalent interpretations, there may be other considerations that tilt the scales. Geometric inversion gives you mathematically equivalent descriptions, but they're hardly equivalent in other respects. The physics is different–as Byl concedes. And to my knowledge, flat-earthers haven't produced a detailed scientific alternative to standard astronomy in that regard. If one model has a lot of physics to back it up, whereas the physics hasn't been worked out for the other model, these aren't evidentially on a par. There's a difference between mathematical coherence and natural coherence. A scientific model has to balance out natural forces. I'm not saying modern astrophysics is complete. There are some well-known problems. But you can't beat something with nothing. 

iv) Another paradoxical aspect of Byl's argument depends on a mathematical model that would be incomprehensible to the original audience. Assuming ancient readers thought the earth was flat, did they think it was flat in that sense? Did they think the South Pole was infinitely large and infinitely far from the North pole? Did they think the flat earth was shaped in that way? 

The irony is to defend a flat earth by substituting a mathematical model that doesn't match the mental image which ancient readers (allegedly) entertained. It defends a particular interpretation of Scripture through a bait-n-switch. That's analogous to people who defend the historicity of Adam by combining theistic evolution with ensoulment. Although that maneuver can give you a "historical Adam", it's not the Adam of Gen 2. 

Typically, scholars who think the Bible reflects a flat-earth cosmography impute a three-story universe to Scripture. They do that by cobbling together scattered references in Scripture, without regard to genre, which they supplement with depictions from other ancient Near Eastern sources. That includes the solid dome, with the cosmic sea above the dome, and so on. Yet Byl pours scorn on that particular model:

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2010/02/genesis-and-ancient-cosmology.html

If, however, we don't think Scripture reflects a flat-earth cosmography in that sense, then what's the evidence that it reflects a flat-earth cosmography in any sense? Surely the esoteric alternative that Byl proposes (for the sake of argument) would be inaccessible to ancient readers. 

John Byl On The Great Christ Comet

A recent post at his blog is about Colin Nicholl's book on the star of Bethlehem.

Is evolution merely unfalsified?

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2015/08/is-evolution-unfalsified.html

Adam plus evolution?

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2015/07/dr-jelsma-proposes-adam-and-evolution.html

More than Myth?

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2015/02/review-more-than-myth.html#more

Nature is a picture book

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2013/12/gods-two-books-and-history.html#more

A Christian astronomer on the star of Bethlehem

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2010/12/star-of-bethlehem.html

Combining Adam and Evolution

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2013/10/combining-adam-and-evolution.html#more

No Bible for Christian Academia?

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2013/10/no-bible-for-christian-academia.html

Creation Days - Real or Analogy?

Williamson's article is weakly argued. Byl also plugs an article by Sarfati (in response to Craig), which–not surprisingly–is more adeptly argued (although it's not above criticism).

Of greater interest, however, is Byl drawing attention to an ostensible self-contradiction in the position of Poythress:

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2013/09/creation-days-real-or-analogy.html

If it quacks like a duck...

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2013/07/creation-qirc-and-quack.html

Does God play dice?

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2013/03/does-god-play-dice.html

Overview of Origins

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2013/02/overview-of-origins.html

Scoring the multiverse

John Byl has posted a critique of Don Page’s theistic multiverse:

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2013/01/did-god-create-multiverse.html

Since Prof. Byl has a doctorate in astrophysics, he’s better qualified than most to evaluate the scientific merits of the theory.

i) Because a theistic multiverse is speculative, I don’t think Christians who are sympathetic to that position should erect a theological edifice over that conjectural foundation. At the same time, the denial of a theistic multiverse is equally speculative.

ii) Dr. Byl targets a scientific version of the multiverse, based on Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. Since Page is propounding a scientific version of the multiverse, his model can be evaluated on scientific grounds.

iii) However, we need to distinguish between physical models of the multiverse, like Everett’s many-worlds version–and metaphysical models, like David Lewis’s concrete modal realism. Scientific criticisms of the former bounce off the latter. Byl’s post leaves the impression that by disposing of Page’s model, he has thereby done away with the multiverse tout court. But that’s clearly overstated.

iv) One conventional objection to the multiverse, which Byl lodges, is the unverifiable or unfalsifiable nature of the hypothesis. That raises a number of issues:

a) Proponents would say there’s indirect evidence for the multiverse. They’d say there’s evidence for quantum mechanics, and they’d say Everett’s interpretation is the best interpretation of quantum mechanics. Of course, that’s disputed, but that’s the argument.

b) On the face of it, postulating a multiverse is no more unscientific than postulating other theoretical entities, like quarks. The justification for postulating theoretical entities is their explanatory value. We shouldn’t stop at the level of observables. For one thing, what’s observable or unobservables varies depending on the state of our technology. What was unobservable in the 15C is observable in the 21C based on technological advances.

Likewise, take a diagnostician who’s trying to find out what’s wrong with a patient. Based on a battery of tests, something is objectively abnormal about the patient’s health. Suppose the diagnostician fails to detect the source. Still, it’s reasonable for the diagnostician to think something must be causing the patient’s medical problem, even if he can’t discover the source of the problem.

Similarly, when we reconstruct the past, we postulate things to fill in the gaps. If we unearth a partial skeleton, we interpolate the missing parts. We don’t assume the organism, when it was alive, had a partial skeleton.

c) Having said that, a problem with theoretical entities is that more than one kind of entity or combination of entities might be responsible for the effect. So the postulate will be underdetermined by the evidence.

v) Byl also objects to the way Page treats natural or physical laws. In fairness to Page, appeal to a natural law theodicy or stable environment is nothing new. And it has a grain of truth. For instance, mountain-climbers can’t expect God to suspend the “law” of gravity when they slip and fall.

That said, I agree with Byl that it’s easy to take this principle too far, as if God’s hands are tied once he initiates a system of second causes. But God doesn’t stand in awe of natural laws. They don’t inhibit divine action.

vi) It’s not entirely clear why Byl rules out a multiverse. Is he saying God is able, but unwilling to create a multiverse–or is he saying there is no multiverse because God is unable to create a multiverse? It seems to me that the latter represents an arbitrary restriction on divine freedom and omnipotence.

vii) Byl claims that, according to Scripture, God only created one world. However, there’s a danger of anachronism in that claim. Isn’t the universe to an ancient man what the multiverse is to a modern man? What did the “cosmic” references in Scripture mean to the original audience? Wasn’t their concept of the cosmos basically limited to the visible solar system? Naked-eye astronomy? No telescopes, spectroscopy, or radio astronomy. If you told them God created billions of other solar systems in billions of unobservable galaxies, would that count as one world or many worlds from an ancient perspective?

viii) Byl raises some theological issues that aren’t unique to a multiverse. One can raise similar issues if there’s intelligent life elsewhere in the universe. Aliens with a religious history particular to their own planet. Indeed, Byl has discussed that issue in the past.

ix) On a model of the multiverse like Everett’s, all physically possible outcomes are automatically realized. But on a metaphysical model, God can exercise discretion as to what possibilities will be exemplified.

Did God Create a Multiverse?

http://bylogos.blogspot.com/2013/01/did-god-create-multiverse.html