A Challenge to the Author and Readers of Triablogue
A response:
Specifically, to those who adhere, more or less, to the version of Christianity which posits a place of everlasting torment for those who reject or otherwise don't believe in the biblical God (actually, I assume that rejection and non-belief are synonymous in this regard).
A Christian couple bears a child. They love her, nurture her, and otherwise provide her with the 'good life'; including an indoctrination into the religious concepts which, if cleaved to, will ultimately secure her a place in God's everlasting Heaven.
However, when the child is 15 years old, she becomes enamored of another faith, and leaves the Christian fold. Unfortunately, on her way to the train station to meet up with her 'guru', she is hit by a car and killed.
Now, leaving aside your personal regrets and/or righteous condemnations (I TOLD you so!), as well as those of the god you serve, let me ask you- Would it not have been better if the child had never been born as far as the child's welfare is concerned? I think this is a very pertinent question, since any Christian who has a child is taking the risk of something like the above hypothetical situation happening. Moreover, it seems to be a very GREAT risk, since 'narrow is the way, and few there be that find it', and with the stakes being so incredibly high and at someone else's expense, doesn't forbearance seem the wisest- and indeed, the kindest- course? After all, if this life is merely a short episode in which a single wrong decision might possibly damn your child to an eternity of unimaginable suffering with absolutely no hope of surcease, wouldn't it have been better FOR THE CHILD it she had never been born in the first place?
I look forward to your participation in this discussion.
Several issues:
i) There’s a philosophical distinction between dispositional belief and occurrent belief, as well as a philosophical distinction between implicit belief and explicit belief.
And I think that philosophical distinction dovetails into certain theological distinctions as well. In Calvinism, regeneration is causally prior to faith. It causes a predisposition to exercise saving faith.
Conversely, sin, in the elect or regenerate, can also result in false beliefs or impede the formation of true beliefs.
Likewise, I think many true beliefs involve tactic knowledge. That varies with age, education, and intellectual aptitude.
ii) Apropos (i), I don’t assume a backslider is damned if she dies before she had an opportunity to repent. Likewise, I don’t assume that a Christian’s loved one is damned if she died before exercising explicit or occurrent faith in Christ. I make allowance for that possibility, but there’s no presumption to that effect.
iii) There is also the question of what you mean by “torment.” Critics of hell generally invest that word with a heavy payload which they bring to the word, yet fail to exegete. But as I’ve often said, I don’t think hell is the same for all damned. The duration is the same, but I don’t assume the specific punishment is the same for one and all. Indeed, I assume that’s person-variable.
iv) Yes, I think the damned are worse off than if they never lived.
However, a cost/benefit analysis (which is how you’ve cast the issue) must consider aggregate goods and evils, not isolated goods and evils.
Suppose, ex hypothesi, Christian parents have 12 children, of which 11 are heavenbound, but 1 is hellbound. The damnation of a single child is bad for the child, and tragic for the parents, but how does that outweigh the good of all the other kids?
Which is better: that good never be exemplified if evil is ever exemplified, or that evil be offset by good? Why does the tradeoff only work one way? Should the good be disallowed for fear of allowing any incidental evil?
Why deny the other 11 kids the opportunity to enjoy the goodness of a beatific existence just because one grown child is justly doomed to hell? Why should she be allowed to spoil their opportunity for eternal bliss? Why should she exercise the unilateral veto on their existence?
Why does the “risk” of evil override the “risk” of good? Should I never marry for fear my wife might be a shrew? What about Tennyson’s celebrated saying that it’s better to love and lose than never love at all?
I’d be happier single than married to a shrew, but I’d be happier married to a wonderful woman than playing it safe. Either way there’s a risking of losing something good. But does the potential gain outweigh the potential loss? Great risks over against great rewards.
It’s worse for the damned. They’d be better off had they never tasted life. But by the same token, it’s worse for the saints had they never been born.
Antinatalism is pathologically risk-adverse. Should I never leave the house lest I’m run over by a bus?
v) In terms of risk factors, we’re ultimately betting on God. Betting on the wisdom and benevolence of God. And betting on God is always a safe bet–especially in the long run.
Life’s a gamble, but God’s the dealer, so I like them odds.
vi) Should someone benefit at another’s expense? That sounds callous, but it all depends on the details. If a sharpshooter kills a schoolyard sniper, the kids benefit at the expense of the sniper. But I don’t have a problem with that outcome. Do you?
vii) I also don’t assume that only a fraction of humanity will be saved. As I’ve discussed before, that turns on a rather disputable interpretation:
