Is God the author of good?

Arminians typically obsess about Calvinism making God the “author of evil.” But another question is whether Arminianism is able to make God the author of good.

I think every attempt to explain why foreordaining evil, immorality, is not morally wrong is a (possibly unconscious) subterfuge. I think it is self-evident that to plan and render certain someone else’s sin is to participate in that sin no matter what one’s own intentions were because, to do this, in a way that would absolutely assure the outcome, one would have to also plan and render certain the sinner’s morally wrong intentions.

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2012/01/strong-meat-not-milk-are-some-things-impossible-to-believe/

There are several problems with this argument:

i) To begin with, let’s clarify his argument. His fundamental objection is not to planning or ensuring the outcome, per se. Rather, his objection is to the consequences of planning and ensuring the outcome. What he deems unacceptable is how that would make God a “participant” in the outcome–where the outcome is evil, or the result of evil human intentions.

ii) There are, however, other ways of making God a participant in the outcome short of planning or ensuring the outcome.

If, according to Arminianism, God makes a world with foreseeable evil events, then he’s a participant in the end-result. That outcome wouldn’t result apart from God’s creative contribution to the outcome.

Likewise, according to Arminianism, God’s providentially enables the sinner to sin. So that makes God a participant in the sinner’s sin.

iii) But let’s examine the issue from another angle. Olson apparently thinks it’s okay for God to plan or ensure moral goods, but not moral evils.

But the problem with this dichotomy is that, in a fallen world, good and evil are often causally intertwined–like the parable of the tares (Mt 13:24-30). For one thing, human beings are social creatures. Many human endeavors involve our collective effort. So you can’t evaluate the outcome from individual intentions alone, for different contributors have different intentions–for good or ill. 

For instance, suppose two medical researchers collaborate to discover the cure for a terrible disease. One scientist is motivated by humanitarian concerns. He wants to alleviate pain and suffering. Premature death.

His partner is motivated by selfish, vainglorious ambitions. He wants to be famous. Win a Nobel prize.  Have a cure named after him. Be cited in medical textbooks.

Now Olson presumably thinks the cure is a good thing. Does he therefore think the Arminian God planned and rendered certain that morally good outcome?

Yet that scientific discovery is causally contingent on a scientific collaboration. Does he think the Arminian God planned or ensured the virtuous intentions of the philanthropic partner while leaving the sinful intentions of his collaborator unplanned and uncertain?

But in that case, how did the Arminian God plan or ensure the scientific discovery? If the outcome results from the accidental conjunction of random variables that coincidentally intersect with planned variables, then the outcome can’t be divinely planned and rendered certain.

Except for certain causally discrete miracles which God performs directly, it’s hard to see how Olson can attribute any morally good complex event to divine planning and providence. And in that case, there’s not much to thank God for.