If possible, let this cup pass from me

As I've remarked on more than one occasion, our ignorance of the future cuts both ways. On the one hand, if we knew the future, we'd make different decisions. In that sense, the future we knew was a counterfactual future. 

Suppose, though, we couldn't change the future we knew because we only knew what was going to happen, but not where, when and how. Then our foreknowledge of heartbreaking things that await us would shadow us from our youth, robbing us of the ability to enjoy the present. 

The reaction of Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane is a formidable example. As God Incarnate, Jesus doesn't have the luxury of ignorance regarding the future. He doesn't have that buffer. He knows what awaits him. From the time he was old enough to be capable of fully comprehending the prospect, he knew what lay in store for him down to the last literally excruciating detail. 

This also illustrates the way in which the two natures intertwine. His divine nature is the source of his foreknowledge. His divine nature informs his human nature. But he suffers in his human nature. 

Can God break his promises?

It's commonly argued that if God knows the future, then the future is fixed. If God knows that I will buy a classic Mustang on July 20, 2019, then I cannot fail to buy a classic Mustang on that date. 

In my experience, some Arminians respond by saying that our future choices/actions are the source of God's foreknowledge. If I didn't buy a Mustang on that date, then I cause God to have a different belief about the future.

With that in mind, let's take a comparison: can God break his promises? Suppose Charles Wesley complies with the term of John 3:16, but the moment after death he finds himself in hell. He complains to God that God broke his promise. God responds by saying that if Charles Wesley finds himself in hell, that retroactively makes it the case that God never made the promise in John 3:16 in the first place–in which case God didn't break his promise! Has something gone awry in the reasoning? 

Does God know the future?

Peter van Inwagen is one of the most brilliant philosophical theologians of his generation. I'd say he's the equal of Alvin Plantinga. He's a freewill theist, and here he concedes that libertarian freedom is incompatible with knowing the future:

https://www.closertotruth.com/series/does-gods-knowledge-quash-free-will#video-48360

Second Sight in the Hebrides

We should have had little claim to the praise of curiosity, if we had not endeavoured with particular attention to examine the question of the Second Sight. Of an opinion received for centuries by a whole nation, and supposed to be confirmed through its whole descent, by a series of successive facts, it is desirable that the truth should be established, or the fallacy detected.

The Second Sight is an impression made either by the mind upon the eye, or by the eye upon the mind, by which things distant or future are perceived, and seen as if they were present. A man on a journey far from home falls from his horse, another, who is perhaps at work about the house, sees him bleeding on the ground, commonly with a landscape of the place where the accident befalls him. Another seer, driving home his cattle, or wandering in idleness, or musing in the sunshine, is suddenly surprised by the appearance of a bridal ceremony, or funeral procession, and counts the mourners or attendants, of whom, if he knows them, he relates the names, if he knows them not, he can describe the dresses. Things distant are seen at the instant when they happen. Of things future I know not that there is any rule for determining the time between the Sight and the event.

This receptive faculty, for power it cannot be called, is neither voluntary nor constant. The appearances have no dependence upon choice: they cannot be summoned, detained, or recalled. The impression is sudden, and the effect often painful.

By the term Second Sight, seems to be meant a mode of seeing, superadded to that which Nature generally bestows. In the Earse it is called Taisch; which signifies likewise a spectre, or a vision. I know not, nor is it likely that the Highlanders ever examined, whether by Taisch, used for Second Sight, they mean the power of seeing, or the thing seen.

I do not find it to be true, as it is reported, that to the Second Sight nothing is presented but phantoms of evil. Good seems to have the same proportions in those visionary scenes, as it obtains in real life: almost all remarkable events have evil for their basis; and are either miseries incurred, or miseries escaped. Our sense is so much stronger of what we suffer, than of what we enjoy, that the ideas of pain predominate in almost every mind. What is recollection but a revival of vexations, or history but a record of wars, treasons, and calamities? Death, which is considered as the greatest evil, happens to all. The greatest good, be it what it will, is the lot but of a part.

That they should often see death is to be expected; because death is an event frequent and important. But they see likewise more pleasing incidents. A gentleman told me, that when he had once gone far from his own Island, one of his labouring servants predicted his return, and described the livery of his attendant, which he had never worn at home; and which had been, without any previous design, occasionally given him.

Our desire of information was keen, and our inquiry frequent. Mr. Boswell's frankness and gaiety made every body communicative; and we heard many tales of these airy shows, with more or less evidence and distinctness.

It is the common talk of the Lowland Scots, that the notion of the Second Sight is wearing away with other superstitions; and that its reality is no longer supposed, but by the grossest people. How far its prevalence ever extended, or what ground it has lost, I know not. The Islanders of all degrees, whether of rank or understanding, universally admit it, except the Ministers, who universally deny it, and are suspected to deny it, in consequence of a system, against conviction. One of them honestly told me, that he came to Sky with a resolution not to believe it.

Strong reasons for incredulity will readily occur. This faculty of seeing things out of sight is local, and commonly useless. It is a breach of the common order of things, without any visible reason or perceptible benefit. It is ascribed only to a people very little enlightened; and among them, for the most part, to the mean and the ignorant.

To the confidence of these objections it may be replied, that by presuming to determine what is fit, and what is beneficial, they presuppose more knowledge of the universal system than man has attained; and therefore depend upon principles too complicated and extensive for our comprehension; and that there can be no security in the consequence, when the premises are not understood; that the Second Sight is only wonderful because it is rare, for, considered in itself, it involves no more difficulty than dreams, or perhaps than the regular exercise of the cogitative faculty; that a general opinion of communicative impulses, or visionary representations, has prevailed in all ages and all nations; that particular instances have been given, with such evidence, as neither Bacon nor Bayle has been able to resist; that sudden impressions, which the event has verified, have been felt by more than own or publish them; that the Second Sight of the Hebrides implies only the local frequency of a power, which is nowhere totally unknown; and that where we are unable to decide by antecedent reason, we must be content to yield to the force of testimony.

By pretension to Second Sight, no profit was ever sought or gained. It is an involuntary affection, in which neither hope nor fear are known to have any part. Those who profess to feel it, do not boast of it as a privilege, nor are considered by others as advantageously distinguished. They have no temptation to feign; and their hearers have no motive to encourage the imposture.

To talk with any of these seers is not easy. There is one living in Sky, with whom we would have gladly conversed; but he was very gross and ignorant, and knew no English. The proportion in these countries of the poor to the rich is such, that if we suppose the quality to be accidental, it can very rarely happen to a man of education; and yet on such men it has sometimes fallen. There is now a Second Sighted gentleman in the Highlands, who complains of the terrors to which he is exposed.

The foresight of the Seers is not always prescience; they are impressed with images, of which the event only shews them the meaning. They tell what they have seen to others, who are at that time not more knowing than themselves, but may become at last very adequate witnesses, by comparing the narrative with its verification.

To collect sufficient testimonies for the satisfaction of the publick, or of ourselves, would have required more time than we could bestow. There is, against it, the seeming analogy of things confusedly seen, and little understood, and for it, the indistinct cry of national persuasion, which may be perhaps resolved at last into prejudice and tradition. I never could advance my curiosity to conviction; but came away at last only willing to believe. A Journey to the Western Isles of Scotland by Samuel Johnson.

In the mind's eye

Calvinism as well as some varieties of freewill theism (e.g. Molinism, classic Arminianism) affirm God's future knowledge and/or counterfactual knowledge. However, even in that respect they share less in common then meets the eye.

Let's take a comparison. I've read that Alfred Hitchcock filmed his movies in his mind before he filmed in reality. We might say he had a mental representation of the future film. Likewise, if I watch Psycho, my memory of the film is a mental representation of what I saw. 

Yet there's clearly an asymmetry here. On the one hand, my mental representation of Psycho is a copy of the original whereas there's a sense in which Psycho is a copy of Hitchcock's original idea. He filmed what he saw in his mind's eye, whereas I visualize the end-product. What's in my mind's eye is caused by the film while what's in his mind's eye is the cause of the film. 

That's analogous to the difference between Calvinism and freewill theism respecting omniscience. In freewill theism, God's knowledge of a creature's future or hypothetical actions is a copy of what they will do or might have done. For their agency is in some respect independent of God. In Calvinism, by contrast, a creature's future or hypothetical actions is a copy of God's exemplary idea. 

In Calvinism, God's concept of what will happen or might have happened is metaphysically prior to the outcome. That's the source of origin. The mental event (in God's mind) is primary while the extramental event (outside God's mind) is secondary. 

In Molinism or Arminianism, by contrast, what will happen or might have happened is metaphysically prior to God's concept. His concept is derivative. The extramental event is primary while the mental event is secondary.

In Calvinism, what will or might have been is ultimately subjective to God. Originating in God's mind and will. 

In Molinism or Arminianism, what will be or might have been is objective to God, originating outside God's mind. His mind mirrors that semiautonomous reality. Imprinted on God's mind. 

The Westminster Confession

I agree with Helm regarding Craig's misinterpretation of the Westminster Confession:

http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2017/12/the-westminster-standard-i.html

http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2018/01/the-westminster-standard-ii.html

I also agree with his criticisms of middle knowledge. And Helm is correct that divine foreknowledge is grounded in divine foreordination. 

However, Helm's appeal to certain prooftexts (Acts 2:23; Rom 8:29; Rom 11:2) is somewhat confused. Proginosko sometimes means "to choose beforehand" rather than "to know beforehand". The meaning is idiomatic. A carryover from OT usage, where treaties and covenants use yada to denote "choosing". 

Fatal snapshot

One consequence of being a celebrity is that folks are continually snapping photos of you. There are paparazzi who tail you relentlessly. There's a snapshot of James Dean tanking up at a Sherman Oaks gas station. There he is, in the prime of life, having a blast, on a warm sunny day in Southern California. A picture perfect scene. Or so it seems. 

Now, because he was a movie star, there are many snapshots of Dean. So what, if anything, makes this particular snapshot special–compared to hundreds of others? Thousands of others?  

It's a snapshot of his silver Porsche 550 Spyder. That's the car he died in. And the snapshot was taken September 30, 1955. That's the day he died, at 5:45 pm, in a fatal collision. In other words, it was taken just hours before his untimely demise. 

And that makes the snapshot ominous. The viewer knows something he doesn't. Dean has no inkling that a few hours later, he will be dead. For him, that lies in the unforeseeable future, however near in time–whereas, for the viewer, it lies in the past. We know the trajectory. We're looking back on that. We mentally begin with how it ended, and view the snapshot in light of the denouement. That snapshot, which is nothing special in prospect, takes on haunting significance in retrospect. We know that he's doomed. And it's too late to warn him. Nothing can save him. 

Now, at the moment the snapshot was taken, it wasn't fatalistic. Indeed, if any one of any number of things had happened slightly differently, he'd still be alive, vibrant, and youthful the next day–with a full life ahead of him. Had he arrived at the intersection a few moments sooner or later, they'd miss connections. Had the driver of the other car arrived at the intersection a few moments sooner or later, they'd miss connections. If one of them had a flat tire on the way, they'd miss connections. And so on and so forth. But the past is unalterable. And when we see that snapshot, with the benefit of hindsight, it has a fatalistic vibe. Not fatalistic in advance of the fact–but after the fact, nothing can be done to avert the outcome. 

Incidentally, it's edifying to consider all the near misses in our lives. In the nature of the case, we're often unaware of a near miss because it didn't happen. There's nothing to notice. In some cases we're conscious of a close call, which makes us thankful. But those must be greatly outnumbered by all the close calls that escape our notice. Had the timing or placement been even slightly different, we wouldn't be here. To make it this far, consider how many times we averted disaster by a few meters or moments. Changing just one variable five, ten, twenty, or fifty miles up the road may preempt a chain reaction. 

Now suppose that due to a temporal anomaly, when you check your mail on September 29, 1955, there's a manila envelop containing two snapshots. One snapshot shows Dean at the gas station, and the other snapshot shows the scene of the accident. It that case, is the accident a foregone conclusion? 

Hypothetically, if you knew what you were looking at, and you had a chance to forewarn the actor, the accident would still be preventable. But suppose there's no way to contact him. Is the accident a fait accompli, even though this is a day before the two scenes depicted in the snapshots? In that event, isn't the collision bound to happen?

i) This illustrates the dilemma between freedom and foreknowledge. If God knows the future, can the future turn out contrary to God's knowledge? Suppose God has, in effect, mental snapshots of Dean at the gas station as well as the crash site. 

ii) Some freewill theists might object that it's disanalogous because God doesn't have advance knowledge of the future. Rather, God is outside of time.

However, I didn't frame the question in terms of what God knew before it happened, but the sequence of events. Not God's relation to time, but relations within time. If, moreover, God has timeless mental snapshots of these two scenes, then how can events play out any differently?

To be sure, God has mental snapshots of alternate timelines. The point, though, is that he knows which one of those many timelines maps onto the real world, in contrast to all the counterfactual timelines. And if, in addition, God creates a world with a history corresponding to those mental snapshots, then how can it deviate from his mental snapshots of the past or future? 

iii) A freewill theist might object that if the future were different, then God would have different mental snapshots of the future. If the future were different, the future God knows would be a different future.

But even so, that's not what's going to happen. Only one timeline will happen. If the manila envelop had snapshots depicting a different outcome, then, of course, Dean won't die in the accident. But isn't that beside the point? The envelop doesn't have those snapshots. Rather, it has snapshots of Dean at the gas station, and the crash site. Given those snapshots (of tomorrow), how can events unfold any differently tomorrow? 

iv) Moreover, the question is whether Dean, or the other driver, or some other participant in the chain of events, has the power to change God's knowledge of the future (were they to do something different). It's not a question of our general ability to do one thing or another, but whether that's open-ended in relation to a fact about God's knowledge. This becomes a debate over the fortunes of Ockhamism. But a basic problem with Ockhamism is that it seems to stand in tension with the fixity of the past. As one philosopher put it, 

It seems to me that it is very difficult to give an account of the necessity of the past that preserves the intuition that the past has a special kind of necessity in virtue of being past, but which has the consequence that God's past beliefs do not have that kind of necessity. The problem is that God's past beliefs seem to be as good a candidate for something that is strictly past as almost anything we can think of, such as an explosion last week. If we have counterfactual power over God's past beliefs, but not the past explosion, that must be because of something special about God's past beliefs that is intuitively plausible apart from the attempt to avoid theological fatalism. If it is not independently plausible, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Ockhamist solution is ad hoc. 

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/#2.3

v) A freewill theist could take the radical step of denying the fixity the past, but if there's a conflict between the fixity of the past and counterfactual power over the past, what gives? Which principle is more plausible and fundamental? When push comes to shove, I think it's arguably the case that the fixity of the past takes precedence. For some detailed analysis:

http://www.andrewmbailey.com/jmf/FFFP.pdf

vi) Another question is whether timeless beliefs are analogous to the past. If even the past is necessary, albeit "accidentally" so, despite the fact that time is continent, then a fortiori, timeless states should be at least as necessary, if not more so. What's timelessness is inherently immutable, whereas temporal events only become immutable when they lie in the past. 

vii) A friend of my noted that a freewill theist might parry the argument by shifting to the question of what grounds God's beliefs, what they metaphysically "depend" on. If they are grounded in the creature's free action, that is if they metaphysically depend on the creature, then this is enough for libertarian freedom (it's argued). So even if we can't do otherwise given God's infallible beliefs, so long as it's us who ground his belief, that's enough for libertarian freedom.

That move concedes that libertarian freedom is inconsistent with God's knowledge of the future if freedom is defined as liberty to do otherwise in the same situation. So the argument is successful against libertarian freedom in that sense. 

If so, the issue shifts to the philosophical prospects for libertarian freedom defined by ultimate sourcehood. That requires different arguments and counterarguments. 

The problem of prophecy

The Trump juggernaut illustrates the challenge of prophecy. It illustrates the problem with a simple foreknowledge approach to providence. It illustrates the logic of open theism, if you grant the premise of libertarian freewill.

Trump's success has confounded the pundits. There are two reasons for that:

i) We are better at predicting the behavior of people who are like us. The case of Trumpkins generates a paradox. Many Trumpkins are low info voters. They don't know and they don't care. By contrast, pundits like Nate Silver, Michael Barone, Larry Sabato, Ross Douthat, Bill Kristol, Karl Rove, Ben Shapiro et al. are high info voters. They know a lot about the issues; they know a lot about the candidates.

The trick is how can a high info voter project himself into the mindset of a low info voter to anticipate what a low info voter will think and do. A high info voter views Trump in a completely different context than a low info voter. Ironically, that's a disadvantage in predicting the behavior of voters who lack that frame of reference. You must bracket what you know about Trump, bracket what you know about the issues, to assume the outlook of a Trumpkin. 

ii) In addition, what's possible or probable depends on the state of play at any given time. Take two chess masters or poker champs. When they sit down at the table, they don't know ahead of time how they will play the game. There's a move/countermove dialectic that depends on what the prior move happens to be. Every move opens up a new set of forking paths. Different ways to win or lose. It's almost like every move is the first move. For every move resets the variables. 

Freedom and retrocognition

There's a classic conundrum between divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom. Freewill theists think the future is open. The future doesn't exist. There are alternate future timelines. Which one becomes the actual future depends on the choices free agents make. Yet that generates well-known problems for the possibility of foreknowledge, or vice versa. For a recent treatment, cf. John Martin Fischer, Our Fate: Essays on God and Freewill (OUP 2016).

In that regard, it's interesting to flip this around by comparing precognition with retrocognition. Just as there's evidence for precognition, there's some evidence for retrocognition, although that's not as well documented. But we could discuss it in principle.

Obviously, it's often possible to naturally know about past events. Take my memory of events I personally witnessed or experienced. Likewise, there can be various kinds of evidence for past events. That's the stuff of history, archeology, and geology.

However, I'm referring to incidents from the past which an individual wouldn't naturally be in a position to know about. Suppose I could see the past. Have a dream or vision about a past event. Even if (ex hypothesi) the future is open, it is now too late for the past to be open. That's over and done with. That's what makes it past. 

Would retrocognition be possible if the past was indeterminate? If there were multiple alternate outcomes, no one of which was the real past, in contrast to the others? Isn't that wildly counterintuitive? 

Simple foreknowledge

Traditionally, I think many or most Arminians espouse simple foreknowledge. Recently, there's been a debate about whether Arminus was influenced by Molinism, That's an Arminian intramural debate that doesn't concern me. My immediate point is that for contemporary Arminians who espouse simple foreknowledge, this analysis sketches some of the difficulties with their position. 

It is important to note that even if foreknowledge and freedom are compatible, it is not clear that simple foreknowledge — foreknowledge that is not based on middle knowledge (see below) — could be of any aid to God in providentially ordering His creation. If God knows what will actually happen, He cannot also use this information to arrange for something else to happen, for then the contents of what He “knows” would not comprise knowledge. Foreknowledge is of the actual occurrence of future events; once the occurrence of these events is known, it is “too late” to prevent them (or to bring them about). Doing so is incompatible with their occurrence being infallibly known by God. Simple foreknowledge, if God has it, allows Him to know what will occur without having to wait for the future occurrence of events, as He must for contingent events according to Open Theism. But His knowledge is no less conditioned by the occurrence of the events; He has no greater control over their occurrence based on foreknowledge than He does if Open Theism is true. 

Once it is realized that simple foreknowledge does not offer any providential advantage to God, one may wonder what reason there is to affirm it, aside from an assumption that it is more perfect for God to have such knowledge than not. One might think that foreknowledge would provide an explanation for the accuracy of prophecy. But it does not. If God has “at once” complete foreknowledge of all that happens, He “sees” what will happen including whether or not He instructs persons to prophesy that events will happen. Given knowledge of what will occur, God is not free to do otherwise than He foresees He will do. Perhaps God could “look” at a little bit of the future at a time, make decisions about how He will react to the events He foresees, and then “look” a little further to see how His creation reacts to these actions. But this would offer no greater help for predicting future events. Suppose that God foresees the course of the world until the end of 1935. Could He then decide to warn persons on January 1st of 1936 that the holocaust is about to occur? Not in any infallible way. For assuming that the holocaust was still avoidable in 1935, and assuming that God has not yet “looked” beyond 1935, He does not yet know what will occur in the next ten years. He can decide to make probably accurate but possibly mistaken predictions on January 1, 1936, based on the tendencies present at that point, but this is no more than He can do given Open Theism. 

Simple foreknowledge has no utility for God’s providential governance of the world, nor can it ground infallible predictions of future events. (It should also be reiterated that Open Theists believe that there are less instances of such predictions in the Bible than is thought by those who affirm a traditional meticulous view of providence.) If one wants to affirm that we have libertarian freedom and still maintain a traditional view of providence according to which God directs the course of the world rather than merely witnessing how it unfolds, then affirming foreknowledge is not enough. 

http://www.iep.utm.edu/o-theism/#H3

Due to unforeseen circumstances

Due to unforeseen circumstances, ha! The website is currently under construction and the content will be restored as quickly as possible. Thank you for your patience and understanding. 

http://opentheism.info/

That's the problem with open theism. God didn't see it coming. 

Foreknowledge and Fatalism: Why Divine Timelessness Doesn’t Help

A persistent dilemma for classical Arminianism, which tries to square the circle of libertarian freedom and divine foreknowledge:

http://www.alanrhoda.net/docs/research/Foreknowledge_and_Fatalism.pdf

The basis of God's knowledge

God’s knowledge of what happens in this world “corresponds” (is the best word) to what happens; it does not cause it or even render it certain. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-5-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/ 

The only way God’s knowledge can be independent of human decisions and actions is if God foreordains them and renders them certain. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/beware-of-stealth-calvinism/

Raises an interesting question: Is this a general principle regarding God's knowledge? Does God know how many moons orbit Neptune because x-number of moons orbit Neptune? Is his knowledge contingent on (i.e. caused by, the effect of) the moons in question? 

Or does Olson bifurcate God's knowledge of actualities into two different modes: how God knows what free agents will do is different from God's knowledge of trees, insects, inanimate objects, &c.? Is God's knowledge of human decisions dependent on human decisions whereas his knowledge of comets and butterflies is independent of comets and butterflies? 

Double trouble

http://bnonn.thinkingmatters.org.nz/thorny-problems-with-calvinism-3/

Pruss on God's knowledge of the past

Commenting on a post of mine, Dr. Pruss draws attention to an interesting symmetry between God's knowledge of the future and the past:

Alexander R Pruss5/09/2014 6:00 PM 

I think it is deeply puzzling how God knows our future free choices. But it is no more puzzling than the deeply puzzling question of how God knows our past free choices. The problem in both cases is this: How can our actions affect the beliefs of a transcendent being? Whether our actions are in the past or in the future makes no difference here. 

(Now, granted, on growing block theories there is a difference, in that past actions and past persons (if there are any persons who don't exist forever) are real and future ones aren't. But on both presentism and eternalism there is ontological symmetry between past actions/persons and future actions/persons. And growing block is false. :-) ) 

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2014/05/when-smoke-clears.html?showComment=1399672858245#c296346453717369103

I believe he's alluding to divine impassibility, which Brian Davies defines as "not able to be causally modified by an external agent," "God cannot be altered by anything a creature does." 

To flesh this out, I think Pruss is suggesting a paradoxical trilemma:

i) Humans have libertarian freedom

ii) God is impassible (i.e. can't be affected by the world)

iii) God knows our past and future choices

I say that's a paradoxical trilemma because Pruss presumably affirms the truth of all three propositions.

In reponse:

1. A Calvinist will relieve the trilemma by denying (i). 

From my perspective, it's a false trilemma. 

2. Jerry Walls will relieve the trilemma by denying (ii-iii). 

3. Where revealed truths generate an apparent contradiction, I think appeal to mystery or paradox is legit. That's an argument from authority (revelation), which is legit so long as the authority is legit. 

But I don't think human libertarian freedom is a revealed truth. At best, it's a philosophical construct. So it can't take refuge in an argument from authority. It stands or falls at the bar of reason. 

Worse, I think human libertarian freedom contradicts revealed truths regarding predestination, meticulous providence, divine hardening, &c.

In Calvinism, God knows our past and future choices because he predestined them. That doesn't generate any tension with impassibility, for God is affecting the creature, rather than vice versa. 

Can a timeless God know time?

Jeremy Pierce
That's the one thing timelessness can give them [i.e. freewill theists]. It doesn't resolve the compatibility issue, but it does provide a means of immediate awareness, since every time is immediately accessible for God.

I don't see how divine timelessness ipso facto makes every time immediately accessible to God. Perhaps this assumes an implicit contrast to a temporal God who only has immediate access to the present (as well as remembered access to the past). Unlike a temporal God, a timeless God isn't "confined" to the present. 

Perhaps this plays on the picturesque metaphor of a God who is "above" time, so that he can see the entire timeline. Or, to vary the metaphor, "outside" time so that he can objectify the timeline. If so, that's figurative and anthropomorphic. It's not clear how we'd translate that into a literal counterpart. 

And, if anything, the opposite seems to be the case. If God is timeless, and that's it, then isn't God isolated from time? Hermetically sealed off? He's not in direct "contact" with temporal events. 

Now Calvinism has metaphysical resources which mere classical theism does not. A timeless predestinarian God can know whatever happens, because he makes it happen, by planning it and causing it. 

Is aftknowledge equivalent to foreknowledge?

Wintery Knight

The latest Unbelievable? podcast featured a prominent Calvinist debating William Lane Craig on middle knowledge. I have posted my summary along with a link to the MP3 file here:
http://winteryknight.wordpress.com/2014/01/07/william-lane-craig-and-paul-helm-discuss-calvinism-and-molinism-on-the-unbelievable-radio-show/

William Lane Craig and Paul Helm discuss Calvinism and Molinism on the Unbelievable radio show

winteryknight.wordpress.com

I listened to this excellent discussion between Dr. William Lane Craig and Oxford University Calvinist philosopher Paul Helm. I think this is a useful discussion in general because atheists often b...

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  Joshua Thibodaux Jeff Lea, that view of LFW is a common mistake: there is nothing about freedom of the will that makes a certain timeline with definite creature choices impossible to know for God.

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  Joshua Thibodaux To put it in perspective, given God's temporally transcendent nature, it's no more impossible for God to know free choices in what we call "future" any more than it is for us to know the results of at least some free choices in our past.

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Of course, Josh is far too partisan to ever consider weaknesses in his own position, but he overlooks a fundamental asymmetry between knowledge of past choices and knowledge of future choices. Given libertarian freedom, when facing forward, there's a forking path of two or more possible choices ahead of us, any one of which may become actual. There's no one choice to foresee. Rather, we see various alternate routes fanning into different timelines. 

But looking back, there is only one actual choice. Only one path was taken. There is only one choice to be known. 

So, of course it's possible to know which choice was made once that's past, once that's over and done with. Time's passage is, itself, is a process of elimination. It hardly follows that it's equally possible to know which choice will be made in advance of the fact. 

For that matter, it's far from obvious, given freewill theism, that God is automatically be privy to past human choices. 

Roger Olson: theological fatalist

rogereolson says:

April 23, 2013 at 12:21 pm

Imagine a world exactly like ours except that God gives clear warnings to everyone who might be affected by evil or calamity. Then read C. S. Lewis’ The Problem of Pain. Also, stop thinking of God’s foreknowledge as providentially advantageous–as if foreknowing something is going to happen makes it possible for God to change what is going to happen.

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2013/04/where-was-god-when-the-fertilizer-plant-exploded/comment-page-1/#comment-41413

Crystal ball foreknowledge

On the one hand, an Arminian commenter over at Scot McKnight’s blog assures us that there’s a profound moral difference between predestination and permission:

I know that some internet Calvinists think there is no real difference between allowing something and unconditionally decreeing it or irresistibly causing it, but I think most people do, and that it is quite obvious and undeniable. But we may have to just agree to disagree about that. The concept of “allowance” is not logically compatible with Calvinism (precisely because of its determinism), whereas it is with Arminianism, leaving Calvinism with no ground to say God allows evil for a greater purpose, while such grounding is part and parcel of Arminianism (God allows evil because free will is necessary for genuine relationship, love, and for glorifying God {who is love} most {more than lack of free will does, in which all that happens is actually God’s will in a fairly robust sense, and there effectively ends up being only one will in the universe}.)

Comment by Arminian — December 26, 2011 @ 1:45 pm

On the other hand, the very same Arminian, just one comment later, adds the following:

Perhaps I should add that the argument that God knowing what would happen and creating anyway means he is responsible for what happens does not work against the simple foreknowledge Arminian position. For God’s foreknowledge cannot be wrong. It simply mirrors what will happen. That in no way conflicts with the freedom of the agents. Yet it also means that he cannot decide not to create someone based on knowing what they will do, since his foreknowledge is based on the fact that they will do that and not creating them would make his foreknowledge wrong, and additionally, not creating them would take away the basis of the decision not to create them in the first place.

Comment by Arminian — December 26, 2011 @ 2:16 pm

So God can’t stop anything from happening. All he can do is gaze into his crystal ball and watch the inevitable before it comes to pass.

But how can God permit what he cannot prevent? If the future is unavoidable, if what will be will be, then God isn’t allowing it to happen. You can only let something happen if you’re in a position to block it. At best, the Arminian God can only assume an attitude to Stoic resignation in the face of the inexorable denouement.

Arminians substitute irresistible fate for irresistible grace.

What might have been

I don’t think omnipotence (i.e. God’s capabilities) is enough to account for these passages. Imaging God creates Santa (which of course He could do). God could have Santa deliver toys this year or He could have Santa occupy Wall Street instead. How does He know which would happen if Santa existed? God must not only be able to do either, but He must choose one.

One of the problems with responding to Dan is that he doesn’t spell out what he means. There’s no argument. Rather, he drops these elliptical, enigmatic statements or questions, then expects his opponent to respond. Well, respond to what, exactly?

Why does he think God wouldn’t be in a position to know the outcome, given my stated views? Dan doesn’t say. Why does he think God couldn’t choose one over the other, given my stated views? Dan doesn’t say.

The Dominicans (early opponents of the Molinists) said God decrees not only what will happen, but also what would happen under every possible scenario. If you believe in God’s decree about what would happen in every hypothetical world, then you could use that view to account for these texts. And they accuse me of imposing speculative philosophy on scripture. James White once said middle knowledge reminded him of the Star Trek episode when Spock had a beard. Welcome to the club.

Once again, he doesn’t explain why that’s “speculative.” Where’s the argument?

In Calvinism you have the generic principle that nothing will happen unless God decrees it. And Calvinists think that’s a scriptural principle, which they’ve established on exegetical grounds. You may disagree, but that’s not speculative.

All we’re doing is to apply the very same principle to what might have happened. How is that “speculative”? And how is that “speculative” compared to the permutations of Molinism?