Pinning Walls to the wall

I'm going to comment on some statements Arminian philosopher Jerry Walls recently made on his Facebook page:

Jerry Walls Maul, I added the word severely the very first time to preclude the sort of counterexample you give about gum. I'm also inclined to think that scenarios like the one you construct have no plausibility for God, who is not beset with the sort of limitations faced by the father in your scenario.

That's an odd comment. As an Arminian (with strong open theist sympathies to boot), Walls most definite thinks God is beset with severe limitations regarding what he can cajole humans into doing. So isn't he creating a dilemma for himself? If he downplays divine limitations vis-a-vis human free agents, then it's harder for him to draw an invidious contrast between Reformed theism and freewill theism. If, on the other hand, he stresses divine limitations, then he plays into Maul's counterexample. 

Jerry Walls Okay, this could go on all day. Time will indeed tell. I agree that Calvinists have had few philosophically sophisticated adherents. And after they have made their case, I may have write another book down the road. And as for exegesis, well, Calvinism is overwhelmingly a minority position in the church at large. That hardly settles the matter but it is question begging to say you have the edge, (even hands down) in view of that fact. Not to mention that many of the best of today (NT Wright, Witherington, Joel Green, Craig Keener) do not support Calvinism.

It's funny what people say, including smart people like Walls, when their back is pinned to the wall.

Walls is a Wesleyan-Arminian with one foot in open theism. That's a subset of a subset of a subset of a subset. 

Arminianism didn't even exist until the 17C. Wesleyan Arminianism didn't exist until the 18C. And open theism didn't exist until the late 20C. 

Most professing Christians are either Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox. Within Protestantism, you have Lutheran opponents of Arminianism as well as Calvinist. 

By historical indices, isn't Jerry's Wesleyan-Arminianism-cum-open theism overwhelmingly a minority position in the church-at-large?

Also, many of the best Protestant Bible scholars reject Calvinism because they agree with Wesley's starting-point: whatever the Bible means, it can't mean that!

Their moral intuition is choo-choo pulling the caboose of Scripture. 

Moreover, Arminians in academia (unlike Internet apologists) increasingly disregard whatever they find offensive in Scripture. 

Jerry Walls Maul: to be clear, my internal critique is twofold: 1) Calvinists, particularly popular writers, often trade on libertarian freedom by saying things that do not make sense on compatibilist assumptions. So one critique is to push for more consistency on that score. 2) Calvinists often say things about God's love for all people that are inconsistent with their theology. Again, my point is to push for more consistency and encourage Calvinists to admit that on their view God does not love all people, or certainly not in the sense of doing all he can to promote their true flourishing, ie save them.

i) Of course, we'd expect popular writers to be philosophically unsophisticated. Is Austin Fischer philosophically astute?

ii) On the second point, this is part of Jerry's schtick. He acts as if these Calvinists are deliberately mendacious. Lowballing Calvinism to dupe the unsuspecting and sell the product.

It doesn't even seem to occur to him that for Calvinists like Piper, this is a case of theological paradox. On the one hand, they think Scripture teaches reprobation. On the other hand, they think there's a sense in which God loves the reprobate. They sincerely believe Scripture teaches both propositions.

They're perfectly aware of the apparent tension between these two claims, but out of fidelity to their understanding of Scripture, they accept the paradox. 

It's not unusual for Christians, including philosophers and theologians, to accept paradoxical doctrines. For instance, some Arminians admit the metaphysical tension between God's foreknowledge and man's libertarian freedom. They defer to mystery at that point. 

iii) In addition, if we take the position that God can only instantiate one possible world, then it's not hard to see how God might love the reprobate even though he damns them. Yes, he could save them, but each possible world has tradeoffs. 

I'm not saying that's the correct explanation. I incline to a different position. But many Christian philosophers and theologians assume that God can only instantiate one possible world. If that's the case, then, in fact, God could regret the fate of the reprobate. But that's the price of certain otherwise unobtainable goods. 

Ironically, freewill theists like W. L. Craig make similar arguments. 

Can Jerry prove that God is able to instantiate multiple alternate possibilities? 

Jerry Walls And there's really nothing complicated about the universalism question as it relates to Calvinism. Sophisticated Calvinists are moving in that direction because otherwise Calvinism is morally indefensible. But universalism is NOT historic Calvinism and to embrace it is to give up historic Calvinism. 

This is going to be fun:

And there's really nothing complicated about the annihilationism question as it relates to Arminianism. Sophisticated Arminians (e.g. Clark Pinnock, Randal Rauser, I. H. Marshall, Scot McKnight) are moving in that direction because otherwise Arminianism is morally indefensible. But annihilationism is NOT historic Arminianism and to embrace it is to give up historic Arminianism. 

And there's really nothing complicated about the postmortem salvation question as it relates to Arminians. Sophisticated Arminians (e.g. Jerry Walls) are moving in that direction because otherwise Arminianism is morally indefensible. But postmortem salvation is NOT historic Arminianism and to embrace it is to give up historic Arminianism.

And there's really nothing complicated about the open theism question as it relates to Arminianism. Sophisticated Arminians (e.g. Clark Pinnock, Roger Olson, Jerry Walls) are moving in that direction because otherwise Arminianism is morally indefensible. But open theism is NOT historic Arminianism and to embrace it is to give up historic Arminianism.

And there's really nothing complicated about the fallibility of Scripture question as it relates to Arminianism. Sophisticated Arminians (e.g. Randal Rauser, Roger Olson, Bill Arnold) are moving in that direction because otherwise Arminianism is morally indefensible. But the fallibility of Scripture is NOT historic Arminianism and to embrace it is to give up historic Arminianism.

And there's really nothing complicated about the New Perspective on Paul question as it relates to Arminianism. Sophisticated Arminians (e.g. Brian Abasciano) are moving in that direction because otherwise Arminianism is morally indefensible. But the New Perspective on Paul is NOT historic Arminianism and to embrace it is to give up historic Arminianism.

Jerry Walls Well, if you want something authoritative and detailed, see Brian Abasciano's commentary on Romans 9. Or NT Wright or Ben Witherington's commentaries on Romans.

In the past I've interacted with Abasciano and Witherington. But for now, what about Jerry's facile appeal to Wright? 

To my knowledge, Wright views Calvinists, Arminians, and Lutherans as different sides of the same flawed paradigm. The NPP rejects the soteriological, going-to-heaven-when-you-die conception of the Gospel.

Assuming (ex hypothesi) that Wright's interpretation of Rom 9 is correct, that doesn't just falsify Calvinism–it falsifies traditional Arminianism. The NPP rejects the way in which traditional Protestant theology frames the issue. It's giving the wrong answer because it's asking the wrong question. 

Jerry Walls Necessarily if S loves S*, S would not determine S* to do wrong action A and then punish him,let alone severely, for doing A. Any punishment remotely like damnation would be severe. Basic intuitions can hardly be proven most of the time.

Walls is such a sloppy philosopher. Admittedly, this is only Facebook, but where does he ever do better?

His opening sentence contains several distinct propositions that need to be disambiguated and evaluated separately:

i) Is it wrong for S to determine S* to do a wrong action?

ii) Is it wrong for S to punish S* for doing a wrong action that S determined S* to do?

iii) Is it wrong for S to severely punish S* for doing a wrong action that S determined S* to do? 

What's the relationship between (i) and (ii)? Does the (alleged) wrongness of (ii) presuppose the (alleged) wrongness of (i)? Does the (alleged) wrongness of (ii) compound the (alleged) wrongness of (i)?  

Arminian eugenics

Roger Olson  

You leave out that the Calvinism I am arguing against claims that this whole world and everything in it was designed, ordained and is governed by God. If God is perfectly good in any sense meaningful to us and exercises that kind of providential control, then, yes, he would have to create the best possible world. To say otherwise is to slide into nominalism and voluntarism--that God is only freely good. I think that is what most Calvinists believe (without being fully aware of it). 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/06/is-this-the-best-of-all-possible-worlds-what-i-would-think-if-i-were-a-calvinist/#comment-1443691864

Problem is: Olson never gives us a reason to accept his claim. Even assuming that there's a best possible world (which I deny), why is God "only freely good" if he made a world that falls short of the best possible world?

We'd only "slide into voluntarism" if we said God made an irremediably evil world. Olson fails to distinguish between good and evil, on the one hand, and good, better, or best, on the other hand. A good God can't make an irremediably evil world. But what prevents a good God from making a good world, although he could make an even better world? 

Olson has a eugenic outlook. Take natural evils. For instance, is a world without Down Syndrome better than a world with Down Syndrome? Suppose we figure out how to eliminate Down Syndrome. In so doing we preemptively eliminate people with Down Syndrome. They are no long allowed to begin to exist. 

Is that an improvement? Improvement for whom? You might say someone with Down Syndrome would be better off without Down Syndrome–but would he be the same person? Or is something lost in the process? Not just losing the syndrome, but losing the personality. Losing character traits associated with the syndrome.

From what I've read, people with Down Syndrome can be exceptionally loving and caring. More so that many "normal" people. A world with Down Syndrome has virtues, has a quality of goodness, that's absent in a world without Down Syndrome. 

Even if the less-than-the-best possible world is less good overall than the best possible world, the less-than-the-best possible world may include a better good than the best possible world, which achieves its best status by evening out the disparities to secure a smooth, uniform consistency of goodness.  

Is the best possible world a world devoid of evils? Or is the best possible world a world in which evils are offset by second-order goods? Goods unobtainable apart from evil? 

"God doesn't make mistakes"

I was skimming through the comments on Kevin DeYoung's recent post: "Five Questions for Christians Who Believe the Bible Supports Gay Marriage." The hostile comments are utterly inane.  For now I'll just confine myself to one comment: "Since God doesn't make mistakes," homosexuals are just fine as is. 

i) Why would a theist who supports homosexual marriage assume that God doesn't make mistakes? How many theists who support homosexual marriage subscribe to classical theism? 

ii) I daresay just about every theist who supports homosexual marriage also believes in theistic or deistic evolution or deistic. On the face of it, the evolution is an error-ridden process. So many false starts. Natural selection lacks prevision. It blindly experiments with different combinations until one works. Most evolutionary trials are abortive. 

iii) Christian theology has a doctrine of the Fall as well as a doctrine of creation. 

iv) If the claim that "God doesn't make mistakes" is used to justify homosexuality, does that forbid medical intervention in the case of a child with a congenital heart defect? Should we let someone die young due to a surgically correctable heart defect on the grounds that "God doesn't make mistakes"?

Likewise, should we deny local anesthesia to women giving birth? After all, "God doesn't make mistakes." 

Five questions for Christians who believe the Bible supports gay marriage

"Five Questions for Christians Who Believe the Bible Supports Gay Marriage" by Kevin DeYoung.

Update: Make sure to check out the combox too. For example, Jeremy Pierce's comments are well worth reading.

Scientism is naïve

"Scientism is naïve" by Evan May.

Nailing our sins to the cross

13 And you, who were dead in your trespasses and the uncircumcision of your flesh, God made alive together with him, having forgiven us all our trespasses, 14 by canceling the record of debt that stood against us with its legal demands. This he set aside, nailing it to the cross (Col 2:13-14).

Sacramentalists (e.g. the real presence, baptismal regeneration, baptismal justification) have a simple argument. The NT attributes certain properties or effects to baptism and communion. Therefore, the sacraments are the source or cause of these effects. 

There are three basic problems with this argument:

i) To begin with, whether some of their prooftexts (e.g. Jn 3:5; Jn 6; Tit 3:5) really refer to the sacraments is highly contestable.

ii) However, it's undoubtedly true that some verses of Scripture link baptism with the remission of sin. What about that? 

One problem is that Scripture often promises the remission of sin by faith alone. It doesn't make forgiveness contingent on baptism. Moreover, that would be at odds with promising remission of sin by faith alone. 

iii) But here's another problem: sacramentalists never get the nature of symbolism. Because a symbol stands for something else, whatever is really true of the thing it stands for can be said of the symbol. At that emblematic level, the symbol takes the place of what it stands for.

Consider the passage from Colossians. Paul makes the physical details of crucifixion a graphic metaphor for the remission of sin. The iron nails and the wooden cross stand for the redemptive work of Christ.

That, however, doesn't mean we are actually forgiven by driving nails into wood. Paul figuratively ascribes to the physical details of crucifixion what is literally true of Christ's redemptive death. He doesn't think hammering nails into the cross remits our sin. That's a picture of redemption. 

Baptism and communion are enacted parables which illustrate certain spiritual truths. Don't confuse the concrete metaphor with the reality it signifies. The connection is symbolic, just like Paul's vivid imagery in Col 2:24. 

Autism and manipulation

At present, the hottest argument against determinism may be the manipulation argument. I'd like to briefly consider a counterexample:

I know two people with autistic kids. Autistics sometimes engage in self-injury.

In one case their son has a penchant for swallowing indigestible objects. This is life-threatening. The objects can't safely pass through the digestive system. They must be surgically removed.

Suppose a neurosurgeon could implant a chip in the brain that would block the impulse to commit self-injury. The autistic would thereby be unconsciously determined or manipulated not to engage in self-injury. 

Under those conditions we might say there's nothing praiseworthy about the autistic's self-restraint. But we wouldn't say it was wrong to unconsciously determine or manipulate him not to engage in self-injury.

Carbon credits

Defending the Christian faith is a necessary task. The Christian faith has opponents both inside and outside the church. And it's a perennial battle. It requires constant vigilance. 

There's a moral satisfaction that comes from fighting for a noble cause. That's what motivates social liberals. They think their cause is just. And it makes them feel virtuous.

This can blind us to to the moral or spiritual hazards of defending a worthy cause. The moral or spiritual hazards for fighting for the wrong cause are obvious. And precisely because that's obvious, it can make us insensible to the less obvious hazards of fighting for the right cause.

We should guard against the trap of treating apologetics as a substitute for good works. Al Gore preaches a Green gospel, and lectures middle class Americans on their carbon emissions, even though his own lifestyle leaves a huge carbon footprint. He excuses his duplicity by purchasing carbon offsets. 

Defending the truths of Scripture, as well as the truth of Scripture, should never become a carbon offset for cultivating sanctity. There are some stalwart defends of the faith who can be quite unethical. It's as if they think the "good works" of polemical theology are carbon offsets that take the place of personal holiness. 

That's an insidious danger which Christian apologists and "heresy hunters" must guard against. Apologetics is not a carbon credit in place of saintliness. 

The Spirit of prophecy

20 knowing this first of all, that no prophecy of Scripture comes from someone's own interpretation. 21 For no prophecy was ever produced by the will of man, but men spoke from God as they were carried along by the Holy Spirit (2 Pet 1:20-21).

In this post my argument doesn't turn on the correct interpretation of v20. But as long as we're discussed the passage, we might as well consider that verse.

1) There are two plausible ways of construing v20:

i) It refers to the divine origin of prophecy. In visionary revelation, inspiration is a two-stage process. The recipient has a revelatory dream or vision. But that requires inspired interpretation. Sometimes the dreamer or visionary is a different person than the interpreter. Classic examples include Joseph/Pharaoh and Daniel/Nebuchadnezzar. Or sometimes the same person is both recipient and interpreter. Take Peter's vision, which he later expounds (Acts 10). 

This can also include divine signs (e.g. portents, prodigies, miracles) which require interpretation. 

On this view, prophetic inspiration covers both the revelatory imagery and their interpretation. Logically, it also extends to inscripturation. A seer must verbalize what he saw when he writes it down or dictates the vision to a scribe. It's more than a record of raw content. Rather, it's verbalized content. Interpreted content.

It's possible that the false teachers whom Peter is combatting denied the inspiration of OT messianic prophecies about the Day of Judgment. 

ii) It refers to the interpretation of written prophecies. The prophecies in question have already been inscripturated. The question at issue is how they ought to be understood, or who should interpret them.

On this view, there's a contrast between the apostolic interpretation of OT messianic prophecies, and the way Peter's opponents misinterpret them. False teachers spurn apostolic authority. They twist Scripture, presuming to interpret the OT in defiance of the apostolic kergyma. 

Both ways of construing v20 have textual and contextual merit. 

3) This verse also crops up in Catholic polemics. Catholic apologists quote v20 as a prooftext against the right of private judgment. There are, however, two basic problems with their appeal:

i) It's self-refuting. A Catholic apologist must interpret v20 for himself before he can deploy it against the Protestant position. But in that case he's resorting to the right of private interpretation of v20 to disprove the right of private interpretation! 

Put another way, the church of Rome has never given the infallible interpretation of v20. So a Catholic apologist must fall back on his own personal, individual exegesis. 

ii) The right of private judgment doesn't mean a reader's interpretation can't be challenged. Rather, it's a check on illicit arguments from authority. The pope or bishop or Roman episcopate can't dictate the meaning of Scripture. Interpretations are subject to responsible appeal. Interpretations are only as good as the supporting arguments. 

2) Moving on to v21, which is the main point of my post, Peter tells us that true prophecy has its origin in God's initiative rather than a prophet's initiative. A prophet must wait for God to speak to him or through him. A prophet is on the receiving end of the process. He has no control over when or if God will give him a revelation. This, in turn, goes back to the classic OT distinction between true and false prophets. A false prophet presumes to speak of his own volition, unbidden by God. 

3) And this has some bearing on the cessationist/noncessationist debate. Many cessationists take the position that since the charismata are "gifts," a gifted individual can exercise his gift at his own discretion. It's a delegated ability. 

This claim is typically applied to the case of faith-healers. If someone really has the gift of healing, then he can heal anyone at will. Failure to do so is evidence that the charismata ceased.

However, the logic of that argument would extend to other gifts, like the gift of prophecy. If someone really has the gift of prophecy, then he should be able to prophesy at will. 

Yet that's precisely what Peter here denies. Because prophecy has its source of origin, not in the prophet, but in God, a true prophet cannot conjure up a revelation on the spur of the moment. A true prophet is someone who only speaks when spoken to–by God. An authentic prophecy is not a product of the prophet's mind. 

Moving along:

26 What then, brothers? When you come together, each one has a hymn, a lesson, a revelation, a tongue, or an interpretation. Let all things be done for building up. 27 If any speak in a tongue, let there be only two or at most three, and each in turn, and let someone interpret. 28 But if there is no one to interpret, let each of them keep silent in church and speak to himself and to God. 29 Let two or three prophets speak, and let the others weigh what is said. 30 If a revelation is made to another sitting there, let the first be silent. 31 For you can all prophesy one by one, so that all may learn and all be encouraged, 32 and the spirits of prophets are subject to prophets. 33 For God is not a God of confusion but of peace (1 Cor 14:26-33).

1) V32 raises interpretive questions, both on its own terms, and in terms of how it jives with 2 Pet 1:21. Given what Paul has said about the Spirit's sovereign dispensation of the charismata, it seems prima facie incongruous for Paul to then say "the spirits of prophets are subject to prophets." Surely the Spirit of God isn't subject to the human recipient. The timing is up to God. By way of explanation:

i) Paul is tacitly contrasting Christian prophecy with pagan prophecy. In pagan prophecy, the prophet (or prophetess) worked himself into a state of frenzy, in an effort to induce prophecy through bypassing rational processes. But even if they trigger an experience, that's still a figment of their own imagination. 

By contrast, the Spirit of God engages the mind of the prophet. The Spirit of God won't sabotage his own aims by fomenting mania. 

ii) There's a distinction between when a revelation is received and when it is delivered. Although a prophet can't control when God will speak to him, he doesn't have to prophesy as soon as he is given prophetic insight. He can exercise discretion and self-restraint in terms of when he reveals what was revealed to him. Wait for a suitable time to express himself. 

For instance, when the angel appeared to Joseph in a dream, warning him to flee to Egypt with his wife and child, it wasn't necessary for Joseph to awaken Mary and tell her his dream. He could wait until morning. 

Leibniz and Arminius

Again, finally, if I cannot accept that this is the best of all possible worlds, and with it the belief that even the Holocaust was “for the best,” then I cannot logically accept that God plans, ordains and governs everything in the sense that Calvin clearly meant it as did Edwards and as do most spokesmen for “the new Calvinism” today. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/06/is-this-the-best-of-all-possible-worlds-what-i-would-think-if-i-were-a-calvinist/

Olson seems to be making a general point, and not just an objection to Calvinism in particular. He seems to be saying that a world containing the Holocaust can't be the best possible world. 

Now, although his post is targeting Calvinism, his principle raises corresponding questions about Arminianism. From an Arminian standpoint, does he believe this world is the best possible world? He seems to think the existence of the Holocaust renders that contention absurd. 

But if there are better possible worlds, then why didn't the Arminian God make one of the better possible worlds, instead of our world, which is worse, or maybe even one of the worst? 

Will he say that God was constrained by human freewill? Even if he thinks human freedom limits the kind of world God can make, then isn't he committed to the proposition that this is the best world God could make? Of the available worlds, ranging from best to worst, there was no better world God could make given the constraints imposed on God's field of action by human freewill. 

At the very least, then, Olson has to say a world containing the Holocaust is the best practically possible world. 

By best possible world, does he mean what's logically possible or actually possible? Keep in mind that as a critic of Molinism, Olson can't avail himself of the possible/feasible distinction. 

Celsus And Origen On Christian Unity

Here's a post I wrote on the subject several years ago, which includes quotations from both sources. Notice that when Celsus criticizes Christian disunity, Origen's response makes no appeal to a papacy, a worldwide denomination every Christian belongs to, or ecumenical councils, for example. Such means of unity, which are often proposed by modern critics of Evangelicalism, aren't mentioned by Origen. As Robert Eno, a Roman Catholic patristic scholar, noted, "a plain recognition of Roman primacy or of a connection between Peter and the contemporary bishop of Rome seems remote from Origen’s thoughts" (The Rise Of The Papacy [Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1990], 43). And for those who want to dismiss Origen as a heretic, schismatic, or something of the like, see here. Origen's response to Celsus regarding Christian unity probably represents common Christian thought at the time.

Unity And The Number Of Denominations

Roman Catholics, as well as other critics of Evangelicalism, often object to the existence of so many denominations, supposedly 30000 or some other high number. We're told that sola scriptura, too low an ecclesiology, or whatever other factor is responsible for such disunity and therefore needs to be avoided. An emailer recently asked me if I knew where he could find Eric Svendsen's material on this subject.

Is Genesis a "scientific" account?

One tiresome cliche that's endlessly repeated in Christian debates over creationism is the claim that Genesis 1-2 is not a "scientific" account. Or the Bible is not a "science textbook." 

At one level, the claim is trivially true. Gen 1-2 isn't written in scientific jargon. How could it be? If it was written in 20C scientific jargon, the description would be out of date by the 21C. 

More to the point, this objection fails to distinguish between a scientific account and a factual account. For instance, I remember the Concorde disaster in 2000. That was televised. You could see the plane becoming engulfed in flames even before it became airborne. 

Now, there happened to be footage, but even if there hadn't been any cameras rolling, there were eyewitnesses. Eyewitness accounts of the plane before and after takeoff wouldn't be "scientific." They would simply be descriptions of what the observers saw. 

Yet their "unscientific" testimony would be useful in developing a scientific theory of what caused the accident. If investigators interviewed witnesses, they could interpret the "unscientific" testimony in scientific terms. To the extent that observers accurately remembered and reported what they saw, that's a factual account of the accident. And because it's a factual account, it can be translated into a scientific account, or at least contribute to a scientific explanation of the accident. 

Even though Gen 1-2 isn't a scientific account, as long as Gen 1-2 is a factual account, it impinges on scientific theories of origins. it can rule out some erroneous scientific theories of origins. 

Was salvation an afterthought?

Calvinism’s doctrine of God’s sovereignty in providence includes its doctrine of predestination. According to it, absolutely nothing ever happens or can happen that God did not decree and render certain. Even sin and evil are part of God’s plan; he planned them, ordained them, and governs them. He doesn’t cause them, but he does render them certain. 

What does this mean? Few consistent Calvinists hesitate to admit that they believe even the fall of Adam and Eve and all its consequences, all the sin, evil and agony of the world, are decreed and rendered certain by God. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2013/03/whats-wrong-with-calvinism/

I'd like to make one brief observation: if God didn't plan the Fall, then God didn't plan the Cross. There was no plan of salvation. Redemption was an afterthought. Something God cobbled together on the fly. 

Empty ideas

http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2014/06/philosophy-is-a-bunch-of-empty-ideas-interview-with-peter-unger.html

The Gospel Authors Were Named Early And Credibly

Ben Witherington has posted a brief video about gospel authorship. He makes some good points, but I disagree with some of his arguments and would add others.

I see no reason to reject the traditional view that Matthew had a larger role in the production of the gospel that goes by his name, for example. See here, as well as the other posts linked within it.

Concerning Witherington's claim that the beloved disciple of the fourth gospel is Lazarus, see here. It should be noted not only that the internal evidence supports John, the son of Zebedee, over Lazarus, but also that the external sources who name John as the author repeatedly identify him as the beloved disciple as well. They don't just name John as the author.

Witherington mentions that the early Christians would have had reason to attach titles to the gospels ("The Gospel According To Matthew", etc.) once the four gospels were being collected and needed to be distinguished from one another. But that sort of need for distinguishing among them would have been present as soon as more than one gospel was circulating. The need would have arisen before the number got to four. See here for a discussion of further evidence suggesting the early attachment of the authors' names to the gospels.

Something Witherington doesn't mention is the early and widespread corroboration of the gospel authorship claims by non-Christian sources. See here and here, for example.

According to Scripture

On the one hand

Andy Stanley says:

Why we must teach the next generation the FOUNDATION of our faith is a an EVENT not a BOOK.

On the other hand

Jesus says:

But all this has taken place that the Scriptures of the prophets might be fulfilled (Mt 26:56). 

26 Was it not necessary that the Christ should suffer these things and enter into his glory?” 27 And beginning with Moses and all the Prophets, he interpreted to them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself (Lk 24:26-27). 

44 Then he said to them, “These are my words that I spoke to you while I was still with you, that everything written about me in the Law of Moses and the Prophets and the Psalms must be fulfilled.” 45 Then he opened their minds to understand the Scriptures, 46 and said to them, “Thus it is written, that the Christ should suffer and on the third day rise from the dead, 47 and that repentance and forgiveness of sins should be proclaimed in his name to all nations, beginning from Jerusalem (Lk 24:44-47).

St. Paul says:

3 For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received: that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures, 4 that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the Scriptures (1 Cor 15:3-4).

Christian commitment

From a Christian perspective, my faith rests in the historical life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The faith doesn't rest on the historicity of particular OT events. 

The truth of Christianity is grounded in the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection rather than the inerrancy of the Bible. If Jesus rose from the dead, Christianity would still be true even if it were the case that some things in the Bible are not. 

These statements seem like they could have been uttered by the same person. In fact, they were uttered by two different people. One is a seminary prof., the other a Christian college prof. 

Now, to my knowledge, the college prof is well to the right of the seminary prof. on the theological spectrum. I think he believes the Bible is actually much more historical than the seminary prof. 

But in terms of their intellectual commitments, it's hard to distinguish their positions. There may be a difference in degree in how they view the actual historicity of Scripture, but both of them take the same position in principle. Even though one of them has a more conservative view of Scripture than the other, he's not committed to that view. 

Absent strong commitment to the truth of God's revealed word, there's no real distance between liberal and conservative theology. These become adjacent squares on the sidewalk. You can go from one to the other in one short step. 

Keep in mind that Christian faith is ultimately about your ultimate commitments. In a pinch, what are you prepared to throw over the back of the sled to stay ahead of the wolves? 

http://www.risenjesus.com/chicagos-muddy-waters

http://randalrauser.com/2014/06/did-god-really-harden-pharaohs-heart/#comment-1436802556

I know better than Jesus

I'm going to comment on a statement by Arminian theologian Randal Rauser:

http://randalrauser.com/2014/06/did-god-really-harden-pharaohs-heart/#comment-1439412117

Randal Rauser 

Calling Jonah a prophet doesn't mean Jesus thought Jonah was a historical personage. A contemporary pastor could make an illustration and refer to "Bilbo the explorer". That wouldn't mean Bilbo was a historical figure.

In addition to the Book of Jonah, the OT treats Jonah as a historical figure:

He restored the border of Israel from Lebo-hamath as far as the Sea of the Arabah, according to the word of the Lord, the God of Israel, which he spoke by his servant Jonah the son of Amittai, the prophet, who was from Gath-hepher (2 Kgs 14:25).

Back to Rauser:

Moreover, even if Jesus did think Jonah was historical, that doesn't mean we should. See my article on Jesus' errant theological beliefs.

If you want to know what's true, don't ask Jesus–ask Randal Rauser. Even Jesus needs Rauser to help correct his errant theological beliefs. 

God and Auschwitz

I'm going to comment on a new post by Roger Olson:

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/06/is-this-the-best-of-all-possible-worlds-what-i-would-think-if-i-were-a-calvinist/

Most Calvinists I know believe in meticulous providence.

Agreed.

Recently I posted an essay here in which I talked about my penchant for seeing the logical outcome of everything. 

His penchant fails him whenever it comes to seeing the logical outcome of Arminianism. 

We should not believe in ideas whose good and necessary consequences are unbelievable or objectionable (to ourselves). In other words, if idea A leads inexorably, by dint of logic, to idea B and idea B is something I do not believe in, I ought not to believe in A either.

What about revealed truths? If God discloses something to us whose good and necessary consequences are objectionable to us, does that mean we should reject revealed truth? If it leads to something we don't believe in, then we should realign our beliefs to match reality.

However, the point I want to make here is that I believe divine determinism and meticulous providence, idea “A” that God plans, ordains and governs everything without exception, leads inexorably by dint of logic to idea “B” which is that this is the best of all possible worlds. 

Saying it leads to that logical outcome doesn't begin to show that it leads to that logical outcome. Where is the logical argument for his conclusion? 

The one and only issue I’m raising here is whether a God who is perfectly good, omnipotent, and all-determining would plan, ordain and govern anything less or other than the best possible world. I cannot imagine that he would.

i) To say he cannot "imagine" that is not a logical argument.

ii) He seems to be suggesting that if God is good, then there must be parity between the goodness of God and the goodness of the world. The world must be as good as God. But no creature can be as good (i.e. excellent) as God. 

One problem may be an equivocation on the meaning of "goodness." Does he mean moral good or excellence?

If this world is the best world on the way to the best of all possible worlds, then it is, for now, in the interim, the best possible world.

That's simplistic. The best means to an end doesn't make the means good in itself. Take amputation to prevent death by gangrene. 

I simply don’t understand why people who believe God plans, ordains and governs everything don’t also believe that this is the best of all possible worlds. I think they should.

One reason I don't believe it is that Olson has yet to give a supporting argument for his key contention. In his post, he never gets around to making a logical case for why, given Calvinism, this world must be the best possible world. He keeps asserting what he needs to prove. 

I can only attribute that they often don’t to either 1) lack of logic in their thinking, or 2) fear of having to explain how this is the best of all possible worlds in light of the Holocaust and events like it.

It's amusing to see the gaping chasm between Olson's intellectual pride and his intellectual performance. He makes self-congratulatory claims about his logical acumen, and makes demeaning comments about his Calvinist opponents, yet he fails to demonstrate his operating assumption. 

I agree with the theologian who said that no theology is worthy of belief that cannot be stated at the gates of Auschwitz.
It takes real guts to say that God planned, ordained and governed the Holocaust. I admire and respect those Calvinists (and other divine determinists) who do it—for their logical rigor and courage.

Yes, God "planned, ordained, and governed" the Holocaust, just as he "planned, ordained, and governed" the Flood, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the Babylonian Exile, and the Fall of Jerusalem (70 AD). 

The problem that immediately jumps up is that if this is the best of all possible worlds then nothing can really be irreducibly evil. If this is the best of all possible worlds then I must say even of the Holocaust “It is a necessary part of the greater good.” Then I cannot consider it truly evil. I would have to redefine “evil” far away from what I and most people mean by that term. 

i) You simply distinguish between whether something is good in itself and whether it can have beneficial consequences down the line. For instance, it isn't good to be congenitally blind, but in this case, that had good results:

As he passed by, he saw a man blind from birth. 2 And his disciples asked him, “Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?” 3 Jesus answered, “It was not that this man sinned, or his parents, but that the works of God might be displayed in him” (Jn 9:1-3).

Likewise, the death of Lazarus wasn't good in itself, but it was a source of good:

But when Jesus heard it he said, “This illness does not lead to death. It is for the glory of God, so that the Son of God may be glorified through it” (Jn 11:4).

ii) Since Olson has failed to discharge his burden of proof, there's nothing more I really need to say. It's not incumbent on me to refute a nonexistent argument. But let's examine his illustration:

Why did the Arminian God allow the Holocaust? After all, the Arminian God had the power to prevent it. So isn't the Arminian committed to saying God allowed the Holocaust for the best? Presumably, an Arminian will justify God's nonintervention on the grounds that it would be even worse for God to prevent the Holocaust than to allow the Holocaust. Had it been better for God to intervene, but he failed to do so, then in what sense is the Arminian God "perfectly good"? 

So how does Olson escape the logic of his own framework? 

iii) Olson is assuming there's a best possible world for the Calvinist God to predestine. But why should we assume such a thing? Take the Holocaust. Is an alternate world in which the Holocaust never happened better than our world? Better in what respect? Better in every respect?

To begin with, a world in which the Holocaust never happened would have a different past and different future. The historical conditions leading up to the Holocaust wouldn't exist. And the historical consequences of the Holocaust wouldn't exist.

But, among other things, that requires the elimination many people from the past, and replacing them with a different set of people. Likewise, that requires the elimination of all the people who were born as a result of the Holocaust. In a way, that would be a different kind of Holocaust. 

Would that be better for the people who never existed in this alternate world? What if some of them were heavenbound? By creating the alternate world, God deprives them of that incomparable blessing. 

Some goods result from a world where the Holocaust occurred which would never result absent the Holocaust. So a world in which the Holocaust occurred is better in some respects, but worse than others. Better for some people but worse for others.

There are even Jews–many Jews–who benefit from the Holocaust. There are Jews who are born as a result of the Holocaust who would never exist apart from that horrific event. For instance, some Holocaust survivors married people they would never have occasion to meet in a world without the dislocations of the Holocaust.  

Under the sun

http://www.sbts.edu/resources/files/2013/08/Pages-from-SBJT-V15-N3_Caneday.pdf

Jesus, Jerusalem, and the Parousia

http://www.sbts.edu/resources/files/2013/06/SBJT-16.3-Stein.pdf

Bibliography on baptism

To my knowledge, these are the best monographs on the credo/paedobaptism debate:

Credobaptism

K. Aland, Did the Early Church Baptize Infants? (Wipf & Stock 2004)

E. Ferguson, Baptism in the Early Church: History, Theology, and Liturgy in the First Five Centuries (Eerdmans 2013) 

T. Schreiner & S. Wright, eds. Believer's Baptism: Sign of the New Covenant in Christ (B&H 2007)

H. F. Stander & L. P. Louw, Baptism in the Early Church (EP Books 2004)

G. Welty, "A Critical Evaluation of Paedobaptism":

http://founders.org/library/welty/

D. F. Wright, Infant Baptism in Historical Perspective: Collected Studies (Wipf & Stock 2007)

Paedobaptism

R. Beckwith, Calendar, Chronology And Worship: Studies in Ancient Judaism And Early Christianity (Brill 2005), chap. 13.

H. Hoeksema,  Believers and Their Seed: Children in the Covenant (RFPA 1997)

J. Jeremias, Infant Baptism in the First Four Centuries (Wipf & Stock 2004)

_____, The Origins of Infant Baptism: A Further Study in Reply to Kurt Aland (Wipf & Stock 2004)

M. Kline, By Oath Consigned: A Reinterpretation of the Covenant Signs of Circumcision and Baptism (Eerdmans 1968)

http://www.meredithkline.com/klines-works/by-oath-consigned/

J. Murray, Christian Baptism (P&R 1992)

V. Poythress, "Linking Small Children with Infants in the Theology of Baptizing," WTJ 59/2 (1997): 143-158:

http://www.frame-poythress.org/linking-small-children-with-infants-in-the-theology-of-baptizing/

_____, "Indifferentism and Rigorism in the Church: With Implications for Baptizing Small Children," WTJ 59/1 (1997) 13-29:

http://www.frame-poythress.org/indifferentism-and-rigorism/

B. B. Warfield, "The Polemics of Infant Baptism"

http://www.the-highway.com/InfantBaptism_Warfield.html

Infallibility, canon, and private judgment

http://bnonn.thinkingmatters.org.nz/infallibility-canon-private-judgment/

Christianity ex nihilo

Arminian theologians like Randal Rauser and Roger Olson keep trying to decouple the Christian faith from the OT :

http://randalrauser.com/2014/06/did-god-really-harden-pharaohs-heart/

This is a question laden with dubious assumptions. You're assuming here that the credibility of the Deuteronomic history resides in the degree to which it corresponds with some set of past historical events. 

How's that a dubious assumption?

This assumption has been repeatedly challenged by biblical scholars and theologians over the last fifty years from Brevard Childs to Hans Frei to George Lindbeck to my friend Yoram Hazony.

Compare how little faith he has in Bible history with how much faith he has in liberal scholars. It's not as if Bible critics were eyewitnesses to OT history. It's not as if they're in a position to correct the record because they saw what really went down. 

From a Christian perspective, my faith rests in the historical life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The faith doesn't rest on the historicity of particular OT events.

Yes, the Christian faith is a hermetically-sealed religion that fell from the sky in the 1C. It doesn't rest on picayune details like God calling Abraham out of Ur. Doesn't rest on God making a covenant with Abraham to bless the Jews and Gentiles. Doesn't rest on God delivering the Jews from Egyptian bondage in fidelity to the Abrahamic covenant (Exod 2:24-25; cf. Gen 12:2-3; 15:13-16). Doesn't rest on whether David ever existed. Doesn't rest on God making a covenant with David–or attendant prophecies about a future Davidic Messiah. Doesn't rest on God restoring the Babylonian exiles to the land, in fulfillment of Jeremiah's prophecy. 

Even though Matthew, John, Luke-Acts, Romans, Hebrews, &c, constantly ground the Christian faith in particular OT events, it makes no difference if those are nonevents. 

BTW, does Rauser think the Gospels are historically accurate? Given his general outlook, surely he regards many reported speeches, incidents, and miracles in the Gospels as fictional additions or legendary embellishments. 

Go back to the Adamic fall narrative as an example. Whether there was a historical fall or not, the narrative functions minimally to elucidate the universal sense of fallenness and alienation that characterizes the human race.

A universal "sense of fallenness" absent a historical fall. That would be delusional. 

What about the main story of the Deuteronomic history? Well here's a concrete issue for you. The archaeological evidence doesn't support the destruction of Jericho within the timeline provided by the Joshua narrative. Is this a problem for your faith.

The timeline is disputed (e.g. Bryant Wood).

Moreover, Rauser fails to distinguish between the historicity of the event, and what trace evidence may survive fire, erosion, or the reuse of building materials. 

Proselyte baptism

As an Anglican, Roger Beckwith naturally supports infant baptism. However, he raises some interesting questions regarding the extent of infant baptism in the early church. If Christian baptism is a modification of John's baptism, which is, in turn, a modification of proselyte baptism, and Christians originally followed that paradigm, then paedobaptism may not have been a universal practice at first. The practice of postponing baptism was another drag factor. 

There are potential strategies for blocking his inferences, but Beckwith's argument is interesting because it concedes certain restrictions on the traditional scope of infant baptism even if you grant the apostolicity of infant baptism. 

The point of contact between the two pairs of ceremonies is that John's baptism, like proselyte baptism, is an initiation rite, performed once only, at the time of conversion. John reinterpreted proselyte baptism as a washing away of sin, and therefore applied it to Jews as much as Gentiles, but likewise in an initiatory fashion.  

Jeremias makes much of the fact of proselyte baptism, and also of Jewish household baptism, in establishing his case, since these present close parallels to the missionary methods used by the apostles. Peter's actions on the Day of Pentecost established a precedent, for it is clear that the apostles and their fellow-evangelists had their converts baptized (Acts 8:12-16,36-39; 19:5; Rom 6:3; 1 Cor 12:13; Gal 3:27; Col 2:12) and that they often baptized them by households. Some of these converts were Jews, some were Gentiles, and some were that middle-category of God-fearers or God-worshippers–Gentiles who attended the synagogue but had not submitted to circumcision. They are mentioned a good number of times in the NT (Acts 10:2,22,35; 13:16,26,50; 16:14; 17:4,17; 18:7).  

The NT contains five individual examples of converts whose households or families were baptized with themselves. The first of these is apparently the God-fearer Cornelius at Caesarea (Acts 10:1f.,46-8; 11:14). Then there are various instances in Macedonia and Greece: the God-fearer Lydia (Acts 16:14f.), the Philippian jailor (Acts 16:33), the Jew Crispus (Acts 18:8) and Stephanas (1 Cor 1:16). It is hard to think that, in the case of Jews and God-fearers, when their households were baptized, this would not have included any children they had, in accordance with Jewish practice. In the cases of Gentiles converts, there might be more room for doubt, but in these cases too, the apostles supervising their baptism were of course Jews, even though they themselves were Gentiles. It is sometimes suggested that none of these five households need have included children, but if it was the practice of the apostles to baptize households, as it evidently was, many such households would have been bound to include children.  

We have more or less explicit evidence that circumcision and proselyte baptism were given to infants as well as adults. In the case of John's baptism and Christian baptism, the NT evidence is not explicit and we are dependent upon inference. But if John's baptism was an adaptation of proselyte baptism, one may assume that he too would probably have admitted the infant children of his converts, and the more so as he was baptizing in immediate expectation of divine judgment on those who did not respond to his message (Mt 3:7-12; Lk 3:7-17). A similar inference could be made in the case of Christian baptism, and here we have more to go on, because there are the records of household baptisms, at which we have just been looking, and which strongly imply baptism of infants as well as adults. 

There is one interesting difference between circumcision and proselyte baptism which may have affected early Christian practice. Circumcision was given in every generation. Proselyte baptism, however, was given only in the first generation, after which the proselyte and his family would observe the laws of ceremonial cleanness, and so would not need to repeat it. On this model, a Christian family might be baptized in every generation or only in the first generation, and it is possible that there was for a time a variety of practice, even among Jewish Christians.  

But though we may have confidence that infant baptism began in the apostolic age, we cannot be sure that it was at first universal. We have noted the possibility that in some Jewish families it was not practised except in the first generation, and in Gentile families there may have been less readiness for it than in Jewish. If this is so, there was probably a variety of practice until agreement was reached that every Christian needed to be baptized. This would still leave open the question, at what age he needed to be baptized. Infant baptism was, before very long, widely practiced, as the evidence from Irenaeus, Tertullian and Hippolytus (from the late second and early third centuries) indicates, but the numerous converts from paganism were still baptized as adults, which made it possible for Tertullian to raise the question of whether this was not a better age for baptism. He did not claim that infant baptism was a novelty, but he argued that the forgiveness of sins was less needed in infancy: it was more suitable at an age when there were actual sins to be repented of and washed away (On Baptism 18). Others thought similarly, to judge from 3C inscriptions which show baptism sometimes delayed until there was a danger of death. And after the conversion of the Empire in the fourth century, such delay became for a time, though only for a time, common. For as long as a delay was being practiced, a fruitless desire to avoid postbaptismal sin seems to have been the reason. 

At the conversion of the Empire there was naturally a flood of adult converts, but it was not long before almost all adults were at least nominal Christians, and were baptized as such, and the only remaining candidates for baptism were the children who might be born to them, in that or succeeding generations. As long as the practice of delaying baptism still existed, this did not make infant baptism universal, but it was largely a matter of time before it did. Only in missionary work in new lands or among new peoples would the situation be any different. R. Beckwith, Calendar, Chronology and Worship (Brill 2005), 220-225.

Let the Philistines Kill Each Other - 1 Samuel 14:20

http://www.americanthinker.com/2014/06/let_them_kill_each_other.html

When to baptize

In many theological traditions, baptism is thought to confer the remission of sins. If you accept that presupposition, it tugs in two opposing directions–both of which were in evidence in early church history. On the one hand, in an age of high infant morality, parents and priests would be motivated to baptize babies. That would guarantee their admission to heaven if they died before the age of discretion.

However, there's a catch. Since these same theological circles consider baptism to be a one-time rite, there'd be an opposing incentive to delay baptism for as long as possible. If baptism wipes the slate clean, but you only get to use that eraser once, then the inclination is to save it until you can get the most out of the rite. 

Hence, by linking baptism to forgiveness, you could argue for infant baptism or deathbed baptism. The extreme ends of the continuum. But you can't do both. How to choose?

This raises the question of whether confession and extreme unction developed to relieve the tension. Infant baptism would remit original sin while confession/absolution and last rites would remit postbaptismal sin. That would plug the gaps. 

Of course, there'd  still be the risk of committing mortal sin after your last confession, but dying before your next confession. So there's still the possibility of falling through the cracks. But given the mechanistic view of grace, combining infant baptism with confession/absolute and last rites is the best one can do within that framework. 

Having mercy on whom he will

I'm going to comment on a post by Arminian theologian Randal Rauser:

http://randalrauser.com/2014/06/did-god-really-harden-pharaohs-heart/

Let's set the stage for why God hardening Pharaoh's heart poses such a problem for Arminian theology:

i) Arminians (e.g. apologists, philosophers, theologians) typically argue that human agents can do otherwise in the same situation. They consider this a necessary precondition of human culpability. Moreover, they think this exculpates God. 

But in Exodus, God hardens Pharaoh's heart to prevent Pharaoh from giving in too soon. If Pharaoh had the freedom to do otherwise, he'd be in a position to scuttle God's design. Divine hardening ensures his resistance to the divine command.

ii) Apropos (i), the narrative distinguishes between God's secret will and his revealed will:

2 You shall speak all that I command you, and your brother Aaron shall tell Pharaoh to let the people of Israel go out of his land. 3 But I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and though I multiply my signs and wonders in the land of Egypt (Exod 7:2-3).

On the one hand, Pharaoh is commanded to liberate the Israelites. Yet God's ulterior purpose is to make Pharaoh disobey his command. That's instrumental to God's goal (Exod 7:5; 9:14; 14:4). God subverts compliance to further his ends. 

Yet Arminians consider the distinction between God's secret will and God's revealed will duplicitous–especially when God commands what God prevents.

iii) In addition, Paul uses the divine hardening of Pharaoh's heart to illustrate divine election and reprobation (Rom 9). But double predestination is anathema to Arminians. 

Now let's turn to Rauser's argument:

Let’s shift gears for a moment and take a look at a passage from Psalm 104 which describes in eloquent terms God’s action in the world. In the following passage the psalmist describes God’s role in the flood...Note that this passage links the flow of water directly to the divine will. And it isn’t just the flood. The rest of the psalm continues in similar fashion in that it describes events in nature as resulting from the divine will acting directly upon the world. God governs the flow of waters into ravines (v. 10), he makes grass and plants grow (v. 14), he makes wine (v. 15) [presumably this means God controls the process of fermentation], he controls the cycling of the celestial bodies (v. 19) and the coming of night (v. 20), he feeds creatures (v. 27), he sustains life by giving his Spirit (v. 30) and takes life by withdrawing his Spirit (v. 29).Needless to say, this ancient near eastern conception of the God/world relation is very different from the way people think about divine action today. If we want to understand the flow of water in a flood, we turn not to the oracle or prophet. We turn to the hydrologist. To be sure, this is not to exclude instances of special divine action in the world. But it is to understand any such instances of special divine action to be occurring within a world of nature in which created things have their own increated properties, potentialities and law-like relations.

Several glaring problems with Rauser's analysis:

i) There was no ANE conception of "the divine will acting directly upon the world." For one thing, that's because most ANE cultures were polytheistic. Israel was the conspicuous exception. In ANE religion generally, there was no one God who made everything happen.

i) Rauser acts is if Ps 104 is teaching occasionalism. That natural events happen apart from second causes. They are the unmediated effect of God's direct causation. But the psalm itself belies that. In v15, did the Psalmist think God ordinarily provides us with instant wine? No. Wine production ordinarily requires viniculture. Indeed, that's alluding to in v14.

LIkewise, in v21, did the Psalmist think God made freshly killed prey fall out of the sky to feed lions? No. In order to eat, lions still had to hunt. Indeed, that's alluded to in v21. 

So the Psalmist doesn't think divine provision bypasses natural means or mechanisms. Indeed, the Psalm is describing natural processes. God doesn't quench the thirst of animals apart from watering holes supplied by streams and rainfall. Ps 104 is describing an ecosystem, involving intramundane causality. 

We still read Psalm 104 with profit as an inspired poetic hymn while recognizing we don’t share the same thought-world as the original author. We can share with that original author a sense of the divine sovereignty and providential governance without sharing his direct command framework for divine action.

i) What does Rauser think providence means if not natural periodic processes? 

ii) Also, notice that despite his throwaway line about the inspiration of the Psalm, he repudiates the teaching of the Psalm regarding the nature of divine action in the world. "Inspiration" is a cosmetic word he uses to maintain pious appearances, but he considers the Psalm to reflect an outmoded notion of how the world works. The Psalm makes false claims about divine agency.

I noted above that we can share the writer of the psalm’s view of God’s sovereignty and providence without accepting his denial of an autonomous sphere of nature.

Notice the false dichotomy. The fact that natural events are normally the result of physical cause and effect relations doesn't render them autonomous in relation to God. God can always override the automatic setting–and sometimes does. 

Now let’s turn back to the Exodus narrative. Countless readers have been perplexed by the seamless way the author describes God hardening Pharaoh’s heart with Pharaoh hardening his own heart. The picture of God directly determining the human will calls to mind the images in Psalm 104 of God directly determining the water’s course and other natural events.This brings us to the conclusion. Just as the ancient authors of scripture freely saw nature as the product of direct divine willing, so it was for human agents: the interrelation of divine will to human will was as seamless as divine will to water flow.

Having misinterpreted his prooftext (Ps 104), Rauser then deploys his misinterpreted prooftext to misinterpret Exodus. At least he's consistently wrong.

But today we understand an autonomous sphere of human mind and will as surely as we recognize an autonomous sphere of hydrological laws.

Notice how he begs the question. Many philosophers reject the attempt to compartmentalize the human mind and will from the causal nexus in which human agents exist and operate. 

Likewise, we can accept the writer of Exodus’ view of God’s sovereignty and providence without accepting his denial of an autonomous sphere of human willing.

i) Rauser admits that if you accept the text as is, divine hardening contradicts freewill theism. 

ii) His solution is to disbelieve what the text says is true. At one level, I appreciate his concession speech. Arminianism can only defend itself against Calvinism by denying the witness of Scripture.

In each case, God accommodates to ancient theological thought-forms to communicate important theological truths. We can recognize the truths presented without accepting the ancient thought-form through which they are conveyed.

i) That's completely ad hoc. How does he separate the true elements of the text from the false elements of the text? The text itself doesn't split into true and false elements. That distinction is imposed on the text in spite of the text, from the outside. It artificially pries the text apart.

ii) Moreover, his treatment cuts against the grain of the text. If, in reality, Pharaoh was an autonomous agent, then he could relent at any stage of the confrontation with Moses. The whole point of divine hardening is that God acts on Pharaoh in such a way as to ensure that Pharaoh won't relent prematurely. Rauser's dismissive treatment of the text makes the "truth" the polar opposite of what the text enunciates. The text says God hardened Pharaoh to guarantee his noncompliance with the command. Rauser counters that Pharaoh's will operates in an autonomous sphere, which shields it from the very thing the text asserts. So Rauser's treatment systematically falsifies the text. 

i) Since Paul's use of Exodus came up in the course of Rauser's discussion, let's consider that as well. Here's one attempt to deflect its force:

I suggest you check out N.T. Wright. He refocuses the context of Romans 9 from soteriology and on to ecclesiology where it belongs. Wright critiques both Arminians and Calvinists for reading the text through a Pelagian/Augustinian grid. Piper is an obvious example of that kind of reading which is, to my mind, a profound misreading. 

http://randalrauser.com/2014/06/why-a-perfect-god-might-have-hardened-pharaohs-heart/#comment-1430518121

i) But that's demonstrably false. In Rom 9-11, Paul is answering the question of why most Jews in his own day rejected the Messiah. For Paul, that's a salvation issue. Accepting or rejecting Jesus goes to the heart of the Gospel. Putting faith in Jesus saves you from the wrath of God. Believing in Jesus justifies you. It is about going to heaven or hell when you die. 

ii) Moreover, as Rauser admits, it would be counterproductive for Arminians to side with Wright, for Arminians traditionally read Romans (Galatians, &c) soteriologically. 

iii) More recently, some Arminians (e.g. Brian Abascino) resort to corporate election. But one basic problem with that interpretation is that, in Rom 9-11, Jews aren't hardened by God because they reject Jesus; rather, they reject Jesus because they are hardened by God. The corporate elective interpretation has the cause/effect relation exactly backwards. 

That's the question Paul is addressing. Why do so many Jews in his own day reject the Messiah? His answer: because God has hardened them.

Conversely, some Jews in his own day did believe in Jesus. Paul himself is a case in point. So are his fellow apostles. What's the differential factor? Some believe while others disbelieve because some were chosen to believe while others were hardened. That's Paul's explanation. 

Now, some commentators think that's temporary. They think Rom 11 teaches an endtime restoration of the Jews. Even if that's the case, it's too late for Paul's contemporaries. That generation was doomed–apart from a remnant.  

No other name

1. There is no other name
In heaven can be found
Through whom we are redeemed
Through whom your grace abounds
No other name can save
But Jesus Christ our Lord

Chorus
My joy in sorrowʼs tears
My strength to cast out fears
No other name but Jesus, Jesus
My hope in darkest night
My broken soulʼs delight
No other name but Jesus, Jesus

2. There is no victory
But Jesus crucified
No other cure for sin
But that our Saviour died
No other hope we have
But that he rose again

3. No other throne endures
No other song remains
But 'Worthy is the Lamb
Who was for sinners slain'
When every knee shall bow
And tongue confess you are Lord,
You are Lord

(Source)