Before responding, notice Arminian priorities. A philosopher of religion, who’s been a professing Christian up until now, converts to the Hare Krishna cult. The Hindu convert makes a public case to justify his defection from Christianity, and conversion to the Hare Krishna cult.
How does the Arminian respond? Does he argue against the Hare Krishna cult? Does he critique the reasoning of the Hindu convert?
No. He launches an attack on...Calvinism.
RICHARD COORDS SAID:
However, I had detected in Steve’s comments a sense of *complaint* insomuch that people were lauding tolerance, instead of denouncing apostasy. So my question is, why the complaint all, even if we grant that such is made without emotion?
Assuming (arguendo) that my post amounted to a “complaint,” that’s perfectly consistent with predestination. On that view, God predestined my “complaint.”
So my question is, why the complaint all, even if we grant that such is made without emotion? In other words, if Michael is a divine puppet (which I discuss further in a moment), as well as everyone else being puppets, then to complain against God’s sock-puppetry is to complain against the divine sock-puppeteer.
i) Of course, I don’t grant the puppet metaphor.
ii) But even if I did play along with the puppet metaphor for the sake of argument, in puppet shows, puppets often complain about the conduct of their fellow puppets. They reflect the viewpoint of a puppet character, within the little world of their puppet stage. Their viewpoint well may be distinct from the viewpoint of the puppet master, who is not a puppet character sharing the same stage as his puppets.
Now, you could say that God complains…
That’s not my argument.
In other words, with Determinism, with all things being scripted by God, the saying holds, ‘It’s all good.’
Once again, even if we play along with the puppet metaphor for the sake of argument, in a puppet show, some puppet characters play the hero or heroine while other puppet characters play the villain.
The play is good. The script is good. That doesn’t mean everything the characters do is good. It’s a question of how the villain functions in the story. If he’s a foil character, then his badness serves a good purpose.
How such a paradigm could avoid an impression of puppetry, I cannot fathom.
Depends on how you tweak the metaphor. In a puppet show, the puppets are mindless. Not conscious, deliberative agents.
To take another comparison, Arminians are also captivated by the robot metaphor. Indeed, they use the puppet/robot metaphors interchangeably. But in Asimov’s classic story (I, Robot), the robot is artificially intelligent. The accused robot is psychologically indistinguishable from a human being. So at that point the metaphor breaks down.
He scripted it, in order to have knowledge *of* it, in order to maintain omniscience.
Actually, Calvinism doesn’t say that God predestined the future in order to know the future. It’s true that God knows the future because he predestined the future. Which doesn’t mean that’s why he predestined the future.
The demonic realm relies upon God for its each and every successive thought, from eternity past to eternity future.
i) Demons don’t have an eternal past.
ii) According to Arminianism, the demonic realm relies on God’s providential collaboration with everything the demons do.
How does one distinguish the works of God from the works of the devil if the devil thinks only and precisely the complete set of thoughts that God gives him?
That’s simplistic. It confuses two distinct propositions:
i) The devil does whatever God intends him to do.
ii) The devil intentionally does whatever God intends him to do.
To take a comparison: suppose a terrorist courier is headed to a rendezvous with a terrorist leader. Suppose, unbeknownst to the courier, a counterterrorist agency plants a remote detonatable bomb on the courier. When the courier arrives at the hideout, the counterterrorist agency detonates the bomb, thereby killing the terrorist leader.
The courier unintentionally carries out what the counterterrorist agency intends him to do. The courier intends to deliver a message to the terrorist leader. He didn’t intend to do what the counterterrorist agency intended for him to do. He unwittingly does their bidding.
Thanks for taking the time to respond to my concerns with Determinism, and I look forward to dialoguing with you. I believe that the best place to begin is regarding the puppetry matter. You mentioned that puppets are mindless, and are not deliberating conscious agents, or sentient beings, and that's what I want to address first. Question: by your beliefs, if God did not predetermine the very next thought of any single demon within the scope of the demonic realm, do you believe that God could otherwise infallibly know it?
ReplyDeleteIf the future is indeterminate, then, by definition, it can't be an object of knowledge-for there is no one future to be known until the actual outcome eventuates. All you have is a series of possible forking paths. And each forking path leads to yet another forking path down the line, ad infinitum. Forking paths within forking paths (i.e. within each hypothetical timeline), as well as forking paths between forking paths (i.e. between alternate timelines).
ReplyDeleteThanks for the explanation. So by that reasoning, for God to infallibly know what a demon will think next, He would have to *determine* what they will think next, including any and all facets of their conscious thinking state, which one might otherwise use as a basis to distinguish a sentient being from a mere “puppet.” So I see a Determinist’s perspective of divine omniscience as being the driving factor that results in the hardest form of Hard Determinism. That would mean that every thought of every demon, including their every emotion, every calculating act of lust and hatred, must all be derived from God, or else if not by God, He could not have a logically basis upon which to know it, and simply stated, He’d have no idea what they might think next. In other words, your perspective of omniscience indicates to me that there is no such concept as “independent thought,” or a random or rogue thought, but that all thoughts come from God, both good and evil, and that no one could think any thought besides those thoughts that God gives it, without which, God could not otherwise have a basis in order to know it.
ReplyDeleteOne might wonder why I keep citing the example of a demon, and the reason why is because, by contrast, God is holy, and to think that the sum total of all thoughts of every demon (that is, the most unholy of all creatures) is nothing more and nothing less than the determined thoughts of the Holy Spirit (that is, the most Holy of all), seems to run counter to our normal standard of thinking.
RICHARD COORDS SAID:
ReplyDelete"So I see a Determinist’s perspective of divine omniscience as being the driving factor that results in the hardest form of Hard Determinism."
You don't seem to grasp the differences between hard determinism (or hard incompatibilism), semicompatibilism, and classical compatibilism. Do you bandy the phrase "hard determinism" inaccurately just because that sounds bad?
"He could not have a logically basis upon which to know it, and simply stated, He’d have no idea what they might think next."
In one respect (prescinding other issues), a libertarian deity could have an inkling what they *might* think next–just not what they *will* think next.
However, even that raises questions concerning the ontology of possible worlds on a libertarian scheme.
"...and to think that the sum total of all thoughts of every demon (that is, the most unholy of all creatures) is nothing more and nothing less than the determined thoughts of the Holy Spirit (that is, the most Holy of all)..."
i) Unless you think, like Richard Creel, that there's a plenum of possibilities, coeternal with God, yet ontologically independent of God, then God is necessarily the source of all possibilities and contingent actualities.
ii) Raising moral objections does nothing to blunt the metaphysical consequences of an indeterminate future in relation to God's omniscience, or lack thereof.
iii) Talking abstractly about God's holiness doesn't have much predictive value. For instance:
“19And Micaiah said, “Therefore hear the word of the Lord: I saw the Lord sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing beside him on his right hand and on his left; 20and the Lord said, ‘Who will entice Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-gilead?’ And one said one thing, and another said another. 21Then a spirit came forward and stood before the Lord, saying, ‘I will entice him.’ 22And the Lord said to him, ‘By what means?’ And he said, ‘I will go out, and will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets.’ And he said, ‘You are to entice him, and you shall succeed; go out and do so.’ 23Now therefore behold, the Lord has put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these your prophets; the Lord has declared disaster for you” (1 Kgs 22:19-23).”
1) No, “Hard” was not meant to indicate “bad,” but rather to indicate range, in other words, to eliminate any sense of real compatibilism, in which some C’s have readily agreed. In other words, if a demon is a blank slate, and God fills that slate, from the moment of creation and into an infinite future, and thus God necessarily knows what He filled, He has infallible omniscience over it. That seems to be the thought process. But where does that leave compatibilism, or any real sense of it? In other words, the determinations of the divine Being is not dependent upon anything within the “clay” so to speak, so as to act “compatibilistically” with it, but rather, is a matter of filling a blank slate. Do you see where I’m going with that? That’s where I was going with the reference to “hard” determinism.
ReplyDelete2) You wrote: “In one respect (prescinding other issues), a libertarian deity could have an inkling what they *might* think next–just not what they *will* think next.”
That’s something that I want to touch upon next. It’s the question of whether an Arminian or Libertarian has a logical basis upon which to establish a theology of divine omniscience, if the future is not exhaustively predetermined by God. There are two points that I want to make there.
3) I’ve argued that deterministic Calvinism must ultimately reject the concept of “independent thought,” and I’d like to know if you agree, or whether my charge is unfounded. Here’s the reason, as it deals with what you just mentioned, which is the issue of “raising moral objections,” as per the OP: Without independent thought, how do we reasonably assign “human blame,” or the issue of human “moral monsters,” as the term has recently been brought up by Roger Olson, such that, if a demon has no independent thoughts, ever, but that all of their thoughts, even throughout eternity while residing in the Lake of Fire, are all fed by the “eternal and exhaustive decree of God,” then upon what basis would we say that the specific demon in question has done something bad? In other words, if a demon is essentially a *blank slate,* which God fills, and thus God perfectly knows, then how do we lay blame upon them? That’s what most A’s like me, find difficult to grasp.
4) Can you restate your point on 1 Kgs 22:19-23? I didn’t follow.
RE: the Arminian concept of omniscience:
ReplyDeleteIn terms of the Arminian perspective on omniscience, my first point is that before we are in a position to answer the smaller question (i.e. How is God omniscient), we must first answer the larger question (i.e. how is God eternal?) What is your logical formula to explain how a Being that currently exists, has had no beginning? I know that there are mathematical representations of infinity, but what is a logical explanation for how a Being can have no beginning point? We use that argument against Evolutionists all of the time. We demand of the evolutionist: How can matter come from nothing? And so we rule that out. We say, “matter has its origin in God.” And so we have a beginning point. But what about God’s beginning point? He has none, and yet we accept that, without a basis in logic. So my question, then, is how can we demand a logical formula for God’s omniscience, when we cannot, and do not, demand a logical formula for how God is eternal? For if we knew the latter, then we’d be in position to know the former. In other words, if you could tell me how God is eternal, then I could tell you how such a Being knows the future. The relevance is that Arminians often invoke the “eternal now” perspective for God, in that God is not bound by time, such as being limited to a *linear formula* for knowledge. If God is truly omnipresent, then this must be for all time & space, so that no coordinate of time/space can hide from God. Pick any coordinate of time/space, and God is there. That would seemingly be a realistic *property* of an “eternal Being.” So God would know the future, because He is already there. In fact, He is both before and after that coordinate in time/space. So that might be the Arminian conceptualization of divine omniscience, stemming from supremacy over all time & space. In other words, God is not *arriving* to some coordinate in time/space, but time is waiting to catch up with Him.
Sorry. I had to fix some typos. Reposted:
ReplyDeleteRegarding the prior post, if we are going to demand a logical formula to resolve God's omniscience, then we must also demand a logical formula to resolve God's eternal nature (as well as God's omnipresence).
In other words, if we are going to try to strap God with a logical formula and say, "This is how God is omniscient," then you reasonably must also do the same for God's other features. I would like for you to take the C perspective of omniscience and then wear that on God's other attributes, and see how it fits Him. For instance, take your formula on how God is omniscient (i.e. omniscience necessitates exhaustive predetermination), and therefore God is eternal and omnipresent by the same exact measure. I know that other A's would protest and say: You can't take God's plans or predeterminations and force that to define His essential Being. That would be the "tail wagging the dog." By that reasoning, you would have to conclude that God knows the future (i.e. omniscience) independent of determining *anything*. How that makes sense, I don't know, but nor can I make sense how a Being would have no beginning, or how a Being could be truly omnipresent. Those are things that C's may have been too aggressive in placing in a neat theological box.
I would think that the C position is, no, there is no such thing as independent thought, and there is but one independent thinker in the universe, and that is God, and everyone else is just a subject upon whom God operates. But if that’s the case, then consider the effects, especially in terms of how we assign moral accountability. I know of a particular C who had a lapse in judgment, and his wife scolded him for his lack of judgment. But if that person didn’t act independently, but rather that his thoughts were entirely scripted for him, and scripted from before the foundation of the world, then was it truly “him” doing those things, or was it instead, God simply acting through him? When you think of it that way, the C who made the judgment error has to be viewed from a different light. You might even say, “Well, it wasn’t *him* after all. I mean it was him, but it wasn’t really him. It was God. It was the decree.”
ReplyDeletePer (1), you seem to be equating hard determinism with exhaustive determinism. Indeed, you later refer to God’s “exhaustive decree.” So you seem to be using “hard determinism” as a synonym for God’s exhaustive decree. At least, you regard the latter as a theological version of the former.
ReplyDeleteIf so, that’s not how hard determinism is defined. Rather, hard determinism takes the position that if determinism is true, then we lack the type of freedom required to be morally responsible.
Conversely, compatibilism is not defined in terms of God being to some extent dependent on something in the creature.
“I’ve argued that deterministic Calvinism must ultimately reject the concept of ‘independent thought.’”
I don’t know how you define “independent thought.” By “independent,” do you mean the choices and actions of the human agent must originate with the agent? Must “derive” (or “come”) from the human agent rather than God? You use those terms.
Yet you also seem to define “independence” in terms of randomness (“a random or rogue thought”).
And you also seem to define independence in terms of alternate possibilities (so “that no one could think any thought besides those thoughts that God gives it”).
So you don’t appear to have a clear definition in view. Rather, you seem to be oscillating between three different principles.
You then ask, “Without independent thought, how do we reasonably assign “human blame?”
Actually, I’d turn that around. If an agent can make a different decision given an identical personal history (e.g. same beliefs, memories, feelings, experiences), then in what respect is he the source of the decisions he makes? You could swap in a total stranger with the same result. His decisions don’t derive from his past self. Everything he’s been up to the moment he decides fails to select for his decision. So in which respect does the decision originate from who he uniquely is–rather than someone else?
Richard Coords said...
ReplyDelete“In terms of the Arminian perspective on omniscience, my first point is that before we are in a position to answer the smaller question (i.e. How is God omniscient), we must first answer the larger question (i.e. how is God eternal?) What is your logical formula to explain how a Being that currently exists, has had no beginning? I know that there are mathematical representations of infinity, but what is a logical explanation for how a Being can have no beginning point?”
You’re confused. That question is only pertinent to a process. To something in time. If God is timeless, then that question is inapplicable.
“In other words, if you could tell me how God is eternal, then I could tell you how such a Being knows the future.”
The Boethian solution is a failure. Even libertarian philosophers admit that. You need to brush up on the standard literature.
“The relevance is that Arminians often invoke the eternal now’ perspective…”
Which is incoherent.
“If God is truly omnipresent…”
He isn’t. That’s metaphorical.
“…then this must be for all time & space, so that no coordinate of time/space can hide from God. Pick any coordinate of time/space, and God is there. That would seemingly be a realistic *property* of an ‘eternal Being.’ So God would know the future, because He is already there. In fact, He is both before and after that coordinate in time/space.”
So Arminianism is a version of pantheism or panentheism.
“Regarding the prior post, if we are going to demand a logical formula to resolve God's omniscience, then we must also demand a logical formula to resolve God's eternal nature (as well as God's omnipresence).”
No, it’s not merely a question of how God knows the future. Rather, it’s a question of how God can know the future given the philosophical postulate of man’s libertarian freedom. The philosophical theory of libertarian freedom must stand or fall on its own merits. Likewise, that theory has logical implications for other things. You can’t ride your theory halfway down the hill, then jump off before it smashes into a thousand pieces at the bottom of the hill.
“By that reasoning, you would have to conclude that God knows the future (i.e. omniscience) independent of determining *anything*.”
How did you arrive at that illogical conclusion?
Hello Steve, I'm back from work and I see that you've posted. Thank you for taking the time to review my thoughts. I'll read over it now.
ReplyDelete1) You wrote: “Rather, hard determinism takes the position that if determinism is true, then we lack the type of freedom required to be morally responsible,” and “I don’t know how you define ‘independent thought.’” You added: “If an agent can make a different decision….” [I stopped there. See the next post, due to character constraints.]
ReplyDelete2) You wrote: “You’re confused. That question is only pertinent to a process. To something in time. If God is timeless, then that question is inapplicable.” [But you could at least answer the question. “What is your logical formula to explain how a Being that currently exists, has had no beginning”? If you say, “Well, I have no idea, Richard”, then how can you simultaneously and definitively say, “But we absolutely DO know how such a Being must necessarily know the future, especially when you consider my logical construct.” So I don’t see my question as being either irrelevant or confused]
3) You wrote: “The Boethian solution is a failure.” [But that’s not exactly answering the question, though, either.]
4) You wrote: “So Arminianism is a version of pantheism or Panentheism.” [But you didn’t explain how and why you felt that this position necessarily resulted in pantheism or panentheism, and, just to ensure that I’m not taking a rogue position here, let me quote a leading Arminian on the subject: “…it is possible that God knows the future not by peering forward but by knowing the future directly as already present. If God’s presence dwells in all places (spatially omnipresent), then perhaps we can speak of God as dwelling in all times: past, present and future (temporally omnipresent).” (Why I am not a Calvinist, p.61) You can certainly contend that the “eternal now” perspective is “incoherent,” but I would ask you again, what is your logical formula to explain how God exists as an uncreated Being? Might someone say that that’s “incoherent” too, and yet we as Christians believe it on biblical authority. That’s the point that I’m trying to get across, and yet you appear to sweep it under the rug as the “failure” of the “Boethian solution.”]
Fixing a typo:
ReplyDeleteRegarding point #1, let me quote Walls and Dongell again, just to demonstrate that I’m not taking a rogue position, unless you consider the aforementioned to be rogue agents of Arminianism: “But if God determined who would be born as well as all the choices everyone would ever make, along with a blueprint specifying how these choices will be determined—there is no mystery as to how he can foreknow these choices. In order to be consistent on this point, Calvinists need to be thoroughgoing determinists. One of the interesting things about Calvinism is the variety of opinions on this whole matter.” (Why I am not a Calvinist, p.124) Ok, demonstrating that I haven’t gone rogue here, let me flesh this out again, and let me know how you answer the tough question: Do you, Steve Hays, believe that God possesses the capacity to infallibly *know* the thoughts of any demon, apart from *predetermining* their thoughts? I must insist on a yes/no answer from you, because if you answer “no,” which would be consistent with what you’ve hinted at already, then it necessarily comes at the consequence of meaning that no demon can think any thought besides the ones that God gives it, or else, by your formula, how could God know it? So if the thoughts of the demonic realm is the sum total of every thought that God has ever given it, how could they possibly be thinking “independently” from God’s decree to unilaterally determine their thoughts? Do you see how that relates to my question concerning “independent thought”? So it’s not about whether an agent “can make a different decision,” but whether your view of divine omniscience requires what their decisions must necessarily be. Returning to the point about “independent thought,” do you, Steve Hays, believe that any random demon ever, in its entire existence, ever thought a thought that God didn’t unilaterally give it to think? Now one Calvinist tried to explain that God “didn’t have to,” on the basis “that it was already there.” But stop right there. How was it already there? Was it already there, apart from God’s predeterminations? Because if it is “already there” apart from God’s predeterminations, then guess what, [how] did He know it? You see, your stance on divine omniscience is driving a conclusion that requires such an exhaustive level of determinism that it necessarily results in what you’ve defined as “hard determinism,” which you’ve stated as having the consequence that “we lack the type of freedom required to be morally responsible.” You see, if a demon thinks only the sum total of thoughts that God gives it, then on what basis do you assign moral responsibility? James White argued that “since God judges on the basis of the intentions of the heart, there is in fact a ground for morality and justice.” (Debating Calvinism, p.320) But, if your view of omniscience necessarily requires that God must *determine* the “intentions of the heart” in order to know and have omniscience over what the intentions of the heart are, then God must be judging a subject for the intentions that He gives it. In other words, doesn’t your view of omniscience circumvent any grounds for morality and justice? I know that you will answer “no,” but will you have a logical basis for doing so?
I'll second those questions, Richard, but as I said over at the other thread here, how do Arminians (or any theists who believe in an omniscient and omnipotent God) get out of this pickle?
ReplyDeletecheers from chilly Vienna, zilch
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteHello Zilch,
ReplyDeleteWhich question? Was it the one about how and how and why Theists believe that God exists eternally, without a beginning or origin, without such, being rooted in any known basis of logic? I take it on faith in the authority of Scripture, only insomuch that the strength of the other links in the chain of Scripture, gives me confidence in the other links that I may fully comprehend. Did I read you correctly? I suppose that it is the principle of the benefit of the doubt.
To piggyback on my prior post to Steve, and restated as follows, with the relevant quote from Steve, Steve explains: “Per (1), you seem to be equating hard determinism with exhaustive determinism. Indeed, you later refer to God’s ‘exhaustive decree.’ So you seem to be using ‘hard determinism’ as a synonym for God’s exhaustive decree. At least, you regard the latter as a theological version of the former. If so, that’s not how hard determinism is defined. Rather, hard determinism takes the position that if determinism is true, then we lack the type of freedom required to be morally responsible.”
ReplyDeleteAnd my follow-up question, from my last post, is that: How can we say that there is still a moral basis upon which God can judge man (and thus avoid the negative aspect of hard determinism, as Steve previously stated), if man’s moral basis was 100% determined by God, without which, God could not otherwise know it?
RICHARD COORDS SAID:
ReplyDelete“[But you could at least answer the question. ‘What is your logical formula to explain how a Being that currently exists, has had no beginning”?
There is no right answer to a wrong question. You still don’t get it. You seem to define God’s eternality as everlasting, viz. God has an infinite past. Hence, no beginning point.
You then draw analogies with modern cosmology, viz. how can the universe have an infinite past? This is where the Kalam cosmological argument applies.
If, however, God is timeless, then the question is predicated on a false premise. God doesn’t have a past, much less an infinite past. Therefore, the question of a first moment or “beginning point” is a category mistake.
“You wrote: “The Boethian solution is a failure.” [But that’s not exactly answering the question, though, either.]”
When you talk about the “eternal now perspective,” that goes back to Boethius. I’m responding to you on your own terms.
“[But you didn’t explain how and why you felt that this position necessarily resulted in pantheism or Panentheism.”
If you think God literally occupies space, has spatial properties, spatial extension, then that’s pantheistic or panentheistic.
“But I would ask you again, what is your logical formula to explain how God exists as an uncreated Being? Might someone say that that’s ‘incoherent’ too…”
It would only be incoherent if you construe God’s eternality in linear, temporal terms, viz. infinite past, infinite future.
Cont. “Do you, Steve Hays, believe that God possesses the capacity to infallibly *know* the thoughts of any demon, apart from *predetermining* their thoughts? I must insist on a yes/no answer from you.”
ReplyDeleteI already answered that question.
“So it’s not about whether an agent “can make a different decision…’”
You have difficulty following your own argument. Among other things, you said, “no one could think any thought besides those thoughts that God gives it.” Well, that’s a way of saying he couldn’t think other than or differently than what God decreed.
Moreover, whether or not an agent can make a different decision is certainly germane to a debate over determinism and indeterminism.
“You see, your stance on divine omniscience is driving a conclusion that requires such an exhaustive level of determinism…”
There is more than one reason to believe in predestination. That’s one reason, but there are others. I don’t have to begin with omniscience and reason back to predestination as the necessary precondition for omniscience. That’s one way to do it, but not the only consideration.
“...exhaustive level of determinism that it necessarily results in what you’ve defined as “hard determinism…’”
Once again, exhaustive determinism is not a synonym for hard determinism. Your usage is idiosyncratic. You need to master standard usage and basic concepts.
“You see, if a demon thinks only the sum total of thoughts that God gives it, then on what basis do you assign moral responsibility?…then God must be judging a subject for the intentions that He gives it. In other words, doesn’t your view of omniscience circumvent any grounds for morality and justice?”
You’re not constructing an argument. You’re merely summarizing predestination, as best you understand it, then posing a question. But that’s not an argument against moral ascriptions. I can’t respond to an argument you fail to make.
You also spend a lot of time repeating yourself, using the same phrases. That doesn’t advance the argument.
Hello Steve and thanks again,
ReplyDeleteYou wrote: “[But you could at least answer the question. ‘What is your logical formula to explain how a Being that currently exists, has had no beginning’? There is no right answer to a wrong question. You still don’t get it. You seem to define God’s eternality as everlasting, viz. God has an infinite past. Hence, no beginning point.”
But if I ask you, “So, Steve, you instead believe that God does have a beginning point, and that God does not have an infinite past?”, and then you would respond, “Richard, you still don’t get it.” But isn’t that just the famous “run around” or is there something simple that I am missing here?
You wrote: “If, however, God is timeless, then the question is predicated on a false premise. God doesn’t have a past, much less an infinite past. Therefore, the question of a first moment or “beginning point” is a category mistake.”
But how can you say that God is “timeless” but does not also have an “infinite past”? You’re right. I don’t get it. I’m following your line of reasoning at all. Scripture seems to indicate that God has an infinite past. No? See here:
“Before the mountains were born or You gave birth to the earth and the world, Even from everlasting to everlasting, You are God.” (Psalm 90:2)
“Your throne is established from of old; You are from everlasting.” (Psalm 93:2)
I’m honestly surprised to hear your views on God’s eternal nature, and that omnipresence is just a metaphor, and thanks for clarifying your point on the Boethian Solution.
You said: “You have difficulty following your own argument.”
Let me see if I can word it satisfactorily: “If God cannot otherwise know the thoughts of any demon, without determinism, and yet God DOES infallibly know their thoughts, then it follows by C logic that God must have determined their thoughts, and therefore if there was one single thought in the cosmos which God did not determine, He could not know it, and therefore it follows by the same logic that all thought, human and angelic, stems from God, and that there is but one independent thinker in the cosmos, and all others who possess the capacity to think, think only as the subjects upon whom the one independent thinker provides all thoughts. If I’m completely off base, then just say so and I’ll give up. I just don’t know how to say it any other way, and I don’t seem to grasp your criticism of my question.
Briefly considering these two verses again:
ReplyDelete“Before the mountains were born or You gave birth to the earth and the world, Even from everlasting to everlasting, You are God.” (Psalm 90:2)
“Your throne is established from of old; You are from everlasting.” (Psalm 93:2)
If we are going to talk about the inifinite future, how can we not also talk about the infinite past? That's what I'm not following in your line of reasoning.
Moreover, in my view of God's eternal Being, I'm willing to accept that He has an infinite past, even thought defies known logic. I'm also willing to concede that I have no idea how God is Triune, but I'm willing to accept that too. In fact, I have no idea how God knows anything at all (past, present or future), but yet I am willing to confess that I believe that He knows it all, despite my ability to grasp who He is as a Being.
RICHARD COORDS SAID:
ReplyDelete“But isn’t that just the famous ‘run around’ or is there something simple that I am missing here?”
Yes, there’s something simple that you’re missing.
“But how can you say that God is ‘timeless’ but does not also have an ‘infinite past’?”
The “past” is a temporal category. Infinite duration (if there were such a thing) is a temporal category. But if God is timeless, then his mode of subsistence has no temporal intervals of subdivisions.
Scripture seems to indicate that God has an infinite past. No? See here: ‘Before the mountains were born or You gave birth to the earth and the world, Even from everlasting to everlasting, You are God.” (Psalm 90:2) ‘Your throne is established from of old; You are from everlasting.’ (Psalm 93:2) I’m honestly surprised to hear your views on God’s eternal nature, and that omnipresence is just a metaphor.
Both passages contain evident metaphors. Ps 90:2 depicts Yahweh as a Mother Goddess. Do you think God literally gives birth to mountains?
Ps 93:2 depicted God as a humanoid figured seated on a throne. Do you think God is literally a man in the sky, sitting on a chair?
The Psalms use popular language. Poetic imagery. Anthropomorphisms.
“If we are going to talk about the inifinite future, how can we not also talk about the infinite past?”
God doesn’t have a future–or a past. Human beings have a future because we are temporal creatures.
Richard Coords said...
ReplyDelete"...and therefore it follows by the same logic that all thought, human and angelic, stems from God, and that there is but one independent thinker in the cosmos, and all others who possess the capacity to think, think only as the subjects upon whom the one independent thinker provides all thoughts."
i) Which fails to explain why you suppose that poses a problem for culpability or just desert.
ii) God is the Creator. A se. The only independent being. Creatures are contingent beings, dependent on their Creator.
iii) Actually, it's your position that blurs the distinction between God and creatures. For you make God and creatures range along a common spatiotemporal continuum. For you, the distinction between God and man is quantitative rather than qualitative: God exists in infinite time and space whereas we exist in finite time and space. So you're the one whose position is monistic, by making God and man the same kind of being–just a difference of degree.
Hello Steve,
ReplyDelete1. Isn’t it instead, your position, which blurs the distinction between God and creatures? In other words, if I’m reading you correctly, you are making God and creatures range along a common "spatiotemporal continuum." For you, the distinction between God and man is quantitative rather than qualitative: God exists in infinite time & space whereas we, man, exist in finite time & space. So aren’t you the one whose position is monistic, that is, by making God and man into the same kind of being–just a difference of degree?
2. You state that, "God doesn’t have a future–or a past." This is the point – logically explain that? By you simply stating it, does not make it so.
3. To reiterate the point on omniscience, as it relates to the demonic realm, the principle issue is how can God know a demon's thoughts before they have made them, ***unless He thinks them for them***, and that’s a fundamental problem for anyone possessing a High view of the morality of God, when considering just how unholy the demonic realm is, and just how angry God gets, whenever anyone attributes the work of the Holy Spirit to evil demons. Do you see the problem there? Based upon my understanding of your view, God can *only know* what He, God, thinks (and not in any way contingent upon what the evil demon would think first, and then God reacts to it.) Can you explain how demons acted freely, without God determining them to think it first? That, to me, is fundamental.
RICHARD COORDS SAID:
ReplyDeleteHello Steve,
"1. Isn’t it instead, your position, which blurs the distinction between God and creatures? In other words, if I’m reading you correctly, you are making God and creatures range along a common 'spatiotemporal continuum.' For you, the distinction between God and man is quantitative rather than qualitative: God exists in infinite time & space whereas we, man, exist in finite time & space. So aren’t you the one whose position is monistic, that is, by making God and man into the same kind of being–just a difference of degree?"
You suffer from profound reading incomprehension. You're imputing your own position to me, whereas I'm made it clear that I think God is timeless and spaceless. Apparently you lack the critical detachment to think outside your own viewpoint and assume the viewpoint of your opponent (for the sake of argument).
You state that, 'God doesn’t have a future–or a past.' This is the point – logically explain that? By you simply stating it, does not make it so.
ReplyDeleteI did explain that. If God is timeless, then he lacks temporal attributes. Remember that I'm responding to the conclusions you draw from your own framework.
Richard Coords said...
ReplyDelete"3. To reiterate the point on omniscience, as it relates to the demonic realm, the principle issue is how can God know a demon's thoughts before they have made them, ***unless He thinks them for them***..."
I didn't say he does the thinking for them, as if they are mindless. Their minds are ontologically distinct from God's mind. God's mind is timeless, whereas he objectifies demons in time.
Their thoughts exactly correspond to what he decreed for them to think.
"...and that’s a fundamental problem for anyone possessing a High view of the morality of God, when considering just how unholy the demonic realm is..."
This has been repeatedly explained to you. You modus operandi is to raise an objection, when the objection is answered, you repeated the same objection as if no response was given. You need to adapt to counterarguments.
God can ordain something unholy as a means to a greater good or incommensurable good. It's simplistic to consider things in isolation. Take the crucifixion.
"...and just how angry God gets, whenever anyone attributes the work of the Holy Spirit to evil demons."
i) I don't think God literally gets angry. That's anthropomorphic.
ii) Demons are agents in their own right. God has ordained a system of second-causes. You're confusing predestination with occasionalism.
iii) And don't forget the Arminian doctrine of providence. In Arminian theology, God must providentially collaborate with whatever demons do. Sustain them, enable them. In Arminian theology, God is providentially complicit in whatever evildoers do.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteHello Steve,
ReplyDeleteColossians 1:17: “He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together.”
1) If God lacks… temporal qualities (lacking past, present and future), then (a) how does He interact with the temporal cosmos?, and (b) how can He not have an infinite past when yet Scripture states that He is “before all things” in having spoken the words, “Let there be light,” with the result that He brought all things into existence, i.e. the heavens and the earth? In other words, although God is timeless, He nonetheless does also act within His creation, in time, and predates the cosmos which houses His created beings.
2) If God lacks… emotional qualities, then (a) how does He interact with emotional beings?, and (b) are we not created in His image and in His likeness, which by necessity, must also include His emotional qualities? By your continual dependence upon the Alegorical Method, aren’t you falling into Neo-Platonian & Manichaean trappings, in relegating all divine displays of emotion into the stale category of “metaphor and anthropomorphism”?
3) If God lacks… the ability to know any thought of a demon [without determining them], with the resulting necessity that “their thoughts exactly correspond” with God’s thoughts & motives for them, then (a) by declaring the demons to be an “agent,” are you not instinctively seeking some sense of “independence” upon which to hold them “morally accountable,” and (b) if “their thoughts exactly correspond” with God’s thoughts & motives for them, then how does the “sentient being” defense provide any safe haven, in defense of the “puppetry charge” which you refused to initially grant?
4) In terms of Arminian Providence, the fact that God keeps and sustains the world in existence, does not logically require that God brings about every event in our lives. By analogy, the sun sustains our lives, without which we could not otherwise survive, and yet, the mere fact of the existence of the sun, does not entail that every decision made “under the sun” is the cause of the sun. Why don’t you grant a “multi-faceted” perspective, which you elsewhere reserve for your own defense? According to 1st Corinthians 10:13, God keeps and sustains the world, that is, a world which does include temptations, but yet God also provides alternative choices, namely, a “way of escape” from temptations, and therefore, with the alternatives provided, the Arminian model of Providence means that God has the power to both (a) grant us alternatives, and (b) the means to select His divine opportunities, thus forming a meaningful basis for moral accountability, which Calvinistic Providence otherwise lacks, and which by necessity of logic, demands the furthest extreme end of Hard Determinism.
RICHARD COORDS SAID:
ReplyDelete"Colossians 1:17: 'He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together.'”
"Before" is literally a spatial preposition which is also used metaphorically to indicate temporal relations. It's not as if time is actually linear. That confuses a geometric representation with reality.
"1) If God lacks… temporal qualities (lacking past, present and future), then (a) how does He interact with the temporal cosmos?"
He doesn't literally "interact" with the cosmos. Rather, he enacts the cosmos. Instantiates his concept of the cosmos.
"...how can He not have an infinite past when yet Scripture states that He is “before all things."
Try reading a standard monograph on the subject, such as Paul Helm's Eternal God (2nd ed.).
"2) If God lacks… emotional qualities, then (a) how does He interact with emotional beings?"
If God lacks homosexual lust, how can he interact with sodomites?
Anyway, I didn't say he lacks emotional qualities. But not all human emotions are literally attributable to God.
"...are we not created in His image and in His likeness, which by necessity, must also include His emotional qualities?"
Since you haven't bothered to exegete the image of God in Biblical usage, your inference begs the question.
"By your continual dependence upon the Alegorical Method."
I haven't relied on the allegorical method. But you need to learn the basics of analogical predication.
"...aren’t you falling into Neo-Platonian & Manichaean trappings, in relegating all divine displays of emotion into the stale category of 'metaphor and anthropomorphism?"
Unless you're a Mormon or open theist, you must make allowance for metaphor and anthropomorphism.
"...by declaring the demons to be an 'agent,' are you not instinctively seeking some sense of 'independence' upon which to hold them 'morally accountable."
No, I'm just affirming a metaphysical distinction between the creature and the Creator.
"...if 'their' thoughts exactly correspond' with God’s thoughts & motives for them, then how does the 'sentient being' defense provide any safe haven, in defense of the 'puppetry charge' which you refused to initially grant?"
Since puppets don't have thoughts, period, they don't have thoughts that correspond to a puppeteer. So your comparison is fatally equivocal.
"In terms of Arminian Providence, the fact that God keeps and sustains the world in existence, does not logically require that God brings about every event in our lives."
According to Arminius and Roger Olson, God both permits and effects a sinful act. God cooperates with the creature in sinning.
So God aids and abets the sin of the sinner.
"According to 1st Corinthians 10:13..."
I've discussed that verse on many occasions. You're way behind the curve.
"...and which by necessity of logic, demands the furthest extreme end of Hard Determinism."
You keep misdefining "hard determinism." You need to bone up on the standard philosophical literature.