Sunday, October 15, 2017

Did sacrificial animals die in place of people?

A while back, Bnonn Tennant did a provocative post. I won't link to it because, in preparation for the Zombie Apocalypse, his estimable blog has gone underground, but I will quote what I take to be some representative samples of his argument, then comment on them:

The Levitical system of sacrifices was not intended to model substitutionary atonement; it was about sanctifying the space and the people that God dwelt in the midst of.

When we read Leviticus, we read it through the lens of the cross. This is good, because Leviticus points to the cross; it was fulfilled there. However, the cross did more than one thing. Our default view is penal substitution—but I don’t believe that is how it fulfilledLeviticus. If we read Leviticus with substitution in mind, our interpretation becomes quite confused, and we miss what it is actually all about.

my contention is that they needed to cleanse it of ritual impurity. That is really the only reason that makes sense. They were purifying it to ensure it remained fit for God’s habitation.

The bull is for decontaminating the high priest; one goat is for decontaminating the people; another is for Azazel, a spiritual being; and the ram is for a burnt offering, which reestablished a relationship between the people and God.

the defilement is of a symbolic nature rather than a moral one.

In ritual settings, both words refer to purging or purifying. In Leviticus, therefore, I think we should translate kipper as “to make a purging,” rather than “to make atonement.” This is because, just as with the “sin offering,” it is clearly not referring to moral guilt; it is referring to decontamination. Obviously a place cannot incur, nor be purged of guilt. Rather, what is in view is the restoring of this space to a state fit for God to dwell in, by sprinkling God’s throne (the lid of the ark) with blood. The same thing happens in verse 18 with the altar: the priest “makes atonement for” the altar by sprinkling it with blood. He is not removing moral guilt; he is purging it from ritual uncleanness.

This understanding of atonement is corroborated in what happens next: the other goat is sent away. It is not sacrificed; its blood is never applied to anyone or anything. Rather, the ritual impurity of the people is symbolically transferred to it, and it is driven out of sacred space

The goat doesn’t “pay for” the impurity with its life; rather, it removes the impurity from the borders of the camp, carrying it into the wilderness, which was the domain of Azazel.

So what the Levitical system is modeling for us is not substitution; it is the need for forensic justification—for being declared fit for God’s presence purely on the basis of faith, as demonstrated in obedience to the cultic laws.

The connection between the blood of animals, and the blood of Jesus, is not that animals had to die in the place of people to turn away God’s wrath. Indeed, as any Christian knows—but hasn’t necessarily thought through—“it is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sins” (Hebrews 10:4). Rather, the blood made the area symbolically suitable, clean, for habitation by God. The point is not to turn away God’s wrath through a substitutionary sacrifice, nor to model the turning away of God’s wrath through a substitutionary sacrifice. It is to demonstrate the extreme unapproachableness of God in view of the depravity of man. 

i) Whether Azazel is a demonic being in Leviticus is highly disputable. However, it isn't clear to me that Bnonn's argument depends on that identification. And my response doesn't require me to refute that identification.

ii) I can't help wondering if Bnonn's argument isn't designed to undergird his Amyraldism and sidestep Owen's double jeopardy argument. If you believe that Christ died for everyone, and if you construe his death in penal substitutionary terms, the question is whether penal substitution in tandem with universal atonement entails universal salvation. Historically, many Arminians reject penal substitution for that very reason. 

iii) Since I'm not a traditionalist, I don't objection to iconoclastic interpretations, per se. And I agree with Bnonn that conventional translations can be prejudicial. 

iv) I don't see how one can avoid a vicarious transaction in some of these examples, where the offering is a stand-in for the sinner or worshiper. A graphic example is the scapegoat, where the guilt of the Israelites is symbolically transferred to the scapegoat, via the gesture of the priest, then the scapegoat is driven out of the camp, symbolically separating guilt from the guilty. 

Penal substitution builds on the generic vicarious principle, but adds a more specific nuance, where one thing is punished in place of another. To put the matter in reverse, absent a surrogate, the sinner or worshipper would suffer punishment in his own person.

v) Although I don't assume that every offering in Leviticus foreshadows the Cross, I think Leviticus is using several different pictures to foreshadow the redemptive significance of the Cross. No one picture is intended to capture in full the concept of penal substitution. Rather, these need to be viewed in combination. Different pictures to illustrate different facets of vicarious atonement and penal substitution. To say, therefore, that the scapegoat wasn't sacrificed misses the point. No one type of offering was meant to cover the entire idea. 

vi) The fundamental problem I have with Bnonn's analysis is that he erects a false dichotomy. I can grant the distinction between moral and ritual purity/impurity. I can grant the sacred spatial framework. 

Problem though, is that his dichotomy only pushes the question back a step. So what does sacred space signify? What does ritual defilement signify? Cultic holiness represents actual holiness. Cultic unholiness represents actual unholiness. These are emblematic pictures or enacted parables. You don't literally enter God's presence by entering the tabernacle or the inner sanctum. Rather, that's a pictorial representation. Concrete spatial metaphors or figurative tokens that stand for real good and evil. 

It's entirely consistent with the symbolic nature of the Levitical cultus that these gestures and actions symbolize vicarious atonement, penal substitution, thereby prefiguring the redemptive death of Christ on behalf of and in place of (elect) sinners. 

10 comments:

  1. I remember this post, and I almost commented on it. I have interacted quite fruitfully with Bnonn in the past. He is following Milgrom in many ways (I can't remember if he actually referenced Milgrom). One of the main problems with the dichotomy between a sacrifice being a substitute and being used to cleanse sacred space is ignoring the implicit (though never really pursued) alternative to the sacrificial animal.

    In both the OT and the ANE sacrificial systems the implied, and sometimes explicitly stated, "norm" is that you died to cleanse the sacred space. Whoever defiles it, their blood can cleanse it. The animal is a substitute. So even if one views the point of the animal's death purely in purification terms and not punishment, there is still the concept of substitution operating.

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  2. I'll venture a few comments in no particular order:

    1. My blog is back :) Here's the original article I wrote: https://bnonn.com/sacrificial-animals-did-not-die-in-place-of-people/

    2. It's fair to say I swung too far in my thesis by neglecting the substitutionary element in purgation. I was concerned to show that the issue with Levitical sacrifice was not guilt per se, but rather ritual purity. However, as you note, one can create a false dichotomy here. Also my title was clearly overstepping my actual thesis; it should be Sacrificial animals did not die for guilt or something similar. I had thought that I acknowledged fairly explicitly that ritual purity images moral purity, but looking back it seems I didn't actually make that connection very clearly at all. I will need to rework the article to be more transparent on these points.

    3. I don't agree that guilt is transferred to the scapegoat. As I argue, it is defilement which is transferred. Defilement certainly images guilt, but image is not identity. If guilt could be imputed to animals, why would Jesus have needed to die?

    4. My argument doesn't hinge on the identity of Azazel, but it does become murkier without that element. I'm not sure the alleged dispute over his identity is really exegetically legitimate, though. Evangelical scholars tend to be extremely squeamish about the spirit world of the Bible, so I tend to assume that "disagreement" on these kinds of points is just a case of not wanting to have to live with the results of their exegesis. In that respect, liberal scholars can (can) be a lot more reliable, because what the text says has no real effect on them. It's all theoretical; an exercise in trivia. They can acknowledge its meaning without getting uncomfortable and having to loosen their collar—let alone gird up their loins to field the backlash that I myself have experienced from conservative Christians.

    5. I'd be cautious about saying that one didn't literally enter God's presence in the tabernacle—or at least in the twice-holy place. As I note in the article, God promised to presence himself there and appear in the cloud between the cherubs. That said, my point was less about being in the direct presence of God, and more about dwelling in the same space as was dedicated to him.

    6. I'm not an Amyraldian unless Charles Hodge was. Amyraut reordered the decrees of God. I'm a tentative supralapsarian, assuming that ordering the decrees even makes sense. Either way, my understanding of Levitical sacrifice has no connection in my own mind to unlimited satisfaction. I've already articulated my position on that; the reason some people are saved by Jesus' atonement and not others is because imputation doesn't work the way Owen thought.

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    1. "I'm not an Amyraldian unless Charles Hodge was."

      The angel Gabriel once confided in me the scandalous story of Hodge's Faustian bargain. But I'm not at liberty to divulge the titillating details because that's classified top secret so as not to taint true Calvinism by guilty association.

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    2. "I'd be cautious about saying that one didn't literally enter God's presence in the tabernacle—or at least in the twice-holy place. As I note in the article, God promised to presence himself there and appear in the cloud between the cherubs."

      i) First question is whether the Shekinah was permanently stationed in the inner sanctum. What was normally there? Just the ark of the covenant?

      ii) But more to the point, if we take the position that God subsists outside of time and space, then God is never actually present at a particular place. God is symbolically present.

      iii) Even theophanies like the Shekiah and the Angel of the Lord would be emblematic manifestations of God, using natural audiovisual media. Or in some cases, it might be psychological (i.e. inspired subjective visions).

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    3. "I don't agree that guilt is transferred to the scapegoat. As I argue, it is defilement which is transferred. Defilement certainly images guilt, but image is not identity. If guilt could be imputed to animals, why would Jesus have needed to die?"

      You blew past the adjective. I said "A graphic example is the scapegoat, where the guilt of the Israelites is symbolically transferred to the scapegoat, via the gesture of the priest, then the scapegoat is driven out of the camp, symbolically separating guilt from the guilty."

      I qualified the relation as symbolic.

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    4. "I'm not sure the alleged dispute over his identity is really exegetically legitimate, though."

      That identification relies on much later, apocryphal sources. Also, a different word is used in 17:7 for "goat demons).

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  3. The question of what constitutes presence is certainly interesting, but whatever we can say there, we should acknowledge that God treats his appearances as him actually appearing—regardless of the ontology in play.

    You're right that I blew past your qualification about guilt being symbolically transferred. My bad, sorry. But that being so, our positions seem quite close. There's maybe an extra layer of symbolism in play under my view, but the overall effect is pretty similar. The key point for me is simply that the blood of bulls and goats didn't atone for moral iniquity, nor directly image the atonement of moral iniquity.

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    1. Glad to see your blog back up Bnonn, it was missed.

      I'll add a few more comments. Take'em for what they are worth:

      I'm not sure all the hard and fast distinctions you are making hold up. I am in quite a bit of agreement, but I guess I see more conceptual "bleeding" than you do between the categories, and I think that was intentional.

      For example, in this paragraph I have 2 quibbles:

      "The important point to note for our purposes is that the priest does not sprinkle the blood on himself, nor on anyone else. This is an offering which involves the shedding of blood, but the term חטאת—chatta’at—which most translations render “sin” offering (Leviticus 16:3 etc.) is confusing, because we read it in light of the cross. As with the burnt offering, it does not deal with moral sin; again, this is obvious in places like Leviticus 5 where a chatta’at must be made for touching a corpse. This is not sinful behavior; anyone performing a burial, or checking on a sick relative, might touch a corpse perfectly innocuously. So although the Hebrew חטאה—chatta’ah; note the ending h—does usually refer to moral sin, the chatta’at—note the ending t—is better translated “purification offering.” It is for removing ritual impurity; the defilement is of a symbolic nature rather than a moral one. This also ties into the meaning of “atonement;” see below."

      (1) "As with the burnt offering, it does not deal with moral sin; again, this is obvious in places like Leviticus 5 where a chatta’at must be made for touching a corpse." The conclusion stated at the beginning of this sentence doesn't follow from the evidence. Just because חטאת clearly doesn't deal with moral sin in some instances, doesn't mean you automatically apply that sense to every occurrence. You would need to do a more thorough study.

      (2) The distinction between חטאת and חטאה doesn't hold. There are numerous occasions where חטאת does not refer to any sacrifice at all, and so the translation "purification offering" would be nonsensical, and in arguably the majority of those occurrences the sense is clearly moral.


      (Now I am going to borrow from some of my unfinished thoughts from my dissertation work):

      I would also note that David is clearly drawing on Leviticus 16 (the scapegoat specifically) when he crafts Psalm 32. In Leviticus 16, guilt (עָוֺן), transgression (פֶּשַׁע), and sin (חַטָּאת) are confessed (ידה) and borne (נשׂא) by the goat. In Psalm 32, guilt (עָוֺן), transgression (פֶּשַׁע), and sin (חַטָּאת), are confessed (ידה) and borne (נשׂא) by God (though this last point is obscured in most English translations, as they usually opt for "forgiven" by God).

      David is clearly dealing with moral guilt. Furthermore, while the psalm is classified as a "confession" psalm, it is not strictly a confession itself (the way Psalm 51 is), but it is a psalm about confession. It is a psalm extolling the virtues of confession. And David's model of confession's relationship to guilt and someone else taking that guilt is drawn from the scapegoat. So even if you want to say they sacrifices and rituals don't "directly" image the atonement of moral iniquity, it is clearly direct enough for the language and imagery to be employed that way by fellow OT authors.

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    2. Interesting, thanks Jeremiah. Clearly I have more work to do!

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    3. Bnonn,

      I still don't agree with your dichotomy. I agree with you that the scapegoat and some other Levitical ceremonies directly concern ritual pollution. However, cultic contamination/decontamination can't be the ultimate explanation, for that fails to address the question of why it's hazardous or improper for a sinner to "enter God's presence" in the first place. It's because these rituals are emblematic pictures of actual holiness and unholiness. Enacted parables.

      It's not as if sinners are automatically incinerated in God's presence. Consider the Incarnation. Rather, these are graphic *tokens* of moral guilt, God's holiness, &c.

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