***QUOTE***
Daniel Morgan said:
I value science, reason, and humanistically-based ethics.
Your values include faith, divine commands, etc., (not to say you don't value what I do as well). So long as you put faith and what you believe God has told you to do before the practical and scientific realities that we all face together, as humans, it doesn't appear that we will ever make headway with one another. Your values and our values are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but prioritized in an inverse fashion to one another's.
***END-QUOTE***
1.Except for the Amish, I don’t know of any major Christian group that opposes modern science.
At most, we oppose certain theory-laden scientific constructs, viz. naturalistic evolution.
We also notice the degree to which these theories are driven by peer-pressure and the blacklisting of dissent.
In addition, there are secular philosophers of science who, to one degree or another, adopt a sceptical view of scientific theorizing.
2.The opposition of faith to reason represents only one particular strain of historical theology—not the only strain, nor the dominant strain.
Conversely, there’s the nagging question of whether naturalist evolution undermines reason.
3.There’s also the question of whether secular ethics is even tenable. Many secular philosophers adopt some brand of moral relativism.
There’s the further issue of whether a meat machine has any rights.
4.Opposing faith to practice begs the question in Danny’s favor.
I have some questions about the approach presented in 1 to 3; no doubt these have previously been discussed at length elsewhere, so apologies for going over old ground.
ReplyDelete1. I assume that calling naturalistic evolution a 'theory-laden scientific construct' distinguishes it somehow from most of the rest of science.
How is the theory of evolution different from most of the rest of science?
2. In what way does evolution undermine reason?
3. If secular ethics leads to moral relativism, how does that make it untenable? Why would a meat machine not have rights?
Ian said:
ReplyDelete“ I have some questions about the approach presented in 1 to 3; no doubt these have previously been discussed at length elsewhere, so apologies for going over old ground.”
Fine
“1. I assume that calling naturalistic evolution a 'theory-laden scientific construct' distinguishes it somehow from most of the rest of science.”
No, it doesn’t distinguish evolution from the rest of science. And it doesn’t automatically discredit evolution.
What it does mean is that there is more in play here than the scientific evidence. Rather, the theory of evolution is, in some measure, used to arrange the evidence in an evolutionary pattern. So there’s an element of circularity here.
The fossil evidence is scattered hither and yon. The fossil record is fragmentary.
So it’s not as if the Darwinian is pointing us to the raw evidence for evolution as it is actually given in the natural record. Rather, he’s giving us a historical reconstruction in which evolutionary theory is extending and arranging the evidence, with various interpolations and extrapolations.
I’m not saying that this is the only argument for (or against) evolution. But it’s the sort of thing I had in mind.
“How is the theory of evolution different from most of the rest of science?”
Different scientific theories vary in their degree of evidential confirmation and predictive power.
Many unbelievers also have a philosophical investment in evolution as an alternative paradigm to the Christian worldview. That is not true of most scientific theories.
“2. In what way does evolution undermine reason?”
There are short answers and long answers. In naturalist evolution, there’s no mind behind the process. It’s undirected. Natural selection doesn’t select for true beliefs. And high IQ is not a prerequisite for survival. Many lower animals get along just fine without a capacity for abstract reason.
For more detailed arguments on how evolution undermines reason, cf.:
http://hisdefense.org/articles/ap001.html
http://www.veritas-ucsb.org/library/plantinga/Dennett.html
http://www.homestead.com/philofreligion/files/alspaper.htm
“3. If secular ethics leads to moral relativism, how does that make it untenable?”
True, the fact that moral relativism might be a consequence of secularism does not, of itself, invalidate secularism.
However, many unbelievers subscribe to both a secular outlook and objective moral norms.
That raises the question of whether their position is coherent, and, in case of tension, in which direction would they resolve the tension?
Would they jettison secularism or morality?
“Why would a meat machine not have rights?”
There are different ways of broaching the answer.
A secularist like Dawkins will say that human beings are disposable carriers for our smart genes. That doesn’t sound like a solid foundation for human rights.
A secularist like Paul Churchland will go further and deny that human beings even have mental states like feelings or beliefs.
In that event, human beings are equivalent to zombies.
In Christian ethics, human beings have rights because they are rational and moral agents created in God’s image. They are endowed with a capacity for abstract reason which, in turn, makes moral deliberation possible.
They also have social obligations because they were designed to be social creatures.
Many unbelievers continue to embrace the conventional outcome of traditional Christian ethics even though they deny the foundation on which that outcome was originally predicated.
But if you deny the operating premise, then it may become necessary to make a radical readjustment in the conclusion.
Some comments:
ReplyDelete1. The circularity of the application and development of evolution does not distinguish it from any other theories; all theories are used in this way to make sense of evidence.
2. Thanks for these links - I'll need to read these to properly appreciate these points. However, as a preliminary, it seems that if natural selection does not select for true beliefs or high IQ, the evolution of reason could still occur: although reason is needed for both truth and intelligence, it can be present without them.
3. Surely secularists (presumably even Dawkins and Churchland?) also believe that "human beings have rights because they are rational and moral agents," and thus "endowed with a capacity for abstract reason which, in turn, makes moral deliberation possible." Doesn't this approach provide a foundation for human rights, and even for meat machine rights, for the secularist?
It is certainly true that "Many unbelievers continue to embrace the conventional outcome of traditional Christian ethics even though they deny the foundation on which that outcome was originally predicated." Yet it doesn't seem necessary to adjust those ethics (at least those relating to human affairs) in the absence of religion, because moral principles such as 'Do not kill moral agents' have no religious content.
"Ian said...
ReplyDeleteSome comments:
1. The circularity of the application and development of evolution does not distinguish it from any other theories; all theories are used in this way to make sense of evidence."
i)Okay, so where do you want to go with this?
ii)I do regard some scientific theories as more speculative than others.
iii)In any event, I'm an antirealist. I regard scientific theories as useful fictions.
"However, as a preliminary, it seems that if natural selection does not select for true beliefs or high IQ, the evolution of reason could still occur: although reason is needed for both truth and intelligence, it can be present without them."
i)To say that reason can be present without truth or intelligence is far from self-explanatory.
ii)Even if the evolution of reason could still occur, the issue remains of how we can trust a mind which is the result of a mindless process?
"3. Surely secularists (presumably even Dawkins and Churchland?) also believe that 'human beings have rights because they are rational and moral agents,' and thus 'endowed with a capacity for abstract reason which, in turn, makes moral deliberation possible.' Doesn't this approach provide a foundation for human rights, and even for meat machine rights, for the secularist?"
i)That's not all I stipulated as the basis of human rights.
ii)Given what I understand of eliminative materialism (which is a very counterintuitive thesis), I think Churchland would regard the talk of moral/rational deliberation as a relic of folk psychology.
iii)As to Dawkins, I assume he believes in human rights, but it's hard to see how he can justify his belief.
a)Why does it matter whether the human race survives by passing along its smart genes to the next generation?
b)And even if it did matter, that would only be relevant to the survival of the species, not to any particular individual thereof.
For him, the individual is just a carrier or conduit of DNA: a means to an end rather than an end in himself.
"Yet it doesn't seem necessary to adjust those ethics (at least those relating to human affairs) in the absence of religion, because moral principles such as 'Do not kill moral agents' have no religious content."
What's at issue is not the content of the prohibition, but the necessary and sufficient conditions to underwrite the prohibition.
1. The only point I was making with this line of thought was that the theory of evolution is not inferior to other scientific theories, at least not on the basis of this kind of circularity, or its status as a theory-laden construct. Your point that some scientific theories are more speculative than others seems to provide a better way of differentiating between theories.
ReplyDeleteIs your antirealism counterbalanced by some kind of reliance on God to take up the slack and turn scientific fictions into knowledge? If not, this approach seems to undemine Plantinga's comparison of theist and Darwinian reliability of cognitive faculties (see below). It also seems to weaken any criticism of eliminative materialism, given that it implies a similar criticism of notions like 'belief'. (Correct me if I'm wrong!)
2. i) The claim that reason can be present without truth or intelligence relies on a narrow conception of reason as the use of logic. As this is well away from what I take to be the main thrust of Plantinga's arguments that you cite, I won't pursue this further.
ii) The issue of trusting a mind that results from a mindless process is much closer to Plantinga's point. I won't pretend to understand his argument fully, but it does have what seem to me to be some strange features.
a) It depends partly on a comparison between the reliability of our cognitive faculties claimed by a theist as opposed to that implied by a Darwinian view. For a theist, Darwinian reliability seems inferior to theist reliability and therefore suspect, but this is only from the theist viewpoint. Given that the Darwinian suspects that the theist understanding of epistemology is an error, this comparison has no strength for the Darwinian because it seems to the Darwinian that this comparison already provides evidence that the Darwinian viewpoint is more reliable than the theist viewpoint.
b) Plantinga's determination of P(R/N&E) as the "weighted average of P(R/N&EΠ) for each
of the four possibilities Pi --weighted by the probabilities, on N&E, of those possibilities" makes sense, but doesn't appear to tell us anything about the reliability of Darwinian cognitive faculties. The strength of the Darwinian connection between beliefs and behavior cannot be assessed by weighing it down with non-Darwinian views like epiphenomenalism.
c) Plantinga's argument relies heavily on the absence of a fully developed Darwinian/naturalist theory of consciousness, intentionality, and knowledge: if there were such a theory, the reliability of our cognitive faculties would not be inscrutable, and Plantinga's argument would fail. Thus it seems fair to characterize his theory as a 'god of the gaps' theory; as such it makes room for a theist view of these matters, but has little to say about evolutionism/naturalism. Thus there is no defeater for E/N, only doubt, and there's nothing unusual about that - doubt is everywhere we look.
3. i) So what else is needed for human rights beyond their status as rational and moral agents? From a secularist viewpoint, this seems sufficient.
ii) Steve says "I think Churchland would regard the talk of moral/rational deliberation as a relic of folk psychology."
I'm not strong on this, but I don't think Churchland's scepticism about beliefs, thoughts etc as entities entails anything about rational or moral agency.
iii) Steve says "As to Dawkins, I assume he believes in human rights, but it's hard to see how he can justify his belief."
It is true that the transmission of genes between generations is no basis for human rights. However, that individuals are a means to this end entails nothing about their rational and moral agency. Dawkins can consistently argue for both.
iv) Unlike the theist, the secularist doesn't need 'necessary and sufficient conditions' to underwrite prohibitions, so the content of ethical principles IS the whole issue for the secularist when deciding the dependence of those principles on religious considerations. Why would other 'conditions' be relevant?
Hi Ian,
ReplyDeleteThe first thing I’d say is that this thread has disappeared into the archive, so I don’t expect to revisit it on a regular basis. There’s too much to keep up with.
“Is your antirealism counterbalanced by some kind of reliance on God to take up the slack and turn scientific fictions into knowledge?”
I think that divine revelation can take up the slack, although it’s unnecessary to turn scientific fictions into knowledge. In the history of science, false theories can be highly successful, viz., Newtonian physics.
“If not, this approach seems to undemine Plantinga's comparison of theist and Darwinian reliability of cognitive faculties (see below).”
It’s possible to critique evolutionary epistemology on internal grounds. Indeed, that’s the primary contention.
“It also seems to weaken any criticism of eliminative materialism, given that it implies a similar criticism of notions like 'belief'. (Correct me if I'm wrong!)”
i) It’s possible to critique eliminative materialism on internal grounds.
ii) Not all true beliefs are wedded to scientific realism or direct reality. Where consciousness is concerned, we’re dealing with immediate, self-presenting states. This is quite different than beliefs about the sensible world, viz. is grass really green? Do theoretical entities exist?
“It depends partly on a comparison between the reliability of our cognitive faculties claimed by a theist as opposed to that implied by a Darwinian view. For a theist, Darwinian reliability seems inferior to theist reliability and therefore suspect, but this is only from the theist viewpoint.”
This is not a question of which model is more reliable in terms of its success rate. Plantinga’s point is that reliability is a relative notion. Reliability is parasitic the principle of proper function, which is, in turn, parasitic on the notion of design.
“Plantinga's argument relies heavily on the absence of a fully developed Darwinian/naturalist theory of consciousness, intentionality, and knowledge: if there were such a theory, the reliability of our cognitive faculties would not be inscrutable, and Plantinga's argument would fail. Thus it seems fair to characterize his theory as a 'god of the gaps' theory; as such it makes room for a theist view of these matters, but has little to say about evolutionism/naturalism.”
The problem runs much deeper. Secular philosophers of mind like Kim, Searle, Nagel, and Chalmers regard consciousness as intrinsically irreducible. It’s not that if we just get better at mapping the microstructures of the brain we’ll hit upon a reductive strategy.
“I'm not strong on this, but I don't think Churchland's scepticism about beliefs, thoughts etc as entities entails anything about rational or moral agency.”
You can’t have moral or rational deliberation without mental states.
“It is true that the transmission of genes between generations is no basis for human rights. However, that individuals are a means to this end entails nothing about their rational and moral agency. Dawkins can consistently argue for both.”
I think you’re failing to distinguish between a faculty for moral deliberation and how one moral agent should treat another moral agent.
“Unlike the theist, the secularist doesn't need 'necessary and sufficient conditions' to underwrite prohibitions, so the content of ethical principles IS the whole issue for the secularist when deciding the dependence of those principles on religious considerations. Why would other 'conditions' be relevant?”
Since you’re obviously a bright, sophisticated guy, you can’t actually believe that prohibitions are self-validating. Surely there’s a distinction between a licit prohibition and an illicit prohibition. So what warrants the content?
Hi Steve,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your thoughts - a nice change to find some patient, polite discussion of these matters.
Just a few final comments:
1. Steve says, "This is not a question of which model is more reliable in terms of its success rate. Plantinga’s point is that reliability is a relative notion."
My point was that the comparison plays an important role in his argument, because without it, his concerns about the reliability of evolved faculties are no different to those about knowledge that have always been with us. Then Plantinga's argument is not a critique of evolutionary epistemology on internal grounds.
2. "The problem runs much deeper. Secular philosophers of mind like Kim, Searle, Nagel, and Chalmers regard consciousness as intrinsically irreducible."
While it is true that these philosophers think that the problem of understanding consciousness runs deeper, in general Darwinians do not agree. (I certainly don't.) This means that Darwinians don't have anything to fear from Plantinga's argument, they're just faced with a very hard problem, as science has often faced (and overcome).
2. "You can’t have moral or rational deliberation without mental states." I think this is a misunderstanding of eliminative materialism - if beliefs and thoughts do not exist, this does not mean that moral and rational arguments in written and spoken form do not occur, it just means that if you look inside someone's head, you won't find such entities.
3. "I think you’re failing to distinguish between a faculty for moral deliberation and how one moral agent should treat another moral agent."
No. My point was rational and moral agency provide a foundation for human rights - Dawkins need only point to the former to justify the latter; selfish genes are not relevant to such justifications.
4. "you can’t actually believe that prohibitions are self-validating. Surely there’s a distinction between a licit prohibition and an illicit prohibition. So what warrants the content?"
One approach would be to argue that rational and moral agency provide a basis for human rights. No further warrants or conditions are required.
That said, my own view is that there are no such things as rights, warrants, or necessary conditions for moral principles. Moral principles are solely based on our preferences, which we negotiate socially and politically. Of course there are principles we don't like (your 'illicit' prohibitions), and we can always offer reasons why we don't like them, but there are no refutations.