Monday, August 03, 2009

Abortion and Reppert

I’m going to go over something Victor Reppert recently said to Steve. However, before I get into the minutia, it is important to read the entire paragraph in its context:

Pro-abortion? Come on. I think there is a reasonable doubt with respect to the claim that fetuses before a certain stage have the same right to life that infants have. However, I do think human life has great value at any stage, and once a brain develops there is no morally relevant difference between the life of the fetus and the life on an infant. Given our state of reasonable doubt, I think that we should do all we can to discourage abortions, (24-hour waiting periods are parental notification are just fine with me), but a wholesale legal ban is probably not going to do what we want it to do. (I'm not sure such a law would even be obeyed at this point). Except for late-term abortions. Those should be illegal, unless the life of the mother is endangered. That won't satisfy movement pro-lifers, but I would consider eugenics and infanticide to be morally wrong. If we got the law the way I wanted it, the law would be far more conservative with respect to abortion than it currently is. I don't think this issue has pride of place amongst all issues, but then I asked you about that and you agreed that it doesn't occupy that position.
Now I realize that Reppert is responding to Steve here and wasn’t intending to offer a full-level defense of his views on abortion. However, his summary is still quite damaging to his position, and ultimately exposes many of the weak foundations of the pro-choice movement. In other words, even though this is a shortened “summary” position, the conclusions are no different then what any pro-choice advocate could expand on.

Reppert begins by saying: “I think there is a reasonable doubt with respect to the claim that fetuses before a certain stage have the same right to life that infants have.” As a philosopher, Reppert surely must be aware of the ad hoc nature of this statement. At what time, or what level of development, is that “certain stage” where human fetuses “have the same right to life that infants have” such that before that stage there remains “reasonable doubt” as to the fetus’s rights? If that stage cannot be defined, then the distinction is arbitrary and worthless.

Reppert seems to imply that the stage occurs when the brain develops, for he says, “once a brain develops there is no morally relevant difference between the life of the fetus and the life on an infant.” This, however, just moves the question back one step. Why should the development of the brain make any difference? Why not the development of the kidney or the heart?

It appears that underneath the development issue, Reppert’s idea is that a fetus gains the right to life because of cognitive ability, that is to say when the fetus demonstrates some kind of intelligence (or at the very least has the organ we associate with intelligence). But if that is the case, Reppert has an untenable position regarding basic human rights, for these rights are linked to intellect. Thus, it surely must follow that the smarter the person the more right to life the person has. So in the classic Life Boat situation, the genius must be spared and the imbecile must be thrown overboard (I use “must” in the morally obligatory sense).

Reppert might wish to argue that this sliding scale is not the case; that when an intellect reaches a certain point, all have equal rights (so that the genius is not automatically spared and the imbecile is not automatically drowned). But if he does so, he is left once more with an arbitrary cut-off point to determine when someone has enough intellect. Is it an IQ of 75? 95? Ultimately, it doesn’t matter because whatever point Reppert chooses must be arbitrary. There is no force of logical consistency behind it.

This is also seen in what Reppert says of late-term abortions: “Those should be illegal, unless the life of the mother is endangered.” But what is the tipping point whereby a pregnancy evolves from being “early-term” to being “late-term”? By that I mean what consistent and non-arbitrary feature is there to the late-term pregnancy that protects the life of the fetus that is not present in early-term pregnancies? It’s hard to see how “gestating x number of days” qualifies one for human rights when “gestating x-1 number of days” does not.

This is the classic problem the pro-choice advocate runs into. In an attempt to differentiate between the born and the unborn with regards to human rights, the pro-choice position cannot help but be arbitrary. Put it this way: there is nothing in nature that indicates at what level of development a fetus begins to have human rights. There is nothing in nature that indicates what level of cognitive faculty a fetus must have to gain those rights. There is nothing in nature that indicates where a fetus should be located in order to have the right to life. Each of these “standards” that the pro-choice advocate uses is completely invented by the pro-choice advocate himself.

An additional problem that Reppert has is his continual attempt to frame abortion in a bare legal manner. Thus, he says that “a wholesale legal ban is probably not going to do what we want it to do.” But that presupposes Reppert knows “what we want it to do” in the first place. I assume he means that a legal ban will not stop all abortions. But then a legal ban on rape doesn’t stop all rapes from occurring, yet I doubt Reppert would use that to argue we shouldn’t legislate against rape. So even retreating to bare legal issues (disregarding the fact that that which is moral is not always that which is legal) doesn’t help him.

Contrast that with the consistent position of the pro-life advocate, who argues that regardless of what the law says human rights are determined by human ontology. That is, it is the fact that an object is human that determines the object has human rights. And there is one thing that cannot be denied: an unborn human fetus is still an unborn human fetus.

The pro-life position argues that a human fetus has all the same basic human rights as an infant human, an adolescent human, an adult human, or an elderly human. Indeed, framing the issue in such a manner seems to be the only way to consistently and non-arbitrarily apply ethics to humans across the broad range of various stages of development. If object x is human, then object x has all basic human rights.

34 comments:

  1. For one-stop shopping, I'll add my comments to Pike's post:

    VICTOR REPPERT SAID:

    “Pro-abortion? Come on. I think there is a reasonable doubt with respect to the claim that fetuses before a certain stage have the same right to life that infants have. However, I do think human life has great value at any stage, and once a brain develops there is no morally relevant difference between the life of the fetus and the life on an infant. Given our state of reasonable doubt, I think that we should do all we can to discourage abortions, (24-hour waiting periods are parental notification are just fine with me), but a wholesale legal ban is probably not going to do what we want it to do. (I'm not sure such a law would even be obeyed at this point). Except for late-term abortions. Those should be illegal, unless the life of the mother is endangered. That won't satisfy movement pro-lifers, but I would consider eugenics and infanticide to be morally wrong.”

    i) You accept the personhood criterion for or against abortion. You don’t even challenge that criterion. You take that for granted.

    ii) BTW, I don’t see how you can identify personhood with brain states consistent with your stated commitment to dualism.

    iii) The personhood criterion underlies arguments for eugenic abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia.

    iv) Where do you place the threshold for personhood? Does a newborn baby meet the threshold? What about a man with Down syndrome? What about a comatose patient? What about an elderly parent in the early stages of senile dementia?

    v) You have also defended the right of SCOTUS to legalize abortion.

    In that case, SCOTUS can also strike down waiting periods and parental notification.

    BTW, that’s the point of parental notification absent parental consent?

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  2. “[Reppert] If I did, it might be with the view to understanding why we value life, not an attack on the value of life principle itself.”

    You have made personhood, which you equate with brain states, the life principle. You have then ranged that along a continuum, above and below the threshold of personhood.

    “I would have to look at the statements of these so-called ‘eugenicists’ and see if they were taken out of context.”

    i) And when are you going to do that?

    ii) Eugenicists will say one thing when speaking to a sympathetic audience, but say something else for public consumption. Appointees and nominees often backpeddle from past statements when their past statements come under public scrutiny. They will say anything to get confirmed. They will claim to be quoted “out of context.” But the incriminating statements reflect what they really believe.

    Eugenics is an incremental policy. Eugenicists know their agenda is unpopular, so they often dissemble–depending on the audience.

    “Obama also appointed Francis Collins, and drew the wrath of people like P. Z. Myers. You just can't please everybody.”

    Given his liberal views on abortion and embryonic stem cell research, that example supports my case, not yours:

    http://blog.beliefnet.com/kingdomofpriests/2009/07/francis-collins-on-abortion.html

    http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/viewarticle.php?selectedarticle=2009.07.13.001.pdart

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  3. In addition, Reppert recently argued that criminal intent is person-variable. It relies, not on the objective status of the victim, but on how assailant perceives the victim. Thus, if Peter Singer commits infanticide, that isn't murder inasmuch as Singer doesn't view a 2-year-old as meeting the threshold.

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  4. Why should the development of the brain make any difference? Why not the development of the kidney or the heart?

    Because a person without a brain cannot be harmed in any morally meaningful sense. By that I mean a person without a brain cannot feel pain, cannot have his needs go unmet, and cannot have his desires thwarted.

    But what is the tipping point whereby a pregnancy evolves from being “early-term” to being “late-term”? By that I mean what consistent and non-arbitrary feature is there to the late-term pregnancy that protects the life of the fetus that is not present in early-term pregnancies?

    Identifying the tipping point as the point where the fetus develops a brain is not arbitrary because beginning at that point the fetus can experience harm in the senses I described above. Assuming morality concerns pleasure and pain in some capacity, it makes no sense to use moral language about a fetus that can experience neither.

    The pro-life position argues that a human fetus has all the same basic human rights as an infant human, an adolescent human, an adult human, or an elderly human. Indeed, framing the issue in such a manner seems to be the only way to consistently and non-arbitrarily apply ethics to humans across the broad range of various stages of development. If object x is human, then object x has all basic human rights.

    It sounds like you are arbitrarily deciding humans have a right to life. What non-arbitrary property of humanity gives one a right to life? Every reasonable answer I can think of forces me to take a position somewhere between the ardent pro-lifers and the ardent pro-choicers.

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  5. "What non-arbitrary property of humanity gives one a right to life?"

    What non-arbitrary property of humanity gives Jayman a right to life?

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  6. Steve, my very brief answer is that I have desires that can either be fulfilled or thwarted. Killing me would thwart ALL my earthly desires (which is why it is the worst moral crime). If you really want to delve in, I refer you to information on desire utilitarianism found here (note the FAQ on the right sidebar).

    My question to Peter was sincere and I would appreciate an answer from anyone who has one. To put it another way, if it is arbitrary to claim the development of the brain gives a fetus rights, why is it not arbitrary to claim that the union of sperm and egg give a zygote rights?

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  7. Jayman said:
    ---
    By that I mean a person without a brain cannot feel pain, cannot have his needs go unmet, and cannot have his desires thwarted.
    ---

    Neither can you if you're under narcotics, although you might quibble on the "needs unmet"--but then, it is certainly the case for the needs of a zygote to go unmet.

    But if you make this your standard, all you've done is said that those who are more sensitive to pain have more of a right to life; those who are forced to work overtime and thus have their desire to goof off thwarted have more of a right to life. Etc.

    If someone is in a painless environment where all his needs are met and there is nothing that can harm him, then you'd say he has no right to life. Pretty strange concept.

    You said:
    ---
    Identifying the tipping point as the point where the fetus develops a brain is not arbitrary because beginning at that point the fetus can experience harm in the senses I described above.
    ---

    I already dispatched your points above. But let me spell it out for you. Since it is possible for us to perceive of instances when human beings who are NOT fetuses could be in the very state you say enables us to invalidate the right of the fetus to life, yet you would NOT (I hope) say it is okay to kill the non-fetus, then there is some other standard that you are subliminally using to make your determination, and your statement about experiencing harm is just a smokescreen to justify yourself (again, in an ad hoc way).

    You said:
    ---
    Assuming morality concerns pleasure and pain in some capacity
    ---

    Why should we assume that? And again, if I use ether on you so that you no longer feel pain, does that mean I can kill you with impugnity?

    You said:
    ---
    It sounds like you are arbitrarily deciding humans have a right to life.
    ---

    Even if you were to make this case, it is not arbitrary in the same manner that the pro-choice argument is. Assume the pro-life position starts with an arbitrary statement that there are human rights. This is something the pro-choice advocate supposedly agrees with. It is then after this that the pro-choice advocate then VIOLATES that premise and uses his arbitrary exceptions to defeat it. Thus, it is apples and oranges.

    However, it's not arbitrary because ultimately human rights are based in the fact that God created us and holds us in value. Rights are arbitrary in a secular world, yes; but not in a theistic universe.

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  8. "Steve, my very brief answer is that I have desires that can either be fulfilled or thwarted. Killing me would thwart ALL my earthly desires (which is why it is the worst moral crime)."

    Ted Bundy has (or had) desires that can either be fulfilled or thwarted. Executing Bundy would thwart ALL his earthly desires. Therefore, executing Bundy is the worst moral crime.

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  9. "My question to Peter was sincere and I would appreciate an answer from anyone who has one."

    The answer depends on how we frame the question. Here's an example of how I approach the issue:

    http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2009/01/valuing-life.html

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  10. Thanks for responding Peter. Note that my response is not a full-blown moral theory. I refer you to the link I provided Steve if you want more details.

    Neither can you if you're under narcotics, although you might quibble on the "needs unmet"--but then, it is certainly the case for the needs of a zygote to go unmet.

    I see my use of "needs" has caused confusion (it's entirely my fault). I meant needs we are aware of. A zygote is not aware of anything. Those on drugs still have various desires that they are aware of.

    But if you make this your standard, all you've done is said that those who are more sensitive to pain have more of a right to life

    I did not claim that one's right to life is proportional to one's ability to feel physical pain. It would be more accurate to say that for one's life to enter into the moral equation he must have desires or be the object of another person's desires (the desire to avoid physical pain is only one desire).

    If someone is in a painless environment where all his needs are met and there is nothing that can harm him, then you'd say he has no right to life. Pretty strange concept.

    Presumably someone in such an environment would have a desire to stay in that environment or a desire to do something in that environment. Thus he would have desires that need to be factored into moral questions.

    Since it is possible for us to perceive of instances when human beings who are NOT fetuses could be in the very state you say enables us to invalidate the right of the fetus to life, yet you would NOT (I hope) say it is okay to kill the non-fetus, then there is some other standard that you are subliminally using to make your determination, and your statement about experiencing harm is just a smokescreen to justify yourself (again, in an ad hoc way).

    The only situation I can think of where a non-fetus would have absolutely no desires is in some form of brain death. Under such a scenario I believe the doctor's can pull the plug if it is in the wishes of the patient or the next of kin.

    Why should we assume that?

    Nearly every moral theory I've come across deals with pleasure and pain in some way.

    Assume the pro-life position starts with an arbitrary statement that there are human rights. This is something the pro-choice advocate supposedly agrees with.

    OK. I come at it from a different direction. I want to know what makes something moral or immoral. I don't want to just assume that human rights exist.

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  11. Steve, my statement about killing was hardly an absolute statement about every killing. However, the fact that killing does thwart every earthly desire of a person (and numerous desires of his/her loved ones) does explain why murder (unjust killing) is thought to be the worst moral crime in most (all?) cultures.

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  12. "Steve, my statement about killing was hardly an absolute statement about every killing. However, the fact that killing does thwart every earthly desire of a person (and numerous desires of his/her loved ones) does explain why murder (unjust killing) is thought to be the worst moral crime in most (all?) cultures."

    Now you're appealing to a distinction between just and unjust killing. And what's the basis for that distinction? The only foundation you've laid thus far is the distinction between fulfilled and thwarted desires. How, if at all, is just/unjust killing grounded in fulfilled/thwarted desires?

    You can't simply appeal to "unjust killing." That would be circular.

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  13. A just killing is a killing that a person with good desires would perform. An unjust killing is a killing that a person with good desires would not perform.

    What is a good desire? It is a desire that tends to fulfill other desires. For your question, we want to know what people's desires towards killing should be so that the most and strongest of the world's desires are fulfilled. I hope there is little doubt that a society of people with a strong desire to preserve human life will lead to a society with more fulfilled desires than a society of people with a strong desire to kill each other.

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  14. JAYMAN SAID:

    "What is a good desire? It is a desire that tends to fulfill other desires."

    I see. So a femme fatale who desires the death of her husband because she desires the life insurance payout has a good desire.

    For you own sake, I hope you keep that explanation from your wife or girlfriend!

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  15. Steve, you did not read my comment closely enough. I stated that all the desires in the world must be considered, not just a single agent's desires. A world where people do NOT desire to kill for money is prescribed. This is abundantly clear even in your example involving two people. The femme fatale fulfills one desire (the life insurance payout) while countless desires of the husband are thwarted.

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  16. Jayman said:
    ---
    I see my use of "needs" has caused confusion (it's entirely my fault). I meant needs we are aware of.
    ---

    So this just means that awareness becomes the issue. But again, some people are more aware then others; would you say that those who are more aware (in whatever context you put that) have more human rights than those who are less aware? If not, why not? Because if not, then there remains an underlying assumption that guides your claims that you've not yet dealt with (indeed, if you'll pardon the pun, I don't even think you're aware of it).

    You said:
    ---
    Those on drugs still have various desires that they are aware of.
    ---

    Depends on the drugs (and I'm not just speaking of illegal drugs in that sense--you can also be brainwashed with chemical agents, etc.). But again, such things miss the larger point, which is: do those with lesser levels of whatever standard you claim establishes the right to life have less of a claim to that right to life than those who have higher levels of that standard? Because if they do not--if there is some "cut-off threshold" that obtains and makes human rights applicable to all beyond that point--then you must deal with that point and demonstrate that it is not an ad hoc, arbitrary line in the sand.

    You said:
    ---
    It would be more accurate to say that for one's life to enter into the moral equation he must have desires or be the object of another person's desires (the desire to avoid physical pain is only one desire).
    ---

    But then since pro-lifers desire all fetuses to be born, wouldn't that mean all fetuses are "the object of another person's desires" and thus "enter into the moral equation"?

    I phrase my question this way because I think you've got fatal ambiguities throughout on how you're defining "desire." Hence, the desire of the pro-lifer regarding the unborn is akin to the desire of a drug addict to whatever he wants, yet neither would seem in and of themselves to satisfy your idea that the existence of those desires establishes the "moral equation."

    You said:
    ---
    OK. I come at it from a different direction. I want to know what makes something moral or immoral. I don't want to just assume that human rights exist.
    ---

    I already alluded to this earlier when I said that human rights aren't arbitrary because they're rooted in Theism. That still applies. I'm a Divine Command Theorist, so what makes something moral or immoral is the command of God (which is formulated by His nature). But if you are a secularist, then I see no reason at all why you should believe in any morality whatsoever, let alone human rights.

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  17. Jayman asked a good question that I don't think has been answered:

    ---
    "if it is arbitrary to claim the development of the brain gives a fetus rights, why is it not arbitrary to claim that the union of sperm and egg give a zygote rights?"
    ---

    For all we know, life, from God's perspective, begins the very moment an egg is produced that will LATER be fertilized by a sperm to produce a zygote. If so, then contraception is a form of abortion.

    It's a little arbitrary to claim fertilization as the only legitimate criterion for personhood.

    Both sides seem to concede that something "physiological" has to happen to distinguish life from non-life, so the question both sides want to answer is: which physiological marker should we use?

    The Bible does not tell us which marker to use, nor does it offer a definitive ontology of personhood.

    I err on the side of life, but I don't claim to have the final word. I don't think anyone else can either.

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  18. Jen said:
    ---
    Jayman asked a good question that I don't think has been answered
    ---

    I've answered it twice.

    Jen said:
    ---
    For all we know, life, from God's perspective, begins the very moment an egg is produced that will LATER be fertilized by a sperm to produce a zygote.
    ---

    That's irrelevant. We're not concerned with when "life" begins but when something that is living is human, and that is clearly, biologically, a fertilized egg.

    Sperm cells and egg cells are both living cells, but that doesn't give them human rights. The only issue that matters is: "Is the unborn human?" If not, then no justification for abortion is necessary. But if the unborn is human, then virtually no justification for abortion is adequate.

    You said:
    ---
    It's a little arbitrary to claim fertilization as the only legitimate criterion for personhood.
    ---

    I never couched the debate in terms of "personhood." I based it in ontology.

    But I daresay that you probably can't define the difference between "being" and "personhood" (not to pick on you specifically because hardly anyone these days knows the difference). These two concepts are not interchangeable, however.

    You said:
    ---
    Both sides seem to concede that something "physiological" has to happen to distinguish life from non-life, so the question both sides want to answer is: which physiological marker should we use?
    ---

    No, because again you're caught up in the issue of "life" or "non-life." It is patently absurd for anyone to claim that a fetus is not living, and I daresay now that I've pointed it out you'll realize that it isn't the correct term to use.

    Instead, the issue is whether the living being is human or not. And again, "human" has a definition that begins at conception and carries through death. A zygote is merely a beginning stage of being a human. The term "fetus" is no different than the term "elderly" or "adolescent." It describes a stage of development, not a thing itself, which is why it is improper (although colloquial) to refer to the unborn as only a fetus, but should always distinguish what kind of fetus. Because a human fetus is not a dog fetus is not a pig fetus.

    You said:
    ---
    The Bible does not tell us which marker to use, nor does it offer a definitive ontology of personhood.
    ---

    There is no "ontology of personhood." You're mixing terms again.

    Furthermore, the Bible doesn't tell us many things that are obvious.

    And again, the arbitrariness of the pro-choice movement is what needs to be explained here, as I said above. To give an example, it would be as if everyone agreed that all numbers divisible by 2 were "even" numbers, and then someone came along and insisted we add "except the number 28." Well, why not 28? "Because it's divisible by 7." But then, so is 14, but we only exclude 28. Such arbitrary behavior is the thing that must be justified.

    As it is, I note that all human beings, regardless of their level of development, have human rights. And the abortionist says, "Except fetuses." It's up to the abortionist to justify the exception, not for me to prove the rule he already accepts.

    You said:
    ---
    I err on the side of life, but I don't claim to have the final word. I don't think anyone else can either.
    ---

    I find statements such as this to be little more than CYA. A pansy attempt inherent in our culture whereby someone decides to try to deflect criticism for sloppy thinking by adding, "but then what do I know?" to the end of everything. But if you truly meant it, you should have remained silent.

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  19. JAYMAN SAID:

    "Steve, you did not read my comment closely enough. I stated that all the desires in the world must be considered, not just a single agent's desires. A world where people do NOT desire to kill for money is prescribed. This is abundantly clear even in your example involving two people. The femme fatale fulfills one desire (the life insurance payout) while countless desires of the husband are thwarted."

    Unless you have some non-circular criterion to distinguish between licit and illicit desires, there is nothing inherently wrong with thwarting desires–since there is nothing wrong with thwarting immoral desires. For that matter, even some licit desires are desires which we should only act on some of the time, not all of the time.

    Also, is your claim that its only wrong to kill someone if his illicit desires outweigh his licit desires by 51% to 49%?

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  20. I'll ask again with clarification:

    For all we know, our HUMANITY, from God's perspective, begins the very moment an egg is produced that will LATER be fertilized by a sperm to produce a zygote.

    It's a little arbitrary to claim fertilization as the only legitimate starting point for our HUMANITY .

    Both sides seem to concede that something "physiological" has to happen to distinguish a human from a non-human.

    I'd add that if humanity isn't indexed to some "biological or physical marker", then we have no way to know precisely when we are endowed with humanity.

    Thus far you offer only the claim that it is "obvious" that we are human at the moment of fertilization and that sperm cells and egg cells are not human, but it is precisely these unargued assertion that I'm questioning.

    How do you know God doesn't consider sperm cells and egg cells to be human. It depends on how you define "human".

    No definitive cutoff has been given, so you, like Reppert, look to biology for the answer—though you wind up favoring different biological criteria.

    "As it is, I note that all human beings, regardless of their level of development, have human rights."

    That is not the issue. The issue is precisely WHEN we deserve those rights. And the answer to that question depends on which biological marker we invoke.

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  21. Jen said:
    ---
    For all we know, our HUMANITY, from God's perspective, begins the very moment an egg is produced that will LATER be fertilized by a sperm to produce a zygote.
    ---

    There is no reason from Scripture to believe that. Furthermore, it flies in the face of what we do have available. An egg cell is not a human being; it is an egg cell. It would be like God considering your liver cell to be a human being--not gonna happen.

    Besides, the onus is on you to prove your assertion above. Anyone can make up hypothetical garbage; that doesn't justify its use.

    You said:
    ---
    It's a little arbitrary to claim fertilization as the only legitimate starting point for our HUMANITY .
    ---

    Since when did it become arbitrary to use a word the way it's defined?

    Jen said:
    ---
    Thus far you offer only the claim that it is "obvious" that we are human at the moment of fertilization and that sperm cells and egg cells are not human, but it is precisely these unargued assertion that I'm questioning.
    ---

    If you have an issue with science, take it up with a biology prof. Your response above says more about your intellect then about my argument. So feel free to demonstrate how a human zygote isn't a human being, if you wish to attempt the impossible.

    Egg and sperm cells are obviously not a human being for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that they'll never develop further alone and they only have half the chromosomes as a healthy human being in the first place.

    You said:
    ---
    It depends on how you define "human".
    ---

    I'm sorry. I don't play stupid games. Come back when you're serious.

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  22. By the way, I should add that I am quite confident that Reppert would agree with me as to the distinction between "being" and "personhood." I anticipate that his objection to my view will be to claim that morality isn't index to ontology, but rather to personhood (or something else); but as I argued above, that would make his view of morality rather ad hoc. But I would highly doubt that Reppert is going to respond with, "It depends on how you define human" or to even doubt that a zygote is a human being (although he may indeed say a zygote isn't a "person").

    Of course I'll have to wait and see if he even responds. He may decide it's not worth his time to get into an abortion discussion instead of documenting how mean Calvinists are.

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  23. What I hold, at this point, is that I don't know of any arguments that clearly adjudicate the question of whether the conception-based view of personhood is correct, or whether the conception-based view of personhood is correct. It can't be settled beyond reasonable doubt, in my mind.

    Brain states provide conditions for mental states even if are not identical to mental states. Taliaferro's discussion of "integrative dualism" and Hasker's discussion in The Emergent Self are required reading here. On Hasker's theory, the soul is generated by the brain. (I asked him if his theory of the soul was the basis for his moderate pro-choice position on abortion, and he said it wasn't).

    Whether biological identity of something over and above that is necessary for a right to life is what is at issue between advocates of pro-life and pro-choice. My use of the word "person" is just an attempt not to beg the question.

    Infants, babies with Down's and late-term fetuses have brains in place. So do comatose patients, whom we presume, will resume consciousness. They are in the middle of their conscious career, not at the end of it or before the beginning of it.

    Thomas Nagel once asked the question "What is it like to be a bat?" We might ask "What is it like to be a two-week embryo?" If that question doesn't have an answer, then we have at least a possible basis for a moral distinction between the life of the two-week-old embryo and an infant, where there is clearly something that it is like to be one of those.

    Add to this the fact that many embryos die in the early stages of pregnancy, indeed, most conceptuses are unfit to survive and are killed in the womb, and this seems to be part of the design plan. If every fertilized egg is sacred before God, then why is God systematically killing so many of them? It seems George Tiller had nothing on the Almighty as an abortionist.

    I'm not sure what to make of that.

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  24. Hello Peter:

    So this just means that awareness becomes the issue.

    Desires are the issue.

    But again, some people are more aware then others; would you say that those who are more aware (in whatever context you put that) have more human rights than those who are less aware? If not, why not?

    The number and strength of one's desires are a factor in deciding what is the ethical thing to do. But since even certain animals have desires this widens the circle of creatures whose desires are relevant instead of shrinks it.

    But then since pro-lifers desire all fetuses to be born, wouldn't that mean all fetuses are "the object of another person's desires" and thus "enter into the moral equation"?

    We have to consider whether the desire that a fetus without desires be born is a desire that tends to fulfill desires or tends to thwart desires (on a worldwide scale). If I were convinced such a desire tends to fulfill other desires better than any alternative desire (e.g., the desire that only fetuses with desires be born) I would be an ardent pro-lifer.

    I already alluded to this earlier when I said that human rights aren't arbitrary because they're rooted in Theism. That still applies. I'm a Divine Command Theorist, so what makes something moral or immoral is the command of God (which is formulated by His nature). But if you are a secularist, then I see no reason at all why you should believe in any morality whatsoever, let alone human rights.

    I'm a Christian but do not subscribe to the notion that something is good SOLELY because God says it is good. Such a view of ethics seems to make good and evil nothing more than the arbitrary decision of God. But perhaps your cryptic remark about God's nature means you have something else in mind.

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  25. "Add to this the fact that many embryos die in the early stages of pregnancy, indeed, most conceptuses are unfit to survive and are killed in the womb, and this seems to be part of the design plan. If every fertilized egg is sacred before God, then why is God systematically killing so many of them? It seems George Tiller had nothing on the Almighty as an abortionist."
    What about the fact that most - pretty darn near all - humans die in the first hundred years or so of life? God doesn't limit his "systematic killing" of humans to the unborn; but just because He kills a zygote, a toddler or an octogenarian doesn't give us the right to do the same. Crikey. A man who killed a stage-4 cancer patient (a demographic in which nearly all, if not all, die earlier than average) would hardly be acquitted on the grounds that "God kills so many stage-4 cancer patients anyway, so it must be part of the Divine plan".

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  26. Hello Steve:

    Unless you have some non-circular criterion to distinguish between licit and illicit desires, there is nothing inherently wrong with thwarting desires–since there is nothing wrong with thwarting immoral desires.

    Going back to your example, suppose we have two societies. In the first society everyone has a desire to kill for money. In the second society no one has the desire to kill for money. Assume all other desires are the same in both societies. It is an objective fact that the second society will fulfill more of the desires of its inhabitants than the first society. No appeal is made to inherent wrongness/rightness. My only appeal is to desire fulfillment/thwarting.

    Also, is your claim that its only wrong to kill someone if his illicit desires outweigh his licit desires by 51% to 49%?

    No, because a society of people so quick to kill would contain more thwarted desires and fewer fulfilled desires than a society of more peaceful individuals. I only find killing justified if it is in self-defense.

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  27. Thanks for your response, Victor.

    You said:
    ---
    What I hold, at this point, is that I don't know of any arguments that clearly adjudicate the question of whether the conception-based view of personhood is correct, or whether the conception-based view of personhood is [in]correct [I assume that's what you meant--ed.]. It can't be settled beyond reasonable doubt, in my mind.
    ---

    That's one of the reasons why I don't hold to rights being based on personhood. Not just because of conception, but because it is far more difficult to define a person at any stage then it is to define a human being. In fact, "personhood" language has oft been abused. Thus, a slave was defined as 3/5 of a person under the original Constitution. Nazis didn't consider Jews to be persons. Etc.

    In fact, I don't see any reason other than to justify denying rights to some subset of human beings as to why we should ever ground rights in personhood rather than in human ontology. Thus, the personhood issue comes to bear in abortion, eugenics, right-to-die, etc. and historically also slavery and genocide.

    So I could offer a pragmatic defense of my position as well, namely: given the abuse of "personhood" by those who would wish to commit attrocities, would it not be ethically "safer" to ground rights in ontology in all cases rather than in some cases? That is, if we insist on human rights based on human ontology, then there is never any wiggle room for someone to claim that slaves are only 3/5s of a person, etc.

    You said:
    ---
    On Hasker's theory...
    ---

    Some of us wondered if you might reference Hasker :-) In any case, do you agree with his position on when the soul is generated, or where you just offering that as a possibility? (I only ask so I know what level of response to give you on the subject.)

    You said:
    ---
    Thomas Nagel once asked the question "What is it like to be a bat?" We might ask "What is it like to be a two-week embryo?" If that question doesn't have an answer, then we have at least a possible basis for a moral distinction between the life of the two-week-old embryo and an infant, where there is clearly something that it is like to be one of those.
    ---

    Not to sound flippant, but I could counter: "I have no idea what it would be like to be God." How would that alter moral concepts regarding Him? Or rather, why would it be that my (in)ability to imagine something determines morality in any way?

    You said:
    ---
    If every fertilized egg is sacred before God, then why is God systematically killing so many of them?
    ---

    First, I wouldn't say God considers zygotes to be "sacred." They are part of fallen humanity, just like the rest of us are. Smokering already gave one counter, and it's worth repeating. There is a 100% death rate for humans (with the possible exceptions of Elijah and Enoch--but even then I think they died as they were caught up to heaven).

    Secondly, the issue isn't whether God has the right to terminate human life, but whether we have the right to terminate human life.

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  28. JAYMAN SAID:

    "It is an objective fact that the second society will fulfill more of the desires of its inhabitants than the first society. No appeal is made to inherent wrongness/rightness. My only appeal is to desire fulfillment/thwarting."

    That may be an objective fact, but that's not an objective norm. Ethics is normative, not description. Ethics is about the way things ought to be, not about the way things are. You're committing the naturalistic fallacy.

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  29. There is a difference between our inability to imagine what it is like to be God and there being nothing it is like to be God. There is nothing that it is like to be a baseball bat, because the baseball bat is not sentient.

    I mentioned the deaths of embryonic humans as possible evidence that the value of their life might be different from the value of the life of an infant. Even pro-lifers don't seem to want to attach the sorts of penalties to killing a fetus that they do to killing an infant. Even when it was illegal, you didn't risk the chair when you got an abortion. But if abortion is a murder equivalent to all other murders, shouldn't it have been a capital crime?

    I have a strong moral objection to just about any abortion on the grounds that I do value every member of the human species and think it's loss to be considerable. In a situation of reasonable doubt, if the choice were mine, and unless the circumstances involved a severe moral dilemma, I would have a reason not to abort. However, when it comes to the enactment of abortion laws, considering some of the problems you would have enforcing laws like that, (I mean, what would you have to do, treat a woman's uterus as a crime scene?), our efforts to bring the abortion rate as close to zero as we can get it should probably not focus on laws prohibiting abortion. There are so many other things we can do in this area. Does adoption work like it should, making that a viable option? Are we working to help mothers who choose life for their fetuses? Do we clearly publish the message that even if there is a legal right to an abortion, there may be no moral right to one? When people say "I think abortion should be safe, legal, and rare" do we say "one out of three ain't bad, what can we do to make it rare?" Do we raise the question of whether more government involvement in health care might reduce the abortion rate? Do we care about fetuses, or care about appearing morally pure to movement pro-lifers.

    Pro-choice does not mean pro-abortion. Maybe pro-choice is wrong, but it doesn't follow that people who are pro-choice don't find abortion unacceptable in most or all cases, or don't want to see the abortion rate come as close to zero as possible.

    If you really accept the logical conclusions of pro-life rhetoric, you would have to make abortion not only a crime, but a capital crime. I don't hear anyone proposing that.

    But in the face of reasonable doubt as to the rights of the fetus, it may be best not to enact laws against abortion.

    Interestingly enough, I don't see pro-lifers saying that the Supreme Court should say that the fetus has a right to life that should be protected under the 14th Amendment. If it has a right to life, why not argue that in court? Instead, they think the legal argument is that a woman doesn't have a right to privacy. Which means that states could outlaw contraceptives of facelifts if they wanted to. I don't find that plausible. But then, I don't believe in originalist jurisprudence, either.

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  30. Reppert said:
    ---
    There is nothing that it is like to be a baseball bat...
    ---

    That's funny, because I originally read it as the mammal instead of a baseball bat and was thinking, "Well, there's always Batman." :-)

    To respond to some specifics that you mentioned before I do a general response, you said:
    ---
    Even pro-lifers don't seem to want to attach the sorts of penalties to killing a fetus that they do to killing an infant.
    ---

    Even if true, such inconsistency could just as easily mean they're wrong not to apply it to abortion rather than that they are wrong about abortion.

    In any case, I believe most pro-lifers do believe that abortion ought to be a punishable offense, just the same as any other murder, but there are pragmatic reasons to not do so right now. First, if you're attempting to convince people to outlaw the practice, and they are afraid that many people will be punished if you do so, then they'll be less likely to do so. Secondly, it's legally dubious to punish someone for something that was legal at the time they did it.

    I realize you couch some of this in terms of what pro-lifers were like before abortion was legalized; but as I cannot speak for them, it's irrelevant to my position (I've never lived in a country where abortion was illegal).

    You said:
    ---
    However, when it comes to the enactment of abortion laws, considering some of the problems you would have enforcing laws like that, (I mean, what would you have to do, treat a woman's uterus as a crime scene?), our efforts to bring the abortion rate as close to zero as we can get it should probably not focus on laws prohibiting abortion.
    ---

    Actually, I agree with this in some respects. But then I never made a legal argument part of my argument against abortion.

    I do believe Koukl's position--to make abortion unthinkable--is the only way the pro-life side will win.

    That doesn't mean we shouldn't try to get some legislation passed, but I don't live and die on whether it is personally.

    You said:
    ---
    Interestingly enough, I don't see pro-lifers saying that the Supreme Court should say that the fetus has a right to life that should be protected under the 14th Amendment. If it has a right to life, why not argue that in court? Instead, they think the legal argument is that a woman doesn't have a right to privacy.
    ---

    Of course, the court is who imposed abortion on the country in the first place, and they did so based on the so-called right to privacy. That's how they framed the issue, so responding with the 14th Amendment won't help.

    Now let me give a more general response as to why I think you're wrong to give up on the legal issues, even though I agree that the pro-life view should not be focused on them as our main issue.

    Simply put, when something is illegal, fewer people will do it. Therefore, even if we focus on the moral issues, we ought not surrender the legal side of the argument needlessly.

    In that regard, it would be like saying that Wilberforce shouldn't have worked so hard to make slavery illegal; he should have pressed the moral issue. But his legal action is what ended it for England, not the moral crusaders who traversed England at the time.

    If you want my own model of what would work well, it would be the way slavery ended in England. After all, the argument could have been made, "You're going to punish business men who are just trying to make a living!" Some could have even said, "Keeping a slave shouldn't be punishable in the same way as kidnapping someone." Yet now they are viewed the same way.

    I don't look at abortion as a short-term issue. It'll take years--centuries even--to overcome.

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  31. Steve, if people desire to live, and instilling other people with a respect for life fulfills people's desire to live, then is it not the case that people ought to instill other people with a respect for life?

    I would be interested in how Peter and yourself bridge the is/ought gap in divine command theory. How do you go from the fact that God commands X to saying we ought to do X? The most obvious answer to me is that doing X will fulfill desires (e.g., a desire not be punished in the afterlife, a desire to be in communion with God, etc.).

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  32. JAYMAN SAID:

    "Steve, if people desire to live, and instilling other people with a respect for life fulfills people's desire to live, then is it not the case that people ought to instill other people with a respect for life?"

    No, that doesn't follow. You have yet to explain why people ought to desire to life and instill that desire in others.

    "I would be interested in how Peter and yourself bridge the is/ought gap in divine command theory. How do you go from the fact that God commands X to saying we ought to do X? The most obvious answer to me is that doing X will fulfill desires (e.g., a desire not be punished in the afterlife, a desire to be in communion with God, etc.)"

    I've discussed this on many occasions. The short answer is that divine commands correlate with divine creation. We ought to do what God designed us to do. So there's more at issue that a bare command. Rather, it's a command grounded in the way we were made. Human nature as God constituted us. And that, in turn, is what gives meaning to fulfillment, since fulfillment is a teleological category.

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  33. Steve:

    No, that doesn't follow. You have yet to explain why people ought to desire to life and instill that desire in others.

    Do you agree that if you desire X, and Y brings about X, then you ought to do Y? If not, we may be at an impasse. If so, I posit that we, as a matter of our nature, desire to fulfill our desires, and that being alive allows us to fulfill our desires, and therefore we ought to desire to live.

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  34. JAYMAN SAID:

    “Do you agree that if you desire X, and Y brings about X, then you ought to do Y?”

    Hmm. Let’s think about that for a moment. If a serial killer desires X, and Y brings about X, then he ought to do Y.

    No, can’t say I agree.

    “If not, we may be at an impasse.”

    Indeed, since your stated principle lacks any antecedent plausibility, and since it’s trivially easy to come up with hair-raising counterexamples, then we may well be at an impasse.

    “If so, I posit that we, as a matter of our nature, desire to fulfill our desires, and that being alive allows us to fulfill our desires, and therefore we ought to desire to live.”

    That depends on what additional assumptions go into your postulate:

    i) If by “natural,” you mean desires which are the product of naturalistic evolution, then nature, on that definition, is amoral. You can’t derive an obligation from an amoral process or product.

    ii) If by “natural,” you mean desires which are part of God’s design for human beings, then your postulate has some validity, but even then it needs to be further qualified.

    Natural needs and desires must be subject to rational discretion. Not instant gratification regardless of the consequences to myself or others.

    Since, unlike lower animals, we’re not purely instinctual creatures, we can’t simply act on impulse.

    It’s possible to exercise a natural good in a bad way. Maybe it’s natural for me to enjoy swimming. That doesn’t mean I should go swimming in shark-infested waters.

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