Hardening pharaoh’s heart

From Greg Beale's Redemptive Reversals and the Ironic Overturning of Human Wisdom:

A Preincarnate Hitler

The pharaoh of ancient Egypt is one of the best examples of ironic judgment, since in great arrogance he hotly pursued afflicted Israel but was "caught in the plots which [he had] devised" (Ps. 10:2). Pharaoh's first mistake was to claim to be God. He gave to himself such titles as "savior of Egypt," "Lord of the living," "Universal god," and the sovereign "god of heaven and earth." As such he was also held to be the divine judge after death.⁴ This is, no doubt, why Pharaoh responds to Moses's message that begins, "Thus says the Lord" (Ex. 5:1), with an equally authoritative, "Thus says Pharaoh" (Ex. 5:10). But, indeed, such a divine claim was farthest from the truth since, ironically, Scripture identifies the pharaoh of the exodus with Satan, "the dragon" (Isa. 51:9; cf. Ps. 74:13–14 and Rev. 12:3–4, 7–9), and the "sea monster" (Ps. 89:10; cf. also Ps. 87:4; Isa. 30:7; Ezek. 32:2). Pharaoh's obstinate claim to deity, even in spite of the plagues that came upon him in Exodus 7–13, was the reason for his judgment.

Pharaoh's mistaken belief in his divine sovereignty must have led him to issue the edict that the firstborn males of Israel were to be killed by the Hebrew midwives (Ex. 1:16), and when this failed, he ordered the firstborn to be drowned in a river (Ex. 1:22). Not only did Pharaoh's attempts to overcome Israel fail, but his edicts declaring the killing of the firstborn were providentially reversed so that they fell on him in judgment. Not only did God kill the firstborn of every Egyptian family (Ex. 12:29), but he also drowned Pharaoh's army in the Red Sea (Ex. 15:1–12). His sins came back on his own head, since he was punished ironically by the very things he perpetrated against Israel.

No Truth and No Consequences

Before we leave this discussion of Pharaoh, it is further enlightening to understand his role as the purported savior of those who died and faced imminent judgment. The Egyptians believed that after death, people had to go through a trial in the Hall of Judgment to determine whether they were guilty of earthly sin. If found innocent, a person inherited eternal bliss, but if found guilty, he or she suffered judgment. There were two parts to this judgment process. (1) The deceased person arrived at one end of the Hall of Judgment and was presented with a long list of sins characteristic of human life, which he or she categorically denied. (2) While the denial of sin was taking place, the deceased's heart was being weighed on the "scales of judgment" at the other end of the hall in order to see if its testimony supported the person's denial. The Egyptians believed that all people are sinful and that the heart would tell the truth if it were separated from the bad influence of the body, so when the heart confessed the deceased's sins, it would become "heavy" with sin, and the disequilibrium of the scales would indicate guilt and judgment. Therefore, the heart's confession of sin would demonstrate that the deceased's denial was a lie, with the result of impending judgment.

Since the Egyptians believed in the universal sinfulness of humanity, it seems that no Egyptian had a chance for salvation. This was a tremendous theological dilemma. However, the Egyptians also believed that the heart could be stopped from naturally confessing sin so that salvation could still be possible. This was thought to be accomplished by placing a stone scarab beetle, shaped in the form of a heart, either in the mummified clothes encasing the deceased or tied to the chest. The scarab beetle was a symbol of the sun god, of whom Pharaoh was viewed as the incarnation, and they thought it had magical powers to suppress the heart's tendency to confess sin so that salvation could be secured. Thus it was actually the magical power of the divine Pharaoh that imposed this silence upon the heart and was responsible for the individual's salvation.

There were various magical spells written on the stone scarab heart to bring about the silence of the human heart. The magical power of the sun god (and Pharaoh) was believed to transfer the stillness of the stone heart to the deceased so that the heart's movements to confess sin would be transformed into the stonelike stillness of silence. This suppression of the heart's confession apparently came to be seen as a kind of "hardening of the heart."⁵

Could this immoral Egyptian concept of salvation through "hardening of the heart" be the background against which to understand the Lord's hardening of Pharaoh's heart? Moses repeatedly commanded Pharaoh to let the people go, but God repeatedly hardened Pharaoh's heart so that he would not release Israel. But perhaps this was not the only purpose of the hardening of Pharaoh's heart. Whereas the pharaoh's magical hardening caused a nonconfession of sin and an apparent sinless heart, resulting in salvation, the Lord's hardening of Pharaoh's heart appears to have led to his own heart confessing sin (cf. Ex. 9:27, 34; 10:16–17) and acknowledging his sinfully heavy condition, resulting in judgment (cf. Ex. 14:4, 17–28). Whereas Pharaoh's hardening the hearts of others falsely suppressed sin, the Lord's hardening of Pharaoh's heart rightly revealed the monarch's sin.

The Lord's hardening of Pharaoh's heart may have been intended, in part, to show that the Egyptian way of salvation is a sham and was really the very opposite—a way of damnation. In fact, is it not interesting that the dead Pharaoh was the only Egyptian who did not have to go through the judgment process, but now, more than any other Egyptian in the exodus narrative, he is the focus of God's hardening judgment? It is probably no coincidence that one of the Hebrew words used for the Lord's hardening of Pharaoh means "to make heavy." Ironically, the pharaoh who claimed to remove the sinful heaviness of others' hearts could not remove his own. The pharaoh himself had now "been weighed on the scales and found deficient" (Dan. 5:27) and awaited impending judgment at the Red Sea. Pharaoh's heart became literally like the stone heart that symbolized his power and ironically caused him to be hard and insensitive to God's commands, which led to his destruction. Because of his stone heart, he sank like a stone in the Red Sea.

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⁴ For a background of Pharaoh's divine names and functions consult I. Engnell, Studies in Divine Kingship in the Ancient Near East (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1967); S. Morenz, Egyptian Religion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1960); E. L. R. Meyerowitz, The Divine Kingship in Ghana and Ancient Egypt (London: Faber & Faber, 1960); H. Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

⁵ For an argument supporting this contention see A. Hermann, “Das Steinhartes Herz,” in Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum 4 (Münster: Aschendorff’sche, 1961), 102–5. I have also argued this in my "The Exodus Hardening Motif of Yahweh as a Polemic," ThM Thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary (1976), 48–52.

Heiser's methodology

I'm going to venture some observations about Michael Heiser's methodology in reference to the nephilim. I say "venture" because I'm not deeply read on his position. 

1. In fairness to Heiser, his interpretation of Gen 6 is certainly the mainstream view in OT scholarship. And it's a traditional Jewish interpretation. It might be the dominant Jewish interpretation, although that depends on how representative the Intertestamental literature which survived happens to be. 

2. As I've noted before, while this is the mainstream view in OT scholarship, that's somewhat misleading. Many OT scholars think Gen 6 reflects a mythological outlook. They don't think the Bible is divine revelation. They think it's merely ancient religious literature, on the same level as ancient Near Eastern mythology or Greco-Roman mythology. 

They don't think their interpretation of Gen 6 has to be realistic. But Christians do think our interpretations of Scripture need to be realistic, albeit in the sense of supernatural realism. 

3. I consider the Intertestamental literature on the nephilim to be exegetically worthless. Gen 6:1-4 is very intriguing. Part of what makes it so intriguing is that it's terse and enigmatic. So that fuels pious speculation. An urge to fill in the gaps.

The Enochian literature, and other suchlike, reflects the same mentality as the apocryphal infancy Gospels. And it has the same exegetical value as the apocryphal infancy Gospels. It's just a load of pious nonsense. No reputable scholar would use the apocryphal infancy Gospels to interpret the canonical Gospels. They wouldn't use that later, fanciful material to interpret the canonical Gospels. But the Enochian stuff operates at the same level. Fictional filler. Thriller filler. 

The only way to legitimately justify the angelic interpretation of Gen 6 is either by direct exegesis of Gen 6 or via the NT. If you can do it that way, then you've got a case. But the Enochian stuff isn't suitable background material, any more than the apocryphal infancy Gospels are suitable background material for the canonical Gospels. 

4. Heiser also appeals to linguistic usage in the Intertestamental literature and Dead Sea Scrolls. There he's on firmer ground, as a general principle. NT usage draws from a well of preexisting usage, where words and phrases have established associations and connotations that may carry over into NT usage. But that needs to be isolated from the wholesale usage grand Enochian narratives as a frame of reference. 

Does Evolution disprove Christianity?

One of those Bambi meets Godzilla debates:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Idyy8p4lShc&t=4616s

In addition to Jonathan's performance, a few observations of my own:

1. Jonathan McLatchie is well-qualified to discuss the issue. That said, the title is ambiguous. It could mean does evolution, if true, disprove Christianity. Or it could mean evolution fails to disprove Christianity because evolution is false.

2. A couple of issues:

i) Lim thinks disease is incompatible with God's existence, but diseases perform a necessary function in maintaining that balance of nature. In addition, most organisms were never designed to be immortal. 

ii) Lim fails to understand that there are constraints on what an omnipotent God can do by natural means. In many cases, God can bypass natural processes to produce a result directly, but if God is creating a cause/effect world, and God is using a physical medium, then that's a self-imposed limitation on God's field of action.

3. We also need to distinguish between Christianity and generic theism or perfect being theology. Even if we posit that disease is incompatible with an abstract concept of God that's a philosophical construct, the existence of disease in no way disproves the existence of the Biblical God. In Scripture, God coexists with disease. So disease in no way counts as evidence against the existence of Christian theism, but is entirely consistent with the God of the Bible.

4. Lim acts like the Genesis creation account indicates that God made all the species from the outset. But Gen 1 doesn't detail the species. Gen 1 doesn't preclude adaptation. Gen 1 refers to a few general taxonomies based on their natural habitat (land animals, freshwater or marine organisms).

5.  Since the issue of how best to interpret Genesis came up, here's a free, recent book: https://frame-poythress.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/PoythressVernInterpretingEdenAGuideToFaithfullyReadingAndUnderstandingGenesis1-3.pdf 

6. Lim constantly raises hypothetical objections to Christianity, but ignores al the evidence. He mentions prayer, but there are countless examples of answered prayer. The fact that many prayers go unanswered doesn't cancel out the evidence for the prayer requests that God does grant.

7. Lim then trots out Sai Babba, but from what I've read, there's lots of evidence that he's a fraud.

8. There are multiple problems with Lim's appeal to alleged pagan parallels between Jesus and hero archetypes:

i) You can't legitimately compare a well-documented historical figure with fictional characters in pagan mythology. Jesus is a historical figure. We have 1C historical sources documenting his life. 1C sources about a 1C individual. 

ii) You also have to take into account the chronological gap between a historical figure like, say, Buddha, and the dates of our earliest sources. 

iii) In addition, you have to take into account the Jewish worldview of the NT, which precludes pagan syncretism.

iv) Did the NT writers even have access to the pagan sources? 

v) How specific are the alleged parallels?

The Plasticity and Flexibility of ANE Myths

https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-3/excursus-on-creation-of-life-and-biological-diversity/excursus-on-creation-of-life-and-biological-diversity-part-19/

Bishop Barron Q/A

This month, Bishop Barron did another Q/A, this time from non-Catholics:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=np_dQOHyfts

1. I didn't watch the whole thing since not all of the questions interest me. He did a pretty good job of fielding the question about alleged pagan parallels because Jesus and mythic heroes. 

2. He also gave an adroit answer to how a loving God can send people to hell: 

It's like someone at a party, everyone is having a great time, but you've decided, because you're in a kind of a funk, to sit sullenly in the corner and refuse to participate. Not only are you happy in yourself but the party around you is making you more unhappy. If you're in a really bad frame of mind, who are the most annoying people? Those who are in a good mood.

We're often our own worst enemies. Drug addicts. Choosing contrary to self-interest. 

There's a grain of truth to those explanations. They're useful up to a point.

But what was glaringly absent from his justification is any reference to the punitive function of hell, even though that's fundamental to the biblical concept. 

In Scripture, damnation isn't primarily about rejecting God's love but retributive punishment from wrongdoing. The theme of eschatological justice, which is hell's primary rationale in Scripture, has disappeared from Barron's concept of damnation.

That may be because Barron is a hopeful universalist, so he believes in remediation rather than retribution. 

In contemporary Catholicism as well as contemporary freewill theism, the concept of damnation and warrant for damnation has been recast in terms of love rather than justice. It's all about rejecting God's love, not about just deserts.  

The Bible and mythology

According to the Bible, human beings can be possessed by disembodied evil spirits. And while the Bible is a bit sketchy on the next part, the backstory seems to be that demonic evil spirits are the losers in a primeval civil war in heaven. Now if that's not mythological, what is? Certainly it seems that way to progressive theologians and atheists. These are the superstitious talltales of Bronze Age goatherds. 

But here's the catch: there's lots of direct empirical evidence that some human beings are possessed by evil spirits. Not just the stuff of ancient books or medieval monks. 

And if that's the case, then purely as a matter of logical elimination, there are only so many explanations. Either the evil spirits always existed or else they came into existence. Either they were always evil or else they became evil. 

So we could turn the exclamation around: if that's not mythological, where does that leave the rest of Scripture? 

Shapeshifters

1. What's the basis for shapeshifters in pagan mythology and folklore? Are they purely figments of the imagination, which undergo further embellishment, or do they have analogues in reality? 

The werewolf character is the best known example, popularized by Hollywood, but I believe that's a part of some American Indian lore. Not sure how widespread that is, and whether that reflects independent traditions or cultural diffusion.

Is that just a legend, or does witchcraft enable practitioners to become animals? If so, do they retain human intelligence in that condition, or have animal psychology? 

2. This isn't confined to mythology and folklore. The cherubim in Ezekiel's theophanies are tetramorphs. Is that physical, or an optical or telepathic illusion?

What about the hybrid monsters in Daniel's visions? Are those merely artificial symbolic constructs? Or is there something analogous in reality that gave rise to the imagery? 

3. In some narratives, angels seem to have the ability to materialize, dematerialize, or even assume the form of human males. How deep does that go? Complete internal anatomy?

An alternative interpretation might be that angels don't have the power to assume human form; rather, they have the power to possess human bodies. If demons can do it, why not angels? Perhaps some descriptions involve angels taking possession of human males as temporary vehicles to perform a particular mission, then releasing the host after the mission is completed. 

4. On a natural level, the closest thing to metamorphosis might be male sexual arousal, which involves a degree of physical and psychological transformation, although nothing like shapeshifters. Human beings are composite entities: ensouled animal bodies. Male sexual arousal taps into something wild and primal. And that doesn't require an evolutionary explanation.

5. A more clear-cut example is the snake magic in Exodus, where the staff of Moses becomes a snake and vice versa. The Egyptian sorcerers are able to duplicate that feat. There is a naturalistic explanation for what the Egyptians sorcerers do, but for reasons I've stated elsewhere, I find that unconvincing. 

Is Noah's flood a legend?

Some people view Noah's flood as sheer fiction. Others view Noah's flood as a reflection of a dim historical memory that's undergone legendary embellishment. 

One of the striking things about the flood account is how it presents the flood as a natural event. The account as a supernatural framework. It gives God's motivation for sending the flood. God repeatedly speaks to Noah. And God "shuts" them in. Those are the most explicitly supernatural elements. 

It also says the animals "came" to Noah, which might suggest God sent them. And there's a reference to God sending a "wind" (which may be a Hebrew pun). 

But the flood itself is depicted as an event caused by natural mechanisms. In that respect it's not different in kind from other floods. If you were an outside observer, you wouldn't notice anything about this particular deluge to distinguish it from other floods in terms of what caused it.  

Put another way, the flood account has far fewer supernatural elements than the Exodus. In that regard, the flood account is conspicuously unembellished. 

If you think any supernaturalism is a mark of mythology or legendary embellishment, so that we must strip away all the supernatural elements to arrive at the historical core, then the flood account reflects legendary embellishment. But that says everything about secular prejudice and nothing about the realism of the account. Reported miracles are only ipso facto evidence of pious fiction or legendary embellishment on the assumption that naturalism is true. 

The archetypal appeal of Catholicism

1. Archetypes 

Although I've probably done hundreds of posts on Roman Catholicism, there's a significant aspect of Catholicism that I've largely neglected (with a partial exception). And that's the archetypal appeal of Catholicism. Much of the popular or enduring appeal of works like Homer, Ovid, Dante, Beowulf, Shakespeare, Milton, Bunyan, Tolkien, C. S. Lewis, James Joyce, T. S. Eliot, and Ray Bradbury (to name a few) lies in their ability to harness archetypes. And that extends to lowbrow writers like Stephen King. The role of archetypes has been explored by scholars and thinkers like Freud (e.g. The Interpretation of Dreams), Jung, Northrop Frye (mythos), Mircea Eliade, and Joseph Campbell. The current fad for Jordan Peterson has revived popular interest in archetypes. 

2. Definitions

Archetypes are recurrent patterns in literature and in life. These patterns can be images (such as light and darkness), character types such as the hero and the trickster) or plot motifs (such as the quest and the initiation). These recurrent patterns are the building blocks of the literary imagination. Writers could not avoid using them if they tried. 

Archetypes are a universal language. We know what they mean simply by virtue of being humans in this world. We all know experiences of winter and hunger, sibling rivalry and tyrannical bullies. One scholar speaks of archetypes as "any of the immemorial patterns of response to the human situation in its most permanent aspects," L. Ryken & M. L. Mead, A Reader's Guide Through the Wardrobe (IVP 2005), 41. 

[Eliade] People want to abolish history, which reflects only appearances, to touch the underlying reality that it can only dimly manifest. By defining a sacred space or sacred acts, one can uncover or reveal the real…Sacred or liturgical calendars repeat the act of creation as the gods performed it…They are thus exemplary models, human acts through which one relives the myths that give meaning to religious life. Reliving the myth abolishes time and puts one in touch with the real; hence, it is a sacred act. Rituals, or archetypal acts, allow one periodically to deny history and change. Thus, we have myths that confer meaning on life. Ritual allows us to "contact" the reality to which the myth refers. We enact exemplary models in our archetypal acts…A sacred calendar repeats creation or the experiences of the gods. Mary Jo Meadow, "Archetypes and Patriarchy: Eliade and Jung," Journal of Religion and Health 31/3 (Fall 1992), 188. 

My point is not to endorse every detail of Eliade's analysis. He may have been influenced by the concept of maya in Indian philosophy as well as the tragic history of his native Rumania. If your native land has a tragic history, there's a yearning to escape from time. But his analysis highlights the role of ritual and religious calendars, which has direct relevance to Roman Catholicism. 

Craig's backwoods exegesis

William Lane Craig recently expanded on a defense of a position he took regarding the depiction of God in Gen 2-3:

https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/genesis-2-3-anthropomorphism-or-theophany

I've already discussed his original presentation: 

https://triablogue.blogspot.com/2019/08/is-genesis-mytho-history.html

https://triablogue.blogspot.com/2019/08/gods-audible-voice.html

I will reproduce his entire answer at the bottom of my post. By way of comment:

i) One of the revealing things about Craig's interpretation of Gen 2-3 is the contrast between his philosophical prowess and his exegetical prowess. How that exposes the difference between his philosophical sophistication and his hermeneutical naivete. Over the decades, Craig's philosophy and philosophical theology have undergone great development. By contrast, it's like he still reads the Bible the same way he did as a teenager. His grasp of biblical hermeneutics never developed in tandem with his grasp of philosophy. His hermeneutic is in a state of arrested development. Intellectually, part of Craig never grew up. His philosophical toolkit matured while his hermeneutical toolkit remains immature, stuck in Sunday school. 

It reminds me of some apostates who become proficient philosophers and scientists, but when they attack Christian theism, they never brought their understanding of the Bible up to the same level of their mastery of science or philosophy. In the age of specialization, that's understandable, but it lays bare a big hole in Craig's skill set. 

ii) The way Craig frames the alternatives is an understatement. As he explained in his original presentation, what he means by "anthropomorphic" is "palpably false if taken literally".

iii) A basic flaw in Craig's analysis is assumption that in order for something to count as a theophany, the criterion is not the nature of the event but whether the account is introduced by a verbal formula: "God appeared to…" Likewise, that a figure must be explicitly called the "Angel of the Lord". 

iv) Another flaw in his analysis is his failure to appreciate that Gen 2-3 isn't told from the viewpoint of Adam and Eve. It's not a first-person, indexical description of how God looked to them. Rather, it's told from the third-person, external viewpoint of the narrator. 

v) Yet another flaw in Craig's analysis is the equivocal notion of an "appearance". It doesn't even seem to occur to Craig that that word or concept has multiple meanings, and so it's necessary to identify which one or ones may be germane to the issue at hand. Among other things, "appear/appearance" can mean the following:

• Materialize

• Be present or show up

• Come into view; become visible or noticeable

• Perform (e.g. Franco Corelli appeared in Il Travatore)

• How something is perceived by one or more senses (e.g. an indirect realist says appearances are all we have to go by–we can't peel back the veil of perception. Or a Catholic says that in transubstantiation, the Host retains the appearance of bread and wine) 

vi) Apropos (v), does a "theophany" mean God "appears" in the sense that he's present or localized at a particular time and place? Does it mean God "appears" in the sense that he can be seen? These are distinct ideas. For instance, an angel might be present but invisible. Take the Balaam account where the Angel of the Lord was present, but initially invisible to Balaam. 

vii) Although the default connotation of "appear" may signify to a visual appearance or apparition, theophanies often include auditions as well as visions. God's audible voice. Or preternatural thunder. So "appearance" can be shorthand for something that's perceptible to one or more of the senses. In principle, it could be tactile as well. 

viii) Some incidents in Scripture indicate that angels are able to materialize and dematerialize. So that's another sense of "appearance" which is applicable to theophanies and angelophanies. In the case of the Angel of the Lord, the two categories overlap. He's the theophanic angel.  

ix) Then there's Craig's frankly silly objection that Adam and Eve didn't exist at the time of the theophanies. But once God brought them into existence, they were in a position to see their Maker, if he took the form of the Angel of the Lord to create them. Likewise, Adam regained consciousness after the operation. So even on his own grounds, Craig's objection is hairsplitting. 

x) Craig reads biblical narratives atomistically, as if similar incidents in the Pentateuch can't shed light on one another. To take a comparison, consider movies, novels,, or a miniseries where earlier scenes raise questions that are answered as the plot unfolds. You don't understand it all at once. Rather, as you go deeper into it, later plot developments retroactively illuminate earlier scenes. 

Likewise, it isn't necessary to pedantically use the same clues each time same kind of event is narrated. That's woodenly repetitious. Readers are expected to analogize from explicit examples to comparable examples. 

Enmity between serpents and women

And I will put enmity

    between you and the woman,

    and between your seed and hers;

he will crush your head,

    and you will strike his heel.

(Gen 3:15)

1. On the secular interpretation, the nemesis in Gen 3 is a talking snake. Because the narrator suffered from a primitive, mythological outlook, he believed in talking snakes. In addition, Gen 3:15 is an etiology to explain women's aversion to snakes. 

2. But does that interpretation make sense even on secular assumptions? It's true that Gen 3:15 trades on serpentine imagery. On the one hand, people inadvertently step on snakes. On the other hand, venomous snakes usually strike at the lower extremities (although a King cobra can strike higher). However, that would be the case whether the imagery is literal or figurative, so that by itself doesn't establish the identity of the nemesis. 

3. The secular interpretation trades on the stereotype that women have a greater aversion to snakes than men. In a sense that may be a valid generalization, but it needs to be qualified. Although boys are more likely than girls to handle snakes with their bare hands, those are usually nonvenomous snakes. As a rule, it's a foolhardy boy who picks up a venomous snake. It takes great skill to do that, and it's reckless to do even if you have the skill.

It's true that lots of guys are fascinated by snakes (and other reptiles). Some collect venomous snakes, including exotic imports. Some men become herpetologists. 

However, before the development of antivenom and snake tongs, men were naturally wary of venomous snakes. Just consider the reaction of Moses to a venomous snake (Exod 4:3). So I don't think the etiological interpretation is realistic. That interpretation singles out women, but the antipathy to venomous snakes extends to men as well. And I'm sure the same holds true for tribes in tropical jungles where reticulated pythons lurk. Dangerous snakes in general. 

4. But the etiological interpretation suffers from another flaw. If the nemesis was a talking snake, then to preserve the parallel, this is a prophecy (after the fact) to explain the animus between women and talking snakes. Not between women and mute snakes. Not merely between the first woman and a talking snake. Rather, this is couched as a prediction. And on the secular interpretation, the narrator thought talking snakes existed. So the initial scenario is projecting into the future. 

But as a etiology, that fails since ancient Jewish women never encountered talking snakes. On a secular interpretation, that might be plausible if you push it back into the past, to a legendary time when there were talking snakes, but the oracle is forward-looking. So for the secular interpretation to be consistent, this is a backstory to account for the aversion that women at the time of writing had towards snakes. And secularists traditionally date the composition of the Pentateuch to the Babylonian Exile or thereabouts. But of course, secularists don't think women in general had any experience with talking snakes–since they don't exist! So the secular interpretation suffers from internal tensions. 

God's audible voice

Having done a general commentary on Craig's treatment of Gen 1-3, I'd like to zoom in on one detail:

The anthropomorphic nature of God, which is merely hinted at in chap. 2, becomes inescapable in chap 3, where God is described as walking in the garden in the cool of the day, calling audibly to Adam...many features of these stories are fantastic. That is to say, they are palpably false if taken literally.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OC9zwO0Gw40&t=165s

1. Is Craig suggesting that if Gen 2-3 attributes an audible voice to God, that's palpably false if taken literally? In his overall treatment of the account, that's one of the "fantastic" features he singles out as metaphorical. 

2. If so, that's a remarkable position for a Christian apologist to take. It would be understandable from John Spong or Rudolf Bultmann. If he's stating a general principle, then it can't be confined to Gen 2-3 or Gen 1-11. The same principle extends to the patriarchal narratives, Exodus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, the Historical Books, the Prophets, the Gospels, Acts, &c. 

3. Over and above Scripture, many Christians claim that God spoke to them in an audible. I'm not suggesting that we should credit every reported voice of God. But if enough Christians say God spoke to them in an audible voice, that's evidence that it happens some of the time. Not all of them are wackos or charlatans. 

4. Perhaps, though, what Craig means by an "audible" voice is not a voice you hear in your mind, not God communicating telepathically, but a physical external voice. If God spoke to someone in an audible voice, and someone else was standing next to him, they'd both hear the voice. An objective sound. Maybe that's what Craig deems to be "fantastic" and "palpably false". 

If so, what is the basis of Craig's objection? Surely God can miraculously structure sound waves to create a disembodied, but external voice. I'd at that even on the telepathic interpretation, God is able to communicate the same message to two or more people at the same time. 

5. But maybe what Craig has in mind is not a disembodied voice, but an embodied voice. If God is an incorporeal being, then he can't use an audible voice in that sense.

But consider the Angel of the Lord. Consider the "mechanics" of the Angel of the Lord. In the OT, angels sometimes have physicality. They can materialize and dematerialize. In principle, the Angel of the Lord might have one of two modalities:

i) God takes possession of an actual angel. A preexistent angelic being–like Michael or Gabriel. He uses the angel as a vehicle to express himself–akin to how God sometimes takes possession of a human seer.  

ii) God creates a temporary body every time the Angel of the Lord appears. A temporary material vehicle to speak to humans and interact with the physical surroundings. And it ceases to exist after it serves the immediate purpose. It might be a humanoid body, or a luminous body, depending on how God wants to present himself. 

6. But maybe Craig's point is not that God's audible voice is "palpably false" considered in isolation, but as one more contribution to the overall scene in Gen 2-3. One of several cumulative, telltale signs that "these stories are fantastic (i.e. palpably false if taken literally)". 

Yet the "fantastic" details are a fixture of biblical supernaturalism. Unfortunately, Craig's treatment of Gen 1-3 is a gift to infidels. He argues that Gen 1-3 is pious fiction. While he avoids the term, that's what his position amounts to. And to judge by his treatment of Gen 1-3, we can expect him to treat the flood account as fictional, too. 

Is Genesis "mytho-history"?

After completing his research program on penal substitution, Craig moved on to his next research program regarding the historical status of Genesis. This seems to be an interim report, but I'm guessing it's a forecast of his final views:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OC9zwO0Gw40&t=165s

No one was expecting Craig to emerge from his studies a young-earth creationist. I wonder if he even bothered to read the best of the young-earth creationists. The question was whether he'd land on the side of old-earth creationists like Vern Poythress and John Collins or the BioLogos crowd. Now we know.

Gott mit uns

I got into an impromptu debate with an apostate Christian who is now an atheist.

[How do you know drowning people is morally wrong?] I know drowning is a very unpleasant sensation and can lead to death. As I wouldn’t what it to happen to me I in turn don’t wish it on others. It’s called empathy.

1. So your morality is ultimately based on your intuition? Your sense or feelings? Such as feeling "a very unpleasant sensation". Such as feeling a sense of "empathy". However, you earlier condemned Hitler and the Holocaust. Yet Hitler felt no empathy for the Jewish people. Hence, by your logic, Hitler did not do anything morally wrong by killing Jews in the Holocaust, did he?

2. A person can also feel "a very unpleasant sensation" when they're undergoing euthanasia. Would you therefore argue euthanasia is morally illicit?

hitler was a Christian so....

1. Hitler came from a Catholic background, just like Stalin came from a Russian Orthodox background (Stalin became an atheist), but Hitler persecuted Christians and hated Christians. Philosophically speaking, one could argue Hitler often promoted the views of Friedrich Nietzsche who was an ardent atheist and nihilist.

2. In fact, Hitler considered Christianity weak. A religion only fit for "slaves". And even Joseph Goebbels, who knew Hitler closely, said: "The Führer is deeply religious, though completely anti-Christian. He views Christianity as a symptom of decay. Rightly so. It is a branch of the Jewish race. This can be seen in the similarity of their religious rites. Both [Judaism and Christianity] have no point of contact to the animal element, and thus, in the end they will be destroyed."

3. However you're missing the actual point. I'm responding to you on your own grounds. This isn't about Hitler, but about your argument. Hitler is simply one example among many. You argued for morality based on feelings like "empathy". Well, if morality is ultimately based on whether or not we have empathy toward another person, then someone who has no empathy toward a group of people - such as Hitler lacking empathy toward Jews, or such as ISIS lacking empathy toward non-Muslims including non-Sunni Muslims - then by your logic how have they wronged the other person?

Euthanasia is a complex issue that requires consent and extenuating circumstances. The right to die for example. Alleviate suffering as such.

1. Again, you missed the point. The point is, by your own logic, euthanasia would be wrong because the person would feel "a very unpleasant sensation and can lead to death".

2. You need to find a better argument if you want to ground objective moral values and duties on atheism. If you can't ground objective moral values and duties, then you have no basis by which to morally judge another person's morality. Such as by calling God a "sadistic jerk" as well as condemning ancient peoples like Israelites and early Christians. At best, it's just your own intuition or feelings or somesuch, but your own personal feelings aren't necessarily a reliable moral compass.

3. Given atheism, what happens to evil people who get away with their evil in this life? Hitler died the way he wanted to die, by suicide, without ever having to answer for his evils. Stalin and Mao got away in the end too. As Dawkins points out: "In a universe of electrons and selfish genes, blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won't find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference."

Gott Mit Uns which is emblazoned on the SS emblem translates to God With Us. Strange thing for an atheist to attach to his death squads.

1. By that logic, we put "In God We Trust" on our money. Hence the United States is (or should be) a Christian nation. Is that what you're arguing?

2. Besides, as Goebbels points out, Hitler was "religious" but "anti-Christian" and anti-Jewish. So whatever "god" this was, it wasn't the God of the Bible.

3. Plus, the Nazis often co-opted religious symbols for their own propaganda. After all, the swastika was originally from Hinduism. Hence, by your logic, the Nazis were Hindu.

horrible people throughout history have co-opted religion to strengthen their power. It’s almost like political leaders understand that having a god around helps keep people in line. Any coincidence that ancient cultures often had church and government so closely entwined. Makes you think doesn’t it. Can’t get the peasants to listen, threaten them with a fate worse than death. A savvy political move.

1. Thanks for conceding my point. Yes, Hitler and the Nazis were "horrible people" who co-opted religion. They were not Christians like you've been ignorantly alleging.

2. If anything, Hitler was driven by a Nietzschean vision mixed with various myths and religious symbols. (This included Norse, Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, and related myths, which JRR Tolkien even criticized the Nazis for misunderstanding at the time.) If anything, Hitler was driven by an atheistic and nihilistic vision. God is dead. The will to power. The German and Aryan peoples are Übermensch. That's one reason why Hitler thought Germans could weather the freezing Russian winter wearing lighter and/or less clothing than the Russians since the Germans are Übermensch! That's one reason why Hitler refused to allow his troops to make strategic retreats to fight another day (such as at Stalingrad) since the Übermensch have the will to overcome their enemies and other obstacles. In short, if anything, Hitler was driven by atheistic and nihilistic philosophies.

3. How "kept in line" to Pharoah and the gods of Egypt were Moses and the Israelites? See John Currid's book Against the Gods: The Polemical Theology of the Old Testament for a start.

4. Most importantly, given atheism, why isn't nihilism the logical conclusion to your atheism? That's what many atheist philosophers even argue (e.g. Alex Rosenberg). Hence, the question is, given your atheism, how would you ground moral realism? Given your atheism, how would you ground objective moral values and duties? So far, you haven't been able to.

Edit: I added more of the debate below.

Do the Gospels borrow from pagan myths?

"Do the Gospels Borrow from Pagan Myths?" by Timothy Paul Jones.

Atlantis

Plato's legend of Atlantis, in the Timaeus and the Critias, captured the imagination. It's popular among New Age gurus. It may well be a myth of Plato's own devising.

However, it's intriguing to consider that one of the two candidates for the location of Eden is lower Mesopotamia, at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Perhaps it's just coincidental, but maybe the legend of Atlantis is a dim memory of Eden, now submerged in the Indian sea. Likewise, it may just be coincidental that the Persian Gulf is a source of pearl oysters, but perhaps that's reminiscent of Gen 2:12.

The other candidate for the location of Eden is upper Mesopotamia, around Armenia or Anatolia.

Primeval ice

1 In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth. 2 The earth was without form and void, and darkness was over the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God was hovering over the face of the waters.

3 And God said, “Let there be light,” and there was light. 4 And God saw that the light was good. And God separated the light from the darkness. 5 God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And there was evening and there was morning, the first day. (Gen 1:1-5).

Progressive/secular Bible scholars think v2 alludes to a preexistent primordial ocean. But is that consistent with what ancient people were in a position to know? What state does water take in the absent of sunlight? Ice. Denizens in the Middle East knew from personal experience that desert temperatures plummet after dark. They were acquainted with hail and snow. They knew about icy mountains. 

Ice wasn't a foreign substance to them. And the relationship between sunlight and heat wasn't a foreign concept to them.

So, from a natural standpoint, if water preexisted sunlight, that wouldn't be a primeval ocean. That wouldn't be liquid, but solid. 

Of course, from a supernatural standpoint, God doesn't need sunlight to have liquified H2O. And even humans can melt ice with fire. But my immediate point is that the mythological conception which some Bible scholars impute to ancient Near Eastern writers doesn't mesh with what they knew about the world, if they gave it much thought. 

To be sure, many people are thoughtless. However, there are always some observant, reflective people who do think things through. So this is another example where desk-bound Bible scholar makes questionable assumptions about the ancient mindset. Modern scholars don't think about these things because they don't live off the land. They don't have to be keen observers of nature to survive. They are cocooned from the harsh elements by modern technology. But ancient people had to be highly attentive to the workings of nature to survive. 

Genesis and the ancient Near East

It's become very popular to say we should interpret the OT in light of its ancient Near Eastern background. That's true or false depending on how we develop the idea. Two of the more prominent exponents are John Walton and Peter Enns, but there are others. This is becoming influential in evangelicalism. 

But one problem with this line of thought is that scholars like Walton and Enns speak with great confidence about their interpretations, as if once you grant the ancient Near Eastern frame of reference, then there's scholarly consensus on how to interpret Genesis. But that's far from monolithic. There are scholars who agree with the frame of reference, but arrive at very different conclusions. 

It's my impression that Walton is to the right of Enns. In addition, it's my impression that Walton is a better scholar than Enns. However, David Tsumura is a more distinguished scholar than either one. And it's revealing to compare his conclusions to theirs. I'll be quoting some excerpts from David T. Tsumura, "Rediscovery of the Ancient Near East and Its Implications for Genesis 1–2," Kyle Greenwood, ed. Since the Beginning: Interpreting Genesis 1 and 2 through the Ages (Baker 2018), chapter 10.

From mere Christianity to mere mythology

https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/hermeneutical-vs-scientific-young-earth-creationism

I find it crucial to distinguish between Young Earth Creationism (YEC) as a hermeneutical hypothesis and as a scientific hypothesis.  The hermeneutical hypothesis concerns the correct interpretation of the early chapters of Genesis. Do these passages affirm, either explicitly or implicitly, that the universe was created in the recent past (say, 10,000-20,000 years ago)?  The scientific hypothesis concerns the empirical adequacy of the view that the universe is so young. Is the scientific evidence plausibly explained by the hypothesis that the universe originated only 10,000-20,000 years ago? 

That's a necessary distinction. 

Now I have long ago taken a stand on YEC as a scientific hypothesis. My defense of the kalām cosmological argument on the basis of Big Bang cosmology presupposes that the universe is more than 13 billion years old. 

I find that odd. Seems to me the kalām cosmological argument is an a priori, metaphysical argument about the possibility (or not) of an actual temporal infinite, rather than an a posteriori argument based on astrophysics and cosmology. 

Indeed, I think that YEC as a scientific hypothesis is quite hopeless. But YEC as a hermeneutical hypothesis is quite another matter. I want to approach the text with an open mind, despite the terrifying prospect that YEC might actually be correct as a hermeneutical hypothesis. In that case, we would face some very hard choices. Given YEC’s failure as a scientific hypothesis, we should have to conclude that the Bible teaches scientific error and therefore revise our doctrine of inspiration to accommodate this fact. That is a route one would prefer not to take.

i) I wonder what YEC scientists Craig has studied. 

ii) He thinks that if push comes to shove, the scientific reconstruction of the distant past is more reliable than divine revelation. 

iii) It's true that YEC chronology is up against many prima facie lines of evidence to the contrary. However, the deeper issue is the assumption that there's an unbroken continuum between the present and the past so that we can reconstruct the distant past by linear extrapolation from the present. Up to a point that's reasonable. Nature is like a machine. You can mentally run the process backwards. 

There are, however, agents who can intervene to produce an effect that's discontinuous with antecedent conditions. Take a miraculous healing. Since that outcome can't be predicted from the status quo ante, because that outcome wasn't caused by the status quo ante, it follows, by the same token, that the status quo ante can't be retrodicted from the outcome. Supernatural agents throw a wild card into our projections and retroactions. Although we shouldn't invoke that willy-nilly, it's something we must make allowance for. 

iv) The challenge has less to do with the amount of time than an evolutionary narrative or evolutionary reading of the natural record. However, that's counterbalanced by the challenges confronting naturalistic evolution.  

So I’m very interested in exploring the suggestion of some commentators that the primaeval history of Genesis 1-11 is mytho-historical, a sort of fusion of history and mythology that should not be interpreted literally.

i) The same supernaturalism that pervades Gen 1-11 likewise pervades the patriarchal narratives, the Book of Exodus, Numbers, &c. There's no bright line between Gen 1-11 and the rest of the Pentateuch, Historical Books, Gospels, Acts. A "mytho-historical" reading will have to be extended to Scripture in general. 

ii) There are non-YEC interpretations of Gen 1-11 that don't appeal to a fusion of mythology and history. Craig's fallback is a false dichotomy. 

Medieval bestiary

A common argument against the inerrancy of Scripture is to compare Scripture to alleged parallels in pagan sources, then infer that Bible writers shared the prescientific outlook of their pagan neighbors. In that regard I'd like to expand on a comparison offered by John Collins in Reading Genesis Well (Zondervan 2018), 260n34.

Suppose a modern reader thought a medieval bestiary was a reliable source for what medieval folk knew about animals. Yet medieval peasants clearly had accurate knowledge of farm animals and game animals. So a medieval bestiary is not a representative sample of what-all they knew about animals. Which is not to deny that a bestiary may reflect a degree of ignorance and superstition, just as pagans in the ancient Near East suffered from ignorance and superstition. But it means we need to be avoid the knee-jerk assumption that some of their depictions were necessarily meant to be realistic.