I'm posting some comments which which Neal left at DC:
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July 22, 2010 10:58 AM
Neal said...
"[John Loftus] this is such a nice version of Christianity developed by angry men for angry men, isn't it?"
What is evident from this posting is that the only one who appears to be angry is you.
"Over and over we read where atheists have no right to make moral judgments if there are no absolute objective morals. This is simply false. They are ignorant to say otherwise. But this is true of most Christians."
I see you are a graduate of the Dan Aykroyd school of argumentation.
“Then too, the authors are Calvinists which I think is a reprehensible theology, as I posted here.”
You'd think that someone who touts the importance of scholarly creds wouldn't make such an amateurish mistake as engaging in ad hominem fallacies. Or maybe you are just giving us autobiographical information here on your psychological makeup? What is not clear is what if anything it has to do with the truth or falsity of Christianity. You seem to think any argument from a Calvinist can be dismissed at the outset by the mere fact that it came from a Calvinist. In fact, this whole posting is nothing more than one ad hominem attack after another. Epic FAIL.
"Over and over the authors contrast their brand of Christianity with atheism which is left undefined but understood by them to be equivalent to metaphysical naturalism. I don't think they truly know what atheism is, as I explained right here, and again here."
Most people understand atheism as the belief that there is no God. Metaphysical naturalism is a consequence of atheism as it is usually defined. Your links failed to make any distinctions between atheism and metaphysical naturalism. As Hays said, metaphysical naturalism is a euphemism for atheism. If you disagree, how does atheism not entail metaphysical naturalism? And does not metaphysical naturalism entail methodological naturalism? It seems that you are merely attempting to escape some criticisms here.
"Besides, the options before us are not between their brand of conservative Calvinism and non-belief. The options are myriad with everything in-between. There is Arminianism, moderate and liberal Christianities, as well as Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Seventh-Day Adventists, Orthodox Judaism, Islam, and many eastern religions to choose from."
But you titled your book "The CHRISTIAN Delusion". Why should they be concerned about all these other religions in a refutation of a book that purports to be a critique of Christianity? And why should they respond to it in terms of what they consider to be weaker and heretical forms of Christianity?
"So it really does not make a whit of difference who is making a particular argument against their brand of Christianity. The argument either stands on its own or not."
Hypocrisy. This coming from someone who thinks he can dismiss Calvinists because he doesn't like "their brand" of Christianity.
"They cannot assert, for instance, that an atheist cannot make this or that kind of argument because he has no standard for morality, since Process Theologians can make that same argument as can Arminians like Christian philosopher Victor Reppert (which they have repeatedly attacked) or liberals like James McGrath."
I thought you just said the argument stands or falls on its own, regardless of who makes it? Why do you bring up irrelevancies? Do atheists have an objective standard of morality or not? What process theologians and liberals have to say about Calvinism has no bearing on that question.
"In areas where it’s obvious we should expect a perfectly good God to communicate his will better, he didn’t do so, which caused a great deal of harm done in his name by the church (think Inquisition, crusades, witch hunts, Christian attempts at genocide during the Thirty Years War directed at other Christian groups, Slavery, the treatment of women, and denial of the democratic ideals of the freedom of religion and of expression)."
This argument is incoherent until you can demonstrate that you have an objective standard of morality by which you can judge all those things as evil. Until you can demonstrate that, your objection to those things amounts to little more than your personal preferences.
"On that same page Manata claims “the last two chapters have no bearing on whether Christianity is a delusion.” Really? Surely whether Christianity is beneficial to society bears some relationship to whether it’s true. I mean, you really wouldn’t want to hold to something as true from a perfectly good God if it wasn’t beneficial to society, or would you?"
Pragmatism is not a standard of truth. Something can be useful but be totally false. In order to determine whether something is "beneficial" or not, you have to have some objective criteria by which you can judge what is and is not beneficial. And atheism provides no objective criteria whatsoever. So even here Christianity is superior in that it provides objective foundations for society. The gulag was "useful" in Stalin's Russia as were the gas chambers in Hitler's Germany. Do you think these men did not have what they considered to be valid moral justifications? They each had a view of what would benefit their respective societies that I assume conflicts with yours. Why should yours prevail?
Thursday, July 22, 2010
"Truth for its own sake"
A couple of unbelievers have attempted to critique an argument I use in my introduction to The Infidel Delusion–one at Reppert's blog, and the other at the theologyweb. Here's my response:
ApostateAbe
Terrible, terrible introduction. It is basically a vindication of the title of their object of criticism, "The Christian Delusion," because it shamelessly tells the reader that there is no value in truth for its own sake when there is an appeal of heaven and threat of damnation hanging in the air. That is what delusion is all about. That is the whole point. That is the primary fault with Christianity--and Islam, and Hinduism, and old-school Buddhism, and all other religious ideologies that promise rewards and threaten you in the afterlife.
i) My argument wasn’t predicated on the threat of damnation.
ii) Abe’s problem is that, like a lot of unbelievers, he acts as if you can make fundamental changes in your worldview, but leave everything else intact.
But where atheism is concerned, we’re not simply dealing with some unfortunate local consequences. Rather, atheism is a global position with global consequences. If atheism leads to moral nihilism (or the equivalent), then there is literally no good reason to be an atheist.
Given moral nihilism, then there is no “value in truth for its own sake.” Without a value system, there are no values. The pursuit of truth cannot be artificially isolated from other values, as if that continues to flourish in its own little glasshouse.
If a worldview denies the very framework for right and wrong, then we have no responsibility to believe something just because it is the right thing to believe–including the worldview in question. Such a worldview summarily forfeits the right to be taken seriously. For a worldview is not entitled to our consideration if it disenfranchises the very notion of epistemic duties. Such a position disenfranchises itself from further consideration.
If a worldview rejects the possibility that true beliefs are praiseworthy, while false beliefs are blameworthy, then there’s nothing praiseworthy about pursing the truth for its own sake. And there’s nothing praiseworthy about believing a worldview which denies the praiseworthy character of true beliefs.
I’m making a radical claim because atheism has radical consequences which the average atheist stops short of taking. So I will do it for him. I’ll give him that extra little nudge over the cliff.
iii) I didn’t say that’s a reason to believe in Christianity. But it clears the underbrush. It narrows the field.
At July 21, 2010 6:21 PM , steve said...
Doctor Logic said...
“On page 1, Steve Hays starts out with the childish canard that the only morality worth caring about is absolute morality.”
“Childish” is a value judgment. But if you reject moral absolutes, then what’s wrong with being childish (assuming, for the sake of argument, that my “canard” was “childish”)?
“That's like saying that the only deliciousness worth caring about is absolute deliciousness…”
That’s an argument from analogy minus the argument. Why should I regard morality as equivalent to taste?
“Hays seems to be telling us that he doesn't give a %$#* about being courageous unless courage is an absolute moral virtue at the abstract level.”
If there are no moral absolutes, then what makes courage virtuous? You rattle off some putative counterexamples, but your counterexamples lose their moral worth once you ditch moral realism. So your exercise is self-defeating.
“(I think we're supposed to assume he lacks any subjective appreciation for courage from which he infers an absolute virtue.)”
What’s the value of subjective appreciation for courage if it doesn’t correspond to an objective moral fact about courage?
“For all practical purposes, Hays declares that it's preferable to be deluded and happy than be correct and stuck with a limited life in a physical universe.”
i) To begin with, that’s not what I said. Either you’re obtuse, or else you’d rather caricature what you cannot refute.
ii) But let’s play along with your caricature for the sake of argument. If you reject moral absolutes, then what is wrong with being deluded?
“He seems to back off from saying that this is an argument against atheism, but essentially he says that he doesn't care about being right if it's going to mean receiving bad news.”
No. What I said is, why should we care about being right if there is no epistemic duty to be right? Are you too dim to grasp the issue?
“If Hays really feels that way, there's not much point in engaging him in rational argument, is there?”
If you reject moral absolutes, then what’s the point of rational argument? There’s no obligation to be right.
“If Christians like Hays would just imagine a world without God, they might see that their appreciation for moral behavior exists independently of any abstract reasoning, and, thus, independent of any absolute values.”
“Moral behavior” which doesn’t answer to moral absolutes is indistinguishable from immoral behavior.
“Alas, fear and superstition prevent Christians from performing this sort of ‘what if’ analysis.”
i) Hypotheticals are a basic feature of rationality.
ii) If you reject moral absolutes, then there’s no obligation to avoid “fear and superstition.”
Thanks for your self-refuting tirade, Dr. Illogic.
At July 22, 2010 7:31 AM , steve said...
Doctor Logic said...
“I'm calling your bluff on this one.”
Never call a player’s bluff when you have a losing hand.
“It doesn't matter if there's no absolute, objective reason why every person should eschew childishness. My argument is compelling to you because you prefer - you care - not to be childish.”
i) If I were an atheist, it wouldn’t matter. Unless your argument is morally compelling (which you deny at the outset), then it has no force.
ii) If your “argument” reduces to emotional bullying, then that’s not an “argument.” Rather, that’s high school social dynamics. Who’s hot and who’s not.
“The same goes for rational thinking. There's no absolute, objective reason why every person should be rational. (Indeed, any such rational justification you come up with would be circular.) The point is that we desire to be rational, and are often biologically compelled to be rational.”
i) I don’t think evolutionary biology compels us to be rational.
ii) But let’s play along with your claim for the sake of argument. That only works for animals which are unaware of their biological programming. If, however, an animal becomes conscious of its biological programming, then it’s in a position to realize that its “desire to be rational” it not, itself, a rational desire.
iii) You’re downshifting to psychological coercion, like the desire of an adolescent schoolgirl to fit in. To do whatever it takes to be accepted. Wearing the “right” clothes. The “right” hairdo. The “right” makeup. Listening to the “right” music.
iv) I might like to murder the guy who stole my girlfriend if I thought I could get away with it. In your worldview, my murderous desire is amoral.
“So, you sit across the table from me, holding a spoonful of dung, asking me to give you an absolute reason why you ought not eat the dung. Sorry, but I'm not worried that either of us is going to start eating dung, especially not on a regular basis.”
If you want to bring “rationality” down to the level of certain tastes and odors we find naturally repellent, that doesn’t exactly commend your worldview.
“Let's suppose (contra reality) that you really didn't care about being rational. How would the existence of some absolute moral imperative cause you to be rational? Surely, such an imperative only has a hold on you if you care. If you lack a subjective appreciation for rationality, a rational argument won't change that.”
There’s a fundamental asymmetry between atheism and Christian theism at this point. In Christianity, there’s a match between our subjective appreciation for rationality and objective epistemic duties. But by your own admission, you don’t have that in atheism.
“None of what I have said is self-defeating. My arguments appeal to people who subjectively value rationality. People who don't subjectively value rationality won't give a damn about my arguments, and I can live with that.”
Of course it’s self-refuting. You appeal to “rationality.” But your real position boils down to one’s personal preference, which is hardly interchangeable with rationality.
“The reason you think my comments are self-defeating is that your model of morality is wrong. You mistakenly think that people are moral because the perform some sort of deductive inference from self-evident moral absolutes. The reality is that morality is caring, not deduction. A man's supposed moral absolutes are inferred from his cares. It's not the other way around.”
I said nothing about moral motivations. I’ve been discussing the metaphysical foundations of morality.
“If I could somehow prove to you on paper that objectively good people absolutely ought to rape, kill and steal, would you still want to be an ‘objectively good’ person? I put it to you that you would prefer to be a subjectively good person, and an objectively evil person. You would rather be ‘objectively evil’ because you care about not murdering, not raping, etc.”
i) We can always dream up hypothetical scenarios which generate tensions between what is subjectively the case and what is objectively the case. But why not deal with the real world situation of atheism and Christian theism? Does Christian theism trigger this cognitive dissonance? No.
ii) And, once again, that goes to the asymmetry between the respective positions.
“Of course, this is all hypothetical because there are no decent arguments about objective goods, let alone proofs. But it does make the important point. People aren't good because they perceive and obey some abstract objective moral framework of absolutes. They act on their cares.”
i) This isn’t a question of what makes people good, since–on your view–nobody is good. There is no good to emulate.
ii) And, once again, I’m not discussing incentives or disincentives. Rather, I’m discussing what grounds moral ascriptions. You admit that moral ascriptions are baseless.
“If you don't care about being rational, and don't care about being childish, then my argument isn't going to work on you.”
To call one’s opponent “childish” is an attempt to shame him into changing his belief or behavior. But your moral nihilism takes the sting out of that accusation.
“Like I said, I can live with that.”
Yes, well…if the ship were going down, I won’t be stepping into the same lifeboat you do. Hard to sleep in a lifeboat with a moral nihilist by my side. I might be missing some body parts when I awake.
ApostateAbe
Terrible, terrible introduction. It is basically a vindication of the title of their object of criticism, "The Christian Delusion," because it shamelessly tells the reader that there is no value in truth for its own sake when there is an appeal of heaven and threat of damnation hanging in the air. That is what delusion is all about. That is the whole point. That is the primary fault with Christianity--and Islam, and Hinduism, and old-school Buddhism, and all other religious ideologies that promise rewards and threaten you in the afterlife.
i) My argument wasn’t predicated on the threat of damnation.
ii) Abe’s problem is that, like a lot of unbelievers, he acts as if you can make fundamental changes in your worldview, but leave everything else intact.
But where atheism is concerned, we’re not simply dealing with some unfortunate local consequences. Rather, atheism is a global position with global consequences. If atheism leads to moral nihilism (or the equivalent), then there is literally no good reason to be an atheist.
Given moral nihilism, then there is no “value in truth for its own sake.” Without a value system, there are no values. The pursuit of truth cannot be artificially isolated from other values, as if that continues to flourish in its own little glasshouse.
If a worldview denies the very framework for right and wrong, then we have no responsibility to believe something just because it is the right thing to believe–including the worldview in question. Such a worldview summarily forfeits the right to be taken seriously. For a worldview is not entitled to our consideration if it disenfranchises the very notion of epistemic duties. Such a position disenfranchises itself from further consideration.
If a worldview rejects the possibility that true beliefs are praiseworthy, while false beliefs are blameworthy, then there’s nothing praiseworthy about pursing the truth for its own sake. And there’s nothing praiseworthy about believing a worldview which denies the praiseworthy character of true beliefs.
I’m making a radical claim because atheism has radical consequences which the average atheist stops short of taking. So I will do it for him. I’ll give him that extra little nudge over the cliff.
iii) I didn’t say that’s a reason to believe in Christianity. But it clears the underbrush. It narrows the field.
At July 21, 2010 6:21 PM , steve said...
Doctor Logic said...
“On page 1, Steve Hays starts out with the childish canard that the only morality worth caring about is absolute morality.”
“Childish” is a value judgment. But if you reject moral absolutes, then what’s wrong with being childish (assuming, for the sake of argument, that my “canard” was “childish”)?
“That's like saying that the only deliciousness worth caring about is absolute deliciousness…”
That’s an argument from analogy minus the argument. Why should I regard morality as equivalent to taste?
“Hays seems to be telling us that he doesn't give a %$#* about being courageous unless courage is an absolute moral virtue at the abstract level.”
If there are no moral absolutes, then what makes courage virtuous? You rattle off some putative counterexamples, but your counterexamples lose their moral worth once you ditch moral realism. So your exercise is self-defeating.
“(I think we're supposed to assume he lacks any subjective appreciation for courage from which he infers an absolute virtue.)”
What’s the value of subjective appreciation for courage if it doesn’t correspond to an objective moral fact about courage?
“For all practical purposes, Hays declares that it's preferable to be deluded and happy than be correct and stuck with a limited life in a physical universe.”
i) To begin with, that’s not what I said. Either you’re obtuse, or else you’d rather caricature what you cannot refute.
ii) But let’s play along with your caricature for the sake of argument. If you reject moral absolutes, then what is wrong with being deluded?
“He seems to back off from saying that this is an argument against atheism, but essentially he says that he doesn't care about being right if it's going to mean receiving bad news.”
No. What I said is, why should we care about being right if there is no epistemic duty to be right? Are you too dim to grasp the issue?
“If Hays really feels that way, there's not much point in engaging him in rational argument, is there?”
If you reject moral absolutes, then what’s the point of rational argument? There’s no obligation to be right.
“If Christians like Hays would just imagine a world without God, they might see that their appreciation for moral behavior exists independently of any abstract reasoning, and, thus, independent of any absolute values.”
“Moral behavior” which doesn’t answer to moral absolutes is indistinguishable from immoral behavior.
“Alas, fear and superstition prevent Christians from performing this sort of ‘what if’ analysis.”
i) Hypotheticals are a basic feature of rationality.
ii) If you reject moral absolutes, then there’s no obligation to avoid “fear and superstition.”
Thanks for your self-refuting tirade, Dr. Illogic.
At July 22, 2010 7:31 AM , steve said...
Doctor Logic said...
“I'm calling your bluff on this one.”
Never call a player’s bluff when you have a losing hand.
“It doesn't matter if there's no absolute, objective reason why every person should eschew childishness. My argument is compelling to you because you prefer - you care - not to be childish.”
i) If I were an atheist, it wouldn’t matter. Unless your argument is morally compelling (which you deny at the outset), then it has no force.
ii) If your “argument” reduces to emotional bullying, then that’s not an “argument.” Rather, that’s high school social dynamics. Who’s hot and who’s not.
“The same goes for rational thinking. There's no absolute, objective reason why every person should be rational. (Indeed, any such rational justification you come up with would be circular.) The point is that we desire to be rational, and are often biologically compelled to be rational.”
i) I don’t think evolutionary biology compels us to be rational.
ii) But let’s play along with your claim for the sake of argument. That only works for animals which are unaware of their biological programming. If, however, an animal becomes conscious of its biological programming, then it’s in a position to realize that its “desire to be rational” it not, itself, a rational desire.
iii) You’re downshifting to psychological coercion, like the desire of an adolescent schoolgirl to fit in. To do whatever it takes to be accepted. Wearing the “right” clothes. The “right” hairdo. The “right” makeup. Listening to the “right” music.
iv) I might like to murder the guy who stole my girlfriend if I thought I could get away with it. In your worldview, my murderous desire is amoral.
“So, you sit across the table from me, holding a spoonful of dung, asking me to give you an absolute reason why you ought not eat the dung. Sorry, but I'm not worried that either of us is going to start eating dung, especially not on a regular basis.”
If you want to bring “rationality” down to the level of certain tastes and odors we find naturally repellent, that doesn’t exactly commend your worldview.
“Let's suppose (contra reality) that you really didn't care about being rational. How would the existence of some absolute moral imperative cause you to be rational? Surely, such an imperative only has a hold on you if you care. If you lack a subjective appreciation for rationality, a rational argument won't change that.”
There’s a fundamental asymmetry between atheism and Christian theism at this point. In Christianity, there’s a match between our subjective appreciation for rationality and objective epistemic duties. But by your own admission, you don’t have that in atheism.
“None of what I have said is self-defeating. My arguments appeal to people who subjectively value rationality. People who don't subjectively value rationality won't give a damn about my arguments, and I can live with that.”
Of course it’s self-refuting. You appeal to “rationality.” But your real position boils down to one’s personal preference, which is hardly interchangeable with rationality.
“The reason you think my comments are self-defeating is that your model of morality is wrong. You mistakenly think that people are moral because the perform some sort of deductive inference from self-evident moral absolutes. The reality is that morality is caring, not deduction. A man's supposed moral absolutes are inferred from his cares. It's not the other way around.”
I said nothing about moral motivations. I’ve been discussing the metaphysical foundations of morality.
“If I could somehow prove to you on paper that objectively good people absolutely ought to rape, kill and steal, would you still want to be an ‘objectively good’ person? I put it to you that you would prefer to be a subjectively good person, and an objectively evil person. You would rather be ‘objectively evil’ because you care about not murdering, not raping, etc.”
i) We can always dream up hypothetical scenarios which generate tensions between what is subjectively the case and what is objectively the case. But why not deal with the real world situation of atheism and Christian theism? Does Christian theism trigger this cognitive dissonance? No.
ii) And, once again, that goes to the asymmetry between the respective positions.
“Of course, this is all hypothetical because there are no decent arguments about objective goods, let alone proofs. But it does make the important point. People aren't good because they perceive and obey some abstract objective moral framework of absolutes. They act on their cares.”
i) This isn’t a question of what makes people good, since–on your view–nobody is good. There is no good to emulate.
ii) And, once again, I’m not discussing incentives or disincentives. Rather, I’m discussing what grounds moral ascriptions. You admit that moral ascriptions are baseless.
“If you don't care about being rational, and don't care about being childish, then my argument isn't going to work on you.”
To call one’s opponent “childish” is an attempt to shame him into changing his belief or behavior. But your moral nihilism takes the sting out of that accusation.
“Like I said, I can live with that.”
Yes, well…if the ship were going down, I won’t be stepping into the same lifeboat you do. Hard to sleep in a lifeboat with a moral nihilist by my side. I might be missing some body parts when I awake.
On Assessing Loftus's Assessment of Triablogue's Review of "The Christian Delusion"
John Loftus's hasty assessment of our review of his book, The Christian Delusion TCD, is ironic for its instancing the psychological and emotional character traits supposedly owned by Christians per chapter 1 - 3 of TCD. If having those traits means your beliefs are deluded, then his co-authors ought to next write, The Loftus Delusion. I'll interact with a few of Loftus's comments in his "assessment" of our review.
"After all, if their God has foreordained me to hell then they have the right to heap additional abuse on me, and they have done so"
I As Jason Engwer noted about terms Loftus and Carrier have used of Christians:
In TCD, Christians have abuse heaped on them in just about every chapter. They are called: irrational, deluded, dishonest, blind, and fools. In one place, Loftus calls the God of the Bible, "stupid." None of the rhetoric in our response to TCD reached that level of vindictiveness. At times, sure, I laughed a little. I mean, we're talking about a book in which a "serious" criticism of Christianity is that God should have made us birds or plants.
"I contacted the contributors of TCD to see if any of them would like to respond to this hatchet job of an online book."
Right, because we are assumed to be wrong from the start. The book says Christians are the ones who act like this. The book said that Christians think that no argument against their faith is good because if it contradicts God's authoritative say-so, then it must be wrong. Here we see Loftus exhibit the same traits chapters 1-3 said were indicative of Christians and the cause for being called deluded.
"Most of us have better things to do than respond to such drivel. If their arguments are considered good ones then it goes to show you that when it comes to faith any argument will do."
"Such drivel?" I thought Calvinists like us were the disrespectful ones.
This is just a way to get off a shot. If Loftus et al. really didn't think our review worth responding to, then they wouldn't.
"What strikes me as a common criticism of TCD is that there are fifteen chapters in "the space of 419 pages," and as such, it isn't as in-depth as whole books written on each of the topics we cover. Well I'm here to tell you that this is simply not an informed way to judge anthologies especially since each chapter in TCD has plenty of footnotes for further reading (did they not notice them?).... Each chapter serves as an introduction to each topic. Get it? ... To criticize any chapter because of the limited space available to the author without exploring the works in the footnotes is, well, not reading it thoroughly or engaging it very deeply."
This scaled-back claim is odd. Reading Carrier, you wouldn't think TCD was just an "introduction." According to Michael Martin, it couldn't be "just an introduction." Loftus is disagreeing with the over-the-top claims made by some atheists about TCD.
Furthermore, we did notice the utter reliance on footnotes in lieu of arguments. Much of the book was made up of naked assertion after naked assertion followed up by "the footnote refutation," i.e., "go see my footnote."
"Over and over we read where atheists have no right to make moral judgments if there are no absolute objective morals. This is simply false. They are ignorant to say otherwise. But this is true of most Christians."
That claim was argued for in the book.
"They cannot assert, for instance, that an atheist cannot make this or that kind of argument because he has no standard for morality, since ... Arminians like Christian philosopher Victor Reppert (which they have repeatedly attacked) [make the same arguments]"
Really? Victor Reppert denies objective morality?
Anyway, here's the relevant argument that Victor Reppert can make and Loftus et al. cannot make:
1. [There are objective moral facts] "Calvinism is objectively morally wrong."
2. [There are no objective moral facts] "Calvinism is objectively morally wrong."
Doesn't John see the difference between (1) and (2)?
Now, that's not to say that some who holds the bracketed belief in (2) cannot offer a moral argument. They could offer an internal critique. But TCD doesn't do that.
"On page 9 Paul Manata faults the book because our claim is that there is no such thing as Christianity (singular), only Christianities (plural), and yet we also claim Christianity (singular) is a delusion. But the fact is that precisely because Christianity is a cultural phenomenon we think all Christianities are a delusion."
If Loftus had read the review before reacting he'd note that I consider this interpretation (i.e., that there are numerous Christianities and no Christianity just is a Christian delusion) and respond to it. Nevertheless, the fact still remains. If Loftus is right, then all the claims that X refutes Christianity are false. If they are not false, then Loftus et al. are admitting that there are common features to Christianity that make for a singular religion.
"On that same page Manata claims “the last two chapters have no bearing on whether Christianity is a delusion.” Really? Surely whether Christianity is beneficial to society bears some relationship to whether it’s true."
Really? How would that argument go. X isn't beneficial to Y, therefore, X isn't true? That is obviously false.
Also, "beneficial" is quite obviously hopelessly vague, so I doubt John will be able to make a good argument here.
"I mean, you really wouldn’t want to hold to something as true from a perfectly good God if it wasn’t beneficial to society, or would you?"
Besides the vagueness of "beneficial", Christians are truth seekers. We hold to things because they are true. If holding true beliefs is "beneficial to society", then Christianity would be "beneficial to society." But that view of "beneficial to society" wasn't considered in TCD.
Furthermore, here's another way Christianity is "beneficial to society." It provides (through the person of Jesus, of course) the only hope man has. The only way to be right before God. The only way to escape the destruction of Babylon (i.e., society). Is that beneficial?
Christianity is a unique religion concerned with saving men's souls, from which various effects follow--like neighbor loving, etc. It's not about making "Christian" music, movies, or video games. It isn't a political party. It is concerned with far more profound things than that.
So Christianity is beneficial to society, but it defines what it means to be beneficial. It is more profound than getting strip clubs off the street, or making "Christian" pop-music knock-offs. John Loftus doesn't understand the faith he critiques. John Loftus attacks a Christianity of his understanding. He thinks the mundane and common is the unique, relevant and interesting.
I hold to Christianity because it is true and there is no hope without it, without the life and death of Jesus Christ. I don't hold to it if it is "beneficial to society." Maybe that's what you think of atheism? It is, isn't it? Why would you "hold to atheism" if it wasn't "beneficial to society?" John wants atheist politics, atheist music, atheist movies, atheist clothing lines, atheist bumper stickers, and the all the rest. Christianity wants to save the souls of politicians, musicians, movie producers, and t-shirt and bumper sticker makers. From there they can go on to engage in politics, make music, movies, t-shirts, and bumper stickers.
"After all, if their God has foreordained me to hell then they have the right to heap additional abuse on me, and they have done so"
I As Jason Engwer noted about terms Loftus and Carrier have used of Christians:
He [Carrier] referred to Christians as "delusional", referred to "mowing them down", and told us that he's going to "be mean", among other things. In the same thread, John Loftus referred to another commenter as "deluded" and "brainwashed". That's one thread. They've made similar comments in other places.
In TCD, Christians have abuse heaped on them in just about every chapter. They are called: irrational, deluded, dishonest, blind, and fools. In one place, Loftus calls the God of the Bible, "stupid." None of the rhetoric in our response to TCD reached that level of vindictiveness. At times, sure, I laughed a little. I mean, we're talking about a book in which a "serious" criticism of Christianity is that God should have made us birds or plants.
"I contacted the contributors of TCD to see if any of them would like to respond to this hatchet job of an online book."
Right, because we are assumed to be wrong from the start. The book says Christians are the ones who act like this. The book said that Christians think that no argument against their faith is good because if it contradicts God's authoritative say-so, then it must be wrong. Here we see Loftus exhibit the same traits chapters 1-3 said were indicative of Christians and the cause for being called deluded.
"Most of us have better things to do than respond to such drivel. If their arguments are considered good ones then it goes to show you that when it comes to faith any argument will do."
"Such drivel?" I thought Calvinists like us were the disrespectful ones.
This is just a way to get off a shot. If Loftus et al. really didn't think our review worth responding to, then they wouldn't.
"What strikes me as a common criticism of TCD is that there are fifteen chapters in "the space of 419 pages," and as such, it isn't as in-depth as whole books written on each of the topics we cover. Well I'm here to tell you that this is simply not an informed way to judge anthologies especially since each chapter in TCD has plenty of footnotes for further reading (did they not notice them?).... Each chapter serves as an introduction to each topic. Get it? ... To criticize any chapter because of the limited space available to the author without exploring the works in the footnotes is, well, not reading it thoroughly or engaging it very deeply."
This scaled-back claim is odd. Reading Carrier, you wouldn't think TCD was just an "introduction." According to Michael Martin, it couldn't be "just an introduction." Loftus is disagreeing with the over-the-top claims made by some atheists about TCD.
Furthermore, we did notice the utter reliance on footnotes in lieu of arguments. Much of the book was made up of naked assertion after naked assertion followed up by "the footnote refutation," i.e., "go see my footnote."
"Over and over we read where atheists have no right to make moral judgments if there are no absolute objective morals. This is simply false. They are ignorant to say otherwise. But this is true of most Christians."
That claim was argued for in the book.
"They cannot assert, for instance, that an atheist cannot make this or that kind of argument because he has no standard for morality, since ... Arminians like Christian philosopher Victor Reppert (which they have repeatedly attacked) [make the same arguments]"
Really? Victor Reppert denies objective morality?
Anyway, here's the relevant argument that Victor Reppert can make and Loftus et al. cannot make:
1. [There are objective moral facts] "Calvinism is objectively morally wrong."
2. [There are no objective moral facts] "Calvinism is objectively morally wrong."
Doesn't John see the difference between (1) and (2)?
Now, that's not to say that some who holds the bracketed belief in (2) cannot offer a moral argument. They could offer an internal critique. But TCD doesn't do that.
"On page 9 Paul Manata faults the book because our claim is that there is no such thing as Christianity (singular), only Christianities (plural), and yet we also claim Christianity (singular) is a delusion. But the fact is that precisely because Christianity is a cultural phenomenon we think all Christianities are a delusion."
If Loftus had read the review before reacting he'd note that I consider this interpretation (i.e., that there are numerous Christianities and no Christianity just is a Christian delusion) and respond to it. Nevertheless, the fact still remains. If Loftus is right, then all the claims that X refutes Christianity are false. If they are not false, then Loftus et al. are admitting that there are common features to Christianity that make for a singular religion.
"On that same page Manata claims “the last two chapters have no bearing on whether Christianity is a delusion.” Really? Surely whether Christianity is beneficial to society bears some relationship to whether it’s true."
Really? How would that argument go. X isn't beneficial to Y, therefore, X isn't true? That is obviously false.
Also, "beneficial" is quite obviously hopelessly vague, so I doubt John will be able to make a good argument here.
"I mean, you really wouldn’t want to hold to something as true from a perfectly good God if it wasn’t beneficial to society, or would you?"
Besides the vagueness of "beneficial", Christians are truth seekers. We hold to things because they are true. If holding true beliefs is "beneficial to society", then Christianity would be "beneficial to society." But that view of "beneficial to society" wasn't considered in TCD.
Furthermore, here's another way Christianity is "beneficial to society." It provides (through the person of Jesus, of course) the only hope man has. The only way to be right before God. The only way to escape the destruction of Babylon (i.e., society). Is that beneficial?
Christianity is a unique religion concerned with saving men's souls, from which various effects follow--like neighbor loving, etc. It's not about making "Christian" music, movies, or video games. It isn't a political party. It is concerned with far more profound things than that.
So Christianity is beneficial to society, but it defines what it means to be beneficial. It is more profound than getting strip clubs off the street, or making "Christian" pop-music knock-offs. John Loftus doesn't understand the faith he critiques. John Loftus attacks a Christianity of his understanding. He thinks the mundane and common is the unique, relevant and interesting.
I hold to Christianity because it is true and there is no hope without it, without the life and death of Jesus Christ. I don't hold to it if it is "beneficial to society." Maybe that's what you think of atheism? It is, isn't it? Why would you "hold to atheism" if it wasn't "beneficial to society?" John wants atheist politics, atheist music, atheist movies, atheist clothing lines, atheist bumper stickers, and the all the rest. Christianity wants to save the souls of politicians, musicians, movie producers, and t-shirt and bumper sticker makers. From there they can go on to engage in politics, make music, movies, t-shirts, and bumper stickers.
Labels:
John Loftus,
The Infidel Delusion,
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Exploding The Naturalistic Box
"He [David Hume] is merely appealing to what everyone knows: the frequent reports of the extraordinary we hear from UFO abductees, Loch Ness Monster fans, people who see ghosts or claim psychic powers, always seem to turn out to be bunk upon examination. Ask Joe Nickell. Ask James Randi. Ask the evangelical stage magician Andre Kole, who exposed Filipino 'psychic surgeons.'" (Robert Price, in John Loftus, ed., The Christian Delusion [Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2010], p. 277)
"Nevertheless, with his usual bluster, [James] Randi accepted a $10,000 challenge (a considerable sum in those days) to duplicate the Serios phenomena and make good on his claim. Of course, confidence is easy to feign, and Randi does it routinely in his role as magician. He also cleverly takes advantage of the occasional high-profile case he successfully exposes as fraudulent, by publicizing those successes and creating the impression that he's a generally reliable guide when it comes to the paranormal. So Randi's dismissal of the Serios case was all it took for those already disposed to believe that Serios was a fake, and it was probably enough even for those sympathetic to parapsychology but unaware of Randi's dishonesty....What the TV audience never learned was that when the show was over and Randi was pressed to make good on his wager, he simply weaseled out of it. To keep that side of the story under wraps, Randi prohibited publication of his correspondence on the matter. That was undoubtedly a shrewd move, because the letters show clearly how Randi backed down from his empty challenge. However, Randi's original letters now reside in the library at the University of Maryland Baltimore County, and researchers, finally, can easily confirm this for themselves. When Serios's principal investigator, Jule Eisenbud, died, I was assigned the task of going through his papers. I collected all the material relevant to the Serios case and deposited it in the Special Collections section of the UMBC library. (This includes correspondence, the original photos and film, and signed affidavits from witnesses.)...But there's no documentary evidence of Randi having even attempted to duplicate the Serios phenomena under anything like the conditions in which Serios succeeded, much less evidence of his having actually pulled it off....In fact, the history of parapsychology chronicles some remarkable examples of dishonest testimony and other reprehensible behavior on the part of skeptics....Skepticism is just as glib and dishonest now as it was in 1882 when the British SPR was founded. In fact, despite sensible and careful dismantling of the traditional skeptical objections, the same tired arguments surface again and again. And those arguments all too easily mislead those who haven't yet heard the other side of the story or examined the evidence for themselves." (Stephen Braude, The Gold Leaf Lady [Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2007], pp. 22, 34, 126)
See Steve Hays' discussion here. And see the sources discussed by Michael Sudduth in the thread here, including the comments section. See, also, Sudduth's material here.
"Nevertheless, with his usual bluster, [James] Randi accepted a $10,000 challenge (a considerable sum in those days) to duplicate the Serios phenomena and make good on his claim. Of course, confidence is easy to feign, and Randi does it routinely in his role as magician. He also cleverly takes advantage of the occasional high-profile case he successfully exposes as fraudulent, by publicizing those successes and creating the impression that he's a generally reliable guide when it comes to the paranormal. So Randi's dismissal of the Serios case was all it took for those already disposed to believe that Serios was a fake, and it was probably enough even for those sympathetic to parapsychology but unaware of Randi's dishonesty....What the TV audience never learned was that when the show was over and Randi was pressed to make good on his wager, he simply weaseled out of it. To keep that side of the story under wraps, Randi prohibited publication of his correspondence on the matter. That was undoubtedly a shrewd move, because the letters show clearly how Randi backed down from his empty challenge. However, Randi's original letters now reside in the library at the University of Maryland Baltimore County, and researchers, finally, can easily confirm this for themselves. When Serios's principal investigator, Jule Eisenbud, died, I was assigned the task of going through his papers. I collected all the material relevant to the Serios case and deposited it in the Special Collections section of the UMBC library. (This includes correspondence, the original photos and film, and signed affidavits from witnesses.)...But there's no documentary evidence of Randi having even attempted to duplicate the Serios phenomena under anything like the conditions in which Serios succeeded, much less evidence of his having actually pulled it off....In fact, the history of parapsychology chronicles some remarkable examples of dishonest testimony and other reprehensible behavior on the part of skeptics....Skepticism is just as glib and dishonest now as it was in 1882 when the British SPR was founded. In fact, despite sensible and careful dismantling of the traditional skeptical objections, the same tired arguments surface again and again. And those arguments all too easily mislead those who haven't yet heard the other side of the story or examined the evidence for themselves." (Stephen Braude, The Gold Leaf Lady [Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2007], pp. 22, 34, 126)
See Steve Hays' discussion here. And see the sources discussed by Michael Sudduth in the thread here, including the comments section. See, also, Sudduth's material here.
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
Monkeys with PhDs
John Loftus fired off a hasty reaction-piece to our review of TCD. I’ll comment on some of the highlights–or should I say, lowlights?
“I've had enough contact with Triablogue authors to know that I will never get in the last word. And I do not consider them honest in dealing with me. They will quote things out of context and misrepresent me because as Calvinists they do not think I deserve any respect at all. After all, if their God has foreordained me to hell then they have the right to heap additional abuse on me, and they have done so (this is such a nice version of Christianity developed by angry men for angry men, isn't it?).”
That’s a nice window into his persecution complex. Did he dash that off that from his headquarters in his abandoned missile silo somewhere in Kansas?
“I contacted the contributors of TCD to see if any of them would like to respond to this hatchet job of an online book.”
Well, ever since the Gorical convinced me of the imminent perils of global warming, I try to economize whenever possible. Why use an ax on something as flimsy as the TCD when a hatchet will do?
“Most of us have better things to do than respond to such drivel. If their arguments are considered good ones then it goes to show you that when it comes to faith any argument will do.”
He talks about arguments, but he doesn’t give an argument.
“I find it amazing that some people think this is a good rebuttal to our book. It isn't, not by a long shot. No wonder Christians have the edge. They respond to every skeptical book with three or four or ten book-length responses. Since they always have the last word and because people cannot think through the issues, the last word is what seems the most reasonable.”
He seems to think the Christian faith is a free fire zone where which he should be at liberty to turn his guns on the Christian faith, but we have no right to return fire.
“What strikes me as a common criticism of TCD is that there are fifteen chapters in the space of 419 pages, and as such, it isn't as in-depth as whole books written on each of the topics we cover. Well I'm here to tell you that this is simply not an informed way to judge anthologies especially since each chapter in TCD has plenty of footnotes for further reading (did they not notice them?). For people who wish to truly evaluate the case we make in each chapter they must read the works listed in the footnotes. It's that simple.”
Well, if it’s that simple, then it’s that simple in reverse. Our review of TCD also contains plenty of footnotes, so unbelievers who wish to truly evaluate our review of the TCD must read the books listed in the footnotes. It’s that simple.
“We DO know what we're talking about.”
If you put it in CAPS, that must make it true.
“To criticize any chapter because of the limited space available to the author without exploring the works in the footnotes is, well, not reading it thoroughly or engaging it very deeply.”
Well, when you deal with something as shallow as TCD, scratching the surface creates the Grand Canyon.
“Over and over we read where atheists have no right to make moral judgments if there are no absolute objective morals. This is simply false. They are ignorant to say otherwise. But this is true of most Christians.”
We quoted his own contributors to the TCD! You know, like Eller and Avalos. They explicitly reject moral absolutes.
What is more, his precious Outsider Test is simply a variant on cultural relativism. And moral relativism is a variant of cultural relativism. If you subscribe to cultural relativism, then that relativizes social mores as well.
“Then too, the authors are Calvinists which I think is a reprehensible theology, as I posted here.”
i) Actually, Jason Engwer is not a Calvinist.
ii) In addition, Loftus is rehashing the same objection he already raised in TCD. And I rebutted that objection in my review.
“Over and over the authors contrast their brand of Christianity with atheism which is left undefined but understood by them to be equivalent to metaphysical naturalism. I don't think they truly know what atheism is, as I explained right here, and again here.”
I see. Well, according to atheist Evan Fales, writing for The Cambridge Companion to Atheism:
Naturalism and physicalism are metaphysical positions commonly associated with atheism…Naturalism and physicalism are, therefore, natural allies of atheism, and offer a philosophical framework within which atheism finds a natural home (118).
“Besides, the options before us are not between their brand of conservative Calvinism and non-belief. The options are myriad with everything in-between. There is Arminianism, moderate and liberal Christianities, as well as Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Seventh-Day Adventists, Orthodox Judaism, Islam, and many eastern religions to choose from. So it really does not make a whit of difference who is making a particular argument against their brand of Christianity.”
Really? Then why is The Christian Delusion called the Christian Delusion–rather than the Mormon Delusion, The Buddhist Delusion, the Hindu Delusion, The Hasidic Delusion, The Ellen G. White Delusion, or The Saracen Delusion?
Furthermore, TCD targets conservative evangelicalism. It doesn’t focus its fire on Don Cupitt or John Spong.
“The argument either stands on its own or not. They cannot assert, for instance, that an atheist cannot make this or that kind of argument because he has no standard for morality, since Process Theologians can make that same argument as can Arminians like Christian philosopher Victor Reppert (which they have repeatedly attacked) or liberals like James McGrath.”
If Victor Reppert or Alfred North Whitehead were moral relativists, then they’d be in the same bind. And it won’t do to bring up McGrath since I’ve already argued him down.
“Then too, the Triabloguers forget that the reason why there are moderates and liberals and process theologians is precisely because many of them grew up as conservative Christians and found the arguments we have expressed in TCD to be telling against their faith. It's precisely because of these arguments that led us away from conservative Christianity in the first place.”
It’s true that apostates have a stereotypical deconversion process. But the fact that apostates are typecast to read from the same script bodes ill for their claims to be free-thinkers.
“Steve Hays asks me on page 4 to justify my assumptions. Well, if he read Why I Became an Atheist then he would see that I did just that.”
That’s symptomatic of Loftus’ egocentrism. What I actually said is:
“If, however, The Christian Delusion is directed at believers as well as unbelievers, then the contributors can‘t simply take their own methods and assumptions for granted. They can‘t treat their own social mores as the default position. They can‘t treat secular moral realism as the default position. They can‘t treat methodological naturalism as the default position. And so on. If the contributors are attempting to persuade Christians to abandon their faith, then the contributors must justify their operating assumptions. Otherwise, the whole exercise is question-begging and unconvincing from the get-go.”
Notice that my comment wasn’t limited to Loftus. Moreover, why would Loftus call in the cavalry if he thinks that he can do it all by his little lonesome?
“In areas where it’s obvious we should expect a perfectly good God to communicate his will better, he didn’t do so, which caused a great deal of harm done in his name by the church (think Inquisition, crusades, witch hunts, Christian attempts at genocide during the Thirty Years War directed at other Christian groups, Slavery, the treatment of women, and denial of the democratic ideals of the freedom of religion and of expression).”
Of course, this is simply incoherent. Loftus doesn’t think the Bible is unclear on these issues. To the contrary, he thinks the Bible is clearly wrong.
It’s a work of supererogation to refute Loftus. You only have to quote him to refute him. He does the rest.
“But in other areas through good sound Biblical scholarship we can discern what the Biblical authors probably meant to say. Take for instance their claim that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. We know this is simply ignorant.”
Of course, that’s circular. He defines “good sound Bible scholarship” as scholarship that just so happens to agree with him.
“Furthermore, the two last chapters in TCD are examples of the delusional thinking Christians have used to defend their faith, so they are indeed relevant to the book as a whole. Christians have repeatedly come along after social/political/scientific changes and claimed it was Christianity that produced these changes. The arguments of the last two chapters show this is not the case, nor is it the case when it comes to the rise of democracy, feminism, environmentalism, and animal rights.”
The chapter by Hector Avalos is basically a critique of an argument by Dinesh D'Souza while the chapter by Carrier is basically a critique of an argument by Rodney Stark. But even if Stark and D’Souza overstated their case, that doesn’t begin to disprove Christianity.
“Ken Pulliam said...These guys at Tribalogue are not worthy of a response. First, they are not scholars as were the authors of TCD. Second, because they are not scholars they don't understand the issues involved. They just merely presuppose that their holy book is perfect and that anyone who disagrees is of the devil.”
i) If the contributors to TCD are real scholars, while we are not, then it should be all the easier to knock us down.
ii) Are the contributors to TCD “scholars”? For instance, is Babinski a scholar? He contributed an essay on ANE cosmology. Is he a Hebraist? Does he read cuneiform? Does he publish learned articles in BASOR?
iii) From the Darwinian standpoint, what does it mean to be a scholar? To be a monkey with a PhD?
iv) Is TCD written by and for scholars? It wasn’t published by an academic publishing house like Oxford, Harvard, or Cambridge.
v) If scholars don’t understand the issues, then what does that say about the natural constituency for TCD? The average atheist who reads TCD can’t grasp the issues. The poor dear.
“I've had enough contact with Triablogue authors to know that I will never get in the last word. And I do not consider them honest in dealing with me. They will quote things out of context and misrepresent me because as Calvinists they do not think I deserve any respect at all. After all, if their God has foreordained me to hell then they have the right to heap additional abuse on me, and they have done so (this is such a nice version of Christianity developed by angry men for angry men, isn't it?).”
That’s a nice window into his persecution complex. Did he dash that off that from his headquarters in his abandoned missile silo somewhere in Kansas?
“I contacted the contributors of TCD to see if any of them would like to respond to this hatchet job of an online book.”
Well, ever since the Gorical convinced me of the imminent perils of global warming, I try to economize whenever possible. Why use an ax on something as flimsy as the TCD when a hatchet will do?
“Most of us have better things to do than respond to such drivel. If their arguments are considered good ones then it goes to show you that when it comes to faith any argument will do.”
He talks about arguments, but he doesn’t give an argument.
“I find it amazing that some people think this is a good rebuttal to our book. It isn't, not by a long shot. No wonder Christians have the edge. They respond to every skeptical book with three or four or ten book-length responses. Since they always have the last word and because people cannot think through the issues, the last word is what seems the most reasonable.”
He seems to think the Christian faith is a free fire zone where which he should be at liberty to turn his guns on the Christian faith, but we have no right to return fire.
“What strikes me as a common criticism of TCD is that there are fifteen chapters in the space of 419 pages, and as such, it isn't as in-depth as whole books written on each of the topics we cover. Well I'm here to tell you that this is simply not an informed way to judge anthologies especially since each chapter in TCD has plenty of footnotes for further reading (did they not notice them?). For people who wish to truly evaluate the case we make in each chapter they must read the works listed in the footnotes. It's that simple.”
Well, if it’s that simple, then it’s that simple in reverse. Our review of TCD also contains plenty of footnotes, so unbelievers who wish to truly evaluate our review of the TCD must read the books listed in the footnotes. It’s that simple.
“We DO know what we're talking about.”
If you put it in CAPS, that must make it true.
“To criticize any chapter because of the limited space available to the author without exploring the works in the footnotes is, well, not reading it thoroughly or engaging it very deeply.”
Well, when you deal with something as shallow as TCD, scratching the surface creates the Grand Canyon.
“Over and over we read where atheists have no right to make moral judgments if there are no absolute objective morals. This is simply false. They are ignorant to say otherwise. But this is true of most Christians.”
We quoted his own contributors to the TCD! You know, like Eller and Avalos. They explicitly reject moral absolutes.
What is more, his precious Outsider Test is simply a variant on cultural relativism. And moral relativism is a variant of cultural relativism. If you subscribe to cultural relativism, then that relativizes social mores as well.
“Then too, the authors are Calvinists which I think is a reprehensible theology, as I posted here.”
i) Actually, Jason Engwer is not a Calvinist.
ii) In addition, Loftus is rehashing the same objection he already raised in TCD. And I rebutted that objection in my review.
“Over and over the authors contrast their brand of Christianity with atheism which is left undefined but understood by them to be equivalent to metaphysical naturalism. I don't think they truly know what atheism is, as I explained right here, and again here.”
I see. Well, according to atheist Evan Fales, writing for The Cambridge Companion to Atheism:
Naturalism and physicalism are metaphysical positions commonly associated with atheism…Naturalism and physicalism are, therefore, natural allies of atheism, and offer a philosophical framework within which atheism finds a natural home (118).
“Besides, the options before us are not between their brand of conservative Calvinism and non-belief. The options are myriad with everything in-between. There is Arminianism, moderate and liberal Christianities, as well as Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Seventh-Day Adventists, Orthodox Judaism, Islam, and many eastern religions to choose from. So it really does not make a whit of difference who is making a particular argument against their brand of Christianity.”
Really? Then why is The Christian Delusion called the Christian Delusion–rather than the Mormon Delusion, The Buddhist Delusion, the Hindu Delusion, The Hasidic Delusion, The Ellen G. White Delusion, or The Saracen Delusion?
Furthermore, TCD targets conservative evangelicalism. It doesn’t focus its fire on Don Cupitt or John Spong.
“The argument either stands on its own or not. They cannot assert, for instance, that an atheist cannot make this or that kind of argument because he has no standard for morality, since Process Theologians can make that same argument as can Arminians like Christian philosopher Victor Reppert (which they have repeatedly attacked) or liberals like James McGrath.”
If Victor Reppert or Alfred North Whitehead were moral relativists, then they’d be in the same bind. And it won’t do to bring up McGrath since I’ve already argued him down.
“Then too, the Triabloguers forget that the reason why there are moderates and liberals and process theologians is precisely because many of them grew up as conservative Christians and found the arguments we have expressed in TCD to be telling against their faith. It's precisely because of these arguments that led us away from conservative Christianity in the first place.”
It’s true that apostates have a stereotypical deconversion process. But the fact that apostates are typecast to read from the same script bodes ill for their claims to be free-thinkers.
“Steve Hays asks me on page 4 to justify my assumptions. Well, if he read Why I Became an Atheist then he would see that I did just that.”
That’s symptomatic of Loftus’ egocentrism. What I actually said is:
“If, however, The Christian Delusion is directed at believers as well as unbelievers, then the contributors can‘t simply take their own methods and assumptions for granted. They can‘t treat their own social mores as the default position. They can‘t treat secular moral realism as the default position. They can‘t treat methodological naturalism as the default position. And so on. If the contributors are attempting to persuade Christians to abandon their faith, then the contributors must justify their operating assumptions. Otherwise, the whole exercise is question-begging and unconvincing from the get-go.”
Notice that my comment wasn’t limited to Loftus. Moreover, why would Loftus call in the cavalry if he thinks that he can do it all by his little lonesome?
“In areas where it’s obvious we should expect a perfectly good God to communicate his will better, he didn’t do so, which caused a great deal of harm done in his name by the church (think Inquisition, crusades, witch hunts, Christian attempts at genocide during the Thirty Years War directed at other Christian groups, Slavery, the treatment of women, and denial of the democratic ideals of the freedom of religion and of expression).”
Of course, this is simply incoherent. Loftus doesn’t think the Bible is unclear on these issues. To the contrary, he thinks the Bible is clearly wrong.
It’s a work of supererogation to refute Loftus. You only have to quote him to refute him. He does the rest.
“But in other areas through good sound Biblical scholarship we can discern what the Biblical authors probably meant to say. Take for instance their claim that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. We know this is simply ignorant.”
Of course, that’s circular. He defines “good sound Bible scholarship” as scholarship that just so happens to agree with him.
“Furthermore, the two last chapters in TCD are examples of the delusional thinking Christians have used to defend their faith, so they are indeed relevant to the book as a whole. Christians have repeatedly come along after social/political/scientific changes and claimed it was Christianity that produced these changes. The arguments of the last two chapters show this is not the case, nor is it the case when it comes to the rise of democracy, feminism, environmentalism, and animal rights.”
The chapter by Hector Avalos is basically a critique of an argument by Dinesh D'Souza while the chapter by Carrier is basically a critique of an argument by Rodney Stark. But even if Stark and D’Souza overstated their case, that doesn’t begin to disprove Christianity.
“Ken Pulliam said...These guys at Tribalogue are not worthy of a response. First, they are not scholars as were the authors of TCD. Second, because they are not scholars they don't understand the issues involved. They just merely presuppose that their holy book is perfect and that anyone who disagrees is of the devil.”
i) If the contributors to TCD are real scholars, while we are not, then it should be all the easier to knock us down.
ii) Are the contributors to TCD “scholars”? For instance, is Babinski a scholar? He contributed an essay on ANE cosmology. Is he a Hebraist? Does he read cuneiform? Does he publish learned articles in BASOR?
iii) From the Darwinian standpoint, what does it mean to be a scholar? To be a monkey with a PhD?
iv) Is TCD written by and for scholars? It wasn’t published by an academic publishing house like Oxford, Harvard, or Cambridge.
v) If scholars don’t understand the issues, then what does that say about the natural constituency for TCD? The average atheist who reads TCD can’t grasp the issues. The poor dear.
Credibility
Over on Loftus's blog, Ken Pulliam is telling John to ignore The Infidel Delusion. Here’s what Ken said:
Since I’ve actually read what was written, I find this laughable. But for the record, Ken, you can feel free to do this (and this won’t even require you to actually read the ebook). Download The Infidel Delusion and open it in Adobe. Use the search feature and look for “devil.” You will get zero results.
So look for the word “Satan” instead. Here’s what you find.
What of the word “presuppose” then? Well, we get this:
I dare say, Ken, that you start worrying about your own credibility before worrying about ours.
John,
These guys at Tribalogue are not worthy of a response. First, they are not scholars as were the authors of TCD. Second, because they are not scholars they don't understand the issues involved. They just merely presuppose that their holy book is perfect and that anyone who disagrees is of the devil. Third, any response only gives them credibility.
Since I’ve actually read what was written, I find this laughable. But for the record, Ken, you can feel free to do this (and this won’t even require you to actually read the ebook). Download The Infidel Delusion and open it in Adobe. Use the search feature and look for “devil.” You will get zero results.
So look for the word “Satan” instead. Here’s what you find.
Page 65: The parallel passage in Luke 4:5 refers to how Satan showed Jesus the kingdoms “in a moment of time”. Jesus is shown the kingdoms. He doesn‘t move around to look at them. And it happens in an instant. Apparently, Satan is supernaturally bringing images before Jesus.And that’s it.
Page 104: A passage written by a Jew, in which another Jew refers to some other Jews of first-century Israel as children of Satan (John 8:44-45), is described by Loftus as supporting “anti-Semitism” (191). Using Loftus’ reasoning, passages like Ephesians 2:3 and Colossians 1:13 must be expressing hatred of every race, since they refer to all humans as condemned and coming from Satan’s kingdom.
Page 134: Angels, both good and evil, are involved as well, and Satan took part in bringing about the fall of mankind.
What of the word “presuppose” then? Well, we get this:
Page 17: It has no bearing on whether reasoning presupposes theism.And that’s it.
Page 200: Science presupposes the reliability of our cognitive faculties, but what does the conjunction of naturalism and evolution—Carrier‘s position—do to this?
Page 204: Next, science presupposes logical and mathematical truths.
Page 204: Speaking of antirealism, Robert Koons has argued that naturalism cannot hold to scientific realism (which the book presupposes) “since scientific realism entails the falsity of naturalism.”
Page 208: The quasi-prophecy [11:36-39] closes with an evaluative summary of Antiochus‘s religious attitudes as king…The ‘him’ [11:40-45] again presupposes that ‘the northern king’ is the same person as that in vv21-39.
I dare say, Ken, that you start worrying about your own credibility before worrying about ours.
Labels:
Ken Pulliam,
Peter Pike,
The Infidel Delusion
The Waterloo of atheism
I'm posting some comments that Timothy McGrew left over at Victor Reppert's blog:
At July 15, 2010 5:52 PM , Tim said...
Mark writes:
*****
No kidding. In practice, no miracle testimony has ever been strong enough to establish its conclusion. This is a far cry from saying Hume thinks it's impossible for testimony to establish the existence of miracles. Look at these sentences from part 2, which come immediately after the section you quoted:
"I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history."
Still not convinced?
*****
Well, no. Just look at the way that Hume goes on:
Thus, suppose, all authors, in all languages, agree, that, from the first of JANUARY 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: Suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people: That all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or contradiction: It is evident, that our present philosophers, instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived.
The closing reference to ‘causes’ can scarcely be taken to mean anything but natural causes, and the ‘philosophers’ are natural philosophers, that is, scientists. This choice of words warns the reader that under the circumstances Hume would consider the period of darkness to be, not in the strict sense a miracle, that is, a violation of the laws of nature, but rather a violation of its usual course. He goes on to note that the ‘decay, corruption, and dissolution of nature’ is rendered so probable by many analogies that it ‘comes within the reach of human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and uniform’. The event, in short, is a marvel rather than a miracle; Hume has taken back with the left hand what he appeared to concede with the right.
At July 16, 2010 6:51 AM , Tim said...
Stephen,
Why be so shy? You're missing out. Imagine the fun you could have if you approached Napoleon the way you approach Jesus. I'll illustrate, using the sort of reasoning that you've displayed over the years, just to get you started.
* You have Napoleon's body? Hah. All you have is some body or other.
* Napoleon really existed? Show us his birth certificate. You can't.
* We have not a single photograph of Napoleon. Not. One. Of course, Napoleon apologists will argue that Napoleon died in 1821, whereas the camera was not invented until 1839. That just shows you the desperate lengths to which they will go to explain away the lack of evidence.
* Supposedly we have Napoleon's autograph. But there are about a dozen wildly different ways that he supposedly signed his name, and even those who believe Napoleon existed will concede that most of the signatures purporting to be his are outright forgeries.
* The accounts of the exploits of Napoleon are wildly inconsistent. Just try to reconcile them. It can't be done.
* Even apart from the contradictions, the feats ascribed to Napoleon are wildly improbable; and it is a well-known fact that the more marvelous anything is the less likely is it to be true.
* It was in the interest of the British government to promote national unity at the time. What better way to do so than to invent a figure to play the "good part" of a common enemy against whom the gullible populace might be rallied?
* Supposed memorabilia of Napoleon fetch high prices at auctions. An encrusted sword with no documentation will fetch $30,000; Henry Wellcome even purchased a gold-plated toothbrush that supposedly belonged to Napoleon. The Napoleon myth is good business.
See how easy this is?
The one about the birth certificate illustrates a particularly useful trick that you will want to study closely and imitate as often as you can. No matter what the actual evidence is, you can always find something that isn't available. Fasten on that as if its absence were of crushing significance. If your interlocutors point out that it wasn't to be expected, at this point in time, that we should have every sort of ancillary evidence we might think up, deride them as ignorant and delusional. If they try to turn the discussion to the actual positive evidence for their primary contention, just shout louder about the absence of the thing you demand. It makes you seem like a serious historian.
At July 17, 2010 5:27 AM , Tim said...
Steven,
It was not skeptical arguments Überhaupt that I was satirizing. It was yours. The transparent unfairness of these arguments against the existence of Napoleon is simply a mirror of the transparent unfairness of the arguments you use on the internet almost daily. You're the only one in this conversation who can't recognize yourself.
Thanks for the additional laughs in your link to the page of "photographic documented evidence." This is your own attempt at satire, right? Taking a few words in a row as proof of borrowing?
Golly, what a wide field for further research that one provides.
I open my copy of The House at Pooh Corner at random -- it happened to fall open at p. 87 -- and the second line reads "... until he came to the place ..." What do you want to bet that we can find a close match for this in the Bible? Hey, how about Luke 23:33: "When they came to the place ..." And in fact, Luke is talking about the crucifixion of Jesus -- whom Christians identify as the Man of Sorrows -- while The House at Pooh Corner is talking about Eeyore ("... when he came to the place where Eeyore was ..."), who is also a man of sorrows! Yes, that clinches it: Milne is definitely borrowing from Luke. Or maybe Luke is borrowing from Milne. Or maybe picking out a few words in a row and claiming that it is "photographic documented evidence" that one document is borrowed from another is bonkers.
At July 18, 2010 9:58 AM , Tim said...
An "argument" for conscious borrowing in the service of mythmaking that can be replicated in 90 seconds with a copy of a Winnie the Pooh book in one hand and a copy of the Bible in the other is, to borrow a phrase from Hume, more properly a subject of derision than of argument. It belongs in the same pile with The Bible Code -- which, come to think of it, it rather resembles.
At July 18, 2010 7:05 PM , Tim said...
J,
This has already been discussed above. Hume does use "miracle" and "extreme improbability" interchangeably sometimes, e.g. here:
"When any one tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other." [Emphasis added]
On the epistemic side, extreme improbability is all we have to work with.
Whately's point is that the alleged events of Napoleon's career are wildly improbable. It is therefore fair game for the application of Hume's maxim.
By the way, there's a cookie for you if you can find a passage from Gibbon expressing doubt regarding the existence of Jesus. And no, the famous passage from Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire ch. 15 doesn't help you; that has to do with Jesus' reported miracles, not with his existence. (It's a lousy argument anyway, but that issue is being discussed in the thread on arguments from silence.)
At July 18, 2010 8:45 PM , Tim said...
J,
All the work is being done by improbability. Hume sets up his argument from universal testimony in order to support his claim that a miracle is wildly improbable. That's why the comparison is fair game. You're free to argue that the aspects of the (reported) career of Napoleon cited by Whately aren't actually all that improbable. But that would require that you actually read Whately -- and judging from your comments so far, this is something that you haven't bothered to do.
At July 19, 2010 10:41 AM , Tim said...
J,
No, you don't quite understand the like basic Fratboy-o-sopher point that it's an irrelevant analogy.
Perhaps that’s because, unlike you, I don’t do fratboy-o-sophy.
Napoleon's existence is not controversial
Neither is the existence of Jesus, except among the lunatic fringe. Good grief, even Bart Ehrman gets this.
Hume’s argument against miracles is that there is universal testimony against them. He isn’t even consistent, since elsewhere in the same piece he admits that miracle reports abound in all of history. But waive that. The argument from universal testimony to the contrary, if it were any good, would apply equally well to spontaneous proton decay. Yet we accept that testimony would be perfectly competent to confirm such an event. Hume’s argument, applied consistently, would truly be a science stopper.
You don't quite understand Humean tactics either. He wanted to undercut the supposed inerrancy of scripture, ie theocracy, like as a basis for law. And that he does, uh did.
Hume’s tactics and his motives would be two separate matters. But never mind that; your description is so far off from what Hume actually says that it is really rather bizarre. Hume’s critique of miracles has nothing to say about theocracy. You are simply jumbling together standard skeptical complaints that have nothing to do with one another in a sort of verbal salad. This may be standard fare in fratboy-o-sophy. But it is not reasoning.
At July 19, 2010 1:28 PM , Tim said...
J,
You are apparently under the misimpression that, just because you are finally starting to understand Hume’s reasoning in Hume’s own terms, you can assert without argument that his reasoning is cogent. Maybe on the atheist blogs – but not here.
However, we aren’t even quite there yet. Let’s take this one step at a time.
Whether the biblical miracles are wildly improbable depends on two factors; the prior probability that something like the Judeo-Christian God exists, and the strength of the total evidence for the biblical miracle claims. Vic has repeatedly pointed out that estimates of the former vary from person to person. Every sensible Christian acknowledges that the evidence for some particular biblical miracle claims is better than for others.
Napoleon's existence isn't improbable, even if some details of his life can't be established. It's really a false analogy. He's merely pointing out that you can't necessarily prove Napoleon existed either.
You seem to be treating ‘Napoleon’ as a rigid designator. As a good neo-Russellian, I’m not obligated to let you get away with it. ‘Napoleon’ denotes someone who did at least approximately the things attributed to him in the historical accounts we have. These are quite astonishing and improbable, some of them quite unprecedented. That is all that is required for Whately’s satire to hit home. I suggest that you take the time actually to read Whately’s satire before you say again that it is a false analogy.
Spinoza also said much the same as Hume (as did other writers) in the 17th century, and suggested all biblical miracles could be accounted for by natural science.
This claim is half right, half wrong. The half that is right is that Spinoza did suggest that the root of belief in the biblical miracles was ignorance of natural causes. But the other half is wrong. Spinoza’s argument against miracles is completely different from Hume’s argument, and Hume does not suggest that the biblical miracles were just misunderstood natural phenomena.
If you think the apparitions of Mary are even remotely akin to the resurrection, then you have not read the gospels through even once with attention. The use of the misspelling “Hebbin’” as a derogatory term may make you feel that you are better educated than those with whom you disagree, but that feeling, I regret to inform you, is an illusion, and the affectation is childish.
If it were any part of the Christian faith that the resurrection of Jesus would end all war and suffering, then the occurrence of these things might have a point. But it isn’t, so the only relevance of these remarks is that they direct attention to the general problem of evil, which has of course been discussed at great length by Christian authors. Incidentally, using the diminutive form of someone’s name does not increase the cogency of your argument. Nor does the spelling “Jeezus” magically transform your opponents into hapless rednecks.
I have no clear sense of what you mean by a “fundamentalist,” but there are certainly many Christians who believe that Jesus literally rose from the dead who have written serious works grappling with the problem of evil. If you are aware of these works but are going to disqualify the authors from being “fundamentalists” because many of the authors are well-published professional philosophers with graduate degrees, then why are you even commenting about fundamentalism here? Is it because you don’t realize that Vic and several of his commentators have earned doctorates and have been teaching and writing philosophy longer than you have been alive? If, on the other hand, you are not familiar with the literature of Christian philosophers addressing the problem of evil, perhaps you should read up on the topic a bit before you stride into Vic’s comboxes with your cape fluttering behind you.
At July 19, 2010 2:51 PM , Tim said...
J,
You persist in assuming that understanding Hume’s point and agreeing with it are the same thing. This requires argument – which you have yet to provide. We’re also waiting on you to provide any reference to “theocracy” in Hume’s writings.
As I already mentioned, Spinoza’s argument against the credibility of the biblical miracle reports is completely different from Hume’s. But I’m beginning to realize that you are working from a hazy recollection of someone else's talking points and have never actually read either author for yourself.
Hume’s grasp of the mathematics of probable reasoning was minimal. Have a look at John Earman’s discussion of the subject in Hume’s Abject Failure. As for inconsistencies in the gospels, suppose it to be true in some ancillary matters; how would this render the main outlines of the history incredible?
... 4000 BC or whatever judeo-christian tradition held
By the late 18th century, before either Darwin or Lyell was born, the majority position among Protestant theologians was that the earth is extremely old and that the chronologies worked out by Bishop Ussher and other well-intentioned scholars were based on a faulty understanding of the biblical narrative.
Indeed the historical view of the Gospels arguably misses the point anyway. It's not Herodotus or Tacitus, but more like....ethics...and poetry. Consider the lilies of the field. etc. Jeeezuss was a William Blake type, man. Or the Grateful Dead, on a good night.
Cherry picking some inspirational quotations from Jesus’ teaching will not substantiate the claim that the genre of the Gospels is not history. Please try to do at least a little reading on the subject before you say silly things like this. You might start here.
You also seem to need reminding again that saying "Jeeezuss" does not give you gravitas.
At July 19, 2010 2:58 PM , Tim said...
J,
If that were a real wager, you’d be paying me money right now. Pointing out that you are a clueless internet hack is not, per se, unchristian. Think of it as compassionate intervention.
The only things I’ve been concerned to argue about here are your repeated and pervasive misconceptions regarding Whately, Hume, Spinoza, and the New Testament. It took me a while to realize that you haven’t read any of them. There is no shame in this; many otherwise fine people have not read them. But for someone who pretends to know all about them, a lack of firsthand acquaintance with these works must surely be an inconvenience.
At July 19, 2010 3:13 PM , Tim said...
J,
Can you read? I mean, at all? I just said that the only thing I’ve been concerned to argue about is your misreading of just about everybody. Now it appears that you can’t even be bothered to read what I write. It does rather diminish the interest of having a conversation.
You say that proving Napoleon existed poses the exact same difficulties as does establishing the veracity of biblical miracles.
Actually, I didn’t say that; I said that the nub of the problem is extreme improbability in both cases. There are, of course, various disanalogies, some of which tell in favor of the accounts of Napoleon’s exploits and some of which tell in the other direction.
In everything I have ever written on the subject, I have consistently maintained that the only legitimate way to deal with these issues is by straightforward historical scholarship. The reason to believe in the resurrection but not in the supposed miracles of other religions or even of later ecclesiastical history is simply that the evidence for the resurrection is many orders of magnitude stronger than the evidence for those other claims. If you really think that Christians are unaware of the issue of other religious miracle claims, I can only surmise that you have been hiding in a cave for the past 400 years or so.
At July 19, 2010 4:05 PM , Tim said...
J,
Actually, Hume is wrong on the uniformity of experience claim, since miracles other than the resurrection have occasionally occurred. And even if he weren't wrong, in this context, it would be begging the question to make that claim. But there's another claim in the neighborhood that is true, namely, that outside of the Judeo-Christian tradition, there are no well-attested miracle reports. We can charitably read him as really meaning that.
What on earth the First Amendment has to so with any of this is completely obscure. No one is abridging your freedom of speech, even though you are making a complete fool of yourself.
You were indeed the first one to use the phrase "uniformity of experience" in this thread. Why you think that shows me to be lying is a mystery. It's right up there with your juvenile fascination with the diminutive form of my name. Whatever.
You're "pretty well acquainted with zee klassix" because you are aware of a fact about Kant that can be read off of the Wikipedia article on him? Well, I'm convinced.
And you still think Hume was talking about theocracy. I've asked you a couple of times to provide a reference for this, but to no avail. It seems like providing evidence to back up your assertions isn't your strong suit.
On the other hand, you do show some elementary facility with vulgar insults, like the Spanish word for a male prostitute. Your upbringing apparently left out some basic training in manners, but trust me: it's considered impolite.
At July 19, 2010 5:48 PM , Tim said...
J,
You are seriously delusional and probably need professional help. It is a trial of patience simply to respond to all of the palpable falsehoods you continue to spew out. Just so that you cannot with any show of plausibility claim that my silence gave color to your claims, here are responses to ten of them:
I never blogged at Right Reason. I am not a Calvinist. I did not favor going into the war in Iraq. I have never defended or even discussed the claim that there were WMDs there. To the best of my recollection, I have never discussed Ann Coulter on the internet (though I once did tell a reporter that I thought she was over the top). I have no objection to carbon-14 dating when used within the limits of its range (i.e. up to about 60K years BP). Widespread Christian belief in an indefinitely old earth and cosmos predated Lyell and Darwin. The First Amendment is not about inerrancy. No one in this conversation is trying to infringe your First Amendment rights. My criticisms of Hume are very nearly identical to those of John Earman, a well-respected philosopher of science at the University of Pittsburgh; Earman is not a religious believer of any stripe.
Enough.
At July 15, 2010 5:52 PM , Tim said...
Mark writes:
*****
No kidding. In practice, no miracle testimony has ever been strong enough to establish its conclusion. This is a far cry from saying Hume thinks it's impossible for testimony to establish the existence of miracles. Look at these sentences from part 2, which come immediately after the section you quoted:
"I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history."
Still not convinced?
*****
Well, no. Just look at the way that Hume goes on:
Thus, suppose, all authors, in all languages, agree, that, from the first of JANUARY 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: Suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people: That all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or contradiction: It is evident, that our present philosophers, instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived.
The closing reference to ‘causes’ can scarcely be taken to mean anything but natural causes, and the ‘philosophers’ are natural philosophers, that is, scientists. This choice of words warns the reader that under the circumstances Hume would consider the period of darkness to be, not in the strict sense a miracle, that is, a violation of the laws of nature, but rather a violation of its usual course. He goes on to note that the ‘decay, corruption, and dissolution of nature’ is rendered so probable by many analogies that it ‘comes within the reach of human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and uniform’. The event, in short, is a marvel rather than a miracle; Hume has taken back with the left hand what he appeared to concede with the right.
At July 16, 2010 6:51 AM , Tim said...
Stephen,
Why be so shy? You're missing out. Imagine the fun you could have if you approached Napoleon the way you approach Jesus. I'll illustrate, using the sort of reasoning that you've displayed over the years, just to get you started.
* You have Napoleon's body? Hah. All you have is some body or other.
* Napoleon really existed? Show us his birth certificate. You can't.
* We have not a single photograph of Napoleon. Not. One. Of course, Napoleon apologists will argue that Napoleon died in 1821, whereas the camera was not invented until 1839. That just shows you the desperate lengths to which they will go to explain away the lack of evidence.
* Supposedly we have Napoleon's autograph. But there are about a dozen wildly different ways that he supposedly signed his name, and even those who believe Napoleon existed will concede that most of the signatures purporting to be his are outright forgeries.
* The accounts of the exploits of Napoleon are wildly inconsistent. Just try to reconcile them. It can't be done.
* Even apart from the contradictions, the feats ascribed to Napoleon are wildly improbable; and it is a well-known fact that the more marvelous anything is the less likely is it to be true.
* It was in the interest of the British government to promote national unity at the time. What better way to do so than to invent a figure to play the "good part" of a common enemy against whom the gullible populace might be rallied?
* Supposed memorabilia of Napoleon fetch high prices at auctions. An encrusted sword with no documentation will fetch $30,000; Henry Wellcome even purchased a gold-plated toothbrush that supposedly belonged to Napoleon. The Napoleon myth is good business.
See how easy this is?
The one about the birth certificate illustrates a particularly useful trick that you will want to study closely and imitate as often as you can. No matter what the actual evidence is, you can always find something that isn't available. Fasten on that as if its absence were of crushing significance. If your interlocutors point out that it wasn't to be expected, at this point in time, that we should have every sort of ancillary evidence we might think up, deride them as ignorant and delusional. If they try to turn the discussion to the actual positive evidence for their primary contention, just shout louder about the absence of the thing you demand. It makes you seem like a serious historian.
At July 17, 2010 5:27 AM , Tim said...
Steven,
It was not skeptical arguments Überhaupt that I was satirizing. It was yours. The transparent unfairness of these arguments against the existence of Napoleon is simply a mirror of the transparent unfairness of the arguments you use on the internet almost daily. You're the only one in this conversation who can't recognize yourself.
Thanks for the additional laughs in your link to the page of "photographic documented evidence." This is your own attempt at satire, right? Taking a few words in a row as proof of borrowing?
Golly, what a wide field for further research that one provides.
I open my copy of The House at Pooh Corner at random -- it happened to fall open at p. 87 -- and the second line reads "... until he came to the place ..." What do you want to bet that we can find a close match for this in the Bible? Hey, how about Luke 23:33: "When they came to the place ..." And in fact, Luke is talking about the crucifixion of Jesus -- whom Christians identify as the Man of Sorrows -- while The House at Pooh Corner is talking about Eeyore ("... when he came to the place where Eeyore was ..."), who is also a man of sorrows! Yes, that clinches it: Milne is definitely borrowing from Luke. Or maybe Luke is borrowing from Milne. Or maybe picking out a few words in a row and claiming that it is "photographic documented evidence" that one document is borrowed from another is bonkers.
At July 18, 2010 9:58 AM , Tim said...
An "argument" for conscious borrowing in the service of mythmaking that can be replicated in 90 seconds with a copy of a Winnie the Pooh book in one hand and a copy of the Bible in the other is, to borrow a phrase from Hume, more properly a subject of derision than of argument. It belongs in the same pile with The Bible Code -- which, come to think of it, it rather resembles.
At July 18, 2010 7:05 PM , Tim said...
J,
This has already been discussed above. Hume does use "miracle" and "extreme improbability" interchangeably sometimes, e.g. here:
"When any one tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other." [Emphasis added]
On the epistemic side, extreme improbability is all we have to work with.
Whately's point is that the alleged events of Napoleon's career are wildly improbable. It is therefore fair game for the application of Hume's maxim.
By the way, there's a cookie for you if you can find a passage from Gibbon expressing doubt regarding the existence of Jesus. And no, the famous passage from Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire ch. 15 doesn't help you; that has to do with Jesus' reported miracles, not with his existence. (It's a lousy argument anyway, but that issue is being discussed in the thread on arguments from silence.)
At July 18, 2010 8:45 PM , Tim said...
J,
All the work is being done by improbability. Hume sets up his argument from universal testimony in order to support his claim that a miracle is wildly improbable. That's why the comparison is fair game. You're free to argue that the aspects of the (reported) career of Napoleon cited by Whately aren't actually all that improbable. But that would require that you actually read Whately -- and judging from your comments so far, this is something that you haven't bothered to do.
At July 19, 2010 10:41 AM , Tim said...
J,
No, you don't quite understand the like basic Fratboy-o-sopher point that it's an irrelevant analogy.
Perhaps that’s because, unlike you, I don’t do fratboy-o-sophy.
Napoleon's existence is not controversial
Neither is the existence of Jesus, except among the lunatic fringe. Good grief, even Bart Ehrman gets this.
Hume’s argument against miracles is that there is universal testimony against them. He isn’t even consistent, since elsewhere in the same piece he admits that miracle reports abound in all of history. But waive that. The argument from universal testimony to the contrary, if it were any good, would apply equally well to spontaneous proton decay. Yet we accept that testimony would be perfectly competent to confirm such an event. Hume’s argument, applied consistently, would truly be a science stopper.
You don't quite understand Humean tactics either. He wanted to undercut the supposed inerrancy of scripture, ie theocracy, like as a basis for law. And that he does, uh did.
Hume’s tactics and his motives would be two separate matters. But never mind that; your description is so far off from what Hume actually says that it is really rather bizarre. Hume’s critique of miracles has nothing to say about theocracy. You are simply jumbling together standard skeptical complaints that have nothing to do with one another in a sort of verbal salad. This may be standard fare in fratboy-o-sophy. But it is not reasoning.
At July 19, 2010 1:28 PM , Tim said...
J,
You are apparently under the misimpression that, just because you are finally starting to understand Hume’s reasoning in Hume’s own terms, you can assert without argument that his reasoning is cogent. Maybe on the atheist blogs – but not here.
However, we aren’t even quite there yet. Let’s take this one step at a time.
Whether the biblical miracles are wildly improbable depends on two factors; the prior probability that something like the Judeo-Christian God exists, and the strength of the total evidence for the biblical miracle claims. Vic has repeatedly pointed out that estimates of the former vary from person to person. Every sensible Christian acknowledges that the evidence for some particular biblical miracle claims is better than for others.
Napoleon's existence isn't improbable, even if some details of his life can't be established. It's really a false analogy. He's merely pointing out that you can't necessarily prove Napoleon existed either.
You seem to be treating ‘Napoleon’ as a rigid designator. As a good neo-Russellian, I’m not obligated to let you get away with it. ‘Napoleon’ denotes someone who did at least approximately the things attributed to him in the historical accounts we have. These are quite astonishing and improbable, some of them quite unprecedented. That is all that is required for Whately’s satire to hit home. I suggest that you take the time actually to read Whately’s satire before you say again that it is a false analogy.
Spinoza also said much the same as Hume (as did other writers) in the 17th century, and suggested all biblical miracles could be accounted for by natural science.
This claim is half right, half wrong. The half that is right is that Spinoza did suggest that the root of belief in the biblical miracles was ignorance of natural causes. But the other half is wrong. Spinoza’s argument against miracles is completely different from Hume’s argument, and Hume does not suggest that the biblical miracles were just misunderstood natural phenomena.
If you think the apparitions of Mary are even remotely akin to the resurrection, then you have not read the gospels through even once with attention. The use of the misspelling “Hebbin’” as a derogatory term may make you feel that you are better educated than those with whom you disagree, but that feeling, I regret to inform you, is an illusion, and the affectation is childish.
If it were any part of the Christian faith that the resurrection of Jesus would end all war and suffering, then the occurrence of these things might have a point. But it isn’t, so the only relevance of these remarks is that they direct attention to the general problem of evil, which has of course been discussed at great length by Christian authors. Incidentally, using the diminutive form of someone’s name does not increase the cogency of your argument. Nor does the spelling “Jeezus” magically transform your opponents into hapless rednecks.
I have no clear sense of what you mean by a “fundamentalist,” but there are certainly many Christians who believe that Jesus literally rose from the dead who have written serious works grappling with the problem of evil. If you are aware of these works but are going to disqualify the authors from being “fundamentalists” because many of the authors are well-published professional philosophers with graduate degrees, then why are you even commenting about fundamentalism here? Is it because you don’t realize that Vic and several of his commentators have earned doctorates and have been teaching and writing philosophy longer than you have been alive? If, on the other hand, you are not familiar with the literature of Christian philosophers addressing the problem of evil, perhaps you should read up on the topic a bit before you stride into Vic’s comboxes with your cape fluttering behind you.
At July 19, 2010 2:51 PM , Tim said...
J,
You persist in assuming that understanding Hume’s point and agreeing with it are the same thing. This requires argument – which you have yet to provide. We’re also waiting on you to provide any reference to “theocracy” in Hume’s writings.
As I already mentioned, Spinoza’s argument against the credibility of the biblical miracle reports is completely different from Hume’s. But I’m beginning to realize that you are working from a hazy recollection of someone else's talking points and have never actually read either author for yourself.
Hume’s grasp of the mathematics of probable reasoning was minimal. Have a look at John Earman’s discussion of the subject in Hume’s Abject Failure. As for inconsistencies in the gospels, suppose it to be true in some ancillary matters; how would this render the main outlines of the history incredible?
... 4000 BC or whatever judeo-christian tradition held
By the late 18th century, before either Darwin or Lyell was born, the majority position among Protestant theologians was that the earth is extremely old and that the chronologies worked out by Bishop Ussher and other well-intentioned scholars were based on a faulty understanding of the biblical narrative.
Indeed the historical view of the Gospels arguably misses the point anyway. It's not Herodotus or Tacitus, but more like....ethics...and poetry. Consider the lilies of the field. etc. Jeeezuss was a William Blake type, man. Or the Grateful Dead, on a good night.
Cherry picking some inspirational quotations from Jesus’ teaching will not substantiate the claim that the genre of the Gospels is not history. Please try to do at least a little reading on the subject before you say silly things like this. You might start here.
You also seem to need reminding again that saying "Jeeezuss" does not give you gravitas.
At July 19, 2010 2:58 PM , Tim said...
J,
If that were a real wager, you’d be paying me money right now. Pointing out that you are a clueless internet hack is not, per se, unchristian. Think of it as compassionate intervention.
The only things I’ve been concerned to argue about here are your repeated and pervasive misconceptions regarding Whately, Hume, Spinoza, and the New Testament. It took me a while to realize that you haven’t read any of them. There is no shame in this; many otherwise fine people have not read them. But for someone who pretends to know all about them, a lack of firsthand acquaintance with these works must surely be an inconvenience.
At July 19, 2010 3:13 PM , Tim said...
J,
Can you read? I mean, at all? I just said that the only thing I’ve been concerned to argue about is your misreading of just about everybody. Now it appears that you can’t even be bothered to read what I write. It does rather diminish the interest of having a conversation.
You say that proving Napoleon existed poses the exact same difficulties as does establishing the veracity of biblical miracles.
Actually, I didn’t say that; I said that the nub of the problem is extreme improbability in both cases. There are, of course, various disanalogies, some of which tell in favor of the accounts of Napoleon’s exploits and some of which tell in the other direction.
In everything I have ever written on the subject, I have consistently maintained that the only legitimate way to deal with these issues is by straightforward historical scholarship. The reason to believe in the resurrection but not in the supposed miracles of other religions or even of later ecclesiastical history is simply that the evidence for the resurrection is many orders of magnitude stronger than the evidence for those other claims. If you really think that Christians are unaware of the issue of other religious miracle claims, I can only surmise that you have been hiding in a cave for the past 400 years or so.
At July 19, 2010 4:05 PM , Tim said...
J,
Actually, Hume is wrong on the uniformity of experience claim, since miracles other than the resurrection have occasionally occurred. And even if he weren't wrong, in this context, it would be begging the question to make that claim. But there's another claim in the neighborhood that is true, namely, that outside of the Judeo-Christian tradition, there are no well-attested miracle reports. We can charitably read him as really meaning that.
What on earth the First Amendment has to so with any of this is completely obscure. No one is abridging your freedom of speech, even though you are making a complete fool of yourself.
You were indeed the first one to use the phrase "uniformity of experience" in this thread. Why you think that shows me to be lying is a mystery. It's right up there with your juvenile fascination with the diminutive form of my name. Whatever.
You're "pretty well acquainted with zee klassix" because you are aware of a fact about Kant that can be read off of the Wikipedia article on him? Well, I'm convinced.
And you still think Hume was talking about theocracy. I've asked you a couple of times to provide a reference for this, but to no avail. It seems like providing evidence to back up your assertions isn't your strong suit.
On the other hand, you do show some elementary facility with vulgar insults, like the Spanish word for a male prostitute. Your upbringing apparently left out some basic training in manners, but trust me: it's considered impolite.
At July 19, 2010 5:48 PM , Tim said...
J,
You are seriously delusional and probably need professional help. It is a trial of patience simply to respond to all of the palpable falsehoods you continue to spew out. Just so that you cannot with any show of plausibility claim that my silence gave color to your claims, here are responses to ten of them:
I never blogged at Right Reason. I am not a Calvinist. I did not favor going into the war in Iraq. I have never defended or even discussed the claim that there were WMDs there. To the best of my recollection, I have never discussed Ann Coulter on the internet (though I once did tell a reporter that I thought she was over the top). I have no objection to carbon-14 dating when used within the limits of its range (i.e. up to about 60K years BP). Widespread Christian belief in an indefinitely old earth and cosmos predated Lyell and Darwin. The First Amendment is not about inerrancy. No one in this conversation is trying to infringe your First Amendment rights. My criticisms of Hume are very nearly identical to those of John Earman, a well-respected philosopher of science at the University of Pittsburgh; Earman is not a religious believer of any stripe.
Enough.
Labels:
Evidences,
Hays,
Historiography,
Miracles
Tuesday, July 20, 2010
The Infidel Delusion
“…this book completely destroys Christianity.”
Those words by atheist Michael Martin are located in the blurb he wrote that appears on the back cover of The Christian Delusion, edited by John Loftus (speaking of back cover blurbs, Dale C. Allison, Jr. starts his blurb by instructing us to “Forget Dawkins” and that’s sage advice no matter who gives it). Furthermore, Keith Parsons states of The Christian Delusion that “there can have been few works as effective” at debunking Christianity. Ken Pulliam states: “It demonstrates that those who believe in the tenets of evangelical Christianity truly are deluded.”
The book contains chapters written by a wide range of modern atheists, including Hector Avalos, Richard Carrier, and Edward T. Babinski[*]. (If those names sound familiar it’s because we’ve engaged with each of them many times on Triablogue.) Of his contribution to the book, Carrier slapped both of his chapters with a “tour de force” label and confidently assured us, “I doubt I'll ever have to write another [refutation of the resurrection].” He says: “My debunking of [Christian claims on science] is so decisive in this chapter, you won't need to refer anyone anywhere else.”
But such hubris vastly overreaches reality, and Triablogue is here to demonstrate it with The Infidel Delusion.
The Infidel Delusion was written (in alphabetical order) by Patrick Chan, Jason Engwer, Steve Hays, and Paul Manata. This is a true tour de force. By the time I got to Manata’s debunking of Valerie Tarico’s naturalistic reductionism in chapter two, the perfect metaphor had formed in my head: Collectively, these Triabloggian authors were firing intellectual howitzer shells point-blank into a cardboard shanty town.
Each chapter of The Christian Delusion is thoroughly debunked by Hay’s philosophical and theological acumen, Engwer’s encyclopedic knowledge of history, Chan’s scientific training, and/or Manata’s philosophical prowess. Contrary to the tactic The Christian Delusion used—to attack the weakest arguments put forth in the name of Christianity—the authors of The Infidel Delusion dismantled the strongest arguments atheists had to offer. Indeed, if there truly are “few works as effective” as The Christian Delusion, as Parsons claimed, then Triablogue shows atheism to be in a sad state indeed.
A Quick Overview of What’s in The Infidel Delusion
After introductions from Hays, Engwer, and Manata, the debunking of The Christian Delusion begins. In chapter one, Eller’s entire premise is shown to be at odds with the rest of The Christian Delusion, making that book internally incoherent. Eller’s belief that there is no real Christianity, but instead thousands of Christianities, actually destroys the basis for The Christian Delusion by rendering the idea that there is such a thing as Christianity (singular) to refute moot. If atheists are to be consistent, either Eller’s contribution must go or it must stand alone.
Chapter two shows Tarico’s cognitive research to be nowhere near adequate to explain what she thinks it explains. In addition to showing the argument to be self-refuting, Manata makes an excellent case that Tarico doesn’t even understand the issues involved in naturalism and scientific reductionism. Additionally, Chan includes a great deal on the medical issues involved, including debunking the idea that Paul’s vision of Christ on the Road to Damascus could be explained by a frontal lobe seizure.
Chapter three deals with Long’s attempt to show cultural background determines how one will believe. This sort of cultural relativism is a double-edged sword, however. If it works against Christianity, it is only at the expense of destroying atheism in the process.
Chapter four gets us to the heart of The Christian Delusion, the Outsider Test for Faith that forms the key of Loftus’s atheistic apologetic. Hays demonstrates how Loftus doesn’t consistently apply this test since it equally destroys his own view. Engwer shows that the attitude Loftus has about how beliefs are formed doesn’t cohere to Christian experience. And finally, Manata demonstrates that the outsider test is “vague, ambiguous, invalid, unsound, superfluous, informally fallacious, and subject to a defeater-deflector.”
Chapter five reviews Babinski’s flawed view of Jewish cosmology based on uncharitable assumptions about the stupidity of ancient people and their lack of ability to understand figurative language; chapter six shows Tobin’s repeating of common objections to Scripture (creating “dilemma” by ignoring all conservative scholarship, and even most liberal scholarship); and chapter seven refutes Loftus’s claim that Scripture is unclear, ironically in part by showing that if Loftus’s chapter is true, Babinski’s and Tobin’s must be false! But internal consistency is not something The Christian Delusion was concerned with.
Chapter eight deals with Avalos’s claims that Yahweh is a “moral monster.” Yet this once again requires us to reject Loftus’s chapter seven, and furthermore Avalos’s moral relativism defeats his own argument.
Chapter nine deals with concepts of animal suffering as evidence for the non-existence of God. Amongst other arguments they present, Hays deftly shows how Loftus’s claims are unsupported anthropomorphisms, while Engwer focuses on the ludicrous demands Loftus requires of believers to “answer” this “problem” and Manata shows Loftus’s argument is really nothing short of wishful thinking completely divorced from the Christian theology it was supposed to debunk.
Chapter ten reviews Price’s misuse of methodological naturalism, including the fact that Price actually ignores the vast majority of modern scholarship in rejecting the very existence of Jesus as a historical figure. Chapter eleven examines similar weaknesses of methodology in the claims Carrier makes regarding the resurrection.
Chapter twelve examines Loftus’s poor exegetical skills and his inability to understand even simple Biblical passages in context. In critiquing Christian prophecy, Loftus manages to all but ignore the preterist movement and makes some rather basic label errors on the positions he does look at.
Chapter thirteen deals with Eller’s moral claims, especially in light of his rejection of objective morality. The Infidel Delusion shows how his evolutionary claims are insufficient to create any type of morality.
Chapter fourteen shows that Avalos’s argument that atheism didn’t cause the Holocaust is irrelevant to the issue of whether Christianity is true. Finally, chapter fifteen shows that Carrier’s historical claims that Christians are not responsible for modern science is both irrelevant to the issue of the truth of Christianity as well as focused on the wrong issues, even within the context of his argument.
The last section of The Infidel Delusion consists of ten appendices that give us more detail into some of the arguments presented within the various chapters, as well as a look at some of the specific claims made by contributors to The Christian Delusion outside of the scope of that actual book.
Conclusion
The Infidel Delusion debunks the entirety of The Christian Delusion. This is not to say it addresses every single flaw in The Christian Delusion—such would take multiple volumes. But there is no major claim made in The Christian Delusion that withstands the criticism leveled at it in The Infidel Delusion. As Steve Hays wrote in his introduction, “…if The Christian Delusion turns out to be just another white elephant in the overcrowded zoo of militant atheism, then that‘s a vindication of the Christian faith.”
The Infidel Delusion certainly demonstrates this.
Full disclosure: While I did not contribute any writing to The Infidel Delusion, I did edit, collate, and format the ebook.
UPDATE:
[*] To be fair, Babinski classifies himself as an agnostic.
Those words by atheist Michael Martin are located in the blurb he wrote that appears on the back cover of The Christian Delusion, edited by John Loftus (speaking of back cover blurbs, Dale C. Allison, Jr. starts his blurb by instructing us to “Forget Dawkins” and that’s sage advice no matter who gives it). Furthermore, Keith Parsons states of The Christian Delusion that “there can have been few works as effective” at debunking Christianity. Ken Pulliam states: “It demonstrates that those who believe in the tenets of evangelical Christianity truly are deluded.”
The book contains chapters written by a wide range of modern atheists, including Hector Avalos, Richard Carrier, and Edward T. Babinski[*]. (If those names sound familiar it’s because we’ve engaged with each of them many times on Triablogue.) Of his contribution to the book, Carrier slapped both of his chapters with a “tour de force” label and confidently assured us, “I doubt I'll ever have to write another [refutation of the resurrection].” He says: “My debunking of [Christian claims on science] is so decisive in this chapter, you won't need to refer anyone anywhere else.”
But such hubris vastly overreaches reality, and Triablogue is here to demonstrate it with The Infidel Delusion.
The Infidel Delusion was written (in alphabetical order) by Patrick Chan, Jason Engwer, Steve Hays, and Paul Manata. This is a true tour de force. By the time I got to Manata’s debunking of Valerie Tarico’s naturalistic reductionism in chapter two, the perfect metaphor had formed in my head: Collectively, these Triabloggian authors were firing intellectual howitzer shells point-blank into a cardboard shanty town.
Each chapter of The Christian Delusion is thoroughly debunked by Hay’s philosophical and theological acumen, Engwer’s encyclopedic knowledge of history, Chan’s scientific training, and/or Manata’s philosophical prowess. Contrary to the tactic The Christian Delusion used—to attack the weakest arguments put forth in the name of Christianity—the authors of The Infidel Delusion dismantled the strongest arguments atheists had to offer. Indeed, if there truly are “few works as effective” as The Christian Delusion, as Parsons claimed, then Triablogue shows atheism to be in a sad state indeed.
After introductions from Hays, Engwer, and Manata, the debunking of The Christian Delusion begins. In chapter one, Eller’s entire premise is shown to be at odds with the rest of The Christian Delusion, making that book internally incoherent. Eller’s belief that there is no real Christianity, but instead thousands of Christianities, actually destroys the basis for The Christian Delusion by rendering the idea that there is such a thing as Christianity (singular) to refute moot. If atheists are to be consistent, either Eller’s contribution must go or it must stand alone.
Chapter two shows Tarico’s cognitive research to be nowhere near adequate to explain what she thinks it explains. In addition to showing the argument to be self-refuting, Manata makes an excellent case that Tarico doesn’t even understand the issues involved in naturalism and scientific reductionism. Additionally, Chan includes a great deal on the medical issues involved, including debunking the idea that Paul’s vision of Christ on the Road to Damascus could be explained by a frontal lobe seizure.
Chapter three deals with Long’s attempt to show cultural background determines how one will believe. This sort of cultural relativism is a double-edged sword, however. If it works against Christianity, it is only at the expense of destroying atheism in the process.
Chapter four gets us to the heart of The Christian Delusion, the Outsider Test for Faith that forms the key of Loftus’s atheistic apologetic. Hays demonstrates how Loftus doesn’t consistently apply this test since it equally destroys his own view. Engwer shows that the attitude Loftus has about how beliefs are formed doesn’t cohere to Christian experience. And finally, Manata demonstrates that the outsider test is “vague, ambiguous, invalid, unsound, superfluous, informally fallacious, and subject to a defeater-deflector.”
Chapter five reviews Babinski’s flawed view of Jewish cosmology based on uncharitable assumptions about the stupidity of ancient people and their lack of ability to understand figurative language; chapter six shows Tobin’s repeating of common objections to Scripture (creating “dilemma” by ignoring all conservative scholarship, and even most liberal scholarship); and chapter seven refutes Loftus’s claim that Scripture is unclear, ironically in part by showing that if Loftus’s chapter is true, Babinski’s and Tobin’s must be false! But internal consistency is not something The Christian Delusion was concerned with.
Chapter eight deals with Avalos’s claims that Yahweh is a “moral monster.” Yet this once again requires us to reject Loftus’s chapter seven, and furthermore Avalos’s moral relativism defeats his own argument.
Chapter nine deals with concepts of animal suffering as evidence for the non-existence of God. Amongst other arguments they present, Hays deftly shows how Loftus’s claims are unsupported anthropomorphisms, while Engwer focuses on the ludicrous demands Loftus requires of believers to “answer” this “problem” and Manata shows Loftus’s argument is really nothing short of wishful thinking completely divorced from the Christian theology it was supposed to debunk.
Chapter ten reviews Price’s misuse of methodological naturalism, including the fact that Price actually ignores the vast majority of modern scholarship in rejecting the very existence of Jesus as a historical figure. Chapter eleven examines similar weaknesses of methodology in the claims Carrier makes regarding the resurrection.
Chapter twelve examines Loftus’s poor exegetical skills and his inability to understand even simple Biblical passages in context. In critiquing Christian prophecy, Loftus manages to all but ignore the preterist movement and makes some rather basic label errors on the positions he does look at.
Chapter thirteen deals with Eller’s moral claims, especially in light of his rejection of objective morality. The Infidel Delusion shows how his evolutionary claims are insufficient to create any type of morality.
Chapter fourteen shows that Avalos’s argument that atheism didn’t cause the Holocaust is irrelevant to the issue of whether Christianity is true. Finally, chapter fifteen shows that Carrier’s historical claims that Christians are not responsible for modern science is both irrelevant to the issue of the truth of Christianity as well as focused on the wrong issues, even within the context of his argument.
The last section of The Infidel Delusion consists of ten appendices that give us more detail into some of the arguments presented within the various chapters, as well as a look at some of the specific claims made by contributors to The Christian Delusion outside of the scope of that actual book.
The Infidel Delusion debunks the entirety of The Christian Delusion. This is not to say it addresses every single flaw in The Christian Delusion—such would take multiple volumes. But there is no major claim made in The Christian Delusion that withstands the criticism leveled at it in The Infidel Delusion. As Steve Hays wrote in his introduction, “…if The Christian Delusion turns out to be just another white elephant in the overcrowded zoo of militant atheism, then that‘s a vindication of the Christian faith.”
The Infidel Delusion certainly demonstrates this.
Full disclosure: While I did not contribute any writing to The Infidel Delusion, I did edit, collate, and format the ebook.
UPDATE:
[*] To be fair, Babinski classifies himself as an agnostic.
Labels:
Apologetics,
Atheism,
John Loftus,
Peter Pike,
The Infidel Delusion
How loving is loving?
Arminians assure us that the Arminian God is more loving than the Calvinist God. But does the Arminian God do whatever it takes, at any cost, by any means necessary, to act in the best interests of sinners?
Just compare Arminian theism with a recent post by Joe Carter, and see the difference between the lengths to which real paternal love will go, and the Arminian deity:
Best Dads in TV and Film
Joe Carter
Father’s Day was last Sunday, but it’s never too late to appreciate good ol’ dad. Here are several categories and candidates for best fathers in film and television:
Best Protector: Bryan Mills (Taken) – Chances are you won’t recognize the name even if you’ve seen the good-but-forgettable 2008 action flick Taken. So why does Mills make the list? Because when faced with every father’s worst nightmare (his his 17-year-old daughter is kidnapped in Paris and forced in the sexual slave trade), Mills uses all his skills and knowledge (he’s a former CIA agent) to find her and bring her home. While the action is pure Hollywood, the message is universal: We dads will do anything in our power to protect our children.
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2010/06/25/best-dads-in-tv-and-film/
Just compare Arminian theism with a recent post by Joe Carter, and see the difference between the lengths to which real paternal love will go, and the Arminian deity:
Best Dads in TV and Film
Joe Carter
Father’s Day was last Sunday, but it’s never too late to appreciate good ol’ dad. Here are several categories and candidates for best fathers in film and television:
Best Protector: Bryan Mills (Taken) – Chances are you won’t recognize the name even if you’ve seen the good-but-forgettable 2008 action flick Taken. So why does Mills make the list? Because when faced with every father’s worst nightmare (his his 17-year-old daughter is kidnapped in Paris and forced in the sexual slave trade), Mills uses all his skills and knowledge (he’s a former CIA agent) to find her and bring her home. While the action is pure Hollywood, the message is universal: We dads will do anything in our power to protect our children.
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2010/06/25/best-dads-in-tv-and-film/
Labels:
Arminianism,
Calvinism,
Hays
Oracular dreams
1. In Scripture, a primary mode of divine revelation is visionary revelation. Scripture contains a number of oracular dreams, which employ that revelatory mode.
Oracular dreams are the same type of revelation as visions. The basic difference is the time of day. Oracular dreams are night visions, whereas daytime visions are inspired daydreams.
One of the striking features of oracular dreams is the symbolic imagery. This means that while oracular dreams are predictive, they are not representational. The dreamer isn’t literally “seeing” the future. Rather, the dream is a figurative analogy of future events.
And that, in turn, raises interpretive issues. There are two ways in which an oracular dream can be understood. One way is if the inspired dream is accompanied by an inspired interpretation. In some cases the dreamer can be the interpreter. Or a speaker within the dream can be the interpreter.
In addition, oracular dreams are embedded within a larger narrative, so that a reader can see how the dream was fulfilled after the fact.
If, however, we didn’t have either of those aids, then it’s harder to perceive the exact nature of the fulfillment in advance of the facts.
2. Although Scripture explicitly identifies some oracular dreams, their presence raises the question of whether some other oracles of Scripture may be prosaic summaries of oracular dreams and visions. In other words, are there cases where a seer has a vision or dream, but instead of taking the time to describe the dream, with all of the emblematic imagery, he simply summarizes the message of the dream?
3. This, in turn, raises some ancillary issues:
i) If many oracles are symbolic analogies, then that affects the terms of the fulfillment. For the oracle will be fulfilled analogically rather than univocally. You can’t go straight from the metaphor to the historical referent. Rather, you must first decrypt the metaphor.
What you have, at the given level of the prophecy, is a one-to-one correspondence between the figurative imagery and the historical referent. But to make sense of that we need to decipher the imagery so that we can draw a direct correspondence between the thing it stands for, and the future analogue. And, indeed, that’s what happens when Joseph or Daniel (to take two examples) interpret oracular dreams.
That has some potential relevance for millennial debates.
ii) This also bears on the inerrancy of Scripture. If the terms of fulfillment are analogous rather than univocal, then we need to make allowance for that distinction. If someone alleges that a Bible prophecy failed, he needs to demonstrate that it failed on analogical terms.
iii) Finally, this has some potential bearing on debates over cessationism, semicessationism, and continuationism. Continuationists sometimes draw a distinction between infallible “revelations” and fallible interpretations. And depending on the nature of the ostensible “revelation,” that distinction might be tenable.
Of course, the pros and cons of that debate turn on many additional considerations.
Gen 28:10-16
10Jacob left Beersheba and went toward Haran. 11And he came to a certain place and stayed there that night, because the sun had set. Taking one of the stones of the place, he put it under his head and lay down in that place to sleep. 12And he dreamed, and behold, there was a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to heaven. And behold, the angels of God were ascending and descending on it! 13And behold, the LORD stood above it and said, "I am the LORD, the God of Abraham your father and the God of Isaac. The land on which you lie I will give to you and to your offspring. 14Your offspring shall be like the dust of the earth, and you shall spread abroad to the west and to the east and to the north and to the south, and in you and your offspring shall all the families of the earth be blessed. 15Behold, I am with you and will keep you wherever you go, and will bring you back to this land. For I will not leave you until I have done what I have promised you." 16Then Jacob awoke from his sleep and said, "Surely the LORD is in this place, and I did not know it."
Gen 37:5-10
5Now Joseph had a dream, and when he told it to his brothers they hated him even more. 6He said to them, "Hear this dream that I have dreamed: 7Behold, we were binding sheaves in the field, and behold, my sheaf arose and stood upright. And behold, your sheaves gathered around it and bowed down to my sheaf." 8His brothers said to him, "Are you indeed to reign over us? Or are you indeed to rule over us?" So they hated him even more for his dreams and for his words.
9Then he dreamed another dream and told it to his brothers and said, "Behold, I have dreamed another dream. Behold, the sun, the moon, and eleven stars were bowing down to me." 10But when he told it to his father and to his brothers, his father rebuked him and said to him, "What is this dream that you have dreamed? Shall I and your mother and your brothers indeed come to bow ourselves to the ground before you?"
Gen 40:5-19
5And one night they both dreamed—the cupbearer and the baker of the king of Egypt, who were confined in the prison—each his own dream, and each dream with its own interpretation. 6When Joseph came to them in the morning, he saw that they were troubled. 7So he asked Pharaoh’s officers who were with him in custody in his master’s house, "Why are your faces downcast today?" 8They said to him, "We have had dreams, and there is no one to interpret them." And Joseph said to them, "Do not interpretations belong to God? Please tell them to me."
9So the chief cupbearer told his dream to Joseph and said to him, "In my dream there was a vine before me, 10and on the vine there were three branches. As soon as it budded, its blossoms shot forth, and the clusters ripened into grapes. 11Pharaoh’s cup was in my hand, and I took the grapes and pressed them into Pharaoh’s cup and placed the cup in Pharaoh’s hand." 12Then Joseph said to him, "This is its interpretation: the three branches are three days. 13In three days Pharaoh will lift up your head and restore you to your office, and you shall place Pharaoh’s cup in his hand as formerly, when you were his cupbearer. 14Only remember me, when it is well with you, and please do me the kindness to mention me to Pharaoh, and so get me out of this house. 15For I was indeed stolen out of the land of the Hebrews, and here also I have done nothing that they should put me into the pit."
16When the chief baker saw that the interpretation was favorable, he said to Joseph, "I also had a dream: there were three cake baskets on my head, 17and in the uppermost basket there were all sorts of baked food for Pharaoh, but the birds were eating it out of the basket on my head." 18And Joseph answered and said, "This is its interpretation: the three baskets are three days. 19 In three days Pharaoh will lift up your head—from you!—and hang you on a tree. And the birds will eat the flesh from you."
Gen 41:1-7,25-32
1After two whole years, Pharaoh dreamed that he was standing by the Nile, 2and behold, there came up out of the Nile seven cows attractive and plump, and they fed in the reed grass. 3And behold, seven other cows, ugly and thin, came up out of the Nile after them, and stood by the other cows on the bank of the Nile. 4And the ugly, thin cows ate up the seven attractive, plump cows. And Pharaoh awoke. 5And he fell asleep and dreamed a second time. And behold, seven ears of grain, plump and good, were growing on one stalk. 6And behold, after them sprouted seven ears, thin and blighted by the east wind. 7And the thin ears swallowed up the seven plump, full ears. And Pharaoh awoke, and behold, it was a dream.
25Then Joseph said to Pharaoh, "The dreams of Pharaoh are one; God has revealed to Pharaoh what he is about to do. 26The seven good cows are seven years, and the seven good ears are seven years; the dreams are one. 27The seven lean and ugly cows that came up after them are seven years, and the seven empty ears blighted by the east wind are also seven years of famine. 28It is as I told Pharaoh; God has shown to Pharaoh what he is about to do. 29There will come seven years of great plenty throughout all the land of Egypt, 30but after them there will arise seven years of famine, and all the plenty will be forgotten in the land of Egypt. The famine will consume the land, 31and the plenty will be unknown in the land by reason of the famine that will follow, for it will be very severe. 32And the doubling of Pharaoh’s dream means that the thing is fixed by God, and God will shortly bring it about.
Judg 7:13-14
13When Gideon came, behold, a man was telling a dream to his comrade. And he said, "Behold, I dreamed a dream, and behold, a cake of barley bread tumbled into the camp of Midian and came to the tent and struck it so that it fell and turned it upside down, so that the tent lay flat." 14And his comrade answered, "This is no other than the sword of Gideon the son of Joash, a man of Israel; God has given into his hand Midian and all the camp."
Dan 2:31-45
31"You saw, O king, and behold, a great image. This image, mighty and of exceeding brightness, stood before you, and its appearance was frightening. 32 The head of this image was of fine gold, its chest and arms of silver, its middle and thighs of bronze, 33 its legs of iron, its feet partly of iron and partly of clay. 34As you looked, a stone was cut out by no human hand, and it struck the image on its feet of iron and clay, and broke them in pieces. 35Then the iron, the clay, the bronze, the silver, and the gold, all together were broken in pieces, and became like the chaff of the summer threshing floors; and the wind carried them away, so that not a trace of them could be found. But the stone that struck the image became a great mountain and filled the whole earth.
36"This was the dream. Now we will tell the king its interpretation. 37You, O king, the king of kings, to whom the God of heaven has given the kingdom, the power, and the might, and the glory, 38and into whose hand he has given, wherever they dwell, the children of man, the beasts of the field, and the birds of the heavens, making you rule over them all—you are the head of gold. 39 Another kingdom inferior to you shall arise after you, and yet a third kingdom of bronze, which shall rule over all the earth. 40And there shall be a fourth kingdom, strong as iron, because iron breaks to pieces and shatters all things. And like iron that crushes, it shall break and crush all these. 41And as you saw the feet and toes, partly of potter’s clay and partly of iron, it shall be a divided kingdom, but some of the firmness of iron shall be in it, just as you saw iron mixed with the soft clay. 42And as the toes of the feet were partly iron and partly clay, so the kingdom shall be partly strong and partly brittle. 43As you saw the iron mixed with soft clay, so they will mix with one another in marriage, but they will not hold together, just as iron does not mix with clay. 44And in the days of those kings the God of heaven will set up a kingdom that shall never be destroyed, nor shall the kingdom be left to another people. It shall break in pieces all these kingdoms and bring them to an end, and it shall stand forever, 45just as you saw that a stone was cut from a mountain by no human hand, and that it broke in pieces the iron, the bronze, the clay, the silver, and the gold. A great God has made known to the king what shall be after this. The dream is certain, and its interpretation sure."
Dan 8:1-27
1In the third year of the reign of King Belshazzar a vision appeared to me, Daniel, after that which appeared to me at the first. 2And I saw in the vision; and when I saw, I was in Susa the capital, which is in the province of Elam. And I saw in the vision, and I was at the Ulai canal. 3I raised my eyes and saw, and behold, a ram standing on the bank of the canal. It had two horns, and both horns were high, but one was higher than the other, and the higher one came up last. 4I saw the ram charging westward and northward and southward. No beast could stand before him, and there was no one who could rescue from his power. He did as he pleased and became great.
5As I was considering, behold, a male goat came from the west across the face of the whole earth, without touching the ground. And the goat had a conspicuous horn between his eyes. 6He came to the ram with the two horns, which I had seen standing on the bank of the canal, and he ran at him in his powerful wrath. 7I saw him come close to the ram, and he was enraged against him and struck the ram and broke his two horns. And the ram had no power to stand before him, but he cast him down to the ground and trampled on him. And there was no one who could rescue the ram from his power. 8Then the goat became exceedingly great, but when he was strong, the great horn was broken, and instead of it there came up four conspicuous horns toward the four winds of heaven.
9Out of one of them came a little horn, which grew exceedingly great toward the south, toward the east, and toward the glorious land. 10 It grew great, even to the host of heaven. And some of the host and some of the stars it threw down to the ground and trampled on them. 11 It became great, even as great as the Prince of the host. And the regular burnt offering was taken away from him, and the place of his sanctuary was overthrown. 12And a host will be given over to it together with the regular burnt offering because of transgression, and it will throw truth to the ground, and it will act and prosper. 13Then I heard a holy one speaking, and another holy one said to the one who spoke, "For how long is the vision concerning the regular burnt offering, the transgression that makes desolate, and the giving over of the sanctuary and host to be trampled underfoot?" 14And he said to me, "For 2,300 evenings and mornings. Then the sanctuary shall be restored to its rightful state."
15When I, Daniel, had seen the vision, I sought to understand it. And behold, there stood before me one having the appearance of a man. 16 And I heard a man’s voice between the banks of the Ulai, and it called, "Gabriel, make this man understand the vision." 17So he came near where I stood. And when he came, I was frightened and fell on my face. But he said to me, "Understand, O son of man, that the vision is for the time of the end."
18And when he had spoken to me, I fell into a deep sleep with my face to the ground. But he touched me and made me stand up. 19He said, "Behold, I will make known to you what shall be at the latter end of the indignation, for it refers to the appointed time of the end. 20As for the ram that you saw with the two horns, these are the kings of Media and Persia. 21And the goat is the king of Greece. And the great horn between his eyes is the first king. 22 As for the horn that was broken, in place of which four others arose, four kingdoms shall arise from his nation, but not with his power. 23And at the latter end of their kingdom, when the transgressors have reached their limit, a king of bold face, one who understands riddles, shall arise. 24His power shall be great— but not by his own power; and he shall cause fearful destruction and shall succeed in what he does, and destroy mighty men and the people who are the saints. 25 By his cunning he shall make deceit prosper under his hand, and in his own mind he shall become great. Without warning he shall destroy many. And he shall even rise up against the Prince of princes, and he shall be broken—but by no human hand. 26The vision of the evenings and the mornings that has been told is true, but seal up the vision, for it refers to many days from now."
27And I, Daniel, was overcome and lay sick for some days. Then I rose and went about the king’s business, but I was appalled by the vision and did not understand it.
Oracular dreams are the same type of revelation as visions. The basic difference is the time of day. Oracular dreams are night visions, whereas daytime visions are inspired daydreams.
One of the striking features of oracular dreams is the symbolic imagery. This means that while oracular dreams are predictive, they are not representational. The dreamer isn’t literally “seeing” the future. Rather, the dream is a figurative analogy of future events.
And that, in turn, raises interpretive issues. There are two ways in which an oracular dream can be understood. One way is if the inspired dream is accompanied by an inspired interpretation. In some cases the dreamer can be the interpreter. Or a speaker within the dream can be the interpreter.
In addition, oracular dreams are embedded within a larger narrative, so that a reader can see how the dream was fulfilled after the fact.
If, however, we didn’t have either of those aids, then it’s harder to perceive the exact nature of the fulfillment in advance of the facts.
2. Although Scripture explicitly identifies some oracular dreams, their presence raises the question of whether some other oracles of Scripture may be prosaic summaries of oracular dreams and visions. In other words, are there cases where a seer has a vision or dream, but instead of taking the time to describe the dream, with all of the emblematic imagery, he simply summarizes the message of the dream?
3. This, in turn, raises some ancillary issues:
i) If many oracles are symbolic analogies, then that affects the terms of the fulfillment. For the oracle will be fulfilled analogically rather than univocally. You can’t go straight from the metaphor to the historical referent. Rather, you must first decrypt the metaphor.
What you have, at the given level of the prophecy, is a one-to-one correspondence between the figurative imagery and the historical referent. But to make sense of that we need to decipher the imagery so that we can draw a direct correspondence between the thing it stands for, and the future analogue. And, indeed, that’s what happens when Joseph or Daniel (to take two examples) interpret oracular dreams.
That has some potential relevance for millennial debates.
ii) This also bears on the inerrancy of Scripture. If the terms of fulfillment are analogous rather than univocal, then we need to make allowance for that distinction. If someone alleges that a Bible prophecy failed, he needs to demonstrate that it failed on analogical terms.
iii) Finally, this has some potential bearing on debates over cessationism, semicessationism, and continuationism. Continuationists sometimes draw a distinction between infallible “revelations” and fallible interpretations. And depending on the nature of the ostensible “revelation,” that distinction might be tenable.
Of course, the pros and cons of that debate turn on many additional considerations.
Gen 28:10-16
10Jacob left Beersheba and went toward Haran. 11And he came to a certain place and stayed there that night, because the sun had set. Taking one of the stones of the place, he put it under his head and lay down in that place to sleep. 12And he dreamed, and behold, there was a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to heaven. And behold, the angels of God were ascending and descending on it! 13And behold, the LORD stood above it and said, "I am the LORD, the God of Abraham your father and the God of Isaac. The land on which you lie I will give to you and to your offspring. 14Your offspring shall be like the dust of the earth, and you shall spread abroad to the west and to the east and to the north and to the south, and in you and your offspring shall all the families of the earth be blessed. 15Behold, I am with you and will keep you wherever you go, and will bring you back to this land. For I will not leave you until I have done what I have promised you." 16Then Jacob awoke from his sleep and said, "Surely the LORD is in this place, and I did not know it."
Gen 37:5-10
5Now Joseph had a dream, and when he told it to his brothers they hated him even more. 6He said to them, "Hear this dream that I have dreamed: 7Behold, we were binding sheaves in the field, and behold, my sheaf arose and stood upright. And behold, your sheaves gathered around it and bowed down to my sheaf." 8His brothers said to him, "Are you indeed to reign over us? Or are you indeed to rule over us?" So they hated him even more for his dreams and for his words.
9Then he dreamed another dream and told it to his brothers and said, "Behold, I have dreamed another dream. Behold, the sun, the moon, and eleven stars were bowing down to me." 10But when he told it to his father and to his brothers, his father rebuked him and said to him, "What is this dream that you have dreamed? Shall I and your mother and your brothers indeed come to bow ourselves to the ground before you?"
Gen 40:5-19
5And one night they both dreamed—the cupbearer and the baker of the king of Egypt, who were confined in the prison—each his own dream, and each dream with its own interpretation. 6When Joseph came to them in the morning, he saw that they were troubled. 7So he asked Pharaoh’s officers who were with him in custody in his master’s house, "Why are your faces downcast today?" 8They said to him, "We have had dreams, and there is no one to interpret them." And Joseph said to them, "Do not interpretations belong to God? Please tell them to me."
9So the chief cupbearer told his dream to Joseph and said to him, "In my dream there was a vine before me, 10and on the vine there were three branches. As soon as it budded, its blossoms shot forth, and the clusters ripened into grapes. 11Pharaoh’s cup was in my hand, and I took the grapes and pressed them into Pharaoh’s cup and placed the cup in Pharaoh’s hand." 12Then Joseph said to him, "This is its interpretation: the three branches are three days. 13In three days Pharaoh will lift up your head and restore you to your office, and you shall place Pharaoh’s cup in his hand as formerly, when you were his cupbearer. 14Only remember me, when it is well with you, and please do me the kindness to mention me to Pharaoh, and so get me out of this house. 15For I was indeed stolen out of the land of the Hebrews, and here also I have done nothing that they should put me into the pit."
16When the chief baker saw that the interpretation was favorable, he said to Joseph, "I also had a dream: there were three cake baskets on my head, 17and in the uppermost basket there were all sorts of baked food for Pharaoh, but the birds were eating it out of the basket on my head." 18And Joseph answered and said, "This is its interpretation: the three baskets are three days. 19 In three days Pharaoh will lift up your head—from you!—and hang you on a tree. And the birds will eat the flesh from you."
Gen 41:1-7,25-32
1After two whole years, Pharaoh dreamed that he was standing by the Nile, 2and behold, there came up out of the Nile seven cows attractive and plump, and they fed in the reed grass. 3And behold, seven other cows, ugly and thin, came up out of the Nile after them, and stood by the other cows on the bank of the Nile. 4And the ugly, thin cows ate up the seven attractive, plump cows. And Pharaoh awoke. 5And he fell asleep and dreamed a second time. And behold, seven ears of grain, plump and good, were growing on one stalk. 6And behold, after them sprouted seven ears, thin and blighted by the east wind. 7And the thin ears swallowed up the seven plump, full ears. And Pharaoh awoke, and behold, it was a dream.
25Then Joseph said to Pharaoh, "The dreams of Pharaoh are one; God has revealed to Pharaoh what he is about to do. 26The seven good cows are seven years, and the seven good ears are seven years; the dreams are one. 27The seven lean and ugly cows that came up after them are seven years, and the seven empty ears blighted by the east wind are also seven years of famine. 28It is as I told Pharaoh; God has shown to Pharaoh what he is about to do. 29There will come seven years of great plenty throughout all the land of Egypt, 30but after them there will arise seven years of famine, and all the plenty will be forgotten in the land of Egypt. The famine will consume the land, 31and the plenty will be unknown in the land by reason of the famine that will follow, for it will be very severe. 32And the doubling of Pharaoh’s dream means that the thing is fixed by God, and God will shortly bring it about.
Judg 7:13-14
13When Gideon came, behold, a man was telling a dream to his comrade. And he said, "Behold, I dreamed a dream, and behold, a cake of barley bread tumbled into the camp of Midian and came to the tent and struck it so that it fell and turned it upside down, so that the tent lay flat." 14And his comrade answered, "This is no other than the sword of Gideon the son of Joash, a man of Israel; God has given into his hand Midian and all the camp."
Dan 2:31-45
31"You saw, O king, and behold, a great image. This image, mighty and of exceeding brightness, stood before you, and its appearance was frightening. 32 The head of this image was of fine gold, its chest and arms of silver, its middle and thighs of bronze, 33 its legs of iron, its feet partly of iron and partly of clay. 34As you looked, a stone was cut out by no human hand, and it struck the image on its feet of iron and clay, and broke them in pieces. 35Then the iron, the clay, the bronze, the silver, and the gold, all together were broken in pieces, and became like the chaff of the summer threshing floors; and the wind carried them away, so that not a trace of them could be found. But the stone that struck the image became a great mountain and filled the whole earth.
36"This was the dream. Now we will tell the king its interpretation. 37You, O king, the king of kings, to whom the God of heaven has given the kingdom, the power, and the might, and the glory, 38and into whose hand he has given, wherever they dwell, the children of man, the beasts of the field, and the birds of the heavens, making you rule over them all—you are the head of gold. 39 Another kingdom inferior to you shall arise after you, and yet a third kingdom of bronze, which shall rule over all the earth. 40And there shall be a fourth kingdom, strong as iron, because iron breaks to pieces and shatters all things. And like iron that crushes, it shall break and crush all these. 41And as you saw the feet and toes, partly of potter’s clay and partly of iron, it shall be a divided kingdom, but some of the firmness of iron shall be in it, just as you saw iron mixed with the soft clay. 42And as the toes of the feet were partly iron and partly clay, so the kingdom shall be partly strong and partly brittle. 43As you saw the iron mixed with soft clay, so they will mix with one another in marriage, but they will not hold together, just as iron does not mix with clay. 44And in the days of those kings the God of heaven will set up a kingdom that shall never be destroyed, nor shall the kingdom be left to another people. It shall break in pieces all these kingdoms and bring them to an end, and it shall stand forever, 45just as you saw that a stone was cut from a mountain by no human hand, and that it broke in pieces the iron, the bronze, the clay, the silver, and the gold. A great God has made known to the king what shall be after this. The dream is certain, and its interpretation sure."
Dan 8:1-27
1In the third year of the reign of King Belshazzar a vision appeared to me, Daniel, after that which appeared to me at the first. 2And I saw in the vision; and when I saw, I was in Susa the capital, which is in the province of Elam. And I saw in the vision, and I was at the Ulai canal. 3I raised my eyes and saw, and behold, a ram standing on the bank of the canal. It had two horns, and both horns were high, but one was higher than the other, and the higher one came up last. 4I saw the ram charging westward and northward and southward. No beast could stand before him, and there was no one who could rescue from his power. He did as he pleased and became great.
5As I was considering, behold, a male goat came from the west across the face of the whole earth, without touching the ground. And the goat had a conspicuous horn between his eyes. 6He came to the ram with the two horns, which I had seen standing on the bank of the canal, and he ran at him in his powerful wrath. 7I saw him come close to the ram, and he was enraged against him and struck the ram and broke his two horns. And the ram had no power to stand before him, but he cast him down to the ground and trampled on him. And there was no one who could rescue the ram from his power. 8Then the goat became exceedingly great, but when he was strong, the great horn was broken, and instead of it there came up four conspicuous horns toward the four winds of heaven.
9Out of one of them came a little horn, which grew exceedingly great toward the south, toward the east, and toward the glorious land. 10 It grew great, even to the host of heaven. And some of the host and some of the stars it threw down to the ground and trampled on them. 11 It became great, even as great as the Prince of the host. And the regular burnt offering was taken away from him, and the place of his sanctuary was overthrown. 12And a host will be given over to it together with the regular burnt offering because of transgression, and it will throw truth to the ground, and it will act and prosper. 13Then I heard a holy one speaking, and another holy one said to the one who spoke, "For how long is the vision concerning the regular burnt offering, the transgression that makes desolate, and the giving over of the sanctuary and host to be trampled underfoot?" 14And he said to me, "For 2,300 evenings and mornings. Then the sanctuary shall be restored to its rightful state."
15When I, Daniel, had seen the vision, I sought to understand it. And behold, there stood before me one having the appearance of a man. 16 And I heard a man’s voice between the banks of the Ulai, and it called, "Gabriel, make this man understand the vision." 17So he came near where I stood. And when he came, I was frightened and fell on my face. But he said to me, "Understand, O son of man, that the vision is for the time of the end."
18And when he had spoken to me, I fell into a deep sleep with my face to the ground. But he touched me and made me stand up. 19He said, "Behold, I will make known to you what shall be at the latter end of the indignation, for it refers to the appointed time of the end. 20As for the ram that you saw with the two horns, these are the kings of Media and Persia. 21And the goat is the king of Greece. And the great horn between his eyes is the first king. 22 As for the horn that was broken, in place of which four others arose, four kingdoms shall arise from his nation, but not with his power. 23And at the latter end of their kingdom, when the transgressors have reached their limit, a king of bold face, one who understands riddles, shall arise. 24His power shall be great— but not by his own power; and he shall cause fearful destruction and shall succeed in what he does, and destroy mighty men and the people who are the saints. 25 By his cunning he shall make deceit prosper under his hand, and in his own mind he shall become great. Without warning he shall destroy many. And he shall even rise up against the Prince of princes, and he shall be broken—but by no human hand. 26The vision of the evenings and the mornings that has been told is true, but seal up the vision, for it refers to many days from now."
27And I, Daniel, was overcome and lay sick for some days. Then I rose and went about the king’s business, but I was appalled by the vision and did not understand it.
Labels:
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hermeneutics,
Inerrancy,
Prophecy
Monday, July 19, 2010
Brainless Atheism
Babinski wants to keep reminding us that there’s no correlation between infidelity and high IQ. I appreciate his unwitting services to the Christian faith.
“Second, You both admit you don't know what happens to a fetus, but you also both admit you want to believe that infants who die are not eternally damned.”
i) I haven’t said what I want to be the case concerning infants in my exchanges with Babinski.
ii) Since I’m human, I have the emotional make-up of a human being. But God isn’t human, so I don’t expect that he feels the same way about the same things that I do. I don’t assume that God feels the same way about steak and lobster, or Rita Hayworth, or Italian sports cars, that I might feel.
So I don’t see how that is even relevant to the issue at hand. Assuming there’s a discrepancy between my wants and God’s wants, so what? I’m not God.
iii) Human babies are cute. They’re meant to be cute.
The suicide bomber who murders 30 Israeli teenagers in a Tel Aviv pizzeria started out life as a cute little baby. I’m sure that Ted Bundy was a cute baby. I can only judge by what I see before me. But that’s not the whole story. Appearances can be deceptive.
BTW, not all kids are cuties. There’s the kid who vivisects the neighborhood cats.
There are also horror films in which cute kids are turned into little vampires and zombies. They go from being cuties to beasties. That’s a good metaphor for what happens when you remove common grace.
iv) The objection to infant damnation usually assumes the torture chamber view of hell. I do not.
It also assumes that you remain whatever you were when you died. But I don’t assume that.
For instance, I don’t assume that if a baby dies and goes to heaven, he remains a baby for all eternity.
“My reply is this, your coulds and wishes disagree with those of Calvin, Edwards and Augustine (an early church father) who agreed that according to their studied interpretation of the Bible infants who died unbaptized were damned. Look up their arguments and how and why they based them on Scripture. Argue with your Christian mentors from the past.”
i) I don’t think baptism has any bearing on the issue one way or the other.
ii) I’m not answerable to Calvin, Edwards, and Augustine. I’m answerable to God.
iii) I’ve made my case for my understanding of the sacraments on more than one occasion.
“Third, If you both wish to believe that infants that die unbaptized go to heaven, then also note that abortion would thereby ensure the salvation of more souls percentage-wise than any evangelistic tent rally ever did.”
I already deflated that argument in a previous post. But Ed can’t think on his feet. Ed can only read aloud what is written on his cue cards.
“Fourth, let's even assume for the sake of argument that we could baptize babies in the womb with holy water and a syringe and some prayers by a Calvinist minister before aborting them. (Even though the Calvinist minister might abhor abortion he might compromise enough to at least ensure the salvation of each fetus before it is aborted.) That would certainly ensure their salvation, even per Augustine.”
I don’t think baptism ensures anyone’s salvation. We are saved, not by the water of baptism, but by the blood of Christ.
I don’t believe in holy water. For purposes of baptism, any water will do.
“Lastly, if you can prove that Augustine, Calvin and Edwards misinterpreted the Bible concerning original sin and the damnation of infants…”
Original sin doesn’t ipso facto damn anyone. Every heavenbound Christian is born in sin.
“I suppose the best you can do is reach a proposal of indeterminacy as Steve has, but that is also to admit that God does not exactly make a family great after a miscarriage, since they don't know whether their child is suffering eternity.”
Why is that a reason to be an atheist rather than a Christian? It’s like telling a cancer patient that it’s better for him to forego cancer therapy, without which he has a zero chance of recovery, than to undergo therapy, which gives him a 50/50 chance.
“You can hope all you want, and as an agnostic I too hope for the best.”
The hope of a Christian, and the hope of an agnostic, are hardly equivalent.
“According to Augustine an unbaptized infant was a ‘limb of Satan’”
Augustine is not my rule of faith.
“Some Catholic saints even experienced ‘spiritual visions’ that depicted little children suffering in hell.”
Why should I put any stock in their visions?
“But recently the Catholic Church…”
Since I’m not Catholic, why should I care?
“JONATHAN EDWARDS - The sight of hell torments will exalt the happiness of the saints forever… Can the believing father in Heaven be happy with his unbelieving children in Hell?”
i) Since Edwards hadn’t been to heaven at the time he said that, he’s in no position to say that.
ii) Perhaps he was expanding on some of the colorful imagery in Revelation. But aside from the fact that Revelation uses picturesque metaphors, the martyred saints in Revelation take moral satisfaction in the just punishment of their mortal enemies. That’s hardly equivalent to parents and children.
“R. A. Torrey [one of the contributors to The Fundamentals, a series of tracts published in the 1920’s that helped popularize ‘fundamentalist’ Christianity. Torry argued in the above case that slaughtering the children was an act of infinite mercy because it ensured them eternal paradise.]”
Torrey was a fine Christian. But his conclusions are only as good as his supporting arguments.
“A small Danish (Protestant) sect went around killing as many newly baptized infants as they could discover…A. J. Ayer, Voltaire.”
Voltaire? Surely you don’t think he’s a reliable church historian?
“Some (Catholic) Spaniards in Mexico and Peru used to baptize Indian infants then immediately dash their brains out; by this means they secured that those infants went to heaven. – Bertrand Russell.”
Once more, surely you don’t think Russell is a reliable church historian.
“THEOLOGICAL OPTION #1: THE SOULS OF DEAD FETUSES GO TO HEAVEN. This first option is the most optimistic, loving, and forgiving, but seems to turn abortions into “altar calls” with 100% assurance of eternal salvation for each and every aborted fetus.”
Even if we were to judge that argument on purely pragmatic/utilitarian grounds, it doesn’t work on its own terms. If you abort every baby, then that action will (ex hypothesi) save the aborted generation at the cost of dooming the human race. Fewer human beings would be saved in the long run.
“THEOLOGICAL OPTION #2: THE SOULS OF DEAD FETUSES GO TO WHEREVER GOD ORDAINS THEM TO GO, EITHER HEAVEN OR HELL. According to various Bible verses, God “ordains” all things, including the premature deaths (including executions) of fetuses, pregnant women, and children. In other words, each soul in this world ‘gets’ what God has “ordained” for it, regardless if they are aborted in the womb, or reach old age.”
True. However, that’s neutral on the fate of dying infants.
“THEOLOGICAL OPTION #3: THE SOULS OF DEAD FETUSES WHOSE BODIES ARE NOT BAPTIZED, GO TO HELL. Theologians from Augustine to Jonathan Edwards considered it right for God to send to hell the souls of fetuses whose bodies were not baptized before they died. Their doctrine was called ‘infant damnation’ and it was taught by Christian churches for centuries. So, all fetuses that are not baptized before they die go to hell.”
I reject the underlying sacramentology.
“THEOLOGICAL OPTION #4: BAPTIZE FETUSES IN THE WOMB. If baptism spiritually cleanses the fetus’ ‘original sin,’ ensuring it goes to heaven, then why take any risks of it not getting baptized, and instead baptize fetuses by inserting a syringe filled with water into the womb? This would be especially useful in cases where the life of a fetus and/or the mother was at risk. Indeed, the option of syringe baptism continued to be taught to Catholic seminarians right up till Vatican II in the 1960s.”
One doesn’t have to look very far to find out that I’m not overly sympathetic to Catholic theology. So what’s the point?
“Attempting to counteract such Catholic excesses as he viewed them the Protestant Reformer, John Calvin, forbade mid-wives (or anyone else for that matter) from hastily baptizing sickly newborn infants, because Calvin believed in waiting a few days until a proper baptism ceremony in church could be conducted. According to Calvin, it was God’s providential choice, not human effort, that determined who would wind up in heaven or hell, and if the fetus or newborn didn’t survive long enough to have a proper baptismal ceremony, it was God’s will that it die prematurely and/or suffer in hell for eternity.”
“And/or”? Damnation is hardly interchangeable with premature death.
“Second, You both admit you don't know what happens to a fetus, but you also both admit you want to believe that infants who die are not eternally damned.”
i) I haven’t said what I want to be the case concerning infants in my exchanges with Babinski.
ii) Since I’m human, I have the emotional make-up of a human being. But God isn’t human, so I don’t expect that he feels the same way about the same things that I do. I don’t assume that God feels the same way about steak and lobster, or Rita Hayworth, or Italian sports cars, that I might feel.
So I don’t see how that is even relevant to the issue at hand. Assuming there’s a discrepancy between my wants and God’s wants, so what? I’m not God.
iii) Human babies are cute. They’re meant to be cute.
The suicide bomber who murders 30 Israeli teenagers in a Tel Aviv pizzeria started out life as a cute little baby. I’m sure that Ted Bundy was a cute baby. I can only judge by what I see before me. But that’s not the whole story. Appearances can be deceptive.
BTW, not all kids are cuties. There’s the kid who vivisects the neighborhood cats.
There are also horror films in which cute kids are turned into little vampires and zombies. They go from being cuties to beasties. That’s a good metaphor for what happens when you remove common grace.
iv) The objection to infant damnation usually assumes the torture chamber view of hell. I do not.
It also assumes that you remain whatever you were when you died. But I don’t assume that.
For instance, I don’t assume that if a baby dies and goes to heaven, he remains a baby for all eternity.
“My reply is this, your coulds and wishes disagree with those of Calvin, Edwards and Augustine (an early church father) who agreed that according to their studied interpretation of the Bible infants who died unbaptized were damned. Look up their arguments and how and why they based them on Scripture. Argue with your Christian mentors from the past.”
i) I don’t think baptism has any bearing on the issue one way or the other.
ii) I’m not answerable to Calvin, Edwards, and Augustine. I’m answerable to God.
iii) I’ve made my case for my understanding of the sacraments on more than one occasion.
“Third, If you both wish to believe that infants that die unbaptized go to heaven, then also note that abortion would thereby ensure the salvation of more souls percentage-wise than any evangelistic tent rally ever did.”
I already deflated that argument in a previous post. But Ed can’t think on his feet. Ed can only read aloud what is written on his cue cards.
“Fourth, let's even assume for the sake of argument that we could baptize babies in the womb with holy water and a syringe and some prayers by a Calvinist minister before aborting them. (Even though the Calvinist minister might abhor abortion he might compromise enough to at least ensure the salvation of each fetus before it is aborted.) That would certainly ensure their salvation, even per Augustine.”
I don’t think baptism ensures anyone’s salvation. We are saved, not by the water of baptism, but by the blood of Christ.
I don’t believe in holy water. For purposes of baptism, any water will do.
“Lastly, if you can prove that Augustine, Calvin and Edwards misinterpreted the Bible concerning original sin and the damnation of infants…”
Original sin doesn’t ipso facto damn anyone. Every heavenbound Christian is born in sin.
“I suppose the best you can do is reach a proposal of indeterminacy as Steve has, but that is also to admit that God does not exactly make a family great after a miscarriage, since they don't know whether their child is suffering eternity.”
Why is that a reason to be an atheist rather than a Christian? It’s like telling a cancer patient that it’s better for him to forego cancer therapy, without which he has a zero chance of recovery, than to undergo therapy, which gives him a 50/50 chance.
“You can hope all you want, and as an agnostic I too hope for the best.”
The hope of a Christian, and the hope of an agnostic, are hardly equivalent.
“According to Augustine an unbaptized infant was a ‘limb of Satan’”
Augustine is not my rule of faith.
“Some Catholic saints even experienced ‘spiritual visions’ that depicted little children suffering in hell.”
Why should I put any stock in their visions?
“But recently the Catholic Church…”
Since I’m not Catholic, why should I care?
“JONATHAN EDWARDS - The sight of hell torments will exalt the happiness of the saints forever… Can the believing father in Heaven be happy with his unbelieving children in Hell?”
i) Since Edwards hadn’t been to heaven at the time he said that, he’s in no position to say that.
ii) Perhaps he was expanding on some of the colorful imagery in Revelation. But aside from the fact that Revelation uses picturesque metaphors, the martyred saints in Revelation take moral satisfaction in the just punishment of their mortal enemies. That’s hardly equivalent to parents and children.
“R. A. Torrey [one of the contributors to The Fundamentals, a series of tracts published in the 1920’s that helped popularize ‘fundamentalist’ Christianity. Torry argued in the above case that slaughtering the children was an act of infinite mercy because it ensured them eternal paradise.]”
Torrey was a fine Christian. But his conclusions are only as good as his supporting arguments.
“A small Danish (Protestant) sect went around killing as many newly baptized infants as they could discover…A. J. Ayer, Voltaire.”
Voltaire? Surely you don’t think he’s a reliable church historian?
“Some (Catholic) Spaniards in Mexico and Peru used to baptize Indian infants then immediately dash their brains out; by this means they secured that those infants went to heaven. – Bertrand Russell.”
Once more, surely you don’t think Russell is a reliable church historian.
“THEOLOGICAL OPTION #1: THE SOULS OF DEAD FETUSES GO TO HEAVEN. This first option is the most optimistic, loving, and forgiving, but seems to turn abortions into “altar calls” with 100% assurance of eternal salvation for each and every aborted fetus.”
Even if we were to judge that argument on purely pragmatic/utilitarian grounds, it doesn’t work on its own terms. If you abort every baby, then that action will (ex hypothesi) save the aborted generation at the cost of dooming the human race. Fewer human beings would be saved in the long run.
“THEOLOGICAL OPTION #2: THE SOULS OF DEAD FETUSES GO TO WHEREVER GOD ORDAINS THEM TO GO, EITHER HEAVEN OR HELL. According to various Bible verses, God “ordains” all things, including the premature deaths (including executions) of fetuses, pregnant women, and children. In other words, each soul in this world ‘gets’ what God has “ordained” for it, regardless if they are aborted in the womb, or reach old age.”
True. However, that’s neutral on the fate of dying infants.
“THEOLOGICAL OPTION #3: THE SOULS OF DEAD FETUSES WHOSE BODIES ARE NOT BAPTIZED, GO TO HELL. Theologians from Augustine to Jonathan Edwards considered it right for God to send to hell the souls of fetuses whose bodies were not baptized before they died. Their doctrine was called ‘infant damnation’ and it was taught by Christian churches for centuries. So, all fetuses that are not baptized before they die go to hell.”
I reject the underlying sacramentology.
“THEOLOGICAL OPTION #4: BAPTIZE FETUSES IN THE WOMB. If baptism spiritually cleanses the fetus’ ‘original sin,’ ensuring it goes to heaven, then why take any risks of it not getting baptized, and instead baptize fetuses by inserting a syringe filled with water into the womb? This would be especially useful in cases where the life of a fetus and/or the mother was at risk. Indeed, the option of syringe baptism continued to be taught to Catholic seminarians right up till Vatican II in the 1960s.”
One doesn’t have to look very far to find out that I’m not overly sympathetic to Catholic theology. So what’s the point?
“Attempting to counteract such Catholic excesses as he viewed them the Protestant Reformer, John Calvin, forbade mid-wives (or anyone else for that matter) from hastily baptizing sickly newborn infants, because Calvin believed in waiting a few days until a proper baptism ceremony in church could be conducted. According to Calvin, it was God’s providential choice, not human effort, that determined who would wind up in heaven or hell, and if the fetus or newborn didn’t survive long enough to have a proper baptismal ceremony, it was God’s will that it die prematurely and/or suffer in hell for eternity.”
“And/or”? Damnation is hardly interchangeable with premature death.
Sunday, July 18, 2010
Chicken or the egg

Which came first, the chicken or the egg? Apparently, it's the chicken.
However, the jury's still out on why the chicken crossed the road, why novel foods taste like chicken, whether the sky is falling, and whether a rubber chicken or a rubber ducky would swerve first if both were racing toward another at full speed.
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