I’m going to begin by juxtaposing two statements by Roger Olson:
I think the main difference lies in different views of God’s intentionality. Arminians say God never intended the fall to happen and does not intend any of its consequences–except to allow them. Calvinists would seem to have to say that even the fall, then all of its consequences, was intended by God. To me, there’s a huge difference there. If God intended for the fall to happen, if it is part of a divine plan, then God’s character is questionable.
However, even Anabaptists believe God gave the sword to the state and so some killing is justified even if it is sin. But it is never justifiable for the Jesus follower to kill. It is not God’s will for his people to kill.
Christian realists believe sometimes God’s people must hold their noses and kill. But even when killing is absolutely necessary (e.g., in the case of Bonhoeffer participating in the plot to kill Hitler) the Jesus follower must not celebrate. The appropriate response is instead to repent and trust God for forgiveness.
If you think evil events are divinely unintended events, if God didn’t plan the fall, or other evil events, then it’s easy to see how that, in turn, would generate intractable moral dilemmas in which we have no morally good options. For we’re dealt our cards from a disorganized deck of haphazard events.
If conversely, God predestined every event, including evil events, then each event (including evil events) is coordinated with every other event. God has good reason for whatever he decrees. Even if a given event is evil in and of itself, it serves a good purpose.
But if you take Roger Olsen’s position, then evil events are random, disjointed events. So you could well find yourself trapped in a haphazard situation where there is no right course of action. It’s just the luck of the draw whether or not unplanned evils leave you with a morally licit option.
Ironically, Olsen’s position is fairly fatalistic. You may find yourself, through no fault of your own, caught up in a web of helter-skelter events where whatever you do will be morally wrong.
But it’s unclear, on that scenario, why Olson still believes our actions are blameworthy.
In a further irony, Olson’s position invalidates a popular Arminian prooftext (1 Cor 10:13). For on his view there are situations in which we have no innocuous escape route. We may have choices, but all our choices are culpable choices.
I have to confess that I'm flummoxed by the following:
ReplyDeleteGod commands Adam not to eat from the Tree of Knowledge (Gen. 2:16-17). If it is God's will and commandment that Adam not eat from the tree, first how is it that Adam eats from the tree? Secondly, if it is God's "will" that Adam "disobey" God's will (in order to fulfill a higher purpose), how is Adam culpable in that Adam is conforming to God's will?
I must be missing something here.
Thanks.
You're equivocating over the the word "will," which you are using in two different senses.
ReplyDeleteWe can start by distinguishing between God's command and God's decree. Nothing happens contrary to God's decree (i.e. predestination). However, it's possible to violate God's command, and God foreordains transgressions of his law to further his ulterior aims.
A very good friend of mine who happens to be staunchly Arminian recently said this to me:
ReplyDeleteOlson is a twit! I am not hugely familiar with his arguments, mostly because the bits and pieces I have read from him have done more harm to the stature or Arminian theology than good.
(from a private email)
I would disagree these are random events. Rather the events are simply not sourced in God.
ReplyDeleteGod certainly is capable of using the events sourced by others, but there is no need for God to either ordain, cause, or in some other way source these events. The fundamental issue comes down to the question of sin as a transgression of what God commands. Essentially, if you say God ordains or desires an act that transgresses what he commands, you are stating that God cannot achieve what he desires apart from sin.
This does not appear to be a very sovereign or even a very intelligent God to me. He is just a deterministic machine - as determined in his actions as we are in this view.
And in a mechanistic universe, what is the need of postulating such a being?
BOB ANDERSON SAID:
ReplyDelete“I would disagree these are random events. Rather the events are simply not sourced in God.”
If evil events are unplanned events (a la Olson), then evil events aren’t coordinated with other events.
“Essentially, if you say God ordains or desires an act that transgresses what he commands, you are stating that God cannot achieve what he desires apart from sin.”
So what? Some second-order goods presuppose evil. That’s an internal relation. There is no other way of achieving the second-order good.
“This does not appear to be a very sovereign or even a very intelligent God to me. He is just a deterministic machine - as determined in his actions as we are in this view.”
That’s a sloppy argument. We’d dealing with teleology: a means-ends relation. What makes you think that’s mechanical? And what makes you think teleology is unintelligent?
You yourself are a goal-oriented agent. Are you a machine? Are you unintelligent?
You’re also dodging the issue: a world with divinely-unintended evils will generate insoluble moral predicaments.
steve said "a world with divinely-unintended evils will generate insoluble moral predicaments."
ReplyDelete- Are you then suggesting that if we accept that all evil IS divinely intended, that these insoluble moral predicaments disappear. Or just that they cease to be insoluble because the predicament doesn not actually "exist" because the choice itself is predetermingd? I seem to be missing a connection here...
"If evil events are unplanned events (a la Olson), then evil events aren’t coordinated with other events."
ReplyDeleteWhy? I don't see how your conclusion follows the premise. God doesn't need planning and prep time. He's outside of time. As we make free choices, God's power is such that there is a way for good to result, if we seek his grace.
In his ominiscience, he knows what we will choose, but that is not the same as God willing evil events. Someone who wills, and thus carries out evil, is evil. So I don't get it. This type of viewpoint stuns me. Is this what Calvinism is? As a Catholic, I'm very hesitant to comment here, but this is so surprising to me.
JEFF RUDLOFF SAID:
ReplyDelete"- Are you then suggesting that if we accept that all evil IS divinely intended, that these insoluble moral predicaments disappear."
Yes. If history unfolds according to God's plan, then God can organize one event in relation to another such that Christians always have a morally licit option.
Christine said:
ReplyDelete---
In his ominiscience, he knows what we will choose...
---
What is the basis for God's omniscience?
Steve,
ReplyDeleteThe main issue I take with Olson's position, as quoted above, is that I think there are absolutely times when it is right for a christian to kill. As my brother once quipped, "Saving lives one death at a time."
Come to think of it, I also disagree that God does not intend any of the consequences of sin. God certainly intends judgment on people, and He also intends the good that He brings out of bad situations. I do, however, think that God allows and plans for sin, rather than desiring it and planning it.
But, here's where you lost me: "If you think evil events are divinely unintended events, if God didn’t plan the fall, or other evil events, then it’s easy to see how that, in turn, would generate intractable moral dilemmas in which we have no morally good options."
To me that seems like a non-sequitar. Why would a world with divinely-allowed evils necessitate or cause the certain genesis of insoluble moral predicaments? I mean, certainly Olson's position poses insoluble moral predicaments in that he seems to postulate that just killing is wrong. But if one did not hold to that belief, then what moral predicaments would be caused by allowed evils?
Do you mean what is the basis for our belief in God's omniscience? Or do you mean what is the basis of his attribute of omniscience?
ReplyDeleteFor the former, of course, there are scripture verses such as 1 John 3:19-20 and many others.
For the latter, it is beyond our understanding.
Christine said:
ReplyDeleteIs this what Calvinism is?
Hi Christine,
If you're interested in what Calvinism or Reformed theology is all about, particularly with regard to the problem of suffering and evil, you might like to check out How Long, O Lord? by D.A. Carson as well as this interview with John Frame (which includes further resources where Frame discusses the problem of evil). Also, Steve, Paul, and others here have written quite a bit on the problem of evil if you search the archives.
Speaking more broadly, you might be interested in reading Steve's two part "Why I Believe" articles here and here.
patrick
Patrick, I had never seen those "Why I Believe" articles by Steve. Thanks for posting them.
ReplyDeleteCHRISTINE SAID:
ReplyDelete“Why? I don't see how your conclusion follows the premise. God doesn't need planning and prep time.”
A divine plan doesn’t entail prep time.
“He's outside of time.”
The divine plan is timeless.
“As we make free choices, God's power is such that there is a way for good to result, if we seek his grace.”
i) That wouldn’t be timeless. To the contrary, that would be ex post facto.
ii) In addition, if we have the freedom to do otherwise, then the outcome is undecided until the last minute, in which case God’s participation would be temporally contingent on the outcome.
“In his ominiscience, he knows what we will choose…”
i) Given libertarian freedom, he doesn’t know what we “will” do, for the future is open-ended until it eventuates. Up until till that point it could go either way. God only knows what we have done, after the fact. God knows the past, not the future (assuming libertarian freewill).
ii) Conversely, if he knows what we will do, then the outcome is certain.
“…but that is not the same as God willing evil events.”
If evil events are both foreseeable and preventable (i.e. God could preempt them by not instantiating the world in which they occur), then God intended the outcome, since divine activity was a necessary precondition of the outcome. Unless you deny that God wills the consequences of his own actions–in which case God is clinically insane.
SKARLET SAID:
ReplyDelete"To me that seems like a non-sequitar. Why would a world with divinely-allowed evils necessitate or cause the certain genesis of insoluble moral predicaments? I mean, certainly Olson's position poses insoluble moral predicaments in that he seems to postulate that just killing is wrong. But if one did not hold to that belief, then what moral predicaments would be caused by allowed evils?"
For starters, you've substituted divinely-allowed evils for divinely-unplanned/unintended evils.
I already explained how divinely-unplanned/unintended evils generate moral dilemmas.
If and when you address the actual issue, as Olson framed the issue, as well as my argument, in response to his framework, perhaps we'll have something further to discuss.
Steve,
ReplyDeleteYou say that I have "substituted divinely-allowed evils for divinely-unplanned/unintended evils." I don't see an improper substitution, though, because Olson wrote that God "does not intend any of its consequences–except to allow them."
Olson, therefore, puts forward exactly the idea of divinely-allowed evils, albeit unplanned and unintended. Regarding Olson's argument, then, either label is correct.
Also, you write, "I already explained how divinely-unplanned/unintended evils generate moral dilemmas."
Well if you mean argument by assertion, then sure.
"...then evil events are random, disjointed events. So you could well find yourself trapped in a haphazard situation where there is no right course of action. It’s just the luck of the draw whether or not unplanned evils leave you with a morally licit option."
That's an assertion. I don't see an example. I don't see any logic. I don't see proof. I only see an assertion that given randomness, you may end up in a situation with no morally licit option.
And what if there is no possible situation in which there is no morally licit option? In that case, no matter what random events happened, you would always have a good and moral option. You don't disprove this at all yet.
SKARLET SAID:
ReplyDelete"I don't see an example. I don't see any logic. I don't see proof."
"Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed" (Jn 20:29).
SKARLET SAID:
ReplyDelete“Olson, therefore, puts forward exactly the idea of divinely-allowed evils, albeit unplanned and unintended. Regarding Olson's argument, then, either label is correct.”
If for purposes of this discussion you’re using “allowed” interchangeably with “unplanned/unintended,” that’s fine–as long as we’re clear on how “allowed” is being (re-)defined.
However, the implications of an “unplanned/unintended” event is a crucial distinction in my analysis, and since Olson’s usage is idiosyncratic, I prefer to stick with “unplanned/unintended.”
“Well if you mean argument by assertion, then sure…That's an assertion. I don't see an example. I don't see any logic. I don't see proof. I only see an assertion that given randomness, you may end up in a situation with no morally licit option. And what if there is no possible situation in which there is no morally licit option? In that case, no matter what random events happened, you would always have a good and moral option. You don't disprove this at all yet.”
If world events are a combination of divinely-intended good events alongside divinely-unintended evil events, and if there are gazillions of evil events (large and small) in the course of human history, then chances are it’s highly unlikely that we will always find ourselves in evil circumstances which just so happen to afford the opportunity to do right.
Rather, that’s only likely (much less inevitable) if God has planned both kinds of events, in tandem, such that in every evil situation there is a morally licit option. Otherwise, you have to get lucky with every roll of the dice.
test
ReplyDeleteSteve,
ReplyDelete"Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed" (Jn 20:29).”
Hehe, somehow I think that trying to apply that verse to believing propositions for which proper arguments and/or evidence has not been shown is a misunderstanding of the basic point.
“However, the implications of an 'unplanned/unintended' event is a crucial distinction in my analysis, and since Olson’s usage is idiosyncratic, I prefer to stick with 'unplanned/unintended.'”
Fair enough.
“...then chances are it’s highly unlikely that we will always find ourselves in evil circumstances which just so happen to afford the opportunity to do right.”
But here's the thing: I believe that in every evil situation, no matter what happens to us, there is an opportunity to do right. Even if killing was morally wrong, then there would be the righteous option of not-killing, even if it results in death to self or those you care for. If it's wrong to lie, then you can simply not lie, even in bad situations. Can you explain, or better yet prove, that a situation could possibly exist in which there would be NO opportunity to do right? I simply can't think of one at all.
“Rather, that’s only likely (much less inevitable) if God has planned both kinds of events, in tandem, such that in every evil situation there is a morally licit option. Otherwise, you have to get lucky with every roll of the dice.”
You know, this is a great point against Calvinism. See, from the Arminian understanding of Scripture, we believe that we are responsible for our own actions because we actually determine our own actions. For those of us who are in Christ and are indwelt with the Spirit of God, there is no need to get lucky because with every temptation that comes, there is a way of escape that we can take. In every situation, evil or not, there is opportunity to do right.
However, from the Calvinist point of view, all of the future sins of a christian are decreed by God. Of course the compatablist answer must include that the christian desired to sin in that manner (as decreed by God) and therefore holds the responsibility and blame for the action (as decreed by God). But ultimately, the only thing which could have enabled the christian to resist that temptation would have been God's decree, and we just aren't lucky enough to have God always decree righteousness in our lives. In this view, in many situations christians do not have the ability to do right (since God decreed that they would do wrong, and in fact determined it, rather than allowing the christian to determine whether or not to resist His grace), and therefore we just better hope we get lucky!
As parents, do we want children that we operate as marionettes in our "plan"? Or do we allow them freedom as they grow to make choices that will bring them success or failure, but then we love them and encourage them to do right next time? Is that the same as INTENDING them to sin?
ReplyDeleteIt's different with God of course, because we can't fully control our children even if we wanted to. God COULD control us, and never have endowed us with freedom (to "choose LIFE!"), but that's not what he did. What is the meaning of Jesus' many directives to us, if we can't freely choose to follow them anyway?
So I guess, for you, "allow" is the same as "intend", and that particular conflation gives us a God who plans, intends, and therefore IS evil. On the other hand, his intention to allow US to choose evil is the only way that our NOT choosing it has any meaning.
Your statement: "You’re also dodging the issue: a world with divinely-unintended evils will generate insoluble moral predicaments." How can we dodge an issue that has't been argued in any comprehensible way?
Steve said:
ReplyDelete"If history unfolds according to God's plan, then God can organize one event in relation to another such that Christians always have a morally licit option."
Since Bonhoeffer questioned whether either of the two options he felt compelled to consider - allowing Hitler to live or participating in his murder - were morally acceptable, I find this assertion week. We might disagree with Bonhoeffer's decision but I believe we must affirm his dilemma.
"Given libertarian freedom, he doesn’t know what we “will” do, for the future is open-ended until it eventuates. Up until till that point it could go either way. God only knows what we have done, after the fact. God knows the past, not the future (assuming libertarian freewill)."
If I am hearing you correctly on this point, then what you are asserting is that what is commonly understood as "foreknowledge" doesn't exist apart from predestination. In other words, if God hasn't purposefully determined the outcome, He has no clue what it will be? This seems to be a serious diminishing of God from the infinite and omniscient deity I understood Him to be.
"If evil events are both foreseeable and preventable (i.e. God could preempt them by not instantiating the world in which they occur), then God intended the outcome, since divine activity was a necessary precondition of the outcome."
If "instantiating" is the word you intended to use there, you are using it in a sense with which I am not familiar, so I am missing some of the point you are trying to make. BUT - that being said, it is divine inactivity, not activity that you are describing here - and that fits more consistently with the traditional Arminian understanding of God "permitting" those events, rather than directing them.
SKARLET SAID:
ReplyDelete“But here's the thing: I believe that in every evil situation, no matter what happens to us, there is an opportunity to do right. Even if killing was morally wrong, then there would be the righteous option of not-killing, even if it results in death to self or those you care for. If it's wrong to lie, then you can simply not lie, even in bad situations.”
You’ve given me a faith-statement rather than a counterargument.
“Can you explain, or better yet prove, that a situation could possibly exist in which there would be NO opportunity to do right? I simply can't think of one at all.”
Since you’re not interacting with the explanation I’ve given, it’s not incumbent on me to say more. But I’m happy to accept your tacit intellectual surrender.
“You know, this is a great point against Calvinism.”
No, I don’t know that–since I’m not arguing from Reformed assumptions, but Arminian assumptions. I’m responding to Olson on his own terms.
“See, from the Arminian understanding of Scripture, we believe that we are responsible for our own actions because we actually determine our own actions. For those of us who are in Christ and are indwelt with the Spirit of God, there is no need to get lucky because with every temptation that comes, there is a way of escape that we can take. In every situation, evil or not, there is opportunity to do right.”
That’s another faith-statement. You haven’t shown how that’s consistent with presence of so many divinely-unplanned events. You can’t invoke divine agency to provide an escape route when you simultaneously deny divine agency in planning the temptations (or other evils). Unless God planned an escape route, there’s no reason to assume an escape route will always be available. But that would require God to coordinate evil events–which is not the case if evil events are no part of God’s plan.
Cont. “However, from the Calvinist point of view, all of the future sins of a christian are decreed by God. Of course the compatablist answer must include that the christian desired to sin in that manner (as decreed by God) and therefore holds the responsibility and blame for the action (as decreed by God). But ultimately, the only thing which could have enabled the christian to resist that temptation would have been God's decree, and we just aren't lucky enough to have God always decree righteousness in our lives. In this view, in many situations christians do not have the ability to do right (since God decreed that they would do wrong, and in fact determined it, rather than allowing the christian to determine whether or not to resist His grace), and therefore we just better hope we get lucky!”
ReplyDeletei) In ordinary discourse, “luck” implies random chance. For you to equate a determinate outcome with “luck” is just about the polar opposite of what is meant by “chance” in standard usage. If the dice are loaded (i.e. predestination), then rolling sixes (or snake eyes, as the case may be) every single time isn’t a chancy outcome. Just the opposite.
ii) You also fail to distinguish between *having* a morally licit option and *exercising* a morally licit option. But if evils are divinely-unplanned events, then there’s no reason to think Christians (or humans generally) would even have a morally licit option in every situation. That’s a distinct question from whether they are libertarianly free to exercise that option (even assuming we should take libertarian freedom as the frame of reference, which begs the question).
iii) If you’re still alluding to 1 Cor 10:13, I don’t think that has reference to temptations in general. Rather, I agree with standard commentators (Fitzmyer, Garland, Thiselton, Ciampa/Rosner) that the referent is more restrictive).
JEFF RUDLOFF SAID:
ReplyDelete“Since Bonhoeffer questioned whether either of the two options he felt compelled to consider - allowing Hitler to live or participating in his murder - were morally acceptable, I find this assertion week. We might disagree with Bonhoeffer's decision but I believe we must affirm his dilemma.”
You’re confusing subjective impressions with objective realities. A specious moral dilemma is not a genuine moral dilemma. Try again.
“If I am hearing you correctly on this point, then what you are asserting is that what is commonly understood as ‘foreknowledge’ doesn't exist apart from predestination. In other words, if God hasn't purposefully determined the outcome, He has no clue what it will be? This seems to be a serious diminishing of God from the infinite and omniscient deity I understood Him to be.”
i) You haven’t given me a reason to believe it “diminishes” God. Just saying so doesn’t make it so.
ii) Moreover, I, unlike you, presented an argument for my statement. Where’s your rebuttal?
“If ‘instantiating’ is the word you intended to use there, you are using it in a sense with which I am not familiar, so I am missing some of the point you are trying to make.”
It’s standard philosophical usage. Look it up.
“BUT - that being said, it is divine inactivity, not activity that you are describing here - and that fits more consistently with the traditional Arminian understanding of God ‘permitting’ those events, rather than directing them.”
i) In the traditional Arminian understanding, God does more than merely “permit” evils to happen. God is an active participant in the outcome by causing the world in which they occur and concurrently sustaining the agent or agency. The outcome could not transpire apart from God’s active contribution.
ii) Moreover, your objection is irrelevant. Whether you say it’s active or passive, it’s still intentional.
"You can’t invoke divine agency to provide an escape route when you simultaneously deny divine agency in planning the temptations (or other evils)."
ReplyDeleteWhy not? I do so invoke and simultaneously deny. God does good, and does not do evil. Pretty simple.
Christine,
ReplyDeleteYou're not even attempting to follow the argument. You also have a habit of playing hopscotch, where you start with one argument, drop it, then go to another, and another.
Thanks for the typically kind and generous Triablogue comment. You guys are always so sweet!
ReplyDeleteI'm actually stuck on this point, which you reiterated as:
"But if evils are divinely-unplanned events, then there’s no reason to think Christians (or humans generally) would even have a morally licit option in every situation."
Please tell me WHY you believe this to be the case, or where I missed your explanation.
I don't think I am hopscotching but if so, it was God's intention, so deal with it. Just kidding.
Peter asked me about the basis for God's omniscience, and then . . . crickets . . .
CHRISTINE SAID:
ReplyDelete“Why not? I do so invoke and simultaneously deny. God does good, and does not do evil. Pretty simple.”
i) Pretty simple-minded, you mean. To begin with, I haven’t said anything about God “doing” evil. I was discussing divine intent or planning.
ii)Likewise, there’s no reason to assume there will always be an escape route unless God has arranged evil events to make provision for an escape route in every morally compromising situation.
Christine said...
ReplyDelete"Thanks for the typically kind and generous Triablogue comment. You guys are always so sweet!"
That's part of your two-faced act, where you pretend to be so tender and innocent when you comment on a Protestant blog. But when you're on sympathetic territory, you drop the façade:
http://pilgrimsdaughter.blogspot.com/2010/12/beggars-all-reformation-and-apologetics.html
"Please tell me WHY you believe this to be the case, or where I missed your explanation."
Since I've already covered the same ground with Skarlet, I don't need to repeat myself for you.
Wow - OK.
ReplyDeleteChristine said...
ReplyDelete“As parents, do we want children that we operate as marionettes in our ‘plan’? Or do we allow them freedom as they grow to make choices that will bring them success or failure, but then we love them and encourage them to do right next time?”
If I knew my child was about to commit suicide (to take one example), I’d mess with his freedom–for if I allow him to make his own choice, there won’t be a next time.
But I guess you think good parenting allows kids to commit suicide–since the alternative is to treat them as “marionettes.”
“Is that the same as INTENDING them to sin? ”
Since God is responsible for their existence as well as their environment, he intended the consequences of his own actions.
“…but that's not what he did. What is the meaning of Jesus' many directives to us, if we can't freely choose to follow them anyway?”
Your definition of “freedom” begs the question.
“So I guess, for you, ‘allow’ is the same as ‘intend.’"
Did I say they were synonymous? No. But allowance implies the intention to allow the outcome, and therefore intends the outcome.
“…and that particular conflation gives us a God who plans, intends, and therefore IS evil.”
i) You need to provide a supporting argument for your conclusion.
ii) Moreover, to say that makes God evil, even if (ex hypothesi) that were true, does nothing to invalidate the logic of the conclusion. Just because you don’t like the consequences does nothing to negate the consequences. You have yet to explain how God can fail to intend foreseeable, avoidable outcomes.
“How can we dodge an issue that has't been argued in any comprehensible way?”
That’s an assertion, not an argument.
You’re wasting my time. If you can’t bring yourself to argue in good faith, go away.
Steve said:
ReplyDelete"You’re confusing subjective impressions with objective realities. A specious moral dilemma is not a genuine moral dilemma. Try again."
I don't consider that dilemma to be specious, and Pastor Bonhoeffer certainly didn't. One of your rebuttals (immediately below) chided me for not giving a reason for one of my positions. I would ask for the same consideration here. Just calling it "specious" doesn't make it so.
"i) You haven’t given me a reason to believe it “diminishes” God. Just saying so doesn’t make it so.
ii) Moreover, I, unlike you, presented an argument for my statement. Where’s your rebuttal?"
Your original argument was that, given libertarian free will, God does not know what man's choices will be *until* he makes them, and that God only knows what we have done *after the fact*. You attribute to God a quality of being "bound" by time, instead of being its master. Perhaps I am just theologically naive, but I have always believed God to be independent of, outside of, above and unbounded by time. In that framework, there is no "after" or "until" to be considered. All of time is God's "now". I don't believe that the Arminian position places God in the kind of tennis match you suggest - always responding and reacting on the fly to the choices of His creations. If that is in fact the relationship you suggest, I see that as diminishing Him to the status of (keeping the tennis metaphor) a John McEnroe or Ivan Lendl (I'm too old to use contrmporary players!) in a match with me - He will never lose, but we're on the same court. Only if he stands outside the court altogether can He be truly God as I understand Him. That posits foreknowledge as a possible basis of onmiscience, not predestination alone. (I hate to frame it in those terms, because I do not really believe that those terms are mutually exclusive or in conflict with each other as much as that argument makes it sound, but I am, unfortunately, not theologically sophisticated enough to do any better at the moment!)
"It’s standard philosophical usage. Look it up."
I did - from 14 different sources - BEFORE the response to you - and found no help. Unfortunately I am not trained in the philosphical disciplines, and only self-trained in the theological. I came here to be sharpened by thinking beyond my own. I don't wish to clutter the playing field, but I do wish to learn. If I am in the wrong place for that, say so and I will just follow the blog rather than participate.
In any event - here is the definition I found (slight variations at the different sources, but basically the same): (Philosophy / Logic) the representation of (an abstraction) by a concrete example.
Your original sentence: "If evil events are both foreseeable and preventable (i.e. God could preempt them by not instantiating the world in which they occur), then God intended the outcome, since divine activity was a necessary precondition of the outcome."
I trust that I am not significantly more dense than most of my fellow mortals, but I truly cannot grasp the meaning you are intending by trying to use that definition in that sentence. If you would consider enlightening me, I would be grateful. If not, I drop the argument entirely as beyond my capabilities.
Christine said:
ReplyDelete---
Peter asked me about the basis for God's omniscience, and then . . . crickets . . .
---
You actually think there's something meaningful to interact with "it is beyond our understanding"?
Jeff said:
ReplyDelete---
Your original argument was that, given libertarian free will, God does not know what man's choices will be *until* he makes them, and that God only knows what we have done *after the fact*. You attribute to God a quality of being "bound" by time, instead of being its master.
---
Actually, this is precisely why I asked Christine the question, for it is the *Arminian* who makes God bound by time in arguing for Libertarian Free Will. The fact of the matter is that Calvinists have no problem accounting for God's omniscience--God knows what He foreordains. Arminians, on the other hand, have to invoke some kind of irrational ability for God to know what will happen infallibly without taking away the possibility of a person doing otherwise and without God having to "wait to see" what will happen in order to know it.
So again, I ask: what is the basis for God's ominiscience?
JEFF RUDLOFF SAID:
ReplyDelete“I don't consider that dilemma to be specious, and Pastor Bonhoeffer certainly didn't. One of your rebuttals (immediately below) chided me for not giving a reason for one of my positions. I would ask for the same consideration here. Just calling it ‘specious’ doesn't make it so.”
i) If you think that’s a genuine moral dilemma, you need to argue for your position.
ii) To take your illustration, an insoluble moral dilemma is generated if you say that:
a) Bonhoeffer had a moral obligation to participate in the assassination plot.
And:
b) Bonhoeffer had a moral obligation to refrain from such participation
Put another way, if you think it’s always morally wrong to take anyone’s life under any circumstances, yet you also think Bonhoeffer had a duty to assassinate Hitler (or be a player in the plot to do so), then that’s an intractable moral dilemma.
iii) And, what is more, it’s incoherent. For you’re positing that Bonhoeffer had a simultaneous duty to kill and not to kill. But if killing is inherently immoral, then there can be no moral imperative to commit an immoral act.
iv) Furthermore, if God put Bonhoeffer in that morally untenable situation, such that whatever he did or refrained from doing was wrong, then it’s far from clear why he’s blameworthy. Why would Bonhoeffer require forgiveness in that situation?
This is especially odd coming from an Arminian theologian (Olson). Libertarian fatalism.
Even Skarlet demurs at this point–which doesn’t surprise me, since she's is clearly more intelligent than Olson.
Jeff Rudloff said...
ReplyDelete“Your original argument was that, given libertarian free will, God does not know what man's choices will be *until* he makes them, and that God only knows what we have done *after the fact*. You attribute to God a quality of being ‘bound’ by time, instead of being its master.”
I was responding to Christine. That’s an implication of Christine’s theism, not my own.
Conversely, if God’s foreknowledge is predicated on his foreordination, then God’s foreknowledge is not contingent on temporally unfolding events. That’s consistent with God’s timeless eternality.
“Perhaps I am just theologically naive, but I have always believed God to be independent of, outside of, above and unbounded by time. In that framework, there is no ‘after’ or ‘until’ to be considered.”
Which is not a position you can sustain if you also posit divine foreknowledge of libertarianly free choices.
“Only if he stands outside the court altogether can He be truly God as I understand Him.”
You’ve done nothing to disprove my argument. You disapprove of the conclusion, but you haven’t shown how the conclusion is invalid, given the implications of libertarian freewill. I spelled that out for you.
And using tennis court metaphors is hardly an argument to the contrary. At best, that would serve to illustrate an argument. But that’s no substitute for giving us an argument.
“I did - from 14 different sources - BEFORE the response to you - and found no help.”
For God to “instantiate” the world is for God to actualize a possible world, which thereby becomes the real world.
“But I truly cannot grasp the meaning you are intending by trying to use that definition in that sentence.”
I don’t know what you fail to grasp. An occurrence could be unintended if God had no control over the eventuation of the occurrence. If the event happens all by itself, and God can do nothing to stop it, then God did not intend the outcome.
But that’s not the case–even on Arminian terms.
Likewise, an occurrence can be unintended if the occurrence is unforeseen. Say, a chain-reaction, where an agent can’t anticipate the consequences of the precipitating event.
But that’s contrary to Classical Arminianism.
Steve,
ReplyDelete“Unless God planned an escape route, there’s no reason to assume an escape route will always be available. But that would require God to coordinate evil events–which is not the case if evil events are no part of God’s plan.”
Well, you claim here that escape routes require coordinated events. While this may be true with physical escape routes, such as needing a lifeboat or something, this does not remain true in the spiritual realm. God would not need to coordinate any physical events in order to constantly provide spiritual escape routes as a relief from spiritual, internal, moral temptation.
You seem to claim that *IF* there are many circumstances not specifically planned by God, *THEN* you will be bound to run into a circumstance where there is no morally licit option. The reasoning seems to be that if God doesn't plan events, then events will be random. And, given enough random events, then one is bound to experience at least one event in which there is no morally licit option. However, this takes as a given that such a thing is possible. Certainly, if that option is possible, then if you have enough random options happen, that one will certainly happen to.
However, if that option [the option of a situation in which a a person not have a morally licit option] is impossible, then it makes no more sense then saying that if you select a random card from a deck enough times, you will eventually pull a 13 of spades of a card deck.
Given the moral code in the Bible, I do not see any even hypothetically possible physical situation in which a person would not have a morally and spiritually licit option. There is no law in the Bible which would command one to do wrong, in any situation.
In response to this claim [“I believe that in every evil situation, no matter what happens to us, there is an opportunity to do right.”], you wrote that I have given you faith-statement rather than a counterargument. You could also say that it's an assertion, not an argument. You could tell me to provide a supporting argument for your conclusion. But here is a supporting argument: There is no law, given by God to us through the Bible, which would have to be broken given a specific situation. You know many of the laws in the Bible, I'm sure, so you can see this to be true.
However, you postulate that given the moral code in the Bible, there WOULD BE A hypothetically possible situation in which a human did not have a morally licit option. That's an assertion too. You need to provide a supporting argument for your conclusion.
Peter,
ReplyDelete“Actually, this is precisely why I asked Christine the question, for it is the *Arminian* who makes God bound by time in arguing for Libertarian Free Will. The fact of the matter is that Calvinists have no problem accounting for God's omniscience--God knows what He foreordains.”
Of course if God foreordains something, He will know it ahead of time. But, can you show why God would not be able to know something which He chooses (ahead of time) to allow?
Why would LFW put God inside of time? God cannot be inside of time, since He is self-existent. If God does not need to causally determine something in order to know, it does not logically follow that He cannot know something that a created being causally determined, which He allowed.
“Arminians, on the other hand, have to invoke some kind of irrational ability for God to know what will happen infallibly without taking away the possibility of a person doing otherwise and without God having to "wait to see" what will happen in order to know it.”
Well, a person may have the ability to choose otherwise, but in any given circumstance at a point in time, a person will only determine one course of action. The person determines this action. This action, since it is determined, can be seen by future humans reviewing history, or else seen by God in eternity. God does not need to “wait” in time to see anything; He knows what is determined – regardless of whether we call it “was determined,” “is being determined,” or “will be determined.”
Skarlet,
ReplyDeleteBut, at that point, you're still left with the one who determines the action having to actually DO the determining of the action before it can be known by anyone else, even a divine anyone else.
If X self-determines Y at time T, then it is impossible--not only actually, but in all possible *THEORIES*--for *ANY BEING* to know Y will occur before time T. This is a direct result of the fact that X makes the determination, so pre-X, no determination has been made.
And positing that God is outside of time doesn't solve this problem either. See, X is *IN* time, so even if God is outside of time, He cannot know what X will do until X reaches time T and does it. At the very least, God has to allow time to "run out", see what will happen, and *then* know that's what will happen.
Not even God can know what a free being will determine before (logically or temporally) the free being has determined it.
Peter,
ReplyDeleteYou make the claim that IF X self-determines Y at time T, THEN no possible being could know Y before time T.
I would say that if a being exists within time, and cannot see time T until time T occurs, then yes they will not be able to see time T (or anything which is determined at the time) until it occurs. This is called being trapped in time.
God is outside of time. You know that this is the claim, but I'm afraid that you don't seem to understand it. Let me give you an analogy. Instead of time, let's talk about places. Let us suppose that person X caused Y to be on place P.
Place P is near the end of a long maze, and so the people behind person X in the maze will have no way of knowing that Y is on place P until they reach that point in the maze. However, if a person is out of the maze and looking down from a helicopter, they can see all of the places. They would know that person X dropped Y at place P without even having to actually go to place P.
When you say “before time T” you use the word before, as in, “at a time previously,” which is still in time. In the analogy, you are basically saying that those who in the maze and not yet at place P can't see it. But that does not address those outside of the maze who can see it from above without being at place P. God is NEVER “before” time T. He's not in the maze. He can see a point in time without being “at” that point in time, since He is outside of time.
You try to respond to this concept when you write: “See, X is *IN* time, so even if God is outside of time, He cannot know what X will do until X reaches time T and does it.”
Think of it like a book, then. At the end of Goldilocks, she flees from the house. Now, I can open to the first page of the book, and I will see that Goldilocks has not yet reached time T, at which she will flee from the house. But I don't have to “wait” until that happens. I could either look at that page forever, or else skip to the end and see the part where she flees.
Since I'm not IN the book, it is not true that I “cannot know what [Goldilocks] will do until [Goldilocks] reaches” that point in the story and does it. There is no waiting to see. If I stay looking at one page, I can look at page forever and never see the end of the book, even though I know what will happen (even though I didn't write it.) Else I could just look at the end, without wading through the middle pages. Reading all the middle pages would be analogous to God acting as though He's in time and “waiting” (in time) to see what will happen. He doesn't need to wait, He doesn't need to act like He's in time or in the book.
X self-determines Y at time T, and God, being outside of time, can look directly at time T without first needing to look at the times organized to the left of time T.
Skarlet,
ReplyDeleteBut that would still require God to look *at* time T, which means that time T must *exist* before God can look at it to see what will happen at time T.
In other words, you can skip to the end of a book because the book already exists as a complete unit. To correspond to God, that would mean that all of history must exist before God can foresee it, in order for Him to know what it will be.
This leads to a contradiction, where God knows what will happen (since He never learns anything) logically before it is possible for Him to know it. (And note: "before" does not merely have it's grounding in temporal sequences, but also in logical sequences that do no require the passage of any time at all.)
SKARLET SAID:
ReplyDelete“Well, you claim here that escape routes require coordinated events. While this may be true with physical escape routes, such as needing a lifeboat or something, this does not remain true in the spiritual realm. God would not need to coordinate any physical events in order to constantly provide spiritual escape routes as a relief from spiritual, internal, moral temptation.”
Ethical dilemmas generally involve a conjunction of external circumstances. Say a man belongs to a Mafia clan. But he’s never gone into the family business. Not until now.
Then his 9-year-old daughter is diagnosed with cancer, and requires a bone-marrow transplant. But he can’t afford the treatment.
His Mafia clan offers to foot the bill if he murders a business rival of the don.
Or take a ticking-timebomb scenario. Many people, including many Christians, think it would be intrinsically wrong to torture the terrorist to find out what he knows even if that would advert the death of many innocents.
Or let’s assume the terrorist is highly resistant to torture, but he will spill the beans if they torture his 5-year-old son.
“Given the moral code in the Bible, I do not see any even hypothetically possible physical situation in which a person would not have a morally and spiritually licit option. There is no law in the Bible which would command one to do wrong, in any situation.”
That’s irrelevant. The question at issue is not whether our Scriptural duties are consistent with our opportunities, but whether our duties are consistent with Arminian providence.
I have deferred to Skarlet, since he or she was doing a much better job than I was anyway - but I feel the need to return here.
ReplyDeletePeter Pike said: "But that would still require God to look *at* time T, which means that time T must *exist* before God can look at it to see what will happen at time T.
In other words, you can skip to the end of a book because the book already exists as a complete unit. To correspond to God, that would mean that all of history must exist before God can foresee it, in order for Him to know what it will be."
At this point, I started getting really excited - you've got it Peter! That's exactly right!
Oops! Celebrated too soon!
"This leads to a contradiction, where God knows what will happen (since He never learns anything) logically before it is possible for Him to know it."
Perhaps from a HUMAN logical perspective, but I am not sure we can count on God to operate within our logic systems. It is only illogical when you insist on putting God INTO the framework we call time. The reason that periods like days and thousands of years are no different to God (per Psalm 90:4 or 2 Peter 3:8) is that He does not move within those boundaries, so they mean nothing to Him. In the eternal "now", God is still creating our universe and celebrating the marriage supper of the Lamb, all at the same "time." So yes - all of human experience, which we refer to as history, even though that is TOTALLY the wrong term from God's perspective - already DOES exist from God's perspective.
In fact, if you want to get technical about it, from this vantage point, "pre"destination has no meaning at all - since there never is a "pre-", "post-", "mid-" or anything else to God. There is only *NOW*. And "fore"knowledge has no meaning either; it's just His knowledge of *NOW*. Is it possible that this whole concept is just one giant Moebius strip, and our problems with understanding one another are all based on what point on the strip we occupy?
"(And note: "before" does not merely have it's grounding in temporal sequences, but also in logical sequences that do no require the passage of any time at all.)"
But ALL logical sequences are functions of time. You can't even use the word "sequence" without implying time! Even our traditional phrasing acknowledges that: IF....THEN - then acknowledges sequence, and sequence is dependent upon time.
Jeff,
ReplyDeleteYou keep alluding to the Boethian solution, popularized by C. S. Lewis. You don't seem to be aware of the standard objections to that solution:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/#2.2
http://philofreligion.homestead.com/files/augustboethius.html
continued....
ReplyDeleteYour second citation:
http://philofreligion.homestead.com/files/augustboethius.html
This represents a paper or article by Professor Michael Sudduth, Professor of Philosophy at San Francisco State University and author of the 2009 book "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology." So let us be clear that this is NOT a review of the Boethian position from a NEUTRAL SOURCE; I believe it is fair to say that Professor Sudduth has chosen sides. The good professor raises two different objections, but still has to close without pronouncing the case proven:
"Aquinas and others (including many Reformed theologians) will eventually argue that God knows what is future to us by knowing the contents of his own (timeless) will. This is not a knowledge of vision, and thus avoids God being affected by anything or his knowledge being based on things as they will happen (committing one to the existence of the future in the present). It might be thought to be defective since it is not a knowledge of vision. Is God’s knowledge of what he will infallibly do the same as the knowledge he would have of those things in their actuality? Nevertheless, it does provide a very strong conception of divine providence. On this account, it clearly reintroduces the problem of human freedom and divine knowledge at the level of how God can determine or cause something and that something be free. The route here is simply to exploit the sui generis character of all divine causality. God is so powerful that he can bring it about that some things happen necessarily and others freely. We might also examine the meaning of "freedom" and emphasize a free act as one which is done according to one’s desires or inclinations or nature (and so not by compulsion) - so-called compatibilist free will, as opposed to power of contrary choice (so-called libertarian free will)."
Let me be clear here: I DO NOT say that Boethius is RIGHT. I DO believe that this argument presents an acceptable, logical counterbalance to the fatalist position, and the one that I happen to prefer.
One last note...
ReplyDeleteIn floundering around the internet looking for additional references to Boethius to see if there was any apparent weoght of opinion on one side or the other of this dedebate, I came across a post of Steve's from 3 years ago or so, in which he referred to the Boethian solution as "jejune."
I could understand your use of a term like that if I were the only one arguing on it's behalf. BUT - since Augustine accepted it as HIS view, I think we need to give it a little more credence than that. Not, of course, that Augustine was infallible, any more than Calvin or Aquinas, who disagreed with him, were. Now there would be a debate worth watching - Augustine & Boethius vs. Calvin & Aquinas. I'd buy tickets for that one!
Jeff,
ReplyDeleteYour theory runs into all kinds of immediate problems. God is eternally omniscient. He does not learn anything, for He has always known all that is to be known. But if His knowledge is based on the actual existence of something within time (i.e., like the book, all events must exist and then their existence is the cause of God knowing what will come), then the existence of everything is necessarily eternal along with God. In other words, Creation simply *IS* part of the divine attributes of God, it is necessary, and God could NOT have refrained from creating anything.
You still do not grasp the enormity of the problem your view causes. The Reformed view does not have this problem, because God's knowledge is grounded in His decree of what will come, and therefore we can be assured that God never learns anything because His *decree* is eternal; but His decree *is not* His creation, and His creation does not have to exist before God can know what it is.
Secondly, as to logical sequences not needing to be temporal, it's obvious that this is the case, because you can have a cause and effect that occur with no time lapsing between the cause and the effect, but causality is still there. Look at Einstein's relativity for examples of this.
Peter Pike said:
ReplyDelete"Your theory runs into all kinds of immediate problems."
Well, it's not my theory, actually. It's known as the Boethian solution and has been around for a couple of thousand years, but let's consider your problems.
"God is eternally omniscient. He does not learn anything, for He has always known all that is to be known."
Almost granted. Not that you have injected "time-speak" into the discussion already. You are equating "eternity", which is NOT a time concept per se, with "always," which IS a time concept. But let's move on.
"But if His knowledge is based on the actual existence of something within time (i.e., like the book, all events must exist and then their existence is the cause of God knowing what will come), then the existence of everything is necessarily eternal along with God."
See, the problem is that we have no reference points for discussing this without introducing "time language" and "time concepts" immediately to make your argument. His knowledge isn't "based on" anything related to temporal relationships - the existence of something is not the "cause" of God knowing about it. (The book analogy was Skarlet's, not mine - and though it's not bad, isn't my favorite, so I have no interest in defending it.) God creates the world within time and interacts with it in the time that HE created for it. But though it takes millenia for the time of that world to unravel itself TO THE OCCUPANTS OF THAT WORLD, God - existing outside the time that He has created - has unlimited access to all of the *NOWS* of that world at all times. And He had that access both "before" and "after" - wrong words, but they are the only ones we have to use to try and express this - He created that time pattern and that world. There is no learning involved.
"In other words, Creation simply *IS* part of the divine attributes of God, it is necessary, and God could NOT have refrained from creating anything."
I'm not quite sure how you got from the last point to this one, and I am learning that arguing from either ignorance or confusion on this site is dangerous - so I will pass unless you wish to clarify that for me.
Peter Pike said:
ReplyDelete"The Reformed view does not have this problem,"
No, Peter, it doesn't. But ultimately, I do not believe a theological system becasue it can be made upon good logical arguments. Though I am not a fan of what is usually referred to around here as traditional or classic Arminianism, I am sure that at least some of their theologians can make logical cases for their beliefs as well. So can Muslims and a raft of other faiths. I subscribe to my belief system because on the basis of ALL the evidence, logical and otherwise, I believe it to be true. I have not found that in Reformed theology to this point, and have not yet found anything that has changed my mind. But I keep searching, just in case...
To Steve:
ReplyDeleteEarlier today, Patrick Chan posted some links to earlier articles of yours called "Why I Believe" which I decided I should read so I had some background instead of making you a straw man for my frustrations with earlier encounters with Calvinists. In the second of those articles, I found an interesting passage in the section on omniscience that I'd like to quote here:
"Gen 1 tells us that the timeline began with God's creative fiat, in which case the Creator falls outside the timeline. And if that is so, then creation is a temporal effect of a timeless act. And in that event, the effect is fully enfolded and unfolded in this singular and indivisible fiat—like a short story or novel or real of film. The writer or filmmaker exists outside the timeline of the writing or film footage, and the writing or film is finished from first to last.
Incidentally, this is the best way of construing the relation between divine immanence and transcendence. God is “present” or “active” within the world, not by acting in or on the world, but by enacting the world. He not only sets the ball in motion but brings everything into being.
More generally, the Bible has some things to say about the priority of the eternal to the temporal (Ps 90:2,4; 102:25-27; 1 Cor 2:7; 2 Tim 1:9; Tit 1:2; Jas 1:17; Jude 25). It may be objected that words like "before" imply an antemundane timeline. But this overlooks the fact that such words are literally spatial-markers, and only applied to the divisions of time by figurative extension. We're back on the river. The future lies ahead, the past lies behind, and I paddle my way through time, like a rowboat or riverboat on the current of the stream. But this is poetry and picture-language.[8]
The fact that we apply a spatial grid to our common conception of time raises the question of what would be left of the sequence were we to strip away this picturesque metaphor. Is last month really more distant in time than last week? Or am I allowing myself to be bewitched by a spatial simile? The real sequence would be teleological rather than strictly linear or causal—more akin to a storybook sequence or film footage.
It is often said that our concept of eternity is privative and negative. But I would turn this around. If time and space are limits, then eternity implies an indivisible, unsurpassable plenity of being. To say that God preexisted the world literally means that there is never a time when God did not exist, for time was given in creation, and God subsists apart from the world."
Now by no means are you advocating the Boethian position in this article, but it is certainly sounds like a differenr argument than the one I have been hearing today. Or am I misreading your earlier work somehow? Just curious...
Just one more thought from the "tender and innocent" pretender.
ReplyDelete"If I knew my child was about to commit suicide (to take one example), I’d mess with his freedom–for if I allow him to make his own choice, there won’t be a next time."
Of course, I'd mess with their freedom in case of serious danger. But doesn't your view actually make the parent (God) into not the protector, but the one who intends and plans that suicide for his own grand scheme? If not, then what?
And I'll admit, I still don't understand a question that is worded as "What is the BASIS for God's omniscience?"
CHRISTINE SAID:
ReplyDelete“Of course, I'd mess with their freedom in case of serious danger.”
So you think a human parent should mess with their freedom in case of serious danger, but you don’t think a divine parent (to use your analogy) should mess with their freedom in case of hellish danger. Interesting priorities.
“But doesn't your view actually make the parent (God) into not the protector, but the one who intends and plans that suicide for his own grand scheme? If not, then what?”
i) Since you chose to use the parent/child analogy, I’m merely responding to you on your own terms.
ii) You’re now confusing the analogy with what it allegedly corresponds to. What’s your theological analogue for suicide? Damnation? Natural evils?
iii) In terms of Biblical theology, everyone is not a child of God. Only those who are adopted (Pauline category) or regenerated (Johannine category) are children of God.
God always takes care of his children. But the reprobate are not his children. They are children of darkness (cf. 1 John).
iv) God intends and plans whatever occurs. God would be irresponsible if he didn’t.
v) BTW, this isn’t just my view. Thomism also has a strong doctrine of predestination:
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1023.htm
Yet Thomism is an orthodox option in Catholic theology. So why do you think Calvinistic predestination is morally unacceptable, but Thomistic predestination is morally acceptable? Explain the relevant differences.
My understanding of the Catholic Church position is that people are "predestined" only in the sense that God in his omniscience knows the choices we'll make. That all are given sufficient grace to make those choices, and that God wills that none should be lost. There must be a willful turning away from God.
ReplyDeleteThe Catechism states that "God predestines no one to go to hell".
My understanding also is that St Thomas taught that in the sense that God created the possibility that humans could choose to willfully turn away from God and remain in that rebellion, he predestined their doom. As a consequence of their chosen actions. And it seems from what I'm reading here that Calvin taught that some are doomed via God's plan without any choice on their part. Perhaps Calvin also included the consequential concept, too, I don't know.
I am asking sincere questions, and not really getting anywhere. The suicide analogy is getting a little mangled. BUT isn't it a matter of - does God allow tragedies or does he intend them? Does he allow us to choose death and hell, or does he choose it for [some of]us?
My priorities aren't mixed up, although my analogy may be poor. To carry on with what you consider a poor analogy, I'm interpreting your belief system to say that the parent would intervene in the case of one child's suicide but not with another of their children. Or even more than that, that the parent would PLAN that some of his children would die tragically and others would NEVER be in that danger.
That may very well NOT be what you believe, and that is why I am asking about it.
I was going to place a simple post asking Steve why he had not responded to my last FOUR posts last evening re his conceern whether I was aware I was re-presenting the Boethian Solution and whether or not I was aware of the standard arguments against it. But when I went back over that section, I discovered that I had not only been ignored, but the first and main point I made had been REMOVED.
ReplyDeleteSorry, fellas - but that is truly unworthy of you.
Please do not try and say that my post was not ever there - I always check to make sure posts reach their destination AND I have a confirmation sent by email so I have a copy to review later.
SO - just in the light of fairness to the argument, I am reposting what was removed last night. If it comes up missing again, I will be certain as to your intentions concerning its airing, and fairly certain why.
---------------------------------
Steve said:
"You keep alluding to the Boethian solution, popularized by C. S. Lewis. You don't seem to be aware of the standard objections to that solution:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/#2.2
http://philofreligion.homestead.com/files/augustboethius.h1"
1) Yes, it is the Boethian solution to which I am appealing.
2) Yes, it was popularized by C.S. Lewis - it was his reference that first brought the concept to my attention. The fact that C.S. Lewis believed it does nothing to either enhance or detract from its truth value.
3) Yes, I am aware of the standard objections to that solution.
a - The fact that they are standard objections does not speak to their value as truth, merely to the fact that they have been used more than once over a long period of time.
b - The fact that YOU refer to them as "standard objections to" rather than "proofs against" the position indicates that, though I am certain that you accept the validity of these arguments, you cannot in good conscience present them as proven beyond doubt. I take that very sincerely and with gratitude - not as validation of anything I have said, because I am certain it is not intended that way, but as validation of your own integrity as a man of truth. Thank you for that.
3) I was somewhat surprised at the two articles you chose to exemplify the arguments against Boethius. Perhaps an act of kindness on your part to a visibly inferior opponent? In any event BOTH of the sources you cited in fact express the shortcomings of their arguments against Boethius as demonstrably true!
Your first reference:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/#2.2
This entry in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philospophy article on "Foreknowledge and Free Will" ends with the following paragraph:
"In my judgment the Boethian solution does not solve the problem of theological fatalism by itself, but since the nature of the timeless realm is elusive, the intuition of the necessity of the timeless realm is probably weaker than the intuition of the necessity of the past. The necessity of the past has the advantage of being deeply imbedded in our ordinary intuitions about time; there are no ordinary intuitions about the realm of timelessness. Perhaps, then, the view that God is timeless puts the theological fatalist on the defensive."
This was my argument with Peter Pike, who continuosly returned to time-based concepts to refute the Boethian argument. I believe he found it virtually impossible to remove "time-thought" from his perspective long enough to argue the points themselves.
Boy, you guys are really something aren't you!
ReplyDeleteI have just discovered that the second part of my responst to Peter Pike, in which I respond to his argument that Einstein's theories support his position and not Boethius' HAS ALSO BEEN REMOVED!!! His mistake there was to wander off his own turf - as you accused Christine of DOING - and getting into trouble on MINE! SO - again in the interest of fairness to the argument, here is the rest of the answer I gave to Peter.
Shame, shame.....
continued....
ReplyDelete"You still do not grasp the enormity of the problem your view causes."
Not quite true. It's not that I don't grasp it; I understand how it is an enormous problem for YOU. I just don't accept it. And as I mentioned in my most immediate last post, neither did Augustine. I am comfortable with that.
"The Reformed view does not have this problem, because God's knowledge is grounded in His decree of what will come, and therefore we can be assured that God never learns anything because His *decree* is eternal; but His decree *is not* His creation, and His creation does not have to exist before God can know what it is."
Of course it doesn't have the problem we are currently discussing - but I've never denied that fact. I have stated from the beginning that, if you start from the "givens" that Reformed theology starts from, the system that results is a logical thing of beauty - no flaws or inconsistencies that any logical person could argue with. It is those presuppositions - this being one of them - that give me the greatest pause.
"Secondly, as to logical sequences not needing to be temporal, it's obvious that this is the case, because you can have a cause and effect that occur with no time lapsing between the cause and the effect, but causality is still there. Look at Einstein's relativity for examples of this."
I'm not sure you really want to go there, Peter. The Special theory of relativity specifically negates the some of the time-based arguments you have raised here, and is VERY supportive of the Boethian position. I have a reference for that which, unfortunately, you will need to wait to view, as the server on which it's stored is currently down for maintenance - per the University of Colorado website. Here is the link - and feel free to review and comment after you have a chance to see it:
[PDF] TWO VIEWS OF TIME AND THE BOETHIAN SOLUTION PDF/Adobe Acrobat - Quick View
TWO VIEWS OF TIME AND THE BOETHIAN SOLUTION. The Boethian view. It is not strictly correct to say that God has always known what would happen. ...
www.colorado.edu/philosophy/wes/3600/boethius.pdf
Jeff Rudloff said:
ReplyDeleteI was going to place a simple post asking Steve why he had not responded to my last FOUR posts last evening re his conceern whether I was aware I was re-presenting the Boethian Solution and whether or not I was aware of the standard arguments against it. But when I went back over that section, I discovered that I had not only been ignored, but the first and main point I made had been REMOVED.
Sorry, fellas - but that is truly unworthy of you.
Please do not try and say that my post was not ever there - I always check to make sure posts reach their destination AND I have a confirmation sent by email so I have a copy to review later.
SO - just in the light of fairness to the argument, I am reposting what was removed last night. If it comes up missing again, I will be certain as to your intentions concerning its airing, and fairly certain why.
[...]
Boy, you guys are really something aren't you!
I have just discovered that the second part of my responst to Peter Pike, in which I respond to his argument that Einstein's theories support his position and not Boethius' HAS ALSO BEEN REMOVED!!! His mistake there was to wander off his own turf - as you accused Christine of DOING - and getting into trouble on MINE! SO - again in the interest of fairness to the argument, here is the rest of the answer I gave to Peter.
Shame, shame.....
Whoa there, Jeff! Let's not get carried away and start making all sorts of unfounded accusations. Are these the comments to which you're referring? If so, you'll notice they're in the spambox.
Now, we don't control what's put in the spambox. Blogger does it automatically. Specifically, we can't delete or otherwise remove comments that have already been posted on our weblog and move them into the spambox.
Sure, we can delete comments, but when we delete comments, they're simply deleted. Gone. They don't get deleted only to then appear in the spambox.
At the same time, we have had comments appear in various comboxes of our posts only to subsequently disappear into the spambox without us doing anything at all. Strange, I know, but I believe this is a known Blogger issue. Please Google if you don't believe me.
Others have experienced the same problem (e.g. here, there).
Patrick -
ReplyDeleteNice try - but as I said in my email, the posts - and those are the ones to which I was referring - were ON THE BLOGSITE last night when I retired - I specifically visited the site before going to bed in order to make sure they had not been responded to. I will take your word that blogger has had problems, but the facts do not line up with your explanations.
Feel free to post or remove anything you choose, including our attempt to clear it up. If they wish to respond, fine. If not, fine again. This was my second venture onto your site, and my conclusion is that the reasoning levels are amazing, the insights profound, and the evidence of the character and life of Jesus and the work of the Holy Spirit in the actions of the participants pitiful. I can do without the logic and the sarcasm.
Jeff Rudloff said:
ReplyDeleteNice try - but as I said in my email, the posts - and those are the ones to which I was referring - were ON THE BLOGSITE last night when I retired - I specifically visited the site before going to bed in order to make sure they had not been responded to. I will take your word that blogger has had problems, but the facts do not line up with your explanations.
1. Sorry, Jeff, but you've blown right past everything I pointed out above.
2. But again, like I've already explained, don't take my word for it. Please Google if you don't believe me.
3. I've also provided a couple of links in the previous comment.
4. Not sure why you continue to maintain otherwise. It strikes me as unreasonable. But, well, you're free to believe whatever you like.
Feel free to post or remove anything you choose, including our attempt to clear it up. If they wish to respond, fine.
Since to my knowledge we didn't remove anything, I don't see how this sticks. (I know I certainly haven't touched anyone's comments here.)
If not, fine again. This was my second venture onto your site, and my conclusion is that the reasoning levels are amazing, the insights profound, and the evidence of the character and life of Jesus and the work of the Holy Spirit in the actions of the participants pitiful. I can do without the logic and the sarcasm.
1. I don't know how you can discern "evidence of the character and life of Jesus and the work of the Holy Spirit" based on online discourse. I mean, it's not like you know any of us personally.
2. When you say we're "pitiful" in this regard, you'll have to be more specific. What makes you think so? You're just telling us we're "pitiful" without bothering to explain why you think so. But if it's true we're behaving "pitiful[ly]," then, as a fellow Christian, you should take care to tell us the reason(s) you think so. Otherwise you're generating more heat than light. Not to mention, if it's true we're behaving "pitiful[ly]," then we can't correct our behavior if you simply call us "pitiful" without giving us anything else.
3. Well, unless you think "I can do without the logic and the sarcasm" is some sort of a reason that substantiates you calling us "pitiful." In response, one would think using logic would actually be a good thing. Also, I don't see how sarcasm is unbiblical in certain contexts. You'll have to spell that argument out if you want it to carry any weight.
4. BTW, what sort of "evidence of the character and life of Jesus and the work of the Holy Spirit" would labeling the behavior of fellow Christians "pitiful" without good reason provide?
5. I don't know if you're referring to me or another Tblogger, but I haven't been sarcastic toward you. In fact, the previous comment was the first time I've even responded to you. This is the second time.
Patrick,
ReplyDeleteI will respond to your last comment first....
"5. I don't know if you're referring to me or another Tblogger, but I haven't been sarcastic toward you. In fact, the previous comment was the first time I've even responded to you. This is the second time."
No, I was not referring to you at all. Even in this response to my very emotional post, you have been a gentleman, and I must apologize to you and thank you for your response. Since we have never communicated before tonight, I have no reason - and did not intend - to lump you with the ones to whom I am referring.
Let me just say a couple of things in general, rather than responding to to your specific questions. ("You" in the following statements refers to the bloggers in general, NOT you specifically, Patrick.)
Several responses - more of them directed to others than to me - have been outright direct personal attacks - one in particular stands out in my mind. For that I can find no justification. Your rules of engagement say the following:
"A lurker or commenter who is not “one of us” should not be made to feel that he has strayed into enemy territory and needs to keep his head down lest he get it blown off."
I have observed at least two occations where heads HAVE been at least shot at. I have felt the need to keep my head down ever since I arrived.
On more than one occasion, I have ventured a comment or argument, only to have my point disregarded and a response posted to the beliefs of "most Arminians" (since I only post on Calvinist/Arminian dialogues) or "classical Arminianns." I am neither one of them, and strongly object to being made a straw man.
Yes, I read through your rules of engagement before ever making a post here, so I should have been more prepared. But in those rules, you give to yourselves rights of judgement that I think go beyond legitimate bounds - and then you exercise those self-given rights to their fulest potential. Quote once again from those rules:
"Remember that, in Scripture, most false teachers are professing believers. So merely calling yourself a Christian doesn’t immunize you from judgmental language where appropriate."
Calling YOURSELVES Christians doesn't immunize you either.
Another quote, same source:
"Some trolls recycle the same stock objections no matter how often we’ve refuted them. This is dishonest. And it represents an abuse of the combox."
Giving an argument that is acceptable to you doesn't constitute "refutation" unless you assume that you are right. THAT is dishonest.
I spent 17 years in pastoral ministry. I cannot think of a single person I ever dealt with who would be more likely to - if he had the opportunity, which your people do not believe - be drawn to Christ as a result of reading this blog. If it weren't for the fact that I have been a disciple myself for nearly 40 years, I might have misgivings as well.
To my personal discredit, I have allowed my own emotions to get too involved with this site, and I will do some repenting after I've gone. That's my own fault, not yours.
Jeff,
ReplyDeletePatrick provided photographic evidence that your posts landed in the spam filter, unless you think he moonlights as a graphic designer for Pixar and doctored the screen shot.
This is a common occurrence with Google. My comments are regularly eaten by the spam filter at sites around the web. They will appear for one moment after I've posted them, and then disappear immediately after, especially if I make a post that includes a variety of links. I think you need to acquaint yourself with the technology you're using before making irresponsible accusations in a public forum.
You said:
I can do without the logic and the sarcasm.
Proverbs often utilizes sarcasm, some of it deeply caustic. Yet this intense, acidic treatment of certain kinds of behavior and people serves a highly spiritual purpose; it diverts teachable youths from foolish actions and toward holy character.
So there's no reason to automatically dismiss sarcastic comments as nonspiritual.
Sarcasm can be misused to cut others down, just as assertions about the spiritual inferiority of theological disputants can serve as a transparent pretext for Pharisaic sanctimony. It depends on the context.
Do you really believe that YOUR sarcasm could divert others to holy character? Do you have an example?
ReplyDeleteIn this statement, "God's knowledge is grounded in His decree of what will come", I may now understanding the question of the "basis" of God's omniscience. The Calvinist answer must be that the basis for God's omniscience is in his decrees. For Catholics, and probably other non-Calvinists, we'd say that God's omniscience is grounded in his essence, or his perfection, i.e. who He is, rather than what He does.
His omniscience is "from all eternity" - as Jeff and Skarlet so ably described. Rather than him knowing because it's his plan without our participation, his all-knowingness of our actions is from the FACT of them, known by God "from all eternity" as opposed to in earthbound time.
I don't think you are interested in my answer, but I wanted to give it now that I understand what you were getting at.
I think the very first comment by EA is still the problem, in a nutshell. You answered it by saying that God foreordains transgressions for his ultimate purposes. Again, how is Adam then culpable? Or are we not culpable for our sins?
Have blogged on the Boethian solution here
ReplyDeletehttp://triablogue.blogspot.com/2010/03/timelessness-solution-to-problem-of.html
Chistine asks,
ReplyDelete"Again, how is Adam then culpable? Or are we not culpable for our sins?
First, what if I used the "Christine-move" to answer this, i.e., "it is beyond our understanding."? Would that work?
Second, why think Adam not culpable? Because he couldn't do otherwise? Why think that's necessary for responsibility? Libertarians such as W.L. Craig, Eleanor Stump, Linda Zagzebski, and David Hunt, among others, don't think so.
Third, responsibility is connected to 'control' in important ways. We can make distinctions between regulative control and guidance control. Responsibility only requires the latter, and the latter doesn't involve the principle of alternative possibilities. Since guidance control is compatible with not having alternatives available---indeed, with events being determined---and since having control is included as important in traditional discussions of moral responsibility, it's not at all clear why Adam would be thought to not be culpable.
What does guidance control consist of? Two important features are that the mechanism is the agents own mechanism and that the agent is responsive to reasons. So, there must be this "ownership" feature and the "reasons-responsive" feature. It is compatible with determinism that an action can issue from an agent's own, reasons-responsive mechanism. These mechanisms can be made the agent's own by the agent taking responsibility for them. Agents are responsive to reasons if they are sensitive to reasons such that if reasons other than the actual reasons for which they acted were brought forth to bear upon the action, the mechanism would respond differently and the agent would act differently.
Of course the above could be further spelled out, and it has been (cf. Fischer and Ravizza, Moral Responsibility), but it certainly makes the matter not as clear cut as the indeterminist thinks (who, by the way, has problems of her own, issuing not only from foreknowledge but also from possible lack of control that issues in from indeterminism), certainly showing that the indeterminist needs more than this: "Oh, so Adam was determined? How was he then culpable?" where the latter question is really supposed to function as a gotcha, something the questioner already knows can't be answered.
Aw, come on - can't you be nicer? I was about to express some appreciation for the argument you had linked to, with our friend Al Dente. Then I see your next comment.
ReplyDeleteI didn't agree with your conclusions there, but liked how you made your view understandable and funny. My problems have to do with the concept of "God's beliefs" being put into a linear time sequence. To me, God has knowledge, not "beliefs". I still think Al Dente is free to eat or not eat his fettucine, and God knows from all eternity which action he takes. I will read your latest comment - looks pretty challenging for the simple-minded, but I will give it a shot when Mother's Day has finished with me.
I just spent an hour writing a response to this and Paul's posts - which the site just blew off with an "action cannot be completed" message. Seems I have angered Blogger as well as this particular site.
ReplyDeleteI will simplify the answer, because I really don't want to go through another hour on this....
To Paul:
I appreciate your reference to your earlier posting on the Boethian question. But as I have mentioned in prefious posts, I have a grossly inadequate background in both logic and philosophy to keep up with you and yours on this blog. Two paragraphs in, I was hopelessly lost. I submit, though not to your position so much as my inability to comprehend it.
To Matthew:
You are correct - my words, and in particular, the spirit in which I said them, was worse than those I was accusing. I apologize to you and repent before God.
I realized this morning as I was listening to my pastor that I was, in fact, reliving arguments that I had back in the days when I was preparing for ministry. I did then, and still do today, a lot of counseling, since my education is primarily in psychology. I never found a way to reconcile the Reformed position with my need to offer those with whom I worked a "legitimate" offer of hope for their futures. I know that your theology claims it's offers of grace and hellp to be valid to everyone, but I could never wrap my own head - or perhaps it was just my heart - around that, given the claims of the rest of the system. I chose the theology - quite illogically - that best described the God I perceived when I read the scriptures. I am by no means a classic Arminian - we disagree on a number of points - which meand that I am truly "without a dog in the fight" on either side.
Thanks to your people for putting up with me while I returned to this conclusion - the same one I reached more than 30 years ago, but had to return to in order to get back my focus today.
Whatever your purpose is for maintaining this sire, may God bring it about to His satisfaction.
Jeff: I just spent an hour writing a response to this and Paul's posts - which the site just blew off with an "action cannot be completed" message. Seems I have angered Blogger as well as this particular site.
ReplyDeleteI've had that sort of thing happen many times. Always best to write something in MS Word or even Notepad and then copy and paste when done.
Thanks for your kind response here, and for being such a good sport.
Jeff, I believe you could finish the blog post and understand over 90% of it. Grab a coffee and a quiet space on a couch, then read it through without stopping. If you hit a rough patch, keep going, you'll make it to the end.
ReplyDeleteHi Jeff,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your comments. I appreciate them.
BTW, you said:
I never found a way to reconcile the Reformed position with my need to offer those with whom I worked a "legitimate" offer of hope for their futures. I know that your theology claims it's offers of grace and hellp to be valid to everyone, but I could never wrap my own head - or perhaps it was just my heart - around that, given the claims of the rest of the system.
1. I'm not exactly sure which specific claims in "the rest of the system" you're objecting to. But I'd like to say if you haven't already searched our archives, I'd recommend going to Google and typing (without quotation marks) "site:triablogue.blogspot.com" followed by whatever search string or phrase interests you.
2. If you're looking for literature on the doctrines of grace or Reformed theology, I'm sure we or others could recommend something suitable. For example, if you're looking for a popular level treatment on a couple of the issues it sounds like you might have with Reformed theology and evangelism, I'd recommend Evangelism and the Sovereignty of God by J.I. Packer for starters. Of course, there are more technical treatments from different perspectives that we or others could recommend if you're looking for something with more meat. Please don't hesitate to ask. I don't know if I can help but I'll try to do my best. Plus, I'm sure others can better help.
Jeff,
ReplyDeleteI never found a way to reconcile the Reformed position with my need to offer those with whom I worked a "legitimate" offer of hope for their futures. I know that your theology claims it's offers of grace and hellp to be valid to everyone, but I could never wrap my own head - or perhaps it was just my heart - around that, given the claims of the rest of the system.
What was the problem? You didn't know whether any of them are elect or not.
A "legitimate" offer for their future would be that if they would believe on Jesus, they would be saved.
Now, how is that false on Reformed Theology?
It is true that IF they believed, God would save them. So what's the problem?
Is it that there is a possibility they might not actually believe?
But that is true even on your system. if God knows they will not believe, then it is a fact that they will not.
Did you ever try spelling out just what, exactly, the problem was supposed to be? Or did you have a gut feeling that there was a problem and then refused to think about it any longer?
Paul said:
ReplyDelete"Jeff, I believe you could finish the blog post and understand over 90% of it. Grab a coffee and a quiet space on a couch, then read it through without stopping. If you hit a rough patch, keep going, you'll make it to the end."
The only thing I am completely convinced of is that if Mr. Dente had read this before getting to eat his pasta, he would not have enjoyed it!
I had to give up the quiet space on the couch really fast, for two reasons: (1) With no formal training in logic, I find formulations like the one presented to be difficult to follow and (2) I had to look up all the philosophial terms that went along with it. That took me back to the computer for a long while. After that, I struggled through the rest and probably achieved 50%.
So here's what I can do. If you truly want to try and walk me through this - and that's what it is really going to be! - here are the first two questions I need answers to:
(1) Why do you use the phrase "infallibly believes" in your statement of the proposal? "Infallible belief" sounds like a big-words euphemism for "knows" - so is there a difference?
(2) In reading through all the comments and responses that follow, it seems like there is a strong predilection on your part and that of the other respondent from Triablogue to avoid a causal link between what happens at t3 and God's "belief" at t1 or any other point. Has Calvinism given up it's commitment to predestination as it was presented to me 30 years ago?
If it would be preferable to do this off-site, feel free to suggest an alternative and we can go that route. But before you agree, I am sure you understand from the other post to which you responded - which I will respond to momentarily - that I am not coming at this from a totally open-minded perspective. I have some real issues with this that make it hard for me to be totally objective. Throw that into the mix and we'll go from there.
Paul said:
ReplyDelete"What was the problem? You didn't know whether any of them are elect or not.
A "legitimate" offer for their future would be that if they would believe on Jesus, they would be saved.
Now, how is that false on Reformed Theology?
It is true that IF they believed, God would save them. So what's the problem?
I don't think you need to ask this question, as I am sure you have dealt with this more often than you like to remember. But yes - election is the issue entirely.
Of course it's technically tru to say that IF they believed they would be saved. But for me to know that the IF is qualified not by anything they can do but by a choice God has already made renders the offer not only illegitimate but downright deceptive.
30 years ago when I last had a seriouys discussion with a Reformed seminary professor, his response to this question was - and these were his exact words, which I will never forget - "You have to get over this soft-headed, sentimental notion that God cares for all of mankind equally, or you will never be able to appreciate the magnitude of what He has done for you - if in fact YOU are really one of the elect!"
That's what you're up against, Paul. Good luck....
@ Patrick:
ReplyDeleteThanks for your note. You may have noticed that Paul has responded as well, and he is - for now at least, until I drive him mad! - doing a little personal shepherding in this area. I have read the Packer work you mentioned, and a few others of his and other more "popular" Reformed authors. And I still find it difficult to reconcile with the Scriptures as I read them. Of course, that has been true pretty much since the days of the early church, so I don't feel too bad about that. Let's see what kind of progress Paul makes, and see just how much of a hard case I really am.
Thanks again!
Jeff,
ReplyDelete1. If someone knows something, then he believes it. So foreknowledge entails forebelief. In the literature there's some issue with cashing things out in terms of foreknowledge, since those who think libertarian free will is compatible with God's knowledge claim that to cash things in terms of foreknowledge is an unfair advantage, so tradition has been to accommodate them and cast matters in terms of belief. It's more of a technical point and it doesn't really affect the argument.
2. I don't understand the question. Reformed theology has not given up predestination, but talk of "causation" is beset with problems, not the least of which is the fact that there's not even a consensus on what a "cause" is. Apart from that, there's several different models of causation, and on some of them problems don't arise as they do on other models. It's not clear Calvinism entails the more nefarious models, and no one has shown that it entails them. Lastly, determinism isn't identical to causal determinism, the former can be had without the latter. I'm committed to determinism, yet this might not be causal determinism. But to complicate matters, even if it were, since it is God-causation this is of a sui generis sort and so doesn't map on to our more intramundane, transitive and mechanical models.
Re: the gospel offer:
"Of course it's technically tru to say that IF they believed they would be saved. But for me to know that the IF is qualified not by anything they can do but by a choice God has already made renders the offer not only illegitimate but downright deceptive.
This isn't an argument, and you've given no reason to suppose the conclusion is either true or follows validly from your premises. Moreover, it is qualified by what they can do, their belief. It is *they* who believe, not God. Again, you don't know that any particular person is not-elect. So on what basis do you hesitate to tell them the gospel? Moreover, it is true of every single human that if they believe, they will be saved. What's disingenuous? Lastly, if God knows everything, then he knows some people will be in hell, and he knew that "before" they were actualized, he knew it from eternity. Since his knowledge is infallible, it cannot be that they will ever accept the gospel offer, yet you still offer it to them. But it is impossible that they should actually take you up on it. So there's not really a big distinction here.