VICTOR REPPERT SAID:
“I mentioned the deaths of embryonic humans as possible evidence that the value of their life might be different from the value of the life of an infant. Even pro-lifers don't seem to want to attach the sorts of penalties to killing a fetus that they do to killing an infant.”
Are you saying they don’t want to as a matter of principle or strategy? Don’t want to because they don’t value both equally? Or don’t want to because that’s a futile political maneuver?
“Even when it was illegal, you didn't risk the chair when you got an abortion.”
I think it would be perfectly appropriate to treat abortion like other forms of homicide.
“But if abortion is a murder equivalent to all other murders, shouldn't it have been a capital crime?”
Yes, it should have. But the political process doesn’t enable us to do everything which out to be done. That’s pretty obvious. Why is Reppert so clueless?
“(I mean, what would you have to do, treat a woman's uterus as a crime scene?)”
Why not? For example, there are cases in which a pregnant woman is murdered so that her murder can cut the baby out of her womb and kidnap it.
Is Reppert suggesting that in a case like that, the uterus is not a crime scene?
BTW, notice how, to prejudice the issue, he chooses to single out the mother, as if she’s the only party to an abortion.
“Our efforts to bring the abortion rate as close to zero as we can get it should probably not focus on laws prohibiting abortion. There are so many other things we can do in this area. Does adoption work like it should, making that a viable option?”
It’s hard to adopt an aborted baby.
“Do we clearly publish the message that even if there is a legal right to an abortion, there may be no moral right to one?”
It’s hard to send a “clear” message when Reppert is busy promoting his “skepticism.”
“When people say ‘I think abortion should be safe, legal, and rare’ do we say "one out of three ain't bad, what can we do to make it rare?”
“Safe, legal, and rare” is not a real policy. It’s just a throwaway line which proabortion candidates use to make themselves sound more moderate than they really are.
“Do we raise the question of whether more government involvement in health care might reduce the abortion rate?”
Prolifers have addressed that issue. Try again.
“Pro-choice does not mean pro-abortion.”
That’s another throwaway line. It’s NARAL propaganda. This is how Reppert gives cover to the baby-killers.
“Maybe pro-choice is wrong.”
“Maybe.” Notice his chronic vacillation. Does “maybe” send a clear message?
Maybe it’s right and maybe it’s wrong. Yeah, that sends a clear message.
“But it doesn't follow that people who are pro-choice don't find abortion unacceptable in most or all cases, or don't want to see the abortion rate come as close to zero as possible.”
At best they have a theoretical distaste which, however, is never allowed to interfere with what actually happens.
Impermissible in theory, permissible in practice.
“If you really accept the logical conclusions of pro-life rhetoric, you would have to make abortion not only a crime, but a capital crime. I don't hear anyone proposing that.”
i) That would be a just penalty. However, I don’t have to make something to be the case which I lack the power to make the case.
ii) Moreover, the priority is to deter the crime, not punish the crime. If you deter the crime, then there’s no crime to punish.
“But in the face of reasonable doubt as to the rights of the fetus, it may be best not to enact laws against abortion.”
Notice the “clear message” that Reppert is sending. “In the face of reasonable doubts about the rights of the fetus…”
“Interestingly enough, I don't see pro-lifers saying that the Supreme Court should say that the fetus has a right to life that should be protected under the 14th Amendment. If it has a right to life, why not argue that in court?”
Since the Constitution is silent on abortion, this is an issue for the legislative branch.
“Instead, they think the legal argument is that a woman doesn't have a right to privacy. Which means that states could outlaw contraceptives of facelifts if they wanted to.”
There is no Constitutional right to use birth control or have a facelift. Issues like that should be left to state legislatures.
So what if states try to outlaw it? They can only do so if that reflects the will of the voters. If the voters don’t like it, they can elect lawmakers who will enact their wishes. That’s the democratic process.
“But then, I don't believe in originalist jurisprudence, either.”
So he doesn’t believe the Bill of Rights should function as a check on powers of the state. He doesn’t believe the Constitution should limit the powers of the presidency.
Sunday, August 09, 2009
Pro-nonsense v. anti-nonsense
True to form, Reppert is lining up a row of straw men for ritual immolation. Beware of smoke inhalation.
http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2009/08/pro-choice-vs-pro-abortion.html
“The strategy that seems to be at work in some of the pro-life responses to my attempts to a) make sense of the highly difficult abortion issue…”
Begs the question of whether abortion is a highly difficult issue. Like many moral issues, it may on rare occasion present some tricky borderline cases, but this hardly means that abortion in general is a highly difficult issue.
“And b) understand how those views relate to the issue of voting, is to conflate all deviance from the standard pro-life position into the most extreme version of the pro-abortion view possible.”
Given that Obama has taken the most extreme version of the pro-abortion view of any electable candidate for president–no conflation is necessary.
“What results is a kind of pro-life purism, either you are for us or you are against us.”
Is Reppert going out of his way to misrepresent “some of the prolife responses” to his chronic vacillation on the subject? Wouldn’t be the first time.
Just to set the record straight, this is what I said about the last election:
I said a Christian could, in good conscience, vote for McCain, vote for a third-party candidate, or sit out the election. What a Christian could not do in good conscience was vote for abortion.
That’s not a “purist” position in terms of voting. It actually involves a fair amount of latitude.
“The pro-life position here means a) fetal life has the same value as life after birth…”
Is that how he defines prolife “purism”? I agree with (a). But he seems to be using “purist” as a pejorative adjective.
“b) therefore all abortions are murders.”
A logical consequence of (a). I have no problem with that definition. But I guess that makes me a “purist.”
Reppert evidently thinks it’s better to be a moral impurist than be a moral purist. Or does he think it’s better to be a logical impurist rather than a logical purist?
“c) Roe v. Wade was wrong, not because the Court failed to affirm the right of the fetus to life, but because it overstepped its boundaries and affirmed the right of the pregnant woman to privacy”
Once again, I like that part of the definition. Keep in mind, though, that you don’t have to be a prolife “purist” to take that position. Proabortion social libs and legal scholars like Laurence Tribe and Richard Posner agree that Roe v. Wade was bad law.
“d) the way to fight against abortion is to vote for Republican candidates, who will not only have a more restrictive executive abortion policy, but will nominate ‘strict constructionist’ or ‘originalist’ justices to the Supreme Court who will reverse Roe and empower states to enact abti-abortion legislation.”
i) That oversimplifies the issue. There’s more than one way to fight abortion. We should employ all legitimate methods at our disposal.
ii) Not all Republicans are prolife.
“Any skepticism about any of these propositions makes one a fellow traveler of Peter Singer and George Tiller.”
If you’re skeptical about (a), to take one example, then how do you stake out a coherent mediating position? On what principle basis do you oppose Peter Singer?
“But you can push pro-life purism even further.”
Especially if you’re eager to erect a straw man.
“I suppose if you follow the logic of ‘abortion is murder’ to its logical conclusion, you would have to make abortion a capital crime and try both the pregnant mother and the abortion doctor for murder. I don't see any pro-lifers advocating that.”
i) To say we “have to make it” a capital crime assumes that we have the power to do so. In a republican democracy, there are limits to what we can legislate, even if we ought to have such laws. We only “have to do” the best that we’re capable of doing.
ii) There is also a question of objectives:
a) If the objective is to punish abortion, then making it a capital offense would be appropriate.
b) If the objective is to deter abortion, then we might pursue a more pragmatic strategy. To deter abortion, it might be sufficient to try the abortionist for murder–among other things.
Then there are situations where the father puts the woman up to it. That makes him equally culpable. Sometimes more so.
iii) Making abortion a capital offense might have some deterrent value (assuming juries would convict). However, that’s not politically feasible for the time being. So you settle for the best you can get. Obama is not the best we can get. Pelosi is not the best we can get.
“Unfortunately, when you vote, you've got to consider all the issues.”
Since Obama was wrong on the same issues that McCain was wrong on, while also being wrong on the issues McCain was right on, that consideration hardly weighs in favor of Obama.
In any case, that’s now a moot issue. Hopefully we can do better than McCain the next time around. That wouldn’t be hard. However, it would be hard to do worse than Obama.
“I am sure there were plenty of people who voted for Obama who held their noses when it came to his views on abortion. But if your overall political sympathies are closer to Obama than to McCain, I can't see holding your nose about everything else in order not to hold your nose on abortion.”
In other words, Reppert is appealing to his other ideological deficiencies to justify his ideological deficiencies on abortion.
“Many people who are, strictly speaking, pro-choice, hate abortion.”
That’s a throwaway line.
“They want to see the number of abortions brought as close to zero as possible.”
Then why did Reppert cast his vote to empower the baby-killers? Give them carte blanche? Is that a way to lower the abortion rate?
“To call them friends of baby-butchers is the triumph of ideology over common sense.”
Reppert voted for the most militantly proabortion candidate in the pack. Also, by putting a Democrat in the White House when Democrats already control Congress, which further gives them a chance to change the balance of power on the courts, that removes any check on proabortion extremism.
And it’s not as if Obama’s political agenda is notable for its compensatory virtues. Reppert voted for the worst electable candidate, and urged his readers follow him over the moral abyss.
So, yes, that makes him complicit. He had better options, but opted for the greater evil.
http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2009/08/pro-choice-vs-pro-abortion.html
“The strategy that seems to be at work in some of the pro-life responses to my attempts to a) make sense of the highly difficult abortion issue…”
Begs the question of whether abortion is a highly difficult issue. Like many moral issues, it may on rare occasion present some tricky borderline cases, but this hardly means that abortion in general is a highly difficult issue.
“And b) understand how those views relate to the issue of voting, is to conflate all deviance from the standard pro-life position into the most extreme version of the pro-abortion view possible.”
Given that Obama has taken the most extreme version of the pro-abortion view of any electable candidate for president–no conflation is necessary.
“What results is a kind of pro-life purism, either you are for us or you are against us.”
Is Reppert going out of his way to misrepresent “some of the prolife responses” to his chronic vacillation on the subject? Wouldn’t be the first time.
Just to set the record straight, this is what I said about the last election:
I said a Christian could, in good conscience, vote for McCain, vote for a third-party candidate, or sit out the election. What a Christian could not do in good conscience was vote for abortion.
That’s not a “purist” position in terms of voting. It actually involves a fair amount of latitude.
“The pro-life position here means a) fetal life has the same value as life after birth…”
Is that how he defines prolife “purism”? I agree with (a). But he seems to be using “purist” as a pejorative adjective.
“b) therefore all abortions are murders.”
A logical consequence of (a). I have no problem with that definition. But I guess that makes me a “purist.”
Reppert evidently thinks it’s better to be a moral impurist than be a moral purist. Or does he think it’s better to be a logical impurist rather than a logical purist?
“c) Roe v. Wade was wrong, not because the Court failed to affirm the right of the fetus to life, but because it overstepped its boundaries and affirmed the right of the pregnant woman to privacy”
Once again, I like that part of the definition. Keep in mind, though, that you don’t have to be a prolife “purist” to take that position. Proabortion social libs and legal scholars like Laurence Tribe and Richard Posner agree that Roe v. Wade was bad law.
“d) the way to fight against abortion is to vote for Republican candidates, who will not only have a more restrictive executive abortion policy, but will nominate ‘strict constructionist’ or ‘originalist’ justices to the Supreme Court who will reverse Roe and empower states to enact abti-abortion legislation.”
i) That oversimplifies the issue. There’s more than one way to fight abortion. We should employ all legitimate methods at our disposal.
ii) Not all Republicans are prolife.
“Any skepticism about any of these propositions makes one a fellow traveler of Peter Singer and George Tiller.”
If you’re skeptical about (a), to take one example, then how do you stake out a coherent mediating position? On what principle basis do you oppose Peter Singer?
“But you can push pro-life purism even further.”
Especially if you’re eager to erect a straw man.
“I suppose if you follow the logic of ‘abortion is murder’ to its logical conclusion, you would have to make abortion a capital crime and try both the pregnant mother and the abortion doctor for murder. I don't see any pro-lifers advocating that.”
i) To say we “have to make it” a capital crime assumes that we have the power to do so. In a republican democracy, there are limits to what we can legislate, even if we ought to have such laws. We only “have to do” the best that we’re capable of doing.
ii) There is also a question of objectives:
a) If the objective is to punish abortion, then making it a capital offense would be appropriate.
b) If the objective is to deter abortion, then we might pursue a more pragmatic strategy. To deter abortion, it might be sufficient to try the abortionist for murder–among other things.
Then there are situations where the father puts the woman up to it. That makes him equally culpable. Sometimes more so.
iii) Making abortion a capital offense might have some deterrent value (assuming juries would convict). However, that’s not politically feasible for the time being. So you settle for the best you can get. Obama is not the best we can get. Pelosi is not the best we can get.
“Unfortunately, when you vote, you've got to consider all the issues.”
Since Obama was wrong on the same issues that McCain was wrong on, while also being wrong on the issues McCain was right on, that consideration hardly weighs in favor of Obama.
In any case, that’s now a moot issue. Hopefully we can do better than McCain the next time around. That wouldn’t be hard. However, it would be hard to do worse than Obama.
“I am sure there were plenty of people who voted for Obama who held their noses when it came to his views on abortion. But if your overall political sympathies are closer to Obama than to McCain, I can't see holding your nose about everything else in order not to hold your nose on abortion.”
In other words, Reppert is appealing to his other ideological deficiencies to justify his ideological deficiencies on abortion.
“Many people who are, strictly speaking, pro-choice, hate abortion.”
That’s a throwaway line.
“They want to see the number of abortions brought as close to zero as possible.”
Then why did Reppert cast his vote to empower the baby-killers? Give them carte blanche? Is that a way to lower the abortion rate?
“To call them friends of baby-butchers is the triumph of ideology over common sense.”
Reppert voted for the most militantly proabortion candidate in the pack. Also, by putting a Democrat in the White House when Democrats already control Congress, which further gives them a chance to change the balance of power on the courts, that removes any check on proabortion extremism.
And it’s not as if Obama’s political agenda is notable for its compensatory virtues. Reppert voted for the worst electable candidate, and urged his readers follow him over the moral abyss.
So, yes, that makes him complicit. He had better options, but opted for the greater evil.
Early Use Of Paul's Letters
Chris Price has a good article on Ignatius of Antioch's use of the letters of Paul, especially Ephesians. See, too, his earlier article on the use of 1 Corinthians in First Clement.
The Center For The Study Of New Testament Manuscripts
Dan Wallace was on James White's webcast this past Thursday, discussing his work with the Center for the Study of New Testament Manuscripts (CSNTM) and other textual issues. Though CSNTM isn't an apologetics organization, its work is relevant to apologetics. Those of you who are interested in financially supporting an organization that's doing significant work relevant to apologetics and other important fields, such as the quality of the manuscript record that will influence Bible translations for future generations, may want to donate.
Saturday, August 08, 2009
Arminian motives
Dominic Bnonn Tennant said...
I have no more reason to doubt a Calvinist's account of why he is a Calvinists as I am to doubt an Arminian's account of why he is an Arminian.
But there's a bit of a disparity here, isn't there? I haven't met an Arminian yet who is willing to give up his libertarian assumptions when he comes to the Bible. But if you ask him to show where Scripture teaches libertarian free will, he can't. He just takes it as implicit. Or he points to places where people make choices, as if this proves a libertarian action theory. So Arminians, by their own admission, are Arminian not because of what Scripture says, but in fact because of their philosophical commitments.
Calvinists, on the other hand, are typically the opposite. Indeed, most Calvinists I know are strongly sympathetic to libertarian theories of the will, and treat them as intuitively obvious. It is only because Scripture openly and obviously contradicts such theories that these people are Calvinists at all. One merely needs to point to God's use of Pharaoh in Exodus—hardening his heart so that he would sin, while still holding him accountable for that sin—to see that libertarian action theory is false and unbiblical. So Calvinists, in contrast to Arminians, are Calvinists because of what Scripture says, despite any philosophical commitments they have.
Frankly, I find your deigning to believe that Calvinist are really arriving at their position by studying the Scriptures both ironic and hypocritical.
August 06, 2009 8:38 PM
Dominic Bnonn Tennant said...
Hi Gordon. It doesn't matter if this is an exception or not—the case against libertarianism, and for compatibilism, is still proved. Arminians say that we can't be held morally accountable for actions we didn't libertarianly choose. But Scripture gives us an example where Pharaoh is held accountable for actions he didn't libertarianly choose. So, even if this isn't normative, the objection against a compatibilist view of the will still collapses—as does any argument for a libertarian action theory which relies on maintaining moral accountability. That's what's at issue here; viz, "Given our understanding of who is responsible for what, an understanding we consider to be the fact of the matter, the Calvinistic God turns out to be as bad as the devil."
Given the example of Pharaoh, the Arminian case is just unsustainable. Or, if the Arminian thinks it is sustainable,then by his own standards God is as bad as the devil in his dealings with Pharaoh. Does that just make God occasionally evil under the Arminian view? Is this okay? I mean, what does it take for Arminians to realize that the reason they think God is the devil is because they are judging him according to the devil's standards?
August 06, 2009 9:37 PM
Dominic Bnonn Tennant said...
mattghg, obviously I haven't put the question to every Arminian I've met. But the ones to whom I have put the question made it clear that their commitment to libertarian freedom was the overriding factor behind their rejection of the doctrines you mention. In other words, a priori Scripture can't teach those doctrines, because that would be unjust on libertarian assumptions—therefore, it does not teach them. "Whatever it says, it can't teach that!"
I have also met Arminians who are so committed to libertarian freedom that, when pressed by the logic of their position, they admit they'd be willing give up doctrines like God's knowledge of counterfactual free choices rather than their commitment to libertarian freedom. (For the logic, see, eg here.) This is why I argue that open theism is merely consistent Arminianism.
August 07, 2009 3:44 AM
D Bnonn Tennant
Hey James; good post. There are some other, similar problems which arise from Arminian’s views, relating to the grounds of God’s knowledge. Arminian has previously stated that “God’s foreknowledge of free human acts is contingent on what the free human actors will actually do.” I agree that this view is logically necessary given Arminianism’s other philosophical commitments—but if it’s actually true, then the following problems seem to present themselves:
1. God’s aseity, simplicity, immutability, and necessity are undermined. Re aseity, if parts of God’s knowledge are causally contingent on human actions, such that this knowledge obtains only if the actions themselves obtain, then there is a sense in which God is causally dependent on his creation. Re simplicity, if parts of God’s knowledge are contingent on human actions, while other parts are not, then God is divisible. I’m not sure what the Arminian position is on God’s simplicity (or whether there is a standard view), but it seems to me to be a very important doctrine. Re immutability, if God gains knowledge when contingent events obtain, he is not immutable. And similarly for necessity. Perhaps it is possible to redefine these doctrines to fit into an Arminian scheme, but it doesn’t seem possible to do so without producing irreparable flaws into the core ontology of the Godhead.
2. One wonders what knowledge is, and how it is produced, under Arminian’s view. It appears to be something independent of God, which he, like us, obtains in certain circumstances. But this seems to raise enormous problems of ontology (I’m sure Greg Welty would throw up a little in his mouth at the mere thought). Put mildly, it appears to contradict strikingly with the meaning of logos that John has in mind in the first verse of his gospel.
3. Furthermore, if God’s foreknowledge of free human acts is causally contingent on what the free human actors actually do, then it follows necessarily that God has no knowledge of things which free human actors do not do. If God’s knowledge of free acts obtains only in the event that the free acts themselves obtain, then hypothetical free acts, which don’t obtain, will commensurately not cause any knowledge in God. So Arminian appears to be committed to a view in which God has no knowledge of counterfactual free acts. How, then, does Jesus know that Tyre and Sidon would have repented in sackcloth and ashes in Matthew 11:21?
4. God’s inability, under Arminian’s view, to know counterfactual free acts also raises further problems. Since God’s knowledge of all free human acts only obtains causally consequent to the acts themselves obtaining (although temporarily prior, since God is timeless), it stands that he had no knowledge of any free acts causally prior to the creation of the universe. Since God’s action in creating the universe is a prior causal condition of human free acts, and human free acts are a prior causal condition of God’s knowledge of them, it follows that God did not know any human free acts prior to his creation of the universe. Therefore, he did not (and could not have) surveyed all the possible worlds with all the possible free human acts, and chosen to instantiate a particular one. Rather, he must have merely surveyed all the possible initial conditions for the world, up until the first free human act, and then instantiated the one that he wanted. Only once he had done this would he have gained any knowledge at all of free human acts—by which stage, it would be too late.
5. This in turn produces obvious absurdities. For instance, God is limited to a purely reactive attitude toward history. Exodus and Romans tell us that God raised Pharaoh up for the express purpose of revealing his power in him. Yet how could this be possible under the Arminian view? What counter-factual reality did God foresee where Pharaoh was obstinate? Evidently it was not the reality in which he was king, since Scripture says that God raises up Pharaoh to be king as a response to his foreknowledge of Pharaoh’s obstinacy. But then, Pharaoh must have been obstinate in some other reality. What reality is that?
6. Moreover, given that this counter-factual reality was not the reality in which Pharaoh was king, how did God know that Pharaoh would act in the same way in the actual reality? Since, by definition, free will entails the real ability to do otherwise, is it not the case that Pharaoh was just as likely to not be obstinate (or, at least, that it was not impossible?) In fact, isn’t it the case that God would have to foreknow the actual reality, in which Pharaoh is king, in order to raise him up as king at all?
7. This unfortunately leads on to entail that God is “stuck” with regard to time. Even though he is mutable, and can learn, under the view Arminian has espoused, he is unable to respond to events which involve free acts which have not yet occurred in time. Once he knows of a free will event, it has already happened. Although his knowledge may flow back in time from our point of view, such that he can know what will happen before it does because he exists at all times (including a time prior to the free will choice), he cannot actually act to change that event—even in a passive sense, by altering natural events. By the time a free act is known by God, it is already fixed in history. God is merely an observer. He cannot actually influence history at all—unless, that is, he acts like a time-traveler and goes “back in time” and changes things to see what will happen later on! Ultimately, all manner of time paradoxes would seem to be entailed in such a view, along with any number of realities that actually happened (they were not merely counter-factual) but then were “undone” by God in the past. But this view seems to have more in common with my last NaNoWriMo project than with the God of the Bible. What Arminian would agree that God spends his time changing things in the past to try to find the best possible outcome for the universe?
8. Lastly, I wonder if any of this even saves free will in the end anyway. Even if God foreknows events causally consequent to their occurring, it remains that he does foreknow them—his knowledge is chronologically prior. This seems to commit Arminianism to some variant on the B theory of time. But the B theory of time is patently incompatible with libertarian free will. If there is no logical distinction between past and future for God, and both are set and cannot be changed, then it seems that libertarianism fails to obtain pretty much automatically. A choice I make in two minutes must happen one way, and not the other. But if it must happen one way, and not the other, then I have no actual ability to choose the opposite of what I will. Unless one is willing to give up the principle of alternate possibility (and most libertarians aren’t), it would appear that despite putting their philosophy, and their theology proper, through the mangler and reducing God to a time-traveler, Arminians still cannot salvage free will.
I have no more reason to doubt a Calvinist's account of why he is a Calvinists as I am to doubt an Arminian's account of why he is an Arminian.
But there's a bit of a disparity here, isn't there? I haven't met an Arminian yet who is willing to give up his libertarian assumptions when he comes to the Bible. But if you ask him to show where Scripture teaches libertarian free will, he can't. He just takes it as implicit. Or he points to places where people make choices, as if this proves a libertarian action theory. So Arminians, by their own admission, are Arminian not because of what Scripture says, but in fact because of their philosophical commitments.
Calvinists, on the other hand, are typically the opposite. Indeed, most Calvinists I know are strongly sympathetic to libertarian theories of the will, and treat them as intuitively obvious. It is only because Scripture openly and obviously contradicts such theories that these people are Calvinists at all. One merely needs to point to God's use of Pharaoh in Exodus—hardening his heart so that he would sin, while still holding him accountable for that sin—to see that libertarian action theory is false and unbiblical. So Calvinists, in contrast to Arminians, are Calvinists because of what Scripture says, despite any philosophical commitments they have.
Frankly, I find your deigning to believe that Calvinist are really arriving at their position by studying the Scriptures both ironic and hypocritical.
August 06, 2009 8:38 PM
Dominic Bnonn Tennant said...
Hi Gordon. It doesn't matter if this is an exception or not—the case against libertarianism, and for compatibilism, is still proved. Arminians say that we can't be held morally accountable for actions we didn't libertarianly choose. But Scripture gives us an example where Pharaoh is held accountable for actions he didn't libertarianly choose. So, even if this isn't normative, the objection against a compatibilist view of the will still collapses—as does any argument for a libertarian action theory which relies on maintaining moral accountability. That's what's at issue here; viz, "Given our understanding of who is responsible for what, an understanding we consider to be the fact of the matter, the Calvinistic God turns out to be as bad as the devil."
Given the example of Pharaoh, the Arminian case is just unsustainable. Or, if the Arminian thinks it is sustainable,then by his own standards God is as bad as the devil in his dealings with Pharaoh. Does that just make God occasionally evil under the Arminian view? Is this okay? I mean, what does it take for Arminians to realize that the reason they think God is the devil is because they are judging him according to the devil's standards?
August 06, 2009 9:37 PM
Dominic Bnonn Tennant said...
mattghg, obviously I haven't put the question to every Arminian I've met. But the ones to whom I have put the question made it clear that their commitment to libertarian freedom was the overriding factor behind their rejection of the doctrines you mention. In other words, a priori Scripture can't teach those doctrines, because that would be unjust on libertarian assumptions—therefore, it does not teach them. "Whatever it says, it can't teach that!"
I have also met Arminians who are so committed to libertarian freedom that, when pressed by the logic of their position, they admit they'd be willing give up doctrines like God's knowledge of counterfactual free choices rather than their commitment to libertarian freedom. (For the logic, see, eg here.) This is why I argue that open theism is merely consistent Arminianism.
August 07, 2009 3:44 AM
D Bnonn Tennant
Hey James; good post. There are some other, similar problems which arise from Arminian’s views, relating to the grounds of God’s knowledge. Arminian has previously stated that “God’s foreknowledge of free human acts is contingent on what the free human actors will actually do.” I agree that this view is logically necessary given Arminianism’s other philosophical commitments—but if it’s actually true, then the following problems seem to present themselves:
1. God’s aseity, simplicity, immutability, and necessity are undermined. Re aseity, if parts of God’s knowledge are causally contingent on human actions, such that this knowledge obtains only if the actions themselves obtain, then there is a sense in which God is causally dependent on his creation. Re simplicity, if parts of God’s knowledge are contingent on human actions, while other parts are not, then God is divisible. I’m not sure what the Arminian position is on God’s simplicity (or whether there is a standard view), but it seems to me to be a very important doctrine. Re immutability, if God gains knowledge when contingent events obtain, he is not immutable. And similarly for necessity. Perhaps it is possible to redefine these doctrines to fit into an Arminian scheme, but it doesn’t seem possible to do so without producing irreparable flaws into the core ontology of the Godhead.
2. One wonders what knowledge is, and how it is produced, under Arminian’s view. It appears to be something independent of God, which he, like us, obtains in certain circumstances. But this seems to raise enormous problems of ontology (I’m sure Greg Welty would throw up a little in his mouth at the mere thought). Put mildly, it appears to contradict strikingly with the meaning of logos that John has in mind in the first verse of his gospel.
3. Furthermore, if God’s foreknowledge of free human acts is causally contingent on what the free human actors actually do, then it follows necessarily that God has no knowledge of things which free human actors do not do. If God’s knowledge of free acts obtains only in the event that the free acts themselves obtain, then hypothetical free acts, which don’t obtain, will commensurately not cause any knowledge in God. So Arminian appears to be committed to a view in which God has no knowledge of counterfactual free acts. How, then, does Jesus know that Tyre and Sidon would have repented in sackcloth and ashes in Matthew 11:21?
4. God’s inability, under Arminian’s view, to know counterfactual free acts also raises further problems. Since God’s knowledge of all free human acts only obtains causally consequent to the acts themselves obtaining (although temporarily prior, since God is timeless), it stands that he had no knowledge of any free acts causally prior to the creation of the universe. Since God’s action in creating the universe is a prior causal condition of human free acts, and human free acts are a prior causal condition of God’s knowledge of them, it follows that God did not know any human free acts prior to his creation of the universe. Therefore, he did not (and could not have) surveyed all the possible worlds with all the possible free human acts, and chosen to instantiate a particular one. Rather, he must have merely surveyed all the possible initial conditions for the world, up until the first free human act, and then instantiated the one that he wanted. Only once he had done this would he have gained any knowledge at all of free human acts—by which stage, it would be too late.
5. This in turn produces obvious absurdities. For instance, God is limited to a purely reactive attitude toward history. Exodus and Romans tell us that God raised Pharaoh up for the express purpose of revealing his power in him. Yet how could this be possible under the Arminian view? What counter-factual reality did God foresee where Pharaoh was obstinate? Evidently it was not the reality in which he was king, since Scripture says that God raises up Pharaoh to be king as a response to his foreknowledge of Pharaoh’s obstinacy. But then, Pharaoh must have been obstinate in some other reality. What reality is that?
6. Moreover, given that this counter-factual reality was not the reality in which Pharaoh was king, how did God know that Pharaoh would act in the same way in the actual reality? Since, by definition, free will entails the real ability to do otherwise, is it not the case that Pharaoh was just as likely to not be obstinate (or, at least, that it was not impossible?) In fact, isn’t it the case that God would have to foreknow the actual reality, in which Pharaoh is king, in order to raise him up as king at all?
7. This unfortunately leads on to entail that God is “stuck” with regard to time. Even though he is mutable, and can learn, under the view Arminian has espoused, he is unable to respond to events which involve free acts which have not yet occurred in time. Once he knows of a free will event, it has already happened. Although his knowledge may flow back in time from our point of view, such that he can know what will happen before it does because he exists at all times (including a time prior to the free will choice), he cannot actually act to change that event—even in a passive sense, by altering natural events. By the time a free act is known by God, it is already fixed in history. God is merely an observer. He cannot actually influence history at all—unless, that is, he acts like a time-traveler and goes “back in time” and changes things to see what will happen later on! Ultimately, all manner of time paradoxes would seem to be entailed in such a view, along with any number of realities that actually happened (they were not merely counter-factual) but then were “undone” by God in the past. But this view seems to have more in common with my last NaNoWriMo project than with the God of the Bible. What Arminian would agree that God spends his time changing things in the past to try to find the best possible outcome for the universe?
8. Lastly, I wonder if any of this even saves free will in the end anyway. Even if God foreknows events causally consequent to their occurring, it remains that he does foreknow them—his knowledge is chronologically prior. This seems to commit Arminianism to some variant on the B theory of time. But the B theory of time is patently incompatible with libertarian free will. If there is no logical distinction between past and future for God, and both are set and cannot be changed, then it seems that libertarianism fails to obtain pretty much automatically. A choice I make in two minutes must happen one way, and not the other. But if it must happen one way, and not the other, then I have no actual ability to choose the opposite of what I will. Unless one is willing to give up the principle of alternate possibility (and most libertarians aren’t), it would appear that despite putting their philosophy, and their theology proper, through the mangler and reducing God to a time-traveler, Arminians still cannot salvage free will.
Friday, August 07, 2009
A Reminder
Occasionally, it is worthwhile to be reminded of who the enemy that the US is fighting against in Iraq really is. This article gives some details as to what happened to a six-year-old boy who was kidnapped by Al Qaeda because his father was a policeman:
"They beat me with a shovel, they pulled my teeth out with pliers, they would go like this and pull it," said Khidir, now 8, demonstrating with his hands. "And they would make me work on the farm gathering carrots."In case anyone is wondering, this is what torture looks like. Completely different from Gitmo.
What followed was even more horrific, an ordeal that would last for two years in captivity. Khidir and his father spoke to CNN recently, more than half a year after his rescue by Iraqi police.
"This is where they hammered a nail into my leg and then they pulled it out," he says, lifting up his pant leg to show a tiny wound.
He says his captors also pulled out each of his tiny fingernails, broke both his arms, and beat him repeatedly on the side of the head with a shovel. He still suffers chronic headaches. He remembers them laughing as they inflicted the pain.
…
"He didn't recognize his mother or his grandmother," Abdul Qader says. "But then he saw me in uniform and ran to me. I went flying toward him to hug him. People said be careful; both his arms are broken. So I held him from his waist, and he hugged me, kissed me, smelled me, and then broke into a smile."
The Best Source For The Papias Fragments
Stephen Carlson recently linked to a new online edition of Papias fragments. The new collection of fragments was put together by Tom Schmidt and some other individuals he mentions on the page just linked. It's the best collection I've seen yet. He includes some material that he doesn't believe has ever been published in English before, and he includes some translations of his own and corrections of previous translations. There's a lot of significant material there.
When I linked to an older collection of Papias fragments in the past, I noted that every source who comments on Papias' relationship with John either states or suggests that he had met the apostle. I think the same is true with this latest collection of fragments, which is the most complete one I've seen. The modern dispute over Papias' relationship with John is often framed as if we have to judge between two sources, Irenaeus and Eusebius of Caeserea, often with the suggestion that Eusebius is the more reliable of the two. Not only is the suggestion that Eusebius is the more reliable source on this matter dubious, but it's often not mentioned that other sources commented on the issue as well and supported Irenaeus' position. Eusebius himself was inconsistent on the issue. He affirms Irenaeus' view in another passage. Thus, every source to comment on the issue suggests that Papias met John, and one source is inconsistent on the matter. And the reasons Eusebius gives for doubting Papias' close relationship with John are dubious, for reasons I've mentioned before. There's no good reason to doubt that Papias met John.
The Papias fragments, as well as Tom Schmidt's comments on them, also contain some other significant information, such as Papias' affirmation of the authenticity of the book of Revelation and a report by some sources that Papias was the secretary who wrote the fourth gospel at John's dictation. I recommend reading all of the fragments and the commentary on them.
We may find a copy of Papias' work someday. It was still extant in the Middle Ages, but was eventually lost.
When I linked to an older collection of Papias fragments in the past, I noted that every source who comments on Papias' relationship with John either states or suggests that he had met the apostle. I think the same is true with this latest collection of fragments, which is the most complete one I've seen. The modern dispute over Papias' relationship with John is often framed as if we have to judge between two sources, Irenaeus and Eusebius of Caeserea, often with the suggestion that Eusebius is the more reliable of the two. Not only is the suggestion that Eusebius is the more reliable source on this matter dubious, but it's often not mentioned that other sources commented on the issue as well and supported Irenaeus' position. Eusebius himself was inconsistent on the issue. He affirms Irenaeus' view in another passage. Thus, every source to comment on the issue suggests that Papias met John, and one source is inconsistent on the matter. And the reasons Eusebius gives for doubting Papias' close relationship with John are dubious, for reasons I've mentioned before. There's no good reason to doubt that Papias met John.
The Papias fragments, as well as Tom Schmidt's comments on them, also contain some other significant information, such as Papias' affirmation of the authenticity of the book of Revelation and a report by some sources that Papias was the secretary who wrote the fourth gospel at John's dictation. I recommend reading all of the fragments and the commentary on them.
We may find a copy of Papias' work someday. It was still extant in the Middle Ages, but was eventually lost.
Speak of the devil
Victor Reppert left a long comment on my blog, and also posted the same comment over at his blog. Before responding, it’s important to remember the context. The latest round got started when (on July 22) Reppert chose to plug a provocative and unprovoked attack on Calvinism in general and Triablogue in particular by Billy Birch. And Reppert taunted us to respond: “This is a nice piece, by William Watson Birch. Calvin's Bulldogs will no doubt differ with this assessment, however.”
Reppert is entitled to plug whoever he likes. By the same token, I’m entitled to respond.
Perhaps his latest post represents his belated attempt to put out a fire on which he used an accelerant. Fine. But let’s just keep in mind how this all got started.
I think some of the angry responses on the part of Calvinists to Arminians has to do with the moral objection to Calvinism that Arminians often use, which sometimes is expressed by the claim that the Calvinistic God is as bad or worse than the devil.
Working from their own understanding of moral responsibility, it is easy to see why Arminians can end up saying "Your God is the devil." The Wesleys did that, and it cost them their friendship with Whitefield. Put thus, the objection puts the Calvinist's back up, and things tend to get acrimonious from there.
i) This is incorrectly framed. The issue has nothing to do with getting angry or getting one’s back up.
It’s not as if I take this personally. I’m not offended when people attack God. God can take care of himself. He doesn’t need me to defend him. Those who attack the God of Scripture are answerable to the God of Scripture. And that’s a very sobering prospect.
I respond for the benefit of others. Militant Arminians like Birch are doing what political consultants typically do. Redefine your opponent before he can define himself. Defame his character. Use that, in turn, to defame his position (guilt-by-association). Define how or what he’s allowed to say in his own defense.
It’s a preemptive strike. An effort to discredit a position by discrediting its proponents, and thereby prejudice the reader against it.
When opponents of Calvinism try to poison the well of Calvinism, I have a right to pour antitoxin into the well to counteract their tactics. I'm keeping the Reformed well drinkable for thirsty souls.
Militant Arminians like Birch are trying their best (or worst) to prevent Calvinism from getting a fair hearing. The purpose of my response is to set the record straight. That’s all.
I don’t have to convince anyone. That’s not my duty. But it is my duty to make a case for what I, as a Christian, believe.
ii) As far as emotion goes, some Arminians are so overtly hostile to Calvin, Calvinism, and Calvinists that their animosity disables any critical detachment or notion of fair play. And that’s ironic, since Arminianism is all about fair play. But the sheer animus that some Arminians exhibit towards all things Calvinistic issues in some strikingly paradoxical fits of Arminian chauvinism.
Maybe the Arminian should say "Given our understanding of who is responsible for what, an understanding we consider to be the fact of the matter, the Calvinistic God turns out to be as bad as the devil." I think that is not quite the same as saying "Your God is the devil."
i) This isn’t a question of whether Arminians should be more tactful. Birch was misrepresenting Reformed theology. And he was also resorting to hypocritical tactics to prevent Calvinism from getting a fair hearing.
ii) At the same time, I think it’s a good thing when the issue comes to a head. A good thing when Arminians candidly state what they really think of Calvinism. When they take their own position to its logical extreme. Polarization can be beneficial. It promotes intellectual clarity. It presents the theological options for what they really are. No fudging.
iii) As I’ve explained on more than one occasion, the reason I quote Arminians who say the God of Calvinism is diabolical, and those who worship such a God share the evil character of the God they worship, is to expose Arminian duplicity. On the one hand, you have some Arminians who wax sanctimonious about how we should never be disrespectful in the way we address a professing believer. On the other hand, the very same Arminians characterize their Reformed opponents in the most degrading terms they can possibly muster.
It’s important to document that backstabbing, Janus-faced behavior.
This is tricky and something I should probably address. I take it Calvinists say that the actions of Satan are predestined before the foundation of the world by God.
True.
That being the case, if you buy into the kind of incompatibilist theory of moral responsibility that an Arminian typically does (responsibility is traceable to the originating cause), then God is responsible for everything the devil does. Given this picture of things (and an Arminian might agree with Kant that compatibilism is a "wretched subterfuge").
That’s misleading. Arminians tend to use “responsibility” as a synonym for culpability. But it’s not.
Responsibility is a precondition for culpability, but a responsible agent can be blameless and praiseworthy in his actual conduct.
If we say that Mary and John are responsible parents, that’s a compliment. If we said Mary and John are irresponsible parents, that would be critical.
Likewise, if I say, “Please hire my son. He’s very responsible for his age,” that’s a commendation, not a condemnation.
In Calvinism, God is ultimately responsible for whatever the devil does. However, this doesn’t mean that God is solely responsible. And it doesn’t mean that God is blameworthy.
Incidentally, would we really prefer a God who is not responsible for what the devil is up to? Would we rather have fallen angels on the loose–like a rabid dog that prowls the playground?
Now Calvinists think that intermediate causal agents are responsible for their actions, and, at the same time, God does have a good reason for predestining Satan to perform all the evil actions he performs, including those actions which cause people to sin their way into hell. So, God is in the clear, and Satan is not.
True.
Reppert is entitled to plug whoever he likes. By the same token, I’m entitled to respond.
Perhaps his latest post represents his belated attempt to put out a fire on which he used an accelerant. Fine. But let’s just keep in mind how this all got started.
I think some of the angry responses on the part of Calvinists to Arminians has to do with the moral objection to Calvinism that Arminians often use, which sometimes is expressed by the claim that the Calvinistic God is as bad or worse than the devil.
Working from their own understanding of moral responsibility, it is easy to see why Arminians can end up saying "Your God is the devil." The Wesleys did that, and it cost them their friendship with Whitefield. Put thus, the objection puts the Calvinist's back up, and things tend to get acrimonious from there.
i) This is incorrectly framed. The issue has nothing to do with getting angry or getting one’s back up.
It’s not as if I take this personally. I’m not offended when people attack God. God can take care of himself. He doesn’t need me to defend him. Those who attack the God of Scripture are answerable to the God of Scripture. And that’s a very sobering prospect.
I respond for the benefit of others. Militant Arminians like Birch are doing what political consultants typically do. Redefine your opponent before he can define himself. Defame his character. Use that, in turn, to defame his position (guilt-by-association). Define how or what he’s allowed to say in his own defense.
It’s a preemptive strike. An effort to discredit a position by discrediting its proponents, and thereby prejudice the reader against it.
When opponents of Calvinism try to poison the well of Calvinism, I have a right to pour antitoxin into the well to counteract their tactics. I'm keeping the Reformed well drinkable for thirsty souls.
Militant Arminians like Birch are trying their best (or worst) to prevent Calvinism from getting a fair hearing. The purpose of my response is to set the record straight. That’s all.
I don’t have to convince anyone. That’s not my duty. But it is my duty to make a case for what I, as a Christian, believe.
ii) As far as emotion goes, some Arminians are so overtly hostile to Calvin, Calvinism, and Calvinists that their animosity disables any critical detachment or notion of fair play. And that’s ironic, since Arminianism is all about fair play. But the sheer animus that some Arminians exhibit towards all things Calvinistic issues in some strikingly paradoxical fits of Arminian chauvinism.
Maybe the Arminian should say "Given our understanding of who is responsible for what, an understanding we consider to be the fact of the matter, the Calvinistic God turns out to be as bad as the devil." I think that is not quite the same as saying "Your God is the devil."
i) This isn’t a question of whether Arminians should be more tactful. Birch was misrepresenting Reformed theology. And he was also resorting to hypocritical tactics to prevent Calvinism from getting a fair hearing.
ii) At the same time, I think it’s a good thing when the issue comes to a head. A good thing when Arminians candidly state what they really think of Calvinism. When they take their own position to its logical extreme. Polarization can be beneficial. It promotes intellectual clarity. It presents the theological options for what they really are. No fudging.
iii) As I’ve explained on more than one occasion, the reason I quote Arminians who say the God of Calvinism is diabolical, and those who worship such a God share the evil character of the God they worship, is to expose Arminian duplicity. On the one hand, you have some Arminians who wax sanctimonious about how we should never be disrespectful in the way we address a professing believer. On the other hand, the very same Arminians characterize their Reformed opponents in the most degrading terms they can possibly muster.
It’s important to document that backstabbing, Janus-faced behavior.
This is tricky and something I should probably address. I take it Calvinists say that the actions of Satan are predestined before the foundation of the world by God.
True.
That being the case, if you buy into the kind of incompatibilist theory of moral responsibility that an Arminian typically does (responsibility is traceable to the originating cause), then God is responsible for everything the devil does. Given this picture of things (and an Arminian might agree with Kant that compatibilism is a "wretched subterfuge").
That’s misleading. Arminians tend to use “responsibility” as a synonym for culpability. But it’s not.
Responsibility is a precondition for culpability, but a responsible agent can be blameless and praiseworthy in his actual conduct.
If we say that Mary and John are responsible parents, that’s a compliment. If we said Mary and John are irresponsible parents, that would be critical.
Likewise, if I say, “Please hire my son. He’s very responsible for his age,” that’s a commendation, not a condemnation.
In Calvinism, God is ultimately responsible for whatever the devil does. However, this doesn’t mean that God is solely responsible. And it doesn’t mean that God is blameworthy.
Incidentally, would we really prefer a God who is not responsible for what the devil is up to? Would we rather have fallen angels on the loose–like a rabid dog that prowls the playground?
Now Calvinists think that intermediate causal agents are responsible for their actions, and, at the same time, God does have a good reason for predestining Satan to perform all the evil actions he performs, including those actions which cause people to sin their way into hell. So, God is in the clear, and Satan is not.
True.
Thursday, August 06, 2009
Theological Conservationism
A Primer for Bossmanham.
Our friend BSmnhm, takes issue with the notion that some Calvinists believe Arminianism to lead to liberalism. By way of reply, he cites groups like the PCUSA and Robert Schuller, as if the existence of these proves that Calvinism leads to it too, or, more properly, "Neener, neener!"
This misses the point..so it seems we'll have to do some explaining for our friend. When representatives of Calvinism, like Philip Ryken state that the road to liberalism frequently leads through Arminianism, they do so from the perspective that Calvinism is a conserving force in theology, not a liberalizing force.
Indeed, one can cite example after example of historical instances in which Arminianism has led directly to theological drift and outright apostasy. The Socinians and Arminians were quick friends centuries ago. The Free Will Baptists nearly died out because of that union, and, if not for the New Connexion would have done so. After Francis Turretin passed on, Amyraldianism and then Arminianism arose in Geneva, and a generation later, Geneva was apostate. Today, we have Open Theists and Universalists.
Ah, says, Bossmanham, what about theological drift in the PCUSA? What about it? Does the PCUSA adhere to the Westminster Standards? No. The liberals had to leave those behind, and with it Calvinism qua Calvinism. Ah, but what about the Neo-Orthodox, aren't they liberals, and didn't they arise, as with Barth, out of Calvinism? Yes on both counts...but what this neglects is this: Neo-Orthodoxy is not a response to evangelical orthodoxy, rather it is a move within the liberal movement back toward orthodoxy...a conserving force, which proves the point, where Protestant theology moves in a more conservative direction, it tends toward more Calvinistic underpinnings. Where it moves in a more Arminian direction, it has a more liberalizing tendency.
Our friend BSmnhm, takes issue with the notion that some Calvinists believe Arminianism to lead to liberalism. By way of reply, he cites groups like the PCUSA and Robert Schuller, as if the existence of these proves that Calvinism leads to it too, or, more properly, "Neener, neener!"
This misses the point..so it seems we'll have to do some explaining for our friend. When representatives of Calvinism, like Philip Ryken state that the road to liberalism frequently leads through Arminianism, they do so from the perspective that Calvinism is a conserving force in theology, not a liberalizing force.
Indeed, one can cite example after example of historical instances in which Arminianism has led directly to theological drift and outright apostasy. The Socinians and Arminians were quick friends centuries ago. The Free Will Baptists nearly died out because of that union, and, if not for the New Connexion would have done so. After Francis Turretin passed on, Amyraldianism and then Arminianism arose in Geneva, and a generation later, Geneva was apostate. Today, we have Open Theists and Universalists.
Ah, says, Bossmanham, what about theological drift in the PCUSA? What about it? Does the PCUSA adhere to the Westminster Standards? No. The liberals had to leave those behind, and with it Calvinism qua Calvinism. Ah, but what about the Neo-Orthodox, aren't they liberals, and didn't they arise, as with Barth, out of Calvinism? Yes on both counts...but what this neglects is this: Neo-Orthodoxy is not a response to evangelical orthodoxy, rather it is a move within the liberal movement back toward orthodoxy...a conserving force, which proves the point, where Protestant theology moves in a more conservative direction, it tends toward more Calvinistic underpinnings. Where it moves in a more Arminian direction, it has a more liberalizing tendency.
Double-dealing Arminians
According to one definition, a double standard is a set of principles that applies differently and usually more rigorously to one group of people or circumstances than another.
There’s nothing inherently wrong with treating different groups differently in case there are relevant differences which justify inequitable treatment. The problem is when standards are applied inequitably in the absence of relevant differential factors.
From a Christian standpoint, why should we care? For two basic reasons.
i) A double standard is an ethical lapse. A form of hypocrisy. Christians should avoid misconduct.
Since we're all sinners, we're all hypocritical to some degree. But habitual, impenitent duplicity in a professing Christian is a spiritually perilous condition.
ii) A double standard may also betray a lack of sincerity on the party of the individual who is guilty of applying the double standard. If he applies one standard to one group, and another standard to another group, then although he’s using two different standards, it’s quite possible that he only believes in one of them.
It’s useful to smoke out his true commitments. Is he sincere, or is he merely grandstanding?
Single double standards
In my experience, there are two different ways in which some Arminians are guilty of double standards:
i) An Arminian who has one standard for himself, and another standard for his Reformed opponent.
ii) An Arminian who has one standard for his Arminian comrades, and other standard for his/their Arminian opponents.
Double double standards
An Arminian who is guilty of a single, double standard is concomitantly guilty of a double double standard.
Not only is an Arminian committing a generic logical and ethical lapse, but he is also committing a specific theological and ethical lapse.
That’s due to the egalitarian structure of Arminian theology. God’s indiscriminate love.
And that, in turn, generates an ethical obligation to treat everyone equitably. An ethical obligation which is distinctive to Arminian ethics.
When, therefore, An Arminian is guilty of a single double standard, that carries with it a corollary culpability for a double double standard since he has not only violated generic moral and logical norms, but also violated moral and theological norms which are specific to his particular belief-system. So his favoritism compounds the ethical and logical lapse. An aggravated case of hypocrisy.
There’s nothing inherently wrong with treating different groups differently in case there are relevant differences which justify inequitable treatment. The problem is when standards are applied inequitably in the absence of relevant differential factors.
From a Christian standpoint, why should we care? For two basic reasons.
i) A double standard is an ethical lapse. A form of hypocrisy. Christians should avoid misconduct.
Since we're all sinners, we're all hypocritical to some degree. But habitual, impenitent duplicity in a professing Christian is a spiritually perilous condition.
ii) A double standard may also betray a lack of sincerity on the party of the individual who is guilty of applying the double standard. If he applies one standard to one group, and another standard to another group, then although he’s using two different standards, it’s quite possible that he only believes in one of them.
It’s useful to smoke out his true commitments. Is he sincere, or is he merely grandstanding?
Single double standards
In my experience, there are two different ways in which some Arminians are guilty of double standards:
i) An Arminian who has one standard for himself, and another standard for his Reformed opponent.
ii) An Arminian who has one standard for his Arminian comrades, and other standard for his/their Arminian opponents.
Double double standards
An Arminian who is guilty of a single, double standard is concomitantly guilty of a double double standard.
Not only is an Arminian committing a generic logical and ethical lapse, but he is also committing a specific theological and ethical lapse.
That’s due to the egalitarian structure of Arminian theology. God’s indiscriminate love.
And that, in turn, generates an ethical obligation to treat everyone equitably. An ethical obligation which is distinctive to Arminian ethics.
When, therefore, An Arminian is guilty of a single double standard, that carries with it a corollary culpability for a double double standard since he has not only violated generic moral and logical norms, but also violated moral and theological norms which are specific to his particular belief-system. So his favoritism compounds the ethical and logical lapse. An aggravated case of hypocrisy.
The typical Calvinist
"At times, one must wonder why so many Calvinists are so very angry. The psychological affects of Calvinism are not so easily ascertained. According to John Piper, typically, certain types of people are prone to accepting Calvinism. 'What types of people are these?' you ask. These, according to Piper, are the intellectual types (quite a misnomer, given that there are many intellectual non-Calvinists); and these types of people produce negative and mean-spirited attitudes, some of whom, he admits, may not be born again (which I have stated previously as well). It is interesting: the gospel of Jesus Christ does not attract such types of people. I digress."
http://classicalarminianism.blogspot.com/2009/07/god-in-hands-of-angry-calvinists.html
According to this statement, the typical person who is attracted to Calvinism is a different type of person than the typical person who is attracted to the Gospel. So, according to this Birch's statement, Calvinists typically find the Gospel unattractive. Hence, the typical Calvinist is unsaved. Hellbound. Damned.
Moving along:
"Did I write that Piper stated as a universal truth that all Calvinists produce negative and mean-spirited attitudes? No, that is what Hays read into my words."
http://classicalarminianism.blogspot.com/2009/08/response-to-arminian-fruit-tree.html
He made a categorial statement about a whole class of individuals. A type of individual.
But let's assume, for the sake of argument, that he isn't speaking of all Calvinists. He is, however, speaking of the typical Calvinist.
So, according to him, the typical Calvinist is mean-spirited. What is worse, the typical Calvinist doesn't find the gospel attractive. Hence, the typical Calvinist is not a true Christian.
I realize that many opponents bitterly resent it when I take them at their word and hold them to their words. But I hardly think that's unfair.
Of course, Birch is welcome to retract that characterization. He could admit that he expressed himself carelessly.
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that he didn't intend to say the typical Calvinist is damned. Where does that leave the rest of his argument?
Remember that he had a psychological theory for why the the typical Calvinist is mean-spirited and underhanded:
"I think that this matter penetrates much deeper psychologically than what Piper or most Calvinists are willing to admit. The reason why many Calvinists act in an un-Christlike manner has little to do with the feeling of being misled by Arminian theology. Like Father, like son. Ungodly Calvinists are merely imitating the concept of God that they have embraced...Unconvinced of this truth, the Calvinist constructs a worldview of God that is deficient, and he or she then begins to imitate that erroneous view of God. And because God treats human beings in such an underhanded manner (so they think), then so can they!"
So is this theory typical or atypical of Calvinists? If it's typical, then Calvinists are typically damned. But if it's atypical, then his psychological theory has precious little explanatory power. It would describe anomalous behavior rather than typical behavior. Is it like Father/like son, or not?
http://classicalarminianism.blogspot.com/2009/07/god-in-hands-of-angry-calvinists.html
According to this statement, the typical person who is attracted to Calvinism is a different type of person than the typical person who is attracted to the Gospel. So, according to this Birch's statement, Calvinists typically find the Gospel unattractive. Hence, the typical Calvinist is unsaved. Hellbound. Damned.
Moving along:
"Did I write that Piper stated as a universal truth that all Calvinists produce negative and mean-spirited attitudes? No, that is what Hays read into my words."
http://classicalarminianism.blogspot.com/2009/08/response-to-arminian-fruit-tree.html
He made a categorial statement about a whole class of individuals. A type of individual.
But let's assume, for the sake of argument, that he isn't speaking of all Calvinists. He is, however, speaking of the typical Calvinist.
So, according to him, the typical Calvinist is mean-spirited. What is worse, the typical Calvinist doesn't find the gospel attractive. Hence, the typical Calvinist is not a true Christian.
I realize that many opponents bitterly resent it when I take them at their word and hold them to their words. But I hardly think that's unfair.
Of course, Birch is welcome to retract that characterization. He could admit that he expressed himself carelessly.
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that he didn't intend to say the typical Calvinist is damned. Where does that leave the rest of his argument?
Remember that he had a psychological theory for why the the typical Calvinist is mean-spirited and underhanded:
"I think that this matter penetrates much deeper psychologically than what Piper or most Calvinists are willing to admit. The reason why many Calvinists act in an un-Christlike manner has little to do with the feeling of being misled by Arminian theology. Like Father, like son. Ungodly Calvinists are merely imitating the concept of God that they have embraced...Unconvinced of this truth, the Calvinist constructs a worldview of God that is deficient, and he or she then begins to imitate that erroneous view of God. And because God treats human beings in such an underhanded manner (so they think), then so can they!"
So is this theory typical or atypical of Calvinists? If it's typical, then Calvinists are typically damned. But if it's atypical, then his psychological theory has precious little explanatory power. It would describe anomalous behavior rather than typical behavior. Is it like Father/like son, or not?
"Everything's Bigger in Texas, Including the Idiots"
“We're still dealing with organized ignorance in high places here in Texas.”
http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/2009/07/everythings-bigger-in-texas-including.html
Exhibit A:
“Welcome to the Humanists of Houston (HOH) website. Our organization has been the premier Humanist group in Houston for thirty years.”
URL: http://www.humanistsofhouston.org
http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/2009/07/everythings-bigger-in-texas-including.html
Exhibit A:
“Welcome to the Humanists of Houston (HOH) website. Our organization has been the premier Humanist group in Houston for thirty years.”
URL: http://www.humanistsofhouston.org
Arminian duplicity
Is it ever appropriate to apply Biblical condemnations or judgmental language to your theological opponents? A number of Arminians feign indignation at this practice.
If a Calvinist does that, they exclaim, How dare you presume to emulate the linguistic practices of Scripture! Who do you think you are, exactly? A prophet? Apostle? Jesus? Only an inspired speaker is entitled to do that!
Indeed, some of them take this a step further. If you do this, then that calls your salvation into question. It fails to manifest the fruits of the Spirit.
Okay, let’s put this to the test. Here is what what prominent Arminian epologist said about Calvinists:
“When it comes to light that a teaching is clearly contradicted by biblical fact, its proponents will often try desperately to find some way to make the facts fit their doctrine, stretching the limits of believability and sanity. Others try instead to simply cloud the facts or cast doubt upon the clear meaning of the words of scripture, effectively nullifying what the word of God is saying so they won't be forced to deal with the facts therein. Chief among the earthly enemies of Christ were the Pharisees, who held their traditions and the teachings of the elders higher than the word of God. Often they would employ parts of doctrine they had themselves added to God's words to nullify or 'get around' the clear commands of God, such as honoring and caring for one's parents. Christ said to them concerning their doctrinal errors: "Thus have ye made the commandment of God of none effect by your tradition." (Matthew 15:6). Thus, if a doctrine requires that certain commands of God or the clear statements made in scripture be made meaningless or 'explained away' in whole or in part, it is a sure bet that such doctrine is in serious error.”
http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/calvinism/reformedchallenge.php
Notice that Thibodaux is taking the very words of Christ himself, which–by Thibodaux’s own admission–were originally addressed to the Pharisees, whom Thibodaux goes out of the way to remind us were among the “chief enemies of Christ,” and then applying that condemnation directly to Calvinists.
Question for Arminians: is this proper or improper? Will Arminians wax indignant at Thibodaux’s behavior here? Or will they play favorites? Will they either pass over this in diplomatic silence or indulge in special pleading?
In my experience, not only do Arminians exhibit a persistent double standard, but they exhibit a persistent double-double standard. On the one hand, their theology is predicated on equal treatment for all. God loves everyone, so we should do the same.
On the other hand, they are strikingly inequitable in the way the treat their Arminian comrades in contrast to their Reformed opponents. Egalitarian theory, double-faced praxis.
If a Calvinist does that, they exclaim, How dare you presume to emulate the linguistic practices of Scripture! Who do you think you are, exactly? A prophet? Apostle? Jesus? Only an inspired speaker is entitled to do that!
Indeed, some of them take this a step further. If you do this, then that calls your salvation into question. It fails to manifest the fruits of the Spirit.
Okay, let’s put this to the test. Here is what what prominent Arminian epologist said about Calvinists:
“When it comes to light that a teaching is clearly contradicted by biblical fact, its proponents will often try desperately to find some way to make the facts fit their doctrine, stretching the limits of believability and sanity. Others try instead to simply cloud the facts or cast doubt upon the clear meaning of the words of scripture, effectively nullifying what the word of God is saying so they won't be forced to deal with the facts therein. Chief among the earthly enemies of Christ were the Pharisees, who held their traditions and the teachings of the elders higher than the word of God. Often they would employ parts of doctrine they had themselves added to God's words to nullify or 'get around' the clear commands of God, such as honoring and caring for one's parents. Christ said to them concerning their doctrinal errors: "Thus have ye made the commandment of God of none effect by your tradition." (Matthew 15:6). Thus, if a doctrine requires that certain commands of God or the clear statements made in scripture be made meaningless or 'explained away' in whole or in part, it is a sure bet that such doctrine is in serious error.”
http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/calvinism/reformedchallenge.php
Notice that Thibodaux is taking the very words of Christ himself, which–by Thibodaux’s own admission–were originally addressed to the Pharisees, whom Thibodaux goes out of the way to remind us were among the “chief enemies of Christ,” and then applying that condemnation directly to Calvinists.
Question for Arminians: is this proper or improper? Will Arminians wax indignant at Thibodaux’s behavior here? Or will they play favorites? Will they either pass over this in diplomatic silence or indulge in special pleading?
In my experience, not only do Arminians exhibit a persistent double standard, but they exhibit a persistent double-double standard. On the one hand, their theology is predicated on equal treatment for all. God loves everyone, so we should do the same.
On the other hand, they are strikingly inequitable in the way the treat their Arminian comrades in contrast to their Reformed opponents. Egalitarian theory, double-faced praxis.
Cross-textual harmonization
Anonymous said...
It's interesting that Hays presumes to advise on hermeneutics, when he plummets head-first into a flub that no one year seminary student is bound to committ. He proof-texts Acts to contravene the didactic Pauline teachings on sound speech. Hays therefore assumes scripture is incoherent, and is content to leave it at that without cross-text harmonization. It is a 101 elementary point of fact that the nature of historical narrative (i.e., Acts) is descriptive not prescriptive.
http://classicalarminianism.blogspot.com/2009/08/response-to-arminian-fruit-tree.html#comment-2086990378538167681
If the gospel is encapsulated in the brief phrase, "Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved" (Acts 16:31 TNIV), then I see no other alternative than to admit that infant baptism (as described by the Reformers) is an affront to the central tenets of the gospel. Again, Schreiner explains:
"For some believers today the connection of baptism to conversion seems odd, for they associate conversion with belief, making a profession of faith, or even going forward at an evangelistic event. Baptism is separated from conversion because many were baptized long before or after their conversion. But in the NT era it was unheard of to separate baptism from faith in Christ for such a long period. Baptism occurred either immediately after or very soon after people believed. The short interval between faith and baptism is evident from numerous examples in the book of Acts (Acts 2:41; 8:12-13; 8:38; 9:18; 10:48; 16:15, 33; 18:8; 19:5). It follows, then, that when Paul connects death to sin with baptism, death to sin takes place at conversion, for baptism as an initiatory event occurs at the threshold of one's new life. Paul appeals to baptism because it dramatically represents the washing away of one's sins and the new life to which believers are called."4
http://classicalarminianism.blogspot.com/2009/04/doctrine-of-baptism-believers-baptism.html
i) Notice that Billy Birch, in his approving citation of Schreiner, as well as his own citation of Acts, doesn't hesitate to use the historical narrative Acts as prescriptive rather than merely descriptive. He uses Acts to establish the theory and practice of credobaptism. I guess that Billy committed a flub which no first-year seminarian would commit.
ii) And keep in mind that there's also such a thing as narrative theology. We can't draw a hard and fast line between descriptive and prescription communication.
iii) I'd add that his disjunction between Pauline discourse in Acts and Pauline teaching in the Pauline epistles is futile since we also have examples of harsh Pauline discourse in the Pauline epistles. So, he can't draw a bright line between the historical genre and the epistolary genre in that respect.
Anonymous said...
"Moreover, even if Paul uses harsh language in a context of historicality, his speech is a product of God's omnicausality, thus it is itself inspired."
Yes, inspired discourse. And why should inspired discourse never be a model for Christian discourse? Should uninspired discourse be the model for Christian discourse?
If Hays thinks that he is well qualified to appertain such contextualization, let him tell us how he too attains the property of the divine self-representation that changes his flesh-induced bombasts into one of divine approval, in a passage that is historically and culturally conditioned.
i) To begin with, don't we need to be careful about blanket dismissals regarding the culturebound nature of Biblical statements? Isn't that what liberals always say about the Bible? Don't we need to stake out a considerably more qualified position?
After all, the Pauline epistles are occasional writings. Prompted by a particular sitz-im-leben. Should we also dismiss "didactic Pauline teachings" as culturebound?
ii) In addition, NT writers use commendatory language as well as condemnatory language. If we're never permitted to emulate the condemnatory language of Scripture, then we're never permitted to emulate the commendatory language of Scripture. Neither praise nor blame.
It's interesting that Hays presumes to advise on hermeneutics, when he plummets head-first into a flub that no one year seminary student is bound to committ. He proof-texts Acts to contravene the didactic Pauline teachings on sound speech. Hays therefore assumes scripture is incoherent, and is content to leave it at that without cross-text harmonization. It is a 101 elementary point of fact that the nature of historical narrative (i.e., Acts) is descriptive not prescriptive.
http://classicalarminianism.blogspot.com/2009/08/response-to-arminian-fruit-tree.html#comment-2086990378538167681
If the gospel is encapsulated in the brief phrase, "Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved" (Acts 16:31 TNIV), then I see no other alternative than to admit that infant baptism (as described by the Reformers) is an affront to the central tenets of the gospel. Again, Schreiner explains:
"For some believers today the connection of baptism to conversion seems odd, for they associate conversion with belief, making a profession of faith, or even going forward at an evangelistic event. Baptism is separated from conversion because many were baptized long before or after their conversion. But in the NT era it was unheard of to separate baptism from faith in Christ for such a long period. Baptism occurred either immediately after or very soon after people believed. The short interval between faith and baptism is evident from numerous examples in the book of Acts (Acts 2:41; 8:12-13; 8:38; 9:18; 10:48; 16:15, 33; 18:8; 19:5). It follows, then, that when Paul connects death to sin with baptism, death to sin takes place at conversion, for baptism as an initiatory event occurs at the threshold of one's new life. Paul appeals to baptism because it dramatically represents the washing away of one's sins and the new life to which believers are called."4
http://classicalarminianism.blogspot.com/2009/04/doctrine-of-baptism-believers-baptism.html
i) Notice that Billy Birch, in his approving citation of Schreiner, as well as his own citation of Acts, doesn't hesitate to use the historical narrative Acts as prescriptive rather than merely descriptive. He uses Acts to establish the theory and practice of credobaptism. I guess that Billy committed a flub which no first-year seminarian would commit.
ii) And keep in mind that there's also such a thing as narrative theology. We can't draw a hard and fast line between descriptive and prescription communication.
iii) I'd add that his disjunction between Pauline discourse in Acts and Pauline teaching in the Pauline epistles is futile since we also have examples of harsh Pauline discourse in the Pauline epistles. So, he can't draw a bright line between the historical genre and the epistolary genre in that respect.
Anonymous said...
"Moreover, even if Paul uses harsh language in a context of historicality, his speech is a product of God's omnicausality, thus it is itself inspired."
Yes, inspired discourse. And why should inspired discourse never be a model for Christian discourse? Should uninspired discourse be the model for Christian discourse?
If Hays thinks that he is well qualified to appertain such contextualization, let him tell us how he too attains the property of the divine self-representation that changes his flesh-induced bombasts into one of divine approval, in a passage that is historically and culturally conditioned.
i) To begin with, don't we need to be careful about blanket dismissals regarding the culturebound nature of Biblical statements? Isn't that what liberals always say about the Bible? Don't we need to stake out a considerably more qualified position?
After all, the Pauline epistles are occasional writings. Prompted by a particular sitz-im-leben. Should we also dismiss "didactic Pauline teachings" as culturebound?
ii) In addition, NT writers use commendatory language as well as condemnatory language. If we're never permitted to emulate the condemnatory language of Scripture, then we're never permitted to emulate the commendatory language of Scripture. Neither praise nor blame.
Unnatural naturalism
One of the ironies of naturalism is the unnatural way in which naturalists relate to nature. Let’s take a few examples involving animal rights. It’s striking to see the way in which a naturalist rises to the defense of animals.
I don’t know how many nature shows I’ve seen in which the host lectures the audience on how we shouldn’t blame a predator for acting like a predator.
One of the problems is with the gratuitous and condescending assumption that we need to be told that. That unless a naturalist delivered this admonition, we’d be too stupid to realize on our own that it’s only natural for a predator to act like a predator.
On the other hand, having assured us that animals, being amoral, are blameless, we are then treated to naturalists who confer legal rights on animals because animals have moral status. Indeed, some animal rights activists want to confer equal rights or special rights on animals. More rights than a human baby.
So which is it? Are animals innocent because they are amoral? Or is it that animals are entitled to legal rights given their moral status?
We also told that our basic emotional makeup is rooted in the primitive brain, which we share with other animals. But in that event, why wouldn’t a naturalist render value-judgments about animal emotions in the same way he’s prepared to render value-judgments about human emotions?
Here’s another way in which they feel the need to stick up for animals: I don’t know how many times I’ve heard a naturalist say, after a shark attack, that the shark “mistook” the surfer or sailor or swimmer for a seal or some other prey species. The shark was confused by surfboard or sailboat.
Now, for all I know, that may be true. But I don’t see how the naturalist is in a position to speak for the shark. How can a naturalist get inside the mind of a shark and tell me its true motives?
Put another way, why wouldn’t a shark eat a human being that strayed into its domain?
Yet the host is quick to assure us that sharks are “misunderstood.” They talk about sharks the way bleeding-heart liberals talk about juvenile delinquents.
I’ve also heard the same thing about killer whales. They pose no threat to human beings.
Maybe not. I’m not a marine biologist. Still, a killer whale is an alpha predator. It kills sharks, elephant seals, and sea lions. It will kill a swimming polar bear. Is there some presumption that a human swimmer or diver is off-limits? Why would that be?
Likewise, I don’t know how many times I’ve heard it say that there’s no documented case of a wolf pack killing a human being.
Well, I have to problems with that claim:
i) Just in terms of antecedent probabilities, is there some presumption that a wolf pack wouldn’t kill a human being? I’ve seen many programs show hungry wolf packs in winter hunting an elk or moose. Food is scarce in winter. Wolves are desperate for food. Surely an unarmed human being would be a lot easier to take down than a bull moose.
ii) Another obvious question is, under what circumstances would we expect a fatal attack to be reported? It can only be reported if there are witnesses. If there’s a solitary victim, the evidence winds in the stomach of the wolves and scavengers. If, on the other hand, there are witnesses, then the attack is less likely to be fatal since there are other men to come to the aid of the potential victim and fend off the attack.
For example, if you have two or three hunters, I wouldn’t expect them to report a fatal attack for the obvious reason that armed men moving in groups are far less likely to be the victims of fatal wolf attacks.
In the same vein, I don’t know how many times I’ve been told that there are no documented cases of an alligator killing a human being.
But, once again, a successful attack would mostly dispose of the evidence. It’s one-stop shopping: kill the victim, eat the victim.
And a successful attack would most likely take place on lone individuals, where there’s no one else around to come to the victim’s rescue.
Likewise, why wouldn’t an alligator kill and consume a human being? If the gator is big enough, what would deter it from doing so? Alligators are not all that finicky, are they?
In addition, whether or not there are documented cases of alligators killing human beings, there’s no doubt that Nile crocodiles and salt-water crocodiles are notorious man-eaters. If a crocodile, why not an alligator?
Not all alligators are big enough to pose a threat to a man, but some are. And we know that some alligators attack dogs. If a dog, why not a man?
Why do we so often encounter this knee-jerk defense of natural predators?
Let’s take another example. I recently heard a report about Burmese pythons in the Everglades. There’s a man who captures them. They recently caught a 17-foot python.
Yet he assured the TV reporter that a 17-foot python isn’t dangerous to a human being. That’s because, he said, we’re not their natural prey. We’re too big to consume.
Well, that’s a stupid non sequitur. It’s true that a python can’t swallow a full-grown man. But that hardly means a huge python cannot or will not kill a full-grown man.
In fact I’ve seen nature shows which highlight that danger. I once saw a nature show in which a zookeeper was nearly killed by a python. He only survived the attack because his assistant came to his aid. And even then it was very difficult to prevent the python from killing him.
I saw another show in which a wildlife photographer went all the way to Borneo to snap some pictures of a giant python. He succeeded in finding one. It chased him. Lunged at him. Barely missed.
Had he been alone, had the python gotten a hold of him, that’s the last anyone would have heard of him.
And, of course, the focus of the the current effort is to capture Burmese pythons, then take them to a place where they can be “humanely euthanized.” You mustn’t shoot one on the spot. That would be “inhumane.” Instead, a human being must assume the risk of trying to catch it.
And, indeed, the major objection to Burmese pythons in Florida is not the threat they pose to human beings. No, it’s the threat they pose to other wildlife. That’s the stated concern. They ruin the native habitat. Which may well be true. But notice the priorities.
I also don’t know how many times I’ve been told that venomous snakes will leave you alone as long as you leave them alone. And I expect that’s often the case. In many situations, avoidance is the best policy. However, some species are quite aggressive. The black mamba is an obvious example. Some cobras seem to be quite aggressive. Same thing with the Tiger snake–or so I’ve read.
Moreover, a snake doesn’t have to be aggressive to be dangerous. I don’t think the Krait is very aggressive, but it kills a lot of people every year.
In the past, the US has been spared some of the venomous snakes that plague other parts of the world. But because they’re imported here and released into the wild, it’s only a matter of time before we combine all the most venomous of Africa, Asia, and Australia!
In their defense, we’re told that snakes are necessary to keep the rodent population under control. And there’s no doubt that this is a natural function of snakes–not that a naturalist is entitled to invoke teleological explanations.
But even in that respect, cold-blooded predators eat less often than warm-blooded predators. So as far as rodent-control is concerned, warm-blooded predators are more efficient. Indeed, we even bred a dog to do that (the Rat Terrier).
We also witness this unnatural outlook on nature in the way we deal with vicious dogs. In the past, if a vicious dog were prowling the neighborhood, a neighbor would shoot it. Most neighbors had hunting rifles.
But nowadays you’re supposed to call animal control. And when it arrives, animal control is not supposed to shoot the vicious dog. No, it’s supposed to take the dog alive–even if the dog will be euthanized a few days later.
Since dogs are faster than dog-catchers, this is a very time-consuming and labor-intensive exercise. But more to the point, it’s dangerous to catch a dangerous dog. Hazardous to get that close to a vicious dog. But in terms of our enlightened priorities, it’s better to endanger a man than endanger a dog.
Same thing if a bear invades the neighborhood. You mustn’t shoot the bear. Oh no. You must tranquilize it, move it miles away, and hope it doesn’t return.
If the bear kills a man, the bear will be destroyed. But the bear must kill a human being before a human being is allowed to kill the bear.
Of course, this is irrational even from the standpoint of naturalism. For one thing, the survival of the species is hardly dependent on the survival of one or two specimens.
Moreover, why should we care more about other species than we do about our own? It’s not as if other species return the favor.
Furthermore, our sun will go supernova one of these days. And long before then the earth will be uninhabitable. In the great scheme of things, why should a naturalist even care what happens to an endangered species when every species is doomed to inexorable extinction?
For that matter, why this desperate effort to save the life of an animal which will take the life of another animal? And the predator itself is bound to die sooner or later.
In fact, naturalists frequently spend their time trying to save wild animals from natural hazards. Save marine animals that wash ashore. Save crocodiles from drought conditions. Save nature from itself.
It’s dangerous to lowball the danger of dangerous animals. So why do so many nature shows indulge in this reckless propaganda?
Well, at one level, they’d rather protect predators from human beings than protect us from the predators. They’re afraid that if we fear them, we’ll kill them. So they downplay the dangers.
Yet that, of itself, requires an explanation. Part of it is simple perversity. A rejection of the Christian worldview. Rejecting the view of man as the vice-regent of the natural world.
Not only does a naturalist repudiate the Biblical doctrine of creation, but also the doctrine of the fall. We live in a dangerous world. To some extent a hostile world. And there’s a reason for that.
You and I are exiles. Living in exile. Adam and Eve were banished from the safety and security of the garden.
The flipside of naturalism is “bonding” with the natural world. Since a naturalist deems himself to be a product of nature, he also deems himself as just another cog in the ecosystem. On that view, he doesn’t have a right to value his life more highly than animal life.
Back in the bad old days, when people moved into an area, they would eliminate the natural predators–since these posed a threat to both the human inhabitants and their livestock. But environmentalists disapprove of that practice.
Of course, they can afford to since environmentalists are generally urbanites who live in areas where the natural predators were eliminated before they moved in. They get their food from a grocery store, where food was shipped in from other states. If they were farmers and ranchers, they’d sing a different tune.
Not only is the naturalist at war with Christianity, he’s also at war with nature. He lacks a stable worldview. Yet he imposes his views on the rest of us, thereby imperiling the rest of us in the process.
I don’t know how many nature shows I’ve seen in which the host lectures the audience on how we shouldn’t blame a predator for acting like a predator.
One of the problems is with the gratuitous and condescending assumption that we need to be told that. That unless a naturalist delivered this admonition, we’d be too stupid to realize on our own that it’s only natural for a predator to act like a predator.
On the other hand, having assured us that animals, being amoral, are blameless, we are then treated to naturalists who confer legal rights on animals because animals have moral status. Indeed, some animal rights activists want to confer equal rights or special rights on animals. More rights than a human baby.
So which is it? Are animals innocent because they are amoral? Or is it that animals are entitled to legal rights given their moral status?
We also told that our basic emotional makeup is rooted in the primitive brain, which we share with other animals. But in that event, why wouldn’t a naturalist render value-judgments about animal emotions in the same way he’s prepared to render value-judgments about human emotions?
Here’s another way in which they feel the need to stick up for animals: I don’t know how many times I’ve heard a naturalist say, after a shark attack, that the shark “mistook” the surfer or sailor or swimmer for a seal or some other prey species. The shark was confused by surfboard or sailboat.
Now, for all I know, that may be true. But I don’t see how the naturalist is in a position to speak for the shark. How can a naturalist get inside the mind of a shark and tell me its true motives?
Put another way, why wouldn’t a shark eat a human being that strayed into its domain?
Yet the host is quick to assure us that sharks are “misunderstood.” They talk about sharks the way bleeding-heart liberals talk about juvenile delinquents.
I’ve also heard the same thing about killer whales. They pose no threat to human beings.
Maybe not. I’m not a marine biologist. Still, a killer whale is an alpha predator. It kills sharks, elephant seals, and sea lions. It will kill a swimming polar bear. Is there some presumption that a human swimmer or diver is off-limits? Why would that be?
Likewise, I don’t know how many times I’ve heard it say that there’s no documented case of a wolf pack killing a human being.
Well, I have to problems with that claim:
i) Just in terms of antecedent probabilities, is there some presumption that a wolf pack wouldn’t kill a human being? I’ve seen many programs show hungry wolf packs in winter hunting an elk or moose. Food is scarce in winter. Wolves are desperate for food. Surely an unarmed human being would be a lot easier to take down than a bull moose.
ii) Another obvious question is, under what circumstances would we expect a fatal attack to be reported? It can only be reported if there are witnesses. If there’s a solitary victim, the evidence winds in the stomach of the wolves and scavengers. If, on the other hand, there are witnesses, then the attack is less likely to be fatal since there are other men to come to the aid of the potential victim and fend off the attack.
For example, if you have two or three hunters, I wouldn’t expect them to report a fatal attack for the obvious reason that armed men moving in groups are far less likely to be the victims of fatal wolf attacks.
In the same vein, I don’t know how many times I’ve been told that there are no documented cases of an alligator killing a human being.
But, once again, a successful attack would mostly dispose of the evidence. It’s one-stop shopping: kill the victim, eat the victim.
And a successful attack would most likely take place on lone individuals, where there’s no one else around to come to the victim’s rescue.
Likewise, why wouldn’t an alligator kill and consume a human being? If the gator is big enough, what would deter it from doing so? Alligators are not all that finicky, are they?
In addition, whether or not there are documented cases of alligators killing human beings, there’s no doubt that Nile crocodiles and salt-water crocodiles are notorious man-eaters. If a crocodile, why not an alligator?
Not all alligators are big enough to pose a threat to a man, but some are. And we know that some alligators attack dogs. If a dog, why not a man?
Why do we so often encounter this knee-jerk defense of natural predators?
Let’s take another example. I recently heard a report about Burmese pythons in the Everglades. There’s a man who captures them. They recently caught a 17-foot python.
Yet he assured the TV reporter that a 17-foot python isn’t dangerous to a human being. That’s because, he said, we’re not their natural prey. We’re too big to consume.
Well, that’s a stupid non sequitur. It’s true that a python can’t swallow a full-grown man. But that hardly means a huge python cannot or will not kill a full-grown man.
In fact I’ve seen nature shows which highlight that danger. I once saw a nature show in which a zookeeper was nearly killed by a python. He only survived the attack because his assistant came to his aid. And even then it was very difficult to prevent the python from killing him.
I saw another show in which a wildlife photographer went all the way to Borneo to snap some pictures of a giant python. He succeeded in finding one. It chased him. Lunged at him. Barely missed.
Had he been alone, had the python gotten a hold of him, that’s the last anyone would have heard of him.
And, of course, the focus of the the current effort is to capture Burmese pythons, then take them to a place where they can be “humanely euthanized.” You mustn’t shoot one on the spot. That would be “inhumane.” Instead, a human being must assume the risk of trying to catch it.
And, indeed, the major objection to Burmese pythons in Florida is not the threat they pose to human beings. No, it’s the threat they pose to other wildlife. That’s the stated concern. They ruin the native habitat. Which may well be true. But notice the priorities.
I also don’t know how many times I’ve been told that venomous snakes will leave you alone as long as you leave them alone. And I expect that’s often the case. In many situations, avoidance is the best policy. However, some species are quite aggressive. The black mamba is an obvious example. Some cobras seem to be quite aggressive. Same thing with the Tiger snake–or so I’ve read.
Moreover, a snake doesn’t have to be aggressive to be dangerous. I don’t think the Krait is very aggressive, but it kills a lot of people every year.
In the past, the US has been spared some of the venomous snakes that plague other parts of the world. But because they’re imported here and released into the wild, it’s only a matter of time before we combine all the most venomous of Africa, Asia, and Australia!
In their defense, we’re told that snakes are necessary to keep the rodent population under control. And there’s no doubt that this is a natural function of snakes–not that a naturalist is entitled to invoke teleological explanations.
But even in that respect, cold-blooded predators eat less often than warm-blooded predators. So as far as rodent-control is concerned, warm-blooded predators are more efficient. Indeed, we even bred a dog to do that (the Rat Terrier).
We also witness this unnatural outlook on nature in the way we deal with vicious dogs. In the past, if a vicious dog were prowling the neighborhood, a neighbor would shoot it. Most neighbors had hunting rifles.
But nowadays you’re supposed to call animal control. And when it arrives, animal control is not supposed to shoot the vicious dog. No, it’s supposed to take the dog alive–even if the dog will be euthanized a few days later.
Since dogs are faster than dog-catchers, this is a very time-consuming and labor-intensive exercise. But more to the point, it’s dangerous to catch a dangerous dog. Hazardous to get that close to a vicious dog. But in terms of our enlightened priorities, it’s better to endanger a man than endanger a dog.
Same thing if a bear invades the neighborhood. You mustn’t shoot the bear. Oh no. You must tranquilize it, move it miles away, and hope it doesn’t return.
If the bear kills a man, the bear will be destroyed. But the bear must kill a human being before a human being is allowed to kill the bear.
Of course, this is irrational even from the standpoint of naturalism. For one thing, the survival of the species is hardly dependent on the survival of one or two specimens.
Moreover, why should we care more about other species than we do about our own? It’s not as if other species return the favor.
Furthermore, our sun will go supernova one of these days. And long before then the earth will be uninhabitable. In the great scheme of things, why should a naturalist even care what happens to an endangered species when every species is doomed to inexorable extinction?
For that matter, why this desperate effort to save the life of an animal which will take the life of another animal? And the predator itself is bound to die sooner or later.
In fact, naturalists frequently spend their time trying to save wild animals from natural hazards. Save marine animals that wash ashore. Save crocodiles from drought conditions. Save nature from itself.
It’s dangerous to lowball the danger of dangerous animals. So why do so many nature shows indulge in this reckless propaganda?
Well, at one level, they’d rather protect predators from human beings than protect us from the predators. They’re afraid that if we fear them, we’ll kill them. So they downplay the dangers.
Yet that, of itself, requires an explanation. Part of it is simple perversity. A rejection of the Christian worldview. Rejecting the view of man as the vice-regent of the natural world.
Not only does a naturalist repudiate the Biblical doctrine of creation, but also the doctrine of the fall. We live in a dangerous world. To some extent a hostile world. And there’s a reason for that.
You and I are exiles. Living in exile. Adam and Eve were banished from the safety and security of the garden.
The flipside of naturalism is “bonding” with the natural world. Since a naturalist deems himself to be a product of nature, he also deems himself as just another cog in the ecosystem. On that view, he doesn’t have a right to value his life more highly than animal life.
Back in the bad old days, when people moved into an area, they would eliminate the natural predators–since these posed a threat to both the human inhabitants and their livestock. But environmentalists disapprove of that practice.
Of course, they can afford to since environmentalists are generally urbanites who live in areas where the natural predators were eliminated before they moved in. They get their food from a grocery store, where food was shipped in from other states. If they were farmers and ranchers, they’d sing a different tune.
Not only is the naturalist at war with Christianity, he’s also at war with nature. He lacks a stable worldview. Yet he imposes his views on the rest of us, thereby imperiling the rest of us in the process.
Wednesday, August 05, 2009
Distinguishing ad hominem arguments
Here's a discriminating discussion:
A debater commits the Ad Hominem Fallacy when he introduces irrelevant personal premisses about his opponent. Such red herrings may successfully distract the opponent or the audience from the topic of the debate.
Ad Hominem is the most familiar of informal fallacies, and—with the possible exception of Undistributed Middle—the most familiar logical fallacy of them all. It is also one of the most used and abused of fallacies, and both justified and unjustified accusations of Ad Hominem abound in any debate.
The phrase "ad hominem argument" is sometimes used to refer to a very different type of argument, namely, one that uses premisses accepted by the opposition to argue for a position. In other words, if you are trying to convince someone of something, using premisses that the person accepts—whether or not you believe them yourself. This is not necessarily a fallacious argument, and is often rhetorically effective.
For instance, ad hominem is one of the most frequently misidentified fallacies, probably because it is one of the best known ones. Many people seem to think that any personal criticism, attack, or insult counts as an ad hominem fallacy. Moreover, in some contexts the phrase "ad hominem" may refer to an ethical lapse, rather than a logical mistake, as it may be a violation of debate etiquette to engage in personalities. So, in addition to ignorance, there is also the possibility of equivocation on the meaning of "ad hominem".
For instance, the charge of "ad hominem" is often raised during American political campaigns, but is seldom logically warranted. We vote for, elect, and are governed by politicians, not platforms; in fact, political platforms are primarily symbolic and seldom enacted. So, personal criticisms are logically relevant to deciding who to vote for. Of course, such criticisms may be logically relevant but factually mistaken, or wrong in some other non-logical way.
Subfallacies:
Abusive: An Abusive Ad Hominem occurs when an attack on the character or other irrelevant personal qualities of the opposition—such as appearance—is offered as evidence against her position. Such attacks are often effective distractions ("red herrings"), because the opponent feels it necessary to defend herself, thus being distracted from the topic of the debate.
Circumstantial: A Circumstantial Ad Hominem is one in which some irrelevant personal circumstance surrounding the opponent is offered as evidence against the opponent's position. This fallacy is often introduced by phrases such as: "Of course, that's what you'd expect him to say." The fallacy claims that the only reason why he argues as he does is because of personal circumstances, such as standing to gain from the argument's acceptance.
This form of the fallacy needs to be distinguished from criticisms directed at testimony, which are not fallacious, since pointing out that someone stands to gain from testifying a certain way would tend to cast doubt upon that testimony. For instance, when a celebrity endorses a product, it is usually in return for money, which lowers the evidentiary value of such an endorsement—often to nothing! In contrast, the fact that an arguer may gain in some way from an argument's acceptance does not affect the evidentiary value of the argument, for arguments can and do stand or fall on their own merits.
http://www.fallacyfiles.org/adhomine.html
A debater commits the Ad Hominem Fallacy when he introduces irrelevant personal premisses about his opponent. Such red herrings may successfully distract the opponent or the audience from the topic of the debate.
Ad Hominem is the most familiar of informal fallacies, and—with the possible exception of Undistributed Middle—the most familiar logical fallacy of them all. It is also one of the most used and abused of fallacies, and both justified and unjustified accusations of Ad Hominem abound in any debate.
The phrase "ad hominem argument" is sometimes used to refer to a very different type of argument, namely, one that uses premisses accepted by the opposition to argue for a position. In other words, if you are trying to convince someone of something, using premisses that the person accepts—whether or not you believe them yourself. This is not necessarily a fallacious argument, and is often rhetorically effective.
For instance, ad hominem is one of the most frequently misidentified fallacies, probably because it is one of the best known ones. Many people seem to think that any personal criticism, attack, or insult counts as an ad hominem fallacy. Moreover, in some contexts the phrase "ad hominem" may refer to an ethical lapse, rather than a logical mistake, as it may be a violation of debate etiquette to engage in personalities. So, in addition to ignorance, there is also the possibility of equivocation on the meaning of "ad hominem".
For instance, the charge of "ad hominem" is often raised during American political campaigns, but is seldom logically warranted. We vote for, elect, and are governed by politicians, not platforms; in fact, political platforms are primarily symbolic and seldom enacted. So, personal criticisms are logically relevant to deciding who to vote for. Of course, such criticisms may be logically relevant but factually mistaken, or wrong in some other non-logical way.
Subfallacies:
Abusive: An Abusive Ad Hominem occurs when an attack on the character or other irrelevant personal qualities of the opposition—such as appearance—is offered as evidence against her position. Such attacks are often effective distractions ("red herrings"), because the opponent feels it necessary to defend herself, thus being distracted from the topic of the debate.
Circumstantial: A Circumstantial Ad Hominem is one in which some irrelevant personal circumstance surrounding the opponent is offered as evidence against the opponent's position. This fallacy is often introduced by phrases such as: "Of course, that's what you'd expect him to say." The fallacy claims that the only reason why he argues as he does is because of personal circumstances, such as standing to gain from the argument's acceptance.
This form of the fallacy needs to be distinguished from criticisms directed at testimony, which are not fallacious, since pointing out that someone stands to gain from testifying a certain way would tend to cast doubt upon that testimony. For instance, when a celebrity endorses a product, it is usually in return for money, which lowers the evidentiary value of such an endorsement—often to nothing! In contrast, the fact that an arguer may gain in some way from an argument's acceptance does not affect the evidentiary value of the argument, for arguments can and do stand or fall on their own merits.
http://www.fallacyfiles.org/adhomine.html
Euthyphro Examined
In the comments on my Abortion and Reppert post, Jayman asked me a question regarding the grounding of morality which I would like to expand on here. I had originally stated in response to him:
And we can see why when we consider any standard. If we say something must be the standard, then we must define what that standard is. For instance, we say that light at the wavelength of 620-750 nm and a frequency of 400-484 THz is “red.” The label “red” is not what is important, for it is called different things in different languages (e.g., rojo in Spanish); therefore, let us say that we have defined light that is at 620-750 nm and a frequency of 400-484 THz as X.
Suppose that we create a sensor that requires light to be X in order for a machine to work properly. Do the limits of how X is defined matter then? They very much do. If I build a machine expecting X to be a wavelength of 620-750 nm and someone sends a wavelength of 600 nm, my machine ought to do nothing. If it does do something, then clearly there is a malfunction of the sensor.
Is that arbitrary? It depends on how you look at it. Sure it’s possible to create the sensor to operate at different wavelengths than the one chosen; but once one is chosen, then the sensor must have that wavelength in order for the machine to properly work. One could argue that which wavelength is chosen is arbitrary, but it is a necessary function of the machine working that some wavelength be chosen.
However, further suppose that I am pleased with the color red and I want the machine to work when there is red light; so I design the sensor with that in mind. Is the fact that the machine runs on the color red arbitrary, or is it instead a reflection of my nature and my desires?
While we could in theory expect sensors to work at different colors, in actuality they never will because I like red that much. Is red therefore arbitrary? No, because I am who I am and that’s the way that I wanted it, and therefore red becomes necessary because of my nature.
In a similar way, we have morality. People ought to behave in a certain manner. But where did that standard come from? God’s commands, which are a reflection of His nature.
See, ultimately God is the standard of what is good. There is nothing higher than God that we could point to and say, “God, in order to be good, must be/do that.” He is, by definition, the highest possible good. Therefore, anything He does is by definition good.
Now one could argue, as the Moral Philosophy site did, that that means that God could command slavery, genocide, holocausts or any number of such things. However, God could not have done so, for then God would have a different nature then the one He has. A different God could have commanded those things and been morally good in doing so; this God (Who happens to be the real God) cannot do so.
And note that it is precisely because God is Who He is that it “doesn’t seem” like an alternate morality would be just.
For further takes on the dilemma, you can look at the following too:
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/07/euthyphro-dilemma.html
http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/1993Euthyphro.htm
And a global search of T-blog for all references:
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/search?q=euthyphro
Therefore, I must conclude: News of Divine Command Theory's demise has been vastly overstated.
I already alluded to this earlier when I said that human rights aren't arbitrary because they're rooted in Theism. That still applies. I'm a Divine Command Theorist, so what makes something moral or immoral is the command of God (which is formulated by His nature). But if you are a secularist, then I see no reason at all why you should believe in any morality whatsoever, let alone human rights.Jayman responded:
I'm a Christian but do not subscribe to the notion that something is good SOLELY because God says it is good. Such a view of ethics seems to make good and evil nothing more than the arbitrary decision of God. But perhaps your cryptic remark about God's nature means you have something else in mind.To clarify my “cryptic remark” as well as to show what kind of Divine Command Theorist I am, I would like to offer the following discussion on the Euthyphro dilemma. This was summed up on the Moral Philosophy site as follows (all italics in the original):
The most common argument against divine command theory is the Euthyphro dilemma. The argument gets its name from Plato’s Euthyphro dialogue, which contains the inspiration for it. The Euthyphro dilemma is introduced with the question Does God command the good because it is good, or is it good because it is commanded by God? Each of the two possibilities identified in this question are widely agreed to present intractable problems for divine command theory.The flaw of this argument is telegraphed by the wishy-washy ending of the "second horn." While the first horn of the dilemma is matter-of-fact, the second horn must resort to “That doesn’t seem right” language. Obviously, the second horn of the problem is the weak point of the argument.
Suppose that the divine command theorist takes the first horn of the dilemma, asserting that God commands the good because it is good. If God commands the good because it is good, then he bases his decision what to command on what is already morally good. Moral goodness, then, must exist before God issues any commands, otherwise he wouldn’t command anything. If moral goodness exists before God issues any commands, though, then moral goodness is independent of God’s commands; God’s commands aren’t the source of morality, but merely a source of information about morality. Morality itself is not based in divine commands.
Suppose, then, that the divine commands theorist takes the second horn of the dilemma, asserting that the good is good because it is commanded by God. On this view, nothing is good until God commands it. This, though, raises a problem too: if nothing is good until God commands it, then what God commands is completely morally arbitrary; God has no moral reason for commanding as he does; morally speaking, he could just as well have commanded anything else. This problem is exacerbated when we consider that God, being omnipotent, could have commanded anything at all. He could, for example, have commanded polygamy, slavery, and the killing of the over-50s. If divine command theory is true, then had he done so then these things would be morally good. That doesn’t seem right, though; even if God had commanded these things they would still be morally bad. Divine command theory, then, must be false.
And we can see why when we consider any standard. If we say something must be the standard, then we must define what that standard is. For instance, we say that light at the wavelength of 620-750 nm and a frequency of 400-484 THz is “red.” The label “red” is not what is important, for it is called different things in different languages (e.g., rojo in Spanish); therefore, let us say that we have defined light that is at 620-750 nm and a frequency of 400-484 THz as X.
Suppose that we create a sensor that requires light to be X in order for a machine to work properly. Do the limits of how X is defined matter then? They very much do. If I build a machine expecting X to be a wavelength of 620-750 nm and someone sends a wavelength of 600 nm, my machine ought to do nothing. If it does do something, then clearly there is a malfunction of the sensor.
Is that arbitrary? It depends on how you look at it. Sure it’s possible to create the sensor to operate at different wavelengths than the one chosen; but once one is chosen, then the sensor must have that wavelength in order for the machine to properly work. One could argue that which wavelength is chosen is arbitrary, but it is a necessary function of the machine working that some wavelength be chosen.
However, further suppose that I am pleased with the color red and I want the machine to work when there is red light; so I design the sensor with that in mind. Is the fact that the machine runs on the color red arbitrary, or is it instead a reflection of my nature and my desires?
While we could in theory expect sensors to work at different colors, in actuality they never will because I like red that much. Is red therefore arbitrary? No, because I am who I am and that’s the way that I wanted it, and therefore red becomes necessary because of my nature.
In a similar way, we have morality. People ought to behave in a certain manner. But where did that standard come from? God’s commands, which are a reflection of His nature.
See, ultimately God is the standard of what is good. There is nothing higher than God that we could point to and say, “God, in order to be good, must be/do that.” He is, by definition, the highest possible good. Therefore, anything He does is by definition good.
Now one could argue, as the Moral Philosophy site did, that that means that God could command slavery, genocide, holocausts or any number of such things. However, God could not have done so, for then God would have a different nature then the one He has. A different God could have commanded those things and been morally good in doing so; this God (Who happens to be the real God) cannot do so.
And note that it is precisely because God is Who He is that it “doesn’t seem” like an alternate morality would be just.
For further takes on the dilemma, you can look at the following too:
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/07/euthyphro-dilemma.html
http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/1993Euthyphro.htm
And a global search of T-blog for all references:
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/search?q=euthyphro
Therefore, I must conclude: News of Divine Command Theory's demise has been vastly overstated.
Tolle corpus Satani
To: Field operatives
From: Belial
Re: Contingency plans
According to infernal intelligence reports, some Arminian epologists have blown the cover our field operatives. As a result, we have to move up the schedule for Damien’s coronation. In preparation, we also need to infiltrate their strongholds and disrupt their base of operations.
I’ve dispatched Delilah from Bogia 1, Circle 8, to seduce Dave Hunt. She assures me that Hunt will by reciting the Westminster Shorter Catechism in his sleep by the end of the month.
I’ve ordered James White to Lynchburg, where he’ll be doing a body-swap with Ergun Caner.
John Piper has been reassigned to Fort Worth–where he’ll use his black magic to transform Paige Patterson into a cactus.
I’ve dispatched a pack of hellhounds to Wilmore to wolf down Ben Witherington.
For the time being, we’ll leave Roger Olson intact. As you know, his black cat (“Salem”) is one of our best informants.
I’ve assigned a flock of ravens to shadow Jerry Vines.
Albert Mohler is adding an effigy of Norman Geisler to his collection of voodoo dolls.
Further information will be released on a need-to-know basis.
From: Belial
Re: Contingency plans
According to infernal intelligence reports, some Arminian epologists have blown the cover our field operatives. As a result, we have to move up the schedule for Damien’s coronation. In preparation, we also need to infiltrate their strongholds and disrupt their base of operations.
I’ve dispatched Delilah from Bogia 1, Circle 8, to seduce Dave Hunt. She assures me that Hunt will by reciting the Westminster Shorter Catechism in his sleep by the end of the month.
I’ve ordered James White to Lynchburg, where he’ll be doing a body-swap with Ergun Caner.
John Piper has been reassigned to Fort Worth–where he’ll use his black magic to transform Paige Patterson into a cactus.
I’ve dispatched a pack of hellhounds to Wilmore to wolf down Ben Witherington.
For the time being, we’ll leave Roger Olson intact. As you know, his black cat (“Salem”) is one of our best informants.
I’ve assigned a flock of ravens to shadow Jerry Vines.
Albert Mohler is adding an effigy of Norman Geisler to his collection of voodoo dolls.
Further information will be released on a need-to-know basis.
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