James "The Iceman" Anderson

Last month, Dr. Anderson discussed theistic proofs. This generated a number of comments and replies. I suspect many people who read Anderson’s original piece didn’t read all of the feedback. Here I’m going to quote the best comments.

James Anderson April 17, 2012 at 7:59 PM

Hi Ron,

 

My point was that if we understand proofs as person-dependent (analogous to mathematical proofs being system-dependent) then we can indeed prove the existence of God. If a particular person, having been presented with a good theistic argument based on propositions he accepts, subsequently denies those propositions (rather than accept the theistic conclusion), it doesn't follow that God's existence wasn't proven. A goal is a goal, even if someone moves the goalposts after the event.

 

A "consistent" professing unbeliever may typically reject the premises, but by the grace of God not every professing unbeliever is consistent (in his unbelief). The Holy Spirit may open the heart of the unbeliever to accept the conclusion. We know it happens sometimes. So we persevere with apologetics, just as we persevere with evangelism, even while we hold to the doctrine of total depravity.

 

I think in the case of some sound theistic arguments, a person ought to believe their premises (where 'ought' is cashed out in terms of proper-function rationality or something along those lines). But that wasn't the point I was trying to make. I'd also add that TAG can proceed even from false premises; this is one of its distinctive features. (Antitheism presupposes theism!)

 

I'm not sure I understand the thrust of your last question. Even TAG has to proceed from premises that are accepted by the target audience. The neat thing about TAG (if you can pull it off) is that it can incorporate any proposition whatsoever as a premise. Even so, exactly which proposition one uses as a "launching pad" will depend on the target audience. And TAG has other premises that must also be accepted (or else argued for on the basis of other accepted propositions).

James Anderson April 18, 2012 at 12:29 PM

Thanks for the stimulating comments, Ron.

 

Regarding the "acid test", there are really three conditions: (1) sound argument; (2) non-question-begging argument (in the sense discussed in the article); (3) acceptance of premises.

 

None of this is incompatible (so far as I can tell) with the notion of a "universally objective proof". But whether there is such a proof (or proofs) depends, of course, on exactly what it means for a proof to be "universally objective". Clearly, in your mind, soundness isn't sufficient. I guess what you're looking for is a proof with premises that are universally accepted, or, better still, that cannot be rationally denied. If so, that raises the further question of what are the conditions of rationality -- and that was something I couldn't delve into in the article (and I don't think I needed to).

 

If rationality is cashed out in something like Plantingan proper-function terms, then yes, I think there are "universally objective proofs" -- sound arguments with premises that one would normally be irrational to deny.

 

As for the transcendental premise in TAG, I wouldn't expect an unbeliever simply to accept that premise; I would give arguments in its support, arguments from premises that he does accept (or ought to accept on reflection). The article I co-wrote with Greg Welty does that sort of argumentative work.

 

Does that address your concerns?

James Anderson April 17, 2012 at 8:12 PM

Mike,

 

Yes, I think it's fair to say that a good theistic argument will aim to bring the unbeliever into line with the objective truth that they suppress.

 

I don't think my position leaves room for relativism. From our Christian perspective, the premises that the unbeliever accepts, the premises on the basis of which we're proving God's existence, are objective truths. They represent objective reality. (Some qualifications need to be made here regarding the Transcendental Argument for God -- see my reply to Ron above.)

James Anderson April 18, 2012 at 12:48 PM

zilch,

 

No, that's not a rewording, that's a completely different syllogism. A moral duty is not a desire. If you can't tell the difference between a duty and a desire, you need to read up on basic moral theory.

 

Like your friend Keith, you're confusing the prescriptive with the descriptive. Atheists do that a lot. :(

 

I can understand, though, why you'd want to substitute a bad theistic argument for a good theistic argument. :)

James Anderson April 18, 2012 at 12:42 PM

Keith,

 

You're confusing patterns of behavior with moral duties. That animals behave in certain ways is no evidence that they have moral duties to behave in those ways, and our knowledge of our own moral duties is not based on observing our own behavior patterns. In short, you're confusing the prescriptive with the descriptive: how we ought to behave with how we do in fact behave.

 

But perhaps the root problem is that you want to deny that we really do have moral duties. Perhaps that's why you put "moral duties" in scare quotes. If that's the case, you nicely illustrate what I claimed in the article. You would sooner repudiate your basic human moral intuitions than accept the existence of God.

 

If you don't think you have a real moral duty to care for your children, then frankly I pity your children -- or, if you don't have children, I pray that you'll hold off until your moral outlook matures. The same applies if you think that there is no moral difference between humans and animals.

 

James Anderson April 18, 2012 at 8:17 PM

If there are no moral duties, why did you feel the need to apologize?

 

If there are no moral duties, why did you complain (below) about Christian apologists not apprising people of atheist counterarguments?

 

Do you think that people have a moral obligation to pursue and promote the truth over their own group interests?

 

I'm not trying to be cute, Keith. I'm just pointing out that you don't seem to take your atheism seriously enough, because your comments here are shot through with presuppositions inconsistent with what you profess. You can't seem to shake off the moral categories you inherited from Christianity via Western culture. You're borrowing capital from the Christian worldview in order to criticize its adherents, because your evolutionary naturalism can't fund the checks you're writing.

 

Only someone indoctrinated by Darwinian mythology would seriously claim that human behaviors are identical to animal behaviors.

James Anderson April 19, 2012 at 10:00 AM

Keith,

 

Those weren't rhetorical questions. I'm sure I'm not the only one here who would like to know your answers. How do you reconcile your comments here with your denial of moral duties?

 

There couldn't be reasonable evidence that "our morality is a purely natural mechanism" because morality, properly understood, couldn't be a mechanism. Again you confuse the prescriptive with the descriptive. Morality pertains to how we ought to behave, not how we do in fact behave. It's possible that our moral beliefs are the product of a mechanism; but don't confuse beliefs about morality with morality as such.

 

For the same reason, distinguishing human behaviors from animal behaviors is beside the point. The question at hand is not whether we do behave in such-and-such a manner, but whether we have a duty -- a moral obligation -- to behave in such-and-such a manner. When you raise questions about supposed similarities between human behavior and animal behavior, you're only changing the subject.

James Anderson April 19, 2012 at 10:17 AM

zilch,

 

You're equivocating on "morals" and missing the point altogether. Moral codes are not moral duties. If you think they are, presumably you must also think that the Aztecs had a moral duty to sacrifice their children and that precolonial Indian widows had a moral duty to self-immolate on their husbands' funeral pyres.

 

You're making the same basic error as Keith (see above). Moral codes are to moral duties much as scientific theories are to the (actual) laws of physics. Just because two people hold to different scientific theories doesn't mean that different laws of physics apply to them. Just as the (actual) laws of physics are independent of human thoughts about them, so the (actual) laws of morality are independent of human thoughts about them.

 

Even if evolutionary naturalism could account for moral codes (it can't, by the way, because it can't account for human consciousness and intellect) that would tell us nothing about whether it could account for real moral duties: moral obligations that are binding on all human beings regardless of their moral code, regardless of their cultural situation, regardless of their actual patterns of behavior.

 

James Anderson April 19, 2012 at 10:20 AM

Keith and zilch,

 

You guys would benefit from reading this chapter by Paul Copan on the failure of naturalistic ethics:

http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/pdf/God-naturalism-morality.pdf

James Anderson April 18, 2012 at 12:53 PM

Simplistic?

 

This from the guy who says Craig's cosmological argument is "little different" than Aristotle's? :)

James Anderson April 19, 2012 at 1:28 PM

FroodyZarquon,

 

Our conversation has been about whether there are objective, culture-transcending moral duties. That is most assuredly not a matter of semantics.

 

Keith wants to deny that there are such duties while at the same time making moral judgments that presuppose them.

 

The question is not whether Keith can make moral judgements or whether he can do so without referring to God. The question is whether such moral judgments are even intelligible from a naturalistic perspective.

 

James Anderson April 21, 2012 at 9:35 PM

Keith and zilch,

 

This has been an interesting exchange, but I can't keep it up indefinitely, and now that Keith has regurgitated the "cosmic Jewish zombie" meme, I'm not sure he's a serious interlocutor. So these will be my final comments. You guys are welcome to have the last words.

 

I appreciate the fact that you both took the time to read the Copan article. Here are some remarks on your responses.

 

zilch writes: "Basically, it commits the same error you do: it assumes, without demonstrating or even mentioning it, that there exists an 'objective' morality which must be declared by fiat by some authority, who must naturally be God."

 

It's hardly an error to assume that there are objective moral values and that we know such values, since everybody takes it for granted all the time, including you. For example, you think that your morals are superior to the Aztecs. Really? By what standard? If there are no objective, culture-transcending moral norms, your claim is utterly without foundation.

 

zilch writes elsewhere: "James- again, I can't speak for Keith, but for me, morals are, like all living things, in a state of evolution. That means that while there are no absolute rights or wrongs, there are general tendencies and desires, and they change with time. For instance: the Bible condones slavery. Do you?"

 

Nice try. But no, you are the one who condones slavery, by denying any moral absolutes. Do you think the Atlantic slave trade was morally acceptable or morally wrong? Or will you say that there's no objective answer to that question?

 

I pose the same questions to Keith, who says he rejects "the idea of an absolute morality". So how consistent are you guys?

 

Keith writes: "In [Copan's] expansion of these ideas, it's clear his argument is not about evidence, rather it's about probabilities: evolution is less likely to produce a common morality than a deity."

 

It's about both evidence and probabilities; the two are related, of course. If the probability of some phenomenon P given theism is much higher that the probability of P given naturalism, then P is good evidence for theism over against naturalism.

 

Keith continues: "Third, [Copan] is making a god-of-the-gaps argument. We can't explain moral behaviors fully, and so 'god did it' is a simpler, more complete explanation. It's a dangerous argument to make. For the last several hundred years we've repeated this argument on thousands of topics, and religion has lost the argument every single time. Think about that: without exception, every single time, religion has lost this argument. I'm doubtful the 'roots of morality' will be the case that changes religion's losing streak. History alone should make us hesitant to accept any god-of-the-gaps arguments, and Paul's argument is not based on evidence: it's based on a lack of evidence on the other side of the question."

 

This is a caricature of Copan's argument. It isn't a God-of-the-gaps argument, because theism is doing positive explanatory work. The argument isn't anything like "We can't see how morality evolved naturally so God must've done it". The argument is: theism can readily account for our knowledge of objective moral values, human rights, human dignity, etc., whereas naturalism cannot; therefore, we have good reason for believing in God. What exactly do you think is wrong with that inference?

 

If you want to deny that there are objective moral values, human rights, etc., so be it -- but that's hardly an easy way out.

 

I notice, by the way, that you didn't give a direct answer to my question about whether we have a moral duty to pursue and promote the truth. I have to assume at this point that your answer is no.

 

Keith writes: "Rejecting the idea of an absolute morality does not prevent me from judging choices as morally good or bad. We all judge others' behaviors based on what we believe is good or bad, right or wrong, whatever. I can say 'it's bad to lie' without any recourse to god."

 

Yes, of course you can say that. But that's not the point. The point is that you can't account for the intelligibility of those moral judgments. You may say that such judgments reduce to personal or societal preferences. In that case, why think your preferences are any better or worse than those of, say, Anders Behring Breivik?

 

Keith apparently thinks that, given enough time, naturalistic explanations for morality, consciousness, and intelligence will be forthcoming, even though naturalists today don't have the faintest idea how to explain them (many preferring to deny their reality altogether). This tells me three things: (1) Keith doesn't realize that the arguments against naturalism based on morality, consciousness, and intelligence aren't arguments from ignorance but positive arguments showing that naturalism doesn't have the metaphysical resources in principle to account for them; (2) he doesn't appreciate just how intractable these problems are for naturalists; and (3) he lives by faith, not by sight.

 

I don't mean this as an insult, but I'm afraid you guys are dilettante atheists. You haven't really come to terms with the implications of your evolutionary naturalism. You should read and digest the works of some hard-core naturalists like Daniel Dennett, Alex Rosenberg, and the Churchlands, who recognize that a consistent naturalist has to deny altogether the reality of objective moral values, moral responsibility, free will, consciousness, and intellect. (By the way, Keith, that's the answer to your question about whether I can prove my claim about naturalism's inability to account for such things: I don't need to prove it, because these guys have already made the argument and bitten the bullet.)

 

To be fair, however, Keith may be further down the road than I've given him credit, because he says that "our senses, reasoning and moral instincts are entirely brain-based (at least, there's no evidence to suggest they are not brain-based), and they systematically deceive us."

 

Keith isn't the first naturalist to say this sort of thing. But it's astonishing to me that he doesn't see how self-defeating it is. He thinks his senses and reasoning systematically deceive him and yet by employing those same senses and reasoning he concludes that science has discredited religion and that all the arguments for theism are bogus. Go figure! :)

 

Finally, some brief remarks about Keith's argument from the bad design of the eye, etc. Darwinists love to trot out these supposed examples of bad design, but they simply don't hold water on closer examination. For example, you can find two articles on the ARN website (www.arn.org) which explain why the design of the human eye is perfectly sensible, and indeed inexplicable from a Darwinian perspective. (I can't post the links, because then this comment would be flagged as spam. But they're authored by George Ayoub and Michael Denton.) The same goes for the other standard examples. Moreover, these arguments from alleged bad design fail to recognize that design always involves trade-offs and that one needs to know the designer's desiderata in order to make a reliable judgment about whether the design of something was good or bad with respect to those desiderata. But how on earth would an atheist be in a position to know that sort of thing, especially an atheist with a brain that systematically deceives him?

James Anderson April 22, 2012 at 7:21 AM

"Trusting your brain simply ignores everything neuroscience has taught us."

 

I'm pleased to hear that you and the neuroscientists have been able to outwit your brains. Perhaps you can do without them altogether?

 

Okay, I'm done now. Really. :)

Noah April 17, 2012 at 4:36 PM

Adam,

 

Dr. Anderson's argument is *not* a logical fallacy. (and if it is what fallacy is it? What *rule* of logic does it violate?) Nor is it bad/failed logic. You say, "I think the logic fails when the author said that everyone including atheists have sensus divinitatis because the Bible tells me so is a another logical fallacy."

 

That is ***not*** a logical fallacy or a failure of logic (read a logic book if you don't believe me). The following reconstruction of your argument is logically valid:

 

(1) If the Bible tells me (X), then (X) is true. (if p, then q)

(2) The Bible tells me (X). (p)

(3) Therefore (X) is true (by modus ponens). (.: q)

 

The conclusion necessarily follows the premises and does not violate the rules of logic. The real question is whether the premises are true (i.e. (1) and (2)). Dr. Anderson nicely summarized and explained all of this in this very post, which means you either didn't read him well or didn't understand him. You may not agree with the soundness of Dr. Anderson's remarks (which is another thing he nicely explained), but that doesn't mean Dr. Anderson was making any logical fallacies.

 

Lastly, Dr. Anderson gave a bare bones description of a technical and robust understanding of the sensus divinitatis as presented by Alvin Plantinga and others (you can read Dr. Anderson's book for a thorough treatment of the topic). Your reply also seems to be loaded with contestable views concerning the nature of disagreement, evidence, role of the Bible, reason, etc.

Fletcher April 17, 2012 at 11:01 PM

The underlying argument seems to be: if there is disagreement, that is evidence against the positive claim's truthfulness. Brilliant.

 

There is disagreement over whether light is wave- or particle-based. Guess we should just abandon physics.

Fletcher April 18, 2012 at 8:05 AM

I'm afraid you've tipped your hand. Arguments by Plato and Aristotle are not "state-of-the-art", and, actually, an argument as simple as Anselm's ontological argument has been subject to extremely rigorous analysis and has undergone considerable refinement.

 

You also demonstrate a lack of precision in your grasp of philosophical methodology. You don't "deduce facts" with any degree of "probability". Deductive entailment is necessary, not probabilistic.

 

The subject matter of theology and philosophy does not often lend itself to empirical investigation. A distinction as elementary as that between an empirical question and an evaluative question should enable you get a grasp of why progress is readily forthcoming in one and not in the other. Why expect all areas of inquiry to be explanatorily accessible in this way?

Fletcher April 18, 2012 at 10:27 AM

Do you expect anyone to accept your first premise? If you're attempting to draw a parallel between that argument and any of the ones Anderson put up, then I'm afraid you've failed to produce anything even approximating an analogous argument. While many people think the premises Anderson provided are false, many of them take them to be true. Contrastingly, children aside, nobody takes your first premise to be true.

 

Anderson's point is simply that not every sound argument is rationally persuasive, since the latter is a relation (two-place) and not a property (one-place). Validity is a property of some arguments, soundness is a property of some arguments, being rationally compelling is a relation that holds between an argument and a person (even though I stated it here as a relational property).

Fletcher April 18, 2012 at 12:57 PM

That argument of Anderson's is deductively valid; it has the form of a modus tollens, which ensures its validity. So predicating of it "irrationality" or suggesting that the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises represents a confusion about logic.

 

If you think that either of the premises (or both) are false, then you do not think that the argument is sound. But that's just not logically or philosophically interesting. The point about rational persuasiveness is simply that an argument's soundness is insufficient (and unnecessary, in fact) for its rational acceptability. The latter component is extraneous to arguments, hence why its a relation that holds between arguments *and* persons.