Saturday, February 28, 2009
Friday, February 27, 2009
What is grace?
LIGHTWEIGHT SAID:
“You asked the question, ‘What is grace?’ You then went on to describe the different technical and nontechnical ways that term grace is used in Reformed Theology, but, as far as I could tell, never went on to explain exactly what grace is. I have a couple of questions: What exactly is grace? and, What is the opposite of grace? Thanks.”
i) Saving grace has reference to all the things that God does to and for the elect to ensure their salvation, viz. election, redemption, regeneration, justification, sanctification, preservation, glorification.
ii) Common grace denotes all the things that God does to and for the reprobate to enable them to perform natural goods.
iii) The opposite of grace is:
a) A negative condition: the absence of saving grace and common grace,
along with:
b) A positive condition: to be the object of retributive justice.
“You asked the question, ‘What is grace?’ You then went on to describe the different technical and nontechnical ways that term grace is used in Reformed Theology, but, as far as I could tell, never went on to explain exactly what grace is. I have a couple of questions: What exactly is grace? and, What is the opposite of grace? Thanks.”
i) Saving grace has reference to all the things that God does to and for the elect to ensure their salvation, viz. election, redemption, regeneration, justification, sanctification, preservation, glorification.
ii) Common grace denotes all the things that God does to and for the reprobate to enable them to perform natural goods.
iii) The opposite of grace is:
a) A negative condition: the absence of saving grace and common grace,
along with:
b) A positive condition: to be the object of retributive justice.
"A twinge of irony"
“You might remember that a few days ago I linked to Steve Hays’ post in which he mocked Perry Robinson’s post about Reformed anthropology being Pelagian in its core. I concluded that post saying: “Of course the substance of Perry’s post wasn’t addressed, but then again I don’t know if Hays is up to such a task (I honestly don’t know since I know next to nothing about the man).” Apparently Mr. Hays is up to the task because he has responded to the substance of Perry’s post today. This bit from the beginning of Steve’s post stood out”:
I was making a point about Robinson’s apologetic method. So often he uses the following tactic to “disprove” Calvinism:
i) Compare and contrast Reformed theology with Orthodox theology.
ii) Arrive at the conclusion that Reformed theology is different than Orthodox theology.
iii) Case closed!
Of course, that begs the question of why Orthodox theology should supply the standard of comparison. He almost never tries to prove his theological criterion. He takes that as a given. And the few times I’ve seen him try to prove his theological criterion, he did so in a way that took for granted his Orthodox ecclesiology. I have yet to see him offer a defense of his theological criterion that doesn’t assume what he needs to prove. And most of the time he doesn’t even try.
“Sounds remarkably like Perry employs a presuppositional apologetic! I might be wrong about this (please correct me if I am), but I think I read once upon a time that Steve Hays was a presuppositionalist (or maybe it was Paul Manata, they both write for Triablogue). If this is the case then the above statement has more than a twinge of irony. In any event, give it a read as I’m sure it will exercise your mind.”
http://rdtwot.wordpress.com/2009/02/26/steve-hays-responds-to-perry-robinson/
It’s obvious that Nick hasn’t done any direct reading on Van Tilian apologetics (e.g. Frame, Byron, Bahnsen, Anderson).
He appears to be inferring the nature of presuppositionalism from the word “presuppose.” So he seems to think a presuppositional apologist simply takes his own position for granted. Needless to say, that’s a caricature of Van Tilian apologetics.
i) It would be more accurate to say that, according to Van Tilian apologetics, the unbeliever is taking certain truths for granted that only make sense within a Christian worldview. The unbeliever is a closet presuppositionalist. And the job of a Van Tilian apologist is to make the unbeliever aware of his tacit, theistic presuppositions.
ii) And a Van Tilian apologist doesn’t simply take his own position for granted, and leave it at that. On the one hand he tries to disprove the unbeliever’s worldview by exposing its residual and irreducible commitment to certain theistic truths.
On the other hand, he tries to prove his own position by process of elimination.
I was making a point about Robinson’s apologetic method. So often he uses the following tactic to “disprove” Calvinism:
i) Compare and contrast Reformed theology with Orthodox theology.
ii) Arrive at the conclusion that Reformed theology is different than Orthodox theology.
iii) Case closed!
Of course, that begs the question of why Orthodox theology should supply the standard of comparison. He almost never tries to prove his theological criterion. He takes that as a given. And the few times I’ve seen him try to prove his theological criterion, he did so in a way that took for granted his Orthodox ecclesiology. I have yet to see him offer a defense of his theological criterion that doesn’t assume what he needs to prove. And most of the time he doesn’t even try.
“Sounds remarkably like Perry employs a presuppositional apologetic! I might be wrong about this (please correct me if I am), but I think I read once upon a time that Steve Hays was a presuppositionalist (or maybe it was Paul Manata, they both write for Triablogue). If this is the case then the above statement has more than a twinge of irony. In any event, give it a read as I’m sure it will exercise your mind.”
http://rdtwot.wordpress.com/2009/02/26/steve-hays-responds-to-perry-robinson/
It’s obvious that Nick hasn’t done any direct reading on Van Tilian apologetics (e.g. Frame, Byron, Bahnsen, Anderson).
He appears to be inferring the nature of presuppositionalism from the word “presuppose.” So he seems to think a presuppositional apologist simply takes his own position for granted. Needless to say, that’s a caricature of Van Tilian apologetics.
i) It would be more accurate to say that, according to Van Tilian apologetics, the unbeliever is taking certain truths for granted that only make sense within a Christian worldview. The unbeliever is a closet presuppositionalist. And the job of a Van Tilian apologist is to make the unbeliever aware of his tacit, theistic presuppositions.
ii) And a Van Tilian apologist doesn’t simply take his own position for granted, and leave it at that. On the one hand he tries to disprove the unbeliever’s worldview by exposing its residual and irreducible commitment to certain theistic truths.
On the other hand, he tries to prove his own position by process of elimination.
"Safe sex"
SMOKERING SAID:
“What do abstinence-only advocates think of teaching reproductive health in general? I'm not familiar with how the system works in the USA (or anywhere, come to think of it). Presumably everyone wants their teenagers to exit school with a decent understanding of biology and reproduction, just as they'd want their children to know how the digestive system worked. Are these facts currently taught as part of human biology in science class, with 'sex ed' (discussing condom use or whatever) in a separate class, or is it all in together?"
Knowledge of procreation is not the question at issue. Rather, the question at issue is knowledge of, and access to, contraceptives.
“Personally I plan to homeschool, but while I'll teach 'abstinence only' in the sense of 'abstinence is the only moral alternative to married monogamy', I'll probably teach quite a lot about birth control, simply because the biology and history of it is fascinating. I want my daughter to learn FAM (no, not the rhythm method, proper sympto-thermal charting) for the myriad things it will teach her about her health and body. I don't particularly see the need for her to stick condoms on bananas (if for no other reason than that by that stage of her education, I hope she can read the writing on a packet), but I don't see the problem with mentioning what condoms are, when they were invented and how they work; nor the biology behind hormonal birth control, the side effects of it, and so on. As a sociological phenomenon, birth control exists, and not knowing what it is or does is ignorance rather than virtue.__So, would abstinence-only advocates have any problems with teenagers being taught the things I mentioned above? Is there a moral viewpoint being taught alongside these facts which they find objectionable, or do they object to the teaching of the facts themselves?”
1.It’s unclear to me why you think an adolescent or preadolesent needs to have advance knowledge of contraception. Seems to me that specific knowledge of contraception is only pertinent at the time a couple is engaged to be married.
2.I also assume that anyone who’s old enough to get married is old enough to do his/her own research on the contraceptive options. That’s something the couple should do on their own.
3.Why would you teach your daughter about condoms? She’s not going to use one herself.
I hope you don’t intent to teach your son about condoms. For one thing, I doubt a boy would appreciate having his mother explain condom use to him. In addition, a teenage boy would have to be as dumb as straw not to figure out how a condom works. It’s pretty self-explanatory.
4.More to the point, the primary use of a condom is to engage in “safe” premarital or extramarital sex. Even then, only about 1 out of 4 promiscuous males use a condom, and–not surprisingly–it’s even less popular in conjugal relations.
5.Opponents of abstinence-only programs are not merely recommending that we teach students about contraception. Rather, they advocate the free distribution of contraceptives.
6.Finally, there are times when ignorance is virtuous. For example, I hope most folks are ignorant of how to construct a biochemical weapon.
“What do abstinence-only advocates think of teaching reproductive health in general? I'm not familiar with how the system works in the USA (or anywhere, come to think of it). Presumably everyone wants their teenagers to exit school with a decent understanding of biology and reproduction, just as they'd want their children to know how the digestive system worked. Are these facts currently taught as part of human biology in science class, with 'sex ed' (discussing condom use or whatever) in a separate class, or is it all in together?"
Knowledge of procreation is not the question at issue. Rather, the question at issue is knowledge of, and access to, contraceptives.
“Personally I plan to homeschool, but while I'll teach 'abstinence only' in the sense of 'abstinence is the only moral alternative to married monogamy', I'll probably teach quite a lot about birth control, simply because the biology and history of it is fascinating. I want my daughter to learn FAM (no, not the rhythm method, proper sympto-thermal charting) for the myriad things it will teach her about her health and body. I don't particularly see the need for her to stick condoms on bananas (if for no other reason than that by that stage of her education, I hope she can read the writing on a packet), but I don't see the problem with mentioning what condoms are, when they were invented and how they work; nor the biology behind hormonal birth control, the side effects of it, and so on. As a sociological phenomenon, birth control exists, and not knowing what it is or does is ignorance rather than virtue.__So, would abstinence-only advocates have any problems with teenagers being taught the things I mentioned above? Is there a moral viewpoint being taught alongside these facts which they find objectionable, or do they object to the teaching of the facts themselves?”
1.It’s unclear to me why you think an adolescent or preadolesent needs to have advance knowledge of contraception. Seems to me that specific knowledge of contraception is only pertinent at the time a couple is engaged to be married.
2.I also assume that anyone who’s old enough to get married is old enough to do his/her own research on the contraceptive options. That’s something the couple should do on their own.
3.Why would you teach your daughter about condoms? She’s not going to use one herself.
I hope you don’t intent to teach your son about condoms. For one thing, I doubt a boy would appreciate having his mother explain condom use to him. In addition, a teenage boy would have to be as dumb as straw not to figure out how a condom works. It’s pretty self-explanatory.
4.More to the point, the primary use of a condom is to engage in “safe” premarital or extramarital sex. Even then, only about 1 out of 4 promiscuous males use a condom, and–not surprisingly–it’s even less popular in conjugal relations.
5.Opponents of abstinence-only programs are not merely recommending that we teach students about contraception. Rather, they advocate the free distribution of contraceptives.
6.Finally, there are times when ignorance is virtuous. For example, I hope most folks are ignorant of how to construct a biochemical weapon.
Damned if you do and damned if you don't
DOMINIC BNONN TENNANT SAID:
[Quoting me] 7.But let’s assume it is possible to contact the dead. If the only departed spirits you can reach turn out to be damnéd spirits, then they will not be reliable guides to the true nature of the afterlife. Rather, they will be more like vampires, who try to “turn you” to the dark side.
"What evidence would you call on to corroborate this statement? It seems definitive enough that you must have some underlying reasons for making it, but the only obvious scriptural example which springs to mind regarding the motivations of the dead is the rich man in the parable of Lazarus in Abraham's Bosom. I don't think that this parable necessarily intends to accurately represent the nature of the afterlife per se, but rather to emphasize the finality of it (Jesus, I believe, was drawing on an existing eschatological device, which doesn't imply that he was necessarily endorsing it). That said, the concern of the rich man for the eternal destinies of those still living could be affected for the sake of the point being made. But there isn't any definitive evidence that this is so, I wouldn't say—at best it's indeterminate; though it certainly could be taken as weighing against your statement. Perhaps I'm neglecting other places where the dead are represented in a less altruistic, more parasitic light?"
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2009/02/bell-book-candle.html#852909341201022543
1.Let’s bracket the parable of Lazarus and Dives for the moment, and discuss the issue at a more generic level. Why do the reprobate care about their family and friends in this life?
The standard Reformed answer is common grace. And common grace exists for the benefit of the elect. Life on earth would be impossible for the elect unless God extended common grace to the reprobate. Restraining their sin as well as preserving an element of common decency.
The next question is whether common grace extends to the damned. I don’t see why it would. How would that benefit the living?
Keep in mind that, in the parable, Dives is not allowed to contact the living. So he has no influence on them, for good or ill. He’s not allowed to either help them or harm them. That being the case, what purpose would common grace serve in a damnéd spirit like Dives? And absent common grace, why would he actually care about the wellbeing of his family on earth?
Sure, he shows apparent concern in the parable. But at the moment I’ve discussing systematic theology, not theological fiction.
2.Turning to the parable:
i) There’s the preliminary question of genre. As one commentator notes, “parallels in Egyptian and Jewish sources suggest that a story of a rich man and a poor man whose fortunes are reversed in the other world was a widespread and well-known folktale, which had been variously adapted,” C. F. Evans, St. Luke, 612.
As another scholar notes, “In the Middle East there is a huge corpus of pearly-gate stories that circulates orally…These stories are usually humorous and often have nothing to do with the teller’s understanding of eschatology…Somewhat similar stories are also found in early Jewish tradition…if the parable is a 1C ‘pearly gate story’ its primary purpose is not to present fine points of Jesus’ view of life after death. Jesus was no doubt opposing the Sadducees, who claimed that there was no resurrection from the dead. The Sadducees were wealthy, and the entire composition of the story appears to be a challenge to them…But the main point of the story can perhaps be stated differently,” K. Bailey, Jesus Through Middle Eastern Eyes, 378-79.
ii) This, in turn, dovetails into the interpretation of the parable: “A few verses before the parable of Lazarus there is a short poem on God and mammon (Lk 16:9-13)…This poem on money and God is followed by a reference to the Pharisees who ‘were lovers of money’ and who ‘lifted up their noses at him’ (literal translation)…A slight backward tilt of the head and a lifting of the eyebrows signal rejection laced with condescension. Jesus’ comments on money trigger this negative response. With Luke 16:9-13 in mind as background, the reader of Luke’s Gospel is presented with the parable of Lazarus and the rich man. It is as though Jesus says, ‘Now I will tell you a story of two people; one served God and the other mammon,’” Bailey, 379-80.
So that goes to the primary point of the story.
iii) Finally, the rich man’s motives may not be as altruistic as they appear to be at first glance. As another commentator explains, “Given the indifference that had characterized the comportment of the rich man in relation to Lazarus, we may be surprised at the concern he now shows. His concern, though, is characteristic of the rich, whose circle of compassion extends to ‘friends,’ ‘brothers,’ ‘relatives,’ and ‘rich neighbors’ who are able to repay concern with concern, hospitality with hospitality (14:12-14). Even this show of sensitivity, then, is self-indicting since it manifests how true to character this rich man has been and even now remains,” J. Green, The Gospel of Luke, 608-09.
[Quoting me] 7.But let’s assume it is possible to contact the dead. If the only departed spirits you can reach turn out to be damnéd spirits, then they will not be reliable guides to the true nature of the afterlife. Rather, they will be more like vampires, who try to “turn you” to the dark side.
"What evidence would you call on to corroborate this statement? It seems definitive enough that you must have some underlying reasons for making it, but the only obvious scriptural example which springs to mind regarding the motivations of the dead is the rich man in the parable of Lazarus in Abraham's Bosom. I don't think that this parable necessarily intends to accurately represent the nature of the afterlife per se, but rather to emphasize the finality of it (Jesus, I believe, was drawing on an existing eschatological device, which doesn't imply that he was necessarily endorsing it). That said, the concern of the rich man for the eternal destinies of those still living could be affected for the sake of the point being made. But there isn't any definitive evidence that this is so, I wouldn't say—at best it's indeterminate; though it certainly could be taken as weighing against your statement. Perhaps I'm neglecting other places where the dead are represented in a less altruistic, more parasitic light?"
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2009/02/bell-book-candle.html#852909341201022543
1.Let’s bracket the parable of Lazarus and Dives for the moment, and discuss the issue at a more generic level. Why do the reprobate care about their family and friends in this life?
The standard Reformed answer is common grace. And common grace exists for the benefit of the elect. Life on earth would be impossible for the elect unless God extended common grace to the reprobate. Restraining their sin as well as preserving an element of common decency.
The next question is whether common grace extends to the damned. I don’t see why it would. How would that benefit the living?
Keep in mind that, in the parable, Dives is not allowed to contact the living. So he has no influence on them, for good or ill. He’s not allowed to either help them or harm them. That being the case, what purpose would common grace serve in a damnéd spirit like Dives? And absent common grace, why would he actually care about the wellbeing of his family on earth?
Sure, he shows apparent concern in the parable. But at the moment I’ve discussing systematic theology, not theological fiction.
2.Turning to the parable:
i) There’s the preliminary question of genre. As one commentator notes, “parallels in Egyptian and Jewish sources suggest that a story of a rich man and a poor man whose fortunes are reversed in the other world was a widespread and well-known folktale, which had been variously adapted,” C. F. Evans, St. Luke, 612.
As another scholar notes, “In the Middle East there is a huge corpus of pearly-gate stories that circulates orally…These stories are usually humorous and often have nothing to do with the teller’s understanding of eschatology…Somewhat similar stories are also found in early Jewish tradition…if the parable is a 1C ‘pearly gate story’ its primary purpose is not to present fine points of Jesus’ view of life after death. Jesus was no doubt opposing the Sadducees, who claimed that there was no resurrection from the dead. The Sadducees were wealthy, and the entire composition of the story appears to be a challenge to them…But the main point of the story can perhaps be stated differently,” K. Bailey, Jesus Through Middle Eastern Eyes, 378-79.
ii) This, in turn, dovetails into the interpretation of the parable: “A few verses before the parable of Lazarus there is a short poem on God and mammon (Lk 16:9-13)…This poem on money and God is followed by a reference to the Pharisees who ‘were lovers of money’ and who ‘lifted up their noses at him’ (literal translation)…A slight backward tilt of the head and a lifting of the eyebrows signal rejection laced with condescension. Jesus’ comments on money trigger this negative response. With Luke 16:9-13 in mind as background, the reader of Luke’s Gospel is presented with the parable of Lazarus and the rich man. It is as though Jesus says, ‘Now I will tell you a story of two people; one served God and the other mammon,’” Bailey, 379-80.
So that goes to the primary point of the story.
iii) Finally, the rich man’s motives may not be as altruistic as they appear to be at first glance. As another commentator explains, “Given the indifference that had characterized the comportment of the rich man in relation to Lazarus, we may be surprised at the concern he now shows. His concern, though, is characteristic of the rich, whose circle of compassion extends to ‘friends,’ ‘brothers,’ ‘relatives,’ and ‘rich neighbors’ who are able to repay concern with concern, hospitality with hospitality (14:12-14). Even this show of sensitivity, then, is self-indicting since it manifests how true to character this rich man has been and even now remains,” J. Green, The Gospel of Luke, 608-09.
Why Would A Non-Christian Have A Positive Near-Death Experience?
Here's something I wrote in a recent thread, in case anybody not following that thread would find it helpful:
It should be kept in mind that near-death experiences are near-death experiences, not after-death experiences. Whatever the physical state of the person, God would know whether their physical life has come to completion. God would know whether something we view as death will be reversed or overcome in some manner afterward. We can speak of the experiences people have in near-death occurrences as Heaven or Hell, but it may be better to think of them as Heaven-like and Hell-like.
A non-Christian can have a seemingly positive or neutral near-death experience, without the sort of suffering we associate with Hell (or an intermediate state leading to Hell, if we want to use the term Hell more narrowly), just as non-Christians in the Bible can encounter angels, demons, visions, supernatural dreams, etc. without accompanying Hell-like suffering. A lot of people expect Heaven or Hell in near-death experiences, as if they're after-death experiences. They aren't. The fact that a non-Christian has a pleasant near-death experience doesn't contradict Christianity. The details might be inconsistent with Christianity, and such a judgment would have to be made case-by-case, but Christianity doesn't deny that a non-Christian can have a pleasant experience outside of his body, or in some other unusual means, in a state that's near death.
In Michael Sabom's book cited above, he argues that passages like Genesis 35:18-19 and Job 14:2 refer to the soul's departure from the body as a process. Near-death experiences, at least some of them, may occur during that process, before death. What occurs during that process can be Heaven-like or Hell-like, but it isn't the same as Heaven and Hell. And a variety of things can occur. A person can get a true foretaste of his upcoming afterlife. Or he could be deceived by a demon, for example. Regardless of what one thinks of Sabom's reading of Genesis 35 and Job 14, the concept seems plausible and consistent with scripture.
It should also be kept in mind that these reports of near-death experiences are coming from fallible individuals. While what they report is likely to be generally accurate, they can be mistaken about details. Sabom cites a case (p. 216) in which an individual assumed that a being he saw in a near-death experience was Jesus. But the being denied that he was Jesus when asked. As Sabom points out, the vast majority of people who claim to have seen Jesus in near-death experiences seem to just assume that it's Jesus or assume that the being's claim to be Jesus must be true. They didn't have much, if any, confirmation of that assumption.
And sometimes near-death experiences contradict one another. An obvious example is the case of a person who's told, in a near-death experience, that there is no Hell, in contrast to another person's report that he went to Hell or was told that he was on his way there.
The generalities of what a person reports can be true without every detail being true. People may be relying partly on false interpretations of what they experienced. Often, these experiences are too unexpected and brief for people to derive as much information about them as we'd like to have. Near-death experiences can tell us more about the soul, angels, demons, the dying process, etc. than they tell us about the afterlife.
Thursday, February 26, 2009
What, All of a Sudden You Don't Like Your Argument?
Recently an Arminian taught us such a cool method of debate. Check it out:
"Worthy are you, our Lord and God, to receive glory and honor and power, for you created all things, and by your will [all things] existed and were created." -Rev. 4:11
"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him was not any thing made that was made." -John 1-3
"As you do not know the way the spirit comes to( the bones in the womb of a woman with child, so you do not know the work of God who makes everything." -Ecc 11:5
"He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn over all creation. For by him all things were created: things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things were created by him and for him." -Col. 1:15-16
As the common man would understand all, this means that God created all of our beliefs and they are not created ex-nihilo by our "immaterial substance." The only beliefs we have, therefore, are the ones God determined to give is. We don't have the "power" to create a belief to do otherwise. Ergo, libertarianism is false.
Now, watch the Arminians tell us that all doesn't really mean all ;-)
"Worthy are you, our Lord and God, to receive glory and honor and power, for you created all things, and by your will [all things] existed and were created." -Rev. 4:11
"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him was not any thing made that was made." -John 1-3
"As you do not know the way the spirit comes to( the bones in the womb of a woman with child, so you do not know the work of God who makes everything." -Ecc 11:5
"He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn over all creation. For by him all things were created: things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things were created by him and for him." -Col. 1:15-16
Dictionary:
all [awl] –adjective
1. the whole of (used in referring to quantity, extent, or duration): all the cake; all the way; all year.
2. the whole number of (used in referring to individuals or particulars, taken collectively): all students.
3. the greatest possible (used in referring to quality or degree): with all due respect; with all speed.
4. every: all kinds; all sorts.
eve⋅ry⋅thing [ev-ree-thing] –pronoun
1. every thing or particular of an aggregate or total; all.
As the common man would understand all, this means that God created all of our beliefs and they are not created ex-nihilo by our "immaterial substance." The only beliefs we have, therefore, are the ones God determined to give is. We don't have the "power" to create a belief to do otherwise. Ergo, libertarianism is false.
Now, watch the Arminians tell us that all doesn't really mean all ;-)
Consequence Arguments Against Determinism and Molinism
Peter van Inwagen offers an informal statement of the Consequence Argument against freedom and determinism: “If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events of the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born; and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore the consequences of these things are not up to us” (van Inwangen, An Essay on Free Will, p.16).
I offer an informal statement of a consequence argument against molinism and freedom: "If molinism is true, then our actual acts are the consequences of the possible world God actualized in the remote past. But it is not up to us what possible world God actualizes. Who knows, if it were really "up to me" perhaps I'd choose to actualize the world where I freely do A over B. But God actualized B over A because B is the world that best brings about his will. Therefore, that I actually did B over A wasn't really "up to me." Therefore the consequences of these things are not up to us."
I offer an informal statement of a consequence argument against molinism and freedom: "If molinism is true, then our actual acts are the consequences of the possible world God actualized in the remote past. But it is not up to us what possible world God actualizes. Who knows, if it were really "up to me" perhaps I'd choose to actualize the world where I freely do A over B. But God actualized B over A because B is the world that best brings about his will. Therefore, that I actually did B over A wasn't really "up to me." Therefore the consequences of these things are not up to us."
"Pelagian Calvinism"
http://rdtwot.wordpress.com/2009/02/23/an-exercise-in-missing-the-point/
“[Nick Norelli] I have to admit that I don’t read Triablogue unless someone whose blog I do read links to it. Well, TurettinFan did exactly that in linking to an admittedly humorous post by Steve Hays in which he mocks Perry Robinson of Energetic Procession for outing TurrettinFan as a Calvinist. But as amusing as Hays’ post was it was an exercise in missing the point. Perry’s post was about Reformed anthropology being essentially Pelagian, a charge which TurretinFan denied elsewhere and sought ot defend against. Perry pointed out from Reformed sources (one of which TF used, i.e., Charles Hodge) that Reformed anthropology is indeed Pelagian in so far as he understands Pelagianism (and I think he makes an excellent case). Of course the substance of Perry’s post wasn’t addressed, but then again I don’t know if Hays is up to such a task (I honestly don’t know since I know next to nothing about the man).”
“[Perry Robinson] I was wondering when Hays would come out to play. I am suprised that mockery was all that was dispensed. Of course I expected mockery but also something trying to look like an argument too. Steve is smart enough to do much more. Perhaps he will engage the argument and sources, but if he doesn’t, that by itself will be sufficiently telling.”
I was making a point about Robinson's apologetic method. So often he uses the following tactic to "disprove" Calvinism:
i) Compare and contrast Reformed theology with Orthodox theology.
ii) Arrive at the conclusion that Reformed theology is different than Orthodox theology.
iii) Case closed!
Of course, that begs the question of why Orthodox theology should supply the standard of comparison. He almost never tries to prove his theological criterion. He takes that as a given. And the few times I've seen him try to prove his theological criterion, he did so in a way that took for granted his Orthodox ecclesiology. I have yet to see him offer a defense of his theological criterion that doesn't assume what he needs to prove. And most of the time he doesn't even try.
“[Robinson] I had no doubt that Hays would be called in since TF seems incapable of grasping and adjudicating the issues. Nothing personal but, TF doesn’t seem to grasp the issues and Dyer masters language from arguments that he can’t effectively deploy.
Sorry to disappoint you, but I didn’t receive a desperate, 3AM phone call from TF.
I’m acting on my own initiative. In that respect I’m not speaking for TF. He can speak for himself.
For purpose of this reply, I’ll act as if Perry addressing me rather than TF or another interlocutor.
http://energeticprocession.wordpress.com/2009/02/20/we-have-met-the-enemy/
“The primary error of Pelagianism is the identification of nature with grace. For Pelagians, nature is grace, completely.”
And, of course, that underscores a primary difference between Pelagianism and Calvinism.
“Because they thought this was so, Adam was not deprived of anything at the Fall and children inherit no deprivation of divine power or corruption. Adam’s nature is impenetrable by sin since grace or righteousness is intrinsic to it. The only way for this not to be so along Pelagian lines is for Adam’s nature to be fundamentally changed, for him to then possess a sinful nature or a nature of sin.”
Notice that Perry uses “grace” and “righteousness” as synonymous. That’s one of his key equivocations. What is “grace”?
In Reformed theology, the term can be used in at least three difference ways:
i) It can be used as a technical term for saving grace.
Moreover, saving grace has both an:
a) objective dimension (e.g. justification)
and a:
b) subjective dimension (e.g. regeneration).
c) Furthermore, in its subjective dimension, saving grace can, in some respects, come in degrees (e.g. sanctification).
ii) It can also be used as a technical term for common grace. By definition, common grace is nonsaving grace.
iii) Finally, it can be used in a nontechnical sense for something gratuitous. Something generous and discretionary rather than obligatory.
So, for example, creation is gracious in the sense of (iii), but not in the sense of (i). For (i) presupposes the Fall.
As for “righteousness,” Reformed theology uses this term in the Pauline sense, where it denotes moral perfection. The holiness of God sets the standard.
(Incidentally, James has the same concept. If you transgress a single commandment, you’re guilty of the whole nine yards.)
As such, an actually righteous person always does right. Righteousness, in Pauline usage, does not admit degrees of righteousness. So, by definition, a sinner cannot be actually righteous.
However, a righteous standing can be imputed to a sinner via the righteousness of a second-party (Christ).
Perry also uses the loaded word “nature.” But that, too, is ambiguous.
“Adam was then perpetually under a ‘covenant of works’ since he intrinsically possessed the requisite power to fulfill it. This is why incidentally the Reformed doctrine of the Covenant of Works is essentially Pelagian.”
i) But, of course, Reformed theology doesn’t believe that Adam was under a “perpetual” covenant of work.
ii) Moreover, the term “Pelagian” connotes a package of errors. For example, when Reformed theology says that Adam was in a covenant of works, this doesn’t entail the proposition that Adam merited the reward. Rather, it could operate on the same principle as heavenly rewards.
[Quoting Hodge] The important point of difference is this, that the Protestants hold that original righteousness, so far as it consisted in the moral excellence of Adam, was natural, while the Romanists maintain that it was supernatural…Protestants maintain that original righteousness was concreated and natural.” Systematic Theology, vol. 2, p. 103.
“Now, that is clearly a Pelagian anthropology. Grace or righteousness is intrinsic to nature for Hodge.”
i) Notice the equivocation. Perry treats “grace” and “righteousness” as if they were synonymous.
ii) In addition, which is typical of his behavior, Perry slaps an odious label onto the opposing position rather than bothering to show if the opposing position is right or wrong.
From the standpoint of Scripture, what is wrong with Hodge’s statement? Doesn’t Scripture implicitly describe the condition of Adam in the way Hodge describes it (e.g. Eccl 7:29; Eph 4:24; Col 3:10).
But Perry prefers debating historical theology to exegetical theology since he would lose a debate over exegetical theology.
“The only way to stave off full blown Pelagianism after the Fall is to posit a fundamental alteration in human nature, specifically in a loss in some respect or another of the imago dei. And this is exactly what the Reformed have historically asserted. Total Depravity is therefore required to stave off a complete Pelagian soteriology while motivated by a Pelagian anthropology. And so the dialectic moves from a Pelagian anthropology to essentially a Manichean anthropology post Fall.”
i) Of course, this way of putting it makes it sound as if total depravity was hustled in as an afterthought or ad hoc modification. Perry likes to write these just-so stories about his opponents. And like any pulp fiction writer he includes a few comic book villains for melodramatic effect. In this just-so story, Calvinism began life as pure Pelagianism, but then it suddenly occurred to some Reformed caveman that this was way too Pelagian, so he invented the “Manichean” doctrine of total depravity as a face-saving maneuver.
ii) And, once more, Perry likes to tell just-so stories because this allows him to dodge the exegetical issue. Good Kipling, bad exegesis.
iii) We don’t have to use the word “nature.” The underlying point is that, according to Scripture, there are both continuities and discontinuities between fallen man and unfallen man. “Nature” is just a handy linguistic placeholder.
The only relevant question is whether Reformed theology accurately describes the continuities and discontinuities.
iv) Traditionally, one way in which Reformed theology describes the degree of identity and difference is to distinguish between a broad and narrow imago Dei. And it uses this framework because Scripture itself draws certain distinctions with respect to the imago Dei. On the one hand, it continues to ascribe the imago Dei to fallen man. On the other hand, it also speaks of the renewal of the imago Dei in the case of Christians. Therefore, Reformed theology is simply tracking the nuances of Biblical usage at this point.
“This is why there are no works of nature post-Fall for the Reformed, even works done of common grace that are not sin.”
Once again, what is wrong with that position from a Scriptural standpoint?
[Quoting Turretin] Where two things immediately opposed belong to any subject, one or the other of the two must necessarily be in it. Now righteousness and sin are predicated of man as their fit subject and are directly opposed to each other. Therefore one or the other must necessarily be in him; nor can there be a man who is not either righteous or sinner. Institutes of Eclenctic Theology, vol. 1, p. 464.
“Here Turretin is writing against the Pelagian notion of a pure nature. Notice the dialectic first in terms of opposition and second in terms of sin or righteousness. If nature is to be good, it must be good in terms of moral or personal goodness. There is an apparent conflation between the personal and the natural. Natural goodness is personal righteousness for Turretin.”
i) What, exactly, is wrong with Turretin’s statement that sin and righteousness are antithetical?
ii) Moreover, what would be wrong with saying that God created Adam as a morally good agent?
How is (i) or (ii) at odds with Scripture?
[Quoting Turretin] For the Son of God only is ‘the image of the invisible God’ (Col 1:15)-the essential and natural, and no mortal can attain to it because the finite cannot be a partaker of the infinite. And if we are said by grace to be ‘partakers of the divine nature’ (2 Pet 1:4), this is not to be understood of an essential, formal and instrinsic participation, but an analogical, accidental and extrinsic participation (by reason of the effects analogous to the divine perfections which are produced in us by the Spirit after the image of God).” Institutes of Eclenctic Theology vol. 1, p. 465
“Notice that the patristic notion of deification is impossible for Turretin.”
So what? Why should Turretin accept the patristic notion? Perry imposes a standard which he makes no effort to defend.
“He has to strain against the obvious import of the biblical material.”
Several issues here:
i) It’s true that Turretin isn’t doing exegesis in the modern sense of the term. But, then, no 17C theologian is doing exegesis in the modern sense of the term.
ii) Moreover, I don’t think Turretin is even attempting to exegete the passage. Rather, he’s excluding an interpretive option that would run contrary to the general tenor of scripture (e.g. Col 1:15).
There’s nothing inherently improper with that. We often say that, considered in isolation, a given verse might have several possible meanings, but considered in relation to other teachings of Scripture, those are not all live possibilities.
iii) And it’s not as if Perry bothers to exegete the verse.
iv) What about the “obvious import” of the passage? “Obvious” to whom? The original reader? A contemporary reader?
v) What is the correct interpretation of this passage? In a detailed discussion, where he carefully works through the relevant background material, a recent commentator concludes that “Peter’s thought has to do with moral transformation…the acquisition of moral character,” G. Green, Jude & 2 Peter (Baker 2008), 186.
So, even though Turretin didn’t’ have the resources of Green, Turretin’s interpretation dovetails quite nicely with the grammatico-historical exegesis of this verse.
This is why Perry studiously avoids real exegesis. As soon as he leaves the unquestioned deliverances of historical theology for the rough terrain of exegetical theology, he will slip and fall.
“For him human nature remains impenetrable to divinity and must remain so, except either morally in terms of an imposed law or in terms of efficient causation volitionally. This is why he must interpret 2 Pet 1:4 in terms of a created analogs in the soul-virtues or ‘created grace.’ The human and divine are divided up on the dialectical fulcrum of cause and effect.”
Notice that Perry’s modus operandi is to simply state the consequence of an opposing position as if that’s unacceptable, without bothering to explain why that’s an unacceptable consequence. Even if this were an accurate description of Turretin’s position, what makes that unacceptable?
[Quoting Plato] Indeed, the opposite is true of them-an image cannot remain an image if it presents all the details of what it represents. Cratylus, 432b
“Here you can see this principle at work. The opposition between cause and effect for Turretin functions to leave human nature always and only extrinically related to the divine. If this weren’t so, Turretin argues, therre would necessarily be a formal or essential confusion between the human essence and the divine essence, which is impossible. There would be no way to distinguish humanity from divinity. God for Turretin obviously lacks intrinsically related energies or activities that can be united inherently and intrinsically to human nature without an abosrption of humanity into the divine essence. Humanity can only be a tool or instrument of the divine will or influenced by moral principles. Humanity at best can only be brought into a kind of contiguity of analogs with God through a subordinating relation of will. The two wills work side by side doing similar things. It goes without saying that this schema is Nestorian in structure.”
Several problems:
i) Perry is quoting Plato, not Turretin. Yet he acts as though this is something Turretin said–in representing his own position–then he proceeds to do a lengthy riff on the implications of this statement for Turretin’s theology.
ii) To the extent that Turretin uses philosophical categories and distinctions, aren’t these generally Aristotelian rather than Platonic?
iii) Once more, he merely states a consequence as if that were unacceptable, without making any effort to demonstrate the point.
iv) Divine “energies” is shorthand for Perry’s Palamite theology. But he hasn’t make any effort to argue for his Palamite standard of comparison. He just takes that for granted.
v) And he’s using this as a pretext to smuggle in the “Nestorian” bogeyman. Yet he hasn’t begun to show that Turretin espouses a Nestorian Christology.
[Quoting Turretin] Was original rightouesness natural or supernatural? The former we affirm, and the latter we deny against the Romanists.” (Institutes, v. 1, p. 470)
However, the orthodox [the Reformed] (although not denying that this rightousness may be called supernatural with regard to the corrupt state and holding that it is not natural constitutuvely or consecutively) yet think it may well be called natural orioginally and perfectively (with regard to the pure state because created with it). (Ibid, 471)
Although original righteousness can properly be called ‘grace’ or ‘a gratuitous gift’ (and so not due on the part of God, just as the nature itself also, created by him), it does not follow that it is supernatural or not due to the perfection of the innocent nature. For although God owned nothing to man, yet it being posited that he willed to create man after his own image, he was bound to create him righteous and holy.” (Ibid, 473)
“If rightouesness can be called superntural with respect to the corrupt state of man after the fall, then it follows that nature is righteousness or grace prior to the Fall. Here the Pelagian anthropology is quite apparent and along with a nascent confusion of the categories of person and nature.”
Here, Perry is continuing to trade on the equivocation of terms we already noted.
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2009/02/turretin-fan-exposed.html
“Consequently the basic problem of viewing God and creation as related oppositionally remains the unfortunate heart of Reformed theology. It is just a diferent location for the pagan conception of God and the world as distinguished by opposite properties. God is cause and humans are effect.”
i) Since God is the Creator, and man is the creature, there’s a fundamental sense in which God is cause and man is effect.
ii) At the same time, the Westminster Confession goes out of its way to exclude occasionalism. It has a doctrine of second causes. God is not the only agent. Man is a finite agent.
iii) It’s highly inaccurate to say that, in Reformed theology, God and man have opposite properties. In Reformed theology there are communicable as well as incommunicable attributes.
Perry knows all this. But he feels free to misrepresent Reformed theology for the readers of his blog since he expects them to rely on his say-so rather than do their own fact-checking. He can lie with impunity.
“No, the Orthodox do not think we become God by essence. We become partakers of the divine nature with respect to God’s energies or activities-love, immortality, glory, impassibility, etc.”
Divine impassibility refers to the view that God cannot be affected by the world. Does Perry claim that, according to Orthodox theology, Christians cannot be affected by the world? Do Christians become impassible?
"No, it was part of an argument I was making with respect to a citation from Turretin. In the context, because Turretin thinks of God as absolutely simple such that all of the attributions we make of God are identical in God and all there is to God is his essence, it is impossible for Turretin to take the passage in a straightforward way. He has to introduce the idea of a created subsitute or analog that we partake of."
Once again, what is wrong with the claim that God is identical with his essence? And how does 2 Pet 1:4 contract that claim?
Notice how habitually Perry Robinson states a position as if it were objectionable without bothering to explain what makes it objectionable. Perry is a very lazy debater. We’re treated to his conclusions minus anything resembling a supporting argument.
“I am aware of what Horton is trying to do with the Reformed ordo. He seems the problems with the pretty much standard way of glossing justification and sanctification as contiguous relation between the forensic and the real.”
Once more, what is wrong with that relation? If, according to Scripture, sin has both an objective dimension (guilt) and a subjective dimension (corruption), then we’d expect saving grace to have both an objective dimension (e.g. justification) and a subjective dimension (e.g. sanctification).
Has Perry lost all capacity to ever argue for his position? Maybe he never had much ability to do so. Instead of making a case for what he believes, we’re constantly treated to his considered opinion as a fait accompli, to which we should instantly acquiesce.
“The church does the activities and is empowered by Christ and is in fact his glorified and immortal body.”
Of course, that’s pious nonsense on stilts. What is the glorified body of Christ? Try reading Lk 24 or Jn 20-21. It wasn’t “the church.” It was a discrete body that could sit down alongside other bodies and speak with them and eat with them.
“Horton’s position of keeping Christ in heaven…”
As in the Ascension and Session of Christ? In distinction to the return of Christ? Seems pretty biblical to me.
“It is sufficiently known that Horton has a more Lutheran slant. Look at his political theology as well as his teaching, or lack thereof on sanctification. This is why he detests Theonomy. He pretty much won’t even preach progressive sanctification. It was quite strange to see when Gerstner came to our church and was preaching all this standard Puritan stuff on progressive sanctification and Mike flipped out, claiming it was Rome through the back door.”
Perry may well be right about this.
“In any case, I sat under Horton personally for almost five years. Spent time at his house, with his family, etc. Horton has a problem with reading primary sources. For example, the debate that he was participant to for example in the 1990’s with three other Protestant participants against four Catholics in Pasadena is a good example. Prior to the debate he hadn’t read any substantial amount of Catholic sources like Newman’s lectures on justification or Journet on Grace or Lagrange. Zippo.”
Once again, Perry may well be right about this. Horton is a popularizer. And he spreads himself very thin. Not only is he quite prolific, but just look at all his speaking engagements. It’s safe to say he doesn’t have time for in-depth research.
http://energeticprocession.wordpress.com/2009/02/11/shibboleth/
"In their view, the 'person' Jesus Christ was the product or result of the union of the two natures. This is why it is possible to give an unorthodox reading to the statement that after the Incarnation Jesus is a composite hypostasis. That could mean that the person is the product of the two natures coming into union or it could mean that the one divine person takes human nature into his divine person."
This, too, is fatally ambiguous:
i) Is the person of the Son a product of the hypostatic union? No. The person of the Son would subsist with or without an Incarnation.
ii) However, is Perry going to say the human nature makes no distinctive contribution to the personality of Christ? Would Christ have the same psychology if he had no human nature—only his divine personhood? Obviously not.
And, of course, the “person” of Christ is used for more than mental attributes. It includes physical attributes as well.
So, in that sense, the person of Christ is a product of the hypostatic union.
Is Christ a "divine person"? Yes and no. He's not a merely divine person. Rather, he's a theanthropic person.
And, of course, Perry never discusses NT Christology. Revelation is not his touchstone.
“[Nick Norelli] I have to admit that I don’t read Triablogue unless someone whose blog I do read links to it. Well, TurettinFan did exactly that in linking to an admittedly humorous post by Steve Hays in which he mocks Perry Robinson of Energetic Procession for outing TurrettinFan as a Calvinist. But as amusing as Hays’ post was it was an exercise in missing the point. Perry’s post was about Reformed anthropology being essentially Pelagian, a charge which TurretinFan denied elsewhere and sought ot defend against. Perry pointed out from Reformed sources (one of which TF used, i.e., Charles Hodge) that Reformed anthropology is indeed Pelagian in so far as he understands Pelagianism (and I think he makes an excellent case). Of course the substance of Perry’s post wasn’t addressed, but then again I don’t know if Hays is up to such a task (I honestly don’t know since I know next to nothing about the man).”
“[Perry Robinson] I was wondering when Hays would come out to play. I am suprised that mockery was all that was dispensed. Of course I expected mockery but also something trying to look like an argument too. Steve is smart enough to do much more. Perhaps he will engage the argument and sources, but if he doesn’t, that by itself will be sufficiently telling.”
I was making a point about Robinson's apologetic method. So often he uses the following tactic to "disprove" Calvinism:
i) Compare and contrast Reformed theology with Orthodox theology.
ii) Arrive at the conclusion that Reformed theology is different than Orthodox theology.
iii) Case closed!
Of course, that begs the question of why Orthodox theology should supply the standard of comparison. He almost never tries to prove his theological criterion. He takes that as a given. And the few times I've seen him try to prove his theological criterion, he did so in a way that took for granted his Orthodox ecclesiology. I have yet to see him offer a defense of his theological criterion that doesn't assume what he needs to prove. And most of the time he doesn't even try.
“[Robinson] I had no doubt that Hays would be called in since TF seems incapable of grasping and adjudicating the issues. Nothing personal but, TF doesn’t seem to grasp the issues and Dyer masters language from arguments that he can’t effectively deploy.
Sorry to disappoint you, but I didn’t receive a desperate, 3AM phone call from TF.
I’m acting on my own initiative. In that respect I’m not speaking for TF. He can speak for himself.
For purpose of this reply, I’ll act as if Perry addressing me rather than TF or another interlocutor.
http://energeticprocession.wordpress.com/2009/02/20/we-have-met-the-enemy/
“The primary error of Pelagianism is the identification of nature with grace. For Pelagians, nature is grace, completely.”
And, of course, that underscores a primary difference between Pelagianism and Calvinism.
“Because they thought this was so, Adam was not deprived of anything at the Fall and children inherit no deprivation of divine power or corruption. Adam’s nature is impenetrable by sin since grace or righteousness is intrinsic to it. The only way for this not to be so along Pelagian lines is for Adam’s nature to be fundamentally changed, for him to then possess a sinful nature or a nature of sin.”
Notice that Perry uses “grace” and “righteousness” as synonymous. That’s one of his key equivocations. What is “grace”?
In Reformed theology, the term can be used in at least three difference ways:
i) It can be used as a technical term for saving grace.
Moreover, saving grace has both an:
a) objective dimension (e.g. justification)
and a:
b) subjective dimension (e.g. regeneration).
c) Furthermore, in its subjective dimension, saving grace can, in some respects, come in degrees (e.g. sanctification).
ii) It can also be used as a technical term for common grace. By definition, common grace is nonsaving grace.
iii) Finally, it can be used in a nontechnical sense for something gratuitous. Something generous and discretionary rather than obligatory.
So, for example, creation is gracious in the sense of (iii), but not in the sense of (i). For (i) presupposes the Fall.
As for “righteousness,” Reformed theology uses this term in the Pauline sense, where it denotes moral perfection. The holiness of God sets the standard.
(Incidentally, James has the same concept. If you transgress a single commandment, you’re guilty of the whole nine yards.)
As such, an actually righteous person always does right. Righteousness, in Pauline usage, does not admit degrees of righteousness. So, by definition, a sinner cannot be actually righteous.
However, a righteous standing can be imputed to a sinner via the righteousness of a second-party (Christ).
Perry also uses the loaded word “nature.” But that, too, is ambiguous.
“Adam was then perpetually under a ‘covenant of works’ since he intrinsically possessed the requisite power to fulfill it. This is why incidentally the Reformed doctrine of the Covenant of Works is essentially Pelagian.”
i) But, of course, Reformed theology doesn’t believe that Adam was under a “perpetual” covenant of work.
ii) Moreover, the term “Pelagian” connotes a package of errors. For example, when Reformed theology says that Adam was in a covenant of works, this doesn’t entail the proposition that Adam merited the reward. Rather, it could operate on the same principle as heavenly rewards.
[Quoting Hodge] The important point of difference is this, that the Protestants hold that original righteousness, so far as it consisted in the moral excellence of Adam, was natural, while the Romanists maintain that it was supernatural…Protestants maintain that original righteousness was concreated and natural.” Systematic Theology, vol. 2, p. 103.
“Now, that is clearly a Pelagian anthropology. Grace or righteousness is intrinsic to nature for Hodge.”
i) Notice the equivocation. Perry treats “grace” and “righteousness” as if they were synonymous.
ii) In addition, which is typical of his behavior, Perry slaps an odious label onto the opposing position rather than bothering to show if the opposing position is right or wrong.
From the standpoint of Scripture, what is wrong with Hodge’s statement? Doesn’t Scripture implicitly describe the condition of Adam in the way Hodge describes it (e.g. Eccl 7:29; Eph 4:24; Col 3:10).
But Perry prefers debating historical theology to exegetical theology since he would lose a debate over exegetical theology.
“The only way to stave off full blown Pelagianism after the Fall is to posit a fundamental alteration in human nature, specifically in a loss in some respect or another of the imago dei. And this is exactly what the Reformed have historically asserted. Total Depravity is therefore required to stave off a complete Pelagian soteriology while motivated by a Pelagian anthropology. And so the dialectic moves from a Pelagian anthropology to essentially a Manichean anthropology post Fall.”
i) Of course, this way of putting it makes it sound as if total depravity was hustled in as an afterthought or ad hoc modification. Perry likes to write these just-so stories about his opponents. And like any pulp fiction writer he includes a few comic book villains for melodramatic effect. In this just-so story, Calvinism began life as pure Pelagianism, but then it suddenly occurred to some Reformed caveman that this was way too Pelagian, so he invented the “Manichean” doctrine of total depravity as a face-saving maneuver.
ii) And, once more, Perry likes to tell just-so stories because this allows him to dodge the exegetical issue. Good Kipling, bad exegesis.
iii) We don’t have to use the word “nature.” The underlying point is that, according to Scripture, there are both continuities and discontinuities between fallen man and unfallen man. “Nature” is just a handy linguistic placeholder.
The only relevant question is whether Reformed theology accurately describes the continuities and discontinuities.
iv) Traditionally, one way in which Reformed theology describes the degree of identity and difference is to distinguish between a broad and narrow imago Dei. And it uses this framework because Scripture itself draws certain distinctions with respect to the imago Dei. On the one hand, it continues to ascribe the imago Dei to fallen man. On the other hand, it also speaks of the renewal of the imago Dei in the case of Christians. Therefore, Reformed theology is simply tracking the nuances of Biblical usage at this point.
“This is why there are no works of nature post-Fall for the Reformed, even works done of common grace that are not sin.”
Once again, what is wrong with that position from a Scriptural standpoint?
[Quoting Turretin] Where two things immediately opposed belong to any subject, one or the other of the two must necessarily be in it. Now righteousness and sin are predicated of man as their fit subject and are directly opposed to each other. Therefore one or the other must necessarily be in him; nor can there be a man who is not either righteous or sinner. Institutes of Eclenctic Theology, vol. 1, p. 464.
“Here Turretin is writing against the Pelagian notion of a pure nature. Notice the dialectic first in terms of opposition and second in terms of sin or righteousness. If nature is to be good, it must be good in terms of moral or personal goodness. There is an apparent conflation between the personal and the natural. Natural goodness is personal righteousness for Turretin.”
i) What, exactly, is wrong with Turretin’s statement that sin and righteousness are antithetical?
ii) Moreover, what would be wrong with saying that God created Adam as a morally good agent?
How is (i) or (ii) at odds with Scripture?
[Quoting Turretin] For the Son of God only is ‘the image of the invisible God’ (Col 1:15)-the essential and natural, and no mortal can attain to it because the finite cannot be a partaker of the infinite. And if we are said by grace to be ‘partakers of the divine nature’ (2 Pet 1:4), this is not to be understood of an essential, formal and instrinsic participation, but an analogical, accidental and extrinsic participation (by reason of the effects analogous to the divine perfections which are produced in us by the Spirit after the image of God).” Institutes of Eclenctic Theology vol. 1, p. 465
“Notice that the patristic notion of deification is impossible for Turretin.”
So what? Why should Turretin accept the patristic notion? Perry imposes a standard which he makes no effort to defend.
“He has to strain against the obvious import of the biblical material.”
Several issues here:
i) It’s true that Turretin isn’t doing exegesis in the modern sense of the term. But, then, no 17C theologian is doing exegesis in the modern sense of the term.
ii) Moreover, I don’t think Turretin is even attempting to exegete the passage. Rather, he’s excluding an interpretive option that would run contrary to the general tenor of scripture (e.g. Col 1:15).
There’s nothing inherently improper with that. We often say that, considered in isolation, a given verse might have several possible meanings, but considered in relation to other teachings of Scripture, those are not all live possibilities.
iii) And it’s not as if Perry bothers to exegete the verse.
iv) What about the “obvious import” of the passage? “Obvious” to whom? The original reader? A contemporary reader?
v) What is the correct interpretation of this passage? In a detailed discussion, where he carefully works through the relevant background material, a recent commentator concludes that “Peter’s thought has to do with moral transformation…the acquisition of moral character,” G. Green, Jude & 2 Peter (Baker 2008), 186.
So, even though Turretin didn’t’ have the resources of Green, Turretin’s interpretation dovetails quite nicely with the grammatico-historical exegesis of this verse.
This is why Perry studiously avoids real exegesis. As soon as he leaves the unquestioned deliverances of historical theology for the rough terrain of exegetical theology, he will slip and fall.
“For him human nature remains impenetrable to divinity and must remain so, except either morally in terms of an imposed law or in terms of efficient causation volitionally. This is why he must interpret 2 Pet 1:4 in terms of a created analogs in the soul-virtues or ‘created grace.’ The human and divine are divided up on the dialectical fulcrum of cause and effect.”
Notice that Perry’s modus operandi is to simply state the consequence of an opposing position as if that’s unacceptable, without bothering to explain why that’s an unacceptable consequence. Even if this were an accurate description of Turretin’s position, what makes that unacceptable?
[Quoting Plato] Indeed, the opposite is true of them-an image cannot remain an image if it presents all the details of what it represents. Cratylus, 432b
“Here you can see this principle at work. The opposition between cause and effect for Turretin functions to leave human nature always and only extrinically related to the divine. If this weren’t so, Turretin argues, therre would necessarily be a formal or essential confusion between the human essence and the divine essence, which is impossible. There would be no way to distinguish humanity from divinity. God for Turretin obviously lacks intrinsically related energies or activities that can be united inherently and intrinsically to human nature without an abosrption of humanity into the divine essence. Humanity can only be a tool or instrument of the divine will or influenced by moral principles. Humanity at best can only be brought into a kind of contiguity of analogs with God through a subordinating relation of will. The two wills work side by side doing similar things. It goes without saying that this schema is Nestorian in structure.”
Several problems:
i) Perry is quoting Plato, not Turretin. Yet he acts as though this is something Turretin said–in representing his own position–then he proceeds to do a lengthy riff on the implications of this statement for Turretin’s theology.
ii) To the extent that Turretin uses philosophical categories and distinctions, aren’t these generally Aristotelian rather than Platonic?
iii) Once more, he merely states a consequence as if that were unacceptable, without making any effort to demonstrate the point.
iv) Divine “energies” is shorthand for Perry’s Palamite theology. But he hasn’t make any effort to argue for his Palamite standard of comparison. He just takes that for granted.
v) And he’s using this as a pretext to smuggle in the “Nestorian” bogeyman. Yet he hasn’t begun to show that Turretin espouses a Nestorian Christology.
[Quoting Turretin] Was original rightouesness natural or supernatural? The former we affirm, and the latter we deny against the Romanists.” (Institutes, v. 1, p. 470)
However, the orthodox [the Reformed] (although not denying that this rightousness may be called supernatural with regard to the corrupt state and holding that it is not natural constitutuvely or consecutively) yet think it may well be called natural orioginally and perfectively (with regard to the pure state because created with it). (Ibid, 471)
Although original righteousness can properly be called ‘grace’ or ‘a gratuitous gift’ (and so not due on the part of God, just as the nature itself also, created by him), it does not follow that it is supernatural or not due to the perfection of the innocent nature. For although God owned nothing to man, yet it being posited that he willed to create man after his own image, he was bound to create him righteous and holy.” (Ibid, 473)
“If rightouesness can be called superntural with respect to the corrupt state of man after the fall, then it follows that nature is righteousness or grace prior to the Fall. Here the Pelagian anthropology is quite apparent and along with a nascent confusion of the categories of person and nature.”
Here, Perry is continuing to trade on the equivocation of terms we already noted.
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2009/02/turretin-fan-exposed.html
“Consequently the basic problem of viewing God and creation as related oppositionally remains the unfortunate heart of Reformed theology. It is just a diferent location for the pagan conception of God and the world as distinguished by opposite properties. God is cause and humans are effect.”
i) Since God is the Creator, and man is the creature, there’s a fundamental sense in which God is cause and man is effect.
ii) At the same time, the Westminster Confession goes out of its way to exclude occasionalism. It has a doctrine of second causes. God is not the only agent. Man is a finite agent.
iii) It’s highly inaccurate to say that, in Reformed theology, God and man have opposite properties. In Reformed theology there are communicable as well as incommunicable attributes.
Perry knows all this. But he feels free to misrepresent Reformed theology for the readers of his blog since he expects them to rely on his say-so rather than do their own fact-checking. He can lie with impunity.
“No, the Orthodox do not think we become God by essence. We become partakers of the divine nature with respect to God’s energies or activities-love, immortality, glory, impassibility, etc.”
Divine impassibility refers to the view that God cannot be affected by the world. Does Perry claim that, according to Orthodox theology, Christians cannot be affected by the world? Do Christians become impassible?
"No, it was part of an argument I was making with respect to a citation from Turretin. In the context, because Turretin thinks of God as absolutely simple such that all of the attributions we make of God are identical in God and all there is to God is his essence, it is impossible for Turretin to take the passage in a straightforward way. He has to introduce the idea of a created subsitute or analog that we partake of."
Once again, what is wrong with the claim that God is identical with his essence? And how does 2 Pet 1:4 contract that claim?
Notice how habitually Perry Robinson states a position as if it were objectionable without bothering to explain what makes it objectionable. Perry is a very lazy debater. We’re treated to his conclusions minus anything resembling a supporting argument.
“I am aware of what Horton is trying to do with the Reformed ordo. He seems the problems with the pretty much standard way of glossing justification and sanctification as contiguous relation between the forensic and the real.”
Once more, what is wrong with that relation? If, according to Scripture, sin has both an objective dimension (guilt) and a subjective dimension (corruption), then we’d expect saving grace to have both an objective dimension (e.g. justification) and a subjective dimension (e.g. sanctification).
Has Perry lost all capacity to ever argue for his position? Maybe he never had much ability to do so. Instead of making a case for what he believes, we’re constantly treated to his considered opinion as a fait accompli, to which we should instantly acquiesce.
“The church does the activities and is empowered by Christ and is in fact his glorified and immortal body.”
Of course, that’s pious nonsense on stilts. What is the glorified body of Christ? Try reading Lk 24 or Jn 20-21. It wasn’t “the church.” It was a discrete body that could sit down alongside other bodies and speak with them and eat with them.
“Horton’s position of keeping Christ in heaven…”
As in the Ascension and Session of Christ? In distinction to the return of Christ? Seems pretty biblical to me.
“It is sufficiently known that Horton has a more Lutheran slant. Look at his political theology as well as his teaching, or lack thereof on sanctification. This is why he detests Theonomy. He pretty much won’t even preach progressive sanctification. It was quite strange to see when Gerstner came to our church and was preaching all this standard Puritan stuff on progressive sanctification and Mike flipped out, claiming it was Rome through the back door.”
Perry may well be right about this.
“In any case, I sat under Horton personally for almost five years. Spent time at his house, with his family, etc. Horton has a problem with reading primary sources. For example, the debate that he was participant to for example in the 1990’s with three other Protestant participants against four Catholics in Pasadena is a good example. Prior to the debate he hadn’t read any substantial amount of Catholic sources like Newman’s lectures on justification or Journet on Grace or Lagrange. Zippo.”
Once again, Perry may well be right about this. Horton is a popularizer. And he spreads himself very thin. Not only is he quite prolific, but just look at all his speaking engagements. It’s safe to say he doesn’t have time for in-depth research.
http://energeticprocession.wordpress.com/2009/02/11/shibboleth/
"In their view, the 'person' Jesus Christ was the product or result of the union of the two natures. This is why it is possible to give an unorthodox reading to the statement that after the Incarnation Jesus is a composite hypostasis. That could mean that the person is the product of the two natures coming into union or it could mean that the one divine person takes human nature into his divine person."
This, too, is fatally ambiguous:
i) Is the person of the Son a product of the hypostatic union? No. The person of the Son would subsist with or without an Incarnation.
ii) However, is Perry going to say the human nature makes no distinctive contribution to the personality of Christ? Would Christ have the same psychology if he had no human nature—only his divine personhood? Obviously not.
And, of course, the “person” of Christ is used for more than mental attributes. It includes physical attributes as well.
So, in that sense, the person of Christ is a product of the hypostatic union.
Is Christ a "divine person"? Yes and no. He's not a merely divine person. Rather, he's a theanthropic person.
And, of course, Perry never discusses NT Christology. Revelation is not his touchstone.
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
Things that go bump in the night
RHOLOGY SAID:
“Hate to pile on, but I'd be interested in knowing what you'd do if you encountered a case of demon-possession.”
TRUTH UNITES... AND DIVIDES SAID:
“Along with Rhology, what do you think of all the Protestant missionaries who encounter demon-possession in the third-world countries they're at?__Or in other words, suppose you went on an overseas mission trip and you witnessed a demon-possession along with the local missionary stationed there. What would you do in that situation?”
i) Since I’ve never been in that situation, I don’t know for sure what would work. I might have to improvise.
That said, these are the operating assumptions I’d bring to my initial encounter:
ii) The NT doesn’t explicitly authorize Christians to expel demons. In the absence of explicit Scriptural authorization, I wouldn’t presume to boss the demon around. I wouldn’t command it to leave the demoniac. I wouldn’t pretend to be some sort of authority-figure in relation to the demon.
iii) However, we can always pray. We can pray for people (at a distance), and we can also with them (if they’re lucid and cooperative) or over them (if they’re unresponsive).
iv) I’d bring some other Christians along with me. Corporate prayer. We might also work in relays–if need be.
v) I wouldn’t get into an argument with the demon. I don’t have any power over the demon. So I don’t think a successful exorcism depends on my relationship with the demon. On my personal clout. I’m in no position to issue orders. I’m not Jesus or one of the apostles. I can’t throw my weight around in the presence of the dark side.
vi) Apropos (v), instead of addressing the demon, I’d address God. I think a successful exorcism depends on my relationship with God. God is the authority-figure in this transaction, not me. God has the power over the demon, not me.
vii) I’d do other things to make the demon uncomfortable. We could sing hymns. Read passages of Scripture aloud. Take turns. Work in shifts. Hold an informal church service in the bedroom of the demoniac.
viii) I don’t think it’s necessary to raise my voice. I don’t think a demon is hard of hearing. And we don’t need to yell for God to hear us either. And our prayers are directed at God, not the demon.
No reason to turn an exorcism into a shouting match. That may make for good movies, but I know see how it’s relevant to a successful exorcism.
ix) If the demoniac has lucid moments, I’d try to involve the demoniac in the process. Invite him to pray with me. Repeat Scripture after me.
x) In the case of a hex, it may be necessary to destroy the talisman.
xi) It’s also important to have a follow-up ministry. Aftercare. Discipleship. Friendship. The fellowship of the saints.
xii) Since an exorcist is exposing himself to direct confrontation with the dark side, he also needs to be very attentive to his own devotional life. For there’s a sense in which he’s leaving himself open to counterattack.
“Hate to pile on, but I'd be interested in knowing what you'd do if you encountered a case of demon-possession.”
TRUTH UNITES... AND DIVIDES SAID:
“Along with Rhology, what do you think of all the Protestant missionaries who encounter demon-possession in the third-world countries they're at?__Or in other words, suppose you went on an overseas mission trip and you witnessed a demon-possession along with the local missionary stationed there. What would you do in that situation?”
i) Since I’ve never been in that situation, I don’t know for sure what would work. I might have to improvise.
That said, these are the operating assumptions I’d bring to my initial encounter:
ii) The NT doesn’t explicitly authorize Christians to expel demons. In the absence of explicit Scriptural authorization, I wouldn’t presume to boss the demon around. I wouldn’t command it to leave the demoniac. I wouldn’t pretend to be some sort of authority-figure in relation to the demon.
iii) However, we can always pray. We can pray for people (at a distance), and we can also with them (if they’re lucid and cooperative) or over them (if they’re unresponsive).
iv) I’d bring some other Christians along with me. Corporate prayer. We might also work in relays–if need be.
v) I wouldn’t get into an argument with the demon. I don’t have any power over the demon. So I don’t think a successful exorcism depends on my relationship with the demon. On my personal clout. I’m in no position to issue orders. I’m not Jesus or one of the apostles. I can’t throw my weight around in the presence of the dark side.
vi) Apropos (v), instead of addressing the demon, I’d address God. I think a successful exorcism depends on my relationship with God. God is the authority-figure in this transaction, not me. God has the power over the demon, not me.
vii) I’d do other things to make the demon uncomfortable. We could sing hymns. Read passages of Scripture aloud. Take turns. Work in shifts. Hold an informal church service in the bedroom of the demoniac.
viii) I don’t think it’s necessary to raise my voice. I don’t think a demon is hard of hearing. And we don’t need to yell for God to hear us either. And our prayers are directed at God, not the demon.
No reason to turn an exorcism into a shouting match. That may make for good movies, but I know see how it’s relevant to a successful exorcism.
ix) If the demoniac has lucid moments, I’d try to involve the demoniac in the process. Invite him to pray with me. Repeat Scripture after me.
x) In the case of a hex, it may be necessary to destroy the talisman.
xi) It’s also important to have a follow-up ministry. Aftercare. Discipleship. Friendship. The fellowship of the saints.
xii) Since an exorcist is exposing himself to direct confrontation with the dark side, he also needs to be very attentive to his own devotional life. For there’s a sense in which he’s leaving himself open to counterattack.
The Credibility Of Some Critical Theories About New Testament Authorship
It's become popular in some modern circles to claim that a large percentage of the New Testament was attributed to the wrong author. It's common for scholars to argue that something like fifteen, eighteen, or more of the books of the New Testament are wrongly attributed. Some skeptics, though a small minority and usually of the more ignorant variety, even go as far as to claim that every New Testament book has been attributed to the wrong author. (Hebrews would be an exception if considered anonymous in its attribution, but not if considered a work attributed to somebody like Paul or Barnabas.) I've discussed some of the problems with such conclusions in many past articles, such as here and here.
Often, critics are inconsistent in their skepticism. The same critic who claims that the textual evidence for the New Testament documents is insufficient, or rejects an authorship attribution as reasonable as Mark's authorship of the second gospel, for example, will accept the text and authorship attributions of many extra-Biblical documents that have comparable or worse evidence, like the Annals of Tacitus. Many critical arguments against Christianity, such as the use of Josephus and Tacitus to argue against the census account of Luke 2, depend on an acceptance of extra-Biblical sources that's far less critical of those sources than the Biblical sources. I've written about such double standards elsewhere, such as here and here. Craig Keener, commenting on attempts to deny that the same author wrote the gospel of John and the epistles of John, writes:
"No other author of antiquity could survive the nit-picking distinctions on which NT [New Testament] scholars, poring over a smaller corpus, often thrive. As a translator of Euripides for the Loeb series notes, Euripides’ 'plays, produced at times widely apart, and not in the order of the story, sometimes present situations (as in Hecuba, Daughters of Troy, and Helen) mutually exclusive, the poet not having followed the same legend throughout the series.' He would not fare well in the hands of our discipline." (The Gospel Of John: A Commentary, Vol. 1 [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003], p. 125)
Last night, in the process of looking for some material to post in another thread, I came across something I wrote about ten years ago. I noticed that there were a lot of differences between how I wrote then and how I write now (vocabulary, argumentation, documentation, etc.). Glenn Miller, in his piece on pseudonymity, notes some variation in his own writing style. He compares the writing in articles he wrote several years earlier to the writing in his latest articles. You can notice some differences. That's one of the reasons why external evidence is so significant. It's more conclusive than internal evidence.
Many people, including scholars, are overly cynical, and often their cynicism is selective. I recently listened to John Piper's biographical sketch of George Whitefield. In it, he comments on a Whitefield biography written by a historian:
"Harry Stout, professor of history at Yale, is not as sure about the purity of Whitefield’s motives as Sarah Edwards was. His biography, The Divine Dramatist: George Whitfield and the Rise of Modern Evangelicalism, is the most sustained piece of historical cynicism I have ever read. In the first 100 pages of this book, I wrote the word cynical in the margin 70 times."
Many people approach the Bible in a manner similar to or worse than how Stout approached Whitefield. But being critical of Christianity, the New Testament, religion, or some other such subject isn't enough. Being wrong is a bad thing, regardless of whether the error occurs in a religious or a non-religious direction. Non-religious gullibility isn't a sufficient substitute for religious gullibility. There's a danger in believing that Mark wrote the second gospel if he didn't actually write it, but there's also a danger in believing that Mark didn't write the second gospel if he actually did write it.
Kent Clarke is an example of a New Testament scholar who believes that some New Testament documents are falsely attributed, but thinks that some of his colleagues have gone too far in their conclusions on the issue. Traditional conservative Christians aren't alone in making such observations.
Clarke writes of one scholar, "by rejecting the authenticity of most New Testament works, Rist has also dismissed much sound historical scholarship." (in Lee McDonald and James Sanders, edd., The Canon Debate [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002], p. 446) He refers to "modern scholarship's proclivity for applying a wide range of interpolative and composite theories to most ancient literature" (n. 36 on p. 447). Concerning F.C. Baur, Clarke comments:
"In time, however, Baur would come to regard all but the first four Pauline letters as pseudonymous, along with the seven General Epistles. Baur's defense of pseudonymity was just as novel as the extent of his pseudonymous declarations, for he was first to assert that antiquity regarded pseudonymity as an acceptable literary convention not undertaken with the intent to deceive. 'With few exceptions,' notes Ellis, speaking of Baur and the Tubingen school, 'they are the root of all subsequent scholarship that assigned pseudepigraphal authorship to New Testament documents....[T]he Baur hypothesis became the Baur tradition.'...Guthrie ('Idea of Canonical Pseudepigrapha,' 21) remarks, 'The fact is that Baur's literary criticism was dominated by his dogmatic presuppositions and since these had to be maintained at all costs, it was no embarrassment that pseudepigraphic writings became more normal in the extant Pauline canon than genuine works.'...A. Julicher, like Baur, was able to minimize the notion of deceit inherent to pseudonymity by arguing that the idea of 'intellectual property' was a modern construct all but absent from antiquity, and that Christian writers could, with the best intentions, place into the mouths of the apostles a contemporising message....Arguments against the concept of intellectual property in antiquity have become common fair in discussions of pseudonymity, and can be found in more recent examples like A.T. Lincoln...This theory has, however, been debunked by Speyer (Die literarische Falschung, 175-76), who has clearly shown the presence of such a concept in antiquity." (pp. 458-459, n. 86 on p. 458, 459, n. 90 on p. 459)
See also here.
Often, critics are inconsistent in their skepticism. The same critic who claims that the textual evidence for the New Testament documents is insufficient, or rejects an authorship attribution as reasonable as Mark's authorship of the second gospel, for example, will accept the text and authorship attributions of many extra-Biblical documents that have comparable or worse evidence, like the Annals of Tacitus. Many critical arguments against Christianity, such as the use of Josephus and Tacitus to argue against the census account of Luke 2, depend on an acceptance of extra-Biblical sources that's far less critical of those sources than the Biblical sources. I've written about such double standards elsewhere, such as here and here. Craig Keener, commenting on attempts to deny that the same author wrote the gospel of John and the epistles of John, writes:
"No other author of antiquity could survive the nit-picking distinctions on which NT [New Testament] scholars, poring over a smaller corpus, often thrive. As a translator of Euripides for the Loeb series notes, Euripides’ 'plays, produced at times widely apart, and not in the order of the story, sometimes present situations (as in Hecuba, Daughters of Troy, and Helen) mutually exclusive, the poet not having followed the same legend throughout the series.' He would not fare well in the hands of our discipline." (The Gospel Of John: A Commentary, Vol. 1 [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003], p. 125)
Last night, in the process of looking for some material to post in another thread, I came across something I wrote about ten years ago. I noticed that there were a lot of differences between how I wrote then and how I write now (vocabulary, argumentation, documentation, etc.). Glenn Miller, in his piece on pseudonymity, notes some variation in his own writing style. He compares the writing in articles he wrote several years earlier to the writing in his latest articles. You can notice some differences. That's one of the reasons why external evidence is so significant. It's more conclusive than internal evidence.
Many people, including scholars, are overly cynical, and often their cynicism is selective. I recently listened to John Piper's biographical sketch of George Whitefield. In it, he comments on a Whitefield biography written by a historian:
"Harry Stout, professor of history at Yale, is not as sure about the purity of Whitefield’s motives as Sarah Edwards was. His biography, The Divine Dramatist: George Whitfield and the Rise of Modern Evangelicalism, is the most sustained piece of historical cynicism I have ever read. In the first 100 pages of this book, I wrote the word cynical in the margin 70 times."
Many people approach the Bible in a manner similar to or worse than how Stout approached Whitefield. But being critical of Christianity, the New Testament, religion, or some other such subject isn't enough. Being wrong is a bad thing, regardless of whether the error occurs in a religious or a non-religious direction. Non-religious gullibility isn't a sufficient substitute for religious gullibility. There's a danger in believing that Mark wrote the second gospel if he didn't actually write it, but there's also a danger in believing that Mark didn't write the second gospel if he actually did write it.
Kent Clarke is an example of a New Testament scholar who believes that some New Testament documents are falsely attributed, but thinks that some of his colleagues have gone too far in their conclusions on the issue. Traditional conservative Christians aren't alone in making such observations.
Clarke writes of one scholar, "by rejecting the authenticity of most New Testament works, Rist has also dismissed much sound historical scholarship." (in Lee McDonald and James Sanders, edd., The Canon Debate [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002], p. 446) He refers to "modern scholarship's proclivity for applying a wide range of interpolative and composite theories to most ancient literature" (n. 36 on p. 447). Concerning F.C. Baur, Clarke comments:
"In time, however, Baur would come to regard all but the first four Pauline letters as pseudonymous, along with the seven General Epistles. Baur's defense of pseudonymity was just as novel as the extent of his pseudonymous declarations, for he was first to assert that antiquity regarded pseudonymity as an acceptable literary convention not undertaken with the intent to deceive. 'With few exceptions,' notes Ellis, speaking of Baur and the Tubingen school, 'they are the root of all subsequent scholarship that assigned pseudepigraphal authorship to New Testament documents....[T]he Baur hypothesis became the Baur tradition.'...Guthrie ('Idea of Canonical Pseudepigrapha,' 21) remarks, 'The fact is that Baur's literary criticism was dominated by his dogmatic presuppositions and since these had to be maintained at all costs, it was no embarrassment that pseudepigraphic writings became more normal in the extant Pauline canon than genuine works.'...A. Julicher, like Baur, was able to minimize the notion of deceit inherent to pseudonymity by arguing that the idea of 'intellectual property' was a modern construct all but absent from antiquity, and that Christian writers could, with the best intentions, place into the mouths of the apostles a contemporising message....Arguments against the concept of intellectual property in antiquity have become common fair in discussions of pseudonymity, and can be found in more recent examples like A.T. Lincoln...This theory has, however, been debunked by Speyer (Die literarische Falschung, 175-76), who has clearly shown the presence of such a concept in antiquity." (pp. 458-459, n. 86 on p. 458, 459, n. 90 on p. 459)
See also here.
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
Bell, book, & candle
I. Introduction
In this post I'll be discussing the relationship between the paranormal and the occult. Whether these are two different things, one and the same thing, or overlapping domains, is one of the issues I'll address.
This topic is of interest to Christians on several potential grounds:
- Evaluating paranormal claims raise much the same issues as evaluating miraculous claims.
- Unbelievers often claim that the Bible is incredible because it describes a world which is a world apart from the world we actually experience. But if paranormal phenomena happen, then the world of the Bible is not fundamentally different from the world we experience today. Of course, at that point the unbeliever might shift grounds. He might accept the paranormal, but try to explain it on secular grounds–then do the same with Scripture.
However, that still advances the argument. Instead of debating whether these events ever happen, we're now debating the proper interpretation of the event.
- Science and medicine are wonderful disciplines. But they have their limitations. For example, some medical conditions may have a spiritual or occultic source of origin. As such, they need a different remedy.
- There's an extensive literature on psi. Writers range from charlatans to philosophers and scholars. In addition, every ideological viewpoint is represented–orthodoxy, heterodoxy, secularism, occultism, &c. It's useful to begin sifting through this vast array of material and set down some basic guidelines.
II. Terminology
- Psi. For the time being I'll use "psi" or "paranormal" as a neutral term to avoid prejudging its origin.
- Exorcist. This designation is associated with people who claim to cast out demons. I'll use it a bit more broadly for people who confront general occultic/paranormal phenomena, viz. possession, black magic, hauntings, &c.
- Energumen. I use this term to denote someone who exhibits paranormal powers.
- Paranormal. By this term I'm referring to things like telepathy, telekinesis, precognition, retrocognition, NDEs, OBEs, materialization, apports, &c.
- Occult. By this term I'm referring to things like possession, black magic, astrology, necromancy, divination, infestation, &c.
- Possession. In principle, spirit-possession can take three different forms:
i) Possession by the Holy Spirit
ii) Possession by evil spirits (i.e. demons)
iii) Possession by departed spirits (i.e. the damned)
(i) & (ii) are clearly attested in Scripture. Putatively speaking, necromancy is a paradigm-case of (iii), which is also attested in Scripture.
However, we have no direct access to the dead, so it's ambiguous what, exactly, the medium is contacting. It could be either (ii) or (iii).
iv) According to another theory of mediumship, the medium is contacting the living rather than the dead. Specially, reading the mind of the sitter.
Whether or not (d) is correct would depend, in part, on whether the medium knows something the sitter does not.
Also, to judge by the anecdotal literature, possession comes in degrees. It's not all of the Linda Blair variety.
- Sitter. Anyone other than the medium, taking part in a séance.
- Communicator. The (alleged) entity whom the medium is channeling.
III. General Criteria
- It's important to distinguish between the evidence for psi, and the interpretation of psi. For example, a writer may be a reliable source of information on case studies. He is accurately reporting the experimental or anecdotal evidence. The same writer may be unreliable when he attempts to interpret the case studies. His worldview will affect his interpretation of the data. It will promote one approach while demoting another.
A writer might be a Christian, secularist, heretic, or occultist. His worldview will favor or allow certain interpretations while disallowing other interpretations.
There are various, competing theories to account for psi. They posit different "mechanisms." But whether an event is well-attested is independent of the way we explain that event.
A witness might be a reliable reporter, even if his interpretation is unreliable. These are distinct issues.
- In evaluating a paranormal report, we should draw a rough distinction between public, observable events, and subjective impressions. This, in turn, correlates with the potential distinction between deception and self-deceptive. Where subjective impressions are concerned, it's possible for a witness to be honest, but self-deluded. He may sincerely believe what he says.
But in the case of public events, there's less room for the witness to be sincerely mistaken. That doesn't mean what he says is true. Rather, if it's false, the falsehood is more likely to be intentional.
This distinction is useful when we evaluate a witness. Which is more likely–that he is a liar, or the event really happened?
- It's customary for unbelievers to dismiss Biblical accounts of possession as "prescientific." We are told, for instance, that the demoniac in Mk 9:14-29 was clearly an epileptic. But aside from the question of whether possession can present standard clinical symptoms, there's a simple way of determining whether a malady like that is demonic or "natural": if conventional therapy is ineffective while exorcism is effective, then it's demonic; if exorcism is ineffective while conventional therapy is effective, then it's "natural." There's no need to speculate on the correct diagnosis. The treatment will select for the correct diagnosis.
IV. Theological Criteria
Is it appropriate to use theological criteria to rule out certain interpretations, or is that an exercise in special pleading?
- If the Bible is true, then there's no reason we shouldn't use the Bible as a criterion to exclude certain interpretations.
- Exorcism itself operates with a theological viewpoint. As such, it's not special pleading to evaluate a value-laden activity by its own value-system.
- To judge by the anecdotal literature, a successful exorcism can be performed by a Catholic (Amorth), Lutheran (Koch), Anglican (Richards), Congregationalist (McCall), nondenominational believer (Peck), &c. As such, a successful exorcism doesn't validate any particular Christian tradition. That being the case, it's not as if the raw evidence singles out a sectarian interpretation of the event. The evidence is not that specific. So it's not as if we disregard the evidence by an ac hoc appeal to Scripture.
- This raises the question of how different rites and ceremonies, representing somewhat differing theological presuppositions, can yield the same effect. Probably because the efficacy of the performance doesn't lie in the precise words which an exorcist uses, or the precise beliefs which the exorcist brings to the situation, but in the general faith of the exorcist and the indulgent grace of God.
God blesses imperfect prayers. He improves on our defective methods. The success or failure of an exorcism depends, not on the magical efficacy of the formula, but on the sovereign disposition of God, who honors or dishonors the exercise according to the spirit in which it was offered (cf. Lk 9:49-50; Acts 19:13-20; Aune 2006:407-11; Twelftree 1993: 40-43; 2007:148-53).
As one writer puts it:
"One must remember that it is not the superior magic of the exorcist but the power of Christ that overcomes the spirit. Ministers have told me of how God has used them in exorcism without any special gifts; they have simply acted according to Scripture" (Wright 1972:153).
"Some exorcists use adaptations of traditional Roman Catholic methods, including the sprinkling of holy water and salt that has been blessed; and some even use old Latin prayers, though one cannot see why a spirit should know Latin rather than English if it has chosen to manifest itself in England. I personally am not convinced that these things are the effective agents, and certainly they could not be a substitute for the name of Jesus Christ, which of course these exorcists use" (Wright 1972:153-154).
V. Biblical Data
What does Scripture have to say about psi?
- At a general level, Scripture ascribes to apostles and prophets of God the ability to perform miracles and predict the future. This is analogous to telekinesis and precognition.
- Visionary revelation is often analogous to an OBE. Ezekiel gives a number of examples.
- Xenoglossy occurs at Pentecost.
- Elisha apparently had the gift of clairaudience (2 Kg 6:12).
- Acts 8:39 seems to be a case of teleportation.
- The Ascension is, in part, a case of levitation. (However, Jesus didn't literally "ascend" to heaven. The "cloud" which receives him is probably the Shekinah.)
- Samson exhibits superhuman strength.
- The Third Commandment (Exod 20:7). In popular piety, this is treated as a prohibition against profanity, but in the original context, it probably had reference to things like perjury–as well as hexes (cf. Ezk 13:17-23).
On another front:
- The Egyptian magicians exhibit metamorphotic powers (Exod 7-8), which is analogous to telekinesis and materialization. For some reason, a number of conservative scholars, who ordinarily go out of their way to defend the supernatural character of the events in Exodus, balk at attributing magic to the Egyptian sorcerers. But while these naturalistic explanations (e.g. catalepsy) may be possible or plausible considered in isolation, this is at odds with the narrative framework. The ability to Moses and Aaron to outwit the legerdemain of some Egyptian charlatans wouldn't prove very much. It seems to me the point of this encounter is to demonstrate the superior power of God by defeating a genuine opponent on his own turf.
(Incidentally, cobras eat other snakes, including other cobras, so that's a realistic detail.)
- A demoniac exhibits superhuman strength (Mk 5:3-4).
- Another demoniac exhibits ESP (Acts 16:16).
- It's possible for a false prophet to accurately predict the future (Deut 13:1-3; Acts 16:16-18). Deuteronomy doesn't explain how this is possible, but Acts attributes this type of prognostication to demonic possession.
- A medium can summon the dead (1 Sam 28). Commentators frequently puzzle over this passage because they don't understand how the witch can see the shade of Samuel, but Saul cannot.
But that's pretty standard in the anecdotal literature, where the sitter is dependent on the medium for his information. The point of being a medium is to mediate this contact. In contrast to the sitter, the medium has access to a normally invisible realm (e.g. a psychic projection by the dead). So this is quite realistic.
- The malefice Black magic was a fixture of the ANE. Does the Bible endorse that?
i) The most celebrated case is the example of Balaam. Since, however, he is unsuccessful in cursing Israel, the narrative doesn't say for sure if he had that power.
There may be a suggestion in Num 23:23 that black magic was a potent force, but ineffective against Israel because Israel enjoyed a special immunity.
ii) By contrast, Ezk 13:17-23 presents a fairly unambiguous case:
"They performed magical spells as a means of prognostication. Ezekiel is directed to engage in a symbolic gesture, as in 6:2. Here it announces a virtual counterspell that puts the evil eye on these sorcerers...This inauspicious introduction allows a further characterization of the female prophets, with respect to their magical devices that evidently accompanied the spells...The prevalence of magical practices in Mesopotamia doubtless encouraged their use among the exiles, although such a tradition was also known in their homeland (cf. Exod 22:18[17]; Deut 18:10). The female sorcerers' magical powers were evidently widely credited among the exiles. The accusation itself has no doubt about their effectiveness. These women evidently operated under the umbrella of Yahwism and doubtless incorporated his name into their spells, like later Jewish magicians" (Allen 1994:204).
"Whatever the nature of the kesatot and the mispahot, they appear to have been instruments of black magic, and their wielders may justifiably be designed sorceresses, evil magicians, witches. Where they learned the tricks of their trade we may only speculate, but given the prevalence of magic in ancient Babylonian and the presence of technical expressions borrowed from Akkadian in this text, some Mesopotamian influence appears likely...With their sorcerous invocation of the divine name, the women have degraded Yahweh in the public's eyes to the level of Babylonian deities and demons, who let themselves be manipulated by divination and witchcraft...By means of incantations, curses, spells, and mutilation of the images of their victims and alliances with evil spirits, they stalk the exilic community for prey and coerce the gods into serving their agenda. These are not prophets as Ezekiel understand the office; they are witches, black magicians, charlatans" (Block 1997:414,416-17).
- Divine healing (Jas 5:14-15)
"Given the overall teaching of the NT, in which healing is not consistently paired with anointing, we should not take this one verse [Jas 5:14] as mandating that oil must accompany all prayers for the sick. At the same time, there is no reason not to implement a practice like this one for some of the most chronic or life-threatening illnesses that church members face. Neither does this verse refer to a specific 'gift' of healing, but rather assigns the task of anointing the sick to the elders, the duly commissioned church leaders responsible for the leadership and nurture of the body as a whole. The descriptive phrase 'in the name of the Lord' reminds us that the healings done solely by the will and power of God. Given the use of the formula 'in the name of Jesus' throughout the early church, especially in Acts, the Lord here may specifically be Christ (Blomberg & Kamell 2008:243).
"This verse [5:15] makes the bold claim that if we pray in faith, God will heal the person for whom we pray...The promise of healing for the sick offers a much needed corrective for those of us who have trouble praying boldly, for we fear or even assume that God will not do what we ask of him. Instead, we ought to pray boldly, believing that he is a God of power and love and that he listens to the prayers of his people. A necessary caveat, however, requires us to remember that he choose how and when he heals, as Paul lays out clearly in 2 Cor 12:8–10, and that complete healing never occurs in this life" (Blomberg & Kamell 2008:244).
"Trying to identify an exact definition of the 'prayer of faith' is perplexing, but perhaps the best explanation appears already in 1:5-8, where we are instructed to pray 'with the confident expectation that God will hear and answer the prayer.' Still, these commands also assume the proviso of 4:15 in which everything for which we hope remains contingent on God's will" (Blomberg & Kamell 2008:244).
"The second half of the sentence forms a third-class condition, which counters the assumption that there must be some sin, or lack of faith, that needs God's forgiveness (recall the recurring, errant counsel of Job's friends). James does not, however, exclude the option that past sins may well have caused current illness" (Blomberg & Kamell 2008:244).
"I remember a Non-conformist minister giving me a lift, and my noticing inside the car a small phial of oil. Although I thought I knew the answer, I nevertheless asked him what it was. 'For anointing people,' he said. 'I didn't think your Church did that,' I said, to which he replied 'No, I don't think they do, but they did New Testament times, and I can't wait for my church to catch up!'" (Richards 1974:17).
- These examples have certain things in common:
i) The source of psi is either explicitly or implicitly supernatural.
ii) In most-all of the examples, the source of psi is or could be spirit-possession.
The distinguishing feature is the identity of the spiritual agent that empowers the subject.
In the case of God's servants, it's the Spirit of God. In the case of God's enemies, it's demonic.
So the Biblical evidence favors a supernatural explanation for psi. That doesn't necessarily preclude the possibility that some types of psi might be natural abilities.
While certain forms of psi might be distinctively supernatural, other forms might be supernaturally enhanced. But it's clear that the supernatural factor is present in at least some cases of psi. And in some cases, dabbling in the occult is clearly a factor.
VI. Theories
Apropos (V), there are different theories of the paranormal. Such theories can be local or global, naturalistic or supernaturalistic.
- Local. Local theories try to explain a particular type of paranormal phenomena.
Let's take the example of the shlemazel. This refers to someone who is accident-prone. It goes beyond the fact that some folks are clumsy or oblivious to danger. Rather, the shlemazel suffers from a chronic run of "bad luck." Anything that can go wrong, will go wrong.
Although this is the stuff of comedy, it's a genuine phenomenon. And it's no fun for the shlemazel.
Here are two different theories to account for the shlemazel:
i) Braude (Braude 2007:148-149) offers a naturalistic explanation. He thinks the shlemazel is an emotional disturbed individual with telekinetic powers. He is subconsciously projecting his frustrations onto his environment.
Of course, this is also a paranormal explanation. I call it "naturalistic" because Braude doesn't attribute to schlemazel's telekinetic ability to an occultic source of origin.
ii) By contrast, Amorth (Amorth 1999:130-31; cf. McCall 1994:77-78; 1996:144-46) regards the shlemazel as a victim of black magic. He is under a curse.
At the same time, Braude (149-150) allows for the same possibility. On the other hand, he doesn't frame this in theological terms (pace Amorth).
iii) For his part, McCall (McCall 1996:124-26) regards the shlemazel as the victim of a family curse. He is living under the pall of departed ancestors who died in tragic circumstances. These restless spirits are reaching out from the grave. The dead take possession of a living descendent.
iv) Not only do these theories differ in principle, but they also differ in practice. If Braude is correct, then I suppose the only solution, if there is a solution, is for the shlemazel is to undergo counseling in hopes of resolving his self-destructive anger.
But Amorth is correct, then the only solution, if there is a solution, is to break the spell–through the appropriate ceremony.
And if McCall is correct, then the only solution, if there is a solution, is to truly put these restless spirits to rest–through the appropriate ceremony.
- Global. A local theory may presuppose a global theory, or it may be neutral on a global theory. A global theory tries to present a unified explanation. A mechanism that underlies these events. What are some global theories of the paranormal?
i) Radin (Radin 2006) offers a naturalistic explanation, based on quantum mechanics.
ii) As we've seen, McCall (McCall 1994:5-21; cf. Amorth 2002:133) offers a supernaturalistic explanation based on the malefic influence of wandering spirits. This is tied to an elaborate theory of racial memory, fetal memory, hypnagogic contact, proxy confession, and postmortem conversion (McCall 1996:149-52; 166-71; 195-210).
According to him, this works both ways. The dead can affect the living while the living can affect the dead. The living can prevent their departed loved ones from "progressing" by refusing to let them go (McCall 1996:195,205). Conversely, the dead can take subliminal possession of the living (McCall 1996:206-208).
In McCall's opinion, this isn't limited to extraordinary events. He applies it to many apparently ordinary medical or psychiatric conditions. The symptoms seem normal enough. But they resist conventional therapy. Although the outward effect is apparently natural, the source of original is supernatural.
iii) For his part, Koch (Koch 1973:53-74) generally classifies psi as form of mediumistic magic. And he also regards mediumistic magic as hereditary (Koch 1972: 186-187; 1973:61-62; cf. Amorth 1999:162; McCall 1994:75-77). The ergumen may not be personally guilty of dabbling in the occult. This is something he inherited from a relative or close ancestor.
Of course, he also thinks you can acquire paranormal powers through direct occultic practice, as well as transference–which, according to him, is weaker than heredity.
And one point he does allow for "traces of natural telepathy" as well as a "natural form" of astral travel (Koch 1973:58).
There is some overlap between McCall's theory and Koch's theory. Both attribute psi to the effect of the dead on the living. But they have a different narrative to account for that effect.
For McCall, the influence of the dead is more direct–a form of possession. McCall also believes in postmortem salvation. By contrast, I sure Koch thought our fate was sealed at death. For him, the influence is more intermediate–the way a sorcerer transfers his Shakti to his apprentice, who transfers it to his apprentice, and so on, down the line.
iv) Amorth (Amorth 1999: 157-58; 2002:160-61; cf. Wright 1972) draws a distinction between people with natural psychic abilities ("seers," "sensitives") and people with supernatural psychic abilities ("charismatics").
According to him, sensitives have a paranormal ability to perceive natural things (like disease), but charismatics have a paranormal ability to perceive supernatural things (like possession).
He also refers to healers and prana-therapists who possess a paranormal ability of "natural origin" (Amorth 2002:135).
On the other hand, he issues a warning about "voices" and "visions" (Amorth 2002:112-13). So even though he seems to classify this as a natural paranormal ability, he thinks it's spiritually treacherous.
On the face of it, his position appears to be a bit inconsistent. If it's a natural ability, you'd expect it to be innocuous or innocent. How do we account for this apparent inconsistency:
a) Perhaps the translation is ambiguous or misleading.
b) Perhaps the evidence is ambiguous.
c) Perhaps he means that a natural, albeit paranormal ability, while innocent in itself, can be a channel for evil forces.
d) Perhaps he is genuinely inconsistent.
v) Rahner (Rahner 1963) uses the term "parapsychological" for individuals with natural psychic ability (e.g. clairvoyance, prophetic dreams, premonitions of death), but he says, in the same connection, that "they seem often to be hereditary and endemic, associated with a particular region" (Rahner 1963:93).
vi) We may have competing theories because each theory is underdetermined by the available evidence. Different causes could produce the same effect. So it's hard to infer the cause from the effect.
What should we do in practice? Writers like Amorth think that some paranormal abilities are natural abilities. But Koch usually regards a paranormal ability as having an occultic origin. It comes at a terrible cost. As such, the energumen needs to renounce this ability for the sake of his own wellbeing and the wellbeing of those around him.
I think Stafford Wright (Wright 1972) strikes a reasonable balance: "Obviously the proper thing is to pray that, if the 'gift' is not according to the will of God, He will take it away. If then it persists, we take it that He will use it if it is put into His hands" (Wright 1972:149).
vii) In this connection, we should keep in mind that the disjunction between nature and supernature is an essentially secular disjunction. The unbeliever draws this line to demarcate the possible (natural) from the impossible (supernatural), and, hence, the credible from the incredible—to his own way of thinking.
But from a Christian standpoint, there's no a priori reason why certain paranormal powers couldn't be God-given abilities. God endows certain individuals with these abilities to further his purposes. For example, I don't see any antecedent reason why God couldn't endow some Christian with the faculty of second sight.
I'm not stating this for a fact. If a paranormal power is traceable to a relative who was trafficking with the dark side, or if a paranormal power seems to be a magnet for "bad luck" or mental illness, then the energumen should clearly renounce this faculty.
VII. Evaluation
How do these theories stack up?
- Amorth. The malefice is clearly attested in Scripture (Ezk 13:17-23). That, of course, doesn't mean that every shlemazel is necessarily the victim of a curse. But that's a live option.
- Koch. Does Scripture support the view that psi is hereditary? I don't see any specific teaching to that effect. However, it's possible that this dovetails with some other biblical teachings:
i) Scripture prohibits necromancy, which is a paradigmatic form of mediumship.
ii) Scripture also teaches that various sins like idolatry can defile the land (e.g. Jer 3:2,9). That indicates that one's ancestor's can do something which has a lasting, spiritual effect on the environment.
If it can have that effect on the land, which is inanimate, then something comparable, or worse, might well be possible in the case of people.
iii) There is also some suggestion in Scripture that demonic influence is more concentrated in some areas than others (Poythress 1995). In a sense, that's about space rather than time, but the two are related. People often reside in the same place from one generation to the next.
iv) On a (possibly) related note, we have the converts who burned their magic books in Acts 19:19. Did they do this because they thought the books were "infested"?
- McCall.
i) It's possible that the theory of racial memory has some basis in fact. However, Jung was hardly a reliable source of information. He himself was an occultist, with a number of relatives who were enmeshed in the occult. To some extent the same is true of William James.
ii) We can discount the heretical elements of McCall's eschatology on Scriptural grounds.
iii) Perhaps possible that the deceased can sometimes possess the living. We can treat that as a working hypothesis.
iv) A basic problem with McCall's methodology is that he operates with a pragmatic, outcome-based epistemology. And the problem with that methodology is that different techniques, representing different theories, can be equally "successful." Therefore, the cause is underdetermined by the effect. If more than one thing works, you can't infer a singular explanation.
v) McCall is terribly naïve about the dark side. He's so credulous and unsuspecting.
- Braude. His theory could be correct up to a point. But it doesn't run deep enough. It fails to furnish an ultimate explanation. What's the source of telekinesis? Black magic also involves telekinesis. But it has more explanatory power.
- Radin. Since there's no unanimity on the proper interpretation of quantum mechanics, it lacks the explanatory power to explain anything else. Like using one enigma to explain another. His explanation also suffers from a secular bias.
- Natural or Supernatural?
i) I don't know that we need to distinguish them. In principle, all paranormal abilities might have a supernatural source, whether divine or demonic (as the case may be). In Christian metaphysics, the fundamental distinction is not between nature and supernature, but between the creature and the Creator.
ii) In addition, nature is not reducible to a machine. It is ultimately directed by divine intelligence. God could have good reason for giving some people some abilities some of the time without giving everyone the same abilities all of the time. Endowing some human beings with paranormal abilities might further his plan, whereas endowing every human being with such abilities might hinder his plan–as they would work at cross-purposes.
VIII. Necromancy
How are we to evaluate descriptions of the afterlife furnished by mediums? According to Meynell, after summarizing the studies of Robert Crookall:
"Another point to be made in favor of Crookall's conclusions is that they do not fit very neatly with any conventional religious view. The popular Christian notion that we are to expect to see Jesus immediately after we die, and the common Protestant view that we are bound directly either for an eternal heaven or an eternal hell, find no support in Crookall's data...Catholics may perhaps take some comfort from the apparent corroboration of their doctrine of purgatory–which is to the effect that most people at least, even if they are ultimately bound for the vision of God in heaven, have to go through a great many trials after death before they attain it; and from the strong vindication of the practice of prayer for the dead" (Stoeber & Meynell 1966:37).
There are several problems with this conclusion:
- In a séance, you lack direct access to the dead. The medium is the conduit. Where is the medium getting her information? There are different possibilities:
i) She could be channeling the damned.
ii) She could be channeling a demon.
iii) She could be reading the mind of the sitter. Then telling him what he wants to hear.
These are not reliable sources of information. Indeed, we would expect all three to be deceptive.
- The composite picture of the afterlife assembled by another writer, drawing on the same sources (necromancy), doesn't bear any real resemblance to the Catholic dogma of Purgatory (cf. Fontana 2007:443-67). If, therefore, the necromantic data is thought to undermine the Protestant doctrine of the afterlife, it equally undermines the Catholic doctrine of the afterlife.
- Meynell is conflating popular conceptions with Protestant doctrine. But the Protestant doctrine of the afterlife posits a distinction between the intermediate state and the final state. The damned don't go straight to hell when they die. While they are hellbound, and their infernal fate is irreversible, hell represents the final state of the damned, not the intermediate state of the damned. So Protestant eschatology doesn't preclude the existence of wandering spirits.
- In addition to the necromantic data, we also have more recent data furnished by NDEs. In contrast to the necromantic data, at least some NDEs corroborate the Protestant doctrine of the afterlife (cf. Sabom 1998). Moreover, there are plausible explanations for apparent cases to the contrary (cf. Habermas & Moreland 1998:178-83; Braude 2002:113).
- To an outsider, the claim that necromantic data has a demonic origin may seem like special pleading: an attempt to save face by imposing a Christian interpretation onto the data. However, that this is not a reinterpretation of the evidence is borne out by a striking correlation between traditional shamanism and modern necromancy. As one scholar explains:
"There are very few studies from an anthropological perspective of spirit mediumship in Western society. This might seem surprising, since the phenomenon is relatively common. Most accounts of mediumship come either from dedicated believers, or else from parapsychologists chiefly interested in assessing the ostensible evidence for ESP. It may be that anthropologists are afraid of being tarred with these brushes. I think, however, that most people who have any substantial acquaintance with Western Spiritualism will recognize that many of the above observations about shamans and shamanism apply equally to Spiritualist mediums in our own society. It is true, of course, that the discarnate entities which are alleged to 'possess' or otherwise communicate through Spiritualist mediums usually (thought not always) claim to be just the spirits of deceased humans rather than of gods, demons, animals spirits and other beings which additionally manifest to shamans. But the outward forms of this phenomena present many analogies which it would be superfluous to pursue in detail. In fact there are few mediumistic phenomena for which the literature on shamanism cannot provide parallels, and few shamanistic performances to which Spiritualism provides no counterpart" (Gauld 1983:20).
In other words, the "communicator" adapts itself to the audience. For a modern séance, it impersonates a lost loved one, but for pagan culture, it impersonates a mythological god or demon or animal spirit, &c. To take a specific example:
"A choirboy once contacted his departed grandmother in this way. When the boy related the incident to his Vicar, the Vicar said, 'I remember your grandmother as a very devout Christian–ask her what she thinks of Jesus Christ.' When, after the next session, the Vicar asked the lad what had happened, the astonished boy said 'She swore!' 'Do you think it was grandma?' the Vicar asked. 'No I don't' said the choirboy.' 'Neither do I,' replied the Vicar, 'and I suggest you leave it alone'" (Richards 1974:63-63).
- In addition, necromancy is generally a two-stage process. The medium must contact a "control" who, in turn, facilitates communication with the dead (cf. Gauld 1983:30; Yap 1960:15). So even if we accept the necromantic literature at face value, there's no direct contact with the dead. Hence, no presumption that you are in actual contact with the dead–rather than a demonic entity.
- But let's assume it is possible to contact the dead. If the only departed spirits you can reach turn out to be damnéd spirits, then they will not be reliable guides to the true nature of the afterlife. Rather, they will be more like vampires, who try to "turn you" to the dark side.
- We should also note the fundamental asymmetry between Christian explanations and occultic explanations, for the occult is parasitic on the Christian worldview. For example:
"The exorcism practiced by British and European witches is more often directed against spells and curses which they believe have been uttered against them by other magic groups...Crosses are made with chalk on the doors...Sometimes holy water is sprinkled in each room–it having been stolen from a church–and white magicians say, 'I exorcise thee, O unclean spirit, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,' and in extreme cases it has been known for them to ask a clergyman not a member of the group, to perform the exorcism for them. Naturally he will not have been told of the curse which is to be lifted. He will have been informed that the house is haunted, or that a poltergeist is troubling the occupants...Where magic groups conduct their rituals by stealth in churches at night, it is not uncommon for the clergymen to have the church reconsecrated before holding another service there" (Johns 1971:101).
IX. "The Psychic Christ"?
Maurice Elliott once wrote a book entitled The Psychic Life of Christ, in which he tried to reinterpret the person and work of Christ as a great psychic.
If we credit the reality of psi, is that a legitimate interpretation? No.
- If, as I've argued, psi has an ultimately supernatural source of origin, whether divine or demonic, then offering a "psychic" interpretation doesn't furnish a genuine alternative, for we can already integrate psi into a Biblical worldview.
- Even if, considered in isolation, one could try to explain the miracles of Christ in terms of psi, that artificially compartmentalizes his miracles from his teaching as well as his redemptive mission. His miracles are not freestanding phenomena. They are thoroughly integrated into a purposeful and meaningful, religious outlook.
- Likewise, the "psychic" interpretation also isolates his miracles from Messianic prophecy.
- There's no historical record of a virgin-born psychic who returned bodily from the dead.
X. Annotated Bibliography
Ahmed, R. The Black Art (Senate 1994). A standard monograph on witchcraft.
Allen, L. Ezekiel 1–19 (Word 1994). A standard commentary on Ezekiel. To the left of Block.
Amorth, G. An Exorcist Tells His Story (Ignatius 1999). A Catholic exorcist. In general, I find Amorth credible. Despite the rather sensational nature of his work, he writes in a business-like style. Just another day at the office. Pragmatic, practical, and down-to-earth.
_____. An Exorcist: More Stories (Ignatius 2002).
Arnold, C. 3 Crucial Questions about Spiritual Warfare (Baker, 1997).
_____. Powers of Darkness: Principalities and Powers in Paul's Letters (IVP, 1992). By an evangelical NT scholar.
Aune, D. Apocalypticism, Prophecy, and Magic in Early Christianity (Baker 2006). By a classicist and NT scholar. Learned, but liberal.
Ayer, A. J. "What I saw when I was dead".
Baring-Gould, S. The Book of Werewolves (2002 Blackmask Online).
Barker, M. G. "Possession and the Occult - a psychiatrist's view". The Churchman.
Bauckham, R. Jesus and the Eyewitnesses (2nd ed.) (Eerdmans, 2017). Excellent discussion of criteria for sifting testimonial evidence.
Baxter, R. The Certainty of the Worlds of Spirits (1691). Classic collection of reported cases of witchcraft, ghosts, &c. by Puritan Divine. Some examples more credible than others.
Beauregard, M. Brain Wars (HarperOne 2012). A noted neuroscientist documents the paranormal. Better for case studies than interpretation.
Beekman, S. Enticed by the Light: The Terrifying Story of One Woman's Encounter with the New Age (Zondervan, 1997). Excellent source for case studies on psi, NDEs, and OBEs. However, his panpsychic theory isn't even consistent with the evidence he cites, where the subject retains personal identity/first-person viewpoint.
Bennett, R. Afraid: Demon Possession and Spiritual Warfare in America (Concordia 2016).
_____. I Am Not Afraid (Concordia 2013). By a Lutheran exorcist.
Berlinski, D. The Secrets of the Vaulted Sky (Harcourt Books 2003). An erudite monograph on astrology.
Blomberg, C. & M. Kamell. James (Zondervan 2008). A fine new commentary on James. Excellent discussion of 5:14-15 (pp 242-45).
_____. "James 5 Commentary and Discussion with Craig L. Blomberg".
Bock, D. The Book of Ezekiel: Chapters 1–24 (Eerdmans 1997). The standard evangelical commentary on Ezekiel. Exhaustive.
Braude, S. ESP & Psychokinesis (Brown Walker Press 2002). Braude is a leading philosopher on the paranormal. Affirms the paranormal, but betrays a secular bias.
_____. Immortal Remains (Rowman & Littlefield 2003).
_____. The Gold Leaf Lady (Chicago 2007). Good case studies. Good discussion of criteria for testimonial evidence.
_____. The Limits of Influence (RKP 1986). Good discussion of criteria for testimonial evidence.
Brown, C. "How should prayer be studied?".
Burns, R. Miracles: The Great Debate on Miracles from Joseph Glanvill to David Hume (Bucknell University Press 1981). Documents the fact that Hume's famous essay broke new ground, but was a latecomer to the debate.
Chan, P. "God's orchard".
_____. "Three women in a vision".
_____. "William Nobes".
Coady, C. Testimony (Oxford 1994). The standard philosophical monograph on testimonial evidence.
Collins, C. John. The God of Miracles: An Exegetical Examination of God's Action in the World (Crossway 2000). An evangelical study.
Coons, P. "The Differential Diagnosis of Possession States".
Cruz, N. Run, Baby, Run (Bridge-Logos 1988). Among other things, describes his deliverance from occult bondage.
Decker R. & Dummett, M. A History of the Occult Tarot (Duckworth 2002). An erudite overview of the esoteric tradition. Exposé of the lurid lives of some of its leading exponents.
Douthat, R. "Varieties of Religions Experience".
Doyle, T. Dreams and Visions: Is Jesus Awakening the Muslim World? (Thomas Nelson 2012).
Dreher, R. "Are Ghosts Real?".
Dude, Epistle of. "Bedside visitations".
_____. "Bones solid as rock".
_____. "A crazed woman".
_____. "Demonic bullying".
_____. "A dream of my father".
_____. "From strength to strength".
_____. "Healed of ALS".
_____. "Healing miracles".
_____. "Idols".
_____. "Jesus and the psychiatrists".
_____. "LAMPs".
_____. "A 'miracle' in Burleson".
_____. "Mrs. Kwo".
_____. "Mystery lady".
_____. "Visions of Jesus".
_____. "Witchcraft".
Duffin, J. Medical Miracles: Doctors, Saints, and Healing in the Modern World (Oxford 2008).
Durbin, J. "The overdose that didn't kill me".
Earman, J. Hume's Abject Failure (Oxford University Press 2000). A secular critique.
Edwards, P. Reincarnation (Prometheus Books 1996). Standard philosophical critique. Secular.
Engwer, J. Multiple posts on the Enfield poltergeist.
Fontana, D. Is There An Afterlife? (O Books 2007). Useful compendium of case studies. Less reliable on analysis.
Gallagher, R. "I help spot demonic possession".
_____. "When exorcists need help, they call him"
Gardner, R. Healing Miracles: A Doctor Investigates (DLT 1987). Contains extensive case studies by a noted physician.
Garrett, D. Angels and the New Spirituality (B&H 1995). An evangelical critique of new age angelology, with sections on some Catholic and Protestant aberrations as well.
Garrison, D. A Wind in the House of Islam (Wingtake 2014).
Gauld, A. Mediumship & Survival (Paladin Books 1982). Standard monograph by an English psych. prof.
Geivett, D. & Habermas, G. (eds.). In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God's Action in History (IVP 1997). A standard reference work.
Goodman, F. How About Demons? (Indiana Press 1988). Academic study by a cultural anthropologist.
Habermas, G. & Moreland, J. P. Beyond Death (CB 1998). The standard evangelical work of its kind.
Hays, S. "Beat the devil".
_____. "Brazilian witchcraft".
_____. "Bruce Waltke on prayer and providence".
_____. "Communion of the saints".
_____. "Deathbed visions".
_____. "Devil may care".
_____. "Dreams and visions".
_____. "Jesus and the psychiatrists".
_____. "Mark Twain's premonition".
_____. "Miraculous organ regeneration".
_____. "The Night Hag".
_____. "Pandemonium".
_____. "Premonitions".
_____. "Second Sight in the Hebrides".
_____. "Spooky hospitals".
_____. "Supernatural dreams".
_____. "Why was the choir late?".
Heathcote-Jones. Emma, Seeing Angels (John Blake 2001). Popularization of doctoral dissertation. Some cases more impressive than others.
Heiser, M. "Spell Casting."
_____. "Sleep paralysis".
_____ & Burton, J. "Werewolves: An Anthropological Exploration: A Discussion with Dr. Judd Burton".
Higton, M. & Holmes, S. "Meeting Scotus: On Scholasticism and Its Ghosts". International Journal of Systematic Theology (2002).
Hird, Ed. "Carl Jung and the Gnostic Reconciliation of Gender Opposites". Exposé of Jung's occultic background.
Houston, J. Reported Miracles: A Critique of Hume (Cambridge University Press 2007). An academic critique of Hume.
Hufford, D. The Terror That Comes in the Night: An Experience-Centered Study of Supernatural Assault Traditions (University of Pennsylvania Press; 2nd ed. 1989). An academic study of Old-Hag syndrome by a noted folklorist.
_____. "Sleep Paralysis as Spiritual Experience". Transcultural Psychiatry 42/1 (March 2005), 11-45.
_____. "Visionary Spiritual Experiences in an Enchanted World". Anthropology & Humanism 35/2 (November, 2010), 142-158.
Inglis, B, The paranormal: An encyclopedia of psychic phenomena (Granada 1985). Standard reference work.
Irvine, D. From Witchcraft to Christ (Life Journey 2007). Inspirational story of bondage and deliverance. I'm sure she's sincere, and I think she's credible up to a point. I don't think she would invent her hardscrabble childhood or experience as a junkie and prostitute. On her career as a witch, I'd distinguish between her subjective impressions–which sometimes strike me as fanciful–from her eyewitness descriptions–which are more likely to be accurate.
Jones, J. Black Magic Today (Nel 1971). By a British journalist. Based on historical investigation and personal observation. Often graphic and gruesome, but a useful window into the true character of the occult.
Kaigh, F. Witchcraft in Africa (Richard Lesley 1947). An eyewitness account, with a forward by leading scholar on witchraft (Summers), which corroborates Kaigh's account.
Kay, W. & Parry, R. (eds.). Exorcism and Deliverance (Paternoster 2011). Uneven but useful collection of studies.
Kee, H. Medicine, Miracle, and Magic in New Testament Times (Cambridge 2005). Standard monograph. Liberal, but learned.
_____. Miracle in the Early Christian World (Yale 1983)
Keener, C. "Crooked Spirits and Spiritual Identity Theft: A Keener Response to Crooks?".
_____. "Exorcism stories".
_____. "Demon possession".
Kluckhohn, C. Navaho Witchcraft (1944). By the Harvard anthropologist.
Koch, K. Christian Counseling & Occultism (Kregel 1972). Koch was a Lutheran exorcist. In his generation, the leading evangelical writer on this topic. Useful for case studies and pastoral advice.
_____. Demonology: Past & Present (Kregel 1973)
_____. Occult ABC (Kregel 1986)
Koestler, A., Hardy, A., & Harvie, R. "Anecdotal Cases". The Challenge of Chance (Random House 1974), 167-224. Events that are too coincidental to be pure coincidence.
Korem D. & Meier, P. The Fakers (Fleming Revell 1980). Christian debunkers. Some of their targets are more deserving than others.
Lane, A. (ed.). The Unseen World: Christian Reflections on Angels, Demons, and the Heavenly Realm (Baker), 1996. Scholarly symposium.
Larmer, R. The Legitimacy of Miracle (Lexington 2013).
_____. Dialogues on Miracles (Wipf & Stock 2015). Both Larmer's books contain case-studies in appendices.
Lee, S. "The scourge of evil spirits".
Lloyd-Jones, M. Healing & the Scriptures (Nelson 1988). By a physician and pastor. Chapter 10 lays down some criteria to distinguish possession from natural mental illness. (Chapter 10 is from Lloyd-Jones' talk "Body, Mind, and Spirit" at the Christian Medical Fellowship Conference in 1974. This talk is available for free via the MLJ Trust here and here.)
_____. Not Against Flesh and Blood (Christian Focus Publications 2013). Addresses on the occult, paranormal, and spiritual warfare.
_____. "The Supernatural in Medicine".
Martin, G. "Dreams and World Evangelization".
Martin, M. Hostage to the Devil (HarperSanFrancisco 1992). A standard Catholic treatment. However, Malachi was a controversial figure. M. Scott Peck, who knew him, evaluates his credibility (see below).
McCall, K. A Guide to Healing the Family Tree (Queenship 1996). McCall was a distinguished medical missionary, the son of another distinguished missionary. Useful case studies, but less reliable on analysis.
_____. Healing the Haunted (Queenship 1996).
_____. Healing the Family Tree (Sheldon Press 1994).
_____. The Moon Looks Down (Darley Anderson (1987).
Montefiore, H. The Paranormal (Upfront 2002). Useful compendium of cases studies, but Montefiore is quite pluralistic.
Montgomery, J. W. (ed.). Demon Possession: A Medical, Historical, Anthropological, and Theological Symposium (Bethany 1976).
Montgomery, J. Principalities and Powers (Bethany 1973). By the polymathic Lutheran apologist.
Mozley, J. B. Eight Lectures on Miracles (BiblioBazaar 2009). A classic Victorian defense of miracles.
Muller, Bill. "Everyday miracle".
Mullin, R. B. Miracles and the Modern Religious Imagination (Yale University Press 1996). Documents a division in modern Christendom, centered on the status of miracles.
Nahm, M. "Terminal lucidity".
Nevius, J. "Demon possession and allied themes: being an inductive study of phenomena of our own times".
Noll, R. The Aryan Christ: The Secret Life of Carl Jung (Random House 1997). Exposé of Jung's occultic background.
_____. The Jung Cult: Origins of a Charismatic Movement (Princeton University Press 1994).
Noll, S. Angels of Light, Powers of Darkness (IVP 1998). Standard monograph by a British NT scholar.
Olson, R. "Stranger Things". Records an apparition of the dead, by a postevangelical theologian.
Page, S. Powers of Evil: A Biblical Study of Satan and Demons (Baker, 1995). By an evangelical scholar.
Peck, M. Glimpses of the Devil (Free Press 2005). Peck was a distinguished psychiatrist. Describes two of his patients, whom he diagnosed as having been possessed, as well as their exorcism.
Poythress, V. "Territorial Spirits". Useful review of the biblical data.
Prince, D. Blessing or Curse (Chosen Books 2007). Prince had a very distinguished résumé. So you'd expect him to be a reliable and insightful writer on the occult. Unfortunately, he's a terribly gullible and impressionable man.
_____. They Shall Expel Demons (Chosen Books 2007).
Radin, D. Entangled Minds (Pocket Books 2006). Useful for case studies. Less reliable on analysis.
Rahner, K. Visions & Prophecies (Herder & Herder 1963). Lays down Catholic criteria for private revelation.
Rasmussen, J. "Prayer studies".
Rauser, R., "Kanashibari". By a progressive theologian.
Richards, J. But Deliver Us From Evil (DLT 1974). By an Anglican exorcist. Thorough. Evangelical. One of the best all-around treatments.
Ring, K. & Cooper, S. "Near-Death and Out-of-Body Experiences in the Blind: A Study of Apparent Eyeless Vision".
Rivas, T. et al. (eds.). The Self Does Not Die (IANDS 2016). Fairly well-documented evidence for post-mortem survival. Uneven. Some cases more impressive than others. Editors have a New Age bias.
Sabom, M. Light & Death (Zondervan 1998). By a Christian cardiologist on NDEs. Good case studies. Good analysis of competing theories.
_____. "The Shadow of Death (part one)".
_____. "The Shadow of Death (part two)".
Sheldrake, R. "Papers on Telepathy".
_____. The Science Delusion: Freeing the Spirit of Scientific Enquiry (Coronet 2012). Sheldrake is a scientific iconoclast who investigates phenomena which the scientific establishment ignores.
Sims, A. "Demon Possession: Medical Perspective in a Western Culture" in Palmer, B (ed.). Medicine and the Bible (Paternoster 1986), 165-89.
Stafford, T. Miracles (Bethany 2012). A few impressive cases, but primary value lies in the pastoral theology.
Stoeber, M. & Meynell, H. (eds.). Critical Reflections on the Paranormal (SUNY 1996). Useful anthology of essays.
Strobel, L. The Case for Miracles (Zondervan 2018). Uneven.
Summers, M. The Werewolf in Lore and Legend (Dover 2003 reprint).
Taylor, G. Pastor Hsi (Overseas Missionary Fellowship 1997). Biography of a famous Chinese pastor and exorcist.
Temple, Ken. "More than dreams".
Twelftree, G. In the Name of Jesus (Baker 2007). Twelftree is a specialist on NT and early church miracles. Useful, but heavy on redaction criticism.
_____. Jesus the Exorcist (Hendrickson 1993).
_____. Jesus the Miracle Worker (IVP 1999).
_____. Paul and the Miraculous: A Historical Reconstruction (Baker 2013). Explores a neglected aspect of Pauline theology.
Twelftree, G. (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Miracles (Cambridge University Press 2011). Standard reference work.
Twelftree, G. (ed.) The Nature Miracles of Jesus (Wipf & Stock 2017). Of value for the contributions by Craig Keener and Timothy McGrew.
Turner, Edith. The Hands Feel It (Northern Illinois U. Press 1996). Field study by academic anthropologist of miracles and witchcraft among an Eskimo community.
_____. "The Reality of Spirits". Turner has a New Age perspective. I reject that. But her prism is separable from the case studies.
Unger, M. Beyond the Crystal Ball (Moody 1974). Unger was a fine OT scholar. Unfortunately, this particular title is very dated.
_____. Demons in the World Today (Tyndale 1976). After he changed his mind.
_____. The Haunting of Bishop Pike (Tyndale 1971). Exposé. A cautionary tale.
Valiant for Truth. "A Pastor’s Reflections: Demon Possession and Mental Illness".
Van der Toorn, K., Becking, B., & van der Horst, P. (eds.). Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible (Leiden: Brill, rev. 1999). Standard reference work.
Wenham, D. & Blomberg, C. Gospel Perspectives VI: The Miracles of Jesus (WS 2003). Useful anthology.
Wiebe, P. God and Other Spirits (Oxford 2004). Philosophical defense of discarnate spirits.
Wiebe, P. Visions of Jesus: Direct Encounters from the New Testament to Today (Oxford 1998). Well-documented collection of reported visions of Jesus by Christian philosopher. An excerpt from the book has been posted here.
Wilson, A. "Modern miracles".
Wright, J. S. Christianity & the Occult (Moody 1972). By an English evangelical Bible scholar. One of the best all-around treatments.
Yamauchi, E. "Magic in the Ancient World". By an erudite evangelical scholar of ancient history.
Yap, P. "The Possession Syndrome in Hong Kong and in Catholic Cultures". Online version of an article originally published in a peer-reviewed journal.
Young, F. A History of Anglican Exorcism (I.B. Tauris 2018). Academic study of the checkered history of exorcism in the Anglican tradition.
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