tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post1956484330764539572..comments2024-03-27T17:15:37.606-04:00Comments on Triablogue: Punch & JudyRyanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17809283662428917799noreply@blogger.comBlogger31125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-10122758487495337712012-01-29T14:49:44.028-05:002012-01-29T14:49:44.028-05:00RICHARD COORDS SAID:
"Colossians 1:17: '...RICHARD COORDS SAID:<br /><br />"Colossians 1:17: 'He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together.'”<br /><br />"Before" is literally a spatial preposition which is also used metaphorically to indicate temporal relations. It's not as if time is actually linear. That confuses a geometric representation with reality.<br /><br />"1) If God lacks… temporal qualities (lacking past, present and future), then (a) how does He interact with the temporal cosmos?"<br /><br />He doesn't literally "interact" with the cosmos. Rather, he enacts the cosmos. Instantiates his concept of the cosmos. <br /><br />"...how can He not have an infinite past when yet Scripture states that He is “before all things."<br /><br />Try reading a standard monograph on the subject, such as Paul Helm's Eternal God (2nd ed.).<br /><br />"2) If God lacks… emotional qualities, then (a) how does He interact with emotional beings?"<br /><br />If God lacks homosexual lust, how can he interact with sodomites? <br /><br />Anyway, I didn't say he lacks emotional qualities. But not all human emotions are literally attributable to God.<br /><br />"...are we not created in His image and in His likeness, which by necessity, must also include His emotional qualities?"<br /><br />Since you haven't bothered to exegete the image of God in Biblical usage, your inference begs the question.<br /><br />"By your continual dependence upon the Alegorical Method."<br /><br />I haven't relied on the allegorical method. But you need to learn the basics of analogical predication.<br /><br />"...aren’t you falling into Neo-Platonian & Manichaean trappings, in relegating all divine displays of emotion into the stale category of 'metaphor and anthropomorphism?"<br /><br />Unless you're a Mormon or open theist, you must make allowance for metaphor and anthropomorphism.<br /><br />"...by declaring the demons to be an 'agent,' are you not instinctively seeking some sense of 'independence' upon which to hold them 'morally accountable."<br /><br />No, I'm just affirming a metaphysical distinction between the creature and the Creator. <br /><br />"...if 'their' thoughts exactly correspond' with God’s thoughts & motives for them, then how does the 'sentient being' defense provide any safe haven, in defense of the 'puppetry charge' which you refused to initially grant?"<br /><br />Since puppets don't have thoughts, period, they don't have thoughts that correspond to a puppeteer. So your comparison is fatally equivocal.<br /><br />"In terms of Arminian Providence, the fact that God keeps and sustains the world in existence, does not logically require that God brings about every event in our lives."<br /><br />According to Arminius and Roger Olson, God both permits and effects a sinful act. God cooperates with the creature in sinning.<br /><br />So God aids and abets the sin of the sinner.<br /><br />"According to 1st Corinthians 10:13..."<br /><br />I've discussed that verse on many occasions. You're way behind the curve. <br /><br />"...and which by necessity of logic, demands the furthest extreme end of Hard Determinism."<br /><br />You keep misdefining "hard determinism." You need to bone up on the standard philosophical literature.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-75875744128064383942012-01-29T13:39:26.667-05:002012-01-29T13:39:26.667-05:00Hello Steve,
Colossians 1:17: “He is before all t...Hello Steve,<br /><br />Colossians 1:17: “He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together.”<br /><br />1) If God lacks… temporal qualities (lacking past, present and future), then (a) how does He interact with the temporal cosmos?, and (b) how can He not have an infinite past when yet Scripture states that He is “before all things” in having spoken the words, “Let there be light,” with the result that He brought all things into existence, i.e. the heavens and the earth? In other words, although God is timeless, He nonetheless does also act within His creation, in time, and predates the cosmos which houses His created beings.<br /><br />2) If God lacks… emotional qualities, then (a) how does He interact with emotional beings?, and (b) are we not created in His image and in His likeness, which by necessity, must also include His emotional qualities? By your continual dependence upon the Alegorical Method, aren’t you falling into Neo-Platonian & Manichaean trappings, in relegating all divine displays of emotion into the stale category of “metaphor and anthropomorphism”?<br /><br />3) If God lacks… the ability to know any thought of a demon [without determining them], with the resulting necessity that “their thoughts exactly correspond” with God’s thoughts & motives for them, then (a) by declaring the demons to be an “agent,” are you not instinctively seeking some sense of “independence” upon which to hold them “morally accountable,” and (b) if “their thoughts exactly correspond” with God’s thoughts & motives for them, then how does the “sentient being” defense provide any safe haven, in defense of the “puppetry charge” which you refused to initially grant?<br /><br />4) In terms of Arminian Providence, the fact that God keeps and sustains the world in existence, does not logically require that God brings about every event in our lives. By analogy, the sun sustains our lives, without which we could not otherwise survive, and yet, the mere fact of the existence of the sun, does not entail that every decision made “under the sun” is the cause of the sun. Why don’t you grant a “multi-faceted” perspective, which you elsewhere reserve for your own defense? According to 1st Corinthians 10:13, God keeps and sustains the world, that is, a world which does include temptations, but yet God also provides alternative choices, namely, a “way of escape” from temptations, and therefore, with the alternatives provided, the Arminian model of Providence means that God has the power to both (a) grant us alternatives, and (b) the means to select His divine opportunities, thus forming a meaningful basis for moral accountability, which Calvinistic Providence otherwise lacks, and which by necessity of logic, demands the furthest extreme end of Hard Determinism.Richard Coordshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05600859155973820653noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-77348377336743830982012-01-29T13:33:34.190-05:002012-01-29T13:33:34.190-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Richard Coordshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05600859155973820653noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-32076564484447415862012-01-29T13:30:11.355-05:002012-01-29T13:30:11.355-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Richard Coordshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05600859155973820653noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-16272829244290454472012-01-29T08:00:48.049-05:002012-01-29T08:00:48.049-05:00Richard Coords said...
"3. To reiterate the ...Richard Coords said...<br /><br />"3. To reiterate the point on omniscience, as it relates to the demonic realm, the principle issue is how can God know a demon's thoughts before they have made them, ***unless He thinks them for them***..."<br /><br />I didn't say he does the thinking for them, as if they are mindless. Their minds are ontologically distinct from God's mind. God's mind is timeless, whereas he objectifies demons in time. <br /><br />Their thoughts exactly correspond to what he decreed for them to think. <br /><br />"...and that’s a fundamental problem for anyone possessing a High view of the morality of God, when considering just how unholy the demonic realm is..."<br /><br />This has been repeatedly explained to you. You modus operandi is to raise an objection, when the objection is answered, you repeated the same objection as if no response was given. You need to adapt to counterarguments. <br /><br />God can ordain something unholy as a means to a greater good or incommensurable good. It's simplistic to consider things in isolation. Take the crucifixion. <br /><br />"...and just how angry God gets, whenever anyone attributes the work of the Holy Spirit to evil demons."<br /><br />i) I don't think God literally gets angry. That's anthropomorphic.<br /><br />ii) Demons are agents in their own right. God has ordained a system of second-causes. You're confusing predestination with occasionalism. <br /><br />iii) And don't forget the Arminian doctrine of providence. In Arminian theology, God must providentially collaborate with whatever demons do. Sustain them, enable them. In Arminian theology, God is providentially complicit in whatever evildoers do.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-58362611393081643752012-01-29T07:50:32.149-05:002012-01-29T07:50:32.149-05:00You state that, 'God doesn’t have a future–or ...You state that, 'God doesn’t have a future–or a past.' This is the point – logically explain that? By you simply stating it, does not make it so.<br /><br />I did explain that. If God is timeless, then he lacks temporal attributes. Remember that I'm responding to the conclusions you draw from your own framework.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-79900077065891287652012-01-29T07:46:59.918-05:002012-01-29T07:46:59.918-05:00RICHARD COORDS SAID:
Hello Steve,
"1. Isn’t...RICHARD COORDS SAID:<br />Hello Steve, <br /><br />"1. Isn’t it instead, your position, which blurs the distinction between God and creatures? In other words, if I’m reading you correctly, you are making God and creatures range along a common 'spatiotemporal continuum.' For you, the distinction between God and man is quantitative rather than qualitative: God exists in infinite time & space whereas we, man, exist in finite time & space. So aren’t you the one whose position is monistic, that is, by making God and man into the same kind of being–just a difference of degree?"<br /><br />You suffer from profound reading incomprehension. You're imputing your own position to me, whereas I'm made it clear that I think God is timeless and spaceless. Apparently you lack the critical detachment to think outside your own viewpoint and assume the viewpoint of your opponent (for the sake of argument).stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-11284295471416518442012-01-28T23:08:35.369-05:002012-01-28T23:08:35.369-05:00Hello Steve,
1. Isn’t it instead, your position,...Hello Steve, <br /><br />1. Isn’t it instead, your position, which blurs the distinction between God and creatures? In other words, if I’m reading you correctly, you are making God and creatures range along a common "spatiotemporal continuum." For you, the distinction between God and man is quantitative rather than qualitative: God exists in infinite time & space whereas we, man, exist in finite time & space. So aren’t you the one whose position is monistic, that is, by making God and man into the same kind of being–just a difference of degree?<br /><br />2. You state that, "God doesn’t have a future–or a past." This is the point – logically explain that? By you simply stating it, does not make it so.<br /><br />3. To reiterate the point on omniscience, as it relates to the demonic realm, the principle issue is how can God know a demon's thoughts before they have made them, ***unless He thinks them for them***, and that’s a fundamental problem for anyone possessing a High view of the morality of God, when considering just how unholy the demonic realm is, and just how angry God gets, whenever anyone attributes the work of the Holy Spirit to evil demons. Do you see the problem there? Based upon my understanding of your view, God can *only know* what He, God, thinks (and not in any way contingent upon what the evil demon would think first, and then God reacts to it.) Can you explain how demons acted freely, without God determining them to think it first? That, to me, is fundamental.Richard Coordshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05600859155973820653noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-74254075074387768722012-01-27T14:51:46.922-05:002012-01-27T14:51:46.922-05:00Richard Coords said...
"...and therefore it ...Richard Coords said...<br /><br />"...and therefore it follows by the same logic that all thought, human and angelic, stems from God, and that there is but one independent thinker in the cosmos, and all others who possess the capacity to think, think only as the subjects upon whom the one independent thinker provides all thoughts."<br /><br />i) Which fails to explain why you suppose that poses a problem for culpability or just desert.<br /><br />ii) God is the Creator. A se. The only independent being. Creatures are contingent beings, dependent on their Creator. <br /><br />iii) Actually, it's your position that blurs the distinction between God and creatures. For you make God and creatures range along a common spatiotemporal continuum. For you, the distinction between God and man is quantitative rather than qualitative: God exists in infinite time and space whereas we exist in finite time and space. So you're the one whose position is monistic, by making God and man the same kind of being–just a difference of degree.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-59009210282173506832012-01-27T14:40:20.428-05:002012-01-27T14:40:20.428-05:00RICHARD COORDS SAID:
“But isn’t that just the fam...RICHARD COORDS SAID:<br /><br />“But isn’t that just the famous ‘run around’ or is there something simple that I am missing here?”<br /><br />Yes, there’s something simple that you’re missing.<br /><br />“But how can you say that God is ‘timeless’ but does not also have an ‘infinite past’?”<br /><br />The “past” is a temporal category. Infinite duration (if there were such a thing) is a temporal category. But if God is timeless, then his mode of subsistence has no temporal intervals of subdivisions. <br /><br />Scripture seems to indicate that God has an infinite past. No? See here: ‘Before the mountains were born or You gave birth to the earth and the world, Even from everlasting to everlasting, You are God.” (Psalm 90:2) ‘Your throne is established from of old; You are from everlasting.’ (Psalm 93:2) I’m honestly surprised to hear your views on God’s eternal nature, and that omnipresence is just a metaphor.<br /><br />Both passages contain evident metaphors. Ps 90:2 depicts Yahweh as a Mother Goddess. Do you think God literally gives birth to mountains?<br /><br />Ps 93:2 depicted God as a humanoid figured seated on a throne. Do you think God is literally a man in the sky, sitting on a chair?<br /><br />The Psalms use popular language. Poetic imagery. Anthropomorphisms. <br /><br />“If we are going to talk about the inifinite future, how can we not also talk about the infinite past?”<br /><br />God doesn’t have a future–or a past. Human beings have a future because we are temporal creatures.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-60125220145349353692012-01-27T12:39:24.327-05:002012-01-27T12:39:24.327-05:00Briefly considering these two verses again:
“Befo...Briefly considering these two verses again:<br /><br />“Before the mountains were born or You gave birth to the earth and the world, Even from everlasting to everlasting, You are God.” (Psalm 90:2) <br /><br />“Your throne is established from of old; You are from everlasting.” (Psalm 93:2)<br /><br />If we are going to talk about the inifinite future, how can we not also talk about the infinite past? That's what I'm not following in your line of reasoning.<br /><br />Moreover, in my view of God's eternal Being, I'm willing to accept that He has an infinite past, even thought defies known logic. I'm also willing to concede that I have no idea how God is Triune, but I'm willing to accept that too. In fact, I have no idea how God knows anything at all (past, present or future), but yet I am willing to confess that I believe that He knows it all, despite my ability to grasp who He is as a Being.Richard Coordshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05600859155973820653noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-80997823546759012122012-01-27T12:25:01.056-05:002012-01-27T12:25:01.056-05:00Hello Steve and thanks again,
You wrote: “[But yo...Hello Steve and thanks again,<br /><br />You wrote: “[But you could at least answer the question. ‘What is your logical formula to explain how a Being that currently exists, has had no beginning’? There is no right answer to a wrong question. You still don’t get it. You seem to define God’s eternality as everlasting, viz. God has an infinite past. Hence, no beginning point.” <br /><br />But if I ask you, “So, Steve, you instead believe that God does have a beginning point, and that God does not have an infinite past?”, and then you would respond, “Richard, you still don’t get it.” But isn’t that just the famous “run around” or is there something simple that I am missing here?<br /><br />You wrote: “If, however, God is timeless, then the question is predicated on a false premise. God doesn’t have a past, much less an infinite past. Therefore, the question of a first moment or “beginning point” is a category mistake.”<br /><br />But how can you say that God is “timeless” but does not also have an “infinite past”? You’re right. I don’t get it. I’m following your line of reasoning at all. Scripture seems to indicate that God has an infinite past. No? See here:<br /><br />“Before the mountains were born or You gave birth to the earth and the world, Even from everlasting to everlasting, You are God.” (Psalm 90:2) <br /><br />“Your throne is established from of old; You are from everlasting.” (Psalm 93:2)<br /><br />I’m honestly surprised to hear your views on God’s eternal nature, and that omnipresence is just a metaphor, and thanks for clarifying your point on the Boethian Solution. <br /><br />You said: “You have difficulty following your own argument.” <br />Let me see if I can word it satisfactorily: “If God cannot otherwise know the thoughts of any demon, without determinism, and yet God DOES infallibly know their thoughts, then it follows by C logic that God must have determined their thoughts, and therefore if there was one single thought in the cosmos which God did not determine, He could not know it, and therefore it follows by the same logic that all thought, human and angelic, stems from God, and that there is but one independent thinker in the cosmos, and all others who possess the capacity to think, think only as the subjects upon whom the one independent thinker provides all thoughts. If I’m completely off base, then just say so and I’ll give up. I just don’t know how to say it any other way, and I don’t seem to grasp your criticism of my question.Richard Coordshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05600859155973820653noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-8581840427134870272012-01-27T09:51:34.264-05:002012-01-27T09:51:34.264-05:00Cont. “Do you, Steve Hays, believe that God posses...Cont. “Do you, Steve Hays, believe that God possesses the capacity to infallibly *know* the thoughts of any demon, apart from *predetermining* their thoughts? I must insist on a yes/no answer from you.”<br /><br />I already answered that question.<br /><br />“So it’s not about whether an agent “can make a different decision…’”<br /><br />You have difficulty following your own argument. Among other things, you said, “no one could think any thought besides those thoughts that God gives it.” Well, that’s a way of saying he couldn’t think other than or differently than what God decreed.<br /><br />Moreover, whether or not an agent can make a different decision is certainly germane to a debate over determinism and indeterminism. <br /><br />“You see, your stance on divine omniscience is driving a conclusion that requires such an exhaustive level of determinism…”<br /><br />There is more than one reason to believe in predestination. That’s one reason, but there are others. I don’t have to begin with omniscience and reason back to predestination as the necessary precondition for omniscience. That’s one way to do it, but not the only consideration.<br /><br />“...exhaustive level of determinism that it necessarily results in what you’ve defined as “hard determinism…’”<br /><br />Once again, exhaustive determinism is not a synonym for hard determinism. Your usage is idiosyncratic. You need to master standard usage and basic concepts. <br /><br />“You see, if a demon thinks only the sum total of thoughts that God gives it, then on what basis do you assign moral responsibility?…then God must be judging a subject for the intentions that He gives it. In other words, doesn’t your view of omniscience circumvent any grounds for morality and justice?”<br /><br />You’re not constructing an argument. You’re merely summarizing predestination, as best you understand it, then posing a question. But that’s not an argument against moral ascriptions. I can’t respond to an argument you fail to make. <br /><br />You also spend a lot of time repeating yourself, using the same phrases. That doesn’t advance the argument.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-33800049253099567652012-01-27T09:51:01.654-05:002012-01-27T09:51:01.654-05:00RICHARD COORDS SAID:
“[But you could at least ans...RICHARD COORDS SAID:<br /><br />“[But you could at least answer the question. ‘What is your logical formula to explain how a Being that currently exists, has had no beginning”?<br /><br />There is no right answer to a wrong question. You still don’t get it. You seem to define God’s eternality as everlasting, viz. God has an infinite past. Hence, no beginning point. <br /><br />You then draw analogies with modern cosmology, viz. how can the universe have an infinite past? This is where the Kalam cosmological argument applies. <br /><br />If, however, God is timeless, then the question is predicated on a false premise. God doesn’t have a past, much less an infinite past. Therefore, the question of a first moment or “beginning point” is a category mistake.<br /><br />“You wrote: “The Boethian solution is a failure.” [But that’s not exactly answering the question, though, either.]”<br /><br />When you talk about the “eternal now perspective,” that goes back to Boethius. I’m responding to you on your own terms. <br /><br />“[But you didn’t explain how and why you felt that this position necessarily resulted in pantheism or Panentheism.”<br /><br />If you think God literally occupies space, has spatial properties, spatial extension, then that’s pantheistic or panentheistic. <br /><br />“But I would ask you again, what is your logical formula to explain how God exists as an uncreated Being? Might someone say that that’s ‘incoherent’ too…”<br /><br />It would only be incoherent if you construe God’s eternality in linear, temporal terms, viz. infinite past, infinite future.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-36468004926835434592012-01-27T09:32:55.930-05:002012-01-27T09:32:55.930-05:00To piggyback on my prior post to Steve, and restat...To piggyback on my prior post to Steve, and restated as follows, with the relevant quote from Steve, Steve explains: “Per (1), you seem to be equating hard determinism with exhaustive determinism. Indeed, you later refer to God’s ‘exhaustive decree.’ So you seem to be using ‘hard determinism’ as a synonym for God’s exhaustive decree. At least, you regard the latter as a theological version of the former. If so, that’s not how hard determinism is defined. Rather, hard determinism takes the position that if determinism is true, then we lack the type of freedom required to be morally responsible.”<br /><br />And my follow-up question, from my last post, is that: How can we say that there is still a moral basis upon which God can judge man (and thus avoid the negative aspect of hard determinism, as Steve previously stated), if man’s moral basis was 100% determined by God, without which, God could not otherwise know it?Richard Coordshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05600859155973820653noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-14550994959523965532012-01-27T09:23:56.741-05:002012-01-27T09:23:56.741-05:00Hello Zilch,
Which question? Was it the one about...Hello Zilch,<br /><br />Which question? Was it the one about how and how and why Theists believe that God exists eternally, without a beginning or origin, without such, being rooted in any known basis of logic? I take it on faith in the authority of Scripture, only insomuch that the strength of the other links in the chain of Scripture, gives me confidence in the other links that I may fully comprehend. Did I read you correctly? I suppose that it is the principle of the benefit of the doubt.Richard Coordshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05600859155973820653noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-42780609062737981432012-01-27T09:19:44.850-05:002012-01-27T09:19:44.850-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Richard Coordshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05600859155973820653noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-76099410367789462902012-01-27T04:41:10.685-05:002012-01-27T04:41:10.685-05:00I'll second those questions, Richard, but as I...I'll second those questions, Richard, but as I said over at the other thread here, how do Arminians (or any theists who believe in an omniscient and omnipotent God) get out of this pickle?<br /><br />cheers from chilly Vienna, zilchzilchhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01695741977946935771noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-76554993144503818332012-01-27T00:11:45.628-05:002012-01-27T00:11:45.628-05:00Fixing a typo:
Regarding point #1, let me quote ...Fixing a typo: <br /><br />Regarding point #1, let me quote Walls and Dongell again, just to demonstrate that I’m not taking a rogue position, unless you consider the aforementioned to be rogue agents of Arminianism: “But if God determined who would be born as well as all the choices everyone would ever make, along with a blueprint specifying how these choices will be determined—there is no mystery as to how he can foreknow these choices. In order to be consistent on this point, Calvinists need to be thoroughgoing determinists. One of the interesting things about Calvinism is the variety of opinions on this whole matter.” (Why I am not a Calvinist, p.124) Ok, demonstrating that I haven’t gone rogue here, let me flesh this out again, and let me know how you answer the tough question: Do you, Steve Hays, believe that God possesses the capacity to infallibly *know* the thoughts of any demon, apart from *predetermining* their thoughts? I must insist on a yes/no answer from you, because if you answer “no,” which would be consistent with what you’ve hinted at already, then it necessarily comes at the consequence of meaning that no demon can think any thought besides the ones that God gives it, or else, by your formula, how could God know it? So if the thoughts of the demonic realm is the sum total of every thought that God has ever given it, how could they possibly be thinking “independently” from God’s decree to unilaterally determine their thoughts? Do you see how that relates to my question concerning “independent thought”? So it’s not about whether an agent “can make a different decision,” but whether your view of divine omniscience requires what their decisions must necessarily be. Returning to the point about “independent thought,” do you, Steve Hays, believe that any random demon ever, in its entire existence, ever thought a thought that God didn’t unilaterally give it to think? Now one Calvinist tried to explain that God “didn’t have to,” on the basis “that it was already there.” But stop right there. How was it already there? Was it already there, apart from God’s predeterminations? Because if it is “already there” apart from God’s predeterminations, then guess what, [how] did He know it? You see, your stance on divine omniscience is driving a conclusion that requires such an exhaustive level of determinism that it necessarily results in what you’ve defined as “hard determinism,” which you’ve stated as having the consequence that “we lack the type of freedom required to be morally responsible.” You see, if a demon thinks only the sum total of thoughts that God gives it, then on what basis do you assign moral responsibility? James White argued that “since God judges on the basis of the intentions of the heart, there is in fact a ground for morality and justice.” (Debating Calvinism, p.320) But, if your view of omniscience necessarily requires that God must *determine* the “intentions of the heart” in order to know and have omniscience over what the intentions of the heart are, then God must be judging a subject for the intentions that He gives it. In other words, doesn’t your view of omniscience circumvent any grounds for morality and justice? I know that you will answer “no,” but will you have a logical basis for doing so?Richard Coordshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05600859155973820653noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-69503455707528611992012-01-27T00:05:10.579-05:002012-01-27T00:05:10.579-05:001) You wrote: “Rather, hard determinism takes the ...1) You wrote: “Rather, hard determinism takes the position that if determinism is true, then we lack the type of freedom required to be morally responsible,” and “I don’t know how you define ‘independent thought.’” You added: “If an agent can make a different decision….” [I stopped there. See the next post, due to character constraints.]<br /><br />2) You wrote: “You’re confused. That question is only pertinent to a process. To something in time. If God is timeless, then that question is inapplicable.” [But you could at least answer the question. “What is your logical formula to explain how a Being that currently exists, has had no beginning”? If you say, “Well, I have no idea, Richard”, then how can you simultaneously and definitively say, “But we absolutely DO know how such a Being must necessarily know the future, especially when you consider my logical construct.” So I don’t see my question as being either irrelevant or confused] <br /><br />3) You wrote: “The Boethian solution is a failure.” [But that’s not exactly answering the question, though, either.]<br /><br />4) You wrote: “So Arminianism is a version of pantheism or Panentheism.” [But you didn’t explain how and why you felt that this position necessarily resulted in pantheism or panentheism, and, just to ensure that I’m not taking a rogue position here, let me quote a leading Arminian on the subject: “…it is possible that God knows the future not by peering forward but by knowing the future directly as already present. If God’s presence dwells in all places (spatially omnipresent), then perhaps we can speak of God as dwelling in all times: past, present and future (temporally omnipresent).” (Why I am not a Calvinist, p.61) You can certainly contend that the “eternal now” perspective is “incoherent,” but I would ask you again, what is your logical formula to explain how God exists as an uncreated Being? Might someone say that that’s “incoherent” too, and yet we as Christians believe it on biblical authority. That’s the point that I’m trying to get across, and yet you appear to sweep it under the rug as the “failure” of the “Boethian solution.”]Richard Coordshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05600859155973820653noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-36799965365375012792012-01-26T22:15:37.258-05:002012-01-26T22:15:37.258-05:00Hello Steve, I'm back from work and I see that...Hello Steve, I'm back from work and I see that you've posted. Thank you for taking the time to review my thoughts. I'll read over it now.Richard Coordshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05600859155973820653noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-5246850187543538872012-01-26T21:59:01.064-05:002012-01-26T21:59:01.064-05:00Richard Coords said...
“In terms of the Arminian ...Richard Coords said...<br /><br />“In terms of the Arminian perspective on omniscience, my first point is that before we are in a position to answer the smaller question (i.e. How is God omniscient), we must first answer the larger question (i.e. how is God eternal?) What is your logical formula to explain how a Being that currently exists, has had no beginning? I know that there are mathematical representations of infinity, but what is a logical explanation for how a Being can have no beginning point?”<br /><br />You’re confused. That question is only pertinent to a process. To something in time. If God is timeless, then that question is inapplicable. <br /><br />“In other words, if you could tell me how God is eternal, then I could tell you how such a Being knows the future.”<br /><br />The Boethian solution is a failure. Even libertarian philosophers admit that. You need to brush up on the standard literature. <br /><br />“The relevance is that Arminians often invoke the eternal now’ perspective…”<br /><br />Which is incoherent.<br /><br />“If God is truly omnipresent…”<br /><br />He isn’t. That’s metaphorical.<br /><br />“…then this must be for all time & space, so that no coordinate of time/space can hide from God. Pick any coordinate of time/space, and God is there. That would seemingly be a realistic *property* of an ‘eternal Being.’ So God would know the future, because He is already there. In fact, He is both before and after that coordinate in time/space.”<br /><br />So Arminianism is a version of pantheism or panentheism. <br /><br />“Regarding the prior post, if we are going to demand a logical formula to resolve God's omniscience, then we must also demand a logical formula to resolve God's eternal nature (as well as God's omnipresence).”<br /><br />No, it’s not merely a question of how God knows the future. Rather, it’s a question of how God can know the future given the philosophical postulate of man’s libertarian freedom. The philosophical theory of libertarian freedom must stand or fall on its own merits. Likewise, that theory has logical implications for other things. You can’t ride your theory halfway down the hill, then jump off before it smashes into a thousand pieces at the bottom of the hill. <br /><br />“By that reasoning, you would have to conclude that God knows the future (i.e. omniscience) independent of determining *anything*.”<br /><br />How did you arrive at that illogical conclusion?stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-27446320805451906912012-01-26T20:24:36.705-05:002012-01-26T20:24:36.705-05:00Per (1), you seem to be equating hard determinism ...Per (1), you seem to be equating hard determinism with exhaustive determinism. Indeed, you later refer to God’s “exhaustive decree.” So you seem to be using “hard determinism” as a synonym for God’s exhaustive decree. At least, you regard the latter as a theological version of the former.<br /><br />If so, that’s not how hard determinism is defined. Rather, hard determinism takes the position that if determinism is true, then we lack the type of freedom required to be morally responsible. <br /><br />Conversely, compatibilism is not defined in terms of God being to some extent dependent on something in the creature. <br /><br />“I’ve argued that deterministic Calvinism must ultimately reject the concept of ‘independent thought.’”<br /><br />I don’t know how you define “independent thought.” By “independent,” do you mean the choices and actions of the human agent must originate with the agent? Must “derive” (or “come”) from the human agent rather than God? You use those terms.<br /><br />Yet you also seem to define “independence” in terms of randomness (“a random or rogue thought”).<br /><br />And you also seem to define independence in terms of alternate possibilities (so “that no one could think any thought besides those thoughts that God gives it”).<br /><br />So you don’t appear to have a clear definition in view. Rather, you seem to be oscillating between three different principles. <br /><br />You then ask, “Without independent thought, how do we reasonably assign “human blame?”<br /><br />Actually, I’d turn that around. If an agent can make a different decision given an identical personal history (e.g. same beliefs, memories, feelings, experiences), then in what respect is he the source of the decisions he makes? You could swap in a total stranger with the same result. His decisions don’t derive from his past self. Everything he’s been up to the moment he decides fails to select for his decision. So in which respect does the decision originate from who he uniquely is–rather than someone else?stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-37465784775120634362012-01-26T20:18:40.119-05:002012-01-26T20:18:40.119-05:00I would think that the C position is, no, there is...I would think that the C position is, no, there is no such thing as independent thought, and there is but one independent thinker in the universe, and that is God, and everyone else is just a subject upon whom God operates. But if that’s the case, then consider the effects, especially in terms of how we assign moral accountability. I know of a particular C who had a lapse in judgment, and his wife scolded him for his lack of judgment. But if that person didn’t act independently, but rather that his thoughts were entirely scripted for him, and scripted from before the foundation of the world, then was it truly “him” doing those things, or was it instead, God simply acting through him? When you think of it that way, the C who made the judgment error has to be viewed from a different light. You might even say, “Well, it wasn’t *him* after all. I mean it was him, but it wasn’t really him. It was God. It was the decree.”Richard Coordshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05600859155973820653noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-42180836119073720072012-01-26T19:28:43.609-05:002012-01-26T19:28:43.609-05:00Sorry. I had to fix some typos. Reposted:
Regardi...Sorry. I had to fix some typos. Reposted:<br /><br />Regarding the prior post, if we are going to demand a logical formula to resolve God's omniscience, then we must also demand a logical formula to resolve God's eternal nature (as well as God's omnipresence). <br /><br />In other words, if we are going to try to strap God with a logical formula and say, "This is how God is omniscient," then you reasonably must also do the same for God's other features. I would like for you to take the C perspective of omniscience and then wear that on God's other attributes, and see how it fits Him. For instance, take your formula on how God is omniscient (i.e. omniscience necessitates exhaustive predetermination), and therefore God is eternal and omnipresent by the same exact measure. I know that other A's would protest and say: You can't take God's plans or predeterminations and force that to define His essential Being. That would be the "tail wagging the dog." By that reasoning, you would have to conclude that God knows the future (i.e. omniscience) independent of determining *anything*. How that makes sense, I don't know, but nor can I make sense how a Being would have no beginning, or how a Being could be truly omnipresent. Those are things that C's may have been too aggressive in placing in a neat theological box.Richard Coordshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05600859155973820653noreply@blogger.com