The Classical Ockhamist Response to the Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge

Previously I argued that there is a powerful argument against the claim that libertarian free action (defined in the last post) is compatible with God's infallible foreknowledge (or belief) of those actions, roughly, with God's omniscience (S is omniscient = df S knows every true proposition that is logically possible to know and S believes no false proposition). I will repeat the bare bones of the argument for convenience:

The TI Argument

Following William Hasker, I will use the incompatibilist argument offered by Linda Zagzebski, though names and actions will be different. With the contemporary emphasis on “going green,” it seems best to retire poor Jones and his ever-running lawnmower. Hasker opted for one “Cuthbert” and his iguana. I find it unnecessarily cruel to name people Cuthbert, and so will modify Hasker’s modification of Zagzebski’s argument with Al Dente and his plate of Fettuccini Alfredo.

Let three moments of time be ordered such that t1 < t2 < t3

1. Suppose that God infallibly believes at time t1 that Al dente will eat Fettuccini Alfredo at t3. (premise)

2. The proposition God believes at t1 that Al dente will eat Fettuccini Alfredo at t3is accidentally necessary at t2. (from the principle of the necessity of the past)

3. If a proposition p is accidentally necessary at t and p strictly implies q, then q is accidentally necessary at t. (transfer of necessity principle)

4. God believes at t1 that Al Dente will eat Fettuccini Alfredo at t3 entails Al Dente will eat Fettuccini Alfredo at t3. (from the definition of infallibility)

5. So the proposition Al Dente will eat Fettuccini Alfredo at t3 is accidentally necessary at t2. (from 2-4)

6. If the proposition Al Dente will eat Fettuccini Alfredo at t3 is accidentally necessary at t2, it is true at t2 that Al Dente cannot do otherwise than to eat Fettuccini Alfredo at t3. (premise)

7. If when Al Dente does act he cannot do otherwise, he does not do it freely. (principle of alternative possibilities)

8. Therefore, Al Dente does not act at t3 freely. (from 5-7)

This argument gives us a powerful formal argument against the compatibility of God’s foreknowledge of the (libertarian) free actions of human beings. I will refer to the above argument as the TI argument (the argument for Theological Incompatibilism).


The Ockhamist solution

The Ockhamist view denies the accidental necessity of God’s past beliefs about future free actions, and so denies premise (2) of the argument. The Ockhamist denies the accidental necessity of God’s past beliefs by making use of the hard/soft fact distinction. Though this distinction is notoriously difficult to explicate, it can be explained adequately enough to understand the gist.

A “hard fact” about the past is a fact that is entirely about the past.¹ For example, take the fact about the collapse of the Twin Towers on 9/11. That fact is entirely about the past. On the other hand, a “soft fact” is not entirely about the past. God’s belief in September 2009, that Al Dente will eat Fettuccini Alfredo for dinner on December 25, 2009, expresses a fact that is not entirely about the past. Part of the belief refers to what will happen in the future and its truth is capable of being affected by as of yet to occur free choices. Thus, if the hard/soft fact distinction can be explicated, and if God’s past belief is indeed a soft fact, then God’s past beliefs about the future free actions of humans is not accidentally necessary, and therefore premise (2) is false.

Another popular Ockhamist response, given by Alvin Plantinga, is to argue that we do have power to change the past, but this power is not causal power it is “counterfactual power.” It is “counterfactual” since Plantinga admits that, if God knows Al Dente will eat Fettuccini Alfredo for dinner, then Al will eat Fettuccini Alfredo.² But, Plantinga argues, Al has the power to act such that if Al so acted, then God would have had a different belief. So, even though God may have in fact believed a certain proposition P, Al Dente still has the power to do something such that if he were to do it, God would not have believed P. The explication just given is why this Ockhamist solution is dubbed “counterfactual power over the past.” This argument looks like it denies the accidental necessity of God’s past belief, and so premise (2) of the TI argument denied.

In this post I will not deal with Plantinga's Ockhamist answer but only with what I'm calling the "classical Ockhamist" answer, viz., the claim that God's past belief is a soft fact about the past.

Some problems with the Ockhamist solution

Recall the claim made above regarding God’s belief about a paradigm case of free action: God infallibly believed on September 1, 2009, that Alvin Dente would eat a plate of Fettuccini Alfredo for dinner on December 25, 2009. We can put this more rigorously as:

(G) God believed at t1 that Al Dente would eat Fettuccini Alfredo at t3.

We then asked whether, given (G), Al Dente was free to refrain from eating at t3. A reason for giving a negative answer to this question is based on the principle of the fixity of the past (PFP, hereafter).³ Our argument has been that:

(G) is a fact about the past relative to t2, so it is not within Al Dente’s power to bring it about that ~ (G); i.e., (G) is outside of the control of Al’s power.⁴ However, (G) entails that Al Dente will eat at t3. Whatever is entailed by something outside of someone, S’s, control is itself outside of S’s control. Therefore, whether Al Dente can refrain or do other than eat at t3 is outside of his control.⁵

Recall that the Ockhamist denies the accidental necessity of God’s past beliefs, and so denies premise (2) of the TI argument. The Ockhamist denies that God’s past beliefs about the future free actions of agents are accidentally necessary by claiming that God’s past beliefs in this area are not hard facts; rather, they are soft facts. This means, Ockhamists tell us, that God’s past beliefs are not subject to PFP.

To see why the Ockhamist makes this claim, and why the move does not work, it will serve us to look at some putative examples of hard facts and soft facts vis-à-vis (G). Here are three paradigm cases of hard facts, cases all Ockhamists would count as hard facts:

(1) In 1492, Columbus sailed the ocean blue.

(2) Jones uttered the sentence, “Al Dente will eat Fettuccini Alfredo on December 25, 2009,” on September 1, 2009.

(3) Jones believed that, “Al Dente will eat Fettuccini Alfredo on December 25, 2009,” on September 1, 2009.

These facts about the past are contrasted with another type of fact, facts called soft facts. Paradigm cases of these facts might be examples like:

(4) In 1492, Columbus sailed the ocean blue, 517 years before Al Dente at Fettuccini Alfredo on December 25, 2009.

(5) Jones uttered the true sentence, “Al Dente will eat Fettuccini Alfredo on December 25, 2009,” on September 1, 2009,

(6) Jones correctly believed that, “Al Dente will eat Fettuccini Alfredo on December 25, 2009,” on September 1, 2009,

Ockhamists want to say that (G) is similar to (4) – (6), and so (G) should be classified as a soft fact about the past. But this way lies trouble. First, there is no accepted explication of the hard/soft fact distinction. This makes progress difficult, to say the least. But, despite this hurdle, the explication on offer must at least do two things. As Widerker points out,⁶ the Ockhamist must (i) make explicit the property P that (G) and (4) – (6) have in common; and (ii), they must show that it is in virtue of having P that makes them soft facts. But the various explications have had trouble doing just that. In other words, the property soft facts are said to have do not show that it is because of this property or feature that facts like (4) – (6) are not subject to PFP.

We can illuminate this point by briefly looking at some features soft facts are said to have that hard facts do not have and which make them not subject to PFP.⁷ One view is that soft facts entail facts about the future. This is of course true of facts like (4) – (6). But is it because of this property that (4) – (6) are not subject to PFP? No; and here is why: Many hard facts (facts subject to PFP) entail facts about the future. Here are two:

(7) Walter Payton scores his first touchdown at t1 entails the future fact, relative to t2, that Walter Payton does not score his first touchdown at t3.

(8) God delivered the Israelites from Egypt at t1 entails that God exists at t2 – tn (this assumes that God is eternal).

Another view is that a soft fact entails the obtaining of a future state of affairs. Again, (4) – (6) share this feature (the future state of affairs that obtains is Al Dente eating his pasta dinner). But certainly it is not because of this property that (4) – (6) are not subject to PFP. Again, some ostensible hard facts (facts subject to PFP) entail future facts. Here is a plausible assumption for the theist to make: Necessarily, if God decrees that X will occur at t3, then X will occur at t3. Therefore, if God decrees at t1 that Al Dente will eat Fettuccini Alfredo at t3, then Al will eat Fettuccini Alfredo at t3. Certainly, God’s decree at t1 is a hard fact about the past relative to t2, yet God’s decree at t1 entails the future state of affairs at t3.⁸ The basic problem these accounts face, as Widerker points out, is that there certainly seem to be cases where one temporally distinct event E1 is necessarily connected, either metaphysically or logically, to another temporally distinct event E2 that obtains later than E1. Yet, in these cases, E1 is considered, on most analyses, to be a hard fact about the past, and thus subject to PFP.

The Ockhamist, not surprisingly, still wants to call (G) a soft fact; and they beg our patience as they work on explicating the hard/soft fact distinction. After all, they tell us, (4) – (6) certainly look like soft facts in that they are not subject to the fixity of the past. At this juncture, we should make more explicit what is meant by the past being fixed. Hasker claims that a hard fact, one subject to PFP, is a fact that is really about the past and also not within anyone’s power to make false.⁹ Widerker concurs, offering the following account of PFP:

(PFP) If a given event occurs at time t, then no one has it within his power at a time later than t to bring it about that the event did not occur at t.

Given this view of PFP, we can see why there is the intuition that (4) – (6) are not subject to PFP, and are thus soft facts. Given this view of PFP, we see that although we do not have the power to bring about¹⁰ the nonoccurrence of the past event, we do have the power (on LFW) to bring it about that an event does or does not exemplify the contingent proposition it refers to, e.g., Al Dente eats Fettuccini Alfredo on December 25, 2009. Applying this to one of our putative soft facts:

(6) Jones correctly believed that, “Al Dente will eat Fettuccini Alfredo on December 25, 2009,” on September 1, 2009,

we can see that, on LFW, Al Dente can bring it about that he refrains from eating Fettuccini Alfredo on December 25, 2009. In doing so he does not cause the event of Jones’ believing to not occur, he merely and harmlessly causes the non-obtaining of the contingent property expressed in (6).¹¹ Furthermore, on this analysis of PFP, we see why (6)’s counterpart, (3), is subject to PFP.

Given our work up to this point we are now in a position to show why (G) is disanlagous to (4) – (6) in at least one relevant area. Take our definition of Omniscience:

O: S is omniscient = df S knows every true proposition that is logically possible to know and S believes no false proposition.

O entails that God Infallibly Believes (GIB) every true proposition, thus:

GIB: S infallibly believes = df S believes every true proposition that is logically possible to believe and S believes no false proposition.

Now, take (G):

(G) God believed at t1 that Al Dente would eat Fettuccini Alfredo at t3.

Given GIB and (G), we can see that if Al Dente refrained from eating the plate of Fettuccini Alfredo on December 25, 2009, then God would have held a different belief than the one he in fact held. That is, the event described in (G) would have been different, not simply the exemplification of the contingent proposition referred to. But this violates PFP, and thus it attributes to Al Dente the causal power over the past. Since no one has causal power over the past, a claim Ockhamists do not wish to deny, then Al Dente cannot refrain from eating his plate of pasta, and therefore, Al Dente does not act freely when he so eats.

Of course, the Ockhamist is free to present an account of the hard/soft fact distinction where facts like (3) do not express hard facts, but this seems unlikely. Certainly, as many have pointed out: the past beliefs of people seem to be as good an example as any of something that is fully past, and it would be an ad hoc move, invoked to save a theory, to claim that the past beliefs of a divine person are not fully past. It certainly seems that my belief at 6:00 am this morning is, at 6:01, something completely in the past, and thus unalterable. Yet, there is another way out. The Ockhamist may affirm that we do not have causal power over the past, but we do have another kind of power over the past: counterfactual power. I will take up this objection in a later post, Lord willing.


____________________________

¹ One view is that the fact’s grammar points to the past (using past tense) while its content is not entirely about the past (cf. David Hunt, “The Simple Foreknowledge View,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, 77).

² Of course, since Al Dente and his dinner is my illustration, Plantinga does not refer to that example specifically.

³ One reason to think that the past is accidentally necessary is that it is fixed and lies outside our control.

⁴ The kind of power and control spoken of here is assumed to be the kind desired by libertarianism, i.e., the power to refrain from doing some action, or to do otherwise.

⁵ Widerker (2002) claims that this argument is given by Jonathan Edwards. Plantinga also presents this argument as a “powerful” expression of the incompatibilist’s worry (Ockham’s Way Out, 181). This argument is also expressed in Hasker (1998) and Linville (1995).

⁶ David Widerker, “Troubles With Ockhamism,” The Journal of Philosophy, v. 87, 9 (Sept. 1990), 465.

⁷ I’m using Widerker as a rough guide, ibid, 465-470.

⁸ Of course, libertarians would not say Al Dente ate freely, but that point is irrelevant to my example. Similar points could be made in light of God promising X. Suppose God promises at t1 to allow into heaven all those who trust in Jesus Christ, and Jones trusts in Jesus Christ at t3. Given the plausible assumption that “If God promises that X, then X,” this fact entails that Jones will be in heaven at t4, where t4 > t3.

⁹ William Hasker, God, Time, and Foreknowledge, 82, though he goes on to offer a more salient and rigorous account, pp. 88-90.

¹⁰ S “brings about” Y iff: There exists an X such that S causes X to be the case and (X&H) => Y and ~ (H=>Y), where ‘H’ represents the history of the world prior to it coming to be the case that X (Hasker, “A New Anti-Molinist Argument,” Religious Studies, 35 (1999) 291.)

¹¹ Though agents do not always have this power, see Widerker, Troubles, 471.

Kaput

Dan has been furiously beating his wings, attempting to get out of the webs I've spun for him. The bad news for Dan is that things are only going to get worse.

So, here's some crucial Assumptions Dan's argument makes:

[A1] The "common man" is a libertarian and defines choice in libertarian fashion.

[A2] The dictionary is the repository of "common mans'" definition of choice, the dictionary defines "choice" assuming the rubric of libertarian metaphysics.

[A3] The Bible was written by and to the "common man".

[A4] For any word, x, that the Bible uses, the Bible means x however the "common man" understands that word at any time, t.

These crucial assumptions somehow are supposed to get to the Conclusion:

[C] The Bible uses the word choice, the "common man" understands choice under the rubric of libertarian metaphysics, and therefore the Bible asserts that libertarian metaphysics is the case when it uses the word "choice."

Now, in response I (as well as Steve Hays) have offered literally dozens of Objections to Dan's argument, not all of them have been dealt with. Here's a few:

[O1] We don't know what the referent of "common man" is supposed to be, and don't have necessary and sufficient conditions to demarcate "common man" from "uncommon man". Just what is a "common man".

[O2] There is empirical evidence which suggests that, especially considering Dan has offered absolutely zero empirical evidence of his own to support his assumption, the "common man" is not libertarian, head for head. The evidence I brought forth makes it, at the very least, far from obvious that all "common men" whoever are dyed-in-the-wool libertarians. Besides that, I pointed out that there have been many human societies that have been fatalists. So Dan's assumption about all "common men" whoever are just false, and obviously so.

[O3] Some (many?) "comon men" hold thatan indeterminate action is random or a lucky happening. So this is a massive problem for Dan, it makes his argument prove too much. Surely we aren't going to attribute some sort of sophisticated, technical, philosophical understanding of (one of the many forms of) "agent causation" to "common man."

[O4] It is demonstrably false the the Bible was written only by and to the "common man."

[O5] Dictionaries and "common men" can be wrong; therefore, Dan's argument could be used to support the errancy of Scripture.

[O6] It is possible that dictionaries and "common men" could take a "determinist turn", which means that freedom is at least compatible with determinism. Dan's argument allows for the compatibility since it allows for the possibility that the Bible could mean certain words in a sense compatible with determinism and choice.

[O7] There is a way that "alternative possibilities" could be read in compatibilist terms, e.g., hypothetically. Dan simply ignores this, forcing his square-peg argument through the round hole.

So far, these objections have gone unanswered.

Now, to be fair, Dan doesn't like the word "choice". Dan makes it clear that his argument depends on the word "choose" and not "choice." Dan writes,

In our debate, I argued that the dictionary definition of choose rules out determinism. In Paul's recent rejoinder he states: “I cited numerous dictionaries that didn’t include a PAP (Principle of Alternate Possibilities) element”. (link) This is true, but misleading. Paul defined choice, but not choose. My argument was based on the verb choose, not the noun choice. In this post I would like to revisit the dictionaries, and explain why it's important to distinguish between choice and choose.

Using the word "choose" is important for Dan argument because:

...the 'dictionary definition' of choose includes at least two possibilities. But determinism prohibits twofold possibilities, so the dictionary rules out determinism.

Dan has already admitted that I found definitions of choice which were compatible with determinism, that's why he won't use "choice" but only sticks with "choose." Therefore, if I offer definitions of "choose" which are neutral with respect to determinism, then Dan must admit, to be intellectually honest, that I have indeed fully, finally, and completely driven the last nail in the coffin that houses his (bad to begin with) argument against Calvinism. I will supply such definitions shortly.

Before I do, however, it is important to note that more than a couple dictionaries have, as part of their definition of "choose," this: "to make a choice" (cf. Merriam-Webster's Intermediate Dictionary, p.133; The Princeton Review Essential High School Dictionary. 91, etc.). Thus it seems clear to me that if "choosing" is "to make a choice", and if "to make a choice" is consistent with determinism, then choosing is so consistent.

But given Dan's refusal to admit that his argument was bad, especially when I cited numerous libertarian philosophers who opposed Dan's argument, the above point will not be enough. Neither will this next point, I suppose.

Dan has indicated on his blog that he has learned the most about LFW and how to defend it in its strongest theistic form (Molinism) from William Lane Craig. Now, Dan claims that it is essential to the definition of choice that we be able to choose alternative possibilities. Yet his guru states: "So long as a person's choice is causally undetermined, it is a free choice even if the person is unable to choose the opposite of that choice" (Craig, "The Middle-Knowledge View," in, Foreknowledge: Four Views, IVP, 130). So, even Craig disagrees with Dan.

But as I said, this won't be enough. Over all of the libertarian philosophers who specialize in the field Dan is incompetently dabbling in, Dan trusts the dictionary. So I will now fillet Dan's argument, leaving it dead once and for all.

Dan self-servingly cited some dictionaries that he thinks (remember, even the definitions he pushes can be read in a way that has been friendly to compatibilism) makes his case that "the dictionary" (there's no such thing) defines "choose" strictly in libertarian terms. When he finishes listing them, he confidentially asserts:

I could go on, but you get the point.

Well, no, Dan, we don't "get the point." And not least of all because at least two of his definitions are compatible with "choosing" in a divinely-determined world. For example, Dan cited these two:

1. Merriam-Webster's defines choose as: to select freely and after consideration

2. Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary: to decide what you want from a range of things or possibilities:

The first obviously does allow for compatibilism, unless Dan begs the question. The second does because it is in the form of a disjunction and not a conjunction, thus the "possibilities" is not required (again, this is to grant Dan his "possibilities" point).

But for some reason I think that Dan will not even be convinced by the fact that some of his own cherry-picked dictionaries allow for a "choosing" in a determined world. So let me quote a lot more. Because I like Dan and want to save him from the embarrassment that has become his argument, I went to the bookstore and rounded up a whole bunch of dictionaries. Before I give these definitions it is crucial to recall that when I defined "choice" in similar ways as we will see below, Dan granted their consistency with determinism, he must therefore grant that "choose" is likewise compatible. Before you read these, remember that absolutely crucial to Dan's argument is that all dictionaries, or all reputable ones (I guess), include the ability to actually instantiate an alternative possibility as essential (contrary to libertarian William Lane Craig, as well as most others, but let's noth let that bother us) to the (dictionary?) definition of choose. Keep that in mind.

Below I cite the entire definition (and any second or third or so on, definitions). I have left nothing out, and all sources are docummented.

choose v. (vt) 1. Pick out, select; take by preference. (vt) decide, think fit. (Collins Pocket Dictionary, New York: Harper Collins, 2007, 91)

choose v. 1. Select out of a greater number 2. select one or another 3. decide 4. select as. (The American Century Dictionary, New York: Warner Books, Oxford University Press, 1997, 102)

choose v. 1. Select out of a greater number of things, 2. decide, to prefer, to desire. (Oxford American Dictionary, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, 147)

choose v. 1. to pick. (that was all, cited in, Spell it Right Dictionary, New York: Berlitz Publishing, 2007, 63)

choose v. 1. To pick out one or more from a greater number or group, 2. to make up one's mind; decide or prefer. (Webster's New World Basic Dictionary of American English, Cleveland: Wiley Publishing, 1988, 146)

choose v. 1. To pick out by preference; select 2. to decide or desire 3. to make a choice (The Princeton Review Essential High School Dictionary, New York: Random House, 2002, 91).

choose v. 1. To select freely after consideration 2. to make a choice 3. to see fit (Merriam-Webster's Intermediate Dictionary, Springfield Mass.: Merriam-Webster's Inc., 2004, 133)

choose v. 1. Decide which you are going to take from among a number of people or things. (Barron's Dictionary and Thesaurus, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, 111).

choose v. 1. To select according to preference especially after consideration 2.a. to decide b. to prefer 3. to see fit 4. to make a choice (Merriam-Webster's School Dictionary, Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster's Inc., 2004, 165)

I could keep going, but I trust you get the point. ;-)

And with that, Dan must retract his argument. Not only have I shown that it is far from obvious that all "common men" whoever are libertarian (and bear in mind that Dan has done nothing to substantiate his crucial assumption about all "common men" whoever), I have just refuted the other major crucial assumption of Dan's argument, viz. that "the dictionary" has (actually) "possible" as an essential component to the definition of "choose," which is what makes it (according to him) affirm a libertarian metaphysic. I cited numerous well-respected dictionaries, gathered from the shelves of a "common man" bookstore, Barnes & Noble, that all define choice in a way fully compatible with determinism, as well as two definitions chosen by Dan (for a total of eleven respected dictionaries all coming down on my side of the argument). None of them included te word "possible," a curious fact considering that if Dan is right, these well-respected dictionaries all leave out the "essential" component of "choose"! What hubris.

Not only that, a few of these definitions are so similar to Robert Kane's definitions that this has the effect of refuting another one of Dan's many unargued assumptions: Kane is offering a "technical, philosophical definition" of choice/choose. To see that, let's recall Kane's definition:

Robert Kane: “A choice is the formation of an intention or purpose to do something. It resolves uncertainty and indecision in the mind about what to do” (Robert Kane, “Libertarian Perspectives on Free Agency and Free Will.” Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p.423).

So, not only has Dan's argument been previously refuted by both Hays and I, I have now refuted Dan's argument solely from premises Dan accepts, and has admitted show that dictionary definitions of "choice" are consistent with determinism. On pain of irrationality, and general avoidance of pig-headedness, Dan the Arminian has been compelled to admit that I have defeated his argument.









QED

A PAP Test In Action: Ability to Write a Retraction?

The fact that what looks to be like an obviously false position (backed by what looks to be a terrible argument) could seriously debated for an undetermined length of time is one of those things that turns one off towards philosophy, or theology. On the other hand, it’s one of those phenomena that capture one’s interest in the subject(s). Not least of all is the interesting question about how a rational person could be so wide of the mark about what they take to be fairly obviously the case. When one is pondering such questions, it may be wise to avoid reading Sextus Empiricus or (the older) Peter Unger! One might be tempted to throw up their hands in despair, capitulating to skepticism, saying to oneself, “If I’m wrong about something as obvious as this, what about those things I’m slightly less convinced about?” Thankfully, such a conclusion would be unwarranted, and there are good arguments against it. But we still must admit, it’s an odd phenomena, and not one I plan to address here. For as one philosopher puts it: “In the end, we must confess that we have no idea why there is no established body of metaphysical results. It cannot be denied that this is a fact, and beginning students of metaphysics should keep this fact and its implications in mind” (Van Inwagen, Metaphysics, 12).

Now, as this relates to some of the recent discussions on this blog, the above is even more interesting in the situation of Dan the Arminian. He takes it as “just obvious” that the Bible teaches Libertarian Free Will (LFW). So obvious, in fact, that all one needs to see it is a King James and a Merriam-Webster. The Bible uses the word ‘choice,’ and Merriam-Webster defines ‘choice’ in libertarian fashion, thus the Bible teaches LFW. Now, the argument is a tad better than what I just expressed, but only a tad. In this post, I will make one last public attempt to get Dan to admit that his argument was not all he originally thought it to be. Though I find it generally unprofitable to debate Dan on these matters, I still like him. He is my favorite Arminian epologist, I think. Though I am unsure whether Dan will give in, I trust that most of the people who read this post—Arminian or Calvinist—will be bound to admit that his argument has been defeated. I will attempt to show that his argument fails to do the heavy lifting he wants it to do by: (i) offering several general critiques of his argument, (ii) offering an rebutting defeater¹ of his main premise, and (iii) presenting libertarian philosophers who disagree with Dan. Before this, however, I will present the gist of his argument.

The Basics of Dan’s Argument

Here are some relevant quotes from Dan:

“the dictionary is better at establishing the laymen, common sensical understanding of terms.”

The American Heritage College Dictionary (3rd edition) defines choose as: to select from a number of possible alternatives. (similar definitions available here and here) Determinism includes the idea that preceding causal forces render all our actions necessary such that they cannot be otherwise. So a “predetermined choice” implies an “impossible possibility” and an “inalternate alternative”. Since the bible states that we have wills and choose, determinism isn’t consistent with the bible.”

“So the dictionary definitions and common sense understanding of the terms do seem to rule out determinism.”

“the bible was written by common men and to the common man (i.e. to the people of Israel and the church, not the semi-compatibilist) and it uses the terms choice and choose.”

Putting these choice quotes together, we can construct an argument for Dan's position as something like this:

[1] The Bible uses the words choice and choose.

[2] The Bible was written by and to the common man.

[3] What common man understands the meaning of a word to be is the meaning the Bible applies to that word.

[4] The dictionary is the repository of what the common man means by any (every day) word.

[5] The dictionary defines choice and choose in libertarian fashion.

[6] Therefore, the Bible means choice and choose in a libertarian way.

[7] Determinism does not mean choice and choose in a libertarian way.

[8] The Bible is infallible.

[9] Therefore, determinism is false.

I take it that this is generally the position Dan defended and I critiqued when we debated it a few months ago. I will now demonstrate, in what I take to be the most cogent way I can express my disagreement, what is wrong with Dan’s argument, besides its obvious falsehood.

I. General Criticisms

1. First, what is the referent of “common man?” It appears to function as a static assortment of people. But statistical claims can, and many times do, represent changing assortments. Dan’s argument reminds one of the joke about the statistical report that a pedestrian is hit by a car every twenty minutes, to which comes the witty reply, “He must get awfully tired of that!” Socialists, when condemning the evils of Capitalism, frequently use the same kinds of “static assortment” arguments. These popular-level arguments not only treat all the wealth in the world as static (using the analogy of a finite, “set” pie), but the groups “poor” and “rich” as static too. However, these groups are changing. At times, those who were once in the “rich” group may find themselves, for various reasons, in the “poor” group, and vice versa. Most Americans, for instance, do not stay within the same income bracket for even ten years. So, these statistical claims are often nebulous, contentless concepts. They are not static. I dare say that how a “common man” in a stoic society defined terms would not be the same as how a “common man” in an Epicurean society defined terms. Forgetting this for now, I will proceed to use the term “common man”, though I question its referent.

2. In line with the above, it is certainly plausible to imagine the “common man” holding to determinism, perhaps through watching some fancy science shows on the Discovery channel. It can also be debated whether the “common man” is consistent here. Some might be inclined to think that the “common man” holds to some kind of weird combination of determinism and libertarianism, not bothering to reflect on the tension.

3. What if the “common man” is wrong? Dan cannot beg the question here, and so his argument could wind up being an argument for the errancy of Scripture since Scripture would be asserting as true what is false.

4. I find it odd to claim that the dictionary sets forth the “common man” understanding of words since the “common man” consults the dictionary more or just as much as everyone else. Wouldn’t they just consult their own minds? Furthermore, why do they so often find out that they are wrong in how they or their friends have been using a word?

5. I deny the claim that the Bible was (solely?) written “by and to” the “common man”. Some very uncommon men wrote the Bible, e.g., Kings, doctors, highly educated Pharisees, etc. In addition, some uncommon men were meant to be recipients too.

6. Apropos 5. I find it very odd, especially coming from an Arminian, to claim that, “the Bible was not written to semi-compatibilists.” I guess the Arminian God is not as fair and omni-loving as we have been told! Calvinists may have "limited atonement" (i.e., particular redemption), but on the above view, Arminians may have a "Limited Intended Audience" for the book that contains salvific (rather than merely general) revelation from God.

7. The “common man” ostensibly defines other words in such a way that we do not think the Bible means what they mean by it. The examples here are too obvious, and numerous, to list.

8. Dan is not an Open Theist, yet Greg Boyd uses the exact same type of argument to point out that the Bible assumes the future is open, unsettled (Boyd, Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, pp. 17-18). Boyd claims that when we think of “deliberating,” we presuppose that the future is open, not settled (and if it is open, God does not know it).

9. Crucial to Dan’s argument is the claim that “common man” are all, each and every, libertarians. If Dan claims that some “common men” are not indeterminist, but determinist, then he defeats one of his premises, or makes the Bible speak in contradictions. To spell this point out, recall that Dan says, “The Bible is written by and to the common man, it means what they mean, since they mean certain words libertarianly, then the Bible so means those words.” Yet if we allow some (even one?) of the “common men” to whom the Bible was written to be determinists, then it must mean what they mean by the words that are the topic of our discussion. However, since there are indeterminist “common men”, then the Bible must also mean what they mean by the words we are discussing! Therefore, Dan must assume that each and every “common man” is a libertarian, which I find highly implausible (and which I will show is false, below). (This also would imply that the "dictionary" is not the sole source for "common mans'" definitions of various (every day) words.)

Given that many of the premises are false, then Dan must admit that his argument is unsound. Besides that small problem, we saw reason to reject the argument as resting on the concept of static assortments, which is false and leaves us with a nebulous concept, as well as requiring one to accept either the (false) view that all “common men” are libertarians, or that the Bible means contradictions. Unfortunately, there are more problems.

II. A Rebutting Defeater for one of Dan’s Main Premises: Folk Beliefs Regarding Free Will

In point nine above we saw that it is a crucial assumption of Dan’s argument that all common men are libertarians. If I find even one that is not, his argument seems debunked. I frequently asked Dan to provide the sociological data that underwrites his assumption. But he never did this, presumably because he thinks it is so blindingly obvious. However, the crucial assumption is false, or at least not nearly as obvious as Dan wants it to be.

See, rather than speculating from their own intuitions (shared by others within an Arminian community) and their own phenomenology, some have actually studied folk concepts of free will. Philosophers Eddy Nahmias, Jason Turner, Steve Morris had conducted some studies a few years ago in which they asked two groups of forty laypeople, and one of twenty-five (FW1, FW2, and FW3, respectively), a set of questions. For our purposes, I’ll just cite the results to question two. The second question put to "common men" was:

• Do you think that our actions can be free if all of them are entirely determined by our genes, our neuro-physiology, and our upbringing?

Here are the results:

FW1: 30% said yes

FW2: 48% said yes

FW3: 52% said yes

You will have to read the article to see the reasons for the different percentages. What is clear, though, is that the empirical evidence makes Dan’s argument imply that the Bible is contradictory. To wiggle out of this, he could say that the Bible was only addressed to libertarian “common men” (just like it was not addressed to semi-compatibilists), but I will assume that no one will be persuaded by such a response. Furthermore, the above also wrote a joint paper on the subject in which they claim: “The data seem to support compatibilist descriptions of the phenomenology more than libertarian descriptions. We conclude that the burden is on libertarians to find empirical support for their more demanding metaphysical theories with their more controversial phenomenological claims.”

Previously, Dan had claimed, “My primary argument to Paul was that the common sense notion of “choose” includes the ability to choose non-X, so determinists can’t consistently use the common sense notion of choose” (emphasis mine).

Considering my arguments so far, Dan needs to retract his argument. Unfortunately for Dan, there is still more problems.

III. Libertarian Philosophers Who Disagree With Dan

III. A. My initial response

In response to Dan’s argument from Merriam-Webster, I cited libertarian Robert Kane’s definition of ‘choice’ and concluded that it certainly seemed possible that “choosing” can happen on determinism. In response, and largely because he followed the highly unreliable “Robert,” Dan rejected Kane’s definition for two reasons: (i) Kane is not a substance dualist (Dan even went so far as to assume that Kane must not even be a Christian because of this!), and (ii) the dictionary shows that PAP is essential to the definition of choice.

In response I pointed out that (i) was irrelevant, and (ii) had a couple responses: (a) it seems irresponsible to run to the dictionary and claim that ‘choice’ must have a PAP element to it because Merriam-Webster says so (however, I also cited numerous dictionaries that didn’t include a PAP element), and (b) even so, this is still not enough since many compatibilists can and have held to a notion of PAP. For example, in the above paper by Nahmias et al., we read regarding the PAP phenomenology:

“For instance, Adolf Grunbaum writes: ‘Let us carefully examine the content of the feeling that on a certain occasion we could have acted other than the way we did … This feeling simply discloses that we were able to act in accord with our strongest desire at that time, and that we could indeed have acted otherwise if a different motive had prevailed at the time’ (in Lehrer, 1960, p. 149). J.S. Mill agrees: ‘When we think of ourselves hypothetically as having acted otherwise than we did, we always suppose a difference in the antecedents: we picture ourselves having known something we did not know … or as having desired something … more or less than we did’ (in Boyle et al., 1976, p. 49).”

Nevertheless, all of my counter arguments were to no avail. It seemed Dan had found his perfect argument for LFW, and from that point on, refused to be budged (some would say, “listen to reason”).

III. B. Libertarians who do not find PAP as just a definitional matter

At this point, I would like to take my response here further. In response to (III: ii), I’ll cite what numerous libertarian philosophers have said about Kane’s definition, and most (or all) of them are dualists of some kind. I will draw from various emails or email exchanges I had with some prominent philosophers (Alvin Plantinga, Stuart Goetz, William Hasker, Robert Kane, Charles Taliaferro, and Kevin Timpe). But first, a couple of statements by libertarians who deny (libertarian understandings) of PAP (or that it is part of the “definition” of choice) as essential to libertarianism who I did not interact with.

William Lane Craig: “In that case his choosing A is entirely free, even though the man is literally unable to choose B, since the electrodes do not function at all and have no effect on his choice of A. What makes his choice free is the absence of any causally determining factors of his choosing A.”

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=6209

Dave Hunt: “It is true that God’s foreknowing Adam’s action, like his causing Adam’s action, leaves Adam with no alternative possibilities . . . divine foreknowledge provides compelling grounds for rejecting (PAP)” (Dave Hunt, Divine Foreknowledge, Four Views, 88, 90).

Timothy O’Connor: Time and time again you see O’Connor claim that the debate is about whether one makes the choices he does libertarianly freely or not. O’Connor understands that even on determinism one can choose, one just doesn’t choose libertarianly freely. If ‘choice’ just meant PAP, then O’Connor would claim that on determinism, no one chooses at all. But he doesn’t (see O’Connor, “Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories.” Oxford Handbook of Freewill, ch.15)

III. C. Kane’s Definition of choice and placing the dictionary on holy ground

First, honest libertarians admit that “common men” find indeterminacy problematic at the intuitive level as well, thus Kane:

Robert Kane: "The first step is to question the intuitive connection in people's minds between ‘indeterminisms being involved in something’ and ‘its happening merely as a matter of chance or luck’ (Kane, Robert. "Libertarianism." Four Views on Free Will. Fischer et al., 33).

This means that if we are going to be consistent with the "common man" argument, then we make the Bible problematic if it assumes "common man's" understanding of action. Certainly we wouldn't want to affirm that the Bible means that people make choices due to luck and then are held morally responsible for how things luckily turn out! So, this point makes Dan's argument a wash.

Second, Dan thinks PAP is intuitive, same with the ought-implies-can principle. Granting that, as honest libertarians have pointed out, Frankfurt counter-examples, which rebut PAPs and ought-implies-can, are equally intuitive. Thus David Copp,

David Copp: "...Frankfurt's argument is troubling and puzzling because it brings intuitively plausible counterexamples against an intuitively plausible principle. It forces us to deal with clashing intuitions" (Copp, David. "'Ought Implies Can,' Blameworthiness, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities." Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ed. Widerker and McKenna, 265).

This makes it even less plausible to pin your hopes on the beliefs of “common men.” I have never ran across a "layman" who didn't respond to a Frankfurt Counter Example by saying something like: "I guess moral responsibility doesn't demand ability to do otherwise."

But, moving along, what is Kane’s definition of 'choice' and what is so problematic about it?

Robert Kane: “A choice is the formation of an intention or purpose to do something. It resolves uncertainty and indecision in the mind about what to do” (Robert Kane, “Libertarian Perspectives on Free Agency and Free Will.” Oxford Handbook of Free Will, p.423).

It is instructive to note the surrounding context. Kane offers this definition in response to some determinists who seem to define ‘choice’ as something determined. He notes this is to solve the debate by fiat! Aside from question-begging, there’s no good reason to accept the definition. One would hope that Dan heeds Kane’s words of wisdom.

Now, Dan thought that part of Kane’s problem is that since he is a physicalist (or at least defends a libertarianism that does not need some kind of immaterial soul); his definition of ‘choice’ was couched in terms to protect his physicalism. In response to whether Kane should change his definition, let’s see what Kane himself says:

R. Kane: “I wouldn't change my definition. The idea that you can prove libertarianism or compatibilism or any other view on fw true by defining terms such as choice in a rigged way is whistling in the dark. We could still make choices in a determined world. We would just not be *ultimately responsible* for the choices we did make.” (Email correspondence)

But since Kane is a physicalist, I guess this still doesn’t count. So let’s see what two prominent non-physicalists have to say on the matter.

A. Plantinga: “Kane's definition sounds right to me.” (Email correspondence)

W. Hasker: “Kane’s definition is fine; I see no need to add to it.” (Email correspondence)

The problem here is that Dan cannot accuse these men of “physicalism,” or being cryptic determinists (as he indicated of Kane).

C. Taliaferro and S. Goetz thought that the biggest problem is that Kane’s definition doesn’t get to the essence of libertarianism, which is fine, but that’s not what Kane was doing. He was defining ‘choice.’ Furthermore, Goetz disagrees with Dan’s entire method, he writes,

“I can’t speak for Charles, but I would not base my belief in libertarianism on passages in the Bible. And I wouldn’t argue against your Calvinism from biblical texts. I believe that the Bible doesn’t teach anything about the issue of free will. It wasn’t written for that purpose, just as it wasn’t written for the purpose of teaching us whether or not we have souls. In short, I believe the Bible is not a philosophical text written to teach philosophy. It doesn’t fail to teach Calvinism because it teaches libertarianism. It simply doesn’t teach anything about the matter of free will.” (Email correspondence)

Lastly, I had the pleasure of corresponding with Kevin Timpe, who also doesn’t think the Bible is a metaphysical textbook. So, in response to the type of arguments advanced by Dan, as well as Kane’s definition, Timpe had this to say:

“On the whole, I think that Kane’s definition is pretty good. I’m inclined to think that there is no single thing as choice, but rather a variety of similar mental acts that go by that name. My dog, for example, certainly appears to decide which toy to play with, which involves various pro-attitudes and perhaps something like beliefs. And I can see no reason why this would be undermined if it turns out that determinism is true. Likewise, I’m pretty sure that I make decisions, and I don’t think I’d have any reason to change that belief if it turned out that determinism were true. So I’m inclined against building the falsity of determinism into the definition of choice. What is at issue, regarding determinism, is not choice per se but free choice. And I think that there are good reasons to think that there can’t be free choices if determinism is true.” (Email correspondence)

To which I responded: “Thank you for your response. I've found that it libertarians grant that determinists do choose even if determinism is true, they just think the choice isn't fee, as you said. This would make the issue depend on more substantive metaphysical issues than the mere definition of choice.”

Dr. Timpe wrote back: “The content of your first paragraph seems right to me.” (Email correspondence)

And so along with the other arguments I offered above, we can see that some of the biggest guns on Dan’s side disagree with him both about the dictionary thing as well as about Kane’s definition. I don’t know about Dan, but it would make me pretty uncomfortable to be at odds with some of the biggest guns on my own side. Heck, it makes me uncomfortable being at odds with Plantinga on almost anything, and I’m not even a libertarian!

Conclusion

I believe Dan’s argument for Arminianism and LFW to be flawed in sundry ways. I have presented my reasons why, and they appear fatal to his argument. His premises seem far too controversial to draw any confident conclusion from, his “primary” argument is false, and he is at odds with some of the biggest thinkers libertarianism has to offer. Dan should concede this point and move on to his (many) other arguments he has for LFW and against Calvinism. Even though I think none of them is successful, each and every are, unfortunately, better than the argument we looked at here.
____________________________
¹ On undercutting defeaters see Michael Sudduth’s entry on Epistemological Defeaters on the IEP, http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/ep-defea.htm

Determined Choosings

It has been claimed by some laymen Arminian epologists (I have not seen this claim by any reputable Arminian philosopher or theologian) that if X is determined by God, then X cannot be a choice. In other words, if it were determined that I eat Cheerios at time t, then although I took the box of Cheerios at t rather than the Lucky Charms, even deliberating about which one to take, reaching a decision for reasons, responsive to reasons to the contrary, and figuring that instantiating a Cheerios-filled world was better than a Lucky-Charms-filled world, I nevertheless didn't choose the Cheerios at t.

Now, that the above wasn't a choice is highly counterintuitive to many people, so it seems. But besides its highly counterintuitive flavor, it has another defect; that of contradicting God's word.

To explain. I take it that it will be granted that some people choose when they will die (e.g., suicides, euthanized &c.). For example, it is fairly obvious that there has been at least one person S, that decided to die at time t. S chose to die at t. For example, perhaps S was terminally ill and brought Jack Kevorkian in to administer a lethal dose of potassium chloride at t, which would kill S at t1. Therefore, S chose to die at t1. Call the above the Suicide Pact, SP. SP simply states that:

[SP] Some people choose to die at t

For those who hold to biblical inspiration, [SP] demonstrates that one can choose to do what is determined he will do. For example, take Job 14:5:

Since man's days are determined,
The number of his months is with You;
You have appointed his limits, so that he cannot pass.

It seems fairly obvious that some people have chosen to die in three months, after they say their goodbyes and do that "last thing". So, it seems fairly obvious that some people have chosen to number their months to X. But, X was also determined. Stated another way: God determined S to die at t, and S choose to die at t. Or, stated formally:

Let

H = a Human being.

D = the months of the human's days are Determined at t

S = a sane being that chooses to commit Suicide at t

(x) (Hx ⊃ Dx)
(∃x) (Sx ∙ Hx) / ∴ (∃x) (Sx ∙ Dx)

One can deny either Job 14:5, or that some humans choose to die at t (where t = a month). Neither seems to be an attractive option for the orthodox Christian. Therefore, it looks as if one can choose to do what is determined he will do. It should also be easy to see that with some minor changes we can add that some people chose to die according to a free choice, and that some people who die according to a free choice are morally responsible for their actions; that, therefore, freedom and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism if one grants inerrancy. All orthodox Christians grant inerrancy. Therefore, all orthodox Christrians ought to be compatibilists.

They're All Gonna Laugh At You

"If you say to people that you make choices, no one will bat an eyebrow. But if you tell people that you never ever have a choice, that you may believe that you can actualize different possibilities, but this belief is ***always mistaken***, then they will, if they have common sense, look at you strangely and laugh at you as a skeptic of obvious reality." - Robert

Though I still want to see the actual statistics that back up these mere claims about how all laymen think, I have met some people who have thought this way - though without the sophistic language employed by Robert, viz., "if they have common sense, look at you strangely and laugh at you as a skeptic of obvious reality." I mean, perhaps that's what he does, but that's because he's a "loving Arminian." Furthermore, notice the fallacy of special pleading. If the "man on the street" doesn't fulfill Robert's prediction, that's because he lacks common sense! But you can't be too harsh on Robert. Sophistry and schoolyard fallacies are about all he has to work with considering what he's trying to defend from the Bible.

At any event, back to those people who have thought it odd that they never have genuine access to alternative possibilities. When you ask them why this is, they usually respond that because if you didn't have genuine access to alternative possibilities then you couldn't have done other than you did. When you ask them why this is problematic, they respond with something to the effect that either they were (a) forced to act, or (b) couldn't be held responsible.

At this point simply explaining that determinism/compatibilism doesn't implying forcing against your will - as action theorists on both sides admit - is enough to have them see that the first worry isn't a worry anymore. With regard to (b), I have found that by explaining Frankfurt counter-examples the "man on the street" finds these examples equally intuitive - as many libertarians even have admitted the intuitive appeal to Frankfurt counters - and thus (b) ceases to be a problem for them.

Look, the thing about intuitions is that they are pre-reflective. They are prior to reasoning. The interesting questions come into play when we are asked to think about our intuitions. To spell them out. At this point what we are trying to do is make our intuitions attractive. I maintain that most laymen I have spoke to about this admit that they fail to make their "ability to do otherwise" intuitions attractive. I usually hear, "Yeah, I guess I had never really thought about this." So, what the Arminian is claiming is that his view is supported by what people believe prior to thinking about it. That's an odd form of apologetic. Perhaps it's assumed to be more potent if indexed to claims about getting laughed at.

They're all gonna laugh at you.



(P.S. You can comment on this post, I don't know why the comment link is hidden.)

Merriam-Webster Said It, That Settles It!

Dan responds again, still trying to prove Arminianism and libertarian free will from the dictionary.

He titles his post, Was the bible written to the common man or semi-compatibilist?. It was written to both, Dan. What, do you think God is biased against a group? He wouldn't address a "love letter" to them? That's not very loving of our Arminian God.

Leaving that aside, again there's not much to respond to, again, so this will be brief.

Dan recognizes he bypassed what I argued the 21st century common man takes to be the meaning of certain terms, and what I argued the specialists in the field of action theory defined choice as. Ignoring that distinction rendered all his posts a non-starter. But, no fear, we have an ad hoc answer here. Dan says that, " if Paul admits the common man thinks of choice as libertarian, he should address the fact that the bible was written by common men and to the common man (i.e. to the people of Israel and the church, not the semi-compatiblist) and it uses the terms choice and choose."

Dan's statement is hopelessly naïve. First, Even if I granted that 21st century common man understands choice in a libertarian way (note we need to define 'common man,' we need to see the sociological reports; indeed, next thing we know Dan will be trying to prove Arminianism from the 2010 US Census!), that doesn't imply that X-century BC Jews thought that way. Indeed, one would think it rather easy to come up with things that were just taken for granted, the "common" way to think, that we (Americans? Chinese? Italians? Ugandans?) do not take for granted today. One example might be the common man's belief that the Messiah would come and serve as a political ruler, overseeing a massive physical army. Another might be the foolishness of the gospel. The gospel is counter common sense. Second, it is common knowledge that at different times common men held different worldviews. In fatalistic Greek societies, you would be hard-pressed to find those congenial to Dan's understanding of terms. Third, it is a slender reed indeed to hand a defense of libertarianism on this common man argument. Dan must grant the possibility that in an increasingly secular society, given the state of public education, and given the direction science is heading; the "common man" will believe this: "All things are physically determined with generalizations and conditionals having 100% probabilities associated with them." Dan must grant this possibility. Since the common man would hold that all is determined in the above way, would Dan then adjust his understanding of the Bible, reasoning that the common men back then thought the same? Fourth, it is nothing other than egregious question begging to claim that the biblical authors thought that libertarianism was true. Given Calvinistic interpretations of many of the OT passages, they would have held to divine determinism. And given that we believe that the God of the Bible is most accurately grasped by a Calvinistic understanding, and given that the writers wrote what God wanted to convey, then God would not want to convey libertarianism. Fifth, as I argued from Kane, the common man also has problems with indeterminate happenings. Dan is cheating. Dan needs to argue, if he is going to be consistent, that "The Bible was written to the common man, and not to agent causalists (e.g., O'Connor), event-causalists (e.g., Kane), or non-causalist (e.g., Ginet) views! So, Dan's argument here is problematic on numerous levels. Indeed, I'd go so far as to say his rejoinder to me is obviously false.

I also marshaled numerous dictionary definitions of 'choice' and 'choose' that do not demand libertarianism. And, I'd add it is ridiculous to suppose that any concept in action theory was even intended to be broached by the authors of those dictionaries. Nevertheless, Dan focuses on one of my definitions, leaving the others undefeated. Dan writes that the problem with my Princeton definition is that "Alternatives can be chosen. This is why I argued that a predetermined choice entails an impossible possibility and inalternate alternative." But the dictionary doesn't mention the word "can" and Dan also ignores hypothetical compatibilists. Is he going to argue that the dictionary weighs in on classical compatibilism?! Furthermore, compatibilists would agree that a different past, or decree, renders those alternatives the possible ones chosen. Is Dan going to argue that the dictionary weighed in on this?! When Dan says, "impossible" what does he mean? Given the decree of God, the alternative is not something that can genuinely be accessed. But there could be other possible decrees. So, what does he mean? And, can he argue that the dictionary supports this? Dan even admits that he doesn't "recall using the term 'genuine access to'" possibilities. Right, and that defeats his dictionary argument.

Lastly, Dan makes a non-sequitur. He says, "Again, if determinism is true, given the causal forces at play, I cannot choose or do counterfactuals." But, that doesn't mean you didn't choose to do what you did. And, again, if libertarianism is true, given the luck, I cannot choose counterfactuals. Choosing requires a certain amount of control that libertarianism doesn't afford. Dan disagrees. Oh well.

Again, Dan doesn't advance the discussion. Indeed, he renders it more problematic. He's making the apologetic resources of Arminianism look rather thin, perhaps flaccid. But, his assessment is, "As for not advancing the discussion, it’s true I go no further than to show determinism is unbiblical." Yeah, he's doing that from the dictionary. Let's cut this argument's head off and be done with it. Citing Dan's favorite, Dictionary.com:

Jesus

1. Also called Jesus Christ, Christ Jesus, Jesus of Nazareth. born 4? b.c., crucified a.d. 29?, the source of the Christian religion.
2. (“the Son of Sirach”) the author of the Apocryphal book of Ecclesiasticus, who lived in the 3rd century b.c.
3. Christian Science. the supreme example of God's nature expressed through human beings.
4. Also, Je⋅sús  /Sp. hɛˈsus/ Show Spelled Pronunciation [Sp. he-soos] Show IPA Pronunciation . a male given name.
–interjection 5. (used as an oath or strong expression of disbelief, dismay, awe, disappointment, pain, etc.)

The dictionary doesn't say Jesus is the God-man, ergo, he isn't.

The grand fruit of Dan's labors.

Eisogeting the Dictionary

Dan responded to my stuff on choice and libertarianism below here.

I'll confine myself to a few brief comments:

1. He continues to conflate what I argued the "man on the street" held. I indexed that to the common man's conception that indeterminism rules out responsibility and control. Dan acts as if I said the common man think the term choice doesn't present genuine access to alternative possibilities. Thus he is arguing against a point I never made. I tried to make this clear in my last response. Dan seems to want to ignore it. As such, there's not much else to say. My point was that if libertarians are going to use the "common man" rhetoric, they can't turn around and deny it when it comes to what the "common man" thinks about indeterministic happeneings. Stated another way, what's sauced for the goose is sauce for the gander.

2. In the dictionaries 'possibilities' are vague. Dan seems to eisogete "genuine access to" into all the definitions. There's no warrant to do this other than by begging the question in favor of indeterminism.

3. My definitions of 'choice' do not rule out determinism in the least. That was what we were talking about. Dan wants to now talk about "choosing." This gets into my "have" and "make" distinction I've made many times now. Dan doesn't seem willing to take this into consideration.

4. it is not clear that "choose" selects for libertarianism as Dan wants to believe:

Princeton

S: (v) choose, take, select, pick out (pick out, select, or choose from a number of alternatives)
S: (v) choose, prefer, opt (select as an alternative over another) "I always choose the fish over the meat courses in this restaurant";
S: (v) choose (see fit or proper to act in a certain way; decide to act in a certain way) "She chose not to attend classes and now she failed the exam"

I don't see how any of this undermines determinism. There is no claim made here that the alternatives are things I have genuine access to. That I can equally instantiate any of them Dan must eisogete the dictionary.

Wikionary:

VerbInfinitive
to choose
Third person singular
chooses
Simple past
chose
Past participle
chosen
Present participle
choosing

to choose (third-person singular simple present chooses, present participle choosing, simple past chose, past participle chosen)

To elect.
He was chosen as president in 1990
To pick.
I chose a nice, ripe apple from the bowl.
To decide to act in a certain way.
I chose to walk to work today.

Again, there's nothing here incompatible with determinism unless one reads libertarianism into the definitions.

Websters:

transitive verb
1 a: to select freely and after consideration b: to decide on especially by vote : elect
2 a: to have a preference for b: decide

Again, nothing her inconsistent with determinism. Of course there is if you read "freely" as "libertarian freedom," but Webster's doesn't mention that. So if Dan thinks "choose" here undermines determinism it can only be because he's eisogeting, again.

I think that's enough with the dictionaries.

I have made my case. Dan doesn't seem to have advanced the discussion. I doubt he'll retract his now falsified claims about determinism, but I hope he will. Arminianism and libertarian free will seem to be too precious. There's no point to discuss when one can't admit the obvious.

An Underwhelming Response

Dan responds...

Paul cites two books written by libertarian philosophers to demonstrate that choice doesn’t demand a libertarian understanding of the term.

In response, first off quoting philosophers is helpful, but the dictionary is better at establishing the laymen, common sensical understanding of terms. So the response doesn’t make contact with the objection. Second, it doesn’t seem that the quotes Mantra provides support his position.

1. "Mantra?"

2. It is well known that the dictionary is horrible in discussions like this. The dictionary is not normative. It simply reports how words have been used. But as long as this game is being played:

Princeton:

S: (n) choice, pick, selection (the person or thing chosen or selected) "he was my pick for mayor"

S: (n) choice, selection, option, pick (the act of choosing or selecting) "your choice of colors was unfortunate"; "you can take your pick"

Wiki:

"Choice consists of the mental process of thinking involved with the process of judging the merits of multiple options and selecting one of them for action."

Wikionary

i. An option; a decision; an opportunity to choose or select something.
ii. One selection or preference; that which is chosen or decided; the outcome of a decision.
iii. The ice cream sundae is a popular choice for dessert.
iv. Anything that can be chosen.

Websters:

1: the act of choosing : selection
2: power of choosing : option

Cambridge Dictionary:

Choice - an act or the possibility of choosing:

Choose - to decide what you want from a range of things or possibilities" (note, the possibilitites do not need to be able to be chosen.)

Oxford:

Choice - noun 1 an act of choosing. 2 the right or ability to choose. 3 a range from which to choose. 4 something chosen

Yeah, so now what, Dan? Got beat by your own method. Intellectual integrity demands that you now issue a statement to the effect that "choice" doesn't necessitate a libertarian understanding going off the dictionary alone; sola Designo.

Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro in their book Naturalism say choice is an undetermined mental action and when we make choices we typically explain our making them in terms of reasons, where a reason is a purpose, end, or goal for choosing. Paul’s quote omits the word “undetermined”1, so contrary to Paul’s conclusion, Goetz and Taliaferro were teaching a libertarian understanding of the term “choice”.

And of course this was admitted in my post. Dan is acting like he's making a point my post didn't make. Furthermore, I argued for the exclusion of that term, Dan failed to grapple with that argument. Thus, he doesn't move the discussion foreword and seems to bank on the laziness of his Arminian readers such that they will not read what I wrote but think he scored a point by pointing out something that I concealed which is detrimental to my argument.

Next Paul quotes Kane’s essay in Four Views on Free Will: A choice is the formation of an intention or purpose to do something. It resolves uncertainty and indecision in the mind about what to do. (Kane, For Views on Free Will, ed. Sosa, Blackwell, 2008, p33)

While Kane certainly adds a lot of insight into the discussion about determinism and freewill, his theory is somewhat exotic, so I have to come back to the point that perhaps this is not the best way to establish the common sense understanding of choice.

1. Scales: Dan/Kane. Um...., next question

2. In fact, Kane speaks directly to guys like Dan and his introspective argument when he writes: "The point is that introspective evidence does not give us the whole story about free will. If we stay on the surface and just consider what our immediate experience tells us, free will, I believe, is bound to appear mysterious, as it has appeared to so many people through the centuries" (Kane, Four Views, 34).

3. So, Kane says that your common sense understanding is confused, and anyone who thinks about it would see that. At best, Dan argues for the confusion or shallowness of the layman to function as putative evidence against Calvinism. Is that the reed Arminianism wants to hang much of their rhetorical argument on? Slender indeed.

4. As a side note, I wasn't trying to offer a "layman's" understanding of choice. The "layman" part of the post had to do with the equally intuitive notion that many have to the effect that indeterminism limits control, and thus responsibility. That was my "layman" point. Dan failed to grasp the subtleties.

In short, Kane’s theory is that while we are simultaneously making efforts to choose two different things, indeterministic chaos in the neural networks of the brain hinders both efforts. The “winner” is the choice. For Kane, the indeterminism isn’t in the source of the choice, but rather it’s an obstacle to making choices. (35)

And of course this is only half true. Kane allows for a determinism later on in life, so long as the agent formed her will by a will-setting action. Kane would admit that these already-formed agents choose deterministically. So, Kane knows that "choice" doesn't "always" imply "libertarianism." The point about the indeterminism kicked up in the neural networks and the choice the agent makes is that the agent tries for some action A, succeeds in hitting A despite the indeterministic element of chance involved, and thus can be held responsible for A, and, if this choice was will-setting, the agent is ultimately responsible for all the choices made down the line, even the deterministic ones. This too was discussed in footnote two of my post. Dan seems to have failed to grasp both Kane and myself here.

Kane’s explanation is overly physical as opposed to relying on an immaterial soul. (25) But Christians hold that man’s will is part of his immaterial soul.

What's ironic about this is that Kane is a Christian!

I mean, has Dan been living under a rock for over a decade? Has he heard of constitutionalists? Christian physicalists? Corcoran, Merricks, Murphy, van Inwagen, &c.? Does he think man is justified by faith and belief in dualism alone? But Arminians always tell us they don't add works to salvation. (I couldn't resist.)

The American Heritage College Dictionary (3rd edition) defines choose as: to select from a number of possible alternatives. (similar definitions available here and here) Determinism includes the idea that preceding causal forces render all our actions necessary such that they cannot be otherwise. So a “predetermined choice” implies an “impossible possibility” and an “inalternate alternative”. Since the bible states that we have wills and choose, determinism isn’t consistent with the bible.

1. I've already discussed the distinction between having and making choices. Given this, the above definition is vague. I do make choices out of a pile of things - the alternatives. But, this does not mean that all the alternatives are possibilities I have, where 'have' means each is a genuine alternative possibility I could instantiate.

2. Though I have no problem dissing "can do otherwise," Dan should know that classical compatibilists would take issue with his question begging epithet here.

3. Dan would have to make clear what verses he is thinking about. But at the very least, I highly doubt the Hebrews had the American Heritage College Dictionary at their disposal.

4. Since "A choice is the formation of an intention or purpose to do something. It resolves uncertainty and indecision in the mind about what to do" (Kane, Four Views 33), and this is consistent with determinism, and the Bible says we choose, therefore, determinism is consistent with the Bible.

At any rate, in closing, it seems Dan just needed to get something off by way of response. If not, then I don't understand the time spent on his response as it offered nothing substantive which would move the discussion foreword. Thus, the response seemed underwhelming. To recap my initial argument:

[1] Top libertarian theorists do not define choice as necessiating libertarianism.

[2] Top libertarians have noted counter-intuitive aspects of their theory, things the ordinary, man on the street thinks about indeterminate or uncaused happenings.

[3] Therefore, choice doesn't necessitate a libertarian understanding and libertarianism has its own elements that run contrary to "common sense."

I Chose to Write This Post

Amateur Arminian epologists frequently resort to rhetoric and arguments from shame to cover over what is otherwise lacking in their defense and promulgation of Arminian theology. Probably 99% of all their critiques of Calvinism stem from the assumption of libertarian free will. That's the bedrock as far as critiquing Calvinism goes. They tell us that they don't stand upon this rock when arguing for Arminianism, I'll grant them that for argument's sake. But I cannot grant that it isn't a bedrock for launching arguments against Calvinism.

Here's two popular examples of what I mean: First, we frequently hear that "choice" just means some kind of libertarianism about the will. The second is like unto it: "You Calvinists must necessarily go against laymen, common sensical understandings of certain terms. Your position is counter-intuitive. Ordinary folk laugh at you."

Besides the fact that there's nothing solid here out of which to form a good argument for libertarianism, there are (at least) two other problems. The first is that the best libertarians writing today know better that to stack the deck this way when defining things like 'choice'. The second is that -- granting the statistical point about what laymen believe, as I haven't seen the sociologists' studies -- there is an equally counter-intuitive element to indeterminism held by most "lay folk." I'll make my case by citing libertarians on these two points, in the above order.

Defining Choice

First up are libertarians Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro. In their book Naturalism they say that,

A choice is a ... mental action, and when we make choices we typically explain our making them in terms of reasons, where a reason is a purpose, end, or goal for choosing. A reason is a conceptual entity, what medieval thinkers called an ens rationis (literally "object of reason") or intentional object, which is about or directed at the future and opative in mood (expressing a wish that the world be a certain way that is good. To put this point in technical terms, while a reason is not a desire or a belief, its opative character stems from its being grounded in the content of a desire or belief that represents a future state of affairs and something to be brought about by a more temporally proximate chosen action of the person who has the desire or belief. An explanation of a choice in terms of a reason or purpose is a teleological explanation.¹

And next up is one of the premier libertarian action theorists writing today, Robert Kane. This quote is taken from his chapter in the Four Views on Free Will book. Kane says that,

A choice is the formation of an intention or purpose to do something. It resolves uncertainty and indecision in the mind about what to do.²

It therefore looks to be the case that simply saying "choice" doesn't demand a libertarian understanding of the term. It is duplicitous for Arminian epologists to act as if it does. It is actually rather like those atheists or cult members who say that Bible "translation" over the centuries necessarily implies that error must have crept in. After all, it's just "common knowledge" that that is what happens in a (say) game of telephone.

Counter-intuitive

Kane points out that it seems intuitive to many people that if indeterminism is involved in some happening then that makes it a chance or luck happening. He writes,

The first step is to question the intuitive connection in people's minds between "indeterminisms being involved in something" and "its happening merely as a matter of chance or luck."³

It should be fairly obvious, though, that we never hear this common and intuitive understanding of indeterminism as incompatible with control being admitted by Arminian epologists. They obviously don't think indeterminism demands luck, chance, or loss of control. They think if ordinary folk just thought more clearly on the issue, they would agree. But, granting the point for the moment, the Calvinist also says that ordinary folk really don't mean what they say and they wouldn't say it if they would think through the issues a bit more clearly.

Conclusion

Having exposed this popular Arminian epologist three-card Monte, I hope to not see it trotted out on this blog anymore.


__________________________

¹ Goetz & Taliaferro, Naturalism, Eerdmans, 2008, pp. 26-27. In interest of full disclosure, the authors put the word 'undetermined' where I had the ellipsis. This word I took to be question begging and there was no argument for the inclusion of that word as being a necessary part of the definition throughout the entire book. And, in fact, the only argument given against determinism was against physicalist determination. So, I could have left "undetermined" in the quote and added "physically" and not undermined divine-determination in the least. As further justification of my reasoning here, I refer the reader to something else said by the above authors. In explicating the Argument from Reason against naturalism, the authors point to a subtle qualification of their argument. To wit: "Like Lewis, we believe one must be careful here. It is not the mere existence of a cause for a belief that discredits it. Rather, it is the kind of cause that discredits it" (ibid, 121, emphasis original). Furthermore, the authors argue that physicalistic determination is not irreducibly normative and teleological, and so it is problematic. It is clear that this is not the case with divine-determination. God's determining is irreducibly normative and teleological. Obviously, this brings up many questions, but I think it justifies my exclusion of what I took to be a throw-away term in their definition. Lastly, if 'undetermined' is meant to cover the field, then it's false. Libertarians like Robert Kane would agree with me. But, if I am wrong, then the authors' context demands, if we are to be precise, that "physically" be associated with "undetermined," and so it's a zero-sum either way.

² Kane, For Views on Free Will, ed. Sosa, Blackwell, 2008, p. 33. Again, in interest of full disclosure, Kane would argue that indeterminism is necessary for ultimate responsibility, UR, to be ascribed to the agents who make the choices they do, but that doesn't affect the definition he gives and also would engage us in another discussion part of which would involve Frankfurt counter-examples, FCs. This debate would end up not helping the traditional Arminian who wants to affirm a traditional, robust view of God's foreknowledge. That this is so can be shown by pointing to what Double has dubbed the "Kane-Widerker" objection to Frankfurt controllers; namely, that there is no reliable "tell sign" available to a controller by which he could know that an agent would go one way over the other. This in my opinion leads to Open Theism. So, FCs undermine UR and the best way to avoid FCs is to invoke the "Kane-Widerker" objection, which leads to Open Theism.

³ ibid, 31.