False hope

I'm going to comment on some recent remarks by Jerry Walls:

https://www.facebook.com/JerryLWalls/posts/10153005501305676?pnref=story

If one freely rejects the truth, it is a fitting form of punishment to be given over to deception. But in that case, the person has rejected God and does not affirm Christian truth. God is not causing him to believe Christian truth as a form of punishment. Rather, he is allowing him to be deceived in believing lies. The case in the false hope is altogether different. The victim of the false hope "believes" the truth, has a sense of faith, is believing what seems true to him precisely because God is causing him to have these beliefs. The person in this situation has no ability at all to discern that it is a false hope, and indeed, it appears to be the "real thing" until God withdraws it. The possibility of such a scenario does indeed undermine assurance precisely because the person involved would be in a state of "faith" caused by God, that appears both to the person, and to others as the real thing. This is quite different than the Arminian counterpart. An Arminian who believes the truth has every reason to think his faith is real, and no parallel reason to think his "faith" is a false hope caused by God. I'm not aware of any Arminian who thinks God punishes unbelief with a false faith in the truth. In short, the problem for the Calvinist is the phenomenological similarity, if not indistinguishability, between real faith and the "false hope." 

Several problems:

i) It's like saying, because crazy people can't tell the difference between reality and illusion (delusion, hallucination), how do I know that I'm not crazy? 

And I'm sure there are philosophers in the skeptical tradition who press that conundrum. 

Perhaps part of this involves the distinction between first-order and second-order belief or knowledge. If I'm sane, then I'm not deluded about reality–even if I can't prove it. 

ii) The Wesley brothers spent a lot of time trying to shake churchgoers out of their complacency. According to evangelical Arminianism, there are lots of churchgoers who think they're heavenbound, but they self-deluded. They haven't been born again. Yet they have false hope. 

iii) Arminians routinely allege that according to Calvinism, only a chosen few are saved.  

When I challenge them to document where the fewness of the elect is official Reformed theology, or mainstream Reformed theology, or a logical entailment of unconditional election and/or reprobation, they can't. So they make a different move. They apply Mt 7:14 to Calvinism. 

However, this means that according to Arminianism, only a fraction of humanity will be saved. But if that's the case, then surely many professing Christians entertain false hope. That's not just a statistical anomaly or isolated incident, but commonplace. 

iv) In Calvinism, the unregenerate don't have the same experience as the regenerate. 

v) Walls acts as though, in Calvinism, those who have false hope have a different psychological experience than their counterparts in Arminianism. We might start by asking why some people have false hope? Well, there can be different reasons or grounds, but let's take one example: suppose someone espouses baptismal regeneration. He believes he's saved because he can show you his baptismal certificate. 

Now that could be the case if either Arminianism or Calvinism is true. 

vi) Then there's the fundamental illogicality of his position. One thing Calvinism and universalism share in common is the correlation between who God loves and who God saves. 

But in Arminianism, those don't match up. So if anything would be a reason to question your salvation, would it not be the nagging doubt that even though God loves me, that carries no presumption that I'm heavenbound.  

And I believe William Cowper's struggles with fears of not being elect were among the factors that led to his suicide.

Cowper didn't commit suicide, although he attempted suicide. 

Moreover, does Walls have any evidence that Cooper lost his mind because he doubted his salvation? As I recall, Cooper doubted his salvation because he lost his mind. It was mental illness that triggered spiritual doubts, not vice versa.

It is a well known fact that believers in both traditions sometimes struggle with their faith and wonder about the status of their relationship with God, sometimes doubting whether they are even saved.
The worst case scenario for the Arminian is that he has in fact lost his faith and broken his relationship with God.

One problem with Jerry's comparison is that it's one-sided. He concentrates on professing Christians who doubt their salvation. But what about professing Christians who don't doubt their salvation, but ought to? What about professing Christians who entertain false hope because their faith is wrongly grounded? Isn't that a worst-case scenario? Their lack of doubt is a problem. They're like somebody with a life-threatening illness who can't feel pain. As such, they don't seek medical intervention until it's too late. They never knew what hit them. 

In Arminian theology, some professing Christians suffer from false assurance. Their problem is just the opposite. Indeed, John and Charles Wesley thought churches were full of people in that self-deluded condition. 

Now given that none of us can be in a position to know whether or not another person is truly elect, a Calvinist pastor cannot with good conscience assure a struggling person that Christ died for him or her without claiming to know more than his theology permits. What a struggling believer most needs to be assured of is that God loves him, that Christ died for him, that God truly desires his salvation, and that God’s grace is at work in his life.

Actually, what a struggling believer most needs is not to feel saved, but to be saved. In Calvinism, the elect are heavenbound whether or not they have the assurance of salvation. And that's a great relief. Your salvation isn't dependent on your assurance of salvation.

What ultimately matters is not to know that you are saved, but to be saved. The ontology is more important than the epistemology. What ultimately matters is what ultimately happens to you, not what you believe will happen to you. 

I also think this conditional is true:If Wesleyan theology is true, those who are in Christ can know that they are among the elect who are finally saved. They too can have both subjective certainty and a warranted belief in their election that will be vindicated on judgment day. 

How can that possibly be true given the Wesleyan Arminian contention that born-again Christians can lose their salvation? As a friend of mine remarked: 

On Calvinism, if S has saving faith now then S will have saving faith to the end; thus any evidence S has for believing that he has saving faith now is necessarily evidence that he will be finally saved. But on Wesleyan Arminianism, even if S has saving faith now, S might not have saving faith to the end; thus any evidence S has for believing that he has saving faith now (which will be the same kinds of evidence as on Calvinism) isn't necessarily evidence that he will be finally saved. The evidential tie is broken.

When Christians forfeit moral debates

I'm going to comment on this post:

http://www.reformation21.org/articles/the-christian-torture-and-intercessory-prayer.php

One of the ways in which the papacy discredits itself is when modern-day popes automatically condemn both sides of an armed conflict. They condemn the "cycle of violence." They don't distinguish between unprovoked aggression and self-defense. 

The result is the few people, including many conservative Catholics, take the pope seriously when he condemns "violence." For modern-day popes make no effort to explain how men of good will should be able to defend themselves.

Unfortunately, I see the same knee-jerk reaction among some evangelicals. They render themselves irrelevant because they refuse to offer serious ground-level advice. They retreat into gauzy pieties. This makes Christians look morally ineffectual. 

Take a maxim like "Do good, avoid evil." However, that's easier said than done. Doing good may have harmful consequences. Doing nothing may have harmful consequences. It's not possible to avoid evil at all costs even if we try. We lack the necessary foresight or control over the future. Although we can avoid doing evil, we can't avoid causing evil.  

One problem with this article is the way Draycott stereotypes his opponents. He imputes a simplistic and monolithic mentality to his opponents. 

So the government authorizes, or the apparatus of the state undertakes, torture. So what? We live in a fallen world and we are not surprised that criminal activity insidiously seeps into the highest reaches of public authority and command. 

i) To begin with, to stipulate that the actions of the CIA or American military were "criminal" begs the question.

ii) In addition, legality and morality are two different, and sometimes contrary, principles. Something can be legal, but immoral. Something can be moral, but illegal. Ironically, Draycott lacks the moral clarity to draw that moral distinction.  

Exposed to the discourse of the 'war on terror', from news to TV shows and movies, it is likely that we live as citizens in fear. 

So it's just a matter of "discourse"? What about actually witnessing the behavior of ISIS–to take one example? 

Surveillance, security, screening, and suspicion are the guarantors of our fragile peace. 

Notice how he lumps these together. But one can be more discriminating. One can support terrorist profiling but oppose dragnet surveillance or dragnet screening. 

That revelation is to be attained, so the torture justification goes, at any cost. 

Here he caricatures the opposing side. But it's not monolithic. Some people take a utilitarian position, but others are more discriminating. 

Of course, at the heart of Scripture's apocalypse stands not the security of the CIA, but the peace of the Lamb who was slain. The Christian response to torture in our midst must turn not first to a vision from our position of vulnerable wealth in a geopolitical age of terror, but to one in which Christ is the key.  The tactic that secures the future is not in our hands, not for lack of security technology or intelligence, but because it never has been. Christ really is able to open the scroll where all others cannot. 

So what does that mean at a policy level? Pacifism? Unilateral disarmament? 

Peace rather than technology and control. 

How does the abdication of national defense result in peace?

Torture is always wrong in light of who Christ is.  

Is sleep deprivation always wrong? If so, how so? 

Human life is not expendable, or degradable, or manipulable for intelligence. Human personhood, in the light of the gospel, cannot be subject to dehumanization. Christians are confident that the dehumanizing reality of sin is dealt with once and for all on the cross. Christians will not dehumanize the enemy, but rather love the enemy, because of Christ's humanizing representative authority. Love drives out fear. 

What makes it wrong to "manipulate" a terrorist for actionable intelligence? If it's wrong for a terrorist network to plot the destruction of innocent lives, it is wrong for a captured terrorist to withhold that information. 

How is sleep deprivation "dehumanizing"? Does Draycott have anything beyond the magic buzzwords to back up his strictures? 

Treating a person's human physical, psychological and emotional integrity as so much expendable or disposable material in the procuring of intelligence is to sell Jesus into the hands of his persecutors. 

Why should a terrorist's physical, psychological, and even "emotional" integrity be sacrosanct? Is it wrong to hurt his feelings? How does that outweigh the duty to protect innocent life? 

The extent to which there has been extortion of confession by force is just the extent to which there has been a denial of the conviction and transformation that is the ministry of the Holy Spirit.
But today we are not talking about arcane practices of an ecclesiastical judiciary. Of course we would be up in arms if torture were going on in our church basements. But must we be so troubled by torture by our military, security and intelligence services? 

That assumes coerced intel is morally equivalent to a coerced confession of sin. But Draycott offers no supporting argument to establish his analogy.

Can we expect these officers of the secular state to practice their profession according to the richness of Christian moral principles?

Unfortunately, guys like Draycott make it impossible for officers of the state to consider Christian ethics, for he presents an interpretation of Christian ethics that has no relevance to counterterrorism. In effect, he's telling them: "Hey, don't look to Christians for moral guidance. We have nothing concrete to offer. So you're on your own." 

What if the dilemma at issue is one where the intelligence is overwhelming that a person is stubbornly withholding information vital to eliminate an imminent horrific threat to innocent civilians. This is a ticking bomb scenario, so beloved of television drama. Do not theological niceties stand down at just this point? Surely here, in extremis, the end justifies the means. 

i) To begin with, sometimes the end does justify the means. That's not a universal principle. But there are special situations in which some actions which are ordinarily impermissible are permissible or even obligatory. 

ii) The problem is that Draycott's theological niceties are theologically unsound. Bad theology should stand down.  

iii) It is Draycott's strictures which are generating the gratuitous dilemma. 

But what is the extreme that has been reached? It seems it is the situation where our own security technology has not secured us invulnerability or full control over our fears. Yet this is not so much the exception but the very logic of security all along. If fear drives our security the enemy is already less then human. The enemy is a monster. Monsters cannot be dehumanized, torture is a misapplied category.

i) This is another one of his belittling caricatures. There's no assumption that our technology will render us "invulnerable." Our countermeasures may fail. It's a question of taking reasonable precautions. 

ii) There's such a thing as rational fear. Don't walk in tall grass where venomous snakes reside. Keep a safe distance from the river that's infested with crocodiles. Don't go hiking in bear country without a high-powered rifle. Don't go jogging at night in a public park with a reputation for muggers. Prudence is a theological virtue. 

Should I not address the finding that torture does not yield good intelligence? 

Which disregards evidence to the contrary. 

Or that its use damages the moral authority of the country in the eyes of the international community.

It's always ironic when people who engage in moral posturing invoke the "international community" as their last resort. Is the UN a moral authority? 

Reigniting the debate on "torture"

The release of the partisan, lameduck Senate report on CIA interrogation has fanned the smoldering embers of the "torture" debate. So often, this goes awry at the outset by asking the wrong questions. Here are two good discussions that draw necessary distinctions:

http://parablemania.ektopos.com/archives/2004/12/ethics_of_tortu.html

https://www.uta.edu/philosophy/faculty/burgess-jackson/The%20Logic%20of%20Torture%20(Wall%20Street%20Journal,%20Version%202).pdf

Calvinism and Cartesian demons

David Houston Maul, I know I’m a bit late to the party but I’d like to know what you think of this argument: Suppose you thought a Cartesian demon exists who is bent on deceiving you. If you believed such a being existed then you would have an undercutting defeater for a large subset of your beliefs. Now, suppose you’re a Calvinist who believes that God sometimes (unculpably) deceives people by determining them to believe that they are elect. In a way analogous to the Cartesian demon scenario, it seems that you would then have an undercutting defeater for your belief that you are elect. You know that he doesn’t always do this so it may not be enough to completely defeat your belief but I think it makes your belief less warranted.

https://www.facebook.com/JerryLWalls/posts/10153005501305676?pnref=story

The situation is getting desperate when Arminians resort to Cartesian demons to defeat Calvinism.  

i) To begin with, once you let the Cartesian demon out of the cage, it will bedevil every belief-system. It isn't partial to Calvinism. It's a universally delusive imp. No getting it back into the cage once it's released. How is Arminianism immune? 

You can't just sic the Cartesian demon on Calvinism. The Cartesian demon is a wild animal. It hasn't been to obedience school. It doesn't follow orders. 

It's like letting a tiger out of the cage, pointing to your enemy, and saying, "Attack!" Well, the tiger stares at you and sees you as a menu item, too. The Cartesian demon is omnivorous. All-devouring. It won't stop with Calvinism. 

ii) If you can't help but be deceived, then aren't your justified in maintaining delusive beliefs? To take a comparison:

The first objection to reliabilism, lodged by several different authors, is the evil-demon counterexample (Cohen, 1984; Pollock, 1984; Feldman, 1985; Foley, 1985). In a possible world inhabited by an evil demon (or permute this, if you wish, into a brain-in-a-vat case), the demon creates non-veridical perceptions of physical objects in people's minds. All of their perceptual beliefs, which are stipulated to be qualitatively identical to ours, are therefore false. Hence, perceptual belief-forming processes in that world are unreliable. Nonetheless, since their perceptual experiences – and hence evidence – are identical to ours, and we surely have justified perceptual beliefs, the beliefs of the people in the demon world must also be justified. So reliabilism gets the case wrong. The intended moral of the example is that reliability isn't necessary for justification; a justified belief can be caused by a process that is unreliable (in the subject's world). 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reliabilism/#ProForEarProRel

Is sleep deprivation immoral?

I'm going to comment on a post by Steven Wedgeworth:

http://wedgewords.wordpress.com/2014/12/10/jesus-died-for-torture-apologists/

Unfortunately, his post represents the kind of half-baked reasoning that's used to shame Christians into accepting that position. 

However, in the wake of the recent Senate Intelligence Committee’s report, there are no longer relevant reasons to prevent us from concluding that the United States did participate in torture and that many of the specific forms were unjust and abhorrent. They were evil.

i) To begin with, the Senate report was a partisan hatchet-job. And it isn't just right-wingers like me who think that:

http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/12/09/torture-cia-senate-intelligence-report-911-column/20088647/

ii) I, for one, don't deny that some methods like sleep deprivation might be classified as "torture." But that just goes to show how morally elastic the definition is. 

As John McCain has ably argued, America has compromised its integrity with the use of enhanced interrogation and thereby weakened the health of the people.

That's an illicit argument from authority. Who made John McCain to be a moral authority on "torture." 

This issue also highlights a more basic one. If you have ever defended an evil action because it satisfied personal revenge or gave you a limited opportunity to indulge violent and bloodthirsty passions, then you must repent. This is not a trifling matter. The torture revelations are but a macro-level version of what goes on in every human heart. Only, in this case, the hateful desires were not suppressed or denied but rather fed. Murder begins with unchecked anger in the heart. Torture comes from elevating hatred, or a false sense of moral entitlement, over the inherent dignity of the image of God. 

That's a scurrilous hasty generalization. Wedgeworth presumes to impute base motives to everyone who defends "torture" of any kind under any circumstance. That's not an appeal to reason. That's not persuasion. It's browbeating people into submission. 

Ask yourselves if you really can and should be defending “rectal hydration.” Why are you not morally shaken by such a practice, or, if you are, why are you still able to overcome that moral compunction?

Why does defending "torture" require me to defend everything that might be classified as torture? Why does defending, say, sleep deprivation require me to defend "rectal hydration"? 

Wedgeworth doesn't bother to explain how one entails the other. He doesn't bother to explain why you can't condemn any form of "torture" unless you condemn every form of "torture." What's the logical or moral basis for lumping all these disparate methods into one package–take it or leave it? It's like saying that unless you're a pacifist, anything goes in warfare. Does Wedgeworth have anything to offer besides disapproving rhetoric? 

In an ethics class with Dr. Derek Thomas, a few students defended the use of torture as a necessary means to an end, and Dr. Thomas rebuked them sternly, stating that he held torture to be an offense against the image of God.

i) How is sleep deprivation an offense against the image of God?

ii) As I've said on other occasions, one problem I have with this ultimatum is that it's counterproductive. If a Christian ethicist tells people that sleep deprivation is never morally permissible, regardless of how many innocent lives that will save, then many people will reacting by saying so much the worse for Christian ethics. That's a reason not to take Christianity seriously. 

Far from acting as a moral restraint, if you tell people that under no circumstances is sleep deprivation ever permissible, they just give up trying to be conscientious. At that point there are no brakes on what they are prepared to do. They become morally thoughtless because you give them no better option. 

…there is a definitive moral line along the spectrum (even if we argue where it precisely is), and utilitarian defenses can never justify crossing that line. It does not matter if an action or policy “works” if it is truly evil. It does not matter if an action or policy “promotes American interests” if it is truly evil. It does not matter if an action or policy is associated with a particular political party or patriotic sentiment if it is truly evil. It is never right to do wrong. 

I agree with him that some lines cannot be crossed. However, to say that consequences are only morally relevant in utilitarianism  is philosophically uniformed. 

Moreover, Wedgeworth doesn't bother to explain why consequences should never be a factor in moral deliberations. 

The use of sexual assault and threats of sexual assault (and murder!) against family members are the kind of enormities which make rational men go mute in shock and moral disbelief...Surely sexual assault and threats against a suspect’s family cross the moral line and are wholly out of the question for reasonable people to consider.

i) Critics like Wedgeworth lack the patience to draw important ethical distinctions. But their intellectual impatience betrays a lack of moral seriousness. If you take right and wrong seriously, if you take moral deliberation seriously, then you can't allow yourself these intellectual shortcuts. I'm struck by how often those who invoke moral rigorism skimp on analytical rigor. 

ii) Notice how he lumps two distinct cases into one, as if physical harm and threatening harm are morally equivalent. Is there no moral difference between actually harming someone and threatening to harm someone? Why should anyone accept Wedgeworth's glib equivalence?

iii) Moreover, who is being verbally threatened? Is this directed at the terrorist, or a family member? Are they telling the terrorist that unless he cooperates, they will harm a family member? Or are they holding a family member hostage, whom they threaten to harm unless the terrorist cooperates? Are those morally equivalent situations?

iv) Is there a moral difference between a threat which the interrogator intends to carry in case the terrorist refuses to comply, and an empty threat which is credible to the terrorist, even though–unbeknownst to him–the interrogator has no intention of making good on? Seems very different to me.

v) As a rule, I think family members are off-limits, but it's easy to think of exceptions. What if terrorism is the family business. What if his father or twenty-something brother is a terrorist, too? Would it be wrong to "torture" them to make him break? 

Or, to take a tougher case, is it intrinsically wrong to scare the child of a terrorist to make him break, if that will save the thousands of innocent lives? 

Sometimes parents deliberately scare their children as a deterrent. They warn them about how dangerous or painful a particular activity is. Suppose you live in Darwin, Australia. That's infested with saltwater crocodiles. Surely it would be prudent to tell your kids scary stories about saltwater crocodiles to make them cautious. 

Whites co-opting black demonstrations

https://ricochet.com/whites-gentrifying-black-led-protests/

Growing Up Gotti

i) Caucasians sometimes respond to the allegation of white privilege by pointing out they weren't alive back then, or their linear ancestors never owned slaves. 

Liberals retort that you can be a beneficiary of past injustice. Even though you didn't personally do anything wrong, you benefit from the wrongdoing of your white forebears. For instance, Carmine Agnello, Jr., John Gotti Agnello, and Frank Gotti Agnello financially benefit from having had a Mafia Don for a father. 

Likewise, white Americans profit from living on "stolen land." Land stolen from American Indians. Today's white Americans benefit from the economic legacy of slave labor. So goes the argument. 

ii) There are, however, some fundamental problems with the argument. To begin with, it proves too much.

Assuming the premise is true, then it's not just white Americans who benefit from past injustice. Americans of every race and ethnicity benefit from past injustice. It's not just white Americans who are squatters on Indian land. 

And assuming that our economic infrastructure was built on the backs of slave labor (which is a huge exaggeration), it's not just contemporary white Americans who prosper from that legacy. 

iii) In addition, the claim that contemporary Americans live on stolen land is, to some extent, exaggerated or anachronistic. 

For starters, isn't the concept of land ownership more appropriate to farmers than foragers? Take the difference between farmers and ranchers. Ranchers need grazing rights. They don't necessarily need to own grazing land. They just need access to grazing land. Land use rather than land ownership. 

Likewise, some nomadic societies track the migratory patterns of fish or game animals. It's not territorial in the sense of owning the land, but having access to seasonal hunting or fishing grounds. 

I'm not saying that's true of all Indian societies. But that's why we need to guard against hasty generalizations. 

iv) Furthermore, Indian tribes raided other Indian tribes. So the question private ownership becomes very blurred very fast. 

Unarmed suspects

Debates over "police brutality" (insert your favorite) adjective are often framed in terms of police shooting an "unarmed" suspect. 

The implication is that an unarmed suspect is no threat to an armed policeman. 

Now, I do think that when a policeman shoots an unarmed suspect, that needs to be investigated. There are certainly situations in which the suspect posed no threat to the policeman. In that event, a policeman should be prosecuted the same way a civilian would be prosecuted. 

BTW, I'm using "suspect" as a placeholder. Sometimes police accost drivers or pedestrians who aren't even suspects. You also have innocent homeowners shot in no-knock raids. 

That said, the comparison is misleading. An armed individual only has an advantage over an unarmed individual so long as the armed individual is prepared to use his gun. If he's not prepared to shoot anyone, then he's effectively unarmed. In that situation, it's equivalent to a confrontation between two unarmed combatants.

To complain that police sometimes shoot unarmed suspects is circular. For if the criticism is that a policeman should never shoot an unarmed suspect, that that amounts to unilateral disarmament of the police. 

And when you have a confrontation between two unarmed individuals, that can obviously be an unequal contest. These are not necessarily evenly-matched combatants. 

Take a female jogger who carries a handgun in her fanny pack to defend herself against potential rapists, muggers, or serial killers. Without a gun, she's no match for a young, strong male assailant. 

Into the Fire

http://www.nationalreview.com/node/394353/print

Police action and disturbing conservative attitudes

http://www.whatswrongwiththeworld.net/2014/12/police_action_and_disturbing_c.html

Taking his seat in the temple of God

For that day will not come, unless the rebellion comes first, and the man of lawlessness is revealed, the son of destruction, 4 who opposes and exalts himself against every so-called god or object of worship, so that he takes his seat in the temple of God, proclaiming himself to be God…9 The coming of the lawless one is by the activity of Satan with all power and false signs and wonders (2 Thes 2:3-4,9). 

There is no other head of the Church but the Lord Jesus Christ; nor can the Pope of Rome, in any sense, be head thereof; but is that Antichrist, that man of sin, and son of perdition, that exalts himself, in the Church, against Christ and all that is called God (WCF 25.6).

1) Traditionally, Protestants identified the papacy with the Antichrist. This post is not defending that identification. I think various individuals and institutions can exemplify the "spirit of the Antichrist" (1 Jn 4:3). 

My immediate point is not to discussion the traditional Protestant view of the papacy, but to discuss some allegations from Catholic sources–allegations which, ironically mirror the traditional Protestant identification.

In his homily given on the Feast of Saints Peter and Paul on June 29, 1972, Pope Paul VI made a famous remark about the “smoke of Satan” entering into the temple of God. The full text of the homily was not reproduced in the Vatican collection of Paul VI’s teachings (Insegnamenti di Paulo VI Vol. X, 1972). Instead, a summary of the homily was given. Within the summary, however, there are some direct quotes from the Pontiff. Two of these are memorable for their references to Satan and the preternatural. 

The Holy Father asserts that he has the feeling that “from some fissure the smoke of Satan has entered into the temple of God” (da qualche fessura sia entrato il fumo di Satana nel tempio di Dio (Insegnamenti [1972], 707). 

Later, he is quoted as saying: “We believe … that something preternatural has come into the world specifically to disturb, to suffocate the fruits of the Ecumenical Council, and to prevent the Church from breaking out in a hymn of joy for having recovered in fullness the awareness of herself (Crediamo … in qualcosa di preternaturale venunto nel mondo proprio per turbare, per soffocare i frutti del Concilio Ecumenico, e per impedire che la Chiesa prorompesse nell’inno della gioia di aver riavuto in pienezza la coscienza di sé (Insegnamenti [1972], 708).
(notes and translations by R. Fastiggi) 

In his general audience of Nov. 15, 1972, Paul VI addressed in more detail the reality of the Devil. He stated that one of the greatest needs of the Church today is the defense against that evil we call the Devil. (Insegnamenti [1972], 1168-1173). 

http://pblosser.blogspot.com/2009/02/paul-vi-on-smoke-of-satan-june-29-1972.html

Taken in isolation, the first statement about "Satan's smoke" could be purely figurative. However, the subsequent reference to "something preternatural," as well as his general audience about the reality of the devil, suggests that his statement about "Satan's smoke" did have reference to Satanic activity. 

And what's the sphere of Satanic activity? He glosses that in terms of opposition to the Vatican II Council. That might also explain the reference to the "temple of God," since formal sessions of the Council took place in the native of St. Peter's Basilica.

Obviously, Paul VI isn't suggesting that Satan is the real power behind the papal throne. Nevertheless, this is an oddly self-incriminating statement for the pope to make about the headquarters of his own denomination.  

Are there men of the curia who are followers of satan? "Certainly there are priests and bishops. I stop at this level of ecclesiastical hierarchy - (Archbishop Milingo) said - because i am an archbishop, higher than this I cannot go." 

http://www.fatimacrusader.com/cr54/cr54pg11.asp

Emmanuel Milingo became an embarrassment to the Vatican. I believe he was subsequently excommunicated and laicized. Due to the prevalence of witchcraft in Africa, he was a strong proponent of exorcism or "deliverance ministry." 

One can certainly question his credibility. However, I'm not the one who made him an archbishop of the Roman Catholic church. To the extent that he's a quack, that reflects poorly on the discernment of the Magisterium, which elevated him to its own ranks. 

Next, let's consider some statements by the late Martin Malachi. He had an impressive resume: 

He received doctorates from the universities of Louvain and Oxford and from Hebrew University in Jerusalem…he became Professor of Palaeontology and Semitic Languages at the prestigious Pontifical Biblical Institute in Rome and was a theological adviser to Cardinal Augustin Bea, the head of the Vatican's Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity. 

http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/obituary-malachi-martin-1110905.html

Among other things, he said: 

A. Windswept House is a novel. But it is 85 percent based on actual fact, and most of the personages appearing in it are real even though I have given them fictional names. 

Q. Your book [Windswept House] begins with a vivid description of a sacrilegious "Black Mass" held in 1963 in Charleston, South Carolina. Did this really happen? 

A. Yes it did. And the participation by telephone of some high officials of the church in the Vatican is also a fact. The young female who was forced to be a part of this satanic ritual is very much alive and, happily, has been able to marry and lead a normal life. She supplied details about the event. 

Q. In addition to the "Cardinal from Century City," you depict numerous other cardinals and bishops in a very bad light. Are these characterizations based on fact? 

A. Yes, among the cardinals and the hierarchy there are satanists, homosexuals, anti-papists, and cooperators in the drive for world rule. 

The Catholic Church in Crisis,” The New American, June 9, 1997. 

http://www.fisheaters.com/forums/index.php?action=printpage;topic=2940508.0 

Indeed Paul [Pope Paul VI] had alluded somberly to ‘the smoke of Satan which has entered the Sanctuary’. . . an enthronement ceremony by Satanists in the Vatican. Besides, the incidence of Satanic pedophilia—rites and practices— was already documented among certain bishops and priests as widely dispersed as Turin, in Italy, and South Carolina, in the United States. The cultic acts of Satanic pedophilia are considered by professionals to be the culmination of the Fallen Archangel’s rites. The Keys of This Blood.

This requires some sifting. With reference to the Black Mass in South Carolina, I believe he's alluding to an allegation concerning Bishop Russell and Joseph Bernardin. There is some partial, independent corroboration of this incident:

Among the hundreds of clerical sex abusers is one Msgr. Frederick J. Hopwood, a priest of the Diocese of Charleston, S.C., whose early career was closely linked to Bernardin's; and when Hopwood's sex abuse victims pressed damages against the Diocese of Charleston, attorneys for the Archdiocese of Chicago, during Bernardin's tenure, worked out the terms of settlement. In March, 1994, six months before a former Cincinnati seminarian named Steven Cook publicly accused Bernardin of sexual abuse, newspapers in South Carolina reported that nine men had come forward to accuse Hopwood of sexual abuse in cases dating back to the 1950s. On March 21st, 1994, Hopwood pleaded guilty to one charge of sex abuse, performed on a minor while Hopwood was rector of the Cathedral of St. John the Baptist sometime in 1970-1971, in a plea agreement that put him in a therapy program instead of jail. About the same time that Hopwood was making the news in Charleston, The Wanderer received an anonymous "fact sheet" (subsequently investigated and substantiated) that drew connections between Bernardin and Hopwood. Both men, who were roommates at the Charleston seminary, were ordained by the late Bishop John J. Russell of Charleston (1950-1958), later bishop of Richmond; Hopwood in 1951, Bernardin in 1952. Bishop Russell was himself accused of sexual abuse. Immediately upon Hopwood's Ordination, Russell appointed him chancellor of the diocese, a post at which he served for a few years, with Bernardin coming on as assistant chancellor in 1953, and replacing Hopwood as chancellor in 1954. For much of the time until Bernardin was named in 1966 as an auxiliary bishop of Atlanta under his mentor, Archbishop Paul J. Hallinan, who had been bishop of Charleston from 1958-1962, Bernardin and Hopwood resided together at the cathedral rectory. What made the Hopwood pedophilia case of more than just passing interest was the involvement of attorneys from Mayer, Brown, and Platt, the Archdiocese of Chicago's law firm, which brokered the settlement for some of Hopwood's victims. According to an attorney familiar with the cases against Hopwood, "he was not your ordinary pedophile. He did hundreds and hundreds of boys, and I can't imagine Bernardin not being aware of it, since they lived together for such a long time.”

http://www.bishop-accountability.org/news/1998_06_18_Likoudis_EpiscopalScandal.htm

The allegation of a satanic enthronement ceremony at the Vatican occurs in both his nonfiction book (The Keys of This Blood) and his historical novel (Windswept House). As a Vatican insider, who worked there from about 1958 until 1965, he might well be in position to know about Satanists at the Vatican conducting blasphemous ceremonies. 

However, I have reservations about the details of Malachi's allegation:

i) The allegation about the South Carolinian incident seems to trade on the craze of recovered memories involving ritual satanic abuse and/or sexual abuse. So I find that suspect. 

ii) Sodomy and heterosexual rape are hardly interchangeable. But perhaps the motivation wouldn't be so much sexual as sacrilegious.

iii) There's the question of relative chronology. Were these in fact simultaneous events, or does his synchronization reflect artistic license in writing a historical novel? 

Finally:

In a book of memoirs released in February, the noted Italian exorcist Fr. Gabriele Amorth affirmed that "Yes, also in the Vatican there are members of Satanic sects." When asked if members of the clergy are involved or if this is within the lay community, he responded, "There are priests, monsignors and also cardinals!" 

The book, "Father Amorth. Memoirs of an Exorcist. My life fighting against Satan." was written by Marco Tosatti, who compiled it from interviews with the priest. 

Fr. Amorth was asked by Tosatti how he knows Vatican clergy are involved. He answered, "I know from those who have been able to relate it to me because they had a way of knowing directly." 

http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/spanish_exorcist_addresses_claims_of_satanic_influence_in_vatican/

As the long-time (but now retired) Chief Exorcist of Rome, I'd expect Amorth to have extensive inside information about clerical satanism, both inside the Vatican and in the city of Rome, where many priests live and work. By that I mean, if it exists, he ought to know better than anyone. 

2) Whether or not we credit these specific allegations, we might assess their antecedent likelihood. If Satanists had access to venerable Christian shrines, it would not be surprising if they practice their rites there. The very point of the Black Mass is to defile sacred space. 

3) In addition, this concretely illustrates how something analogous to 2 Thes 2 could happen in modern times. The point is not whether a Catholic shrine is, in fact, the "temple of God," but to play on the symbolism, to offend traditional reverence, to use that as a foil to defile everything it represents–in the eyes of "the faithful." It could be the Vatican, Mount Athos, Santa Katarina, Canterbury cathedral, the Temple Mount, the Church of the Nativity, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Hallgrímskirkja, &c. 

Recycling Bad Objections To The Accounts Of Jesus' Birth

Valerie Tarico has written an article about Jesus' birth that repeats a lot of common objections without interacting with counterarguments that have been circulating for a long time. And, unsurprisingly, John Loftus linked it. We've covered most of this ground many times before, but I'll respond to several examples of Tarico's argumentation.

Distraught parents

I'm going to comment on a letter from an allegedly distraught parent to William Lane Craig:

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/letter-from-a-grieving-father

i) To begin with, I don't know that this is for real. It may just as well be an exercise in atheistic sockpuppetry to put a prominent Christian apologist on the spot.

ii) There can be a danger in being too deferential to grieving parents. By that I mean, there's a tendency in the current culture to treat the loss of a child as the worst thing that can possibly happen to someone. Uniquely worse than losing a parent, sibling, spouse, or best friend.

But is that true? I think the major reason is that other kinds of deaths are expected. Therefore, the cultural message is that we shouldn't be as distraught by the death of a parent, sibling, or spouse. 

But how is that germane to the sense of loss and depth of loss? Surely that's based on the quality or intensity of the emotional bond, and not whether their death is expected. 

I don't think that the death of a child is uniquely painful. It's rather callous to assume that. 

iii) Why would the correspondent be reading Sam Harris? Assuming the letter is for real, that's the kind of thing someone does who has lost his faith, and is seeking to justify his loss of faith. 

iv) Assuming the letter is for real, this illustrates the danger of false expectations. Child mortality has plummeted in contemporary Western nations thanks to modern medical science. As a result, the death of a child is shocking to parents.

But in the past (as well as Third World countries), parents never expected most of their children to reach maturity. Siblings were used to losing brothers and sisters in childhood. 

Although that's emotional shocking, that wasn't intellectually shocking. 

By the same token, child mortality was high in Bible times. Take references to stillbirth in Scripture. 

Child mortality is not inconsistent with Biblical theism. God didn't promise to protect Christian children from fatal illness. This doesn't call God's existence into question. In terms of Biblical theism, there's no presumption that you children will be exempt from fatal illness. 

We may still ask, "Why does God allow it?", but this doesn't contradict Christian theology. There's no logical tension between what Christian theology says can happen and what (allegedly) happened to this parent.  

v) Apropos (iv), for too many people, something isn't real until it happens to them. Unless they personally experience some tragedy, that's just an abstraction which they don't incorporate into their outlook. 

vi) Rejecting God if you lose a loved one trivializes the life and death of your loved one. In a godless universe, life is cheap. You cheapen the value of your loved one by rejecting God in anger over the death of your loved one. 

Because your loved one meant so much to you, you reject God for taking your loved one from you. But in so doing, you make your loved one worthless. You reduce your loved-one to driftwood in the sea of cosmic indifference. They were just a little flicker of consciousness between the dark and silent stretches of infinite time and space. 

vii) If your loved one is born or diagnosed with a terminal illness, that's tragic, but it's an opportunity as well. It gives you the lead-time to make the most of the remaining time. You know the time is short. So you don't take them for granted.

That intensifies the bond. You learn to get more out of less. The time is very concentrated. The less time remaining, the more precious the remaining time.

So there's a tradeoff. If you think someone will always be a part of your life–you have time to burn, you can call them or see them whenever you want–there can be long stretches when you treat them as if they don't exist. There's no urgency. 

viii) Let's play devil's advocate. Suppose someone says, "Why should I be grateful to God that something even worse didn't befall my loved one? If a mugger knocks out my front teeth, should I thank him because he didn't set me on fire?" 

a) If you're loved one was spared a worse fate even though they deserved a worse fate, then that's reason for gratitude.

b) There's more to it than God protecting your loved one from an even worse fate. There's the compensations of heaven. 

The first and most important distinction between Rome and the Reformed Orthodox

Q1. What is the chief and highest end of man?
A. Man’s chief and highest end is to glorify God, and fully to enjoy him forever.

Just to be clear, this is from the “Westminster Larger Catechism”. After a century of contending with Roman Catholicism, the Reformed Orthodox perceived this issue to be the first and most important distinction between themselves and the Roman Catholics. Rome wants to deify itself and man; the Reformers sought God in his own glory, for His own sake.

What is it that these people have bought into? “You will be fused into God”

In fact, to quote more precisely, “you will be God”.

Convinced Movie Trailer from Don Johnson on Vimeo.

Protestants are not prepared to deal with this sort of thing. But it’s coming, and we had better get ready for it. At the conclusion of his “Brief Catechism on Nature & Grace”, Henri De Lubac writes,

(citing Ratzinger) Let us conclude that “a Christianity which offers man something less than making him God is too modest …. In the struggle for man which we are engaged, such an answer is insufficient.” All along, Christianity has shown perhaps a somewhat less cheerful face; it reminds us with more realism of our condition as sinners, and it does not allow us to forget the prayer given to us by our Lord: “Forgive us our trespasses … deliver us from evil”; but at the same time it opens before us the gates of life in the bosom of the Blessed Trinity.

The promise is not “to become God without God” (as he compares the goal of some in our age). The promise rather, is from God, “you will share in divine life. You will become God”.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but De Lubac says “without the perspective that Christian faith opens of a ‘way out’, leading to divine transcendence and a personalizing union with God in Christ, humanity will not only always remain far from the goal it seeks, it will condemn itself to despair.”

“Personal union with God” means, to the Roman Catholic (with his grand synthesis of neo-Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysic), a literal “fusion of existences” with God, as noted by Herr Ratzinger in his work “Called to Communion”:

Hence, Communion [capital in original] means the fusion of existences. Just as in the taking of nourishment the body assimilates foreign matter to itself, and is thereby enabled to live, in the same way my “I” is “assimilated” to that of Jesus, it is made similar to him in an exchange that increasingly breaks through the lines of division. This same event takes place in the case of all who communicate; they are all assimilated to this “bread” and thus are made one among themselves--one body (36).

Rome’s “justification”, its “sacramental treadmill”, its emphasis on earning “inherent righteousness”, all leads to this.

Of course, the devil tempted Eve, “You will not surely die. For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, ...” Do we want to take the word of the “infallible church” that not only being “like God”, but being “fused into God” is a good thing now, when it wasn’t a good thing then? “The Church” is “the universal sacrament of salvation”. It is this very concept which is its mission to “communicate”, to “bring the fullness of” to people, through the “grace” of its “sacraments”.

That is what these folks have bought into. This will have an appeal in our opra-fied culture, where people all think they're God anyway.

1 Peter 1:13: “Therefore, preparing your minds for action, and being sober-minded, set your hope fully on the grace that will be brought to you at the revelation of Jesus Christ”.

Will the dust praise you?

For in death there is no remembrance of you; in Sheol who will give you praise? (Ps 6:5). 

What profit is there in my death, if I go down to the pit? Will the dust praise you? Will it tell of your faithfulness? (Ps 30:9). 

10 Do you work wonders for the dead? Do the departed rise up to praise you? 11 Is your steadfast love declared in the grave, or your faithfulness in Abaddon? 12 Are your wonders known in the darkness, or your righteousness in the land of forgetfulness? (Ps 88:10-12). 

The dead do not praise the Lord, nor do any who go down into silence. 18 But we will bless the Lord from this time forth and forevermore (Ps 115:17-18).

Annihilationists appeal to these passages. Evangelical commentators struggle over these passages. Do they deny the afterlife? 

i) We need to do a bit of initial sorting. Sometimes Eccl 9:5 is included in these discussions. That, however, strikes a different note. It's not about whether the dead remember anything, but whether the dead are remembered by the living. That's a recurrent theme in Ecclesiastes. We are quickly forgotten. That holds true regardless of the afterlife.

LIkewise, Isa 38:18 is often included in these discussions. But even though that's similar to the Psalmnodic passages, it is not an authoritative statement regarding the fate of the dead. Hezekiah was not a prophet. He's not speaking under inspiration. He's merely expressing his personal opinion. That may reflect a popular view of the afterlife, but it's not revelatory. 

ii) It's important to keep these passages in perspective. There's just a handful of OT passages which raise this issue. It's not like we have many OT passages which appear to deny the afterlife. And, of course, that must be counterbalanced by OT passages that affirm the intermediate state, general resurrection, or resurrection of the just. 

iii) In my opinion, the explanations which evangelical commentators offer are less than satisfying:

a) Some appeal to progressive revelation. And it's true that OT writers didn't have a specifically Christian view of the afterlife. There is, however, a fundamental difference between saying OT writers spoke in ignorance, and saying they spoke falsely. Progressive revelation doesn't mean the NT corrects the OT. 

b) Some appeal to the progress of redemption. OT saints lived before the Cross, so their outlook is darker. I think that has some merit, but it's too generic. 

c) Some appeal to the contrast between embodied and disembodied existence. But is the intermediate state of OT saints such a bleak prospect? 

d) Some say these describe to the inability of the dead to participate in the public worship of Israel. That explanation has the merit of seizing on the "praise" motif. But is there any reason to think that missing out on the public worship of Israel was such a loss for dead OT saints? As with (c), this presumes that the intermediate state was a drastic deprivation. 

iv) I think the best explanation is the fact that the OT strongly links death and divine judgment. The fear that death, especially "premature" death, may reflect God's disfavor. If you die at the hands of your enemies, does that mean God withdrew his protection? Is that a sign of divine abandonment? If you die of illness, is that a mark of divine displeasure? 

And there's an element of truth to this. For, going all the way back to Gen 2-3, death is punitive. "Dust" isn't merely a synonym for the disintegrated corpse, but has connotations of the primeval curse (Gen 3:19). 

This stands in contrast to "praise." As a rule, OT praise is not disinterested. No praise for the sake of praise. Not so much praising God for what he is but what he does. Praise is synonymous with thanksgiving. Expressing gratitude for divine deliverance. God's fidelity to his promises. God's mercy in time of need. To praise God is to thank God for rescuing you from some evil. In context, the would-be decedent can't praise God, not because he ceases to exist, but because God did not deliver him in his extremity. In that sense, he has nothing to praise God for. God turns away when he turns to God in his distress. 

And, of course, it's the living who express this anxiety, not the dead. The Psalmist is alive. So this reflects the viewpoint of the living, not the dead. Fear of what an untimely death may portend regarding God's attitude towards the decedent. 

Notice, for instance, the oppressive tie between mortality and judgment in Ps 90. That's what lies just under the surface of Pss 6:5, 30:9, 88:10-12, and 115:17-18. 

v) Christians view death somewhat differently because we live on the other side of the cross. Take this classic contrast:

14 Since therefore the children share in flesh and blood, he himself likewise partook of the same things, that through death he might destroy the one who has the power of death, that is, the devil, 15 and deliver all those who through fear of death were subject to lifelong slavery (Heb 2:14-15).

Death still represents divine judgment. But Christ died in our stead. We still die, but death isn't punitive for us, because he was punished in our stead. It's difficult to overestimate the impact of promises like this:

Let not your hearts be troubled. Believe in God; believe also in me. 2 In my Father's house are many rooms. If it were not so, would I have told you that I go to prepare a place for you? 3 And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and will take you to myself, that where I am you may be also (Jn 14:1-3).

The prospect of death for OT saints and NT saints is like the difference between first light and sunrise. 

Evidence For Jesus' Family Background

The gospels, Acts, and other early sources agree in presenting an unusual family background for Jesus, one that the early Christians are unlikely to have fabricated. I've discussed some of the details in another post. Why do multiple sources suggest that Mary's conception of Jesus occurred prior to marriage, that the family lived in Nazareth, that Joseph had died prior to Jesus' public ministry, that his siblings were unbelievers until around the time of Jesus' death, etc.? They probably reported that scenario because it's true.

Keeping uppity blacks in their place

Notice that for all the ostentatious talk about white privilege, "structural," "systemic," "institutional" racism, or "microaggressions," when a black accidentally (much less intentionally) steps on the lily white toes of political correctness, he's sent back to the cotton fields. They didn't check their white privileged when they fired this black college president for giving females students some perfectly reasonable, common sense advice:

http://www.nationalreview.com/node/394148/print

New Jersey Bible Institute - Upcoming Seminar on History of the Bible

http://www.newjerseybibleinstitute.org/

David Wood's Conversion To Christianity

Here's a video of David Wood telling the story of his conversion from atheism to Christianity (while in prison for attempted murder):

The Book of Truth

40 “At the time of the end, the king of the south shall attack him, but the king of the north shall rush upon him like a whirlwind, with chariots and horsemen, and with many ships. And he shall come into countries and shall overflow and pass through. 41 He shall come into the glorious land. And tens of thousands shall fall, but these shall be delivered out of his hand: Edom and Moab and the main part of the Ammonites. 42 He shall stretch out his hand against the countries, and the land of Egypt shall not escape. 43 He shall become ruler of the treasures of gold and of silver, and all the precious things of Egypt, and the Libyans and the Cushites shall follow in his train. 44 But news from the east and the north shall alarm him, and he shall go out with great fury to destroy and devote many to destruction. 45 And he shall pitch his palatial tents between the sea and the glorious holy mountain. Yet he shall come to his end, with none to help him (Dan 11:40-45). 

i) Liberals think Daniel was written in the mid-2C BC. They think most of Dan 11 is prophecy after the fact. The anonymous author was writing history under the guise of prophecy.

They think there's a shift at v40. They view that as a genuine, but mistaken prediction. The author was writing history up to that point, but then made the precarious move of extrapolating the future from the recent post–and got it wrong. 

He supposedly got it wrong, because Antiochus didn't die in Palestine (pace vv40-45), but Persia. 

ii) I've critiqued that interpretation from various angles. Now I'd like to broach the issue from another angle.

iii) Keep in mind that Daniel doesn't name the ill-fated individual. He doesn't say this was Antiochus. That identification is supplied by commentators rather than the author. 

That doesn't mean there's anything necessarily wrong with commentators attempting to identify unnamed referents. But we need to guard against a circular argument whereby we first impute to Daniel something he didn't say, then accuse him of contradicting known facts. 

iv) Not to mention that even if Daniel was alluding to Antiochus throughout, it comes down to a question of which historical source you trust. 

v) Commentators who defend the Maccabean date don't believe that God, if there is a God, reveals the future. They view the world as a closed system.

However, even if you take that position, it's important, for the sake of argument, to consider what would follow if, in fact, the opposing position is true. 

Let's take a comparison. Suppose God showed Thomas Aquinas an image of Lee and Grant at Appomattox. No caption. Just the image–like Civil War photos we've seen.

That's future in relation to Aquinas. But could he tell if that's past or future? Sure, people in his own time and place didn't dress that way, but his personal experience is pretty provincial.

In addition, could he tell, by looking at the image, who he was looking at? No. They'd be unrecognizable to him.

Suppose God told him: "That's Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox."

Would that mean anything to Aquinas? Not at all. God might as well tell Aquinas that's Frodo and Legolas at Rivendell–for all the difference it would make.

Suppose God told him: "That's Gen. Lee surrendering to Gen. Grant."

Would that mean anything to Aquinas? Not in the slightest. Aquinas has no frame of reference. God would have to give him a crash course in American history for that explanation to be meaningful.

When we interpret ancient prophecies, it's important not to equate our knowledge of the past (or what we think we know about the past) with the prophet's knowledge of the future–then fault him for allegedly thinking things which, in fact, he couldn't possibly had have in mind at the time. 

vi) The book of Daniel is full of revelatory dreams and visions. Dan 10-12 is, itself, an extended vision. That raises several interpretive questions. 

Revelation can take place by showing, telling, or both. In Daniel we have examples of each–sometimes back-to-back. 

vii) The images are frequently symbolic. Allegorical dreams and visions. Indeed, that's why they require inspired interpretation. Daniel interprets a dream, or Gabriel interprets a vision for Daniel. What they represent is not self-explanatory. 

viii) One interpretive question is how Daniel recorded his visions. Most commentators (e.g. Archer, Baldwin, Collins, Keil, Steinmann, Young) take 7:1 to mean that when Daniel committed his visions to writing, he summarized what he saw. (Goldingay is a notable exception.)

Assuming that's correct, and this represents Daniel's modus operandi, then we'd expect Dan 10-12 to be a summary as well. On the face of it, Dan 10-12 is revelation by telling rather than showing. But if Daniel was in the habit of summarizing his visions, then the original vision may have included illustrative imagery. 

Indeed, given the length of this vision, it wouldn't be surprising if Daniel abbreviated the vision by omitting picturesque descriptions of what he saw, for that would make the record far longer. This may just be a precis. 

We don't know that for a fact. But we need to make allowance for that possibility. 

ix) Dan 10 opens with an angelophany. In 10:21, the angel refers to "the book of truth." What are we to make of that? At one level, the "book of truth" is a metaphor for predestination. God's master plan for world history. Everything happens according to script. 

But as readers, what are we intended to visualize in that scene? Does the angel read aloud from the Book of Truth? Is Daniel listening the whole time while the angel recites that section? Does the angel quote from memory–or paraphrase?

x) On a related note, what does "the book" refer to in Dan 12:4? In context, this evidently takes place within the vision. Of course, that will have a counterpart after Daniel comes out of his trance, when Daniel transcribes the discourse.

Does Daniel assume the role of a scribe in the vision? Is the angel giving dictation, while Daniel writes it down? Or does the angel hand Daniel the scroll after reciting the contents? 

xi) Does Daniel simply listen the whole time, or does he see images which accompany the angelic discourse? The passage doesn't say he sees anything. But at this stage, that might be something the reader should take for granted–given ample precedent in all the dreams and visions which come before this culminating vision. If Daniel is merely summarizing a very long vision, he may strip it down to a prosaic record of what was said. 

xii) Suppose 11:40-45 is a verbal description of an image which Daniel saw in his vision? If so, is that representational or allegorical? If, say, Daniel sees the adversary perish in the desert, between the Mediterranean sea and the temple mount, is that a prediction regarding where, in fact, the adversary will meet his fate? Of is that one of those dreamy images that stands for something analogous to it depicts? 

The Magi Came From Arabia

Hank Hanegraaff discussed the magi during his radio program last Friday. He argued that they were from Persia. That's a common view, and there's some significant evidence for it. But I think it's more likely that the magi came from Arabia. Here's a post where I've argued for that conclusion.