Saturday, January 24, 2009

An Underwhelming Response

Dan responds...

Paul cites two books written by libertarian philosophers to demonstrate that choice doesn’t demand a libertarian understanding of the term.

In response, first off quoting philosophers is helpful, but the dictionary is better at establishing the laymen, common sensical understanding of terms. So the response doesn’t make contact with the objection. Second, it doesn’t seem that the quotes Mantra provides support his position.
1. "Mantra?"

2. It is well known that the dictionary is horrible in discussions like this. The dictionary is not normative. It simply reports how words have been used. But as long as this game is being played:

Princeton:

S: (n) choice, pick, selection (the person or thing chosen or selected) "he was my pick for mayor"

S: (n) choice, selection, option, pick (the act of choosing or selecting) "your choice of colors was unfortunate"; "you can take your pick"

Wiki:

"Choice consists of the mental process of thinking involved with the process of judging the merits of multiple options and selecting one of them for action."

Wikionary

i. An option; a decision; an opportunity to choose or select something.
ii. One selection or preference; that which is chosen or decided; the outcome of a decision.
iii. The ice cream sundae is a popular choice for dessert.
iv. Anything that can be chosen.

Websters:

1: the act of choosing : selection
2: power of choosing : option

Cambridge Dictionary:

Choice - an act or the possibility of choosing:

Choose - to decide what you want from a range of things or possibilities" (note, the possibilitites do not need to be able to be chosen.)

Oxford:

Choice - noun 1 an act of choosing. 2 the right or ability to choose. 3 a range from which to choose. 4 something chosen

Yeah, so now what, Dan? Got beat by your own method. Intellectual integrity demands that you now issue a statement to the effect that "choice" doesn't necessitate a libertarian understanding going off the dictionary alone; sola Designo.


Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro in their book Naturalism say choice is an undetermined mental action and when we make choices we typically explain our making them in terms of reasons, where a reason is a purpose, end, or goal for choosing. Paul’s quote omits the word “undetermined”1, so contrary to Paul’s conclusion, Goetz and Taliaferro were teaching a libertarian understanding of the term “choice”.
And of course this was admitted in my post. Dan is acting like he's making a point my post didn't make. Furthermore, I argued for the exclusion of that term, Dan failed to grapple with that argument. Thus, he doesn't move the discussion foreword and seems to bank on the laziness of his Arminian readers such that they will not read what I wrote but think he scored a point by pointing out something that I concealed which is detrimental to my argument.

Next Paul quotes Kane’s essay in Four Views on Free Will: A choice is the formation of an intention or purpose to do something. It resolves uncertainty and indecision in the mind about what to do. (Kane, For Views on Free Will, ed. Sosa, Blackwell, 2008, p33)

While Kane certainly adds a lot of insight into the discussion about determinism and freewill, his theory is somewhat exotic, so I have to come back to the point that perhaps this is not the best way to establish the common sense understanding of choice.
1. Scales: Dan/Kane. Um...., next question

2. In fact, Kane speaks directly to guys like Dan and his introspective argument when he writes: "The point is that introspective evidence does not give us the whole story about free will. If we stay on the surface and just consider what our immediate experience tells us, free will, I believe, is bound to appear mysterious, as it has appeared to so many people through the centuries" (Kane, Four Views, 34).

3. So, Kane says that your common sense understanding is confused, and anyone who thinks about it would see that. At best, Dan argues for the confusion or shallowness of the layman to function as putative evidence against Calvinism. Is that the reed Arminianism wants to hang much of their rhetorical argument on? Slender indeed.

4. As a side note, I wasn't trying to offer a "layman's" understanding of choice. The "layman" part of the post had to do with the equally intuitive notion that many have to the effect that indeterminism limits control, and thus responsibility. That was my "layman" point. Dan failed to grasp the subtleties.

In short, Kane’s theory is that while we are simultaneously making efforts to choose two different things, indeterministic chaos in the neural networks of the brain hinders both efforts. The “winner” is the choice. For Kane, the indeterminism isn’t in the source of the choice, but rather it’s an obstacle to making choices. (35)
And of course this is only half true. Kane allows for a determinism later on in life, so long as the agent formed her will by a will-setting action. Kane would admit that these already-formed agents choose deterministically. So, Kane knows that "choice" doesn't "always" imply "libertarianism." The point about the indeterminism kicked up in the neural networks and the choice the agent makes is that the agent tries for some action A, succeeds in hitting A despite the indeterministic element of chance involved, and thus can be held responsible for A, and, if this choice was will-setting, the agent is ultimately responsible for all the choices made down the line, even the deterministic ones. This too was discussed in footnote two of my post. Dan seems to have failed to grasp both Kane and myself here.

Kane’s explanation is overly physical as opposed to relying on an immaterial soul. (25) But Christians hold that man’s will is part of his immaterial soul.
What's ironic about this is that Kane is a Christian!

I mean, has Dan been living under a rock for over a decade? Has he heard of constitutionalists? Christian physicalists? Corcoran, Merricks, Murphy, van Inwagen, &c.? Does he think man is justified by faith and belief in dualism alone? But Arminians always tell us they don't add works to salvation. (I couldn't resist.)

The American Heritage College Dictionary (3rd edition) defines choose as: to select from a number of possible alternatives. (similar definitions available here and here) Determinism includes the idea that preceding causal forces render all our actions necessary such that they cannot be otherwise. So a “predetermined choice” implies an “impossible possibility” and an “inalternate alternative”. Since the bible states that we have wills and choose, determinism isn’t consistent with the bible.
1. I've already discussed the distinction between having and making choices. Given this, the above definition is vague. I do make choices out of a pile of things - the alternatives. But, this does not mean that all the alternatives are possibilities I have, where 'have' means each is a genuine alternative possibility I could instantiate.

2. Though I have no problem dissing "can do otherwise," Dan should know that classical compatibilists would take issue with his question begging epithet here.

3. Dan would have to make clear what verses he is thinking about. But at the very least, I highly doubt the Hebrews had the American Heritage College Dictionary at their disposal.

4. Since "A choice is the formation of an intention or purpose to do something. It resolves uncertainty and indecision in the mind about what to do" (Kane, Four Views 33), and this is consistent with determinism, and the Bible says we choose, therefore, determinism is consistent with the Bible.

At any rate, in closing, it seems Dan just needed to get something off by way of response. If not, then I don't understand the time spent on his response as it offered nothing substantive which would move the discussion foreword. Thus, the response seemed underwhelming. To recap my initial argument:

[1] Top libertarian theorists do not define choice as necessiating libertarianism.

[2] Top libertarians have noted counter-intuitive aspects of their theory, things the ordinary, man on the street thinks about indeterminate or uncaused happenings.

[3] Therefore, choice doesn't necessitate a libertarian understanding and libertarianism has its own elements that run contrary to "common sense."

25 comments:

  1. Paul: I mean, has Dan been living under a rock for the past two years? Has he heard of constitutionalists? Christian physicalists? Corcoran, Merricks, Murphay, van Inwagen, &co?

    Vytautas: So could I be a Christian and hold that the soul is physical?

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  2. Vytautas: So could I be a Christian and hold that the soul is physical?

    Paul:

    1. Let's first be clear on what I responded to:

    "But Christians hold that man’s will is part of his immaterial soul."

    I pointed out that there are Christians who do not say this. Dan thought Kan wasn't a Christian.

    2. Of course you could be a Christian and hold that man is strictly physical. I don't think it's a very good position. I think it is onconsistent with the Bible. But, one could hold to it just as one can hold to Cartesian, Thomistic, or emergent dualism. Or, like Bahnsen, substantival monism, aka, personalism. And someone, like Westphal, could hold to neutral monism.

    I mean, we're justified through faith alone, not faith + dualism.

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  3. Paul: Of course you could be a Christian and hold that man is strictly physical.

    Vytautas: If a Christian believes that man is wholly physical, then how does he distinguish between the soul and the body?

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  4. Vytautas: If a Christian believes that man is wholly physical, then how does he distinguish between the soul and the body?

    Paul: You could read their works. There are plenty of books to consult. Many would place it in the mind. And the mind would be something physical in the brain, or any other physicalist understanding. So as nancy Murphy says, " "as we go up the hierarchy of increasingly complex organisms, all of the other capacities once attributed to the soul will also turn out to be products of complex organization, rather than properties of a non-material entity" (p. 57). Or, some might say the soul is an emergent quality, the metal supervenes on the physical, etc.

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  5. Ah but how does like punishment work, assuming physicalism? Just return to the clay? Got to have a Soul that rides the spirit-elevator to Perdido (well, perdido for most): exit, Malebolge street--panderers, thieves,hypocrites, ho's, what have you. Hell, or at least Hades has a certain pragmatic efficiency.


    -----

    Kane's pretty good on the freedom/determinism issue, but like many an academic philosopher does not really understand the actual consequences of strict determinism. Even if freedom does have illusory aspects (ie. some neuroscientist insists, you really just imagine you are making choices, but aren't), it remains critical, especially apres-Stalin, nazis, and behaviorists. When you don't have it, you got nothin' left to lose, like.

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  6. J,

    Merricks discusses heaven and hell in his article on the resurrection in _Reason for the Hope_.

    I do not agree with Christian physicalism. I think it is both philosophically and theologically problematic. I am making the more reasonable claim that someone can be a Christian and hold to physicalism and not go to hell for believing in physicalism. of course, someone might want to claim that it is inconsistent with the Bible since the Bible doesn't teach it. On that score, the claim is uninteresting. On that score, only one position is correct. Assume it is hylomorphic dualism. Then Christians can't be Cartesian dualists or personalists or emergent dualists.

    I failed to grasp your point about Kane and strict determinism. of course, determinists would beg to differ that you don't have freedom and moral responsibility given strict determinism.

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  7. I prefer the Platonic wing of the museum to the Aristotelian , though that doesn't imply I am convinced a transcendent soul or platonic forms exist (or subsist, ala Bertrand Russell). Theology seems to me more congenial to platonism of some sort than to the Aristotelian causes and forms, which seems as pagan as say Hinduism, at least when conjoined with religious tradition. But I could be mistaken. Descartes' Res Cogitans falls in that platonic tradition, I believe: which is to say, when discussing castles, or cannons, mechanistic determinism (actually more Newtonian than Des Cartes) works fine, sans aristotle. When discussing Freedom, justice, or even logic, it doesn't. So that is non-reductive dualism of a sort.

    I do agree however that a physicalist theology seems fairly odd, and close to like heresy of some sort; physicalism also seems to entail strict determinism in terms of the freedom issue (or lack thereof). I mean, the theologian who decides physicalism is all there may have made the wrong career decision.

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  8. J,

    "I mean, the theologian who decides physicalism is all there may have made the wrong career decision."

    Christain Physicalists, CPs, don't claim "physicalism is all there."

    Anyway, take your concerns up with the CPs. I have no interest in defending them.

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  9. OK. that wasn't my real concern. I don't attend church and am agnostic, really. I feel, however, that christians and catholics obsessed with metaphysics and justification generally disregard the ethics of the New Testament, however mundane or rustic that might sound. And they forget that religion's not all joy and light: we are living in Boschland really, yet listening to many reverends (or priests) you wouldn't know that-- .

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  10. J,

    Just so you know, I'd rather not clutter up my meta with people who just want to get off their talking points. I have found that those who focus on the ethics of the new testament can just as easily demote the gospel to the sideline as anyone else.

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  11. Quite right. Back to quoting Kane's guesses at neurology then

    (maybe start with like a perusal of Seale's succinct formulation of the freedom/determinism issue. At least with Searle, he realizes that freedom and choice (or illusion thereof) can't really be defended, regardless if one holds to causal determinism that ordinary science suggests, or some quantum indeterminism: so you are left with either Ghost in the Machine (free, somehow), or Machine--and no ghost (and not free).

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  12. J,

    That only assumed physical determinism. And, when you say "not free" you are obviously assuming incompatibilism, but you haven't argued for such.

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  13. Lacking convincing arguments for a non-physical Mind or Res Cogitans, we are left with physical determinism, no? (I am not saying that issue has been completely decided, and still resist reductive physicalism). So freedom and moral responsibility are, if physical determinism holds, either meaningless, or illusory in some sense (though the illusions are still important: say a "Justice meme"). It's difficult for humans to say "we couldn't have done otherwise," but that might be the case. I once entertained compatibilism of some sort, yet now think it's either incompatibilism (based on dualism, even Cartesian sort), OR strict determinism, and what seem to be purely free choices/decisions aren't, but just illusion, though useful illusions, evolutionary perhaps.

    That said, I believe one can still derive something like "agency" given strict determinism, but it's more like successful habit formation--learning skills, in a sense--however unappealing that might sound to the religiously inclined.

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  14. J,

    Besides the fact that many phsyicalists believe that there is at base an indeterminancy to the world, so that it is not clear that determinism follows from physicalism; a non-physical mind, God's, could be the all-determiner.

    And, even if freedom and moral responsibility were meaningless or illusory on physicalism - I'd be inclined to say that the first isn't, the latter is, but not because of determinism - that doesn't make them meaningless or illusary on models of divine-determinism.

    A soul doesn't necessiate indeterminism, again, because an all-powerful, sovereign, omnscienct God could determine the human soul. Now, you may feel that choices &co. are illusory on determinism, but that may be due to a folk or unanalyzed understanding of those terms. If, as I defined in my post, "A choice is the formation of an intention or purpose to do something. It resolves uncertainty and indecision in the mind about what to do" (Kane, Four Views 33), then there's nothing inconsistent with *that* and determinism.

    I've never seen clear objections from agency being diminished by determinism. Usually they claim something like we are only poassive, not active. But there are uncontroversial and non-question begging ways to understand those terms that do not rule out agency and activity. Others argue that making us only physical events undermines agency. Suppose that is true, I don't hold that I am a strictly physical being but am a substance that exists through time, so this objection doesn't land for me.

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  15. Searle addresses those who argue indeterminism (at a quantum level, presumably) allows for some type of free choice (where determinism doesn't). He rightfully says that doesn't seem to offer the libertarian any more support--may be less. That someone makes a decision which involves some random factors doesn't make it any more free than if it didn't have randomness--assuming those random elements might be identified. And indeterminism doesn't seem to rescue responsibility either (tho maybe attenuates it--dues to some slight misfiring of neurons? or is it misfiring of immortal soul-substance--King JHVH just pulls the strings of His puppet (really would have to be, given omniscience--no real freedom under Calvinism either. And substance seems no more justifiable than Soul)).

    AC Grayling (I doubt AC's on the triablogue reading list) asserts that lacking some clear evidence of "novelty" in the brain (ie via fMRIs) determinism holds. Grayling's fairly obnoxious, but his arguments do not lack force.

    I think one problem for the determinist consists of the inability to trace causal factors, assuming that they led to some specific act or decision: was the murderer who killed someone at the mall a few days ago motivated by greed, poverty, racism, thrills, lust---? All of the above, or none? To what degree. In some cases one can specify a cause (proximate, I guess legalists would say)--say a crime of passion, revenge, even desperation etc. Yet for most if not many crimes (or any intended acts) the causal chain cannot be specified--so determinism in terms of explaining human acts may be trivial in a sense. Hume seems fairly relevant here: he was a determinist for most part, but would presumably agree that cause, whether in terms of human actions, or much of physics (say, the volcano building up under yellowstone), humans' just don't know enough--there is a lack of information, and lacking some high-powered cognitive science, we are left with a somewhat introspective, libertarian accounts.

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  16. J,

    I know Searle's arguments, but you're shifting the goal posts. You wrote:

    "Lacking convincing arguments for a non-physical Mind or Res Cogitans, we are left with physical determinism, no?"

    I said, "not necessarily." One could argue that the world was indeterministic. Your response that that would not allow for freedom may be true, but irrelevant to what I specifically saod in response to your specific comment.

    Of course, many libertarians have argued that indeterminism doesn't rule out control or responsibility. So, you're not advancing the discussion by citing Searle.

    "King JHVH just pulls the strings of His puppet"

    I don't have the time or desire to debate question begging epithets that attempt to appeal to emotion and pictures as a substitute for an argument.

    "And substance seems no more justifiable than Soul"

    You're about 40 years behind. "Justification" is fairly simple to come by. What epistemic duties are being flaunted? Are you imposing an evidentialist constraint?

    "AC Grayling (I doubt AC's on the triablogue reading list)"

    Again, yawn. I don't have time for this. If it continues, then you'll have to go bug someone else.

    "I think one problem for the determinist consists of the inability to trace causal factors, assuming that they led to some specific act or decision: was the murderer who killed someone at the mall a few days ago motivated by greed, poverty, racism, thrills, lust---? All of the above, or none? To what degree."

    Arguments from ignorance aren't typically convincing.

    At any rate, whether we can trace all the causal factors or not seems irrelevant to whether I wanted to do an act for reasons, first-order desires confirming second-order desires, and endorsed the act as my act. Those are some relevant causal factors that we do know and which are clearly relevant to attributions of moral responsibility.

    "--there is a lack of information, and lacking some high-powered cognitive science, we are left with a somewhat introspective, libertarian accounts."

    This is simplistic. Of course, libertarianism can't trace all the causal factors, so there's ignorance here too. What basis is there to say there are no sufficient causal factors?

    There's alsom the lack of information as to why an agent goes one way rather than another. if we rewind the tape of life back to one second before an agents choice, thus leaving all the causal facotrs, reasons, desires, etc., the same, the agent might go the other way - certainly isn't determinied to go the same way given the same past, right - and so why does an agent go one way over another? So I find it hard to say that introspective libertarian accounts are all that's left.

    Furthermore, as a Christian, I know enough. God is the all-determiner. The all-conditioner. All can be traced back tom his all-wise and all-good decree.

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  17. "King JHVH just pulls the strings of His puppet"

    I don't have the time or desire to debate question begging epithets that attempt to appeal to emotion and pictures as a substitute for an argument.""""


    Not question begging at all--the image describes the situation fairly well: granting monotheism and omniscience, King JHVH would by definition pull the strings, or rather He pulled them, like circa big bang (supposedly). Indeed the Reformer, however rustic he might seem to the priesthood, actually understood what follows from omnipotence: more or less a King God who commanded all and knows all (resembles something like premeditation, were one to wax Shelleyan for a few moments).

    So Freedom is as much an illusion to the monotheist as it is do a behaviorist. Indeed Calvin nearly seems modern in his credo que absurdum (yes, variations of the problem of evil, but still relevant however ....ghastly). And the absurdity of Calvinism reveals the absurdity of judeo-christianity as a whole: believe, if you will, but don't mistake your belief for something like rationality.

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  18. J,

    "Not question begging at all--the image describes the situation fairly well: granting monotheism and omniscience, King JHVH would by definition pull the strings, or rather He pulled them, like circa big bang (supposedly).

    It certainly is question begging. It assumes in viture of the very words used, that we are not free but passive, controlled agents. And, if the puppet had a will - which they usually don't - what they will doesn't matter. They go the way the puppet master wants them to go, against their will. If you can't see the question begging nature of the metaphor, then you don't belong in this conversation.

    "Indeed the Reformer, however rustic he might seem to the priesthood, actually understood what follows from omnipotence: more or less a King God who commanded all and knows all (resembles something like premeditation, were one to wax Shelleyan for a few moments)."

    This is all rehetoric minus the argument, and citations.

    "So Freedom is as much an illusion to the monotheist as it is do a behaviorist."

    'nother assertion.

    "Indeed Calvin nearly seems modern in his credo que absurdum (yes, variations of the problem of evil, but still relevant however ....ghastly). And the absurdity of Calvinism reveals the absurdity of judeo-christianity as a whole: believe, if you will, but don't mistake your belief for something like rationality."

    And yet another bare, stark naked assertion. Actually, there were a couple unargued assertions rolled into the above.

    Certainly this isn't the grand expression of "rationality" that I have to look foreword to if I were to reject Christianity! Underwhelming indeed.

    I mean, it seems the appropriate response to you at this point is to say: nee ner nee ner nee ner, you don't have a weener.

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  19. which is to say, those examining the freedom/determinism issue from a theological perspective are the ones begging the question (ie the theology question). Yes, it is religious blog and so forth, but the issue can be framed and understood without recourse to theology--as say William James presented it (who seems to have upheld a strict determinist position, with a few qualms).

    Of course, libertarianism can't trace all the causal factors, so there's ignorance here too. What basis is there to say there are no sufficient causal factors?

    Can you point them out? Just another case of duelling inferences, really: what's a more plausible explanation, not which one fits the Thomistic template. And I am not arguing for introspection: merely saying it's all most laymen (even philosopher-laymen) have. Kant sort of suggested the problem might be irresolvable, via his 3rd Antinomy: a bit quaint, but sets up the issue (tho' I suspect he really favored mechanistic determinism, but was trying to save face with the clergymen).

    I suspect further research in cognitive science will provide more answers. There are of course many experiments indicating brain/mind identity (evidence for physicalism, and determinism), as with neurokinetics: if you have an implant in the back of your head--sort of like a wireless adaptor-- which allows you to key in your words merely by thinking (or turn on TV, computer, etc), it seems Descartes' ghost turns out to be made of meat (tho meat with a small electric charge). That doesn't solve the determinism issue, but seems compelling evidence for a physicalist account of mind.

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  20. "which is to say, those examining the freedom/determinism issue from a theological perspective are the ones begging the question (ie the theology question). Yes, it is religious blog and so forth, but the issue can be framed and understood without recourse to theology--as say William James presented it (who seems to have upheld a strict determinist position, with a few qualms)."

    This is more talk without action. No question was begged, and you can't demonstrate that one was. Now, that's throwing down the gauntlet.

    " And I am not arguing for introspection: merely saying it's all most laymen (even philosopher-laymen) have."

    Do you have the sociologicists statistics? Or were you wanting until the 2010 US census report to come out? Or were you practicing your hasty generalization skills? And I feel their intuitions express kernels of truth that are congenial to compatibilism once properly analyized.

    "I suspect further research in cognitive science will provide more answers. There are of course many experiments indicating brain/mind identity (evidence for physicalism, and determinism), as with neurokinetics: if you have an implant in the back of your head--sort of like a wireless adaptor-- which allows you to key in your words merely by thinking (or turn on TV, computer, etc), it seems Descartes' ghost turns out to be made of meat (tho meat with a small electric charge). That doesn't solve the determinism issue, but seems compelling evidence for a physicalist account of mind."

    You have a habit of throwing out a lot without any concern for the issues involved. It's not like dualists aren't aware of the above. And if of course addresses none of the concerns most philosophers of mind - on both sides of the isle - know are there.

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  21. Your the one making a logic error (and your litany of misapplied informal fallacies means little or nothing): Deciding on the mind/brain identity thesis is not truth functional, but an empirical, and inductive issue (or synthetic as philosophasters say). Situating all intellectual inquiries in the quaint Aristotelian term logic a common and papistic error.

    Evidence suggests a physicalist basis for mind (like cut off oxygen to the brain, and you will die). Or consider lobotomies, the effects of alcohol, or drugs, etc. Quite evident that the brain is where thinking happens (tho involving neurology of spinal cord as well): so thinking is bio-dependent. Thus, thought, more likely than not, has a physicalist basis, both in terms of cause, and effect: ie Maria feels the sensation of hunger, she then decides to get a tamale, etc. Again, that's not "necessary" in the quaint sense, but more plausible than Maria's soul just happens to float into her brain and maybe God causes her to feel hunger, and zombie like she moves towards the icebox.. etc.

    Perhaps Cartesian dualism could be proven, however. Like maybe by summoning up a ghost? Or ESP? Even Hobbes was not far from the mark in claiming volition to be part of the physical world--thinking means a thinker, and a thinker is corporeal, I believe he said in his objections to Monsieur Descartes-- even if we are limited in our abilities to prove that at this stage.

    Given a corporeal thinker, then a Thinker is subject to the causal laws as the bio-chemical matter he's embedded in.....

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  22. Ad auctoritas: that's your fallacy, along with begging the question of well, God's existence (and other fallacies). William James and Co are authoritative--or at least quite more authoritative than St. Thomas, or the latest postmodernist guessing game.



    The intentionality issue is arguably not even a philosophical issue, but an empirical issue involving neurology--philosopher's quibbles matter only when scientists reach some sort of impasse, or make some rather grand claims.

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  23. J,

    "Evidence suggests a physicalist basis for mind (like cut off oxygen to the brain, and you will die). Or consider lobotomies, the effects of alcohol, or drugs, etc. Quite evident that the brain is where thinking happens (tho involving neurology of spinal cord as well): so thinking is bio-dependent. Thus, thought, more likely than not, has a physicalist basis, both in terms of cause, and effect: ie Maria feels the sensation of hunger, she then decides to get a tamale, etc. Again, that's not "necessary" in the quaint sense, but more plausible than Maria's soul just happens to float into her brain and maybe God causes her to feel hunger, and zombie like she moves towards the icebox.. etc."

    Again, this is simply a list of *assertions.* Integrative dualists would agree. As if Descartes or Plato didn't know that a blow to the head affected speach, memory, personality, etc. You also seem to assume that occasionalism is the main dualist story.

    "Perhaps Cartesian dualism could be proven, however. Like maybe by summoning up a ghost? Or ESP?"

    Well Braude would take you up on that challenege.

    "Given a corporeal thinker, then a Thinker is subject to the causal laws as the bio-chemical matter he's embedded in....."

    Again, indeterminist physicalists would disagree. Anyway, no matter to me, I feel no need to defend physicalism.

    "Ad auctoritas: that's your fallacy, along with begging the question of well, God's existence (and other fallacies)."

    Again, I asked you to demonstrate these accusations, just like I did of you.

    "The intentionality issue is arguably not even a philosophical issue, but an empirical issue involving neurology--philosopher's quibbles matter only when scientists reach some sort of impasse, or make some rather grand claims."

    Again, this is more of your throwing out assertions and speculations and acting as if you're making substantive points.

    This discussion is losing interest fast. Say something of interest and substance or risk your comments being deleted and your priviledge to post her suspended.

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  24. Evidence, not merely "assertions." Backing, in the Toulminian sense, for the physicalist claim. And unlike the usual xtian dogmatist, I grant that the claim is revisable: when Padre x causes Maria to appear over the pulpit, or has a Chupacabra run across the campus of Loyola (and maybe make it speak say espanol too), we will revise our physicalist claim (ie based on if you will "ordinary science"). Produce a Chupie, Paddy, and then and only then do we partake of the sacred Triscuit.

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  25. Assertions, J, assertions. Simply asserting that they are evidence and not assertions simply adds to your growing list of mere assertions that you've cluttered my meta up with. Add to that the ironic situation we're in when it has been you acting like the dogmatist. As if "Jsaidso" makes for a convincing argument rather than a secular version of "Popesaidso," or "Godsaidit." On top of that, you apparently think name dropping and flexing your vast knowledge - which is as deep as a puddle - on myriad philosophical topics is enough to convince those skeptical of, and on the lookout for, modern day sophists. As this has now proven to be a monumetal waste of time, despite the many chances given for you to say something of substance, something interesting, I'll close the thread down for both your benefit and mine.

    Do come back when you decide to clothe your assertions in actual arguments, though. Buh-bye.

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