Thoughts without a thinker

The self in Buddhism

1. The soul aka self doesn't exist in Buddhism. Only the non-self exists - the anatman. To my knowledge, that's the case in all major schools of Buddhism, viz. Theravada Buddhism, Mahayana Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, and Tibetan Buddhism.

2. What is perceived to be the "self" in Buddhism consists of a collection of states or a bundle of perceptions. These are like psychological states or perceptions. We can simply call them "aggregates". These aggregates are known as khandhas.

3. There are five khandhas: form/body, sensations, perceptions, mentations/cogitations, and awareness. These aggregates or khandhas are the entirety of what constitutes the self, but the reality is there is no "self". Afaik, it's not even that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, but that the whole is the sum of its parts.

4. Indeed, modern Buddhists often use the ship of Theseus to illustrate how the self doesn't really exist despite its aggregates or khandhas. We're atoms in motion, but these atoms in motion are constantly being replaced by other atoms in motion.

5. Suffering is caused by one being attached to or clinging onto (tanha) these aggregates. Suffering is extinguished (nirvana) when attachment (tanha) to these aggregates (khandhas) is relinquished.

Evaluation

The Evidence For Organized Religion Can't Be Ignored

I recently listened to Alex Tsakiris' interview with Leslie Kean, a journalist who's published some books on paranormal phenomena. The books discussed during the program (one on UFOs and one on the afterlife) seem to have a lot of good material, and I've ordered both. I expect to eventually read them, but it may be a while before I get to them. What I want to do in this post is make some comments about the interview.

Kean's book on the afterlife seems to have some overlap with Patricia Pearson's book that came out in 2014, which I reviewed here. There's also some overlap with Tsakiris' interview of Pearson. I'll refer to perspectives like those held by people such as Tsakiris, Pearson, and Kean as a paranormal view of the afterlife.

When I mention religion, I mean...

  This gentleman and Mr. Thwackum scarce ever met without a disputation; for their tenets were indeed diametrically opposite to each other. Square held human nature to be the perfection of all virtue, and that vice was a deviation from our nature, in the same manner as deformity of body is. Thwackum, on the contrary, maintained that the human mind, since the fall, was nothing but a sink of iniquity, till purified and redeemed by grace. In one point only they agreed, which was, in all their discourses on morality never to mention the word goodness. The favourite phrase of the former, was the natural beauty of virtue; that of the latter, was the divine power of grace. The former measured all actions by the unalterable rule of right, and the eternal fitness of things; the latter decided all matters by authority; but in doing this, he always used the scriptures and their commentators, as the lawyer doth his Coke upon Lyttleton, where the comment is of equal authority with the text.    

  After this short introduction, the reader will be pleased to remember, that the parson had concluded his speech with a triumphant question, to which he had apprehended no answer; viz., Can any honour exist independent of religion?    

  To this Square answered; that it was impossible to discourse philosophically concerning words, till their meaning was first established: that there were scarce any two words of a more vague and uncertain signification, than the two he had mentioned; for that there were almost as many different opinions concerning honour, as concerning religion. “But,” says he, “if by honour you mean the true natural beauty of virtue, I will maintain it may exist independent of any religion whatever. Nay,” added he, “you yourself will allow it may exist independent all but one: so will a Mahometan, a Jew, and all the maintainers of all the different sects in the world.”    

  Thwackum replied, this was arguing with the usual malice of all the enemies to the true Church. He said, he doubted not but that all the infidels and hereticks in the world would, if they could, confine honour to their own absurd errors and damnable deceptions; “but honour,” says he, “is not therefore manifold, because there are many absurd opinions about it; nor is religion manifold, because there are various sects and heresies in the world. When I mention religion, I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion, but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church of England. And when I mention honour, I mean that mode of Divine grace which is not only consistent with, but dependent upon, this religion; and is consistent with and dependent upon no other. Now to say that the honour I here mean, and which was, I thought, all the honour I could be supposed to mean, will uphold, much less dictate an untruth, is to assert an absurdity too shocking to be conceived.” Henry Fielding, The History of Tom Jones.

Miracles And Christian Exclusivism

Earlier in this series of posts on miracles, I addressed how we ought to judge competing miracle claims. In this series and elsewhere, I've argued for the superiority of the Christian system of miracles over its competitors. I want to close this series by considering how much further we can narrow the field. For example, do Christian miracles suggest that God is favoring one denomination or movement within professing Christianity? To what extent do miracles seem to support one particular view of God or system of doctrine?

Montgomery on China and Greece

Two articles from John Warwick Montgomery:

1. "A Critique of Chinese Religious Options"
   
2. "Greek Opposition to Evangelism"