Showing posts with label Dominic Bnonn Tennant. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dominic Bnonn Tennant. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 27, 2019

Shall I compare thee to a summer's day?

Leaving aside biblical theology for simple embodied experience, we all know that women are the glory of men. They are the thing that, when considering humanity as a whole, men themselves are most inclined to celebrate. If presented with the choice of saving either a man or a woman, we save the woman; we consider them of greater value. One woman’s face launched a thousand ships. Another’s is compared to a summer’s day. Just as the beauty of the lily is the glory of the pasture, so is the beauty of the woman the glory of the man.


i) I'd like to briefly revisit this claim. There's a lot of truth in this. Mind you, women have to compete with sports when it comes to what many men celebrate.

ii) Then there's the cliché example of the ambitious, competitive workaholic guy who puts career ahead of relationships. 

iii) As for considering women of greater value, so that we'd save a woman before we'd save a man, that's more complicated. Perhaps he means that all things being equal, if it's a choice between a random man and a random woman, the woman gets the nod. Rescuing strangers. 

iv) Even at that level, there are complications. What if it's a 5-year-old boy? I can't generalize. 

v) In addition, I wouldn't say men automatically value a wife or girlfriend more than they value their father, son, or brother. Unfortunately, many marriages come and go, but blood ties are nearly indestructible. Likewise, many male friendships outlast marriages. 

Monday, August 26, 2019

Veiling women

I'm going to comment on this post:


The danger of my commenting on Bnonn's post is that it's the first installment of a series with however many parts, which may work itself into a book, so Bnonn might steal my blindingly brilliant observations, claiming that he already addressed those concerns in a later installment. I won't get any credit! Humor aside:

Tuesday, May 29, 2018

Superheroines

Recently, Bnonn did a provocative post on whether the superheroine is consistent with Christian theology:


Actually, most of his post was a conventional defense of traditional complementarianism (although there's a token complementarianism promoted by the likes of Carl Trueman that's making the complementation label useless). 

That in turn generated a Facebook debate involving examples like Jael and Buffy Summers. This gives me a chance to take a break from fluffy posts on Trinitarian metaphysics to something truly meaty. There are two separate issues:

i) The social roles of real women

ii) Superheroines

Let's take these one at a time.

1. Jael

To begin with, she's exceptional. But there's also the question of how we should visualize her. Is she a shieldmaiden, a la Brünnhilde? A female counterpart to Viking warriors? If you were a director, filming Judges, would you depict Jael like a Valkyrie? 

What if Jael is more like Mata Hari? It's not a trade secret that some women can penetrate a man's defenses in a way that no man can. To begin with, a man doesn't expect a woman to be dangerous. 

In addition, a man will drop his guard around an alluring woman. He's automatically receptive to her advances. So she can come within striking range in a way he wouldn't allow a warrior from the opposing army. 

I once saw the pilot episode of a short-lived crime drama. There was a male murder victim and two homicide detectives. As I recall, the murder victim was knifed from the front. The male homicide detective was puzzled by how the killer was able to get within range. Since most killers are men, his unquestioning assumption was that the killer was a man.

But his female partner conjectured that the killer was a sexy woman. That's why the unsuspecting murder victim let the killer get so close. 

2. Buffy

It's been many years since I watched it, and I never saw the entire series. With that disclaimer out of the way:

i) Because Buffy has superpowers, she's credibly the physical superior of normal men. However, some female characters are given superpowers so that they can replace the male protagonist in actions films.

ii) Some superheroines fall flat because a pretty ingénue with no acting chops is cast to play the part. Buffy works, not just because the character is well-written, but because of Geller's performance. Same thing with Faith.  

ii) However, Buff retains her femininity. She's sassy, but some women are naturally sassy. And she's emotionally vulnerable. 

iv) However, her vocation comes at a cost. Since no human male is her equal, her boyfriend is the vampire with the heart of gold. In one sense they're a match because they both have superhuman abilities. But they're classic star-crossed lovers, so that can't last. 

As I recall, her fallback boyfriend is a defective supersoldier, so that doesn't work out. And in any event, the series orbits around the Buffy/Angel axis. So she's never able to strike the right balance. 

v) Faith is the rival Slayer. More than Buffy, she illustrates the instability of the superheroine hybrid. It's too damaging to her feminine virtue. 

No doubt there are fans who can expatiate more learnedly than I on the Buffyverse. My interest level is decidedly limited. 

Sunday, October 15, 2017

Did sacrificial animals die in place of people?

A while back, Bnonn Tennant did a provocative post. I won't link to it because, in preparation for the Zombie Apocalypse, his estimable blog has gone underground, but I will quote what I take to be some representative samples of his argument, then comment on them:

The Levitical system of sacrifices was not intended to model substitutionary atonement; it was about sanctifying the space and the people that God dwelt in the midst of.

When we read Leviticus, we read it through the lens of the cross. This is good, because Leviticus points to the cross; it was fulfilled there. However, the cross did more than one thing. Our default view is penal substitution—but I don’t believe that is how it fulfilledLeviticus. If we read Leviticus with substitution in mind, our interpretation becomes quite confused, and we miss what it is actually all about.

my contention is that they needed to cleanse it of ritual impurity. That is really the only reason that makes sense. They were purifying it to ensure it remained fit for God’s habitation.

The bull is for decontaminating the high priest; one goat is for decontaminating the people; another is for Azazel, a spiritual being; and the ram is for a burnt offering, which reestablished a relationship between the people and God.

the defilement is of a symbolic nature rather than a moral one.

In ritual settings, both words refer to purging or purifying. In Leviticus, therefore, I think we should translate kipper as “to make a purging,” rather than “to make atonement.” This is because, just as with the “sin offering,” it is clearly not referring to moral guilt; it is referring to decontamination. Obviously a place cannot incur, nor be purged of guilt. Rather, what is in view is the restoring of this space to a state fit for God to dwell in, by sprinkling God’s throne (the lid of the ark) with blood. The same thing happens in verse 18 with the altar: the priest “makes atonement for” the altar by sprinkling it with blood. He is not removing moral guilt; he is purging it from ritual uncleanness.

This understanding of atonement is corroborated in what happens next: the other goat is sent away. It is not sacrificed; its blood is never applied to anyone or anything. Rather, the ritual impurity of the people is symbolically transferred to it, and it is driven out of sacred space

The goat doesn’t “pay for” the impurity with its life; rather, it removes the impurity from the borders of the camp, carrying it into the wilderness, which was the domain of Azazel.

So what the Levitical system is modeling for us is not substitution; it is the need for forensic justification—for being declared fit for God’s presence purely on the basis of faith, as demonstrated in obedience to the cultic laws.

The connection between the blood of animals, and the blood of Jesus, is not that animals had to die in the place of people to turn away God’s wrath. Indeed, as any Christian knows—but hasn’t necessarily thought through—“it is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sins” (Hebrews 10:4). Rather, the blood made the area symbolically suitable, clean, for habitation by God. The point is not to turn away God’s wrath through a substitutionary sacrifice, nor to model the turning away of God’s wrath through a substitutionary sacrifice. It is to demonstrate the extreme unapproachableness of God in view of the depravity of man. 

i) Whether Azazel is a demonic being in Leviticus is highly disputable. However, it isn't clear to me that Bnonn's argument depends on that identification. And my response doesn't require me to refute that identification.

ii) I can't help wondering if Bnonn's argument isn't designed to undergird his Amyraldism and sidestep Owen's double jeopardy argument. If you believe that Christ died for everyone, and if you construe his death in penal substitutionary terms, the question is whether penal substitution in tandem with universal atonement entails universal salvation. Historically, many Arminians reject penal substitution for that very reason. 

iii) Since I'm not a traditionalist, I don't objection to iconoclastic interpretations, per se. And I agree with Bnonn that conventional translations can be prejudicial. 

iv) I don't see how one can avoid a vicarious transaction in some of these examples, where the offering is a stand-in for the sinner or worshiper. A graphic example is the scapegoat, where the guilt of the Israelites is symbolically transferred to the scapegoat, via the gesture of the priest, then the scapegoat is driven out of the camp, symbolically separating guilt from the guilty. 

Penal substitution builds on the generic vicarious principle, but adds a more specific nuance, where one thing is punished in place of another. To put the matter in reverse, absent a surrogate, the sinner or worshipper would suffer punishment in his own person.

v) Although I don't assume that every offering in Leviticus foreshadows the Cross, I think Leviticus is using several different pictures to foreshadow the redemptive significance of the Cross. No one picture is intended to capture in full the concept of penal substitution. Rather, these need to be viewed in combination. Different pictures to illustrate different facets of vicarious atonement and penal substitution. To say, therefore, that the scapegoat wasn't sacrificed misses the point. No one type of offering was meant to cover the entire idea. 

vi) The fundamental problem I have with Bnonn's analysis is that he erects a false dichotomy. I can grant the distinction between moral and ritual purity/impurity. I can grant the sacred spatial framework. 

Problem though, is that his dichotomy only pushes the question back a step. So what does sacred space signify? What does ritual defilement signify? Cultic holiness represents actual holiness. Cultic unholiness represents actual unholiness. These are emblematic pictures or enacted parables. You don't literally enter God's presence by entering the tabernacle or the inner sanctum. Rather, that's a pictorial representation. Concrete spatial metaphors or figurative tokens that stand for real good and evil. 

It's entirely consistent with the symbolic nature of the Levitical cultus that these gestures and actions symbolize vicarious atonement, penal substitution, thereby prefiguring the redemptive death of Christ on behalf of and in place of (elect) sinners. 

Tuesday, January 24, 2017

The celestial bureacracy

I'll comment on this:


To draw a division between administrative and defensive functions is not only logically unwarranted, but positively contradicted by the nature of those functions in an ancient Near Eastern context…Even if the former point were not the case, the Bible never sets out an “angelic taxonomy” where cherubs are placed into the single category of palace guards.

i) We can only work with the information at our disposal. The Bible doesn't have a whole lot to say about cherubim/seraphim. I wouldn't call it an argument from silence or ignorance to draw conclusions from the available evidence. Surely that's preferable to beliefs that aren't supported by the evidence.

ii) Moreover, isn't the divine council theory require a taxonomy of distinct angelic roles?

In the divine council in Israelite religion, Yahweh was the supreme authority over a divine bureaucracy that included a second tier of lesser elohim ("sons of God") and a third tier of malakim ('angels'). 
http://www.thedivinecouncil.com/HeiserIVPDC.pdf 
The Old Testament seems to distinguish angels—mere messengers—from the sons of God—the royal family; and in doing so it follows Ugarit, which had two tiers of gods: the sons of El, who ruled certain districts and provinces, and a larger group of lesser gods who acted as messengers and warriors. 
http://bnonn.com/what-is-the-kingdom-of-god-2/

Now, however, Bnonn is blending what he previously distinguished. In the quoted paragraph, he differentiates the administrative role of the top-tier angels from the defensive or revelatory role of lower-tier angels. So it looks like the original argument is undergoing ad hoc adjustments when challenged. But in that case, the distinctive assignments in the celestial bureaucracy or hierarchy seem to be arbitrary or interchangeable. 

As for the "counterevidence":

i) Keep in mind that all these representations are anthropomorphic. It's not as if God is literally a white-haired man in royal vestments in a throne room surrounded by sentinels and courtiers. God projects that imagery into the minds of seers. So the question is the significance of the symbolism. I think the point is that God is holy, so that creatures ordinarily need to be shielded from direct contact or the Beatific Vision. The cherumbim/seraphim function as "hazard" signs. If you trespass on sacred space, it's like walking into a radioactive chamber. 

That's a common theme in Scripture. It's not that God needs to be protected. Rather, creatures ordinarily need to be protected from God's incinerating holiness. I never suggested that their role is to protect God from trespassers, but to protect trespassers from God. 

It's a graphic, anthropomorphic way to drive home a point about the relationship between sinners and God. And that's underscored by the literary device of even making the seraphim shield their eyes. In effect, the seraphim need to wear visors. Unfiltered vision of Yahweh is fatal. This is all rather picturesque.

ii) We need to distinguish between cherubic statuary and actual angels or visions thereof.

iii) Some OT theophanies take the form of a portable throne. A mobile, miniature throne-room. In that respect, cherubim/seraphim reprise their role as the outer vanguard to screen unwary eyes from seeing Yahweh directly. That's symbolism. 

iv) I never suggested that angels are distinct from cherubim/seraphim. Rather, "angel" is a generic designation, whereas "cherub" or "seraph" is a specific designation. A special case or distinctive role for some angels. 

Moreover, Heiser and Bnonn are the ones who propose an angelic hierarchy in which top-tier angels have different bureaucratic roles than second-tier angels, and vice versa. 

v) As for Rev 4, that's different from, say, Isa 6, because the saints in heaven are holy in a way that Isaiah (or Moses, Exod 33) is not. They don't need the lead shielding to avoid a fatal dose of divine radiance. 

The depictions are flexible because this is picturesque imagery that varies according to the context. It's not that angels naturally have wings or tetramorphic bodies. 

Sunday, January 22, 2017

Shall we gather at the river?

I'll comment on an interesting post by Bnonn:


I believe that to a great extent, Bnonn is channeling Michael Heiser in this series. Bnonn makes some interesting connections with the Book of Job.

Regarding the identity of the Temper in Gen 3, I agree with Bnonn, but I'd like to anticipate an objection. The OT sometimes uses "folk etymologies" or puns. 

Some people might object that "folk etymologies" are incorrect, but that misses the point. It's like saying a pun is incorrect. But the function is to trigger associations. That communicates. The meaning we attribute to word is arbitrary, in the sense that words mean whatever the linguistic community assigns to certain phonemes. The objective is successful communication. 

Now I'd like to comment on Bnonn's position that the Garden of Eden was the meeting place for the divine council. He offers the following corroborative evidence:

  1. A garden. Most obviously, the divine council was thought to meet in a garden—which is what Adam was created in.
  2. Rivers. In Genesis 2, we learn that Eden was the source of four rivers. If you recall the codewords I listed in the previous installment, this was another common motif for divine council meeting places; in Ugarit, for example, El’s divine council met in a lush garden at the source of two rivers.
  3. A holy mountain. This garden meeting-place was also held to be on a holy mountain; and the Bible explicitly names Eden as such [Ezk 28:13-17).

Here I'm afraid I must demur. 

1. Although I think OT scholars like Heiser and John Walton can be useful, I disagree with their liberal use of comparative mythology. I favor realistic interpretations of OT historical narratives. 

2. Apropos (1), what exactly is the divine council? Michael Heiser says: 

The term divine council is used by Hebrew and Semitics scholars to refer to the heavenly host, the pantheon of divine beings who administer the affairs of the cosmos. 
http://www.thedivinecouncil.com/

Unfortunately, that's ambiguous. Is the heavenly host synonymous with angels?

In a previous installment, Bnonn says:

The Old Testament seems to distinguish angels—mere messengers—from the sons of God—the royal family; and in doing so it follows Ugarit, which had two tiers of gods: the sons of El, who ruled certain districts and provinces, and a larger group of lesser gods who acted as messengers and warriors.

So this suggests that the divine council consists of aristocratic angels. 

i) In a pagan context, the "sons of God" would the literal offspring of high gods and goddesses. Divine princes. 

Now, that might be tolerable as mythopoetic picture language, but it can't be more than that in OT monotheism. 

ii) Apropos (i), why would God have a terrestrial meeting place with angels? It's understandable that God appears to Adam and Eve on terra firma. That's because Adam and Eve are earthlings. But surely God doesn't need a physical meeting place to communicate with angels. In the case of Ugaritic mythology, that might well be taken literally, just like Greek mythology locates the dwelling place of most high gods in a palace on the summit of Mt. Olympus. But surely that's not a realistic interpretation of OT historical narration. At best, that would be using human social metaphors which depict God as a king with his retinue of princes and courtiers. 

iii) It's possible that Ezekiel's mountainous depiction of Eden is figurative. That may trade on the Mt. Zion motif. 

However, it's possible or even probable that Eden was actually located in the high country. For one thing, there's a natural link between rivers and mountains inasmuch as mountains are a major source of rivers. The melting snowpack produces mountain streams which swell into rivers. Moreover, Eden is located somewhere in Mesopotamia. Possibly the highlands of Armenia. 

But in that event, Eden isn't associated with a mountain because that's the location of a divine council. Rather, it's based on physical logistics. Mountains and rivers naturally go together. 

iv) Apropos (iii), that, in turn, dovetails with a river and a garden. It's logical that man's ancestral home would be a garden with fruit-trees. That's supplies a natural human foodstuff. Likewise, the garden provides grazing land for livestock (and possibly game animals). So, once again, Eden isn't associated with a garden because that's the location of a divine council. Rather, it's based on provision for human subsistence. 

v) Apropos (iii-iv), that pans into the riverine locale. Humans typically settle near bodies of water–a spring, well, lake, river, ocean. Rivers are especially valuable because humans can do so many things with a river:

• Irrigation for farming

• Fruit trees and garden plots along the moist river banks

• Fishing

• Waste disposal

• Transportation

• Bathing water

• Cooking water

• Drinking water (for humans)

• Watering hole for livestock and game animals

• Driftwood 

So, once more, Eden isn't associated with a river (or rivers)  because that's the location of a divine council. Rather, that's for the benefit of human inhabitants. The implicit rationale is very practical, very down-to-earth. Providing for the physical needs of human creatures. That's of no earthly use to a divine council. Angels don't need a mountain retreat or garden resort to hang out with God. Angels don't need bodies of water to survive and thrive. If you push that, it pushes you into a mythological conception. 

Friday, June 03, 2016

God's foundling

I'll comment on this post, which is a follow-up to an impromptu debate I've been having on limited atonement:


If it doesn’t actually effect salvation for anyone in particular in and of itself, then what’s the deciding factor, and why?

i) From a 5-point perspective, that's not the right way to frame the issue. According to limited atonement, the atonement ensures or secures the salvation of those for whom it is made. It doesn't effect salvation in isolation to other factors. But it does entail the salvation of those for whom it was made. It's not that Christ's atonement works automatically, but it renders salvation certain for those on whose behalf it was made.

ii) In addition, this goes to the elementary question of what it means to say Christ died for people. That's a shorthand expression. In what sense did Christ die for them. What's the objective? The atonement is a means to what end? 

The 5-point position seems, to me—and I may be misrepresenting it, but this is how 5-pointers themselves often seem to present it—very mechanical. The atonement is like a machine that, once it’s turned on, auto-targets the elect and runs them through a redemption mill, while God just kinda sits back. The atonement itself does all the work of salvation, such that everything that happens afterward in the ordo salutis is just a formality—there is a genuine sense in which once the atonement happens, the elect are saved regardless of what occurs afterward. Even if they never learned about God, exercised faith, or walked in good works, they would be saved because their sins are covered at the cross. They are justified in God’s eyes before they ever exercise faith because Jesus has already paid for every one of their specific sins.

There are several problems with that characterization:

i) It's eerily similar to how confused freewill theists attack Calvinism. They say predestination is fatalistic. If you're elect, it doesn't matter what you do or don't to. Once the election machine is switched on, it autotargets you for salvation and runs you through the formalities, while God just kinda sits back. Election does all the work. Everything that happens in real time makes no difference to the outcome. You are saved regardless of regeneration, justification, sanctification, and perseverance, because you were saved from eternity. You were saved in God's eyes before you exercise faith. 

ii) In 5-point Calvinism, there's a Trinitarian division of labor in the economy of salvation. Those whom the Father elects the Son redeems and the Spirit renews. 

All the elements are coordinated. For instance, justification is contingent on faith, while faith is contingent on regeneration. The Father justifies on the basis of the Son's atonement, while the Spirit produces justifying faith. 

iii) Original sin has two basic components: 

a) Guilt or culpability

b) Moral corruption and spiritual inability.

(a) is objective while (b) is subjective. (a) involves a relation between God and the sinner while (b) involves the personal character of the sinner.

The plan of salvation is an antidote for both. For instance, justification and propitiation affect the objective status of the sinner, affect the relation between God and the sinner–while regeneration and sanctification affect the sinner himself. Justification is something God does for the sinner while regeneration is something God does to the sinner. 

iv) Even if, for the sake of argument, we accept the "mechanical" metaphor, why should that have pejorative connotations? Do we fault an airplane because it got us safely and swiftly to our destination? Would it humanize airplanes if they suffered random mechanical failure, causing the plane to crash? When did efficiency become a bad thing?

I reject the Owenic view of limited atonement because I take faith itself to be the effectual means of justification.

What makes Bnonn suppose that limited atonement, or John Owen's version in particular, is opposed to justification by faith?

Now, I say “faith,” but what that means to 5-pointers seems to be somewhat different to what it means to me. 5-pointers, in my experience, have an impoverished view of faith where it is simply something like willing assent to the truth of the gospel. God then treats this as a sort of “token” for declaring us righteous.

That may be an accurate description of how Gordon Clark viewed it. And I believe that Bnonn was initially influenced by Vincent Cheung, although he's outgrown that. So perhaps that's his residual frame of reference.

In 5-point Calvinism, saving faith is an expression of something more fundamental: spiritual renewal. Faith has different functions. On one function, God has keyed justification to faith. But faith has a broader function, as a general outlook on life. A sense of absolute dependence on God. A basis for prayer. A source of hope. 

Once we are family, the question becomes: how can the Father justly treat us as righteous? That is where the atonement comes in. There has to be some way to cover our sins. And that is what Jesus provided on the cross. When we become Jesus’ brother, he becomes our family head. That means the Father looks to him as the one responsible for our conduct.

Well, to play along with the familial model, in the OT you have the metaphor of divine adoption. That involves divine initiative. Divine adoption is, itself, a spiritual blessing which is, in turn, a source of other spiritual blessings. 
There's a graphic illustration of this metaphor in Ezk 16, where Israel is like a newborn baby that was abandoned to die from exposure or predation. That's not in response to faith.  The foundling was in no position to either choose or refuse to be rescued. 

That’s how corporate, familial responsibility works—strange as it seems to our highly individualistic culture…rather than chunking it down into a weird conglomeration of individualism and federal headship, glued together by purely forensic categories.

But there's a basic tension in Bnonn's model, inasmuch as justification by faith is inherently individualistic. So he himself will have to combine corporate elements (e.g. federal headship) with individualistic elements (e.g. justification by faith).

So it’s not that unbelief is damnatory while other sins are not, as 5-pointers tend to wonder. Rather, when we refuse to swear allegiance to Yahweh and be adopted into his family, we naturally remain outside his family, and thus unrepresented by Jesus. In that case, we are damned for all our sins, including our refusal to swear allegiance, because there is no one else to take our stripes for us. We take them ourselves.

But that dodges the issue. Why would the atonement render every other sin forgivable, but leave unbelief the one unforgivable sin? Unbelief becomes the gateway sin to hell. 

Now, I’m not saying that justification doesn’t involve a forensic imputation. What I am saying is that “forensic imputation” is not a familial category; it is a legal one. If we insist on framing our thinking about how God declares us righteous in legal, pecuniary categories, when Scripture treats it as being a fundamentally familial event, then we are going to get a very skewed picture of the atonement, of faith, and of justification.

It's unclear what Bnonn means. Is he affirming or denying that justification is forensic? Or is he affirming that it's forensic, but not in a pecuniary sense of legality? There's a massive exegetical literature defending the forensic nature of Pauline justification. 

The Bible uses many different theological models and metaphors for salvation. It's reductionistic to make the "family" the fundamental principle. And it's confusing to blend categories. Arguably, Pauline justification is "purely forensic". 

Batteries included

Recently I got into an impromptu debate on limited atonement with a 4-point Calvinist. Here's my side of the exchange:


"I do not think this imputation happened at the cross! The very reason I can make this argument is because I see imputation in the Bible happening because of who our federal head is—and we become represented by Jesus when we exercise faith. That is why justification is by faith—it is the point at which imputation occurs…When I say that God must treat individuals in history according to whether their guilt has actually been imputed to Jesus in history, I am simply saying that God must treat individuals according to whether they have actually exercised faith. That is the historical point of imputation…I don't believe *anything* was imputed to Jesus at the cross. I believe he was treated as a sinner and suffered the wrath of God that is due to any and all sinful human beings. He did so with the intention of that atonement being imputed to his elect in due time (or, of course, to satisfy the imputation of the OT elect which had already occurred)."

Tuesday, May 24, 2016

Pecuniary atonement

Furthermore, not only is the gospel call undermined, but so is God’s justice in condemning those who refuse it. Just as a non-elect sinner cannot be asked to take hold of an atonement which was not actually made for him, so he equally cannot be punished for failing to do so. How can he heap condemnation on himself for rejecting the gospel, as in John 3:18, when the gospel was never for him? Indeed, what sense is there to even speak of him “rejecting” something which was never sincerely offered him to begin with? May he not actually turn around and, without any impertinence, point out that God is manifestly dishonest to call everyone to believe a promise which is not made to everyone, and manifestly unjust to punish those who don’t believe when there is nothing for them to believe in? Yet John says, to the contrary, that “whoever does not believe God has made him a liar, because he has not believed in the testimony that God has borne concerning his Son. And this is the testimony, that God gave us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. Whoever has the Son has life; whoever does not have the Son of God does not have life” (1 John 5:10–12). Eric Svendsen further expands this point by bringing to bear passages which describe the additional condemnation of those who profess the faith, but later fall away. In part 1 of his dialog with James White, ‘When Does Our Union With Christ’s Death Occur?’ he asks, why are they condemned if the gospel was not for them? But Peter says that they deny the Master who bought them (2 Peter 2:1). 
http://bnonn.com/on-the-atonement-part-2/

I'd like to make a few comments on this:

1. I'm going to skip over the objection that it's unjust or insincere for God to condemn the reprobate for refusing to believe an offer that was never extended to them in the first place, inasmuch as I recently discussed that objection:


Of course, Bnonn may view that response as inadequate.

2. I don't know how Bnonn is using 1 Jn 5:10-12. Is he using that as a prooftext for unlimited atonement? Is he using that to show how a faulty view of the atonement can be tantamount to calling God a liar? Is he linking the two? Does he think 1 Jn 5:10-12 proves both? If you deny unlimited atonement, in effect you make God out to be a liar?

3. I'd simply point out that in v11, the "we" stands in implicit contrast to John's opponents. In the context of 1 John, these were schismatics who separated themselves from the churches of Asia Minor which John oversaw. 

They were denying that Christians have eternal life in Christ. Ironically, since Christ is the only source of eternal life, to deny that is to exclude yourself from that very source. If anything, this passage cuts against the grain of unlimited atonement. They stand in opposition to the atonement. They reject the atonement. Thus, they are not party to the atonement.

4. Regarding 2 Pet 2:1, that is, of course, a stock prooftext for unlimited atonement. So Bnonn's appeal to that passage is more straightforward. However, 4-point Calvinists reframe the passage by placing that within an overall doctrine of the atonement. The passage itself merely says they deny the Master who bought them. Consider all the things it doesn't say:

i) Christ died for them

ii) Christ died in their place

iii) Christ shed his blood for them

iv) Christ made atonement for them

v) Christ made propitiation for them

vi) Christ redeemed their sins

vii) Christ reconciled them to God

In other words, the passage says nothing about the death of Christ, or sin, or sacrifice, or blood atonement, or vicarious atonement, or penal substitution. To read this as a prooftext for unlimited atonement, you have to superimpose categories that are conspicuous by their absence from the text.

5. In fact, the passage trades on the metaphor of master/slave relations. Even that is very compressed. It could depict transfer of ownership. On that view, they remain slaves, but they have a new master. Or it could depict manumission: a benefactor buys their freedom. On that view, they were no longer slaves, but freemen. 

No doubt the passage indicates that Jesus did something for them. But it doesn't use atonement language or sacrificial language. It doesn't use any religious terminology. Rather, it uses a secular metaphor. 

To take a close comparison, Yahweh redeemed Israel from Egyptian bondage. An act of divine manumission. That, however, wasn't the same thing as atoning for their sins. The Mosaic cultus had atonement ceremonies. But that's different from the Exodus. 

In that respect you can have three different classes of people:

i) The unredeemed

ii) The soterically redeemed

iii) The unsoterically redeemed

On the one hand, you have people who are outside the pale of special grace. On the other hand, you have people who due to their association with Christianity, have enjoyed some benefits or privileges which, however, fall short of the elect. This is like the OT distinction between pagans, nominal Jews, and pious Jews. 

6. Finally, even if 2 Pet 2:1 or 1 Jn 5:10-12 indicated unlimited atonement, that falls short of what Bnonn needs, because he has a very precise model of the atonement. He distinguishes between pecuniary atonement (e.g. John Owen), and judicial atonement. But is there any prooftext for unlimited atonement which specifies or implies that Jesus died for everyone or redeemed everyone in the sense of judicial atonement–in contradistinction to pecuniary atonement?