John Byl
has posted a critique of Don Page’s theistic multiverse:
Since
Prof. Byl has a doctorate in astrophysics, he’s better qualified than most to
evaluate the scientific merits of the theory.
i)
Because a theistic multiverse is speculative, I don’t think Christians who are
sympathetic to that position should erect a theological edifice over that
conjectural foundation. At the same time, the denial of a theistic multiverse
is equally speculative.
ii) Dr.
Byl targets a scientific version of the multiverse, based on Everett’s
interpretation of quantum mechanics. Since Page is propounding a scientific
version of the multiverse, his model can be evaluated on scientific grounds.
iii) However,
we need to distinguish between physical models of the multiverse, like
Everett’s many-worlds version–and metaphysical models, like David Lewis’s
concrete modal realism. Scientific criticisms of the former bounce off the
latter. Byl’s post leaves the impression that by disposing of Page’s model, he
has thereby done away with the multiverse tout court. But that’s clearly
overstated.
iv) One
conventional objection to the multiverse, which Byl lodges, is the unverifiable
or unfalsifiable nature of the hypothesis. That raises a number of issues:
a)
Proponents would say there’s indirect evidence for the multiverse. They’d say
there’s evidence for quantum mechanics, and they’d say Everett’s interpretation
is the best interpretation of quantum mechanics. Of course, that’s disputed,
but that’s the argument.
b) On
the face of it, postulating a multiverse is no more unscientific than
postulating other theoretical entities, like quarks. The justification for
postulating theoretical entities is their explanatory value. We shouldn’t stop
at the level of observables. For one thing, what’s observable or unobservables
varies depending on the state of our technology. What was unobservable in the
15C is observable in the 21C based on technological advances.
Likewise,
take a diagnostician who’s trying to find out what’s wrong with a patient.
Based on a battery of tests, something is objectively abnormal about the
patient’s health. Suppose the diagnostician fails to detect the source. Still,
it’s reasonable for the diagnostician to think something must be causing the
patient’s medical problem, even if he can’t discover the source of the problem.
Similarly,
when we reconstruct the past, we postulate things to fill in the gaps. If we
unearth a partial skeleton, we interpolate the missing parts. We don’t assume
the organism, when it was alive, had a partial skeleton.
c)
Having said that, a problem with theoretical entities is that more than one
kind of entity or combination of entities might be responsible for the effect.
So the postulate will be underdetermined by the evidence.
v) Byl
also objects to the way Page treats natural or physical laws. In fairness to
Page, appeal to a natural law theodicy or stable environment is nothing new.
And it has a grain of truth. For instance, mountain-climbers can’t expect God
to suspend the “law” of gravity when they slip and fall.
That
said, I agree with Byl that it’s easy to take this principle too far, as if
God’s hands are tied once he initiates a system of second causes. But God
doesn’t stand in awe of natural laws. They don’t inhibit divine action.
vi) It’s
not entirely clear why Byl rules out a multiverse. Is he saying God is able,
but unwilling to create a multiverse–or is he saying there is no multiverse
because God is unable to create a multiverse? It seems to me that the latter
represents an arbitrary restriction on divine freedom and omnipotence.
vii) Byl
claims that, according to Scripture, God only created one world. However,
there’s a danger of anachronism in that claim. Isn’t the universe to an ancient
man what the multiverse is to a modern man? What did the “cosmic” references in
Scripture mean to the original audience? Wasn’t their concept of the cosmos
basically limited to the visible solar system? Naked-eye astronomy? No telescopes, spectroscopy, or radio astronomy. If you told
them God created billions of other solar systems in billions of unobservable
galaxies, would that count as one world or many worlds from an ancient
perspective?
viii)
Byl raises some theological issues that aren’t unique to a multiverse. One can
raise similar issues if there’s intelligent life elsewhere in the universe.
Aliens with a religious history particular to their own planet. Indeed, Byl has
discussed that issue in the past.
ix) On a
model of the multiverse like Everett’s, all physically possible outcomes are
automatically realized. But on a metaphysical model, God can exercise
discretion as to what possibilities will be exemplified.
With regards to point iv, why couldn't I use these reasons proffered by a multiverse atheist and construct a parallel argument for God?
ReplyDeleteOne of the universes in the "multiverse" is the one where I am a brain in a vat, and I am imagining (through stimulation via attached electrodes) that there is such a thing as a multiverse...
ReplyDeleteWell, I'm brain-in-a-vat in a parallel universe, imagining you as a brain-in-a-vat.
DeleteFYI, here's a link to a video of Stephen C. Meyer giving his reasons for why cosmic intelligent design is more plausible even if a multiverse theory is true. He speaks on the topic for about 10 minutes. I've already qued the video at 70 minutes.
ReplyDeletehttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9a-h88ziYA4&feature=youtu.be&t=69m55s