Your pun on Sophie’s Choice (a choice between two bad options) reveals that you haven’t yet grasped the theory of middle knowledge, for God doesn’t create such a choice for Himself. The counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which confront Him are outside His control. He has to play with the hand He has been dealt.
Thursday, December 01, 2011
Molinist fate
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"He has to play with the hand He has been dealt."
ReplyDelete...by whom or what?
By the Grim Dealer.
ReplyDeleteWas the question that Dr. Craig answered ... posed by Triablogger Steve Hays?
ReplyDeleteNo.
ReplyDeleteC'mon now... we all know Steve's not that smart! ;)
ReplyDeleteI find his (3) amazingly implausible! He seems to have a category of 'trans-world reprobate' individuals who, in no possible world in which they exist, freely choose to put their faith in Christ. They are necessarily, freely pagan. I thought Calvinists were supposed to be the determinists!
I can imagine the blank stare that the Apostle Paul would have on his face if he took just five minutes to listen to Craig's molinism. The blank stare and repeated blinking....one word...what?
ReplyDelete3. God has created a world having an optimal balance between saved and lost, and those who never hear the Gospel and are lost would not have believed it even if they had heard it.
ReplyDeleteIn what sense can "they" be the same people if "they" experience something in one world which the "those" don't? It seems to me that that different possible worlds necessarily implies completely different people. If so, then to refer "those" (this world) as "they" (another possible world) would be equivocal. Right?
RYAN SAID:
ReplyDelete"It seems to me that that different possible worlds necessarily implies completely different people. If so, then to refer "those" (this world) as 'they' (another possible world) would be equivocal. Right?"
I wouldn't go that far. There needs to be essential continuity between you and your hypothetical counterpart. But there are degrees of similarity and dissimilarity. We have to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic properties.
Ryan, that's only an issue depending on one's metaphysics of things and one's philosophy of reference. You seem to be operating from a descriptivists view of reference such that we refer to things by way of descriptions/a bundle of descriptions (such as Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great, the author of the Physics, etc.). You also seem to be saying that one's identity is tied to these references, but if identity is tied to these references then the issue of transworld identity (identity across possible worlds) becomes a problem. In order for Aristotle to be Aristotle then he must be the teacher of Alexander the Great, the author of the Physics, etc.
ReplyDeleteSince Saul Kripke's work _Naming and Necessity_ quite a few philosophers would disagree with this descriptivism. Kripke argued that descriptivism falls into problems with possibility and necessity because it seems to make it necessary that Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great. But it seems intuitive that Aristotle could have never been the teacher of Alexander the Great and yet still be Aristotle. In place of descriptivism Kripke develops an essentialist metaphysics where things are understood in terms of essential and accidental 'properties'/constituents. One can be the same across possible worlds as long as one retains their essential properties/constituents, even though their accidental properties/constituents may change (such as being the teacher of Alexander the Great).
I'd recommend reading Kripke's book, it's probably one of the most important philosophy books of the 20th century. Though I do think there are still some problems with it (such as his view of possible worlds and how he understands essential properties/constituents)
Thanks for the response, Noah. You seem to have taken my response to its logical conclusion but stopped short of it. I don't see a problem with it, though I understand even many or most Calvinists would disagree. I appreciate the suggested reading and introduction to "descriptivism" (I wasn't aware that what I was saying had a name).
ReplyDeleteI flirted with the position for a while too and Leibniz held to something like what you said. But I was ultimately persuaded by essentialism. The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries on reference and transworld identity might be helpful as well.
ReplyDeleteI'll piggyback off of Noah's comment and say, Ryan, that I think what you're advocating is called the 'Theory of Worldbound Individuals' (TWI) which is the theory that any object exists in exactly one possible world. That is, that all of an object's properties are essential to it so that you (sorry for objectivizing you!) would be a completely different person had you decided not to comment in this thread because you would lack the property of 'commenting-in-this-threadness' or some other strange property like that. Most philosophers find this tremendously counterintuitive.
ReplyDeleteIf true, TWI would also apply to God and, as a necessary being, it would mean that this is the only possible world and would generate a modal collapse. Again, this is generally considered counter-intuitive and demeaning to God's glory by most philosophers and theologians.
David, that is an accurate representation of the position I currently leaning towards. You perhaps recall my questions to Paul Manata in his review of Olson's book which weren't elaborated on since he wanted to keep to the topic.
ReplyDeleteYeah, I remember that one. I blame Paul for not setting you straight! ;) As philosophical types we are big on logical consistency (which, contrary to the prevailing anti-intellectualism, is a good thing!) but it is possible for a theory to be consistent without being true or having explanatory power or explanatory scope. I believe necessitarianism is just such a view. In any case, no matter the philosophical objections I think that based on Scripture and our intuitions we can raise enough warrant to defeat necessitarianism. Here are some arguments against necessitarianism:
ReplyDeleteFirstly, necessitarianism teaches that this is the only way that the world could have been which is prima facie implausible. After all, I can easily imagine how this world could have been different without any kind of obvious logical contradiction. I could imagine myself sleeping in my bed rather than sitting at the computer typing for instance. Am I really to believe that I possess the property of necessarily sitting at the computer on December 2, 2011 at 8:30AM? That’s a little hard to swallow.
Secondly, but related to the first, necessitarianism entails that all of God’s actions occur necessarily. By extension, this means that God created out of necessity when, historically, Christians have affirmed that God created contingently out of the freedom of his immutable will. The view that God creates out of necessity has more in common with Neo-Platonism than historic Christianity.
Thirdly, necessitarianism entails that God could not have done otherwise than bestow grace upon the elect yet Christians have always affirmed that salvation is an act of grace that God did not have to give to anyone. We might say that on this view there is a possible world in which God decrees the fall but does not decree to save anyone (we might have to nuance this point in light of the work of Oliver Crisp but the basic point stands). This possibility (and possibility in general) is ruled out by necessitarianism.
Fourthly, necessitarianism renders counterfactual claims literally meaningless and this includes those found in Scripture such as Exod. 13:17; 1 Sam. 23:8-14; Jer. 23: 21-22; 1 Cor. 2:8. A counterfactual claim is a statement of the form ‘If this had happened then this would have happened’ where ‘this’ is some event which did not occur. With this definition in mind, take a look at 1 Cor 2:8 where Paul writes, “None of the rulers of this age understood this, for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory.” The texts clearly implies that the rulers of this age did not understand the wisdom of God (see 1 Cor 2:7) and this lead to their crucifying Jesus but it explicitly teaches that if they had understood the wisdom of God they would not have done this; which is a counterfactual claim. If necessitarianism were true then Paul’s statement would be meaningless or, more technically, would lack a truth-maker since the rulers do not understand the wisdom of God in any possible world. But we can’t have meaningless Scriptures so we should pass on necessitarianism.
Thirdly, necessitarianism entails that God could not have done otherwise than bestow grace upon the elect yet Christians have always affirmed that salvation is an act of grace that God did not have to give to anyone. We might say that on this view there is a possible world in which God decrees the fall but does not decree to save anyone (we might have to nuance this point in light of the work of Oliver Crisp but the basic point stands). This possibility (and possibility in general) is ruled out by necessitarianism.
ReplyDeleteAmazing grace, how sweet the sound, that HAD TO save a wretch like me. ;-)
Anyway, on the Crisp point: If God has to exemplify all of his attributes (which makes sense if God does things for his glory (ultimately to benefit the elect) and his glory is a summary of all his attributes, a la Vos &c), then in any created theatre he saves somebody or other (and eternally judges somebody or other). This wouldn't be necessitarian, which states that God saves the same people in all worlds (the actual world being the only world, etc).
Nuance accomplished. Thanks Paul!
ReplyDelete