Wednesday, October 08, 2014
Dimestore atheist
I'm afraid this post will be a bit repetitious. That's because many atheists never learn:
The tactic cites cruelties, horrors, and absurdities ostensibly ordered or endorsed by scripture, thereby undermining its claims of divine provenance. One rhetorical advantage of the tactic is that it immediately puts believers on the defensive and presents them with a dilemma: Either bite the bullet and admit that scripture really does say such things, or reinterpret the passages as metaphorical, allegorical, hyperbolic, or as simply misunderstood by the objector.
Either alternative presents problems. Biting the bullet may be courageous but will probably lead the freethinker to see the point as conceded.
What point has been conceded? That "scripture really does say such things"? Or that such things are "absurdities"? Parsons repeatedly confuses two fundamentally distinct issues:
What does the Bible teach? Is it wrong?
He constantly smuggles his evaluation into this description, but that's fallacious. You'd think a philosophy prof. with two earned doctorates would be able to distinguish descriptive claims from normative claims. But Parsons evidently lacks the intellectual aptitude to draw that elementary categorical distinction.
A common riposte to the citer of scriptural embarrassments is that he is playing the “village atheist.”
Notice, once again, how he skews the question by stipulating that these are scriptural "embarrassments." He constantly builds his tendentious assessment into the way he frames the (alleged) dilemma. But whether or not the offending passages are "absurd" or "embarrassing" is the very issue in dispute. Why does a philosopher prof. chronically commit these logical blunders?
What is a “village atheist?” I take this epithet as implying that the objector is like the old-time purveyor of cracker-barrel skepticism who enjoys needling his pious neighbors with clever but unsophisticated objections to popular belief.
True so far, but the epithetic has a more specific target.
So, does it mark you as a “village atheist” if you cite ostensibly abominable passages of scripture as evidence against their divine provenance?
Yes, that marks you as a village atheist inasmuch as quoting scripture is not an argument for your characterization of said scripture as "ostensibly abominable." Hence, that doesn't count as evidence against their divine provenance.
Parsons keeps swinging and keeps missing. He's utterly clueless.
I also make a moral judgment based on my understanding that the passage commands genocide…
The passage obviously doesn't command "genocide." For one thing, the Amalekites aren't subject to execution due to their "race" or ethnicity. In addition, it only applies to occupants of the Holy Land. If they self-evacuate, they will not be pursued outside the borders of the Holy Land. So there's no command to stamp a particular ethnic group out of existence.
This is bad. I think that any morally decent person would say that if anything is bad, genocide is bad.
This is where he displays his full credentials as a village atheist. He begs the very question at issue. And, ironically, he begs the question, not merely on Christian grounds, but secular grounds.
Many secular philosophers reject moral realism. Parsons offers no counterargument.
Moreover, even if atheism could somehow underwrite moral realism, he hasn't shown why it's wrong to treat human organisms as Scripture commands. Given that humans are merely ephemeral, fortuitous clusters of particles, why assume there's a right and wrong way to treat them?
The structure of the reasoning of the above argument is this:
1) Prima facie, this scriptural passage appears to endorse X.
2) As every morally decent person admits, X is bad.
3) Therefore, this scripture seems to endorse bad things.
4) Therefore, this scripture does endorse bad things.
Is this reasoning superficial and shallow, a typical product of a “village atheist” mentality?
Yep.
1) Biting the bullet is brave but not too smart. To defend the passage you would have to argue that genocide is good in some cases. Like when?
Like in the cases given in Scripture. Next question?
That the victims of genocide are uniformly evil is always the justification claimed by their murderers, and it is always a notorious lie.
To begin with, some people really are evil. Moreover, you can have situations where, say, one country threatens another country for no good reason. Even if everybody in the belligerent country isn't evil, the action of the aggressor is evil, and in order to repel the aggressor, the innocent minority will suffer. For better or worse, that's the nature of collective action. Ultimately, only God can sort it out.
Perhaps, mirabile dictu, apologists will, after all, have adequate justifications for such passages, and not simply tie themselves into mental and moral knots in the attempt. However, the critic may be excused for not holding his breath until such putative justifications emerge. After all, on far too many occasions we have all heard the sophistries of casuists as they attempt to defend the manifestly indefensible.
i) To begin with, that's a backdoor admission that he hasn't bothered to acquaint himself with the relevant literature.
ii) And, once more, his parting line ("manifestly indefensible") asserts the very thing he needs to establish in the first place. For some odd reason, it doesn't occur to him that he shoulders a burden of proof. He doesn't even seem to be familiar with how many of his fellow atheists argue for moral relativism or moral nihilism. Not to mention what human begins are, given physicalism, naturalistic evolution, &c. He keeps taking key intellectual shortcuts.
Liberal Hatred And Liberal Priorities
David French, a lawyer who writes for National Review, recently commented:
"I’ve defended Christian campus groups from exactly these kinds of policies for more than 14 years (representing a number of groups, including some impacted by Cal State’s policies), and in that time I’ve heard just about every excuse imaginable for excluding Christian groups from campus. In reality, however, universities are motivated by malice. They hate the Christian message, often despise its messengers, and have literally been casting about for more than 30 years for the right legal argument to exclude the Christian voice from campus."
Philip Bump writes in the Washington Post about a recent study that confirms something that's been found by other studies:
"Of the states that gave the most to charity in 2012, the top 17 all voted for Mitt Romney that year. The bottom seven states in giving all voted for Obama....Religious people give more to charity. And in its annual assessment of the nation's religiosity, Gallup reveals that the states at the top of the giving list -- Utah, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee -- are also at the top in terms of religious devotion."
"I’ve defended Christian campus groups from exactly these kinds of policies for more than 14 years (representing a number of groups, including some impacted by Cal State’s policies), and in that time I’ve heard just about every excuse imaginable for excluding Christian groups from campus. In reality, however, universities are motivated by malice. They hate the Christian message, often despise its messengers, and have literally been casting about for more than 30 years for the right legal argument to exclude the Christian voice from campus."
Philip Bump writes in the Washington Post about a recent study that confirms something that's been found by other studies:
"Of the states that gave the most to charity in 2012, the top 17 all voted for Mitt Romney that year. The bottom seven states in giving all voted for Obama....Religious people give more to charity. And in its annual assessment of the nation's religiosity, Gallup reveals that the states at the top of the giving list -- Utah, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee -- are also at the top in terms of religious devotion."
Tuesday, October 07, 2014
Foreshadowing the dawn
10 “And I will pour out on the house of David and the inhabitants of Jerusalem a spirit of grace and pleas for mercy, so that, when they look on me, on him whom they have pierced, they shall mourn for him, as one mourns for an only child, and weep bitterly over him, as one weeps over a firstborn…13 “On that day there shall be a fountain opened for the house of David and the inhabitants of Jerusalem, to cleanse them from sin and uncleanness (Zech 12:10; 13:1).
Unbelievers allege that NT writers prooftext Jesus from the OT by ripping passages out of their original, literal context and spiritualizing them in application to Jesus. Let's examine two cases in which we see the opposite development:
1. In Ps 22, David is talking about himself. And he indulges in hyperbole and metaphor.
Yet his descriptions are truer of Jesus than of himself. What was hyperbolic in reference to David suffered was accurate in reference to Jesus. Moreover, some of the figurative language is literally descriptive of what Jesus experienced at Calvary. Here's a case in which the original context is less fitting in reference to the type than the antitype. Ps 22 is more historical in reference to Jesus than David. More truly about Jesus than David. True of Jesus in a way it never was of David.
2. Zech 12:10 & 31:1 employ theological metaphors and similes. There's the anthropomorphic depiction of a wounded God–stabbed in the heart. An anthropopathetic depiction of divine suffering. God is pierced in the person of the shepherd. You also have the aqueous metaphors: the outpouring of the Spirit and the cleansing spring–as well as similes of sonship.
But in reference to Jesus, this suddenly takes on a more literal force. Jesus really was impaled. His shed blood remits sin. We shift from a metaphor (i.e. a literary device) to a concrete symbol. And what the symbol signifies, really happens.
Likewise, Jesus is the messianic Son. The "only son," "firstborn," and "shepherd." Not just a simile (i.e. literary device). And Jesus really did suffer–physically and psychologically.
So once again, the fulfillment is, in a sense, truer than the original setting. In both Ps 22 and Zech 12:10, in relation to their NT counterparts, you have a move from lesser to greater, more figural to more literal–as the OT type or oracle is realized in Christ. One might say, tongue-in-cheek, that the OT writers were ripping these passages of context, whereas the NT writers restored their proper context.
Moderate Muslims
There's a viral video of Ben Affleck sticking up for Muslims. As I said to a friend, isn't Affleck better known for his girlfriends than his movies? Actors are paid to be pretty, emote, and memorize someone else's words. They aren't paid to be informed or smart–which shows. To be fair, Affleck was never much of an actor–unlike his boyhood buddy, Matt Damon. He's an aging pretty boy. So I guess his excuse is that when you're a washed up, third-tier movie star who was never much of an actor in the first place, you moonlight as a pundit.
There are lots of ignorant defenders who think the jihadis represents an "extreme" interpretation of Islam. Of course, if you know anything about Muslim history and historical theology, the jihadis are actually mainstream.
But there are also defenders who cast this as a fairness issue. It's unfair to tar every Muslim with the broad brush of the jihadis. That's not fair to the moderates.
Well, what about that?
i) To begin with, "moderate Muslim" is a matter of degree. It's my observation that when the conversation turns to Israel, "moderate Muslims" are rhetorically indistinguishable from the jihadis.
ii) But let's bracket that for now. Yes there are moderate Muslims, but it's hard to know the percentages. In the Muslim world itself, the moderates maintain a low profile. Keep your head down or lose it.
Now, in once sense you can't blame them. They naturally fear the consequences if they stick their neck out–literally.
But by the same token, that underscores the dominance of the "fundamentalists." Moderate Muslims are irrelevant to public policy. They have no effective voice in setting public policy. It's the hardliners who make the rules.
iii) And that isn't confined to the Muslim world. We see the same dynamic wherever Muslim immigrants become established in a new community. Even though they are in the minority, they begin to demand special rights. Demand accommodation. Insist that non-Muslims don't have the right to offend Muslim sensibilities. They collude with the local authorities to oppress and persecute non-Muslims.
Even though Muslim immigrants presumably include a percentage of moderates, and even though the moderates don't face the same reprisal for bucking the party line, they still observe a code of silence and let the "fundamentalists" call the shots. Why should I make allowance for the moderates when the moderates let the "fundamentalists" call the shots?
I don't care what the moderates think, I care what they do. If they do nothing, nothing to counter the militants, while the militants dictate social policy, then they're complicit. They go along to get along with the militants. Although they can plead extenuating circumstances in the Muslim world, immigrants don't have the same excuse. Their passivity enables the militants to triumph.
Unfortunately, we have "fair-minded" Americans who will make excuses for Muslims until it's too late.
Monday, October 06, 2014
Zombie apocalypse
The walking dead:
And this shall be the plague with which the Lord will strike all the peoples that wage war against Jerusalem: their flesh will rot while they are still standing on their feet, their eyes will rot in their sockets, and their tongues will rot in their mouths (Zech 14:12).
God with us
Tremper Longman and Iain Duguid had a brief exchange over at Green Baggins on christoteolism:
But it's striking that Longman never responded to Duguid's follow-up question. You'd think Isa 7:14 would be an excellent test-case to compare and contrast christotelic hermeneutics with the alternatives. So why did Longman back out? Did he suddenly realize that it was a tactical blunder for him to comment on Isa 7:14? That he better not tip his hand any further, because he'd already shown too much? What he said about Isa 7:14 was already pretty damaging for christotelism.
BTW, here are two good studies of Isa 7:14 and Mt 1:23:
iain duguid said,
October 1, 2014 at 5:18 pm
Jonathan,
If I can clarify the concern that I think Lane is raising, it is this: were the Old Testament saints able genuinely to see the gospel during the Old Testament period through a proper understanding of the Scriptures that they had then (albeit dimly), or did that have to wait until the coming of Christ? If the gospel is not visible (even though present) in the Old Testament until the coming of Christ, how were Abraham and Moses saved? On some level, the gospel has to be visible through ordinary exegesis of the OT texts in the OT period if it is to be the means by which God’s people were saved, which is a central tenet of Reformed theology.
Of course they didn’t have as full an understanding as we have (just as we don’t have a full understanding of the events that will surround the Lord’s return), but they did see enough of the gospel to place their trust prospectively in Christ. So, to take the Isaiah 7 passage, I’m sure the prophet’s original audience didn’t understand the fullness of what it meant. But they could see the contrast between that first young woman’s faith in Immanuel (“God with us”) and the cynical skepticism of the Davidic king, Ahaz. The initial fulfillment in the form of the destruction of the northern kingdom and of Syria was a rebuke to Ahaz and a call to the contemporary audience to trust in the promise of Immanuel, a promise in seed form that flowers completely in the coming of Christ.
This is not to speak directly to the views of specific people, or to say that the gospel is equally clear everywhere in the OT. But I think that one concern of critics of the TRV is that it sounds as if the gospel is not actually visible through a normal, plain reading of the OT by itself, without the NT. And that, it seems to me, does raise significant theological questions. Does that help to clarify matters?
Tremper Longman said,
October 1, 2014 at 7:17 pm
Iain,
Jonathan is totally correct. And as much as I respect you, as my former student and friend, your attempt to argue that the original audience would even have a glimmer of a future messianic hope, not to speak of any kind of specific understanding of the virgin birth of Christ in Isaiah 7:14, is hardly persuasive. The thought process that you are attributing to the original audience is highly improbable. And unnecessary. It is true (and Dan and Doug would agree) that there was a messianic expectation that arose from the Old Testament, that was present in the intertestamental period, but it was not well understood until the resurrection of Christ. Again, in this case, I think Jonathan is exactly right.
iain duguid said,
October 1, 2014 at 8:57 pm
Tremper,
Thanks for your response. I also respect the many things that I learned from you. I’d just like you to clarify what you said, since clarity is of the essence in this discussion. When you say “there was a messianic expectation that arose from the Old Testament, that was present in the intertestamental period, but it was not well understood until the resurrection of Christ”, do you mean that there was no genuine and clear messianic understanding within the Old Testament itself before the intertestamental period? Or, to put it more precisely, that Isaiah’s contemporaries did not understand on some genuine level that through the suffering servant of whom he spoke, the Lord would take away their sins – that that knowledge only became clear after the coming of Christ? Or would you say that the Old Testament saints knew the gospel, truly and genuinely on the basis of what had already been revealed, even though much of the way in which God would fulfill these rich promises was not yet apparent to them?
For me, this is one of the pivotal questions in this debate and I ask it because I’d genuinely like to know how you are processing these things (regardless of where other people may be – I don’t know enough to speculate on what their answers might be).
Jonathan,
If I can clarify the concern that I think Lane is raising, it is this: were the Old Testament saints able genuinely to see the gospel during the Old Testament period through a proper understanding of the Scriptures that they had then (albeit dimly), or did that have to wait until the coming of Christ? If the gospel is not visible (even though present) in the Old Testament until the coming of Christ, how were Abraham and Moses saved? On some level, the gospel has to be visible through ordinary exegesis of the OT texts in the OT period if it is to be the means by which God’s people were saved, which is a central tenet of Reformed theology.
Of course they didn’t have as full an understanding as we have (just as we don’t have a full understanding of the events that will surround the Lord’s return), but they did see enough of the gospel to place their trust prospectively in Christ. So, to take the Isaiah 7 passage, I’m sure the prophet’s original audience didn’t understand the fullness of what it meant. But they could see the contrast between that first young woman’s faith in Immanuel (“God with us”) and the cynical skepticism of the Davidic king, Ahaz. The initial fulfillment in the form of the destruction of the northern kingdom and of Syria was a rebuke to Ahaz and a call to the contemporary audience to trust in the promise of Immanuel, a promise in seed form that flowers completely in the coming of Christ.
This is not to speak directly to the views of specific people, or to say that the gospel is equally clear everywhere in the OT. But I think that one concern of critics of the TRV is that it sounds as if the gospel is not actually visible through a normal, plain reading of the OT by itself, without the NT. And that, it seems to me, does raise significant theological questions. Does that help to clarify matters?
October 1, 2014 at 7:17 pm
Iain,
Jonathan is totally correct. And as much as I respect you, as my former student and friend, your attempt to argue that the original audience would even have a glimmer of a future messianic hope, not to speak of any kind of specific understanding of the virgin birth of Christ in Isaiah 7:14, is hardly persuasive. The thought process that you are attributing to the original audience is highly improbable. And unnecessary. It is true (and Dan and Doug would agree) that there was a messianic expectation that arose from the Old Testament, that was present in the intertestamental period, but it was not well understood until the resurrection of Christ. Again, in this case, I think Jonathan is exactly right.
iain duguid said,
October 1, 2014 at 8:57 pm
Tremper,
Thanks for your response. I also respect the many things that I learned from you. I’d just like you to clarify what you said, since clarity is of the essence in this discussion. When you say “there was a messianic expectation that arose from the Old Testament, that was present in the intertestamental period, but it was not well understood until the resurrection of Christ”, do you mean that there was no genuine and clear messianic understanding within the Old Testament itself before the intertestamental period? Or, to put it more precisely, that Isaiah’s contemporaries did not understand on some genuine level that through the suffering servant of whom he spoke, the Lord would take away their sins – that that knowledge only became clear after the coming of Christ? Or would you say that the Old Testament saints knew the gospel, truly and genuinely on the basis of what had already been revealed, even though much of the way in which God would fulfill these rich promises was not yet apparent to them?
For me, this is one of the pivotal questions in this debate and I ask it because I’d genuinely like to know how you are processing these things (regardless of where other people may be – I don’t know enough to speculate on what their answers might be).
Talking to Mary
A few problems:
i) I'm not her child.
ii) Even if I were her child, how many grown men or teenage boys tell their mother everything that's on their mind? That's pretty immature, not to mention inappropriate.
iii) She can't hear me.
iv) Why should I tell Mary what's on my mind rather than Jesus or the Father?
Inverted priorities
In Washington on Friday, while military officials announced that the Army would more than double the number of soldiers it is sending to West Africa to help contain the Ebola virus there, senior White House officials tried to play down the series of missteps in the handling of the Ebola case in Dallas. They insisted that the public health system in the United States was working effectively and would prevent an epidemic of the deadly virus from taking root in this country.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/04/us/containing-ebola-cdc-troops-west-africa.html?_r=0
i) Um…doesn't that risk exposing US soldiers to the deadly disease? And if they're infected, where will they be treated? Walter Reed?
ii) This suffers from a fundamental inversion about what our armed forces are for. The US military exists to protect Americans and American assets.
That's especially the case when the assignment puts our troops at risk of harm or death. National defense is an extension of self-defense. For instance, if a burglar breaks into your home, it's the duty of a teenage son to protect his mother or younger brothers. He hazards his life to protect theirs. Family members have that duty to one another.
Every soldier is someone's husband, father, son, or brother. A US president doesn't have the right to risk their life on behalf of someone who's not part of the social contract. An American soldier shouldn't have to die for a non-American–unless it's a military alliance.
The principle of national defense involves reciprocity. I'm prepared to die for you if you're prepared to die for me. Pooling our collective resources for the common defense. It's for the benefit of people who have a stake in the system. Shared risk, shared reward.
iii) On a related question: why are we even treating Duncan? Why should US hospitals supply free medical services for someone from another part of the world who decides to hop on a plane and come here?
Yes, I know that sounds cruel, but there are 7 billion people on the planet. The US is not and cannot be a free health clinic for all the desperately ill people outside our borders (not to mention illegals inside our borders). We don't have the resources, and it's not our duty.
Duncan is a looter. He's siphoning medical resources away from American families who've paid into the system.
Consider the drain on hospital resources just to treat one Ebola patient. We can't have an open-door policy for anyone to hop on a plane and demand free medical services.
I mean, who's footing the bill for Ducan's treatment? I assume the hospital will have to pass the cost along to paying customers. Keep in mind that Obamacare is already stressing a struggling healthcare system beyond the breaking point.
It's different for the medical missionaries. They're Americans. And they're risking their lives to save lives. Duncan, by contrast, is risking lives to save his life.
(Mind you, I think it would be more prudent to treat the medical missionaries on site.)
Third-rate atheists emulating second-rate atheists
Some more feedback to my post from the peanut gallery at the Rational Skepticism Forum:
Here's the original post for reference:
Moonwatcher » Sep 25, 2014 11:35 pmExactly. The article is just a slippery slope argument…
If he imagines that my post was a slippery slope argument, then he doesn't know what a slippery slope argument is. My post was about the logical implications of atheism (e.g. moral/existential nihilism), and not a prediction about how atheists behave.
…that has nothing to do with whether or not any religious beliefs are true.
Another confused atheist. I don't have to present an argument for Christianity to present an argument against atheism. I don't have to prove the alternative to disprove something else.
As to his revered fiction of objective morality, suppose the "real" god turns out to be one that demands human sacrifice and orders murders (hmm, who could that be?).
i) To begin with, if morality is objective, then there are some things God would not or (in a sense) could not command or demand–since that would be at odds with his nature.
ii) The only time the Biblical God demanded human sacrifice was in the counterfactual case of Isaac. But that was never really in the cards. To say the Biblical God orders "murders" simply begs the question.
iii) Since, however, "moonwatcher" regards objective morality as fictitious, why does he think his counterexamples have any traction? He acts as if that would be an unacceptable consequence of Christian ethics. Yet by denying objective morality, he's forfeited the right to lodge that complaint.
I got the idea he was somehow saying that if morals are subjective, so is everything. So facts and evidence are somehow immediately subjective?
I didn't make that argument in my post. But since he brings it up, atheism undermines our access to "facts" and "evidence." It comes down to what our brain interprets as facts and evidence. A brain that's the byproduct of an unintelligent biological process.
As someone else said, the guy is a f****wit because you can't just shut off or change your biological reactions.
My post never suggested otherwise. To the contrary, my post took that for granted. When physical determinism pulls the string, the dolls cries. Point is, our "biological reactions" (e.g. grief) have no moral or existential significance if atheism is true.
You're not going to go on a killing spree or become a monster because the Magic Man in the sky doesn't exist…
i) Another muddleheaded objection. My post didn't make a prediction about atheist behavior. Rather, I made a normative point. Mind you, atheists do go massive killing sprees (e.g. abortion, euthanasia).
ii) As a Classical theist, I agree with him that "the Magic Man in the sky doesn't exist."
But suppose I did suggest that consistent atheist will be sociopaths. Since he repudiates objective morality, why is he so defensive on that point?
…UNLESS the only thing stopping you was the belief that he'd smack you down if you did and now you don't believe he exists.
So believing some things are intrinsically evil is never a deterrent?
Believing in objective morality and gods doesn't stop people from committing atrocities or rationalizing away that morality, making it relative.
Since he repudiates objective morality, what's his problem with committing atrocities?
Shrunk » Sep 26, 2014 3:24 pmYes. It's like saying if the desire for food or sex is reducible to biological functions, then people are just going to stop eating and f***ing.
Another clueless atheist who can't follow the argument. For so many atheists, it's all about image and attitude.
Among the questions begged are that a metaphysical motivation for an action makes the it more justifiable.
And why would that not be the case? Is his point that atheists are illogical? They just act randomly? No doubt that would explain a lot.
Ven. Kwan Tam Wooby » Sep 28, 2014 1:40 pm
I don’t need to demonstrate it. He believes that God is the ultimate source of “objective” morality, so did the devout Muslims who hijacked passenger planes and flew them into skyscrapers. So too does that nutjob who hacked off his co-worker’s head the other day. Whether it’s decapitating people, flying planes into buildings or advocating for the bombing of abortion clinics “after hours”, all of these people share a belief that their morality derives from an almighty all-knowing god.
His response suffers from gross intellectual confusions:
i) To begin with, grounding objective morality in God doesn't entail a divine command to fly hijacked passenger planes into skyscrapers or decapitate coworkers. Rather, that supplies the general basis for morality. That, of itself, doesn't specify what the objective moral norms will be. The identity of the moral norms is a distinct question from their metaphysical foundation.
Indeed, only if there is such a thing as objective morality would it even be possible for beheading coworkers or flying passenger planes into skyscrapers to be truly blameworthy.
Woo's reply is like saying that if mathematical realism is true, then 2+2=5. But mathematic realism doesn't, of itself, yield a particular set of equations. That's something to be discovered. And it hardly justifies contradictory equations. How mathematical realism unpacks is something we have to find out over time.
ii) He also equivocates over the identity of "God," as if the "God" of Islam and Christianity share the same referent. Woo might as well say that since endocrinologists and aromatherapists both believe in medicine, that puts endocrinologists on the same side as aromatherapists. But, of course, they don't mean the same thing by medicine.
iii) God doesn't command me to decapitate coworkers, bomb abortion clinics, or fly planes into buildings. Woo might as well blame the multiplication tables if I make a mistake in short division. But, of course, my mathematical practice may be diametrically at odds with mathematical truth. How does my belief that math derives from objective mathematical truths warrant me in miscalculating a column of figures? It doesn't.
When did I say anything about ecoterrorism, and what does it have to do with atheism??
Understandably he'd like to duck secular varieties of terrorism. He only wants to tar Christianity with terrorism. But that tactic cuts both ways. And ecoterrorism is motivated by a secular worldview. Nature is all there is. Humans are animals. Save the planet.
So what?? Argument From Authority may wash with credulous religious types, but in the real world it’s known as (yet another) fallacious form of argument.
No, not an argument from authority. Secular philosophers like Michael Ruse, Joel Marks, Alex Rosenberg, Quentin Smith, J. L. Mackie, and Massimo Pigliucci make a reasoned case for why atheism and moral realism are incompatible.
What it means is that it becomes that much easier to rationalise a destructive act because it isn’t as bad (by what criteria btw?) as some other act which it supposedly works against or replaces.
Really? So if I think setting a dog on fire is less evil than setting a man on fire, that makes it much easier for me to torch dogs?
That’s the start of a very slippery ethical slope.
So he's resorting to the slippery slope fallacy. As far as that goes, what about the "very slippery ethical slope" of…atheism?
Moreover, all his talks about “less worse” and “far worse” acts sounds an awful lot like a relativistic moral framework!
Is he really that ignorant? Does he even know what moral relativism means? For instance:
Moral relativism is the view that moral judgments are true or false only relative to some particular standpoint (for instance, that of a culture or a historical period) and that no standpoint is uniquely privileged over all others.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/moral-re/
Polygamy is morally wrong’ may be true relative to one society, but false relative to another.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/#ForArg
Notice that on this definition or example, what is relativistic is not the claim that one action may be better or worse than a different action, but that the same action has no fixed moral value.
The author has also handily evaded confronting the fact that he has essentially admitted that the only thing stopping him from hurting others is the fear of retribution from his invisible sky-tyrant.
Notice that he doesn't quote me "essentially admitting that." And since I don't believe in a "sky-tyrant," that's clearly not my deterrent.
The author may or may not be aware of the fact that the brain is capable of analysing itself and the world around it. It might also be worth the author’s while to acquaint himself with the concept of an illusion.
A brain that's high on LSD can indulge in self-analysis. But that's not terribly reliable, is it. A psychotic can engage in self-analysis. But is his diagnosis trustworthy?
If the very organ that's conducting the self-review is deluded, then it will lack the objectivity to distinguish reality from illusion.
Since when do we need to bridge a gap to some “moral ontology”?
He puts moral ontology in scare quotes as though he's ignorant of the category. Moral ontology concerns itself with the question of whether there are moral facts–independent of what people may believe or feel.
If some behaviour presents a threat to the survival and/or well-being of the community then the community agrees to discourage and punish it, and the converse is true for behaviours which promote that community’s survival and well-being. This is all the “moral ontology” that human societies need.
i) Why should an atheist care about the survival/wellbeing of "the community" rather than looking out for Number One?
ii) Likewise, if promoting your community's wellbeing is "all the moral ontology that human societies need," then that justifies imperialism. Let's conquer and colonize another society that has natural resources which will promote the wellbeing of our particular in-group.
So is the author in fact saying that he is NOT worried that deconstructing his own thinking process will invalidate his thoughts and emotions?
Since I'm a Christian rather than an atheist, deconstructing my own thinking process will not invalidate my thoughts and emotions. That's only a threat given atheism.
Now he’s trying to use an argument devised by an atheist philosopher (Daniel Denett [sic]) against an atheist! You gotta love the irony.
i) It's ironic that atheism is self-refuting. Yes, I love the irony.
ii) In addition, it's perfectly legit to cite concessions by serious representatives of the opposing position. In a way it's even more significant when the other side admits weakness in its own position.
There is no “me” distinct from the activity of my brain.
i) Which is why the brain is in no position to conduct a self-evaluation. The brain can't assume an objective, third-person perspective from which to assess its reliability. The brain can't step back to see itself for that it really is. The brain can't compare itself to reality. The brain can't tell what the brain is really like.
He acts as if a man can argue with his own brain. But if physicalism is true, that's nonsensical.
ii) That would be less of a problem if there was a some presumption that the brain is trustworthy. If, however, the brain is the byproduct of an unintelligent process (i.e. naturalistic evolution), then cognitive defects will be indetectable.
What the author evidently fails to grasp is that this input data can include abstract concepts, including one’s sense of self.
As card-carrying physicalists like the Churchlands would be the first to note, "one's sense of self" is folk psychology. Woo needs to get with the program.
If the process is in fact a causal process driven by the forces of selection and adaptation, then how is it meaningful to call it “blind”?
The "forces of selection and adaptation" are unintelligent.
Evidently the author is under the misapprehension that “blind” means “not micromanaged by some invisible sky-fairy”.
i) He's ignorant of textbook evolution. Evolutionary biologists routinely say evolution is "blind." That's not my Christian characterization. Rather, that comes straight from the horse's mouth.
ii) In addition, he and "moonwatcher, with their "Magic Man in the sky," "sky-tyrant," and "sky-fairy" epithets, are examples of third-rate atheists parroting the rhetoric of second-rate atheists. As a classical theist, I don't believe God lives in the sky. Are they just too ignorant of Christian theology to even know what they're shooting at?
iii) BTW, what's his beef with invisible entities? Does he deny the existence of invisible entities like abstract objects and subatomic particles?
At any rate, his dice analogy is not an adequate description of brain evolution: a more apt analogy would be a betting program which makes its decisions by using past data to 1) give relative weightings to certain relevant parameters, and 2) hypothesise and test new parameters which are then weighted according to their relevance.
A betting programmed is designed by an intelligent engineer to perform a purposeful activity. That's the antithesis of naturalistic evolution. That's why my dice analogy is more accurate.
The end result is that the ant colony finds the most efficient path to the food source without needing any sort of overarching intelligence to guide the process.
i) That fails to distinguish between internal and external intelligence. A remote control toy plane is unintelligent. It is, however, guided by an intelligent agent.
ii) Insects can also be lured into traps–like carnivorous plants. They are too dumb to tell the difference between a food source and a trap.
iii) Apropos (ii), finding pathways to food using chemical trails doesn't select for true beliefs.
Once again, that's why my dice-throwing example to pick winners is a better analogy–where the outcome is the result of a mindless process.
So the author isn’t satisfied with a “thoughtless process”, but is quite happy to assert the existence of some Primal Grand Thinker whose thought processes…
Thought is not a process for a timeless God.
…are fundamentally indiscernible (i.e. ‘mysterious’) to us.
Divine thought is discernible through its natural effects or verbal revelations.
I said quite clearly that the emotional effects are real, and if the author has ever been emotionally moved by a fictional story or movie then he will be able to appreciate this.
Real emotional effects of fictional causes. He unwittingly sabotages atheism.
The "We" Passages In Acts
Starting in 16:10, the author of Acts uses the term "we" in a way that suggests his participation in the events being narrated. If the author did participate in the events, some significant implications follow. Under that scenario, the author of Acts, who also wrote the third gospel, was a companion of the apostle Paul, had met other important figures in early church history, such as James (Acts 21:18), and was an eyewitness of many significant events, like some of Paul's miracles.
But the traditional interpretation of the "we" passages has been challenged. It's sometimes suggested, for example, that the author of Acts may have been citing what another source reported. The "we" was somebody else's language, and Acts' author didn't edit it out when using that source's material. Or the "we" may be some sort of literary device meant to enhance the reader's experience without any intention of suggesting that the author of Acts participated in the events in question. And so on.
The third volume in Craig Keener's commentary on Acts (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2014) recently came out. Here's some of what he wrote there about the "we" passages:
But the traditional interpretation of the "we" passages has been challenged. It's sometimes suggested, for example, that the author of Acts may have been citing what another source reported. The "we" was somebody else's language, and Acts' author didn't edit it out when using that source's material. Or the "we" may be some sort of literary device meant to enhance the reader's experience without any intention of suggesting that the author of Acts participated in the events in question. And so on.
The third volume in Craig Keener's commentary on Acts (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2014) recently came out. Here's some of what he wrote there about the "we" passages:
Sunday, October 05, 2014
Justification for Roman Catholics
Dr. Joseph Mizzi, a former Roman Catholic, who writes at www.justforcatholics.org, has a new e-booklet available on the topic of justification. It's only 38 pages long, and it's an easy read that's designed to quickly communicate the Gospel message to Roman Catholics in an easily digestible format.
http://www.justforcatholics.org/justification.pdf
http://www.justforcatholics.org/justification.pdf
Russian dolls
The aim of science is to reduce our understanding of the physical world to an objective, third-person description. Of course, this collides with the "hard problem of consciousness":
http://www.iep.utm.edu/hard-con/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#ProCon
However, let's bracket the hard problem of consciousness and grant, for the sake of argument, that physicalism is true. In that event, what is an atheist? An atheist is a thing. A machine. Physical parts.
If physicalism is true, then human beings have no first-person dimension. Humans are just surfaces. No soul. No inner self. No imago Dei.
Humans are like Russian dolls. A nested set of dolls. Open one doll and there's a smaller doll inside. Each doll is just another external object. Another surface.
I once watched an autopsy in TV. Not a simulated, CSI type of autopsy, but the real thing. Dissecting a human corpse. Cutting open the chest cavity. Flipping the ribs on either side like French doors. Removing vital organs. Sawing the skull open. Removing the brain. It's kind of gross to watch.
From a physicalist standpoint, that's all we are. Just body parts. That's your mother. Body parts spread over the stainless steel dissection table.
Surfaces within surfaces within surfaces. Peeling away an outside layer exposes an inside layer. But the exposed layer becomes a new outside layer, like a Russian doll. Inside a larger doll but outside a smaller doll.
You can go down scales of magnitude. The brain composed of neurons. Neurons composed of proteins and amino acids. Molecules composed of atoms. Atoms composed of subatomic particles.
It's surfaces all the way down. One can keep going down without ever finding you. Where are you?
When one opens the last Russian doll, what's inside? Nothing. Empty space. You aren't there.
Yet atheists don't act like things. Atheists don't play the part physicalism assigns to them. For instance, atheists often wax indignant at Christians. But if physicalism is true, it's just one surface moralizing about another surface. Like a disagreement between two different chess computers.
Atheists never come to terms with atheism because it's ultimately just an idea. They can be atheists for as long as atheism remains a safe, distant abstraction.
In practice, they never assume the viewpoint their creeds requires, because it's so unnatural. In fact, it's impossible to assume the viewpoint their creed requires.
(In desperation, a few atheists resort to dualism or platonic realism. But that's a stopgap measure.)
http://www.iep.utm.edu/hard-con/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#ProCon
However, let's bracket the hard problem of consciousness and grant, for the sake of argument, that physicalism is true. In that event, what is an atheist? An atheist is a thing. A machine. Physical parts.
If physicalism is true, then human beings have no first-person dimension. Humans are just surfaces. No soul. No inner self. No imago Dei.
Humans are like Russian dolls. A nested set of dolls. Open one doll and there's a smaller doll inside. Each doll is just another external object. Another surface.
I once watched an autopsy in TV. Not a simulated, CSI type of autopsy, but the real thing. Dissecting a human corpse. Cutting open the chest cavity. Flipping the ribs on either side like French doors. Removing vital organs. Sawing the skull open. Removing the brain. It's kind of gross to watch.
From a physicalist standpoint, that's all we are. Just body parts. That's your mother. Body parts spread over the stainless steel dissection table.
Surfaces within surfaces within surfaces. Peeling away an outside layer exposes an inside layer. But the exposed layer becomes a new outside layer, like a Russian doll. Inside a larger doll but outside a smaller doll.
You can go down scales of magnitude. The brain composed of neurons. Neurons composed of proteins and amino acids. Molecules composed of atoms. Atoms composed of subatomic particles.
It's surfaces all the way down. One can keep going down without ever finding you. Where are you?
When one opens the last Russian doll, what's inside? Nothing. Empty space. You aren't there.
Yet atheists don't act like things. Atheists don't play the part physicalism assigns to them. For instance, atheists often wax indignant at Christians. But if physicalism is true, it's just one surface moralizing about another surface. Like a disagreement between two different chess computers.
Atheists never come to terms with atheism because it's ultimately just an idea. They can be atheists for as long as atheism remains a safe, distant abstraction.
In practice, they never assume the viewpoint their creeds requires, because it's so unnatural. In fact, it's impossible to assume the viewpoint their creed requires.
(In desperation, a few atheists resort to dualism or platonic realism. But that's a stopgap measure.)
“Drunk ex-Pastor”: Did Called to Communion ruin Jason Stellman’s life?
Warning: Graphic Content
He tried to portray himself as hip and cool, but really, as recent history has shown, he was one of the weak ones. Bryan Cross and the Called-to-Communion gang put a big target on his head and set him in their sights. Of course …
Thanks to the growing power and speed of the Internet, we can see the “crash-and-burn” in real-time.
He tried to portray himself as hip and cool, but really, as recent history has shown, he was one of the weak ones. Bryan Cross and the Called-to-Communion gang put a big target on his head and set him in their sights. Of course …
… the folks at CTC treated him as one of their trophies. Like a returning war hero.
Thanks to the growing power and speed of the Internet, we can see the “crash-and-burn” in real-time.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)