Unravelling The Universe

Ben Sinclair's Unravelling The Universe is a good YouTube channel to follow on paranormal issues. He's done interviews with some of the biggest names in the field: Bruce Greyson, Stanley Krippner, Gregory Shushan, etc. There's a lot of valuable material on a lot of subjects.

Theism As A Rival To Christianity

William Lane Craig recently concluded a podcast with the following comments:

It really surprises me, honestly, that here's a fellow who is willing to admit that the arguments for theism are stronger than the evidences for Jesus and for the resurrection! He thinks that's the weak link. Well, he's really put himself in a difficult position because if you argue for theism successfully, you're more than halfway there to getting Christianity. If you've got theism then your choices are going to be Judaism, Christianity, Islam, or maybe deism of some sort. And of those I think Christianity is clearly the most plausible. I think the arguments for the resurrection of Jesus and the historical reliability of the Gospels are such that Christianity is very defensible against this fellow’s sort of skeptical attacks. So he has really adopted a losing strategy, I think, here. You give up on theism – yield on theism – then just try to fight the remaining parapets to prevent Christianity from being established. The problem is it is going to be much, much easier to establish Christianity if you’ve already got theism in place.

It's true that Christianity is easier to argue for with theism in place. But he doesn't mention one of the major rivals to Christianity.

Is inerrancy expendable?

I'm struck by how it's becoming fashionable for some evangelical apologists to trivialize or jettison inerrancy. Let's take a comparison: consider the dispute between Calvinists and open theists. Now open theists have a number of straightforward prooftexts for their position. There's nothing subtle about their prooftexts. What they claim lies right on the surface of the text. Therein lies the appeal.

Calvinists reply in various ways. The open theist interpretation runs counter to other things the Bible says about God. In addition, it fails to take anthropomorphism into consideration–as well as the distinction between propositional and performative language.

The basis of the dispute is that Calvinism and open theism represent incompatible views of God. If Scripture is true, then both interpretations can't be true. So the question is how to harmonize these prima facie contradictory representations of God. 

If, however, Scripture is fallible, then Scripture may teach both open theism and Calvinism. Different Bible writers with inconsistent opinions of God. Or even the same Bible writer with inconsistent opinions of God, depending on his mood or situation in life.

So on that view, the Bible doesn't show us what God is really like. It only shows us what Bible writers thought God was like. It reduces biblical teaching to a collection of theological opinions. Indeed, divergent opinions. But that makes the Bible worse than useless. 

What good does it say that if Jesus rose from the dead, Christianity is true, so we can dispense with inerrancy? But if we dispense with inerrancy, then what is Christianity? If you ditch inerrancy, then Catholics, Calvinists, Arminians, open theists, and so on may all be justified in finding their theology taught somewhere in Scripture. There's nothing to harmonize. And there's no way of telling which, if any, of these disparate positions, is true or truer. When you repudiate inerrancy, that's a recipe for religious pluralism. 

Dembski on Eben Alexander's "heavenly" NDE

I'm going to discuss Dembski's analysis of Eben Alexander's reported NDE:

https://billdembski.com/theology-and-religion/faces-of-miracles-chapter-4/

This is one of the most interesting cases for all the reasons detailed in Dembski's chapter. I'll begin by laying my cards on the table, although I'm not saying anything I haven't said before:

1. I think some people encounter God, heaven, or hell during NDEs. It's the real thing. 

2. I use the Bible as a benchmark to interpret and assess NDEs. 

3. Another consideration is what they come back as. Does an unbeliever prior to the NDE come back a Christian or a New Ager? That affects whether I think this is from God.

4. I think it's undoubtedly the case that at least some children have heavenly NDEs. That's not based on any particular report, but the fact that children have immortal souls. Their minds don't pass into temporarily oblivion during brain death.

5. That said, I put no stock in reported NDEs about kids. If it was my own kid, then depending on the details, I might find his report convincing–because I'm getting it in his own words. And he's telling me what he remembers right after the event. But when it comes to books by parents, I'm highly skeptical. 

6. Some NDEs reportedly penetrate much deeper into the beyond than others. In many cases it's the tunnel of light, meeting a luminous being, and not much more. In other cases the patient claims to have seen far more. 

7. Some Christians chalk it up to the demonic. That's worthy exploring, but I'm going to pursue a different approach.

8. From what I've read, there seems to be a false dichotomy in the explanatory options. According to physicalism, NDEs are hallucinations. Figments of a delirious brain. 

It is, of course, true, that people hallucinate under certain circumstances, but that typically involves an intact, functioning brain, not a brain with no higher cortical functions or no neurological activity at all.

Veridical NDEs pose another problem for a physicalist explanation. According to physicalism, the only sources of knowledge are instinct or sensory perception. But some NDEs report seeing or overhearing things in the ER, or other rooms of the hospital, or miles away at home. But that requires ESP, which physicalism disavows. Another cliche line of evidence is the patient discovering a relative in the afterlife they didn't know existed. 

9. As a result, Christian apologists argue that these experiences can't be subjective or merely psychological. They can't originate in the brain. So they must reflect objective encounters. 

And I think that's true in however many cases. But it overlooks a third explanation. Either memory and imagination are located in the brain or else they are located in the soul. If we have an immortal, immaterial mind, then in some cases the NDE could still be "imaginary". 

That would explain the cartoonish or unorthodox "heaven" that some patients report. When higher cortical functions shut down or when there's a complete cessation of neurological activity, the mind may remain active, and what they perceive is like a dream. 

Many unbelievers have a preconception of heaven. They don't believe in heaven, but they think that's what heaven is supposed to be like if only it was real. That's "heaven" in their imagination. In this case, the "heavenly" NDE doesn't originate in the brain but the mind. Their mind already has stock imagery and characters about heaven. A generic, pop cultural notion of heaven. 

Into the cave

Religious pluralists and universalists (the distinction is cosmetic) think all roads lead to God–whatever "God" is. Is there a face behind the mask, or is it nothing but masks? 

Perhaps the standard metaphor is mountain trails. Different trails on different sides of the mountain all converge on the summit. A winsome if rather banal metaphor.

By contrast, here's a different metaphor. There's only one tunnel out of the cave. There are ever so many tunnels that entice you further into the cave. Tunnels with no outlet. Or branching tunnels. One wrong turn takes you to the next wrong turn. A network of tunnels leading nowhere. Well, not exactly nowhere. Rather, penetrating ever deeper into the cave. Putting the outside world further behind with every fateful step. A trap.  

Rauser's chicanery

I'll comment on Rauser's reply:

https://randalrauser.com/2019/01/notes-on-my-trick-question/

Two days ago I posted a short video summarizing a thought experiment that I present in my book You’re Not as Crazy as I Think, pp. 137-140. The video elicited an online rebuttal from Steve Hays of Triablogue. He begins in his first sentence by poisoning the well as he describes the thought experiment as me posing a “trick question” to serve as a “wedge tactic.”

i) It's just a fact that some people pose trick questions. Take lawyers who pose trick questions: "It's a simple question–yes or no?" Only it may be actually be complex question, and a yes or no answer is misleading. And the lawyer wants to elicit a misleading answer.

In confirmation hearings, Senators often pose trick questions to trip up a nominee. "That's not what I asked! Just answer the question!" 

Some questions don't have good answers because there's something wrong with the question, and it's necessary to reformulate the question. Rauser is smart enough to know that but he pretends not to. 

ii) Likewise, it's just a fact that some people use wedge tactics. And there's nothing necessary wrong with wedge tactics. It depends on the cause. 

Here's a recent example of Rauser's wedge tactics:

https://randalrauser.com/2018/12/would-you-kill-your-child-if-god-told-you-to/

Rauser uses that to instill disbelief in the binding of Isaac (Gen 22). 

Cartesian demons and evolutionary psychology

Responding to some questions I was asked. 

Broadly, I’m a presuppositionalist (though I make adjustments, as does everyone). 

That's intelligent. Good to be discriminating. 

Often I have read modern proponents like Anderson and Oliphint defend the essentially Christian nature of God that must be in place for knowledge to even be possible against other theisms like Islam by pointing to problems in those worldviews. For example, in Islamic sources Allah is capricious. 

That's ambiguous. In presuppositionalism, knowledge is possible without belief in God, but the justification of knowledge is impossible without the Christian God. My questioner may intend that, but was speaking laconically. 

1) Can a skeptic assert that the Christian is in no better epistemic place than a Muslim as in the Bible God allows people to be deceived (indeed sends deceiving spirits) and, in the case of Nebuchadnezzar in Daniel, robs a man of his reasoning? Can the skeptic take this further and argue the Christian is no better place than he is because just as we assert he can’t trust his reasoning faculties because they were formed by random, unthinking processes, we can’t trust our because it’s always possible we’re deceived?

i) The thought-experiment is incoherent. The appeal to biblical passages about divine deception presumes that Scripture is true and we know what it means (at least the passages under consideration). If, however, God deceives the reader, then that nullifies the appeal to biblical passages about divine deception, which the thought-experiment requires. If God deceives the reader, then he can't trust what the text appears to say about divine deception. So the argument never gets started. It can't be delusion all the way down. 

ii) Biblical passages about divine deception refer to a subset of wicked human beings rather than human beings generally. They don't refer to the epistemic situation of Christians. 

iii) The comparison is disanalogous. The allegation is not the abstract possibility that reasoning faculties formed by random thinking processes may render reason untrustworthy. Rather, that's taken to be an implication of naturalistic evolution. An actual defeater rather than a hypothetical defeater. 

2) What if someone decided that all they need is a God who is trustworthy, but not necessarily the Biblical God. I would say those attributes can’t be separated from the Biblical God, but what if they countered that perhaps Christianity is the best we have right now, but we might have a better candidate in the future?

Is a God trustworthy who hasn't revealed himself in any recognizable religion, who hides in the shadows while false religions proliferate with no corrective? 

Krishna, Christ, and Manitou

Recently, J. P. Moreland did a whirlwind presentation on near-death experiences:

https://www.facebook.com/BiolaApologetics/videos/504055120062148/

Unfortunately, the video froze up near the end. But it was an interesting overview.

A common Christian objection to NDEs is the oft-repeated claim that non-Christian NDErs interpret their purported encounter in non-Christian terms. If we think NDEs are real, that seems to be an argument for religious pluralism. 

In this course of his presentation, Moreland recommended this book:

John Burke, Heaven: Near-Death Experiences, God’s Promises, and the Exhilarating Future that Awaits You (Baker Books, 2015). And Moreland quoted this passage:

Osis and Haraldsson, two researchers, studied five hundred Americans and five hundred Indians to determine how much religious or cultural conditioning shaped one's near-death experience. They noted, "If the patient sees a radiant man clad in white who induces in him an inexplicable experience of harmony and peace, he might interpret the apparition in various ways: as an angel, Jesus, or God; or if he is a Hindu, Krishna, Shiva, or Deva."

Though I have heard researchers state conclusions like this, i have never read of NDErs describing anything like Krishna (who has blue skin), Siva (who has three eyes)... (pp141-42).

I haven't read Burke's book, and I'm dubious about using NDEs to detail heaven and hell. But it does draw an important distinction. Hindus use the names of their gods to denote what they saw, but what they (say they) saw doesn't match Hindu iconography. They're just using the religious designations culturally available to them. But to say they saw a being by that name doesn't mean they saw an individual who corresponds to the Hindu god–because the visual impression is different from the conventional designation. 

To take a comparison, suppose Jesus appeared to an Iroquois brave in the 15C. Suppose the Christophany looks like an ancient Palestinian Jews with a robe, beard, and sandals. The Iroquois brave has no word for "Jesus" or "Christ". So he might call him Manitou. That would be the only designation available to him to denote a numinous, humanoid being. 

That might convey the impression of religious pluralism if we fail to make allowance for the fact that he can only use the vocabulary and categories his culture provides. 

If, however, he provided a visual description that didn't match the traditional Iroquois iconography for Manitou, then it would be invalid to infer that he saw Manitou. Rather, he saw a being whom he calls Manitou because that's the only name he has at his disposal to denote a numinous, humanoid being. It doesn't mean his experience actually refers to Manitou. 

Perhaps, then, NDEs have less religious diversity than meets the eye. In principle, non-Christian NDErs might report meeting a heathen deity because that's their only frame of reference. But they didn't actually see a pagan god. They simply use the name of a pagan god as a placeholder. 

I'm insufficiently well-read on NDEs to know how non-Christian NDEers describe their encounters, so I don't know how applicable that distinction is. But it's something to make allowance for when assessing their reports. 

Survey of contemporary American religious beliefs

I may comment on this for later, but for now, here are the statements given to respondents, percentiles, as well as demographic breakdown:

http://lifewayresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Ligonier-State-of-Theology-2018.pdf

http://lifewayresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Ligonier-State-of-Theology-2018-White-Paper.pdf

The Negative And Subjective Side Of Near-Death Experiences

Near-death experiences (NDEs) are often cited as evidence against Christianity and other exclusivistic belief systems. Supposedly, NDEs suggest that everybody or almost everybody goes to heaven. The God of NDEs isn't the God of the Bible. And so on.

Alex Tsakiris recently interviewed Penny Sartori, a prominent NDE researcher. A lot of important points were made during the interview, and I recommend listening to the whole thing. But here are some of the highlights, followed by some comments of my own.

Is there only one way of salvation?

https://tabletalkmagazine.com/article/2017/08/is-there-only-one-way-of-salvation/

Are miracles hazardous?

I'm going to comment on this: Yujin Nagasawa, Miracles: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford 2017):

Performing miracles seems to be extremely risky. Nature is uniform and stable because it is regulated by the laws of nature. If the laws of nature did not exist, we should not breathe, sleep, or even exist. Hence, when miracle workers violate the laws of nature they may endanger living things in nature as well as nature as a whole (47). 

We saw in the Preface to this book that, according to recent polls, the majority of people in the USA and the UK today believe in miracles. We also saw in Chapter 2 that reports of miracles can always be found, irrespective of time, geographical location, or religious tradition. How could that be possible? The most straightforward answer to this question is that miracles do really take place everywhere, all the time. However, miracles should not be so prevalent. Recall our definition of a miracle: it is a violation of the laws of nature that is caused by an intentional agent and has religious significance. If miracles take place everywhere, all the time, then the laws of nature are being violated everywhere, all the time. If this is indeed so, then nature is so unstable that, it would seem, we should not be able to live normal lives. Suppose, for example, that water was frequently being turned into wine or that dead people were frequently being brought back to life. If these events took place regularly then water supply companies and funeral directors would not be able to run their businesses smoothly. However, we almost never hear them complaining about miracles taking place. If miracles do take place then they are extremely rare events. So that brings us back to square one: why is belief in miracles so widespread (51).

This objection is unintentionally comical. An example of smart people with dumb ideas. Presumably, Nagasawa is a bright, sophisticated guy, but his objection is blind on several levels:

i) He begins with an a priori definition of miracle which he then imposes on reports. That generates a discrepancy between the definition and the reports. But instead of adjusting his definition to accommodate the reports, he adjusts the reports to accommodate his definition.

ii) It's doubtful that most respondents to the surveys define a miracle the way he does. 

iii) I myself prefer to define a miracle as a type of event that won't happen when nature is allowed to run its course. 

iv) Then there's the equivocal language about "everywhere, all the time". For instance, suppose a miracle happens everyday in every town, city, and suburb across the globe. Yet the relative distribution of miracles would still be an infinitesimal fraction of all the ordinary events that transpired across the globe on any particular day. Miracles could happen every day or every hour without happening constantly in the sense of representing a sizable proportion of what happens. 

To take a comparison, suppose that every day, in every town, city, and suburb across the globe, there are people with green eyes. Yet in relation to seven billion human inhabitants, that might constitute a tiny fraction of the overall population. Widely scattered specks. By the same token, miracles might be widely distributed in time and place without being densely pervasive. 

v) Perhaps the deepest weakness of Nagasawa's analysis is the apparent, unstated assumption that by breaking a law of nature, each miracle temporarily suspends the laws of nature at a cosmic level. Every time a miracle occurs, assuming a miracle ever occurs, the laws of nature momentarily wink out all across the universe. In that case, the disruption would be cataclysmic. 

But even if we define a miracle as an event that defies the laws of nature (a dubious definition), it doesn't seem to even occur to Nagasawa that the violation can be local rather than global. The transgressive effects can be contained. 

vi) One of the problems may be that Nagasawa adopts a religiously pluralistic viewpoint (although he himself is clearly a skeptic). Within a framework of animism, polytheism, or witchcraft, a wonder-worker might not be able to control the effects of his actions. 

But from the standpoint of biblical monotheism or classical theism, miracles are coordinated with general providence. Even if a miracle requires the suspension of natural laws (a dubious definition), that doesn't mean natural laws must be inoperative everywhere to be inoperative at a particular point in time and space. Rather, the effects would be insulated. A closed system within a larger system.

To take a comparison, passengers inside an airplane are immobile (seated) or walking up and down the aisles within the passenger compartment, even though the plane may be traveling at supersonic speeds.  

Martians

I recently got into an impromptu Facebook debate with a religious pluralist. I've rearranged the comments to group related comments together:

Wayne

Were the 12 disciples reasoned into their faith?

Hays

They were eyewitnesses to the miracles of Jesus, including the Resurrection. 

Wayne

Was St. Paul?

Hays

He was converted through Jesus making a personal appearance to him. And, in addition, his own ministry was confirmed by miracles. 

Wayne 

How is this equivalent to being "reasoned into their faith" in the way that Jonathan suggests?

Hays

Among other lines of evidence, Jonathan appeals to testimonial evidence. That's an extension of firsthand observation, which we rely on that all the time, and it's often highly reliable. 

Wayne

He was knocked on flat on his (back?), struck blind, and communicated with directly by the risen Lord. How is this equivalent to being 'reasoned into his faith' in the way that Jonathan suggests?

Hays

Same answer (see above).

Wayne

It only implies inerrancy if you are desperate to find grounds for inerrancy.

Hays

So you're now admitting that your question was disingenuous. You never wanted an answer. 

Wayne

Divine inspiration more plausibly suggests infallibility with regard to a spiritual message, assuming the target audience happens to have ears to hear (i.e. an open heart in the presence of the Holy Spirit).

Hays

You're confusing the inspiration of Bible writers with the illumination or regeneration of readers. 

Wayne

If the traditional arguments that you have in mind are inductive, they cannot in principle support the absolute conclusion of 'inerrancy'.

Hays

You seem to be confusing an "absolute" position (i.e. the Bible has no errors) with absolute proof. But that's a non sequitur. 

I don't believe there are any Martians residing in subterranean cities on the red planet. That's an "absolute conclusion," inasmuch as my belief amounts to a universal negation. 

Is it a problem for my believe that my arguments for that conclusion are probabilistic rather than absolute? Do I need apodictic proof to be justified in my belief that there are no Martians hiding in underground complexes?

Wayne

And I'm saying that you can never arrive at a belief in inerrant scriptures (as regards internal consistency for over 1000 years or as applies to every claim that might seem to have a bearing on science or history) without having been coerced (through various kinds of 'group-think', usually involving threats of hell and hopes of paradise). The onus is on you to acknowledge these problems and think them through honestly.

Hays

The onus is not on me to accept the armchair narrative you foist on me. I wasn't raised in fundamentalist churches, so your narrative doesn't apply to me. That's a danger of stereotyping your opponent. 

Wayne 

Your 4 ways of 'making a case for Biblical inerrancy' can only support their general authority and reliability--and even that, typically, for someone who is culturally predisposed to accept them.

Hays

It's amusing how you continue to indulge in fact-free narratives about your opponent's assumed background. In fact, it's a revealing window into your standards of evidence, or lack thereof.

My dad was agnostic. My mother had drifted from the faith when I was growing up. I attended public school K-12. And I had a steady diet of secularized pop cultural TV fare. But don't let that stop you for concocting imaginary backstories about what Bible-believing Christians are culturally predisposed to accept. 

Wayne

How about the commonly held belief in eternal conscious torment-- for the devil and his angels AND for unrepentant human beings --how do you reconcile that idea with the idea of an all powerful, all knowing, all loving creator?

Hays

At this juncture there's nothing to reconcile inasmuch as you haven't even presented an argument for how that's supposed to be irreconcilable. Just bunching some things to gather, then positing an inconsistency, begs the question. The onus is on your to turn your objection into an argument. Then we'll have something to talk about.

Wayne

Why all the collateral damage? Are we or are we not created/chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world?

Hays

The elect, but not humanity in general.

Wayne

If so, why is it necessary that our salvation be bought at the price of the suffering of those who were not so created/chosen?

Hays

Once again, you need to flesh out your contention. In what sense do you think reprobation/double predestination entails that the salvation of the elect was "bought at the price of the suffering of those who were not so created/chosen"?

Wayne

Unless these questions are acknowledged as legitimate and then substantially addressed…

Hays

You're taking intellectual shortcuts while you demand far more from Christians. But the onus is not on Christians to rebut accusatorial questions. Accusatorial questions don't amount to rational objections. If you find something objectionable about Christianity, you assume the initial burden of proof to turn that into an actual argument. You need to give reasons for why that's supposed to be a problem for Christianity. Unless and until you put an actual argument on the table, the burden of proof is not on the Christian to rebut something for which you've provided no evidence.

Wayne

Could he not just as easily have made the choice between annihilation and eternal life?

Hays

Annihilation isn't justice, but an evasion of justice. 

Wayne

Does the end really justify the means?

Hays

Sometimes yes, sometimes no. Although any end doesn't justify any means, some ends justify some means. 

Wayne

So the damned never had a chance from the get-go. Not only were they born under the weight of original sin, they were never intended to be saved in the first place. Does that seem reasonable to you? Does that seem like the action of an all knowing, all powerful, all loving God?"

Hays

Yes it does.

This goes back to ancient and perennial debates over the necessary preconditions of moral responsibility. The compatibilist/incompatibilist debate continues to rage in contemporary philosophy, with many variations. It's not as if one side won the argument. 

What people find intuitively plausible or implausible is typically dependent on the examples used to illustrate their intuitions. Change the example, and what appears to be intuitively implausible may now seem plausible, or vice versa. We could get into the weeds of this debate. 

Wayne

If the suffering of the damned is not necessary to some higher good, that makes God a sadistic monster.

Hays

That only follows on the assumption that retributive justice is, at best, an instrumental good rather than an intrinsic good. That's an assumption you need to defend.

Wayne

If it is necessary, it limits his power.

Hays

You seem to have a simplistic grasp of omnipotence. There are things even an omnipotent agent can't do. Take second order goods. In the nature of the case, those can't be produced directly. 

Likewise, although an omnipotent agent can often bypass natural media, he can't do that constantly without destroying the nature of creaturehood. If God opts to achieve an effect through a natural medium, that limits what he can do. That's a self-imposed limitation. To work through a medium is to accept the in-built constraints of the medium. And that's the nature of mundane existence. Our mode of subsistence is creaturely. So God relates to us on our own level–or else not at all. 

Wayne

You mistake moral and intellectual clarity for accusations. I'm saying that you cannot reconcile the traditional attributes of God with the commonly held teaching of eternal conscious torment.

Hays

Yes, that's what you're saying. By saying and showing are two different things. 

Wayne

Prophesies are like horoscopes--they are vague and ambiguous--easy to read whatever meaning into.

Hays

According to you. 

Wayne

As a Christian…

Hays

Was that sarcastic? 

Wayne

I must admit that Isaiah 53 seems incredibly compelling. But to the average Jew, not so much, eh?

Hays

You mean, like the Jewish authors of the NT?

Wayne

But even as a Christian [sic], I don't find, 'I called my son out of Egypt' (Matthew quoting Hosea) at all persuasive. Do you?

Hays

A striking example of typology. And in the nature of the case, we're in a better position to appreciate the emerging pattern in retrospect. 

Wayne

Miracles fall under historicity and are often doubtful, to say the least.

Hays

Because you say so. 

Wayne

Finally, the fact that many objections have been fielded just shows the ingenuity of apologists. Many have been fielded well, to be sure, and many have not.

Hays

Because you say so. 

Wayne

Moreover, your argument is so weak that it is laughable to anyone who is seriously concerned with the question.

Hays

You're not entitled to speak on behalf of others. We didn't vote to make you the standard of comparison.

Wayne 

To deny the seriousness and legitimacy of these objections...

Hays

You're at liberty to regard your objections as "serious" and "legitimate". You are not at liberty to impose your plausibility structure on anyone else. 

Wayne

And to pressure people to believe these doctrines

Hays

We're simply pointing out what God requires of his people. 

Wayne

Poses a moral hazard (since it encourage people to deny the logical and moral implications of such teachings)

Hays

Putting aside your tendentious characterization of their "logical" and "moral" implications, it's dangerous to encourage people to deny revealed truths.

Wayne

If you wish to discuss these ideas further, you need first to demonstrate that you at least understand my objections to them.

Hays

I'm not commenting for your benefit, but for the benefit of lurkers.

Wayne

Moreover, we haven't even broached the topic of other faiths and other scriptures

Hays

Well, that's easily disposed of. Muhammad was a false prophet by his own yardstick. He told doubters to measure him by the Bible. He doesn't measure up. End of story. 

Joseph Smith was a classic con artist. The evidence is abundant.

I'd say Swedenborg was either mentally ill or demonically possessed. 

Even in principle, the Hindu scriptures can only be as inspired as the nature of divinity in Hinduism, which ranges from an impersonal concept of the divine to folk polytheism. In the former case, inspiration is impossible, and in the latter, it would amount to revelation from gods who are finite in knowledge and morally flawed. 

Buddhism ranges from atheism to folk polytheism. Same problem. 

I could continue, but that's a start. 

Wayne

And the spiritual lives of those born in other cultures before and after the common era.

Hays

Like what? Buddha deserting his wife? Vedic sages getting high on mushrooms? 

Wayne

Unless Christian apologists are willing to seriously inquire into all these questions, it is no wonder that young people can be talked out of their faith.

Hays

What Christian apologists have you read? What about Win Corduan on Eastern religion? What about D. S. Margoliouth and Michael Nazi Ali on Islam (to name a few)?

Complaints about the morality of everlasting punishment are nothing new. You think Christian apologists have ignored that? Surely you jest.

Once again, there's an scholarly literature defending the inerrancy of Scripture from various angles. It's not as if Christian "apologists" (i.e. scholars, philosophers, scientists) have neglected that issue.

Wayne

Indeed, their faith was little more than indoctrination to begin with."

Hays

You could say that for anything. You could say that for a kid raised in "progressive Christian" churches. You could say that for a kid raised in atheism.

Wayne

So doing, our faith is no longer dependent on the idea of inerrant scriptures or fear of hell

Hays

That's because your faith is an intellectual compromise that isn't consistently based on revelation or naturism. 

Wayne

Rather, we can recognize and honor the light that lights everyone who comes into the world and acknowledge, truly, that whosoever will may come and drink of the water of life freely.

Hays

As I noted before, you're ripping those passages out of context. They are set in the context of cultivating explicit faith in the historical Jesus of the Gospels.

Wayne

Most compelling, from where I stand, is the notion of the perennial philosophy which finds historical and cultural expression in various religious and philosophical traditions, including Christianity. The latter, certainly, has some historical basis, but one need not imagine that this tradition must be true in every historical detail-- or that it is the only on-ramp to the Way of Truth and Life --in order for it to be an authentic on-ramp that functions positively in the lives of individuals and communities.

Hays

A basic problem is that you're caught in the self-refuting dilemma of the religious pluralist and relativist. In order to distill a core of common truth in various religious and philosophical traditions, you must exempt yourself from the skepticism you impute individual adherents. You must simultaneously assume a God's-eye view of what reality is like while you deny that same objectivity to the benighted adherents of each and every religious and philosophical tradition. The rest of us are blind men groping different parts of the elephant, while you alone are sighted, so you can see the whole picture. 

Wayne

To invite skeptics to bracket their skepticism and look to the living Christ who is not so far from any one of us.

Hays

You offer than nothing but your own skepticism. Drowning men clinging to each other, as they sink beneath the waves.

You then engage is a classic word-study fallacy, by supposing that the concept of Biblical faith is reducible to the dictionary definition of a word.

Wayne

Instead, to the living Reality that IS Christ-in-you

Hays

Unbelievers don't have "Christ-in-them".

Wayne 

Behold I stand at the door and knock... Whosoever will may come and drink of the water of life freely...

Hays 

Think it about it. Really think. Those passages require a response. An informed response. They require historical knowledge of Jesus to respond. You desperately want these passages to mean something they clearly don't. Moreover, it's just a charade for you to prooftext your position from Scripture when you deride the verbal plenary inspiration of Scripture. You're position is riddled with glaring inconsistencies.

The Evidence For Organized Religion Can't Be Ignored

I recently listened to Alex Tsakiris' interview with Leslie Kean, a journalist who's published some books on paranormal phenomena. The books discussed during the program (one on UFOs and one on the afterlife) seem to have a lot of good material, and I've ordered both. I expect to eventually read them, but it may be a while before I get to them. What I want to do in this post is make some comments about the interview.

Kean's book on the afterlife seems to have some overlap with Patricia Pearson's book that came out in 2014, which I reviewed here. There's also some overlap with Tsakiris' interview of Pearson. I'll refer to perspectives like those held by people such as Tsakiris, Pearson, and Kean as a paranormal view of the afterlife.

The wider hope

1. Let's define exclusivism as the view that to be saved during the Christian era a mentally competent person must exercise explicit faith in Jesus prior to death. That's controversial, but it's the bedrock of Christian evangelism. 

2. According to one version of inclusivism, a person can be saved through a receptive response to general revelation. According to a related version, a person can be saved through implicit faith. 

3. Then you have mediating positions that are technically exclusivistic, but are really face-saving versions of inclusivism. For instance, the theory of postmortem salvation, where people can be saved by exercising faith in Jesus after they die. Technically, that might be classified as exclusivism, but it's functionally equivalent to inclusivism. Put another way, it's a radical modification of what exclusivism traditionally meant. In that attenuated sense, even universalism is exclusivistic. At which point the contrast between exclusivism and inclusivism becomes moot. 

4. You also have William Lane Craig's conjecture that God has arranged history so that no unreached person would be receptive to the Gospel if given the opportunity. That suffers from several problems:

i) There's no evidence that it's true.

ii) It depends on the dubious theory of middle knowledge.

iii) It conflicts with Craig's belief that: 

The hypothesis is that God has done the very best He can, given the true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which confront Him...God doesn’t create such a choice for Himself. The counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which confront Him are outside His control. He has to play with the hand He has been dealt. 

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/molinism-and-the-soteriological-problem-of-evil-once-more#ixzz4ahX0FLaH

But in that event, there's no justification for assuming that the card deck God has to work with includes a hand containing a feasible world in which no unreached person would be receptive to the Gospel if given the opportunity.

iv) By the same token, that's in competition with another one of Craig's conjectures:

Maybe His desire to achieve an optimal balance between saved and lost overrides the benefits of a world with less natural and moral evil. 

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/molinism-and-the-soteriological-problem-of-evil-once-more#ixzz4ahY17lxy

But that means God must be dealt two royal flushes in a row. He must be lucky enough to have a feasible world which combines both an optimal balance between the saved and the lost as well as where no unreached person would be receptive to the Gospel if given the opportunity. But on his own grounds, Craig has no warrant for believing that the card deck includes a feasible hand where both rosy scenarios coincide. 

5. C. S. Lewis famously said: "But the truth is God has not told us what His arrangements about the other [unreached] people are. We do know that no man can be saved except through Christ; we do not know that only those who know Him can be saved through Him.

That, of course, is very different from saying no one can be saved except through faith in Christ. 

6. There's internal pressure in freewill theism towards inclusivism because freewill theists typically subscribe to universal atonement and God's ardent desire to save everyone. But that's in tension with belief that salvation is contingent on a condition which is unavailable to many people: knowledge of the Gospel. 

Like it or not, Calvinism doesn't suffer from that internal pressure. Its commitment to exclusivism is internally consistent, given reprobation and limited atonement.  

Offhand, the only Reformed theologian I'm aware of who embraced a "wider hope" is William Shedd. He's fairly idiosyncratic. His position is likely colored by his Christian platonism. 

Let's consider some wedge issues:

7. OT saints

i) OT Jews didn't need to exercise explicit faith in Jesus to be saved. 

True, but that means the content of saving faith is indexed to progressive revelation. To whom much is given, much is required. 

ii) From the standpoint of pre-Christian Jews, there's a distinction between believing in the Messiah and believing in Jesus. They didn't know who the Messiah would be, but they knew what the Messiah would be. From our retrospective standpoint, we know that Jesus and the Messiah are one in the same person. From their prospective standpoint, they couldn't know that Jesus would be the Messiah. They didn't know about the life of Jesus. But they could still believe in the Messiah. 

It's like saying you can believe in Superman without believing in Clark Kent. If you don't know that Clark Kent is Superman, that doesn't prevent you from believing in Superman. 

To draw another distinction, you can know a role or know a character without knowing the actor who will play the role or play the character. 

iii) According to the NT, and Hebrews in particular, there was a transitional phase where, once you know who the Messiah is (Jesus), it's no longer enough just to believe in the Messiah: you must believe that Jesus is the Messiah. At that point, rejecting Jesus is tantamount to rejecting the Messiah, since Jesus is the Messiah. You can no longer separate the two. 

iv) An inclusivist might object that while there's a chronological distinction between Jews who lived before Jesus and Jews who lived after Jesus, that's analogous to a geographical distinction for gentiles who live outside the pale of the Gospel. They are in a position comparable to pre-Christian Jews. Even though they live after Jesus, they might as well be living before Jesus, because their geographical barrier is equivalent to a chronological barrier. Time and place are both buffers. 

But a problem with that comparison is that you had the same geographical distinction in OT times. Yahweh revealed himself to Israel in a way that he didn't generally reveal himself to pagan nations. And to the extent that he made himself known to pagan nations, it was in connection with Israel. Post-Christian pagans are not in a situation analogous to pre-Christian Jews. Rather, they're in the same situation as pre-Christian pagans. God generally distinguished between Jews and Gentiles, except where their lives intersected. 

8. Pagan saints

Some inclusivists classify some Biblical figures as "pagan saints": Enoch, Job, Noah, Melchizedek, Abimelech, Jethro, Naaman, the Queen of Sheba, Nebuchadnezzar, Ninevites, and Cornelius. But there are serious problems with that category:

i) Except for Cornelius, the Bible doesn't say they were saved. 

ii) To the extent that some of them were saved, they came to saving knowledge through contact with the chosen people.

iii) Some of them were recipients of special revelation.

iv) Cornelius was a Godfearer. An intellectual convert to Judaism (although he eschewed circumcision). He's in the position of an OT saint. 

v) How many inclusivists regard Job as a historical rather than fictional character?

vi) It's possible that Melchizedek was pagan. That doesn't make him a "pagan saint". That doesn't mean he was saved. His function is essentially symbolic. His typological role is separable from his person. What matters is what he represents, not his character. 

9. Babies

Even Calvinists believe that "elect" infants dying in infancy are saved. So faith in Jesus is not a sine qua non for salvation. But there are serious problems with that comparison:

i) The argument either proves too much or too little. It's not just that babies lack faith in Jesus. They lack implicit faith. They lack faith in general revelation. 

ii) Children below the age of reason lack the cognitive development to form propositional beliefs. That's not analogous to mentally competent agents. Rather, that's analogous to the developmentally disabled, or the senile. 

iii) Although "elect" infants dying in infancy aren't saved by faith, they are saved by grace. They are saved by regeneration.

iv) But it might be objected that if that's the case, why can't other people be saved by grace or by regeneration rather than faith?

No doubt God could do so if he chose to. But mercy is discretionary rather than obligatory. Fact is, the Bible stresses the necessity of faith in Christ for salvation when addressing adults. Whether or not we find it arbitrary, that's our frame of reference. Even if there are exceptions, that is only known to God. We must operate by his revealed will, not his secret will–assuming God makes exceptions. 

10. Christophanies

The OT records divine disclosure by theophanies and angelophanies, as well as dreams and visions. In the Bible, pagans are sometimes recipients of revelatory dreams. Some Christians identify certain OT angelophanies as Christophanies. Likewise, you have modern-day reports of Jesus appearing to Muslims in dreams, which are instrumental in their conversion. 

If so, then in principle, why couldn't there be Christophanies to the unevangelized? To take one hypothetical scenario why couldn't Manitou sometimes be a Christophany to heathen Indians who had no access to the Gospel? 

Several issues:

i) Even if that's hypothetically possible, unless we have evidence that it ever happens, so what?

ii) According to the Christian paradigm, faith in Jesus involves believing the gist of a biographical narrative about who Jesus is and what he did. By itself, a Christophany is not an object of faith. Even in the OT, event-media and word-media work in tandem.

iii) The OT presents the situation of the heathen as morally and spiritually dire. So does the NT (e.g. Rom 1:21-32; Eph 2:1-3,12; 4:17-19; Tit 3:3). Likewise, when Christian missionaries push into unevangelized lands, they encounter animism, paganism, and depravity. They don't encounter people-groups to whom God appeared in disguised Christophanies. 

iv) If, moreover, God were to instigate a religious movement through a Christophany, without biblical revelation, that would rapidly degenerate into a pagan cult. 

v) Now, for all we know, it's possible that God has appeared to select individuals throughout history, across the globe. But certainly not enough to establish a religious movement that allegorizes Christianity. At best, it could only be in reference to isolated cases.