Explosion of Life
Dr. Paul Chien
Dr. Paul Chien was born in China and graduated from university in Hong Kong where he earned degrees in chemistry and botany. He completed his doctorate at the University of California, Irvine, and his post-doc at Cal Tech in marine biology. Presently he is the chairman of the biology department at the University of San Francisco.
A scientist reveals details of the Cambrian explosion, a biological puzzle that confounds the Darwinists
Dr. Paul Chien, chairman of the biology department at the University of San Francisco, recently accepted a unique invitation to travel to China to study fossils of the Cambrian era. What Chien found at the Chengjiang site, and what he has since learned about the Cambrian fauna, has changed the focus of his career. Today, Chien concentrates on further exploring and promoting the mysteries of the Cambrian explosion of life. Subsequently, Chien possesses the largest collection of Chinese Cambrian fossils in North America.
Chien attended Mere Creation, a conference last November sponsored by Christian Leadership, which was featured in the previous Real Issue. The following is an interview with Paul Chien.
RI: Dr. Chien, what is your interest in the evolution/creation debate?
Chien: Even before I became a Christian, I had doubts about evolution. During my college years I was really interested in finding answers, but I got very little help. For a while I lost interest because I thought, one way or the other, it wasn't very important. But since I started teaching, many people ask me about that. In fact, I often speak at churches and youth groups and conferences, and I have been forced back to that question; it's pretty much my hobby now.
RI: Until recently, you have focused on the effects of pollution on marine organisms. How then did you come to study the Cambrian "explosion of Life"?
Chien: In studying marine organisms, and mainly the invertebrate groups, I have a clear vision of the distinct characteristics of each phyla. The theory of evolution never [seemed to] apply well in my field of marine invertebrates. When the news broke concerning [the discovery of] an explosion of animal life, it really excited me because that [had been] my position for many years. Also, Phil Johnson's chapter on fossils [Darwin on Trial, Intervarsity Press, 1991] really ignited my interest in that area.
When an opportunity came up to talk with Chinese paleontologists and to visit them and the original site of fossil discovery, it became something I had to do. So last March I organized an international group to make a visit there.
RI: So is the Chengjiang site a primary site for the Cambrian explosion?
Chien: Yes, it's the site of the first marine animal found in the early Cambrian times we don't count microorganisms as animals.
RI: Are there other places in the world where you find the same organisms?
Chien: In some ways there are similarities between the China site and the other famous site, the Burgess Shale fauna in Canada. But it turns out that the China site is much older, and the preservation of the specimens is much, much finer. Even nerves, internal organs and other details can be seen that are not present in fossils in any other place.
RI: And I suppose many of these are probably soft-tissue marine-type animals?
Chien: Yes, including jellyfish-like organisms. They can even see water ducts in the jellyfish. They are all marine. That part of western China was under a shallow sea at the time.
RI: As you became more interested in this and discovered more about it, did you find it really was an "explosion of life"?
Chien: Yes. A simple way of putting it is that currently we have about 38 phyla of different groups of animals, but the total number of phyla discovered during that period of time (including those in China, Canada, and elsewhere) adds up to over 50 phyla. That means [there are] more phyla in the very, very beginning, where we found the first fossils [of animal life], than exist now.
Stephen J. Gould, [a Harvard University evolutionary biologist], has referred to this as the reverse cone of diversity. The theory of evolution implies that things get more and more complex and get more and more diverse from one single origin. But the whole thing turns out to be reversed we have more diverse groups in the very beginning, and in fact more and more of them die off over time, and we have less and less now.
RI: What information is the public hearing or not hearing about the Cambrian explosion?
Chien: The general impression people get is that we began with microorganisms, then came lowly animals that don't amount to much, and then came the birds, mammals and man. Scientists were looking at a very small branch of the whole animal kingdom, and they saw more complexity and advanced features in that group. But it turns out that this concept does not apply to the entire spectrum of animals or to the appearance or creation of different groups. Take all the different body plans of roundworms, flatworms, coral, jellyfish and whatever all those appeared at the very first instant.
Most textbooks will show a live tree of evolution with the groups evolving through a long period of time. If you take that tree and chop off 99 percent of it, [what is left] is closer to reality; it's the true beginning of every group of animals, all represented at the very beginning.
Since the Cambrian period, we have only die-off and no new groups coming about, ever. There's only one little exception cited the group known as bryozoans, which are found in the fossil record a little later. However, most people think we just haven't found it yet; that group was probably also present in the Cambrian explosion.
Also, the animal explosion caught people's attention when the Chinese confirmed they found a genus now called Yunnanzoon that was present in the very beginning. This genus is considered a chordate, and the phylum Chordata includes fish, mammals and man. An evolutionist would say the ancestor of humans was present then. Looked at more objectively, you could say the most complex animal group, the chordates, were represented at the beginning, and they did not go through a slow gradual evolution to become a chordate.
RI: In the December 1995 issue of Time magazine in the article "When Life Exploded" the writer implied that there was nothing to get worked up about the theory of evolution was not in any danger.
Chien: The scientists come out and say, "Oh yes, we've heard this before and it's very similar to the Burgess Shale," and so forth, but the Burgess Shale story was not told for many years. The Burgess Shale was first found by Charles Walcott in 1909why was the story not reported to the public until the late 1980's?
At the very beginning I thought it was a problem for them; they couldn't figure out what was going on because they found something that bears no resemblance to the present animal groups and phyla. Walcott originally tried to shoehorn those groups into existing ones, but [his attempt] was never satisfactory.
It was puzzling for a while because they refused to see that in the beginning there could be more complexity than we have now. What they are seeing are phyla that do not exist now that’s more than 50 phyla compared to the 38 we have now. (Actually the number 50 was first quoted as over 100 for a while, but then the consensus became 50-plus.) But the point is, they saw something they didn't know what to do with; that's the scientifically honest position they're placed in. Later on, as they began to understand things are not the same as Darwinian expectations, they started shutting up.
RI: Now that the information is coming out, what are they saying?
Chien: We really don't have much of an explanation yet, although there are a few biological and environmental theories that have been kicked around. Stephen Gould was quoted by Phil Johnson [in Darwin on Trial] as saying that things like [the Cambrian explosion] are the trade secret of paleontology, and not many people know about it. And that includes Gould's own crusade for punctuated equilibrium as well.
I know of some people who teach evolution but do not mention Stephen Jay Gould or punctuated equilibrium. They know about it, but they are of the old school and can't accept it. So there's a lot of politics involved in this, even among themselves.
RI: Does the drift of evidence in the Cambrian Explosion lean toward speeded-up evolution?
Chien: There are two major camps on this explosion business. One is the good old Darwinian explanation that we simply haven't found the intermediates. For those who tend to think that way, they say the Cambrian period was just the best time to preserve a lot of fossils, and they refer to it as a "fossil explosion." They hope that by looking more they might find some evidence of evolution, or they simply say (like Gould), "Well, we'll never find it. Fossils are hard to form in the first place." This is called "artifact theory."
But a lot of younger scientists are turning to new ideas. The first idea put out was the oxygen theory. They say that maybe in Cambrian times the oxygen level in the atmosphere and in the oceans suddenly arose to a critical level which could support larger-sized animals. That theory is pretty much shut down because there should be geological evidence for a sudden increase in oxygen.
There are other theories, too, like that of Berkeley professor James Valentine. He is now working on something new that relates to Jonathan Wells' work. (Wells is the Berkeley biologist who spoke at the Mere Creation conference.) In developmental biology the study of embryo development there’s been a big discovery of something called Hox genes. They are regulatory genes, and they turn on and off sequences the development of the eye and so on.
Valentine infers that primitive organisms accumulated enough Hox genes to suddenly make a different body plan. So he's trying to correlate Cambrian explosion with the development or accumulation of Hox genes. But I think there are many theoretical difficulties he's facing.
John Wells has the idea that Hox genes won't do it. He claims that Hox genes are only switches. You can put the switch on different systems and it just turns on and off you’re not getting new information out of Hox genes.
RI: So when they ask you about it, what do you say?
Chien: Well, it depends who is asking. In scientific dialogue I think I can be very honest with whatever present findings we have. We can all discuss objective data, but pretty soon we find out that whatever conclusion each draws is far from what the evidence says. In other words, I think every theory is still more belief than scientific fact. I wouldn't use scientific findings as evidence to support Biblical creation. All science does is begin to tell us what happened 540 million years ago, and we have just little bits and pieces. However, I think we can use the evidence to strongly show that Darwinian gradual evolution did not happen.
In terms of creation I think we still need to figure out what we mean by natural processes, and we need to ask ourselves if all natural processes have an author or creator behind them. Creation itself is a concept about design involvement, and all these fossils are just the physical evidence that is left over; it still has no direct application to a single creator and how He worked.
But when I read Genesis chapter one, the fifth day seems to read very much like the fossil record we see now because it talks about all the creatures teeming in the oceans. Now, to me that sounds like the Cambrian explosion in a very short period of time, [the animals] are all there.
RI: Where do we, as Christians, go from here with respect to the fossil record?
Chien: I think the Christian community should get into this and do more study on it. I remember meeting a linguist, and he told me that Christians pretty much dominate the field of linguistics because of their interest in translating the Bible. In the same way I would like to see Christians get into paleontology and take an interest in doing good science I think that's at least one way to reverse the church's withdrawal from science. Personally, I have an urge to popularize these ideas because although scientists are beginning to talk about the Cambrian explosion, and while a few people in the inner circle know about it, the general public isn't aware of it.
In fact, I have now in my hands a Chinese book on the Cambrian explosion that I would like to have translated into English and published in the United States. It's mainly a picture book there are about two hundred color photographs and some line drawings showing all the different animals from the Chinese Cambrian site. I believe Christians can publish such books in a context that has little to do with religion this is the truth, and the truth will speak for itself.
In fact, [the Chinese scientists and I] were planning to work together further on algae from the Cambrian period. They have collected thousands and thousands of fossils, and they have a lot of fossil algae that nobody is working on.
RI: What were the circumstances which led you to become a Christian?
Chien: It began in high school; my parents sent me to a Christian school in Hong Kong only because the school has a very good educational reputation. After six years of studying the Bible, I finally accepted the Lord just before graduating from high school.
It was a struggle for many years before that. I thought I wanted to be a scientist, but I didn't want to be a superstitious person. But I was really attracted to Jesus Christ, His life and His teaching. In many respects I thought His teaching was deeper than much of the Chinese moral teaching. So in some ways I was converted in my heart, but I refused to become a Christian.
I tried to imitate Christians and I understood what salvation was all about, but I didn't accept it until the final senior trip our class made. We went to the highest mountains in the Hong Kong area, and we had no other place to stay than in a Buddhist monastery. That [experience] gave me a good contrast to compare the religious effort of the Buddhists, which I admired, with Christianity. When I looked at nature, which I was deeply in love with, I suddenly realized that I had to worship the Creator of nature. So during a prayer meeting I came face-to-face with the Lord, and there was no way I could avoid Him any more. So I confessed my sins and accepted Him as Lord and Savior. That was one of the greatest spiritual experiences of my life.
RI: Did you ever have any Christian professors come along side you in your higher education?
Chien: No. I struggled for a long time, and I really needed some guidance there. I tried to read every book available to me on science and Christianity, but they were not very helpful. That's another reason I would like to work on more books in that area.
RI: Do you intend to go back to Chengjiang, the Chinese Cambrian site?
Chien: I would very much like to do that. Somehow I would like to get more involved in fossil work. Although I have lectured so many years in my own area of marine biology and pollution, I think I would like to concentrate on this aspect. This was an opportunity presented to me which nobody else has.
RI: Perhaps you could add "paleontologist" to your credentials.
Chien: Not really; that's not my purpose. I am more interested in working on the popular level. I know of less than a handful of Christian paleontologists, and I always like to establish dialogue with them. In one sense, biologists, geologists, and paleontologists are put in a pretty difficult position: we are in the middle between the Christians and the atheistic scientists we’re really between a rock and a hard place. That's a big battle for the church to look at. Whenever I speak to young people, I encourage them to become scientists.
RI: Do you think perhaps young Christians are going into these areas, but many of them lose their faith?
Chien: Yes, either that or they get so discouraged that they opt out. When I was in grad school and expressed my doubts about Darwinism, my friends would tell me that I was either ignorant or crazy; they probably thought the "Chinese guy" was not very well educated. They would try to convince me on "scientific" grounds, but I would just say, "Well, it just doesn't seem to be very convincing to me."
http://www.leaderu.com/real/ri9701/chien.html
Wednesday, July 19, 2006
More tough questions!
***QUOTE***
Here are some tough questions for the Christian, depending on his or her particular theology:
Why is a supposedly omniscient and completely understanding God so barbaric, even allowing slavery, knowing full well the suffering people would experience because it wasn't one of his ten commandments: "Thou Shalt not own slaves nor buy and sell them for profit."
Why is a supposedly omnipotent God not able to stop the 2005 Indonesian tsunami that killed a quarter million people before it happened? If he had stopped that underwater earthquake from happening none of us would have known that he did and hence he wouldn’t have revealed himself in any ways he might not have wanted to. Since all it would have taken is a “snap” of his fingers to avert that tragedy then isn’t he morally responsible for it? If we were God we would be morally obligated to do so. Why isn’t God? And if he is morally responsible for it, then he wanted it to happen for some greater good. That’s right, he wanted it to happen. What is the greater good here?
—John Loftus
***END-QUOTE***
Here are some tough questions for the apostate, depending on his or her or their (for the transgender recreant) particular atheology:
Why is a supposedly omniscient and completely understanding God so barbaric, even allowing atheism, knowing full well the suffering people would experience because it wasn't one of his ten commandments: "Thou shalt not be an infidel!"
Why doesn’t a supposedly omnipotent God put all the sacrilegious scoffers on a desert island in the S. Pacific, and then send a tsunami to wipe them out once and for all?
All it would take is for God to snap his fingers and erase every atheist who ever lived. Why aren’t there more natural disasters to take the life of every whiny, little ingrate like Loftus or his thankless crew?
Why did God stop all those earthquakes, plagues, volcanoes, and tidal waves from wiping the slate clear of every last blasphemer who desecrates the world with his insolent impieties and profanities?
Why do we have to wait until Judgment Day to watch John Loftus roast in hell when we could enjoy a sneak preview of his eternal torment?
Life is so unfair!
Here are some tough questions for the Christian, depending on his or her particular theology:
Why is a supposedly omniscient and completely understanding God so barbaric, even allowing slavery, knowing full well the suffering people would experience because it wasn't one of his ten commandments: "Thou Shalt not own slaves nor buy and sell them for profit."
Why is a supposedly omnipotent God not able to stop the 2005 Indonesian tsunami that killed a quarter million people before it happened? If he had stopped that underwater earthquake from happening none of us would have known that he did and hence he wouldn’t have revealed himself in any ways he might not have wanted to. Since all it would have taken is a “snap” of his fingers to avert that tragedy then isn’t he morally responsible for it? If we were God we would be morally obligated to do so. Why isn’t God? And if he is morally responsible for it, then he wanted it to happen for some greater good. That’s right, he wanted it to happen. What is the greater good here?
—John Loftus
***END-QUOTE***
Here are some tough questions for the apostate, depending on his or her or their (for the transgender recreant) particular atheology:
Why is a supposedly omniscient and completely understanding God so barbaric, even allowing atheism, knowing full well the suffering people would experience because it wasn't one of his ten commandments: "Thou shalt not be an infidel!"
Why doesn’t a supposedly omnipotent God put all the sacrilegious scoffers on a desert island in the S. Pacific, and then send a tsunami to wipe them out once and for all?
All it would take is for God to snap his fingers and erase every atheist who ever lived. Why aren’t there more natural disasters to take the life of every whiny, little ingrate like Loftus or his thankless crew?
Why did God stop all those earthquakes, plagues, volcanoes, and tidal waves from wiping the slate clear of every last blasphemer who desecrates the world with his insolent impieties and profanities?
Why do we have to wait until Judgment Day to watch John Loftus roast in hell when we could enjoy a sneak preview of his eternal torment?
Life is so unfair!
By George!
“And believing in talking snakes, donkeys, burning bushes, or clouds, shows the level of your irrational need to worship the veracity of some Hebrew folklore and mythology.”
George suffers from a one-dimensional view of the world. For him, it’s all surface without depth.
But for a Christian, the sensible world exemplifies the spiritual realm. And spiritual agents employ matter as a medium to interact with human beings, who have a foot in both camps.
I’d add that you don’t have to be a Christian to be a dualist. Roger Penrose, for one, doesn’t believe that matter is all there is. Cf. The Road to Reality (Knopf 2004).
“You ‘believe the biblical account’. Or better yet, you ‘believe your personal Reformed Protestant interpretation of a vast collection of ancient writing’.”
Manata’s interpretation of Gen 3 isn’t distinctively Reformed or even especially Protestant. It’s simply the traditional interpretation of the historical Christian church.
George betrays his ignorance of historical theology.
“You ‘believe’ your interpretation of this thing you call the bible, and no amount of rational reasoning or evidence or logical inference that contradicts YOUR interpretation of this collection of writing, is going to change your mind.”
Here the operative word is “no.” George has indeed offered “no” amount of “rational reasoning” (isn’t that a tad redundant?), or evidence or logical inference.
George is long on attitude, but short on evidence; long on assertion, but short on argument.
“You mistakenly believe that by worshipping a somewhat arbitrary collection of ancient writing by countless authors and editors, most of whom are anonymous, you are worshipping something called ‘god’.”
Observe that George doesn’t bother to defend his claim about a “somewhat arbitrary” collection of ancient writings.
Observe that he also fails to defend his claim about the role of “editors.”
George’s idea of evidence begins and ends with his very own ipse dixit.
“It speaks volumes about why the human mind does not have to be ‘rational’, but can survive, flourish, and seemingly ‘win’ meaningless ‘debates’ while clinging to the most irrational superstition and idolatry.”
But according to George, we can only play the hand that natural selection has dealt us. Manata has to draw his cards from same Darwinian deck as dear old George.
“You believe this huge collection of ancient, anonymous Hebrew folklore…”
It’s not all anonymous. But, in any event, inspiration is perfectly concordant with anonymity. Just not with pseudonymity.
“Or because you think this ‘belief’ will somehow be rewarded, with you getting your personal ego extended for all eternity?”
In Reformed theology, faith is not a meritorious condition.
“It seems quite obvious to us ‘rational’ folks, that you’re a member of a literary idolatry, eternal life cult, Paul. That you've been indoctrinated with the idea that you must defend the veracity of this collection of ancient writing against any and all reason or evidence to the contrary, in order to gain you're coveted prize of ‘eternal life’.”
i) The problem with this analogy is that few of us were born and bred in a religious compound off somewhere in the wilderness of Idaho or West Texas. Rather, we’ve been exposed to the very same influences as dear old George.
ii) Also, we’re not defending our faith against any and all reason or evidence to the contrary since George, for one, has yet to offer a single crumb of contrary evidence.
George thinks that talking about evidence is a substitute for giving evidence.
Anyway, why should George abode such faith in reason when, by his own accounting, his mind is the incidental byproduct of a mindless process?
“Many ‘reasonable’, ‘liberal’, modern Christian scholars, have come to accept the fact that the Genesis “garden of Eden” story is a mythical allegory of our ancient ancestors, and that it has been completely contradicted by the rational logic and inference of our modern scientific investigation and empirical evidence for the slow evolution of species over the 3+ billion year history of life on this planet.”
i) I guess that “rational logic” is preferable to irrational logic, or logical irrationality.
ii) To classify Gen 2 as a “mythical allegory” is guilty of conflating two very different literary genres. If it’s mythical, it isn’t allegorical—and if it’s allegorical, it isn’t mythical.
“Myth” is a retrospective classification. A myth is something the original writer believed to be true, but which a modern reader believes to be false.
By contrast, an allegory is neither true nor false. It is a self-consciously fictitious literary work, like Bunyan.
iii) For modern “Christian” scholars to classify Gen 2 as allegorical would be anachronistic. Such a classification represents an intellectual compromise on the part of those that cannot accept the outlook of Scripture, but cannot make a clean break with the Christian faith.
It says a lot about George’s lack of critical judgment that he would endorse such a clumsy makeshift position.
iv) If, moreover, we were to play along with his argument and classify Gen 1-3 as an allegory, then it isn’t even possible for Gen 1-3 to contradict modern science since an allegory makes no pretense to being literally true.
For all his intellectual affectations, George is a fuzz-brain.
“Because what some ancient anonymous Hebrew storyteller wrote down 3000 years ago, MUST be true!”
This assumes, without benefit of argument, that Genesis is anonymous rather than Mosaic.
“To just claim that one collection of ancient mythology, folklore and allegory must be completely TRUE, while dismissing all other collections of similar sacred mythology and folklore of other ancient cultures is FALSE, is called ‘special pleading’ Paul.”
Comparative mythology has been around for a long time now. There are plenty of Evangelical scholars who know their way around the primary sources of ANE literature. This material is readily available and widely discussed.
“Look it up.”
Actually, George is the one who needs to look it up.
“To dismiss an ancient allegory that has a reference to a talking snake as purely FICTIONAL.”
As I said before, if George thinks that Gen 3 is allegorical, and the snake is a fictitious character, then it cannot also be an unscientific myth.
“No, it tells us what is most likely given our observations and current understanding.”
No, what induction tells us, at best (prescinding Humean objections), is only that the same cause will yield the same effect. But if you modify the preconditions, then that will modify the outcome.
Yet Gen 3 is not about the current state of the world.
“Thus, given our lack of any convincing historical or observational evidence that snakes can ‘talk’.”
George acts as if Gen 3 is a pet store.
“And given the overwhelming evidence that ancient cultures made up lots of fictional folklore and mythology.”
George is fond of buzzwords like “folklore.” This makes him sound erudite and educated. But he never gets beyond the buzzwords. He’s a dilettante who’s picked up some fancy, thirdhand jargon, but doesn’t know what it means.
Suppose we were to apply a folkloric understanding to Gen 3. In the ANE, a snake was not merely an animal. Rather, it was a figure redolent with numinous or occultic connotations.
Indeed, in ANE folklore and mythology, a snake might not even be an animal, but rather, a deity in bestial form.
Cf. K. Jones, Serpent Symbolism in the Old Testament (Haddonfield House 1974), 19-29.
This is, in fact, very close to the role of the serpent in Gen 3.
Ophiolatry and ophiomancy are mythological expressions of demonology.
Demons are real. Snake-gods are not. But the snake-cult of the ancient world, which is still prevalent in many parts of the modern world, is a garbled version of a literal truth.
The original readers (or hearers) of Gen 3 would have instantly understood that the “serpent” wasn’t just an animal—assuming that it was any kind of animal.
Rather, the “serpent” is a cultural codeword for an occultic entity. Gen 3 isn’t myth, and it isn’t allegory. Rather, it’s historical narrative.
But it’s also the historical record of an event which assumes a cultural preunderstanding of what the “snake” represents.
It’s easy for a modern reader to lose sight of this fact since what was common knowledge to an ancient audience is not common knowledge to a modern audience.
That’s why modern unbelievers unconsciously substitute a contemporary frame of reference which is not at all what the author had in mind.
When they think of “snake,” that triggers a completely different set of associations than it would for the original audience.
“Perhaps you don’t realize that the collection of ancient musings you call the bible was written by countless MEN, Paul. Not by any “gods”, not even by “Jesus of Nazareth”. That’s why we call them the “gospel of Mark” (whoever that is) or the “epistles of Paul”, and not the “gospel of god, and the epistles of god”.”
Once again, George unwittingly parades his ignorance of Christian theology. Christian theology distinguishes between the primary (divine) and secondary (human) authorship of Scripture.
George also has a habit of using capital letters as a substitute for reasoned argument or supporting evidence.
Sorry, George, but capitalization is a sorry substitute for argumentation.
Yes, the Bible was written by men—inspired men.
George suffers from a one-dimensional view of the world. For him, it’s all surface without depth.
But for a Christian, the sensible world exemplifies the spiritual realm. And spiritual agents employ matter as a medium to interact with human beings, who have a foot in both camps.
I’d add that you don’t have to be a Christian to be a dualist. Roger Penrose, for one, doesn’t believe that matter is all there is. Cf. The Road to Reality (Knopf 2004).
“You ‘believe the biblical account’. Or better yet, you ‘believe your personal Reformed Protestant interpretation of a vast collection of ancient writing’.”
Manata’s interpretation of Gen 3 isn’t distinctively Reformed or even especially Protestant. It’s simply the traditional interpretation of the historical Christian church.
George betrays his ignorance of historical theology.
“You ‘believe’ your interpretation of this thing you call the bible, and no amount of rational reasoning or evidence or logical inference that contradicts YOUR interpretation of this collection of writing, is going to change your mind.”
Here the operative word is “no.” George has indeed offered “no” amount of “rational reasoning” (isn’t that a tad redundant?), or evidence or logical inference.
George is long on attitude, but short on evidence; long on assertion, but short on argument.
“You mistakenly believe that by worshipping a somewhat arbitrary collection of ancient writing by countless authors and editors, most of whom are anonymous, you are worshipping something called ‘god’.”
Observe that George doesn’t bother to defend his claim about a “somewhat arbitrary” collection of ancient writings.
Observe that he also fails to defend his claim about the role of “editors.”
George’s idea of evidence begins and ends with his very own ipse dixit.
“It speaks volumes about why the human mind does not have to be ‘rational’, but can survive, flourish, and seemingly ‘win’ meaningless ‘debates’ while clinging to the most irrational superstition and idolatry.”
But according to George, we can only play the hand that natural selection has dealt us. Manata has to draw his cards from same Darwinian deck as dear old George.
“You believe this huge collection of ancient, anonymous Hebrew folklore…”
It’s not all anonymous. But, in any event, inspiration is perfectly concordant with anonymity. Just not with pseudonymity.
“Or because you think this ‘belief’ will somehow be rewarded, with you getting your personal ego extended for all eternity?”
In Reformed theology, faith is not a meritorious condition.
“It seems quite obvious to us ‘rational’ folks, that you’re a member of a literary idolatry, eternal life cult, Paul. That you've been indoctrinated with the idea that you must defend the veracity of this collection of ancient writing against any and all reason or evidence to the contrary, in order to gain you're coveted prize of ‘eternal life’.”
i) The problem with this analogy is that few of us were born and bred in a religious compound off somewhere in the wilderness of Idaho or West Texas. Rather, we’ve been exposed to the very same influences as dear old George.
ii) Also, we’re not defending our faith against any and all reason or evidence to the contrary since George, for one, has yet to offer a single crumb of contrary evidence.
George thinks that talking about evidence is a substitute for giving evidence.
Anyway, why should George abode such faith in reason when, by his own accounting, his mind is the incidental byproduct of a mindless process?
“Many ‘reasonable’, ‘liberal’, modern Christian scholars, have come to accept the fact that the Genesis “garden of Eden” story is a mythical allegory of our ancient ancestors, and that it has been completely contradicted by the rational logic and inference of our modern scientific investigation and empirical evidence for the slow evolution of species over the 3+ billion year history of life on this planet.”
i) I guess that “rational logic” is preferable to irrational logic, or logical irrationality.
ii) To classify Gen 2 as a “mythical allegory” is guilty of conflating two very different literary genres. If it’s mythical, it isn’t allegorical—and if it’s allegorical, it isn’t mythical.
“Myth” is a retrospective classification. A myth is something the original writer believed to be true, but which a modern reader believes to be false.
By contrast, an allegory is neither true nor false. It is a self-consciously fictitious literary work, like Bunyan.
iii) For modern “Christian” scholars to classify Gen 2 as allegorical would be anachronistic. Such a classification represents an intellectual compromise on the part of those that cannot accept the outlook of Scripture, but cannot make a clean break with the Christian faith.
It says a lot about George’s lack of critical judgment that he would endorse such a clumsy makeshift position.
iv) If, moreover, we were to play along with his argument and classify Gen 1-3 as an allegory, then it isn’t even possible for Gen 1-3 to contradict modern science since an allegory makes no pretense to being literally true.
For all his intellectual affectations, George is a fuzz-brain.
“Because what some ancient anonymous Hebrew storyteller wrote down 3000 years ago, MUST be true!”
This assumes, without benefit of argument, that Genesis is anonymous rather than Mosaic.
“To just claim that one collection of ancient mythology, folklore and allegory must be completely TRUE, while dismissing all other collections of similar sacred mythology and folklore of other ancient cultures is FALSE, is called ‘special pleading’ Paul.”
Comparative mythology has been around for a long time now. There are plenty of Evangelical scholars who know their way around the primary sources of ANE literature. This material is readily available and widely discussed.
“Look it up.”
Actually, George is the one who needs to look it up.
“To dismiss an ancient allegory that has a reference to a talking snake as purely FICTIONAL.”
As I said before, if George thinks that Gen 3 is allegorical, and the snake is a fictitious character, then it cannot also be an unscientific myth.
“No, it tells us what is most likely given our observations and current understanding.”
No, what induction tells us, at best (prescinding Humean objections), is only that the same cause will yield the same effect. But if you modify the preconditions, then that will modify the outcome.
Yet Gen 3 is not about the current state of the world.
“Thus, given our lack of any convincing historical or observational evidence that snakes can ‘talk’.”
George acts as if Gen 3 is a pet store.
“And given the overwhelming evidence that ancient cultures made up lots of fictional folklore and mythology.”
George is fond of buzzwords like “folklore.” This makes him sound erudite and educated. But he never gets beyond the buzzwords. He’s a dilettante who’s picked up some fancy, thirdhand jargon, but doesn’t know what it means.
Suppose we were to apply a folkloric understanding to Gen 3. In the ANE, a snake was not merely an animal. Rather, it was a figure redolent with numinous or occultic connotations.
Indeed, in ANE folklore and mythology, a snake might not even be an animal, but rather, a deity in bestial form.
Cf. K. Jones, Serpent Symbolism in the Old Testament (Haddonfield House 1974), 19-29.
This is, in fact, very close to the role of the serpent in Gen 3.
Ophiolatry and ophiomancy are mythological expressions of demonology.
Demons are real. Snake-gods are not. But the snake-cult of the ancient world, which is still prevalent in many parts of the modern world, is a garbled version of a literal truth.
The original readers (or hearers) of Gen 3 would have instantly understood that the “serpent” wasn’t just an animal—assuming that it was any kind of animal.
Rather, the “serpent” is a cultural codeword for an occultic entity. Gen 3 isn’t myth, and it isn’t allegory. Rather, it’s historical narrative.
But it’s also the historical record of an event which assumes a cultural preunderstanding of what the “snake” represents.
It’s easy for a modern reader to lose sight of this fact since what was common knowledge to an ancient audience is not common knowledge to a modern audience.
That’s why modern unbelievers unconsciously substitute a contemporary frame of reference which is not at all what the author had in mind.
When they think of “snake,” that triggers a completely different set of associations than it would for the original audience.
“Perhaps you don’t realize that the collection of ancient musings you call the bible was written by countless MEN, Paul. Not by any “gods”, not even by “Jesus of Nazareth”. That’s why we call them the “gospel of Mark” (whoever that is) or the “epistles of Paul”, and not the “gospel of god, and the epistles of god”.”
Once again, George unwittingly parades his ignorance of Christian theology. Christian theology distinguishes between the primary (divine) and secondary (human) authorship of Scripture.
George also has a habit of using capital letters as a substitute for reasoned argument or supporting evidence.
Sorry, George, but capitalization is a sorry substitute for argumentation.
Yes, the Bible was written by men—inspired men.
Tuesday, July 18, 2006
For Bob and Charles
Alas, it seems that Rich Pierce is on vacation this week, so they are not taking calls at the Dividing Line, so you gentlemen have a week's reprieve. In case you haven't heard, Dr. White made mention of you today, Charles, and you are very certainly invited by him to call. So, Mr. Pierce will be back next week, and they'll be taking calls. I look forward to hearing you and/or Mr. Ross actually interact with Dr. White "live."
John Walton on Genesis
Since John Loftus, having copycatted Ed Babinski, recently brought up the issue of John Walton’s views of Genesis, why don’t we actually quote some of the things that Dr. Walton has to say in the course of his commentary.
In general, I’d note the apologetic thrust of Walton’s commentary. He devotes more time to the relationship between science and Scripture than any other major commentator I’m aware of, viz. Currid, Hamilton, Ross, Sailhamer, Waltke, Wenham.
He does make use of comparative Semitics, but he does so to defend the inerrancy of Scripture. We may or may not agree with his interpretations, but we should be clear on his aim. Let’s take some examples:
“The Hebrew word translated ‘lights (me’rot) is not used frequently (19x) in its various forms). Most occurrences are in the Pentateuch (15x), with the remainder in Psalms (2x), Proverbs (once), and Ezekiel (once). The occurrences outside the Pentateuch speak either of the celestial bodies or metaphorically of the face or eyes that shine. What is intriguing is that the ten occurrences in the Pentateuch outside Gen 1 (Exod 25:6; 27:20; 35:8,14[2x],28; 39:37; Lev 24:2; Num 4:9,16) all refer to the light of the lampstand that lights up the tabernacle. The use of the word ‘lights” may then be our first clue that there is another whole dimension to this text [1:14-19) that has often eluded us: the description of the cosmos as a temple or sanctuary of god. This will be further explored n the next chapter,” Genesis (Zondervan 2001), 123-24.
“What did God do on day four? In v16 the NIV translates, ‘god made two great lights.’ The Hebrew verb for ‘made’ here (‘sh) has a wide range of meanings. It is usually listed in the lexicons with the primary meaning of ‘to do or make,’ but that is only the tip of the iceberg. So, for instance, one current lexicon used in scholarly circles, the third edition of Koehler-Baumgartner (Hebrew- Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament), lists no fewer than sixteen meanings for the Qal form alone,” ibid. 124.
“On the basis of these passages, there is good reason to conclude that the author of Genesis is using the term functionally. It is indefensible to claim that the use of ‘sh demands that the heavenly bodies are manufactured on day four. Usage in cosmological texts favors taking ‘sh in v16 as a summary of the setting up of functions for the heavenly bodies as reported in vv14-15,” ibid. 125.
“The garden of Eden is not viewed by the author of Genesis simply as a piece of Mesopotamian farmland, but as an archetypal sanctuary, that is a place where God dwells and where man should worship him. Many of the features of the garden may also be found in later sanctuaries particularly the tabernacle or Jerusalem temple. These parallels suggest that the garden itself is understood as a sort of sanctuary,” ibid. 182, quoting Wenham.
“Since we have suggested in our treatment of Gen 1 that creation as a whole was understood in terms of a cosmic temple complex (see above, pp147-52), it is logical to understand the garden as the antechamber for the Most Holy Place. As indicated in the Original Meaning section above, Eden is in effect the Most Holy Place, and the garden adjoins it as the antechamber. In this regard it is important to note that the objects kept in the antechamber of the OT sanctuary are images intended to evoke the garden. The menorah is a symbol of the tree of life, and the table for the bread of the Presence provided food for the priests,” ibid. 182.
“In 7:20 this phrase [‘fifteen cubits above’] is difficult to decipher, largely because of the word that the NIV renders ‘depth’ The Hebrew text says, ‘Fifteen cubits from above [milma’la] rose the waters, and the mountains were covered.’ It is therefore not at all clear that it is suggesting the waters rose fifteen cubits higher than the mountains…As an adverb modifying the verb ‘rose,’ it suggests that the water reached fifteen cubits upward from the plain, covering at least some part of the mountains,” ibid. 325-26.
“We must still consider whether 8:3-5 strikes us the way it does because we are thinking in terms of our understanding of the world. Would this text have meant something different if we could read it with an ANE mindset?” ibid. 326-27.
“This way of think yields a flood of the then-known world (with boundaries as described, for instance, in the Sargon Geography and in the list of Noah’s descendants in Gen 10); it covered all the elevated places that were within eyesight of the occupants of the ark. Though this would be a geographically limited flood, it could still be anthropologically universal if people had not yet spread beyond this region,” 328.
In general, I’d note the apologetic thrust of Walton’s commentary. He devotes more time to the relationship between science and Scripture than any other major commentator I’m aware of, viz. Currid, Hamilton, Ross, Sailhamer, Waltke, Wenham.
He does make use of comparative Semitics, but he does so to defend the inerrancy of Scripture. We may or may not agree with his interpretations, but we should be clear on his aim. Let’s take some examples:
“The Hebrew word translated ‘lights (me’rot) is not used frequently (19x) in its various forms). Most occurrences are in the Pentateuch (15x), with the remainder in Psalms (2x), Proverbs (once), and Ezekiel (once). The occurrences outside the Pentateuch speak either of the celestial bodies or metaphorically of the face or eyes that shine. What is intriguing is that the ten occurrences in the Pentateuch outside Gen 1 (Exod 25:6; 27:20; 35:8,14[2x],28; 39:37; Lev 24:2; Num 4:9,16) all refer to the light of the lampstand that lights up the tabernacle. The use of the word ‘lights” may then be our first clue that there is another whole dimension to this text [1:14-19) that has often eluded us: the description of the cosmos as a temple or sanctuary of god. This will be further explored n the next chapter,” Genesis (Zondervan 2001), 123-24.
“What did God do on day four? In v16 the NIV translates, ‘god made two great lights.’ The Hebrew verb for ‘made’ here (‘sh) has a wide range of meanings. It is usually listed in the lexicons with the primary meaning of ‘to do or make,’ but that is only the tip of the iceberg. So, for instance, one current lexicon used in scholarly circles, the third edition of Koehler-Baumgartner (Hebrew- Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament), lists no fewer than sixteen meanings for the Qal form alone,” ibid. 124.
“On the basis of these passages, there is good reason to conclude that the author of Genesis is using the term functionally. It is indefensible to claim that the use of ‘sh demands that the heavenly bodies are manufactured on day four. Usage in cosmological texts favors taking ‘sh in v16 as a summary of the setting up of functions for the heavenly bodies as reported in vv14-15,” ibid. 125.
“The garden of Eden is not viewed by the author of Genesis simply as a piece of Mesopotamian farmland, but as an archetypal sanctuary, that is a place where God dwells and where man should worship him. Many of the features of the garden may also be found in later sanctuaries particularly the tabernacle or Jerusalem temple. These parallels suggest that the garden itself is understood as a sort of sanctuary,” ibid. 182, quoting Wenham.
“Since we have suggested in our treatment of Gen 1 that creation as a whole was understood in terms of a cosmic temple complex (see above, pp147-52), it is logical to understand the garden as the antechamber for the Most Holy Place. As indicated in the Original Meaning section above, Eden is in effect the Most Holy Place, and the garden adjoins it as the antechamber. In this regard it is important to note that the objects kept in the antechamber of the OT sanctuary are images intended to evoke the garden. The menorah is a symbol of the tree of life, and the table for the bread of the Presence provided food for the priests,” ibid. 182.
“In 7:20 this phrase [‘fifteen cubits above’] is difficult to decipher, largely because of the word that the NIV renders ‘depth’ The Hebrew text says, ‘Fifteen cubits from above [milma’la] rose the waters, and the mountains were covered.’ It is therefore not at all clear that it is suggesting the waters rose fifteen cubits higher than the mountains…As an adverb modifying the verb ‘rose,’ it suggests that the water reached fifteen cubits upward from the plain, covering at least some part of the mountains,” ibid. 325-26.
“We must still consider whether 8:3-5 strikes us the way it does because we are thinking in terms of our understanding of the world. Would this text have meant something different if we could read it with an ANE mindset?” ibid. 326-27.
“This way of think yields a flood of the then-known world (with boundaries as described, for instance, in the Sargon Geography and in the list of Noah’s descendants in Gen 10); it covered all the elevated places that were within eyesight of the occupants of the ark. Though this would be a geographically limited flood, it could still be anthropologically universal if people had not yet spread beyond this region,” 328.
The devil & the deep blue sea
***QUOTE***
Anonymous said:
We have plenty of experience with snakes. We also have plenty of experience with the biological requirements that is required to produce human speech.
Snakes don't meet these requirements. Not even close.
Snakes are deaf, they can't hear sound, thus they can't learn language. Snakes don't have a brain large enough to produce lanaguage, and snakes have no voice apparatus.
***END-QUOTE***
Anonymous is a textbook example of an intellectually challenged unbeliever—incapable of addressing himself to anything other than a straw man argument.
I already went into the identity of the “serpent” in Gen 3. Anonymous simply ignores all that and chooses to tilt at windmills instead.
***QUOTE***
If you want to claim some mythical creature spoke to your mythical first woman, who was made out of the rib of the mythical first man who was made out of mud...please call it something else...the word "snake" is already in common use in our lexicon.
***END-QUOTE***
This is simply illiterate. The frame of reference is not the common usage reflected in “our” lexicon, but the Hebrew lexicon—as well as intertextual motifs in the Pentateuch and beyond.
And this has nothing to do with faith. It’s a matter of disinterested exegesis, regardless of whether you feel committed to the results of your exegesis.
***QUOTE***
Anonymous said:
Hey Steve,
I can see your point when you say Loftus has brought up the issue of necessity. Not that I disagree with what he's said, but I think what he's said could be misunderstood to mean he is referring to logical necessity. Let me explain.
The law of gravity is something known through induction. Our experience and all tests we are aware of indicate that if you drop an apple it will fall. That's our universal experience.
So if you were to tell me that you released an apple and it sat suspended in the air (assuming there were no extra causes of it, such as an upward blast of air or magnetics), in that case it is fair to say that this goes against what induction tells us can happen.
That's the sense in which Loftus said that induction tells us this doesn't happen. We've seen gravity work a billion times. It's never failed us. But then you could respond and say "Just because it's been true a billion times and in all observable instances, this doesn't prove that the laws couldn't change at some point." Sure. Gravity isn't a logical necessity. That's the nature of scientific claims known through repeatable experience. This is induction. Your answer is known with a certain probability.
By claiming Loftus has committed a fallacy you suggest that he's doing deduction by implying that he's saying his conclusion follows with necessity. He's not saying that. He's simply saying that it's so unlikely as to be virtually certainly false. But we're open to your contrary evidence. Show us an apple suspended in midair and we'll consider rejecting the law of gravity.
Jon
***END-QUOTE***
This anonymous commenter is not to be confused with the other anonymous commenter. Jon draws intelligent distinctions and poses intelligent questions.
By way of reply:
1.I’m not especially interested in trying to exegete or gloss the comments of Loftus. I've responded to what he said the way he said it.
It isn’t worth my while to spend a lot of time on what he may have meant to say.
You’ve improved on his formulation. This may or may not be what he intended to say all along.
Why don’t we confine ourselves to what you think are the pertinent issues, in your own words, rather than getting sidetracked on his communication skills, for which I’m not responsible.
2.I regard natural laws as descriptive, not prescriptive or proscriptive.
3.I assume the same causes yield the same effects. But another cause can supervene to yield a different effect.
Let’s take a real life example. I have a friend who unwittingly purchased a haunted house. While he lived there he witnessed various paranormal phenomena, including levitation.
My friend happens to be a philosophy prof. with a doctorate from Oxford. So he’s a very credible witness.
4.Do I believe him? Yes.
Does this mean I reject the “law of gravity”? No. All other things being equal, the law of gravity will remain in force. But if you modify the underlying conditions, then that will modify the resultant conditions.
5.Or let us go back to your earlier example of leprechauns. Why don’t we believe in them? For a couple of reasons:
i) In part because we have no evidence for their existence.
ii) Yet the deeper reason is not the absence of any particular evidence for the existence of leprechauns, but whatever general evidence is feeding into a worldview according to which nothing like a leprechaun either would or could exist.
6.However, we don't have a unilinear relation between the evidence and our worldview.
For what we count as evidence will also be affected by our worldview. Hence, there’s a dialectical relationship between the evidence and our conceptual scheme.
7. And what kind of evidence is feeding into a worldview? Different kinds.
i) There’s empirical evidence. But this reduces to appearances.
The empirical evidence is filtered through our senses. And what we believe about our senses is also filtered through our senses.
What we believe about the brain is filtered through the brain.
ii) Beyond the percept is the percipient. The mind which an observer brings to the observable phenomena. That makes its own independent contribution.
We are more than cameras, passively registering an external stimulus.
iii) But neither (i) or (ii) will give you an intersubjectival glimpse of the real world. The only thing which could do that is divine revelation.
***QUOTE***
Ted said:
But to date, I've not seen any evidence to support his supernaturalism. Instead, I see rhetorical games, sly evasions and snide condescension.
***END-QUOTE***
1.Notice that Ted doesn’t identify my “rhetorical games” or “sly evasions.”
But given a choice, a sly evasion is certainly an improvement over a clumsy evasion.
2.As the archives will abundantly show, I (as well as my colleagues) have entered a great deal of evidence for supernaturalism into the public record.
If Ted wants a specific answer, he should pose a specific question.
3.Also, can anyone remember the last time that Ted ever presented any evidence for his naturalism?
Anonymous said:
We have plenty of experience with snakes. We also have plenty of experience with the biological requirements that is required to produce human speech.
Snakes don't meet these requirements. Not even close.
Snakes are deaf, they can't hear sound, thus they can't learn language. Snakes don't have a brain large enough to produce lanaguage, and snakes have no voice apparatus.
***END-QUOTE***
Anonymous is a textbook example of an intellectually challenged unbeliever—incapable of addressing himself to anything other than a straw man argument.
I already went into the identity of the “serpent” in Gen 3. Anonymous simply ignores all that and chooses to tilt at windmills instead.
***QUOTE***
If you want to claim some mythical creature spoke to your mythical first woman, who was made out of the rib of the mythical first man who was made out of mud...please call it something else...the word "snake" is already in common use in our lexicon.
***END-QUOTE***
This is simply illiterate. The frame of reference is not the common usage reflected in “our” lexicon, but the Hebrew lexicon—as well as intertextual motifs in the Pentateuch and beyond.
And this has nothing to do with faith. It’s a matter of disinterested exegesis, regardless of whether you feel committed to the results of your exegesis.
***QUOTE***
Anonymous said:
Hey Steve,
I can see your point when you say Loftus has brought up the issue of necessity. Not that I disagree with what he's said, but I think what he's said could be misunderstood to mean he is referring to logical necessity. Let me explain.
The law of gravity is something known through induction. Our experience and all tests we are aware of indicate that if you drop an apple it will fall. That's our universal experience.
So if you were to tell me that you released an apple and it sat suspended in the air (assuming there were no extra causes of it, such as an upward blast of air or magnetics), in that case it is fair to say that this goes against what induction tells us can happen.
That's the sense in which Loftus said that induction tells us this doesn't happen. We've seen gravity work a billion times. It's never failed us. But then you could respond and say "Just because it's been true a billion times and in all observable instances, this doesn't prove that the laws couldn't change at some point." Sure. Gravity isn't a logical necessity. That's the nature of scientific claims known through repeatable experience. This is induction. Your answer is known with a certain probability.
By claiming Loftus has committed a fallacy you suggest that he's doing deduction by implying that he's saying his conclusion follows with necessity. He's not saying that. He's simply saying that it's so unlikely as to be virtually certainly false. But we're open to your contrary evidence. Show us an apple suspended in midair and we'll consider rejecting the law of gravity.
Jon
***END-QUOTE***
This anonymous commenter is not to be confused with the other anonymous commenter. Jon draws intelligent distinctions and poses intelligent questions.
By way of reply:
1.I’m not especially interested in trying to exegete or gloss the comments of Loftus. I've responded to what he said the way he said it.
It isn’t worth my while to spend a lot of time on what he may have meant to say.
You’ve improved on his formulation. This may or may not be what he intended to say all along.
Why don’t we confine ourselves to what you think are the pertinent issues, in your own words, rather than getting sidetracked on his communication skills, for which I’m not responsible.
2.I regard natural laws as descriptive, not prescriptive or proscriptive.
3.I assume the same causes yield the same effects. But another cause can supervene to yield a different effect.
Let’s take a real life example. I have a friend who unwittingly purchased a haunted house. While he lived there he witnessed various paranormal phenomena, including levitation.
My friend happens to be a philosophy prof. with a doctorate from Oxford. So he’s a very credible witness.
4.Do I believe him? Yes.
Does this mean I reject the “law of gravity”? No. All other things being equal, the law of gravity will remain in force. But if you modify the underlying conditions, then that will modify the resultant conditions.
5.Or let us go back to your earlier example of leprechauns. Why don’t we believe in them? For a couple of reasons:
i) In part because we have no evidence for their existence.
ii) Yet the deeper reason is not the absence of any particular evidence for the existence of leprechauns, but whatever general evidence is feeding into a worldview according to which nothing like a leprechaun either would or could exist.
6.However, we don't have a unilinear relation between the evidence and our worldview.
For what we count as evidence will also be affected by our worldview. Hence, there’s a dialectical relationship between the evidence and our conceptual scheme.
7. And what kind of evidence is feeding into a worldview? Different kinds.
i) There’s empirical evidence. But this reduces to appearances.
The empirical evidence is filtered through our senses. And what we believe about our senses is also filtered through our senses.
What we believe about the brain is filtered through the brain.
ii) Beyond the percept is the percipient. The mind which an observer brings to the observable phenomena. That makes its own independent contribution.
We are more than cameras, passively registering an external stimulus.
iii) But neither (i) or (ii) will give you an intersubjectival glimpse of the real world. The only thing which could do that is divine revelation.
***QUOTE***
Ted said:
But to date, I've not seen any evidence to support his supernaturalism. Instead, I see rhetorical games, sly evasions and snide condescension.
***END-QUOTE***
1.Notice that Ted doesn’t identify my “rhetorical games” or “sly evasions.”
But given a choice, a sly evasion is certainly an improvement over a clumsy evasion.
2.As the archives will abundantly show, I (as well as my colleagues) have entered a great deal of evidence for supernaturalism into the public record.
If Ted wants a specific answer, he should pose a specific question.
3.Also, can anyone remember the last time that Ted ever presented any evidence for his naturalism?
The Euthyphro dilemma
John W. Loftus said:
“When it comes to the Euthyphro Dilemma, I've already answered both your objections and Frame's objections here, even though what I wrote was before I looked at anything you wrote. What do you say in response to what I wrote? Come on. Give it a try. Your whole apologetical strategy is at stake.”
Several false opening moves:
i) TAG is not my “whole apologetic strategy.”
ii) Even if it were, TAG is primarily concerned with epistemology, not ethics. What precondition must obtain for knowledge to obtain? That’s the core argument.
Even if a Van Tilian had no answer to the Euthyphro dilemma, that would hardly scuttle the appeal to TAG.
It’s possible to mount a transcendental argument for ethics. But TAG is not dependent on that extension.
“I'll read your response and see where it goes from there, okay? But your attempts are already doomed to failure.”
Sounds like something the Borg would say: “Resistance is futile!”
Unfortunately for Loftus, the prospect of being assimilated to Seven-of-Nine in a cat-suit has compensatory benefits for which John Loftus is a sorry substitute.
So if Loftus wants to tempt me over to the dark side, Mephistopheles will need to sweeten the deal.
“Would you be willing to give up presuppositional apologetics if I can show you wrong here?”
Since I’ve never been a chemically pure Van Tilian, I don’t know which component of my apologetic apparatus he thinks is vulnerable.
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/02/transcendental-theism.html
“And if it's a stalemate between us, you still lose, because you can only be sure of your faith to the same degree as you can defend your position on the Euthyphro.”
This goes awry on several grounds:
i) Even if I had no answer to the Euthyphro dilemma, I can have many reasons for believing in God irrespective of the Euthyphro dilemma.
The better part of wisdom lies in learning to distinguish between the answers we can live without and the answers we cannot live without.
ii) You act as if I enjoy direct control over my level of certitude. As if I had a knob or dial that I could manipulate to raise or lower my level of certitude at will.
But my faith is not adjustable. It simply is. It doesn’t come to me in degrees. I can know more quantify my faith in God than I can quantify my belief in the external world, or other minds.
iii) In doing apologetics we try to analyze the rational grounds for our faith. To tease tacit knowledge out into the open.
And this can be done up to a point. But I agree with Cardinal Newman about the illative sense. We know more than we can ever say or ever prove.
Apologetics can only scratch the surface. There’s a whole dimension of religious experience that remains in reserve because it’s essentially private rather than public. Something accessible to an insider rather than an outsider.
As to what he wrote, most of it consists in a false dilemma which I already exposed in my critique of Russell. So I’ll confine myself to a mopping up operation:
“It does no good to step back behind the commands of God to God’s purported nature at all. For we’d still want to know whether or not God’s nature is good. God cannot be known to be good here either, without a standard of goodness that shows he is good. For unless there is standard that shows God is good beyond the mere fact that God declares that his nature is good, we still don’t know whether God is good.”
i) Notice how Loftus is shifting ground. This is not the Euthyphro dilemma. The Euthyphro dilemma is concerned with the ontological question of what makes something right or wrong, not the epistemic question of how we can know something is right or wrong.
ii) Loftus is diverting attention away from the order of being to the order of knowing. That’s a bait-and-switch tactic.
And it doesn’t even work at that level. Suppose we judge the goodness of God by our moral intuitions. Okay, but what’s the source and standard of our moral intuitions? All Loftus has done is to push the original question back a step.
“Furthermore, we usually call someone good when they make good choices. So an additional question here is whether or not God has ever made any good choices. To choose means there were alternatives to choose from. Did God at any point in the past ever choose his supposedly good nature?”
A moral agent doesn’t choose his moral character for the obvious reason that he chooses according to his moral character. His character is a precondition of choice, not a consequence of choice. Otherwise, he would be amoral.
“Besides, there are several ethical systems of thought that do not require a prior belief in God, like Social Contract Theories, Utilitarianism, Virtue Ethics, Kantianism, and John Rawls’ theory of justice.”
That’s beside the point. The question at issue is not whether there are secular alternatives on the market, but whether these are successful alternatives to Christian ethics.
“Even Christian philosopher Thomas V. Morris admits that…”
We need to distinguish between opinion and argument. Even if Loftus could quote a Christian whose opinion agrees with his, that’s not the same thing an argument. The question at issue is what supporting argument underwrites the opinion.
Continuing with Morris:
“It has…been argued in various ways over the past century that the evolutionary process somehow provides a framework of moral reference. Basic human instincts could be cited as loci for the moral constraints needed in society. The physical, survival, functional needs of men in society or community could act as moral matrices for the guiding of moral motions…there are many possible bases or explanations for moral motions in an impersonal universe. They could easily have arisen from evolutionary or community survival needs, for example, and consequently, when identified as a human ‘aspiration,’ the practice of making moral distinctions could be said to be ‘fulfilled’ when it is successfully functional within those contexts.”
i) Notice that Morris is summarizing one version of secular ethics. That doesn’t mean he agrees with evolutionary ethics.
ii) The argument begs the question. If and only if the survival of the human species is good can you then mount a utilitarian argument for the common good.
But why would a secularist say the survival of our species is good? Appealing to instinct will hardly suffice, for that either begs the question or pushes the question back a step. Is this a good instinct or a bad instinct?
“Even if Christians did have objective moral standards, they cannot be objectively certain that they know them, or that they know how they apply to specific real life cases!”
i) Assuming that this is true, so what? This isn’t generated by the Euthyphro dilemma? This isn’t generating the Euthyphro dilemma.
ii) Why should this be a necessary condition of moral valuation? To quote something that Dr. Anderson said in another context: “Loftus seems to be assuming that S's knowing p entails that p is indubitable for S or incorrigible for S. But why think that? Why should Calvinists (or anyone else) be committed to such an implausible Cartesianism?
iii) Within Calvinism, God’s preceptive will doesn’t operate in a vacuum. Rather, his preceptive will works in conjunction with his general and special providence.
“Since Dr. Craig earlier mentioned Hitler, Auschwitz, and Dachau in his apologetics book, consider this response: Germany was a Christian nation—the heart of the Lutheran Protestant Reformation! How could a Christian people allow these evil deeds to happen and even be his willing executioners?”
Several things go wrong here:
i) This is irrelevant to the Euthyphro dilemma.
ii) It is also unresponsive to Craig’s reasoning: “If life ends at the grave, then it makes no difference whether one has lived as a Stalin or as a saint.…”
How does the failure of the church in Germany undermine the logic of Craig’s observation?
iii) Loftus fails to distinguish between Christian theology and Christian ethics. It’s perfectly consistent with Christian theology for Christians to be morally inconsistent. Christians are sinners. Christian theology consistently predicts that Christians will be inconsistent with their code of conduct.
iv) Luther was a notorious anti-Semite. That’s obviously unscriptural given the Jewish character of the Bible.
v) The Christian character of Germany was first eroded by the Enlightenment, and further eroded by Darwinism, higher criticism, and the like.
vi) In a country where you had mass infant baptism, whether Lutheran or Catholic, the room for nominal religious affiliation is enormous.
vii) Christians have prior social obligations and concentric social obligations. We should care for our neighbor, but a Christian father also has an obligation to care for his family, and, given a choice, his familial obligations take precedence over neighbor-love.
Finally, a couple of the Christian commenters over at DC scored direct hits:
At 12:53 AM, January 31, 2006, Genius said...
I think your approach the divine command theory involves a flawed approach to the world.
Lets say water is wet. Is it wet because it is water or is it water because it is wet? This is a nonsense question - furthermore it is a nonsense thought experiment to consider non-wet water (ok there might be wet stuff that is not water but that just points out the lack of perfection of the example).
From this perspective in a sense it is nonsense to propose, "if god was not benevolent would you support him" question has a practical implication because you believe it is fundamentally untrue.
I.e. the higher standard and God's standard are fundamentally the same neither is "created" by the other any more than water is created by wetness.
Or more clearly it is a bit like saying if 1+1=2 does the 2 create 1+1 or does 1+1 create 2?
At 9:57 AM, February 03, 2006, Jeremy Pierce said...
This last point is worth paying attention to. The problems raised in Euthyphro-like questions can be raised about any meta-ethical view. If morality is based, for instance, on whatever rational people would agree to follow if they were concerned only about self-interest (which many contemporary social contract theorists of morality believe), then we have to ask a Euthyphro-like question. Is it good merely because rationally self-interested people would prefer it, or would they prefer it because it's good? The same line of questioning could very easily be raised about any meta-ethical grounding for ethics.
“When it comes to the Euthyphro Dilemma, I've already answered both your objections and Frame's objections here, even though what I wrote was before I looked at anything you wrote. What do you say in response to what I wrote? Come on. Give it a try. Your whole apologetical strategy is at stake.”
Several false opening moves:
i) TAG is not my “whole apologetic strategy.”
ii) Even if it were, TAG is primarily concerned with epistemology, not ethics. What precondition must obtain for knowledge to obtain? That’s the core argument.
Even if a Van Tilian had no answer to the Euthyphro dilemma, that would hardly scuttle the appeal to TAG.
It’s possible to mount a transcendental argument for ethics. But TAG is not dependent on that extension.
“I'll read your response and see where it goes from there, okay? But your attempts are already doomed to failure.”
Sounds like something the Borg would say: “Resistance is futile!”
Unfortunately for Loftus, the prospect of being assimilated to Seven-of-Nine in a cat-suit has compensatory benefits for which John Loftus is a sorry substitute.
So if Loftus wants to tempt me over to the dark side, Mephistopheles will need to sweeten the deal.
“Would you be willing to give up presuppositional apologetics if I can show you wrong here?”
Since I’ve never been a chemically pure Van Tilian, I don’t know which component of my apologetic apparatus he thinks is vulnerable.
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/02/transcendental-theism.html
“And if it's a stalemate between us, you still lose, because you can only be sure of your faith to the same degree as you can defend your position on the Euthyphro.”
This goes awry on several grounds:
i) Even if I had no answer to the Euthyphro dilemma, I can have many reasons for believing in God irrespective of the Euthyphro dilemma.
The better part of wisdom lies in learning to distinguish between the answers we can live without and the answers we cannot live without.
ii) You act as if I enjoy direct control over my level of certitude. As if I had a knob or dial that I could manipulate to raise or lower my level of certitude at will.
But my faith is not adjustable. It simply is. It doesn’t come to me in degrees. I can know more quantify my faith in God than I can quantify my belief in the external world, or other minds.
iii) In doing apologetics we try to analyze the rational grounds for our faith. To tease tacit knowledge out into the open.
And this can be done up to a point. But I agree with Cardinal Newman about the illative sense. We know more than we can ever say or ever prove.
Apologetics can only scratch the surface. There’s a whole dimension of religious experience that remains in reserve because it’s essentially private rather than public. Something accessible to an insider rather than an outsider.
As to what he wrote, most of it consists in a false dilemma which I already exposed in my critique of Russell. So I’ll confine myself to a mopping up operation:
“It does no good to step back behind the commands of God to God’s purported nature at all. For we’d still want to know whether or not God’s nature is good. God cannot be known to be good here either, without a standard of goodness that shows he is good. For unless there is standard that shows God is good beyond the mere fact that God declares that his nature is good, we still don’t know whether God is good.”
i) Notice how Loftus is shifting ground. This is not the Euthyphro dilemma. The Euthyphro dilemma is concerned with the ontological question of what makes something right or wrong, not the epistemic question of how we can know something is right or wrong.
ii) Loftus is diverting attention away from the order of being to the order of knowing. That’s a bait-and-switch tactic.
And it doesn’t even work at that level. Suppose we judge the goodness of God by our moral intuitions. Okay, but what’s the source and standard of our moral intuitions? All Loftus has done is to push the original question back a step.
“Furthermore, we usually call someone good when they make good choices. So an additional question here is whether or not God has ever made any good choices. To choose means there were alternatives to choose from. Did God at any point in the past ever choose his supposedly good nature?”
A moral agent doesn’t choose his moral character for the obvious reason that he chooses according to his moral character. His character is a precondition of choice, not a consequence of choice. Otherwise, he would be amoral.
“Besides, there are several ethical systems of thought that do not require a prior belief in God, like Social Contract Theories, Utilitarianism, Virtue Ethics, Kantianism, and John Rawls’ theory of justice.”
That’s beside the point. The question at issue is not whether there are secular alternatives on the market, but whether these are successful alternatives to Christian ethics.
“Even Christian philosopher Thomas V. Morris admits that…”
We need to distinguish between opinion and argument. Even if Loftus could quote a Christian whose opinion agrees with his, that’s not the same thing an argument. The question at issue is what supporting argument underwrites the opinion.
Continuing with Morris:
“It has…been argued in various ways over the past century that the evolutionary process somehow provides a framework of moral reference. Basic human instincts could be cited as loci for the moral constraints needed in society. The physical, survival, functional needs of men in society or community could act as moral matrices for the guiding of moral motions…there are many possible bases or explanations for moral motions in an impersonal universe. They could easily have arisen from evolutionary or community survival needs, for example, and consequently, when identified as a human ‘aspiration,’ the practice of making moral distinctions could be said to be ‘fulfilled’ when it is successfully functional within those contexts.”
i) Notice that Morris is summarizing one version of secular ethics. That doesn’t mean he agrees with evolutionary ethics.
ii) The argument begs the question. If and only if the survival of the human species is good can you then mount a utilitarian argument for the common good.
But why would a secularist say the survival of our species is good? Appealing to instinct will hardly suffice, for that either begs the question or pushes the question back a step. Is this a good instinct or a bad instinct?
“Even if Christians did have objective moral standards, they cannot be objectively certain that they know them, or that they know how they apply to specific real life cases!”
i) Assuming that this is true, so what? This isn’t generated by the Euthyphro dilemma? This isn’t generating the Euthyphro dilemma.
ii) Why should this be a necessary condition of moral valuation? To quote something that Dr. Anderson said in another context: “Loftus seems to be assuming that S's knowing p entails that p is indubitable for S or incorrigible for S. But why think that? Why should Calvinists (or anyone else) be committed to such an implausible Cartesianism?
iii) Within Calvinism, God’s preceptive will doesn’t operate in a vacuum. Rather, his preceptive will works in conjunction with his general and special providence.
“Since Dr. Craig earlier mentioned Hitler, Auschwitz, and Dachau in his apologetics book, consider this response: Germany was a Christian nation—the heart of the Lutheran Protestant Reformation! How could a Christian people allow these evil deeds to happen and even be his willing executioners?”
Several things go wrong here:
i) This is irrelevant to the Euthyphro dilemma.
ii) It is also unresponsive to Craig’s reasoning: “If life ends at the grave, then it makes no difference whether one has lived as a Stalin or as a saint.…”
How does the failure of the church in Germany undermine the logic of Craig’s observation?
iii) Loftus fails to distinguish between Christian theology and Christian ethics. It’s perfectly consistent with Christian theology for Christians to be morally inconsistent. Christians are sinners. Christian theology consistently predicts that Christians will be inconsistent with their code of conduct.
iv) Luther was a notorious anti-Semite. That’s obviously unscriptural given the Jewish character of the Bible.
v) The Christian character of Germany was first eroded by the Enlightenment, and further eroded by Darwinism, higher criticism, and the like.
vi) In a country where you had mass infant baptism, whether Lutheran or Catholic, the room for nominal religious affiliation is enormous.
vii) Christians have prior social obligations and concentric social obligations. We should care for our neighbor, but a Christian father also has an obligation to care for his family, and, given a choice, his familial obligations take precedence over neighbor-love.
Finally, a couple of the Christian commenters over at DC scored direct hits:
At 12:53 AM, January 31, 2006, Genius said...
I think your approach the divine command theory involves a flawed approach to the world.
Lets say water is wet. Is it wet because it is water or is it water because it is wet? This is a nonsense question - furthermore it is a nonsense thought experiment to consider non-wet water (ok there might be wet stuff that is not water but that just points out the lack of perfection of the example).
From this perspective in a sense it is nonsense to propose, "if god was not benevolent would you support him" question has a practical implication because you believe it is fundamentally untrue.
I.e. the higher standard and God's standard are fundamentally the same neither is "created" by the other any more than water is created by wetness.
Or more clearly it is a bit like saying if 1+1=2 does the 2 create 1+1 or does 1+1 create 2?
At 9:57 AM, February 03, 2006, Jeremy Pierce said...
This last point is worth paying attention to. The problems raised in Euthyphro-like questions can be raised about any meta-ethical view. If morality is based, for instance, on whatever rational people would agree to follow if they were concerned only about self-interest (which many contemporary social contract theorists of morality believe), then we have to ask a Euthyphro-like question. Is it good merely because rationally self-interested people would prefer it, or would they prefer it because it's good? The same line of questioning could very easily be raised about any meta-ethical grounding for ethics.
Reminder for the Folks at the Flyswatter
Mr. Ross has also stated that James White does not wish to debate him. Yet Dr. White has plainly invited Charles and, by extension Mr. Ross, to call the Dividing Line anytime. Let's see Mr. Ross have the courage of his convictions. Let's see him actually interact with James White on this on the DL instead of hiding like a roach in the darkness of the comment box of the Calvinist Flyswatter. The number is 1-877-753-3341 (Toll Free) Most Tuesday Mornings at 11:00am MST and Most Thursday Afternoons at 4:00 MST.
Tuesday is now upon us.
I will be inviting you to call prior to each DL unless I am prevented from posting and noting the number of times I have done so and you have failed. Thus far, this is your second invitation; the first being issued on 7/12/06.
Tuesday is now upon us.
I will be inviting you to call prior to each DL unless I am prevented from posting and noting the number of times I have done so and you have failed. Thus far, this is your second invitation; the first being issued on 7/12/06.
Monday, July 17, 2006
Induction or deduction?
***QUOTE***
Anonymous said:
"Barker/Loftus also act as if the absence of evidence were positive evidence against the existence of something. But that’s a non-sequitur."
Hi Steve,
I think this comment confuses induction with deduction. Does it "necessarily" follow that simply because we have no experience with talking snakes that talking snakes must never have existed? Well no. But inductive arguments (and all arguments about historical fact are inductive arguments) are about probabilities, not necessities. He's saying it's probably not historical. That's reasonable. It is not a fallacy.
Take a claim from a different religion. Mormons say the Ephraimites came to South America around the time of Christ. A little earlier I believe. There is no archeological evidence for this. Is it a fallacy to point this out? Are you satisfied if the Mormon says in response "Non evidence is not evidence against anything. You've committed a non-sequitor." You wouldn't accept that response. Neither do we.
Anonymous said:
Hi slaveofone. I'm Jon by the way.
The issue is not whether or not there are additional evidences against the book of Mormon. And the issue is not the veracity of the Book of Mormon vs the veracity of the Bible. The comparison is between belief that snakes talked and the belief that the Ephraimites lived in South America. Also the issue is about confusion between induction and deduction.
Steve is confusing deduction and induction. Forget about the Bible and the Book of Mormon if need be. I don't want you to confuse what the issue is here. Take belief in leprechauns around the moon. We have no experience with them. So it is not a fallacy to say that this is good reason to doubt their existence. That's a fact.
Now, if that's true, then the same reasoning applies to talking snakes. We have no experience with them. Does this prove that it is impossible that they would exist? Of course not. But we're not doing deduction. We're doing induction. All we can say is that it is very unlikely that they exist. Now, if we had tons and tons of evidence that it really did happen, this might overturn our initial doubt. Barring that, it is irrational to believe it happened.
***END-QUOTE***
Hi Jon,
i) I thought slaveofone handily dispatched the Mormon comparison, so I’ll skip it. Anyway, you’ve dropped that part of your argument.
ii) Loftus is the one who brought “necessity” into the discussion by saying that “Such a story goes against what the principle of induction tells us can happen.”
What he really means, in relation to Gen 3, is that induction tells us what cannot happen.
But induction does nothing of the kind. It only tells us what has happened.
iii) I also disagree with his illicit attempt to convert nonevidence into “overwhelming evidence against the story told in Genesis 3, as well as other Biblical claims.”
He’s trying to turn a negative into positive evidence to the contrary.
iv) Now, the absence of evidence may be good reason to doubt an existential claim if reported event is the kind of thing we’d expect to leave trace evidence, or if it’s supposed to be a periodic phenomenon, like the life-cycle or the comet Halley.
v) Now, I’ve already shown that the identification of the serpent with a talking snake is not the only available interpretation, or even the best available interpretation.
vi) But let’s assume that it is. What’s the context of Gen 3? It moves within the framework of conditions that no longer obtain.
Indeed, that’s the point of the temptation. If the temptation succeeds, it will forever alter the status quo ante.
The fall is a unique, unrepeatable, and unparalleled event.
vii) In addition, all that Loftus ever does is to tacitly gloss the principle of induction naturalistically.
If you operate with a materialistic, closed-system viewpoint, then you’re going to find Gen 3 unbelievable. Christians understand that just as well as infidels.
Of course, Christians find a materialistic, closed-system viewpoint just as unbelievable.
Anonymous said:
"Barker/Loftus also act as if the absence of evidence were positive evidence against the existence of something. But that’s a non-sequitur."
Hi Steve,
I think this comment confuses induction with deduction. Does it "necessarily" follow that simply because we have no experience with talking snakes that talking snakes must never have existed? Well no. But inductive arguments (and all arguments about historical fact are inductive arguments) are about probabilities, not necessities. He's saying it's probably not historical. That's reasonable. It is not a fallacy.
Take a claim from a different religion. Mormons say the Ephraimites came to South America around the time of Christ. A little earlier I believe. There is no archeological evidence for this. Is it a fallacy to point this out? Are you satisfied if the Mormon says in response "Non evidence is not evidence against anything. You've committed a non-sequitor." You wouldn't accept that response. Neither do we.
Anonymous said:
Hi slaveofone. I'm Jon by the way.
The issue is not whether or not there are additional evidences against the book of Mormon. And the issue is not the veracity of the Book of Mormon vs the veracity of the Bible. The comparison is between belief that snakes talked and the belief that the Ephraimites lived in South America. Also the issue is about confusion between induction and deduction.
Steve is confusing deduction and induction. Forget about the Bible and the Book of Mormon if need be. I don't want you to confuse what the issue is here. Take belief in leprechauns around the moon. We have no experience with them. So it is not a fallacy to say that this is good reason to doubt their existence. That's a fact.
Now, if that's true, then the same reasoning applies to talking snakes. We have no experience with them. Does this prove that it is impossible that they would exist? Of course not. But we're not doing deduction. We're doing induction. All we can say is that it is very unlikely that they exist. Now, if we had tons and tons of evidence that it really did happen, this might overturn our initial doubt. Barring that, it is irrational to believe it happened.
***END-QUOTE***
Hi Jon,
i) I thought slaveofone handily dispatched the Mormon comparison, so I’ll skip it. Anyway, you’ve dropped that part of your argument.
ii) Loftus is the one who brought “necessity” into the discussion by saying that “Such a story goes against what the principle of induction tells us can happen.”
What he really means, in relation to Gen 3, is that induction tells us what cannot happen.
But induction does nothing of the kind. It only tells us what has happened.
iii) I also disagree with his illicit attempt to convert nonevidence into “overwhelming evidence against the story told in Genesis 3, as well as other Biblical claims.”
He’s trying to turn a negative into positive evidence to the contrary.
iv) Now, the absence of evidence may be good reason to doubt an existential claim if reported event is the kind of thing we’d expect to leave trace evidence, or if it’s supposed to be a periodic phenomenon, like the life-cycle or the comet Halley.
v) Now, I’ve already shown that the identification of the serpent with a talking snake is not the only available interpretation, or even the best available interpretation.
vi) But let’s assume that it is. What’s the context of Gen 3? It moves within the framework of conditions that no longer obtain.
Indeed, that’s the point of the temptation. If the temptation succeeds, it will forever alter the status quo ante.
The fall is a unique, unrepeatable, and unparalleled event.
vii) In addition, all that Loftus ever does is to tacitly gloss the principle of induction naturalistically.
If you operate with a materialistic, closed-system viewpoint, then you’re going to find Gen 3 unbelievable. Christians understand that just as well as infidels.
Of course, Christians find a materialistic, closed-system viewpoint just as unbelievable.
Heaven & earth
***QUOTE***
slaveofone said:
On another note, I'd be interested to hear what Triablogue thinks about the reference to an angel with a flaming sword... Is there more to this interpretation? A better way to understand the linguistics? Could this be evidence of a narrative that is meant to be understood symbolically or that it was composed through more vision-based imagery?
Historically speaking, metallurgy and swords didn't exist at the time and if an angel held a sword, Adam and Eve wouldn't have recognized it as such anyway. The angel could as well as held a flaming shotgun as a sword except that a flaming shotgun would not be understood at the time the text of Genesis was coming into its form...which suggests the event was being re-interpreted for the understanding of a later audience.
Thanks.
***END-QUOTE***
There are various ways of broaching the answer:
1.I think the constitutive element is flame or fire, not sword. “Sword” functions adjectivally.
A fiery phenomenon that is sword-like in some respect.
2.Apropos (1), it could be a formal comparison. The flame resembles a sword. Perhaps a thunderbolt is in view.
3.Or it could be a functional comparison. Just as a sword can be used as a defensive weapon, the fiery phenomenon is a defensive force to secure the garden from trespassers.
4.As you suggest, it’s possible that Moses has employed a literary anachronism, using a word which denoted a later artifact to designate an earlier, analogous object—in much the same way the translators of the KJV use the hitech word “candle” instead of lamp.
5.I think that answers your second paragraph. However, your first paragraph seems to be broader.
i) The cherubim in 3:24 obviously foreshadow the cherubic statuary in the tabernacle.
At one level, this goes to archetypal/ectypal relation between the garden and the tabernacle.
The garden is sacred space. Indeed, it’s the archetype of the inner sanctum.
The garden has its ectypal analogue in the tabernacle.
We might call this a horizontal, linear, or temporal analogy. Not merely archetypal, but prototypal.
In addition, you have a concentric form of ritual purity. Israel is holy in relation to the nations. The tabernacle is holy in relation to Israel. The inner sanctum is holy in relation to the tabernacle.
Likewise, Eden was holy in relation to the wilderness outside the garden.
ii) At another level, there’s an archetypal/ectypal relation between heaven and earth. Heaven is sacred space. The garden is a microscopic ectype of the macroscopic archetype.
We might call this a vertical or spatial analogy. This is synchronic rather than diachronic.
If you’ve been following my exchange with Loftus on cultic cosmology and the triple-decker universe, you’ll be aware of the argument, as well as some of the supporting literature.
Here are a couple of additional articles:
W. Vogels, “The Cultic & Civil Calendars of the Fourth Day of Creation (Gen 1,14b),” SJOT 11 (1997): 163-80.
G. Wenham, “Sanctuary Symbolism in the Garden of Eden Story,” Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies (Jerusalem), 1986), 19-24.
iii) Beyond the Pentateuch is the cultic imagery of Ezekiel, with its many allusions to Eden and the Mosaic cultus. And that, in turn, foreshadows the Apocalypse.
In tracing out these typical motifs, Bock and Duguid would be good commentators on Ezekiel, while Beale and Smalley would be good commentators on Revelation.
6.On the relation between the figural and/or literal dimensions:
i) Something can be:
a) Either literal, but not figural.
b) Figural, but not literal.
c) Both literal and figural.
I assume that (a) is self-explanatory.
An example of (b) would be Heb 12. This is a literary construct rather than a literal depiction of heaven.
The whole notion of ritually pure or impure objects in the Mosaic cultus would be an example of (c). The land, the temple, and the furnishings thereof, are both actual objects as well as significant objects.
7.Finally, we have many heavenly visions in Scripture. Are these literal or figural?
The question is ambiguous.
i) They are literal visions in the sense that the seer was the actual recipient of visionary revelation.
ii) But are they literally descriptive of what heaven is like?
a) Here we need to draw some distinction between the raw vision and the literary record of the vision.
b) That said, we also need to ask what heaven is?
What heaven is (ontology), and what heaven is like (perception) are interrelated.
To the extent that we identify heaven with the intermediate state, which is a discarnate state, you might say that appearance is reality: esse is percipi.
Heaven is like a collective dream, along the lines of Berkeley’s objective idealism.
God assumes the role of the oneiropompist who sends the celestrial dreams to the sainted believer, who assumes the role of the oneiropolist or dreamer.
So heaven may be very similar to the heavenly visions in Scripture, only more varied and extensive than these isolated glimpses behind the veil.
In addition, they include auditions as well as visions, and other sensory simulations.
The audiovisual images, generated by God, and transmitted to the soul of the sainted believer, are drawn from the sensible world, then redeployed to simulate and signify what would otherwise be the supersensible realities of the spiritual realm. That is how heaven is experienced by the saints in glory.
The earthly ectype is prior to the heavenly archetype in the order of knowing, but posterior in the order of being.
slaveofone said:
On another note, I'd be interested to hear what Triablogue thinks about the reference to an angel with a flaming sword... Is there more to this interpretation? A better way to understand the linguistics? Could this be evidence of a narrative that is meant to be understood symbolically or that it was composed through more vision-based imagery?
Historically speaking, metallurgy and swords didn't exist at the time and if an angel held a sword, Adam and Eve wouldn't have recognized it as such anyway. The angel could as well as held a flaming shotgun as a sword except that a flaming shotgun would not be understood at the time the text of Genesis was coming into its form...which suggests the event was being re-interpreted for the understanding of a later audience.
Thanks.
***END-QUOTE***
There are various ways of broaching the answer:
1.I think the constitutive element is flame or fire, not sword. “Sword” functions adjectivally.
A fiery phenomenon that is sword-like in some respect.
2.Apropos (1), it could be a formal comparison. The flame resembles a sword. Perhaps a thunderbolt is in view.
3.Or it could be a functional comparison. Just as a sword can be used as a defensive weapon, the fiery phenomenon is a defensive force to secure the garden from trespassers.
4.As you suggest, it’s possible that Moses has employed a literary anachronism, using a word which denoted a later artifact to designate an earlier, analogous object—in much the same way the translators of the KJV use the hitech word “candle” instead of lamp.
5.I think that answers your second paragraph. However, your first paragraph seems to be broader.
i) The cherubim in 3:24 obviously foreshadow the cherubic statuary in the tabernacle.
At one level, this goes to archetypal/ectypal relation between the garden and the tabernacle.
The garden is sacred space. Indeed, it’s the archetype of the inner sanctum.
The garden has its ectypal analogue in the tabernacle.
We might call this a horizontal, linear, or temporal analogy. Not merely archetypal, but prototypal.
In addition, you have a concentric form of ritual purity. Israel is holy in relation to the nations. The tabernacle is holy in relation to Israel. The inner sanctum is holy in relation to the tabernacle.
Likewise, Eden was holy in relation to the wilderness outside the garden.
ii) At another level, there’s an archetypal/ectypal relation between heaven and earth. Heaven is sacred space. The garden is a microscopic ectype of the macroscopic archetype.
We might call this a vertical or spatial analogy. This is synchronic rather than diachronic.
If you’ve been following my exchange with Loftus on cultic cosmology and the triple-decker universe, you’ll be aware of the argument, as well as some of the supporting literature.
Here are a couple of additional articles:
W. Vogels, “The Cultic & Civil Calendars of the Fourth Day of Creation (Gen 1,14b),” SJOT 11 (1997): 163-80.
G. Wenham, “Sanctuary Symbolism in the Garden of Eden Story,” Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies (Jerusalem), 1986), 19-24.
iii) Beyond the Pentateuch is the cultic imagery of Ezekiel, with its many allusions to Eden and the Mosaic cultus. And that, in turn, foreshadows the Apocalypse.
In tracing out these typical motifs, Bock and Duguid would be good commentators on Ezekiel, while Beale and Smalley would be good commentators on Revelation.
6.On the relation between the figural and/or literal dimensions:
i) Something can be:
a) Either literal, but not figural.
b) Figural, but not literal.
c) Both literal and figural.
I assume that (a) is self-explanatory.
An example of (b) would be Heb 12. This is a literary construct rather than a literal depiction of heaven.
The whole notion of ritually pure or impure objects in the Mosaic cultus would be an example of (c). The land, the temple, and the furnishings thereof, are both actual objects as well as significant objects.
7.Finally, we have many heavenly visions in Scripture. Are these literal or figural?
The question is ambiguous.
i) They are literal visions in the sense that the seer was the actual recipient of visionary revelation.
ii) But are they literally descriptive of what heaven is like?
a) Here we need to draw some distinction between the raw vision and the literary record of the vision.
b) That said, we also need to ask what heaven is?
What heaven is (ontology), and what heaven is like (perception) are interrelated.
To the extent that we identify heaven with the intermediate state, which is a discarnate state, you might say that appearance is reality: esse is percipi.
Heaven is like a collective dream, along the lines of Berkeley’s objective idealism.
God assumes the role of the oneiropompist who sends the celestrial dreams to the sainted believer, who assumes the role of the oneiropolist or dreamer.
So heaven may be very similar to the heavenly visions in Scripture, only more varied and extensive than these isolated glimpses behind the veil.
In addition, they include auditions as well as visions, and other sensory simulations.
The audiovisual images, generated by God, and transmitted to the soul of the sainted believer, are drawn from the sensible world, then redeployed to simulate and signify what would otherwise be the supersensible realities of the spiritual realm. That is how heaven is experienced by the saints in glory.
The earthly ectype is prior to the heavenly archetype in the order of knowing, but posterior in the order of being.
Talking animals
***QUOTE***
John W. Loftus said:
My brief comments on the debate can be found here.
You see, it doesn't do presuppositionalists any good to say atheists don't have an objective standard for moral truth when we question whether that which they presuppose has any better objective standard for knowledge and truth. What Barker's analogy was getting at was the Euthyphro dilemma And the Euthyphro dilemma puts an end to this presuppositionalist nonsense. So I say to presuppositionalists, solve that dilemma before we go any further.
***END-QUOTE***
There are a couple of basic problems with this objection:
1.Loftus acts as if Christians had either never even heard of the Euthyphro dilemma before, or if they had, are speechless to deal with it.
But many of us are familiar with the dilemma, and we’ve already addressed it. I addressed it a long time ago in my critique of Bertrand Russell, and Frame has also engaged that objection.
http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/1993Euthyphro.htm
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2004/04/why-im-not-bertrand-russell.html
2.Even if the Euthyphro dilemma were unanswerable, that would not be an argument for secular ethics, but only an argument against Christian ethics.
Stalemate—not checkmate for the unbeliever.
Continuing with Loftus:
***QUOTE***
I also thought Barker did a fine job when he asked why Manata believes a snake talked. Barker suggested that the principle of induction stands as overwhelming evidence against the story told in Genesis 3, as well as other Biblical claims. For none of us have experienced a snake that really talks. The only reason Manata believes a snake talked was because "someone told a story." Manata uses that "story" to count as evidence against all of our inductive conclusions about snakes, rather than letteing his own inductive conclusions about snakes to count as evidence against the reliability of the story in Genesis 3, and that's just strange and muddled thinking. Does Manata believe any similar "stories" told today just because someone tells them? Barker told a story with tongue-in-cheek about a cat that spoke Spanish to him. Such a story goes against what the principle of induction tells us can happen, and so Manata inconsistently said he didn't believe it. Of course he doesn't. But he won't apply that same clear thinking to the story about a snake that talked. Snakes do not have vocal chords, nor the other things needed to talk!
***END-QUOTE***
This raises quite a few issues:
1.As I and others have pointed out, secularism is unable to ground the principle of induction.
http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/induction.html
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/cartwrig/Papers/NoGodNoLaws.pdf
http://www.frame-poythress.org/poythress_articles/2003Why.htm
Hence, it would be a simple matter for Manata to convert the Barker/Loftus objection into just so much grist for the TAG mill, this time using induction as his point of departure.
2.Barker/Loftus also act as if the absence of evidence were positive evidence against the existence of something. But that’s a non-sequitur.
Just as nonevidence isn’t evidence for anything, neither is nonevidence evidence against anything.
There are times when the argument from silence has some probative value if we have a reasonable expectation of evidence, but one must make a case for the argument from silence in any given deployment.
Both Barker and Loftus are committing what one writer dubbed “the fallacy of negative proof,” D. Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (Harper & Row 1970), 47-48.
3.Most of our knowledge of the world is based on testimony. The fact that Manata believes in the possibility of a talking snake because he read about one in a reliable source is hardly an argument against his belief in talking snakes.
4.Loftus likes to remind us that he used to be a Christian—a Christian with several seminary degrees.
When did he stumble upon the discovery that snakes lack vocal chords? Did he used to believe in Gen 3 because he didn’t know this fact about ophidian physiology?
5.Why did the author of Gen 3 believe in talking snakes? Is it because, unlike Barker or Loftus, the author had a personal experience with talking snakes?
Whatever date Loftus or Barker assign to Genesis, the author and his audience had no more experience of talking snakes than we do. So modernity is not the differential factor.
There are superstitious ancient writers as well as sceptical ancient writers; superstitions modern writers as well as sceptical modern writers.
6.Barker and Loftus apparently presume a uniform, acontextual criterion for judging the credibility of “stories.”
But they don’t explain or justify why we should apply the same abstract criterion without regard to time, place or circumstance.
For example, suppose we have several reported sightings of a Yeti rummaging through the dumpster in the back lot of the local Wal-Mart. And suppose we also have several reported sightings of a Yeti in the Himalayas.
Should we treat all these sightings as equally credible or incredible? Obviously not. The circumstances make quite a difference.
In the one case, witnesses claim to have seen a large, undiscovered animal in its natural habitat, and—what is more—a largely unexplored habitat.
In the other case, witnesses claim to have seen a large, undiscovered animal in an artificial and densely populated habitat.
Now, you may reasonably conclude that the evidence is insufficient in either case. But clearly the attendant circumstances make a difference in how we weigh the respective reports.
Likewise, if a neighbor tells me that he saw a broomstick levitate and smash into his kitchen window, then my initial reaction will be one of polite disbelief—assuming that I have nothing else to go on.
If, however, his home is reputed to be a haunted house, with a high rate of turnover because a series of former homeowners say they were drive out of the house by the same paranormal phenomena, then I’ll judge my neighbor’s report quite differently.
If, of course, you’re a doctrinaire unbeliever like Loftus or Barker, then no amount of eyewitness testimony would ever shake your dogmatic scepticism.
7.Likewise, Gen 3 isn’t describing an every-day event. Rather, the account is situated in a set of circumstances which no longer exist. In a garden specially prepared by God for the first human couple. In a garden populated by animals specially created by God. In a time and place before the Fall. Before the Flood.
Loftus and Barker would, of course, reject the preternatural underpinnings of the “story.”
But we need to judge the “story” by its narrative outlook, and not deem the “story” to be false by straining it through an extraneous filtering device like atheism or materialism. That’s an exercise in prejudice. The narrative was never meant to make sense from a secular viewpoint.
8.We also need to discuss the identity of the serpent. What are the exegetical options?
i) The serpent could be an articulate, intelligent creature, just like human beings are articulate, intelligent creatures.
The fact that you and I have never encountered a talking snake is due to the curse (3:14). We’re on the wrong side of history.
On this interpretation, Loftus and Barker are guilty of an anachronistic reading of the text.
ii) The serpent could be a fallen angel. It is called a “snake” because the Hebrew word is a pun. As one commentator explains:
“A more directly sinister nuance may be seen in Heb. Nahas if it is to be connected with the verb nahas, ‘to practice divination, observe signs’ (Gen 30:27; 44:5,15; Lev 19:26; Deut 18:10). This verb appears eleven times in the OT, always in the Piel. The related noun nahas means ‘divination’ (Num 23:23; 24:1),” V. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, 1:187.
a) This interpretation is attractive in several respects. It’s consonant with Pentateuchal usage. It resonates with certain intertextual motifs.
b) It has the irony of an accursed creature which is the source of our primal parents’ accursed state. It brings a curse upon Adam and Eve.
c) Note the parallel with the Balaam cycle, in which the false prophet attempts to hex Israel. Note Israel’s lapse into apostasy, like Adam and Eve before her.
If a reptile were in view we’d expect it to be classified with the creepy crawlers rather than the beasts of the field.
d) The syntax of 3:1 is ambiguous: it could either be partitive or comparative. If partitive, then the serpent is set in contrast to the animal kingdom. Cf. EBC 1:50.
e) It fits with the complex allusions to Gen 2-3 in Ezk 28.
iii) It could be a case of metamorphosis, in which an angel assumes a reptilian form.
a) At least on one interpretation, we have other cases of metamorphosis in the Pentateuch (e.g. Gen 3:14; Exod 4:3; 7:15).
b) The Pentateuch is studded with angelophanies. Indeed, we have a couple of angelophanies in the very account of the Fall. Cf. 3:8,24.
c) Angels can assume corporeal form (Gen 18).
d) On a traditional reading, Gen 6:1-4 is alluding to fallen angels.
iv) Or it could be a case of animal possession (cf. Mt 8:30-32). Its ability to speak and reason would be due to the incubus, not the host.
9.On a related note, we might consider Num 22. Two comments are in order:
i) The donkey’s capacity for speech is specifically attributed to divine agency (v8).
ii) The scene is meant to be incongruous and highly ironic. Balaam is a professional seer who is blind to the angel while his donkey, which would ordinarily be a dumb animal, is made more clairvoyant than he!
For a fine analysis, cf. I. Duguid, Numbers: God’s Presence in the Wilderness (Crossway Books 2006), chap. 27.
For an unbeliever, all of this is worse than silly. But it’s only silly because the existence and the presence of God is not a living reality for him.
I’d add that, for a believer, naturalistic evolution is every bit as “magical” and counterintuitive as anything in the Bible.
John W. Loftus said:
My brief comments on the debate can be found here.
You see, it doesn't do presuppositionalists any good to say atheists don't have an objective standard for moral truth when we question whether that which they presuppose has any better objective standard for knowledge and truth. What Barker's analogy was getting at was the Euthyphro dilemma And the Euthyphro dilemma puts an end to this presuppositionalist nonsense. So I say to presuppositionalists, solve that dilemma before we go any further.
***END-QUOTE***
There are a couple of basic problems with this objection:
1.Loftus acts as if Christians had either never even heard of the Euthyphro dilemma before, or if they had, are speechless to deal with it.
But many of us are familiar with the dilemma, and we’ve already addressed it. I addressed it a long time ago in my critique of Bertrand Russell, and Frame has also engaged that objection.
http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/1993Euthyphro.htm
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2004/04/why-im-not-bertrand-russell.html
2.Even if the Euthyphro dilemma were unanswerable, that would not be an argument for secular ethics, but only an argument against Christian ethics.
Stalemate—not checkmate for the unbeliever.
Continuing with Loftus:
***QUOTE***
I also thought Barker did a fine job when he asked why Manata believes a snake talked. Barker suggested that the principle of induction stands as overwhelming evidence against the story told in Genesis 3, as well as other Biblical claims. For none of us have experienced a snake that really talks. The only reason Manata believes a snake talked was because "someone told a story." Manata uses that "story" to count as evidence against all of our inductive conclusions about snakes, rather than letteing his own inductive conclusions about snakes to count as evidence against the reliability of the story in Genesis 3, and that's just strange and muddled thinking. Does Manata believe any similar "stories" told today just because someone tells them? Barker told a story with tongue-in-cheek about a cat that spoke Spanish to him. Such a story goes against what the principle of induction tells us can happen, and so Manata inconsistently said he didn't believe it. Of course he doesn't. But he won't apply that same clear thinking to the story about a snake that talked. Snakes do not have vocal chords, nor the other things needed to talk!
***END-QUOTE***
This raises quite a few issues:
1.As I and others have pointed out, secularism is unable to ground the principle of induction.
http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/induction.html
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/cartwrig/Papers/NoGodNoLaws.pdf
http://www.frame-poythress.org/poythress_articles/2003Why.htm
Hence, it would be a simple matter for Manata to convert the Barker/Loftus objection into just so much grist for the TAG mill, this time using induction as his point of departure.
2.Barker/Loftus also act as if the absence of evidence were positive evidence against the existence of something. But that’s a non-sequitur.
Just as nonevidence isn’t evidence for anything, neither is nonevidence evidence against anything.
There are times when the argument from silence has some probative value if we have a reasonable expectation of evidence, but one must make a case for the argument from silence in any given deployment.
Both Barker and Loftus are committing what one writer dubbed “the fallacy of negative proof,” D. Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (Harper & Row 1970), 47-48.
3.Most of our knowledge of the world is based on testimony. The fact that Manata believes in the possibility of a talking snake because he read about one in a reliable source is hardly an argument against his belief in talking snakes.
4.Loftus likes to remind us that he used to be a Christian—a Christian with several seminary degrees.
When did he stumble upon the discovery that snakes lack vocal chords? Did he used to believe in Gen 3 because he didn’t know this fact about ophidian physiology?
5.Why did the author of Gen 3 believe in talking snakes? Is it because, unlike Barker or Loftus, the author had a personal experience with talking snakes?
Whatever date Loftus or Barker assign to Genesis, the author and his audience had no more experience of talking snakes than we do. So modernity is not the differential factor.
There are superstitious ancient writers as well as sceptical ancient writers; superstitions modern writers as well as sceptical modern writers.
6.Barker and Loftus apparently presume a uniform, acontextual criterion for judging the credibility of “stories.”
But they don’t explain or justify why we should apply the same abstract criterion without regard to time, place or circumstance.
For example, suppose we have several reported sightings of a Yeti rummaging through the dumpster in the back lot of the local Wal-Mart. And suppose we also have several reported sightings of a Yeti in the Himalayas.
Should we treat all these sightings as equally credible or incredible? Obviously not. The circumstances make quite a difference.
In the one case, witnesses claim to have seen a large, undiscovered animal in its natural habitat, and—what is more—a largely unexplored habitat.
In the other case, witnesses claim to have seen a large, undiscovered animal in an artificial and densely populated habitat.
Now, you may reasonably conclude that the evidence is insufficient in either case. But clearly the attendant circumstances make a difference in how we weigh the respective reports.
Likewise, if a neighbor tells me that he saw a broomstick levitate and smash into his kitchen window, then my initial reaction will be one of polite disbelief—assuming that I have nothing else to go on.
If, however, his home is reputed to be a haunted house, with a high rate of turnover because a series of former homeowners say they were drive out of the house by the same paranormal phenomena, then I’ll judge my neighbor’s report quite differently.
If, of course, you’re a doctrinaire unbeliever like Loftus or Barker, then no amount of eyewitness testimony would ever shake your dogmatic scepticism.
7.Likewise, Gen 3 isn’t describing an every-day event. Rather, the account is situated in a set of circumstances which no longer exist. In a garden specially prepared by God for the first human couple. In a garden populated by animals specially created by God. In a time and place before the Fall. Before the Flood.
Loftus and Barker would, of course, reject the preternatural underpinnings of the “story.”
But we need to judge the “story” by its narrative outlook, and not deem the “story” to be false by straining it through an extraneous filtering device like atheism or materialism. That’s an exercise in prejudice. The narrative was never meant to make sense from a secular viewpoint.
8.We also need to discuss the identity of the serpent. What are the exegetical options?
i) The serpent could be an articulate, intelligent creature, just like human beings are articulate, intelligent creatures.
The fact that you and I have never encountered a talking snake is due to the curse (3:14). We’re on the wrong side of history.
On this interpretation, Loftus and Barker are guilty of an anachronistic reading of the text.
ii) The serpent could be a fallen angel. It is called a “snake” because the Hebrew word is a pun. As one commentator explains:
“A more directly sinister nuance may be seen in Heb. Nahas if it is to be connected with the verb nahas, ‘to practice divination, observe signs’ (Gen 30:27; 44:5,15; Lev 19:26; Deut 18:10). This verb appears eleven times in the OT, always in the Piel. The related noun nahas means ‘divination’ (Num 23:23; 24:1),” V. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, 1:187.
a) This interpretation is attractive in several respects. It’s consonant with Pentateuchal usage. It resonates with certain intertextual motifs.
b) It has the irony of an accursed creature which is the source of our primal parents’ accursed state. It brings a curse upon Adam and Eve.
c) Note the parallel with the Balaam cycle, in which the false prophet attempts to hex Israel. Note Israel’s lapse into apostasy, like Adam and Eve before her.
If a reptile were in view we’d expect it to be classified with the creepy crawlers rather than the beasts of the field.
d) The syntax of 3:1 is ambiguous: it could either be partitive or comparative. If partitive, then the serpent is set in contrast to the animal kingdom. Cf. EBC 1:50.
e) It fits with the complex allusions to Gen 2-3 in Ezk 28.
iii) It could be a case of metamorphosis, in which an angel assumes a reptilian form.
a) At least on one interpretation, we have other cases of metamorphosis in the Pentateuch (e.g. Gen 3:14; Exod 4:3; 7:15).
b) The Pentateuch is studded with angelophanies. Indeed, we have a couple of angelophanies in the very account of the Fall. Cf. 3:8,24.
c) Angels can assume corporeal form (Gen 18).
d) On a traditional reading, Gen 6:1-4 is alluding to fallen angels.
iv) Or it could be a case of animal possession (cf. Mt 8:30-32). Its ability to speak and reason would be due to the incubus, not the host.
9.On a related note, we might consider Num 22. Two comments are in order:
i) The donkey’s capacity for speech is specifically attributed to divine agency (v8).
ii) The scene is meant to be incongruous and highly ironic. Balaam is a professional seer who is blind to the angel while his donkey, which would ordinarily be a dumb animal, is made more clairvoyant than he!
For a fine analysis, cf. I. Duguid, Numbers: God’s Presence in the Wilderness (Crossway Books 2006), chap. 27.
For an unbeliever, all of this is worse than silly. But it’s only silly because the existence and the presence of God is not a living reality for him.
I’d add that, for a believer, naturalistic evolution is every bit as “magical” and counterintuitive as anything in the Bible.
Barker's Bulldog
John Loftus stopped by the comments section of my recent post on my debate with Dan Barker. Let's look at his defense of Barker by proxy:
*****
"Paul, I think you fail to see that we're asking how you know the Bible is true and that God doesn't lie, as you so often repeat. You make this statement whenever you're asked about anything in the Bible we question. At some point your belief must touch down to earth where you can defend why you believe the Bible.
*****
1. I think you failed to see that I pointed this out in the debate. I told Barker that he had to prove the story wrong rather than *assume* that it was wrong.
2. If Barker had wanted to know how I know the story was true he should have asked me directly, no? I mean, can I say I won because he failed to tell me his Grandma's recipe for banana muffins? No, I never even asked him that. So, this may be what *you're* asking, but why use the word "we're?" Barker never asked this. His fault, not mine.
3. There's many evidences I have for why I believe the Bible is true. If you are talking about evidence that you'd accept then that would depend on your presuppositions.
4. You fail to see that Barker was trying to make an inductive argument against me. I pointed out the rules for good inductive generalizations and showed that Barker didn't follow them. These are rules even you accept, so why the complaining?
4. Apropos God's own say-so. Now, assume that the Bible is true for arguments sake. Assume that there is no higher weight that can be given to any evidence than God's own word on the matter. Indeed, since He cannot lie, knows everything, etc., then is there any higher authority that I could go to on this matter? If the above is true then why can't I invoke His word? And if I can invoke his word, well that's pretty good evidence for the talking snake.
5. To say therefore that I must give some evidence *other than* God's own say-so is to assume that His word is not the ultimate authority. But this is what's in dispute. Thus we both beg the question. The problem is that my circular argument saves philosophy, yours destroys it.
6. Anyway, listen to the debate and see why I think the Bible's true.
*****
"When we see a snake talking in the Bible and all of our experience says that snakes don't talk, that's what we're asking. To continually respond to every one of our questions about miracles in the Bible with your above response is quite simply begging the question, unless or until you can defend why you believe the Bible is God's word that is grounded in evidence. Evidence. That's what we're asking for, just as you want evidence that a cat spoke in Spanish to Dan Barker."
*****
1. You fail to see that your experience does not count here. You don't have the proper sampling. To assume that the serpent in Genesis was the same as your pet Gartner snake begs the question.
2. I don't respond to every one of your question about miracles this way. Indeed, in the debate I pointed out that Barker could not justify his use of induction, my argument was two-pronged.
3. I've further argued by pointing out the rules of inductive generalizations, showing how you violated them.
4. God's word as God's word is "grounded" in no other evidence than God's own say-so.
WCF
Ch.1
IV. The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed, and obeyed, depends not upon the testimony of any man, or Church; but wholly upon God (who is truth itself) the author thereof: and therefore it is to be received, because it is the Word of God.
5. To say that God's word must be "grounded" in evidence assumes that His word is not ultimate, the point in dispute. So we both beg questions here, I'm just epistemologically self-conscious about my question begging.
6. But I don't just dogmatically assert this. I offer arguments for my worldview, as I did in the debate. We both have an ultimate authority John, it just happens that mine does not destroy the possibility of proving things, yours does. Don't be jealous.
7. I gave you evidence that the snake spoke, i.e., God told us it happened. Don't you even see how you are discounting that as evidence. Now, I would like evidence from Barker. To appeal to *his say-so* and act surprised when I don't accept it while I accepted God's is a bit disanalagous I'd say!
8. I guess you failed to see that part where I pointed out that to have evidence for every belief ends you in an infinite regress. How do you stop the regress John?
*****
"Paul, I think you fail to see that we're asking how you know the Bible is true and that God doesn't lie, as you so often repeat. You make this statement whenever you're asked about anything in the Bible we question. At some point your belief must touch down to earth where you can defend why you believe the Bible.
*****
1. I think you failed to see that I pointed this out in the debate. I told Barker that he had to prove the story wrong rather than *assume* that it was wrong.
2. If Barker had wanted to know how I know the story was true he should have asked me directly, no? I mean, can I say I won because he failed to tell me his Grandma's recipe for banana muffins? No, I never even asked him that. So, this may be what *you're* asking, but why use the word "we're?" Barker never asked this. His fault, not mine.
3. There's many evidences I have for why I believe the Bible is true. If you are talking about evidence that you'd accept then that would depend on your presuppositions.
4. You fail to see that Barker was trying to make an inductive argument against me. I pointed out the rules for good inductive generalizations and showed that Barker didn't follow them. These are rules even you accept, so why the complaining?
4. Apropos God's own say-so. Now, assume that the Bible is true for arguments sake. Assume that there is no higher weight that can be given to any evidence than God's own word on the matter. Indeed, since He cannot lie, knows everything, etc., then is there any higher authority that I could go to on this matter? If the above is true then why can't I invoke His word? And if I can invoke his word, well that's pretty good evidence for the talking snake.
5. To say therefore that I must give some evidence *other than* God's own say-so is to assume that His word is not the ultimate authority. But this is what's in dispute. Thus we both beg the question. The problem is that my circular argument saves philosophy, yours destroys it.
6. Anyway, listen to the debate and see why I think the Bible's true.
*****
"When we see a snake talking in the Bible and all of our experience says that snakes don't talk, that's what we're asking. To continually respond to every one of our questions about miracles in the Bible with your above response is quite simply begging the question, unless or until you can defend why you believe the Bible is God's word that is grounded in evidence. Evidence. That's what we're asking for, just as you want evidence that a cat spoke in Spanish to Dan Barker."
*****
1. You fail to see that your experience does not count here. You don't have the proper sampling. To assume that the serpent in Genesis was the same as your pet Gartner snake begs the question.
2. I don't respond to every one of your question about miracles this way. Indeed, in the debate I pointed out that Barker could not justify his use of induction, my argument was two-pronged.
3. I've further argued by pointing out the rules of inductive generalizations, showing how you violated them.
4. God's word as God's word is "grounded" in no other evidence than God's own say-so.
WCF
Ch.1
IV. The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed, and obeyed, depends not upon the testimony of any man, or Church; but wholly upon God (who is truth itself) the author thereof: and therefore it is to be received, because it is the Word of God.
5. To say that God's word must be "grounded" in evidence assumes that His word is not ultimate, the point in dispute. So we both beg questions here, I'm just epistemologically self-conscious about my question begging.
6. But I don't just dogmatically assert this. I offer arguments for my worldview, as I did in the debate. We both have an ultimate authority John, it just happens that mine does not destroy the possibility of proving things, yours does. Don't be jealous.
7. I gave you evidence that the snake spoke, i.e., God told us it happened. Don't you even see how you are discounting that as evidence. Now, I would like evidence from Barker. To appeal to *his say-so* and act surprised when I don't accept it while I accepted God's is a bit disanalagous I'd say!
8. I guess you failed to see that part where I pointed out that to have evidence for every belief ends you in an infinite regress. How do you stop the regress John?
Sunday, July 16, 2006
Reflections On My Debate With Dan Barker, And The Myriad Comments Regarding It
I must say that it's been a fascinating week reading the various comments from both sides (atheist and Christian) on my debate with Dan Barker. For those who have not heard it, the debate can be downloaded from this site (3rd one down under "free downloads"). Unsurprisingly, most atheists think Barker prevailed and most Christians think I prevailed. I obviously think I faithfully defended the faith. In this entry I'll make some comments on [1] how I think the debate went and [2] the various reviews given by atheists and [3] the main points they think Barker won. We'll go in that order.
[1] Basically, I think it's simple. As far as the debate goes, and objective scoring goes, I don't feel Barker won. Here's my basic run down of how the debate went.
I opened with a sustained argument, arguing that [1] with respect to beliefs atheism was non-rational since, according to Barker, atheism is not a belief. And, [2] with respect to the other area where rationality is attributed (agent, or cognizer, rationality), Barker was agent irrational. I pointed out three internal inconsistencies in Barker's worldview and gave a brief description of how my worldview allows for basic paradigms of rationality; whereas Barker's undermines them. I also quoted Barker saying that if my worldview's presuppositions are accepted then Christianity is internally consistent.
Barker opened with an argument that atheism is rational since there is no evidence for God's existence, the Bible mentions irrational things, and he does not need to account for logic or morality because they are not "things." Barker also tried to show that the concept of God was incoherent with his FANG argument.
Then we had cross examination. During mine Barker admitted that he had a functionalist understanding of the mind, he was a conceptualist, logic did not exist, and that cosmically humans were no different than broccoli but that we subjectively assign value, which may be a wrong assignment, to humans. Barker also admitted that given our worldview God is not evil for punishing sinners.
During Barker's he tried to show that I was inconsistent for believing that a snake talked to Adam and Eve in the garden if I didn't accept his claim that a cat spoke Spanish to him. He also tried to throw me into disrepute by claiming that John Calvin had Servetus burned, and since Calvin was a Christian this means that Christianity was somehow to blame (yeah, I didn‘t think it followed either).
During my rebuttal period I gave an argument against Barker's FANG. I refuted his conceptualism as well as his functionalism. I also refuted his pragmatic justification for induction, pointing out that [a] it was not an epistemic justification and [b] even Barker's book points out that just because something works does not make it rational. I then gave a positive argument for how Christianity accounts for the three paradigms of rationality I mentioned in my opening. I pointed out that given Barker's worldview there was no survival value in thinking in terms of modalities, but given our worldview this fit perfectly. I argued that given the doctrines of providence and God's covenant keeping nature, we had a basis for inductive reasoning. I also pointed out that there are moral obligations and only persons obligate. I then pointed out that if there are universal moral obligations this is because there is a universal person. I also quickly pointed out that Barker's evidentialism had an infinite regress attached to it and if he tried to halt it by foundationalism he needed to deal with the likes of Plantinga (i.e., one's belief in foundationalism is not basic (in the classical sense) and is not inferred (by induction or deduction) from his basic beliefs (whatever those are!, Barker failed to specify) and is therefore self-referentially incoherent).
Barker's rebuttal failed to address any of my arguments. He did not mention any of the refutations of his FANG, conceptualism, functionalism, morality, and pragmatism as an epistemic defense of induction. that I leveled at him. He pointed out that, according to his subjective preference, God was a meany. He again claimed that logic was not a "thing." And, lastly, he said that if logic was dependant on God's nature that meant God could have made different laws of logic. And, he again admitted that man is no different than broccoli, in the cosmic sense.
In my closing I pointed out that I was not reifying logic. I pointed out that Barker was begging the question against metaphysical realism. I also quoted an actual example of the fallacy of reification found in Barker's book. I pointed out that he had no basis for making his moral claims, except for a subjective preference, which does not admit one to objectively condemn Hitler or God! I pointed out that God could not have made the laws of logic different (at least not in my worldview) but, given Barker's view (i.e., logic is a function of the physical brain), we could have evolved differently with different laws of logic. I then called Barker to repentance, pointing out that his philosophically shoddy worldview was a result of sin.
In Barker's closing he again failed to interact with any of my rebuttals. He just asserted, again, that logic was not a "thing." Barker then ranted about how God was a big meany and he would tell Jesus and His Father to go to hell because they were mean for creating it (I guess Barker doesn't like it when someone, cosmically, fries broccoli, because one only should boil it!). Barker ranted some more about Calvin and even claimed Calvin used the King James Version of the Holy Bible! (Not only is he ignorant of basic philosophical issues, he is ignorant of history as well.)
And that's my assessment of the debate.
[2] With respects to the various atheists take on our debate I've not seen any one analyze the debate. Most of the comments seem to refer to me as an idiot and just assert that Barker owned me. The few comments they do make, which have substance to them, will be dealt with below. Many claim that I sounded angry. I've not had one Christian tell me that I did sound that way, though. My wife, friends, and various pastors have said I sounded fine. Also, some atheists have claimed that I was unprofessional in that I went over my time limit. Actually, I never did once, but Barker did on every one of his segments (save his opening)! The only time the moderator had to tell me to stop talking was during the Q and A session. The problem here is that there was never a specified time limit and he had told me via email to keep talking until he felt I talked long enough.
[3] Basically, the main areas of contention in my performance was my supposed reification fallacy, and my belief in a talking snake. I'll deal with these in turn.
Reification: I dealt with that here: Fallacy of Reification.
Talking Snakes and Induction: To even comment on this shows me the level of philosophical sophistication the internet atheists (and Barker) are playing at. Basically the argument goes like this:
You're irrational for believing that a snake talked to Adam and Eve. Induction tells us this can't happen. If you only believe in talking snakes because a book told you so then what about if I say a cat talked to me? If you reject that a cat talked to me, you should also reject that a snake talked to Adam and Eve.
That's the basic gist of the argument. Some brief comments should serve to put it to bed.
1. I believe the biblical account. If true, this refutes the inductive generalization. Therefore, one must undermine the biblical account *before* one claims it can't be correct.
2. To just dismiss the biblical account is called begging the question.
3. Induction does not tell us what is impossible.
4. To put Barker's say-so and the Bible's (as God's word) say-so on the *same level* begs the question. It does not follow that because I don't believe Barker I must also not believe the Bible, especially given my other beliefs.
5. How am I irrational for believing this story in the Bible? Given my worldview I believe that this is God's word and He does not lie. Taking something on the authority of someone who never lies is not irrational. Thus the argument assumes that God is not the ultimate authority and the Bible is not His word, which begs the question against my worldview.
6. Even if I did accept a talking cat, how's that a problem for my worldview? I see how it fails to prove me irrational. Even an evolutionist should have no problem admitting that through mutations we can get talking cats.
7. Parrots talk.
8. In "The Art of Reasoning," atheist David Kelly makes claims about what constitutes a good inductive argument (457-460):
[a] To form an inductive generalization the sample should be sufficiently numerous and various.
[b] We should look for disconfirming as well as confirming instances of a generalization.
[c] We should consider whether a link between S and P is plausible in light of other knowledge we posses.
So the problems here with Barker's argument are numerous.
i. This is an account of what happened pre-fall. All his samples are post-fall samples.
ii. Satan used the snake, Barker has only sampled "non-possessed" snakes.
iii. As T-blogger Jason Engwer has pointed out, many commentaries argue that what was called a serpent before the fall became the creature that we call a "snake" today. Hence the objection assumes that what we call a "snake" today was the creature before the fall.
iv. The Bible, as disconfirming evidence, was dismissed *out of hand* as wrong simply because *it was* disconfirming evidence!
v. Given points 1-4, this affects [c]. Given knowledge about the world if theism is true, a talking snake is no problem. Only if this is dismissed, a priori, do we have a problem.
vi. Thus as I claimed in the debate Barker simply begged the question.
So in closing I fail to see how Barker proved my worldview was irrational at all. Granted he came in *assuming* that is was irrational, given the falsity of theism, but that's uninteresting. Given theism, atheism is irrational. Basically all that happened is that Barker claimed he disagreed with my worldview. But, we already knew that! So why did he bother to show up? Other than that, not answering *any* of my arguments and rebuttals does not constitute winning a debate in any book I know of. Claiming that Christianity is morally bankrupt, while simultaneously admitting that your moral foundation is your subjective opinion, does not constitute winning a debate. Assuming nominalism, does not constitute winning a debate. So, regardless of whether you agree with my position or not, I think any sensible person will agree that Christian theism came out on top Monday night. If you disagree with me, know that on Barker’s worldview, cosmically, we’re just two vegetables who’ve happened to grow differently, and that’s it. But, hey, the debate is public and available for all to hear and form your own opinions.
[1] Basically, I think it's simple. As far as the debate goes, and objective scoring goes, I don't feel Barker won. Here's my basic run down of how the debate went.
I opened with a sustained argument, arguing that [1] with respect to beliefs atheism was non-rational since, according to Barker, atheism is not a belief. And, [2] with respect to the other area where rationality is attributed (agent, or cognizer, rationality), Barker was agent irrational. I pointed out three internal inconsistencies in Barker's worldview and gave a brief description of how my worldview allows for basic paradigms of rationality; whereas Barker's undermines them. I also quoted Barker saying that if my worldview's presuppositions are accepted then Christianity is internally consistent.
Barker opened with an argument that atheism is rational since there is no evidence for God's existence, the Bible mentions irrational things, and he does not need to account for logic or morality because they are not "things." Barker also tried to show that the concept of God was incoherent with his FANG argument.
Then we had cross examination. During mine Barker admitted that he had a functionalist understanding of the mind, he was a conceptualist, logic did not exist, and that cosmically humans were no different than broccoli but that we subjectively assign value, which may be a wrong assignment, to humans. Barker also admitted that given our worldview God is not evil for punishing sinners.
During Barker's he tried to show that I was inconsistent for believing that a snake talked to Adam and Eve in the garden if I didn't accept his claim that a cat spoke Spanish to him. He also tried to throw me into disrepute by claiming that John Calvin had Servetus burned, and since Calvin was a Christian this means that Christianity was somehow to blame (yeah, I didn‘t think it followed either).
During my rebuttal period I gave an argument against Barker's FANG. I refuted his conceptualism as well as his functionalism. I also refuted his pragmatic justification for induction, pointing out that [a] it was not an epistemic justification and [b] even Barker's book points out that just because something works does not make it rational. I then gave a positive argument for how Christianity accounts for the three paradigms of rationality I mentioned in my opening. I pointed out that given Barker's worldview there was no survival value in thinking in terms of modalities, but given our worldview this fit perfectly. I argued that given the doctrines of providence and God's covenant keeping nature, we had a basis for inductive reasoning. I also pointed out that there are moral obligations and only persons obligate. I then pointed out that if there are universal moral obligations this is because there is a universal person. I also quickly pointed out that Barker's evidentialism had an infinite regress attached to it and if he tried to halt it by foundationalism he needed to deal with the likes of Plantinga (i.e., one's belief in foundationalism is not basic (in the classical sense) and is not inferred (by induction or deduction) from his basic beliefs (whatever those are!, Barker failed to specify) and is therefore self-referentially incoherent).
Barker's rebuttal failed to address any of my arguments. He did not mention any of the refutations of his FANG, conceptualism, functionalism, morality, and pragmatism as an epistemic defense of induction. that I leveled at him. He pointed out that, according to his subjective preference, God was a meany. He again claimed that logic was not a "thing." And, lastly, he said that if logic was dependant on God's nature that meant God could have made different laws of logic. And, he again admitted that man is no different than broccoli, in the cosmic sense.
In my closing I pointed out that I was not reifying logic. I pointed out that Barker was begging the question against metaphysical realism. I also quoted an actual example of the fallacy of reification found in Barker's book. I pointed out that he had no basis for making his moral claims, except for a subjective preference, which does not admit one to objectively condemn Hitler or God! I pointed out that God could not have made the laws of logic different (at least not in my worldview) but, given Barker's view (i.e., logic is a function of the physical brain), we could have evolved differently with different laws of logic. I then called Barker to repentance, pointing out that his philosophically shoddy worldview was a result of sin.
In Barker's closing he again failed to interact with any of my rebuttals. He just asserted, again, that logic was not a "thing." Barker then ranted about how God was a big meany and he would tell Jesus and His Father to go to hell because they were mean for creating it (I guess Barker doesn't like it when someone, cosmically, fries broccoli, because one only should boil it!). Barker ranted some more about Calvin and even claimed Calvin used the King James Version of the Holy Bible! (Not only is he ignorant of basic philosophical issues, he is ignorant of history as well.)
And that's my assessment of the debate.
[2] With respects to the various atheists take on our debate I've not seen any one analyze the debate. Most of the comments seem to refer to me as an idiot and just assert that Barker owned me. The few comments they do make, which have substance to them, will be dealt with below. Many claim that I sounded angry. I've not had one Christian tell me that I did sound that way, though. My wife, friends, and various pastors have said I sounded fine. Also, some atheists have claimed that I was unprofessional in that I went over my time limit. Actually, I never did once, but Barker did on every one of his segments (save his opening)! The only time the moderator had to tell me to stop talking was during the Q and A session. The problem here is that there was never a specified time limit and he had told me via email to keep talking until he felt I talked long enough.
[3] Basically, the main areas of contention in my performance was my supposed reification fallacy, and my belief in a talking snake. I'll deal with these in turn.
Reification: I dealt with that here: Fallacy of Reification.
Talking Snakes and Induction: To even comment on this shows me the level of philosophical sophistication the internet atheists (and Barker) are playing at. Basically the argument goes like this:
You're irrational for believing that a snake talked to Adam and Eve. Induction tells us this can't happen. If you only believe in talking snakes because a book told you so then what about if I say a cat talked to me? If you reject that a cat talked to me, you should also reject that a snake talked to Adam and Eve.
That's the basic gist of the argument. Some brief comments should serve to put it to bed.
1. I believe the biblical account. If true, this refutes the inductive generalization. Therefore, one must undermine the biblical account *before* one claims it can't be correct.
2. To just dismiss the biblical account is called begging the question.
3. Induction does not tell us what is impossible.
4. To put Barker's say-so and the Bible's (as God's word) say-so on the *same level* begs the question. It does not follow that because I don't believe Barker I must also not believe the Bible, especially given my other beliefs.
5. How am I irrational for believing this story in the Bible? Given my worldview I believe that this is God's word and He does not lie. Taking something on the authority of someone who never lies is not irrational. Thus the argument assumes that God is not the ultimate authority and the Bible is not His word, which begs the question against my worldview.
6. Even if I did accept a talking cat, how's that a problem for my worldview? I see how it fails to prove me irrational. Even an evolutionist should have no problem admitting that through mutations we can get talking cats.
7. Parrots talk.
8. In "The Art of Reasoning," atheist David Kelly makes claims about what constitutes a good inductive argument (457-460):
[a] To form an inductive generalization the sample should be sufficiently numerous and various.
[b] We should look for disconfirming as well as confirming instances of a generalization.
[c] We should consider whether a link between S and P is plausible in light of other knowledge we posses.
So the problems here with Barker's argument are numerous.
i. This is an account of what happened pre-fall. All his samples are post-fall samples.
ii. Satan used the snake, Barker has only sampled "non-possessed" snakes.
iii. As T-blogger Jason Engwer has pointed out, many commentaries argue that what was called a serpent before the fall became the creature that we call a "snake" today. Hence the objection assumes that what we call a "snake" today was the creature before the fall.
iv. The Bible, as disconfirming evidence, was dismissed *out of hand* as wrong simply because *it was* disconfirming evidence!
v. Given points 1-4, this affects [c]. Given knowledge about the world if theism is true, a talking snake is no problem. Only if this is dismissed, a priori, do we have a problem.
vi. Thus as I claimed in the debate Barker simply begged the question.
So in closing I fail to see how Barker proved my worldview was irrational at all. Granted he came in *assuming* that is was irrational, given the falsity of theism, but that's uninteresting. Given theism, atheism is irrational. Basically all that happened is that Barker claimed he disagreed with my worldview. But, we already knew that! So why did he bother to show up? Other than that, not answering *any* of my arguments and rebuttals does not constitute winning a debate in any book I know of. Claiming that Christianity is morally bankrupt, while simultaneously admitting that your moral foundation is your subjective opinion, does not constitute winning a debate. Assuming nominalism, does not constitute winning a debate. So, regardless of whether you agree with my position or not, I think any sensible person will agree that Christian theism came out on top Monday night. If you disagree with me, know that on Barker’s worldview, cosmically, we’re just two vegetables who’ve happened to grow differently, and that’s it. But, hey, the debate is public and available for all to hear and form your own opinions.
Vital stats
John W. Loftus
John majored in the "Philosophy of Religion" under Dr. William Lane Craig at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, and graduated with a Th.M. in 1985. John's book Why I Rejected Christianity: A Former Apologist Explains is now available. (You can also purchase it here through me in the New & Used link). John is the Debunking Christianity Blog creator.
**************************************************************************
Dr. William Lane Craig
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND
Wheaton College—B. A. Communications, 1971; high honors
Trinity Evangelical Divinity School—M. A. Philosophy of Religion, 1975; summa cum laude
Trinity Evangelical Divinity School—M. A. Church History, 1975; summa cum laude
University of Birmingham, England—Ph.D. Philosophy, 1977
Universität München, Germany—D. Theol. Theology, 1984
HONORS
Scholastic Honor Society—Wheaton College, 1971
Academic Achievement Award—Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1975
Research Grant—Andersen Foundation, 1975-77
Research Fellowship—Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, 1978-80
Best Articles of 1988— Philosopher's Annual II, 1988
McManis Lectureship—Wheaton College, 1994
Geneva Lecture Series—University of Iowa, 1994
Exemplary Papers Award—Templeton Foundation, 1995
Paley Lectures—University of Western Ontario, 1995
Easterwood Lecture—Southern Methodist Universit,y 1996
Carver-Barnes Lectures, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1996
Strauss Lectures—Lincoln Christian College and Seminary, 1996
Easterwood Lecture—Southern Methodist University, 1996
Carver-Barnes Lectures—Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1996
Strauss Lectures—Lincoln Christian College and Seminary, 1996
Exemplary Papers Award—Templeton Foundation, 1996
Exemplary Papers Award—Templeton Foundation, 1997
Ryan Lectures—Asbury College and Seminary, 1999
Templeton Lecture—Montana State University, 1999
Templeton Lecture—Malone College, 2000
Staley Lectures—Crown College, 2000
Saucy Lectures—Talbot School of Theology, 2001
Nelson Lectures—Samford University, 2001
Bonchek Series—Franklin and Marshall College, 2001
Physics and the God of Abraham—Gonzaga University, 2003
Lee Lectures—Louisiana State University, 2003
Weyerhauser Debate Series—University of Hawaii, 2003
Templeton Lecture—University of Colorado, 2004
Templeton Lecture—University of California, Santa Barbara, 2004
Stobb Lectures—Calvin College and Seminary, 2004
D. Litt.—Bethel College, 2005
PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES
American Philosophical Association (1977-)
American Academy of Religion (1978-)
Society of Biblical Literature (1978-)
Society of Christian Philosophers (1979-)
Executive Committee (1997-2000)
Evangelical Theological Society (1983-)
Evangelical Philosophical Society (1983-)
Vice President (1995-96)
President (1996-2005)
Science and Religion Forum (1990-)
Philosophy of Time Society (1992-)
President (1999-)
CAREER EXPERIENCE
Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Religion, 1980-1986, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School
Associate Professor of Religious Studies, 1986-1987, Westmont College
Visiting Researcher, 1987-1994, Université Catholique de Louvain
Research Professor of Philosophy, 1996- , Talbot School of Theology
Visiting Professor of Philosophy, 2003- , Wheaton College
************************************************************
From Minister to Honest Doubter: Why I Changed My Mind
by John W. Loftus
Amazon.com Sales Rank:
Yesterday: #243,970 in Books
Why I Rejected Christianity: A Former Apologist Explains
by John W. Loftus
Amazon.com Sales Rank:
Yesterday: #337,347 in Books
************************************************************
Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics
by William Lane Craig
Amazon.com Sales Rank:
Yesterday: #29,943 in Books
Hard Questions, Real Answers
by William Lane Craig
Amazon.com Sales Rank:
Yesterday: #38,520 in Books
John majored in the "Philosophy of Religion" under Dr. William Lane Craig at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, and graduated with a Th.M. in 1985. John's book Why I Rejected Christianity: A Former Apologist Explains is now available. (You can also purchase it here through me in the New & Used link). John is the Debunking Christianity Blog creator.
**************************************************************************
Dr. William Lane Craig
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND
Wheaton College—B. A. Communications, 1971; high honors
Trinity Evangelical Divinity School—M. A. Philosophy of Religion, 1975; summa cum laude
Trinity Evangelical Divinity School—M. A. Church History, 1975; summa cum laude
University of Birmingham, England—Ph.D. Philosophy, 1977
Universität München, Germany—D. Theol. Theology, 1984
HONORS
Scholastic Honor Society—Wheaton College, 1971
Academic Achievement Award—Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1975
Research Grant—Andersen Foundation, 1975-77
Research Fellowship—Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, 1978-80
Best Articles of 1988— Philosopher's Annual II, 1988
McManis Lectureship—Wheaton College, 1994
Geneva Lecture Series—University of Iowa, 1994
Exemplary Papers Award—Templeton Foundation, 1995
Paley Lectures—University of Western Ontario, 1995
Easterwood Lecture—Southern Methodist Universit,y 1996
Carver-Barnes Lectures, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1996
Strauss Lectures—Lincoln Christian College and Seminary, 1996
Easterwood Lecture—Southern Methodist University, 1996
Carver-Barnes Lectures—Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1996
Strauss Lectures—Lincoln Christian College and Seminary, 1996
Exemplary Papers Award—Templeton Foundation, 1996
Exemplary Papers Award—Templeton Foundation, 1997
Ryan Lectures—Asbury College and Seminary, 1999
Templeton Lecture—Montana State University, 1999
Templeton Lecture—Malone College, 2000
Staley Lectures—Crown College, 2000
Saucy Lectures—Talbot School of Theology, 2001
Nelson Lectures—Samford University, 2001
Bonchek Series—Franklin and Marshall College, 2001
Physics and the God of Abraham—Gonzaga University, 2003
Lee Lectures—Louisiana State University, 2003
Weyerhauser Debate Series—University of Hawaii, 2003
Templeton Lecture—University of Colorado, 2004
Templeton Lecture—University of California, Santa Barbara, 2004
Stobb Lectures—Calvin College and Seminary, 2004
D. Litt.—Bethel College, 2005
PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES
American Philosophical Association (1977-)
American Academy of Religion (1978-)
Society of Biblical Literature (1978-)
Society of Christian Philosophers (1979-)
Executive Committee (1997-2000)
Evangelical Theological Society (1983-)
Evangelical Philosophical Society (1983-)
Vice President (1995-96)
President (1996-2005)
Science and Religion Forum (1990-)
Philosophy of Time Society (1992-)
President (1999-)
CAREER EXPERIENCE
Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Religion, 1980-1986, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School
Associate Professor of Religious Studies, 1986-1987, Westmont College
Visiting Researcher, 1987-1994, Université Catholique de Louvain
Research Professor of Philosophy, 1996- , Talbot School of Theology
Visiting Professor of Philosophy, 2003- , Wheaton College
************************************************************
From Minister to Honest Doubter: Why I Changed My Mind
by John W. Loftus
Amazon.com Sales Rank:
Yesterday: #243,970 in Books
Why I Rejected Christianity: A Former Apologist Explains
by John W. Loftus
Amazon.com Sales Rank:
Yesterday: #337,347 in Books
************************************************************
Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics
by William Lane Craig
Amazon.com Sales Rank:
Yesterday: #29,943 in Books
Hard Questions, Real Answers
by William Lane Craig
Amazon.com Sales Rank:
Yesterday: #38,520 in Books
Asking and receiving
Nowadays, unbelievers who attack the Bible don’t even need to read the Bible for themselves—much less consult a standard commentary.
Rather, they can simply mouse over to The Sceptics Annotated Bible, click on a particular book or chapter of the Bible, pan down the right-hand column, and have objections spoon fed to them. Here’s one example:
***QUOTE***
[Mt](7:7-8) "Ask, and it shall be given you."
Mark Twain said there are "upwards of a thousand lies" in the Bible. But this is probably the biggest. How many desperate, frightened, broken-hearted parents have watched their children die while begging God to help?
http://www.skepticsannotatedbible.com/mt/7.html
***END-QUOTE***
Ever heard this sort of thing before? Sound familiar?
It bears an uncanny resemblance to George’s belabored version of the problem of evil.
Needless to say, the SAB is not a scholarly resource. Mark Twain was not a Bible scholar.
But Twain was very quotable.
The SAB is not designed to interpret the Bible according to the grammatico-historical method.
Rather, the purpose of the SAB is to seize on isolated versions and attack then with punchy one-liners.
So what about the relationship between faith and prayer?
Mt 7:7-8 is not a self-standing passage. For one thing, it’s part of a larger pericope—7:7-12.
In the pericope of which it’s a part, a distinction is drawn between giving good gifts and bad gifts.
If a child of God were to ask his Father for something harmful, like a venomous snake, God would not honor such a request.
In addition, 7:7-8 is part of the Sermon on the Mount. It forms a literary unit.
And it is, among other things, preceded by the Lord’s Prayer. In the Lord’s Prayer, our petitions are prefaced by our acknowledgement of God’s will and submission to his will (6:7-8).
So it was never meant to be a blank check.
Conditionality is also in view in other passages of the same type, such as Jn 14:13-14 or 1 Jn 5:14. Craig Keener has devoted several judicious pages to prayer in Jesus’ name. Cf. The Gospel of John (Hendrickson 2003), 2:447-50.
Even if no restriction were stated, the promises of Scripture inhere within a Biblical value-system.
Mt 7:7-8 doesn’t mean that we can reasonably call upon God to annihilate himself, or strike down our parents with a thunder bolt, or give us our own personal harem.
Jewish readers would understand perfectly well without being told that Mt 7:7-8 is not intended to chain God to our every whim, like a genie in a bottle.
Rather, they can simply mouse over to The Sceptics Annotated Bible, click on a particular book or chapter of the Bible, pan down the right-hand column, and have objections spoon fed to them. Here’s one example:
***QUOTE***
[Mt](7:7-8) "Ask, and it shall be given you."
Mark Twain said there are "upwards of a thousand lies" in the Bible. But this is probably the biggest. How many desperate, frightened, broken-hearted parents have watched their children die while begging God to help?
http://www.skepticsannotatedbible.com/mt/7.html
***END-QUOTE***
Ever heard this sort of thing before? Sound familiar?
It bears an uncanny resemblance to George’s belabored version of the problem of evil.
Needless to say, the SAB is not a scholarly resource. Mark Twain was not a Bible scholar.
But Twain was very quotable.
The SAB is not designed to interpret the Bible according to the grammatico-historical method.
Rather, the purpose of the SAB is to seize on isolated versions and attack then with punchy one-liners.
So what about the relationship between faith and prayer?
Mt 7:7-8 is not a self-standing passage. For one thing, it’s part of a larger pericope—7:7-12.
In the pericope of which it’s a part, a distinction is drawn between giving good gifts and bad gifts.
If a child of God were to ask his Father for something harmful, like a venomous snake, God would not honor such a request.
In addition, 7:7-8 is part of the Sermon on the Mount. It forms a literary unit.
And it is, among other things, preceded by the Lord’s Prayer. In the Lord’s Prayer, our petitions are prefaced by our acknowledgement of God’s will and submission to his will (6:7-8).
So it was never meant to be a blank check.
Conditionality is also in view in other passages of the same type, such as Jn 14:13-14 or 1 Jn 5:14. Craig Keener has devoted several judicious pages to prayer in Jesus’ name. Cf. The Gospel of John (Hendrickson 2003), 2:447-50.
Even if no restriction were stated, the promises of Scripture inhere within a Biblical value-system.
Mt 7:7-8 doesn’t mean that we can reasonably call upon God to annihilate himself, or strike down our parents with a thunder bolt, or give us our own personal harem.
Jewish readers would understand perfectly well without being told that Mt 7:7-8 is not intended to chain God to our every whim, like a genie in a bottle.
Can't we all just get along?
***QUOTE***
Daniel Morgan said:
Can't we all just get along...
Oh, wait, if we believe in a "god-ordained" antithesis, then I guess not.
I'm up here in Buffalo NY at the CFI Student Leadership Conference on secular humanism. It's kind of funny in how I felt in reading over this thread, and the comments, and having gone to meetings today where we discussed the need to be polite and respectful and even try to connect with those who disagree with us (esp Campus Crusade), to get the issues out before people.
We want more people to hear dissenting and alternative explanations to the worldview of traditional Western theism. Calling them names, and belittling their intellect, is not the best way to get them to seriously dialogue. It's just funny that as a bunch of "godless heathens" up here in Buffalo, we aren't talking about "answering the fools according to their folly" with respect to theists.
***END-QUOTE***
Why are christians stupid?
http://www.cfi-forums.org/viewtopic.php?t=272
The Christian, Muslim, Jew Supremacist
http://www.cfi-forums.org/viewtopic.php?t=671
"Talking with Creationists" Discussion Thread
http://www.cfi-forums.org/viewtopic.php?t=323
Daniel Morgan said:
Can't we all just get along...
Oh, wait, if we believe in a "god-ordained" antithesis, then I guess not.
I'm up here in Buffalo NY at the CFI Student Leadership Conference on secular humanism. It's kind of funny in how I felt in reading over this thread, and the comments, and having gone to meetings today where we discussed the need to be polite and respectful and even try to connect with those who disagree with us (esp Campus Crusade), to get the issues out before people.
We want more people to hear dissenting and alternative explanations to the worldview of traditional Western theism. Calling them names, and belittling their intellect, is not the best way to get them to seriously dialogue. It's just funny that as a bunch of "godless heathens" up here in Buffalo, we aren't talking about "answering the fools according to their folly" with respect to theists.
***END-QUOTE***
Why are christians stupid?
http://www.cfi-forums.org/viewtopic.php?t=272
The Christian, Muslim, Jew Supremacist
http://www.cfi-forums.org/viewtopic.php?t=671
"Talking with Creationists" Discussion Thread
http://www.cfi-forums.org/viewtopic.php?t=323
Whose values?
***QUOTE***
Daniel Morgan said:
I value science, reason, and humanistically-based ethics.
Your values include faith, divine commands, etc., (not to say you don't value what I do as well). So long as you put faith and what you believe God has told you to do before the practical and scientific realities that we all face together, as humans, it doesn't appear that we will ever make headway with one another. Your values and our values are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but prioritized in an inverse fashion to one another's.
***END-QUOTE***
1.Except for the Amish, I don’t know of any major Christian group that opposes modern science.
At most, we oppose certain theory-laden scientific constructs, viz. naturalistic evolution.
We also notice the degree to which these theories are driven by peer-pressure and the blacklisting of dissent.
In addition, there are secular philosophers of science who, to one degree or another, adopt a sceptical view of scientific theorizing.
2.The opposition of faith to reason represents only one particular strain of historical theology—not the only strain, nor the dominant strain.
Conversely, there’s the nagging question of whether naturalist evolution undermines reason.
3.There’s also the question of whether secular ethics is even tenable. Many secular philosophers adopt some brand of moral relativism.
There’s the further issue of whether a meat machine has any rights.
4.Opposing faith to practice begs the question in Danny’s favor.
Daniel Morgan said:
I value science, reason, and humanistically-based ethics.
Your values include faith, divine commands, etc., (not to say you don't value what I do as well). So long as you put faith and what you believe God has told you to do before the practical and scientific realities that we all face together, as humans, it doesn't appear that we will ever make headway with one another. Your values and our values are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but prioritized in an inverse fashion to one another's.
***END-QUOTE***
1.Except for the Amish, I don’t know of any major Christian group that opposes modern science.
At most, we oppose certain theory-laden scientific constructs, viz. naturalistic evolution.
We also notice the degree to which these theories are driven by peer-pressure and the blacklisting of dissent.
In addition, there are secular philosophers of science who, to one degree or another, adopt a sceptical view of scientific theorizing.
2.The opposition of faith to reason represents only one particular strain of historical theology—not the only strain, nor the dominant strain.
Conversely, there’s the nagging question of whether naturalist evolution undermines reason.
3.There’s also the question of whether secular ethics is even tenable. Many secular philosophers adopt some brand of moral relativism.
There’s the further issue of whether a meat machine has any rights.
4.Opposing faith to practice begs the question in Danny’s favor.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)