Thursday, November 18, 2010

Naturalistic Delusions

I've said that Michael Licona's The Resurrection Of Jesus (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2010) has the best treatment I've seen of hallucination theories against Jesus' resurrection. There's far too much material on that subject in the book for me to quote all of it. But here's some of what Licona writes:

[quoting psychologist Gary Sibcy] I have surveyed the professional literature (peer-reviewed journal articles and books) written by psychologists, psychiatrists, and other relevant healthcare professionals during the past two decades and have yet to find a single documented case of a group hallucination, that is, an event for which more than one person purportedly shared in a visual or other sensory perception where there was clearly no external referent. [end of quote]

In order to avoid the implausibility of a group hallucination, Goulder would have to suggest that the appearance to the Twelve, which is perhaps the most strongly attested of Jesus' postresurrection appearances, involved each disciple experiencing an individual hallucination at the same time....the Twelve were males who probably belonged to various age groups and almost certainly possessed different personality types. Far more punishing to such a proposal [group hallucinations], however, is the requirement of mind-boggling coincidences. Despite the fact that hallucinations are experienced by roughly 15 percent of the general population and a much larger 50 percent of recently bereaved senior adults (only 14 percent of which are visual in nature), an incredible 100 percent of the Twelve would have experienced a hallucination, of Jesus (rather than something else such as guards), simultaneously, in the same mode (visual) and perhaps in multiple modes. It would be an understatement to claim that such a proposal has only a meager possibility of reflecting what actually occurred. Embracing it would require an extraordinary amount of faith....

And it is appropriate to remind ourselves that credulity is not unique to believers and can be present in the historical work of skeptical scholars who uncritically accept poorly supported natural hypotheses that are terribly ad hoc....

Ludemann also equates the postresurrection appearances of Jesus to Marian apparitions, and we have already addressed this assertion previously with Goulder. Like Goulder, Ludemann does not bother to argue that Marian apparitions are necessarily natural and solely psychological events....

we must observe that there is not even a hint that Jesus' disciples performed any of these actions [to enter into an altered state of consciousness] in order to see Jesus. In fact, there is nothing in the texts that suggests they were even trying to enter into an ASC [altered state of consciousness]. Moreover, it is important to observe that neither Craffert nor Pilch provide any documented reports from the social sciences of a group of individuals who were all convinced they were simultaneously engaged in mutually interactive activities (e.g., speaking with, eating with, walking with, or touching) with an individual who was not actually there in an ontologically objective sense....

In reply to Pilch, Wiebe examined more than thirty reports of ASC experiences he received from those who had experienced them. He compares them with OSC [ordinary state of consciousness] experiences, listing ten qualities that are typically, though not always, absent in an ASC....

This [evidence] suggests that the disciples' encounters with the risen Jesus were understood as OSCs. Wiebe concludes that ASCs may appropriately describe other kinds of experiences reported in the New Testament, but they are inadequate for assisting us in understanding the disciples' encounters with the risen Jesus....

Apparitions [of the dead] are not usually observed by groups (2-12 percent), are not usually observed by enemies (less than 1 percent), are not usually touched (2.7 [two-point-seven] percent) and are not usually accompanied by belief that the person has been raised bodily from the dead (less than 1 percent).

While these qualities are not always absent in apparitions, they are very rare. And it would be much rarer to see an apparition containing all of them; approximately 1:3,800,000. In fact, there are no cases in the literature of such an apparition (which means that any hypothesis proposing that the postresurrection appearances of Jesus were no different than standard experiences of apparitions of the dead lacks plausibility)....

This figure [of less than 1 percent of apparitions being seen by an enemy, like Saul of Tarsus] is based on only one reference to an enemy of Christianity who was a Hindu and who converted after he had an experience in which he believed Jesus had appeared to him....

In terms of an empty tomb, I agree with Habermas and Allison that this is a major difference [between what the New Testament reports about Jesus' resurrection and apparitions]. When we add the unanimous reports of the bodily resurrection of Jesus in the earliest narratives and in Acts 2 and Acts 13, the differences between these reports and what we find in the apparitions literature become marked.

(pp. 484-486, 491, 509, 574-576, 635, n. 65 on p. 635, 637)

16 comments:

  1. How many documented cases of people rising from the dead can be found in the professional literature?

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  2. Vinny,

    You're drawing a false comparison. Christians don't argue that the resurrection occurred by natural means. Personal agents, like God, often choose to do things they haven't done before. They aren't limited by natural laws. A father may give his son a car on his sixteenth birthday, even though he's never given somebody a car before. Natural laws, as commonly defined, have been continually present. God's reasons for raising an individual from the dead, on the other hand, can't be assumed to be present in the world at all times. Would you explain how the absence of resurrections in recent research is comparable to the absence of the relevant hallucinatory phenomena?

    Even if we granted your false comparison for the sake of argument, you'd still have the problem of proposing multiple unprecedented hallucinatory phenomena, in contrast to the one resurrection proposed by Christians.

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  3. If we must allow for the possibility of personal agents who are not limited by natural laws, then we are no longer justified in drawing inferences based on the natural processes we observe. We think that fingerprints on a gun might be evidence of who committed a murder because we understand the natural processes by which the patterns on the human finger can appear on other objects and we understand that those processes act consistently. If we believed that those patterns appeared on objects randomly or by divine fiat, we couldn't say that fingerprints on a gun were evidence of anything at all.

    If I cannot draw inferences about the likelihood of a man coming back from the dead based on what knowledge and experience tell me about the finality of death, how can I draw conclusions about the likelihood of a shared hallucination based on what knowledge and experience tell me about hallucinations?

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  4. Vinny wrote:

    "If we must allow for the possibility of personal agents who are not limited by natural laws, then we are no longer justified in drawing inferences based on the natural processes we observe. We think that fingerprints on a gun might be evidence of who committed a murder because we understand the natural processes by which the patterns on the human finger can appear on other objects and we understand that those processes act consistently. If we believed that those patterns appeared on objects randomly or by divine fiat, we couldn't say that fingerprints on a gun were evidence of anything at all. If I cannot draw inferences about the likelihood of a man coming back from the dead based on what knowledge and experience tell me about the finality of death, how can I draw conclusions about the likelihood of a shared hallucination based on what knowledge and experience tell me about hallucinations?"

    The existence of personal agents doesn't prevent us from taking the regularity of nature into account. Archeology and other sciences distinguish between phenomena caused by regular patterns of nature and what's brought about by the involvement of a personal agent. If an apple falls from a tree, we expect it to hit the ground, but a human could interfere with the process. Say five apples fall from the tree in a given day. A human, for whatever reason, decides to reach his hand out and catch three of those five. We couldn't predict that ahead of time. It's not what normally happens. But we can't reject the possibility just because it complicates things. A view of life that's complicated, but accurate is better than one that's simple, but inaccurate. Truth is more important than simplicity. What you've told us about the alleged consequences of allowing for the involvement of a personal agent doesn't give us any reason to disallow that involvement.

    We can observe that dead bodies don't normally rise by means of the regular patterns of nature. Who denies that? But if a Christian is arguing for a resurrection by other means, whereas a critic of Christianity is arguing for some hallucinatory phenomena by means of the regular patterns of nature, then only one of those two positions can be ruled out by observing natural patterns. Thus, your initial response, which suggested that the two are in the same category, was mistaken.

    Since a confusion of categories often occurs in this sort of discussion, I want to clarify something at this point. I'm not arguing that we should believe in something like Jesus' resurrection just because we don't have any reason to limit ourselves to the normal patterns of nature. The possibility that something like a resurrection would occur by some means other than the normal course of nature doesn't give us reason to think such a thing probably occurred. What I'm addressing here is the possibility, not the probability. The probability would be established by other means, such as those discussed in Licona's book and discussed elsewhere on this blog.

    (continued below)

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  5. (continued from above)

    Your fingerprint example and others like it have been addressed by Christians and other critics of naturalism for a long time. The possibility that God could produce a fingerprint doesn't prevent us from taking other factors into account as well. Humans frequently produce fingerprints on guns and other objects, whereas we don't have reason to believe God has been doing such things. There seems to be an absence of motivation for God to produce the fingerprint in question, whereas the crime suspect had a motivation. Other evidence suggests that the suspect was in the area at the time, which seems unlikely if he didn't commit the crime. If God arranged for everything to make the suspect appear guilty, even though he wasn't, we would have no choice but to follow the evidence to its apparent conclusion. Etc.

    And you're ignoring the danger involved in your own position. If there is a God who's been active in the universe, and you aren't allowing for that possibility, then there are negative consequences to your error, including some that are worse than the consequences of my alleged error.

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  6. VINNY SAID:

    “If we must allow for the possibility of personal agents who are not limited by natural laws, then we are no longer justified in drawing inferences based on the natural processes we observe. We think that fingerprints on a gun might be evidence of who committed a murder because we understand the natural processes by which the patterns on the human finger can appear on other objects and we understand that those processes act consistently. If we believed that those patterns appeared on objects randomly or by divine fiat, we couldn't say that fingerprints on a gun were evidence of anything at all.”

    Sometimes fingerprints are “naturally” left on the gun by the hand of the killer.

    However, sometimes fingerprints are artificially impressed on the gun. The killer staged the murder to look like a suicide. The killer wore latex gloves, shot the victim, then placed the gun in the victim’s hand to make it seem as though the victim shot himself. The fingerprints that appear on the gun are the prints of the victim, not the killer.

    Therefore, is a homicide detective no longer justified in drawing inferences about a murder? No. For more than one piece of evidence is relevant.

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  7. Jason,

    Archeology and other sciences may be able to distinguish between phenomena caused by the regular patterns of nature and those brought about by the involvement of a personal agent when that agent is subject to natural law as well. However, I don’t think that they have any tools with which to identify the activities of personal agents that are not constrained by the regularity of nature. Someone catching an apple that falls from a tree may be unusual but it is not beyond the range of things that people are normally observed to do. On the other hand, the apple disappearing into a chronosynclastic infundibulum and reappearing on the planet Neptune would be far beyond anything that we know to be possible. We may not be able to definitively rule out the possibility, but I think we would be justified in assessing the probability as infinitesimal.

    The Christian wishes to allow for the possibility of the action of a personal agent that is not limited by the natural patterns of nature in the case of the resurrection, but not allow for that possibility in the case of a shared hallucination. I prefer to ignore the possibility of such a personal agent in both cases. Speaking only for myself, I do so not because I assume or I can demonstrate that no such agent exists, but because I lack the tools to detect the action of such an agent, i.e. the logical methodology of drawing inferences from evidence depends on the regularity of the patterns of nature. If I am to allow for the possibility of such agents, I cannot see any principled reason not to allow for their possibility in any case where something irregular is observed. For that matter, why should I consider the possibility that things that appear perfectly normal to me aren’t in fact the actions of such agents?

    Some Christians have pointed to the fact that nobody has made the argument that a shared hallucination occurred due to the action of a personal agent that was not limited by the regular patterns of nature whereas Christians do argue that this is what happened with the resurrection. This doesn’t seem very persuasive to me. I think that there should be something about the evidence itself that warrants the consideration of the possibility of action by such an agent. The fact that someone is willing to claim such action can’t be enough.

    I have also seen some Christians introduce the issue of motive into the analysis. They suggest that God had a discernible motive for raising Jesus from the dead whereas there is not a discernible motive for suspending or violating the regular patterns of nature in other instances. This also seems problematic to me. Motive is something we understand from observing the kind of personal agents who are bound by natural law as they pursue their wants and needs and desires. I don’t know how I can make any intelligent assumptions about what motives might drive a personal agent who is not subject to natural law. If I am going to allow for the possibility of such agents, it seems to me that I have to allow for the possibility that there motives are different from mine.

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  8. Steve,

    I don't know whether I would call that "artificial." The appearance of the pattern on the gun is still the result of the natural secretions on the friction ridges of the finger being transferred to the object. The question of whether someone other than the murderer handled the gun after the fatal shot was fired is always a possibility that needs to be eliminated, but it is a possibility that is governed by the natural processes.

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  9. Well, if the killer is ever apprehended, he can explain to the police that the murder victim died of "natural causes." That should let him off the hook.

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  10. BTW, miracles can also employ natural processes. For instance, there can be miracles of timing. What are called "coincidence" miracles.

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  11. You talk about agents who are "subject to," "bound by," or bound by "natural laws" or the "regularities of nature"–as if the only evidence we have for personal agency is that of agents "constrained by" such "laws."

    However, there are serious paranormal researchers like Michael Sudduth, Stephen Braude, and Rupert Sheldrake who deal apparent types of agency that aren't reducible to physical laws or natural process–at least not as standardly defined. Same thing with Christian exorcists. And if the definition is broadened, then you can't rule out miracles.

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  12. VINNY SAID:

    "Motive is something we understand from observing the kind of personal agents who are bound by natural law as they pursue their wants and needs and desires. I don’t know how I can make any intelligent assumptions about what motives might drive a personal agent who is not subject to natural law."

    You have a very wooden view of how to analyze issues. However, philosophers frequently entertain thought-experiments that are far removed from mundane experience.

    Or take the stock horror theme of the avenging ghost. Say a guy murders a coed. She comes back as a ghost and begins to wreak havoc in his life with all manner of ominous, uncanny happenings.

    Hypothetically speaking, it wouldn't be hard to infer the vindictive motives of the ghost–even though this spectral agent isn't subject to the "laws" of nature. She is out to exact revenge on her killer. Her motives are clearly punitive.

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  13. Vinny wrote:

    "The Christian wishes to allow for the possibility of the action of a personal agent that is not limited by the natural patterns of nature in the case of the resurrection, but not allow for that possibility in the case of a shared hallucination."

    That's not what I'm arguing. As I said earlier, I was addressing the circumstances when "a critic of Christianity is arguing for some hallucinatory phenomena by means of the regular patterns of nature". You and other critics of Christianity aren't arguing that a hallucination was caused by God, a demon, or some other such being. Rather, the usual hallucination theory involves naturalistic hallucinatory phenomena. I don't deny that a supernatural hallucination could occur, and, in fact, I've addressed that possibility before. It's wrong, then, for you to claim that I don't "allow for that possibility in the case of a shared hallucination". Rather, I'm addressing the hallucination theory as it's most often defined by critics of the resurrection.

    You write:

    "Speaking only for myself, I do so not because I assume or I can demonstrate that no such agent exists, but because I lack the tools to detect the action of such an agent, i.e. the logical methodology of drawing inferences from evidence depends on the regularity of the patterns of nature."

    Regularity doesn't require uniformity.

    And allowing for the possibility that God or some other entity would interfere with the normal course of nature doesn't prevent us from discerning a normal course. When I propose that God or some other entity is involved, I'm acknowledging that I'm not expecting the event in question to occur by means of the normal course of nature. Again, we can observe that apples normally fall to the ground while allowing the possibility that a human will reach his hand out and catch one before the apple completes its normal course.

    You write:

    "If I am to allow for the possibility of such agents, I cannot see any principled reason not to allow for their possibility in any case where something irregular is observed. For that matter, why should I consider the possibility that things that appear perfectly normal to me aren’t in fact the actions of such agents?"

    Why are such possibilities supposed to be unacceptable?

    (continued below)

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  14. (continued from above)

    You write:

    "I have also seen some Christians introduce the issue of motive into the analysis. They suggest that God had a discernible motive for raising Jesus from the dead whereas there is not a discernible motive for suspending or violating the regular patterns of nature in other instances. This also seems problematic to me. Motive is something we understand from observing the kind of personal agents who are bound by natural law as they pursue their wants and needs and desires. I don’t know how I can make any intelligent assumptions about what motives might drive a personal agent who is not subject to natural law. If I am going to allow for the possibility of such agents, it seems to me that I have to allow for the possibility that there motives are different from mine."

    You're assuming, without argument, that humans are "bound by natural law" and that reasoning about motives should be limited by natural law. Why should we think that an entity must be limited to natural law in order for reasoning about motives to be applied? Saying that God or some other entity is different than humans doesn't tell us whether that entity is different in a relevant way. You'll have to argue for a connection between natural law and motives. If a human were to be born with a shade of hair different than any other human has had, we wouldn't conclude that we therefore can't apply our motivational reasoning to that individual. Hair color isn't a relevant difference.

    In the case of Jesus' resurrection, the purported event occurred in the context of first-century Israel and in the context of what Jesus and His associates taught about the character of God. While it would be possible that God or some other entity would raise Jesus from the dead while holding a different system of motives than the context of Jesus' life would suggest, the possibility of such a scenario doesn't make it the best explanation.

    Analogizing from our own experience with motives doesn't give us certainty, but we don't need certainty in order to have a better explanation than the alternative. If God's treatment of Jesus (e.g., raising Him from the dead) seems to be the sort of thing we would do to show our approval, and other personal beings we've observed seem to have had the same motivation when they did such things, why should we think the possibility that God has other motives than He seems to have is equally likely or more likely? If God is acting among humans, wouldn't we expect Him to communicate largely in human terms? Why would we think it's equally or more likely that He's leaving us with a false impression?

    (continued below)

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  15. (continued from above)

    Let's say you're walking down a sidewalk and a man approaches you. He looks angry, he's screaming racial epithets at you, and he lunges at you with a knife. Do you judge his motives by extrapolating from your own experience, what you've seen among other people, etc.? Or do you withhold judgment, since he's different than you and different than other people (different genes, different fingerprints, etc.)? Maybe his behavior is his way of showing love. But what are the odds that he would use a series of such specific actions commonly associated with hatred in order to express love?

    We can reason similarly about Jesus' resurrection. Why would God (or some other entity) choose something so specifically meaningful and positive in Jesus' historical context (resurrection), do it so shortly after Jesus' death, etc. if he intended to show disapproval rather than approval of Jesus, for example? The fact that the traditional Christian interpretation of the resurrection aligns so well with the nature of the event suggests that the interpretation is correct. We're not talking about an orange zebra with yellow stripes floating through the air over Constantinople on an uneventful day more than a thousand years after Jesus died. That sort of event wouldn't have the same implications.

    Furthermore, saying that we can't discern what motives God or some other entity had for raising Jesus doesn't tell us whether Jesus was raised. We need to distinguish between objections to the historicity of the resurrection and objections to an interpretation of the event. You've given us no reason to conclude that the event couldn't occur or even that it probably didn't. Instead, you've objected to the traditional Christian interpretation of the event.

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  16. Vinny also creates a false dichotomy. He overlooks the possibility that natural laws can express personal agency. The expression of divine intent.

    My computer keyboard exhibits a fixed correlation between the key I press and the letter that appears on the screen. Yet this law-like correlation is the expression of design. The keyboard was engineered by a personal agent to exhibit that law-like correlation. The regularity is purposeful. Regularity by design.

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