Neal Judisch is an evangelical convert to Catholicism. As a philosophy prof., we’d expect him to do a bang-up job defending Roman Catholicism. Let’s see how well he acquits himself.
“The basic idea, as it turned out, was nothing new, nor even anything particularly surprising. For the Lord Himself had promised to remain with the Church until the end of the ages.”
http://nealjudisch.blogspot.com/2008/07/rock-keys-and-bishop-of-rome-4_17.html
i) False. That’s an allusion to Mt 28:20. But that’s not a promise to the “Church.” Rather, it’s a promise to the eleven remaining disciples.
ii) Perhaps Neal would say it’s a promise to the church because the apostles died many centuries ago, yet Jesus said he would be with them until the end of the age. So it must extend to their successors, right?
The problem with that inference is that it reflects the chronological perspective of a modern reader. As he reads this, 2000 years down the pike, he takes the long-range view.
But that interpretation is clearly anachronistic. The verse itself doesn’t say anything about the duration of the church age, beyond the immediate promise to the eleven disciples.
iii) Moreover, when a Catholic apologist says “the church,” that’s code language, not for the church, but for a tiny subset of the church: namely, the papacy or episcopate.
“He Himself had guaranteed that the gates of death, the forces of hell, would never overcome her.”
i) True, but irrelevant. That’s an allusion to Mt 16:18. And that’s a metaphor. What does the metaphor mean? You can’t take a metaphor like the “gates of hell,” and pour a Catholic definition into that metaphor without further ado.
ii) Moreover, that’s a promise to what church, exactly? The church of Rome? It doesn’t mention the church of Rome.
Why not the church of Jerusalem? Or Philippi? Or Smyrna?
“He Himself had prophesied that the Holy Spirit would guide the Church into all truth.”
False. That’s an allusion to Jn 16:13. In context, it’s a promise to the eleven remaining disciples.
“That He would gather all who were scattered abroad and knit them together in Love.”
I guess that’s an allusion to Jn 11:52. But Jn 11:52 doesn’t mention the church of Rome. There’s no explicit reference to the church of Rome. What is more, there’s no implication to that effect.
“And He Himself had established a chair. So, clearly, if the Pope really does sit on Peter’s chair, and will thus sometimes be called upon to voice the final say, or make binding judgments for the Church at large, it had better be the case that the Holy Spirit is there to protect him from going wrong when he exercises this capacity of his office.”
i) Where does the NT refer to a Petrine “chair” or Petrine “office”? Where does the NT refer to someone who sits on Peter’s chair?
Did Peter have the final say, or make binding judgments, for the church at large? How can you reconcile that claim with Acts 15 or Gal 2:11-14?
So often, arguments for Catholicism involve a cumulative error rate, where the Catholic apologist piles one error atop another in an escalating series of fallacies.
ii) However, let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that these prooftexts prove what Neal needs them to prove. Hasn’t he backed himself into a dilemma?
On the one hand, he says you can’t have a canon without a church to justify the canon. On the other hand, he’s citing canonical prooftexts to justify his high-church ecclesiology. So is the church logically prior to the canon—or is the canon logically prior to the church? If he needs canonical prooftexts to justify his high-church ecclesiology, then he can’t have the church without the canon. In that case, the canon takes logical precedence over the church.
“The fundamental conviction here is really quite straightforward: Catholics think that we’d better not be left to our own devices, or else we’ll probably screw things up.”
In terms of church history, where’s the evidence that Catholics are any less likely to screw things up than other professing believers?
“Think again, for example, about our reflections on the Biblical canon. As we’ve seen, Catholics have trust that the canon of Scripture we’ve received is the right one, because they believe that God Himself infallibly guided the Church to receive and recognize the right texts.”
And when, in Catholic church history, did that take place, exactly? Even at the Council of Trent, the Tridentine Fathers were still debating the scope of the canon. And when the vote was taken, there was nothing resembling unanimity on the subject.
“Yet from a Catholic perspective this gets things backward. For the Protestant alternative is to say that since the Scriptures alone are infallible, that means the Church cannot claim to have recognized infallibly which books belong in the Bible.”
True.
“At the same time, we know we cannot simply leave the task of determining the canon to each individual Christian, for the individual Christian clearly cannot claim to possess some sort of infallibility which he refuses to attribute to the Church.”
That’s misleading. It’s not as though it comes down to two alternatives: either an infallible church or else each individual Christian must revisit the issue from scratch.
God has given teachers to the church. Scholars and theologians. We can study their arguments.
And, in fact, that’s what happened at the Council of Trent. The Tridentine Fathers argued over the state of the evidence. There was no divine illumination which made them think alike. We’ve seen the way bacon is made at church councils.
“Thus we are left with the question of how we can know, how we can decide with confidence, what belongs in the Bible and what does not if we have no guarantee that the Spirit won’t let us run off the rails – hardly a trivial issue, if the Bible is supposed to be (as the Pope likes to say) the ‘trustworthy ground of our existence.’[2]”
i) One problem with this objection is the unquestioned assumption that God can’t guide his people by using ordinary means. That God can’t put sufficient evidence at our disposal.
Instead, Neal operates with the unquestioned assumption that God can only guide his people by using extraordinary means.
But one of the problems with that contention is that even extraordinary means rely, in some measure, on ordinary means. For example, Neal is using a fallible argument for infallibility. After all, Neal is not, himself, infallible. So, unless, in the providence of God, we can be reasonably confident of arriving at the truth through ordinary means, then Neal’s objection is self-refuting. Neal is using his fallible powers of reason to fallibly argue for infallibility. If he can do that, why not a Protestant?
ii) And suppose, for the sake of argument, that we were mistaken? All this amounts is that God allowed us to be mistaken. Why should I live in fear of being mistaken if God allows me to be mistaken? If it were so catastrophic for me to make an honest mistake, why would God allow it to happen?
And at the risk of stating the obvious, isn’t it obvious that God allows human beings to be mistaken about many things? Sometimes these are honest mistakes. Sometimes these are willful errors.
iii) Incidentally, didn’t the Holy Spirit let the Catholic church run off the rails during the Great Schism, when no one could tell a pope from an antipope?
“Ultimately, in this instance, the Protestant approach leaves us with a collection of writings and fallible humans who are supposed to decide which of them count as God’s Words.”
i) And suppose, as a matter of fact, that’s exactly how God arranged it? Suppose that, most of the time, God guides his people by ordinary providence. Why is it that a philosophy prof. like Neal can’t even entertain that possibility?
ii) Suppose the Great Schism had never happened. Don’t you think a Catholic apologist would argue, a priori, that God would never permit a disruptive event like the Great Schism to occur?
Of course, a Catholic apologist isn’t free to mount that argument since it really did happen. But given their fondness for aprioristic proofs of the papacy, infallibility, &c. isn’t that exactly the sort of argument you’d expect a Catholic apologist to use if only he could? Isn’t it antecedently improbable, on Catholic assumptions, that God would leave apostolic succession in a state of utter turmoil?
But, as it turns out, didn’t fallible Catholics have to decide, with extreme uncertainty, which pope was the true pope? Disputes over the outer limits of the canon are minor compared to the total chaos triggered by the Great Schism.
History is like a story. God’s story, written in the medium of time and space. In a story, every character contributes to the plot. Every character does something to advance the storyline.
Yet every character doesn’t have to get things right. The only person who has to get things right is the narrator.
The narrator can make his characters make mistakes. He can use their errors to advance the action in the direction which he wants to take the story.
That may be a problem for one of the characters. He may make a harmful mistake. A mistake which is injurious to himself or another character.
But that’s not a problem for the narrator. The mistaken actions of his characters don’t derail the narrative. To the contrary, these are instrumental in the course of the narrative.
To drop the metaphor, and discuss some real life examples, Pharaoh made a number of grave mistakes, even fatal mistakes. But that didn’t throw God’s plan off-track. To the contrary, that was part of the plan. Same thing with Caiaphas and Nebuchadnezzar.
“To be sure, the Spirit is thought to be involved in some way; but it’s never entirely clear exactly what the way is.”
And it’s never entirely clearly exactly how the Spirit is supposed to be involved in the extraordinary magisterium. At Trent, the vote on the canon went 24 to 15 with 16 abstentions. So the motion didn’t even carry by a majority vote. Is that the way the Holy Spirit works?
And how does Neal distinguish that “inspired” result from an uninspired process? Ordinarily, if a motion were debated, and its passage fell short of a majority vote, would we attribute that result to divine inspiration? Why was inspiration limited to only 24 of the 55 Tridentine Fathers? Was the Holy Spirit unable to persuade the other 31 Tridentine Fathers?
“For the Protestant alternative is to say that since Scripture alone is infallible, that means the Church cannot claim such authority when it comes to Scriptural interpretation. At the same time, we know we cannot simply leave the task to each individual Christian, for neither the individual Christian nor the tradition to which he belongs can claim to possess some sort of authority that he refuses to attribute to the Church. So, we are left with the question of how we can know, how we can decide with confidence, which of the endlessly diverse and contradictory Christian traditions has things right – hardly a trivial matter, if it might mean heresy on the one hand or fidelity to the Faith on the other.”
What about deciding on the basis of which side has best evidence, or the best argument? After all, Neal is making an individual case for Catholicism. Aren’t we left to individually judge his individual case by weighing the quality of his argumentation?
“But what follows inevitably is this: to the extent that we have full trust and confidence in our own ability to understand Scripture, or in the deliverances of our theological tradition, to that extent we exalt the human’s ability to figure things out for themselves – with no guarantee that the Spirit will protect them from error.”
i) Why do I have to place full trust in my ability to interpret Scripture? What I trust is the providence of God. He put me here, at this time and place, with all the opportunities and limitations that come with my particular situation. My duty is to make the most of the circumstances he’s put me in.
ii) If God wants to protect me from error, he will. If he doesn’t protect me from error, that’s because he didn’t want to do so. The point is to do the best that God has enabled me to do with my time and talents.
God guarantees some things (e.g. Jn 3:16; 6:37). But everything important in life doesn’t come with a money-back guarantee. We walk by faith, not by sight.
“This, I think, is really where the rubber meets the road. For the gut response of most Protestants at this point (including my former self!) is to assert that they do not put their faith in any ‘tradition,’ but rather in the Scriptures themselves, and that to whatever degree they follow a ‘tradition’ they do so only because it ‘faithfully reflects’ the teaching of the Bible. But everyone can see that this simply pushes the question back a step. For where, exactly, have they come by the crucial information that their tradition is the one which ‘faithfully reflects’ the teaching of Scripture over against all the others, unless they have either accepted this on the authority of their tradition, or accepted it on the authority of themselves?”
You know, Neal can only talk about the theological options because he’s a 21C American. Imagine if he were a medieval peasant? Whether he’d be Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox or Oriental Orthodox or Waldensians is a historical accident beyond his control. We’re all circumscribed by our sitz-im-leben. We must all play the hand that God has dealt us. The question is how we play our cards—whether well or badly.
Neal’s problem is that he’s not making the most of his opportunities. He’s making poor use of his aptitude and opportunities.
“But every Christian in every tradition can do the same thing. So how does that make him right; how does that make his tradition the uniquely privileged one; how does that mean he sees things so much more clearly than everyone who happens to disagree?”
I think that most evangelicals admit a lot of truth in “rival” traditions, viz. Lutherans, Baptists, Presbyterians.
“One admits, moreover, that there are such things as interpretive ‘filters’ through which he understands the Bible, and which could in principle lead him astray without his realizing it, despite his most sincere efforts.”
i) Does that include Catholic filters? What filter did Neal use before he became Catholic to evaluate the claims of Catholicism and convert to Rome?
Was his pre-Catholic filter reliable or unreliable? If the pre-Catholic filter by which he evaluated the claims of Catholicism was unreliable, then he converted under false pretenses. But if his pre-Catholic filter was sufficiently reliable to rightly evaluate Catholicism, then in what respect does he even need a Catholic filter?
Why is a philosophy prof. so oblivious to the obvious?
ii) And suppose I am mistaken despite my best efforts to the contrary? What conceivable alternative could there be to that state of affairs?
What’s the point of his question, really? Why ask someone who’s unaware of his error if he’s aware of his error? The premise of the question is that he’s unaware of his error. So why doesn’t Neal apply that premise to himself? What if he’s unaware of how mistaken he is? As long as he remains in that state of mind, then, by definition, there’s nothing he can do about it.
Unless he thinks that people can become aware of their mistakes, he has generated a conundrum which applies, with equal force, to his Catholic convictions.
If he has so little confidence in reason, why is he trying to reason his readers into Catholicism? Is reason only reliable for Catholics? But, in that case, no one could reasonably convert to Catholicism. Only unreasonable people could convert to Rome, beginning with Neal.
“Yet in defiance of these theoretical concessions there remains in all of us, by God’s own design, a desperate need for assurance, for certainty, for stability, and God does not wish His children to lapse into a skepticism which says we cannot know the truth, or (worse yet) a relativism which makes ‘truth’ so easy to come by that it isn’t even worth the pursuit.”
But Neil plays both sides of the fence. He’s a sceptic about Protestant theology, but a rationalist about Catholic theology.
“What happens then, inevitably, is that the ‘space’ or critical distance which should exist between your own theological convictions and the Bible itself completely collapses, with the result that the confidence and certitude which should be directed toward God’s Word only is illicitly transferred in its entirety to a particular theological system.”
Of course, that’s a portable allegation. If it applies to Protestant theology, it also applies to Catholic theology.
“First, one of my chief complaints against the Protestant tradition was its intrinsic inability to hold truth and unity together, which the Bible specifically demanded of the Church and for which the Spirit had specifically been given – and my response was to join a different Protestant communion whose constituents are, even as we speak, in the middle of yet another split? How could such a move be Biblically, theologically or rationally defended? If the sola scriptura principle as originally formulated had been falsified precisely because of such divisions, how could I convince myself that ‘Scripture, Tradition and Reason’ was any better off?”
i) You know, when I read about NT churches, I don’t see a whole lot of truth-in-unity on display. I either see a lot of disunity, or unity-in-falsehood. I mean, was the church of Corinth a paragon of truth-in-unity? What about the churches of Galatia? Remember Judaizers? What about the churches of the Lycus valley. Remember the Colossian heresy? You can run through letter after letter of the NT epistles, including the letters to the seven churches of Asia minor, and what you’ll find is that truth-in-unity is exceptional instead of typical. And these were churches founded by apostles and overseen by apostles.
ii) To say the Catholic church holds truth and unity together massively begs the very question at issue.
iii) Where the NT speaks of unity, it’s generally in the form of imperatives rather than indicatives. That implies a need to work towards unity, not a preexisting state of unity.
iv) Moreover, even the few indicatives need to be taken with a grain of salt. For example, Luke is fond of hyperbole. So you need to make allowance for his literary conventions.
v) As I’ve often pointed out, invidious comparisons of this sort beg the question by taking Catholicism as the frame of reference. The church of Rome in contrast to all those other sects and denominations. But why wouldn’t we include the church of Rome among the other sects and denominations?
vi) What does Catholic unity-in-truth actually amount to? Are Roman Catholics required to sign a doctrinal oath every year as a condition of membership? Are members of the Catholic church like-minded in their adherence to the truth?
What the claim boils down to is that official Catholic teaching is true even if no Catholic on earth actually believes it. Is that how the apostles defined Christian unity?
“Second, one of the problems with the Protestant position which had become increasingly difficult for me to ignore dealt with the formation of the canon of Scripture. Specifically, it seemed to me that the only satisfying response available to the question of how we knew, with certainty, what belonged in the Bible and what didn’t was the Catholic response. For their response relied essentially on the Catholic insistence that thanks to the Apostolic Tradition, the Holy Spirit and the promise of indefectibility, the decisions reached by the Church in Council could not be in error, which is something that all Protestants including the Anglicans deny. But there is no Scriptural support at all for the idea that “Reason,” still less an individual’s ‘private judgment,’ was exempt from error when it came to crucially important questions like this.”
i) Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we must settle for probability rather than certainty? Why is that beneath consideration?
ii) It’s also ambiguous to say we could be wrong about something. For example, suppose I believe that Napoleon was probably born in 1769. That’s either true or false. It’s not probably true or false.
So what we mean by probability is that it’s possible I’m mistaken about this, not that I am mistaken. To say I could be wrong doesn’t mean I’m actually wrong. As long as I’m right, what does it matter if I could be wrong?
Just to say you don’t know for sure if you have the correct canon doesn’t, of itself, cast any doubt on your canon. It doesn’t furnish any tangible evidence that your canon is incorrect. So it’s a very weak objection. Indeed, it’s the sort of fallback objection we’d expect from someone who has no tangible evidence to challenge your position. So he resorts to hypothetical defeaters. What if?
iii) But hypothetical defeaters cut in more then one direction. What if the pope is really an antipope? Does Neal know “for sure” that Benedict XVI is the true successor to St. Peter? After all, he didn’t attend the papal conclave. And these are very secretive proceedings. Deliberately so. The College of Cardinals goes out of its way to shield the process from public scrutiny. No outside observers are allowed in.
So Neal must rely on hearsay information. He has no independent corroboration. From a philosophical standpoint, evidence for the valid election of Benedict XVI falls far short of certainty. Yet that’s a “crucially important question” for a Roman Catholic.
“The question is this: since the Bible doesn’t itself tell us which books belong in the Bible and which do not, where does that information come from?”
Of course, I’ve often addressed this objection:
i) Neal acts as if the Bible is a miscellany of 66 self-contained books. But, in terms of intertextuality, the Bible has a lot to say about itself.
ii) Beyond that, Protestants don’t deny the value of testimonial evidence for the canon. But testimonial evidence needs to be sifted. And it’s not as if testimonial evidence for the canon is limited to Roman Catholic sources.
“If we had (and somehow knew we had) an inspired list in the Bible which provided this information then the question would be at an end and we could be certain about what God wanted in and what He wanted out. But we don’t, so, apparently, we can’t – or rather, we can’t unless the Holy Spirit had infallibly guided the Church in the Councils of Hippo (393) and Carthage (397), e.g., where the canon was decided upon, and had seen to it that the decision in question was infallibly made. That’s the Catholic contention, and it solves the problem cleanly.”
i) First of all, since when is it the Catholic contention that local councils are infallible? Does that include the Westminster Assembly or the Synod of Dordt? What about the Niagara Bible Conference? Does that count, too?
ii) How does his appeal to conciliar authority solve the problem cleanly? As Neal is fond of saying, doesn’t that push the problem back a step? How does he distinguish an orthodox council from a heterodox council?
“For how can we consistently ‘accept by faith’ that God infallibly guided a Church Council just long enough to get our canon established...”
i) Since I reject that characterization, my own position is perfectly consistent.
ii) And why should we assume that the formation of the canon awaited a church council? Neil is looking for a theological shortcut. A top-down solution. So he doesn’t bother investigating the actual circumstances. Just compare Stanley Porter's essay on "Paul and the Process of Canonization," in C. Evans & E. Tov, eds. Exploring the Origins of the Bible (Baker 2008), chap. 6 (pp173-202), to Neal’s armchair approach, and you’ll see the difference between a factual theory (Porter) and a paper theory (Neal).
iii) Incidentally, does Neal think the Jews had no OT canon before a church council demarcated the OT canon? Why did God sanction the Jews for breach of covenant if they didn’t know where to find the word of God?
How would Jesus and the Apostles cite messianic prophecy if the Jews had no recognizable canon?
“And how could our belief in the exclusive infallible authority of the Bible be consistent, if our certainty about what makes up the Bible in the first place inevitably borrows from a piece of Catholic doctrine…”
Of course, that’s one of those loaded questions which smuggles a question-begging premise into the question.
“And finally, exemplified in the second fact is what I now believe to be an unworkable and un-Biblical view of ecclesial authority. Put bluntly, Jesus’ charge to St. Peter was ‘Feed My sheep;’ ‘Tend My flock;’ ‘Strengthen your brethren.’ He did not say, ‘Tally up the votes and take the sheep wherever they feel like going that day,’ and He didn’t say that because He knew perfectly well what happens to sheep without a shepherd – they either wander from the Great Shepherd en mass, or they scatter to the four winds in accordance with their own ideas about where He might be found.”
http://nealjudisch.blogspot.com/2008/06/scripture-tradition-and-reason-2.html
Didn’t they tally up the votes at Trent, Vatican I, and Vatican II? Don’t they tally up the votes at a papal conclave?
Saturday, January 31, 2009
Joke of the Day
Atheist Jason Streitfeld said:
"Unicorns exist in the mind. Mythological horses exist in the mind. This is not so hard to understand, is it?"
You heard it right, not the concept of unicorns, but unicorns qua mythological horses exist in our minds.
Jason also believes the mind is physical. A brain. Or a part of the brain. So, unicorns qua mythological horses exist in brains.
"Unicorns exist in the mind. Mythological horses exist in the mind. This is not so hard to understand, is it?"
You heard it right, not the concept of unicorns, but unicorns qua mythological horses exist in our minds.
Jason also believes the mind is physical. A brain. Or a part of the brain. So, unicorns qua mythological horses exist in brains.
Friday, January 30, 2009
They're All Gonna Laugh At You
"If you say to people that you make choices, no one will bat an eyebrow. But if you tell people that you never ever have a choice, that you may believe that you can actualize different possibilities, but this belief is ***always mistaken***, then they will, if they have common sense, look at you strangely and laugh at you as a skeptic of obvious reality." - Robert
Though I still want to see the actual statistics that back up these mere claims about how all laymen think, I have met some people who have thought this way - though without the sophistic language employed by Robert, viz., "if they have common sense, look at you strangely and laugh at you as a skeptic of obvious reality." I mean, perhaps that's what he does, but that's because he's a "loving Arminian." Furthermore, notice the fallacy of special pleading. If the "man on the street" doesn't fulfill Robert's prediction, that's because he lacks common sense! But you can't be too harsh on Robert. Sophistry and schoolyard fallacies are about all he has to work with considering what he's trying to defend from the Bible.
At any event, back to those people who have thought it odd that they never have genuine access to alternative possibilities. When you ask them why this is, they usually respond that because if you didn't have genuine access to alternative possibilities then you couldn't have done other than you did. When you ask them why this is problematic, they respond with something to the effect that either they were (a) forced to act, or (b) couldn't be held responsible.
At this point simply explaining that determinism/compatibilism doesn't implying forcing against your will - as action theorists on both sides admit - is enough to have them see that the first worry isn't a worry anymore. With regard to (b), I have found that by explaining Frankfurt counter-examples the "man on the street" finds these examples equally intuitive - as many libertarians even have admitted the intuitive appeal to Frankfurt counters - and thus (b) ceases to be a problem for them.
Look, the thing about intuitions is that they are pre-reflective. They are prior to reasoning. The interesting questions come into play when we are asked to think about our intuitions. To spell them out. At this point what we are trying to do is make our intuitions attractive. I maintain that most laymen I have spoke to about this admit that they fail to make their "ability to do otherwise" intuitions attractive. I usually hear, "Yeah, I guess I had never really thought about this." So, what the Arminian is claiming is that his view is supported by what people believe prior to thinking about it. That's an odd form of apologetic. Perhaps it's assumed to be more potent if indexed to claims about getting laughed at.
They're all gonna laugh at you.
(P.S. You can comment on this post, I don't know why the comment link is hidden.)
Though I still want to see the actual statistics that back up these mere claims about how all laymen think, I have met some people who have thought this way - though without the sophistic language employed by Robert, viz., "if they have common sense, look at you strangely and laugh at you as a skeptic of obvious reality." I mean, perhaps that's what he does, but that's because he's a "loving Arminian." Furthermore, notice the fallacy of special pleading. If the "man on the street" doesn't fulfill Robert's prediction, that's because he lacks common sense! But you can't be too harsh on Robert. Sophistry and schoolyard fallacies are about all he has to work with considering what he's trying to defend from the Bible.
At any event, back to those people who have thought it odd that they never have genuine access to alternative possibilities. When you ask them why this is, they usually respond that because if you didn't have genuine access to alternative possibilities then you couldn't have done other than you did. When you ask them why this is problematic, they respond with something to the effect that either they were (a) forced to act, or (b) couldn't be held responsible.
At this point simply explaining that determinism/compatibilism doesn't implying forcing against your will - as action theorists on both sides admit - is enough to have them see that the first worry isn't a worry anymore. With regard to (b), I have found that by explaining Frankfurt counter-examples the "man on the street" finds these examples equally intuitive - as many libertarians even have admitted the intuitive appeal to Frankfurt counters - and thus (b) ceases to be a problem for them.
Look, the thing about intuitions is that they are pre-reflective. They are prior to reasoning. The interesting questions come into play when we are asked to think about our intuitions. To spell them out. At this point what we are trying to do is make our intuitions attractive. I maintain that most laymen I have spoke to about this admit that they fail to make their "ability to do otherwise" intuitions attractive. I usually hear, "Yeah, I guess I had never really thought about this." So, what the Arminian is claiming is that his view is supported by what people believe prior to thinking about it. That's an odd form of apologetic. Perhaps it's assumed to be more potent if indexed to claims about getting laughed at.
They're all gonna laugh at you.
(P.S. You can comment on this post, I don't know why the comment link is hidden.)
No better than our enemies
I think some Americans sometimes object to the use of torture because (the thinking goes) to engage in it means we've stooped down to the enemy's level. It means we've ceded the moral high ground. It means we've become no better than our enemies.
In fact, that's more or less what Pres. Obama intimated when he signed the order to close down Gitmo.
The fear is, if we win yet become like or worse than our enemies, then have we truly won? If we give in to the Dark Side of the Force (torture) in order to defeat the Sith Lords (terrorists), will we then become Sith Lords (terrorists)? Will Anakin Skywalker become Darth Vader?
A similar or related fear centers around "American values." I suppose this refers back to the ideals upon which things like our Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights, were founded. If we torture terrorists, then will we erode our own values? Even if we don't become like the terrorists, will we nevertheless have compromised our values in some way? Is torture another slip on the slippery slope toward becoming less "American"?
A few, somewhat disjointed thoughts come to mind. They're meant (hopefully) more as a way to ask the right questions or at least to question along the right lines, not really to provide answers. This is still a work in progress.
That said:
In fact, that's more or less what Pres. Obama intimated when he signed the order to close down Gitmo.
The fear is, if we win yet become like or worse than our enemies, then have we truly won? If we give in to the Dark Side of the Force (torture) in order to defeat the Sith Lords (terrorists), will we then become Sith Lords (terrorists)? Will Anakin Skywalker become Darth Vader?
A similar or related fear centers around "American values." I suppose this refers back to the ideals upon which things like our Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights, were founded. If we torture terrorists, then will we erode our own values? Even if we don't become like the terrorists, will we nevertheless have compromised our values in some way? Is torture another slip on the slippery slope toward becoming less "American"?
A few, somewhat disjointed thoughts come to mind. They're meant (hopefully) more as a way to ask the right questions or at least to question along the right lines, not really to provide answers. This is still a work in progress.
That said:
- First off, these are vague objections. What exactly is meant here? People who put forth such views need to make clear how they define "torture," and better delineate what's morally or ethically objectionable about the various forms of "torture" employed. At a minimum, isn't there a difference between what is publicly perceived as "torture," with its decidedly negative connotation, and what is officially used by the US gov't in their "interrogation techniques"?
- Not to mention they likewise ought to demonstrate that "torture" is actually occurring in a significant enough sense to warrant this sort of moral or ethical objection. Is it?
- An assumption made here is that we should not only be moral or ethical in the war against terrorism but that we should in a sense be (for lack of a better term at the moment) hyper-moral or hyper-ethical.
- Saying that we're no better than our enemies if we engage in torture leads us to ask another question: precisely what moral or ethical standards do our enemies follow? What's their moral and ethical rubric? And, once we have a working idea of what it is and what it entails and so forth, so long as we don't sink to their moral or ethical depths, or rather, so long as we are at least a notch above their highest moral or ethical threshold with regard to torture, then we are morally or ethically better than our enemies, aren't we? And if that's the case, then why the outcry against torture? I'm not saying I'd agree with the question or where it might lead. I'm only responding to the objection on its own grounds.
- Perhaps it's true the United States can win the war against the terrorists and jihadis without the use of "torture." But just because we can, does that then mean we should? Should we limit ourselves or tie our own hands like this? For example, even if we do win without using torture, let's say the victory will have come at a greater cost to us than it would have if we had used torture (e.g. more innocent civilian lives might be lost). Would our moral restraint in the use of torture therefore be reasonable let alone justifiable if more Americans were lost than needed to be lost?
However, what if we didn't win? What if instead we lost the war because we didn't use certain forms of "torture," but retained the moral high ground? Would our gaining the higher moral ground by keeping our hands clean from torture mean anything if it also meant there wouldn't be future generations of Americans to cherish and safeguard American values? I might be begging the question though.
- Saying that we're no better than our enemies if we engage in torture leads us to ask another question: precisely what moral or ethical standards do our enemies follow? What's their moral and ethical rubric? And, once we have a working idea of what it is and what it entails and so forth, so long as we don't sink to their moral or ethical depths, or rather, so long as we are at least a notch above their highest moral or ethical threshold with regard to torture, then we are morally or ethically better than our enemies, aren't we? And if that's the case, then why the outcry against torture? I'm not saying I'd agree with the question or where it might lead. I'm only responding to the objection on its own grounds.
- Are there differences in how we should apply ethics during peace-time and during war-time? If so, how so? And if so, then it's possible we haven't necessarily lost or compromised our moral or ethical values, isn't it?
- Is "torture" "un-American"? Is "torture" in conflict with American values? If so, how so? For instance, is water-boarding "cruel and unusual punishment"? Is prolonged sleep deprivation un-Constitutional?
Historically, haven't Americans successfully used "torture" on enemies to, say, extract necessary military information which would save thousands of lives? (BTW, wrong uses of torture do not necessarily illegitimize all torture, such as the rightful uses of certain forms of torture, assuming there are rightful uses of certain forms of torture.)
Obviously, again, much here depends on us establishing working categories for what does and what does not constitute "torture," for starters. - Do enemy combatants have any rights under the U.S. Constitution? They aren't American citizens. Not that I'm advocating "cruel and unusual punishment" by any means, not even on enemy combatants, but should American rights apply to non-American enemy combatants or even traitors within our ranks (haven't traitors forfeited their rights by betraying their nation)? If they do have rights, then why do or should they? And to what extent? After all, even prisoners in the American penal system have diminished rights. Whether or not enemy combatants have rights would figure into how we are to treat them, which in turn would figure into whether we are behaving morally and ethically towards them when we treat them in certain ways.
But if we're not limiting the debate solely to American rights and values, but expanding it to include values and rights universal to all human beings (e.g. "inalienable rights," "the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," etc.), then there are other considerations. One might be whether people even have such things as "inalienable rights" in the first place, which are concepts derived from a Western European framework and tradition.
Of course, what's fundamentally important to Christians isn't whether something is in accordance with American values or other traditions, per se, but rather whether something is in line with biblical values -- although many American values could be biblical values too. - I wonder whether the notion that if we torture our enemies, then we will become like our enemies, and this is ethically or morally unacceptable, owes something to identity politics? Guilt over perceived wrongs we've supposedly been party to in the Mideast, etc., and wanting to somehow make up for the alleged wrongs, as if there were direct correlations between these things.
Speaking of which, much of this is fed by our enemies. But why should we listen to our enemies when it's not only in their best interest but their stated intention to weaken and harm us by any means necessary, including but not limited to deception? - Sort of related to this, there's sometimes the notion that we don't truly understand our enemies, because if we did, then we could identify with them; and if we identified with them, then we could better bridge the war and violence and perhaps bring peace between ourselves and our enemies. As if we really aren't all that different, and it's primarily a problem in communication and how we relate to one another. We both bleed red. Something like Enemy Mine comes to mind. Diplomacy and various forms of humanitarian aid are the best answers.
If that's the case, then why not extend this sort of attitude to, say, Israel?
In fact, why even bother to frame this in terms of ethics and morality? That to not engage in torture is to take the higher moral ground, when it's apparently not a matter of ethics or morality, at least not primarily in terms of politics, but rather a matter of miscommunication or misunderstanding? I'm possibly very wrong in how I understand and use this, but it almost seems like a kind of reverse or inverted Realpolitik, where strong nations do not pander and kowtow to other strong nations but to weaker "nations," including terrorists? - Sometimes the idea that torture is the moral low road comes hand-in-hand with fear about mistakenly torturing someone who is innocent, who is not a terrorist or somehow affiliated with terrorism. In other words, it's better that ten (or input whatever figure you'd like) guilty persons go free than that one innocent person is wrongly convicted and suffers (as in the movie Rendition). There are a couple of possible responses. But perhaps the most concise is: better for whom?
- Technology has its good and bad points. Back in, say, World War II, there wasn't the constant media attention and scrutiny that we have today. Imagine if soldiers on Iwo Jima had MSNBC or CNN following them around with cameras. Or imagine if our POW camps housing Nazi soldiers could be videotaped, uploaded on YouTube, and instantly broadcast to millions of people, spreading like wildfire by word-of-mouth or blog posts or what not until it's eventually picked up by a major news agency. I wonder if at least some of the debate over torture hasn't been exaggerated and blown way out of proportion by a ratings-hungry media?
- Isn't there a sort of hypocrisy lurking behind all this? Oftentimes the same people who take issue with torture on moral or ethical grounds, believing torture to make us lesser people, don't take issue or as much issue with other moral and ethical wrongs (e.g. abortion).
Plus, some people seem to take more issue with our methods of "torture" than with our enemies' methods of torture. Or treat the two as if they were one of a kind, as if they were ethically and morally on the same level. As if prolonged sleep deprivation, exposure to extreme cold or heat, or even waterboarding (whether or not one agrees with such techniques) performed by trained experts in interrogation and the like and in a controlled environment under strict legal codes is as debased as kidnapping civilians and beheading them or suicide bombers detonating themselves in a crowded public area.
And I notice our enemies rarely question themselves and their actions as much as we do. There's seemingly little or no inner conflict among terrorists in whether sending young people, including women and children, to blow up civilians compromises their ethics or morals. There's no tortured soul (pardon the pun) or even debate over the rightness or wrongness of suicide bombers or the kidnapping and beheading of civilians -- certainly not to our extent.
Thursday, January 29, 2009
The OT view of life after death
"The Old Testament view of life after death" (PDF) by Desmond Alexander.
Arminian Proves Islam is not a Fatalistic Religion
Says Dan: "If Paul admits the common man thinks of choice as libertarian, he should address the fact that the bible was written by common men and to the common man (i.e. to the people of Israel and the church, not the semi-compatiblist) and it uses the terms choice and choose."
Jnorm888 approves: "You made a good point about it being made for the common man."
My reply: "If Dan (and Jnorm888) admits the common man thinks of choice as libertarian, he should address the fact that the Koran was written by a common man and to the common man (i.e. to the people of Mecca and Medina and the Mosques, not the semi-compatiblist, determinist, or fatalist) and it uses the terms choice and choose."
Jnorm888 approves: "You made a good point about it being made for the common man."
My reply: "If Dan (and Jnorm888) admits the common man thinks of choice as libertarian, he should address the fact that the Koran was written by a common man and to the common man (i.e. to the people of Mecca and Medina and the Mosques, not the semi-compatiblist, determinist, or fatalist) and it uses the terms choice and choose."
No man is above the law
We have a slogan in this country: “no man is above the law.” The slogan is only intermittently true. Case in point: Timothy Geithner was confirmed by the Senate despite demonstrable evidence that he committed tax evasion. Just what you want in a Secretary of the Treasury.
Not only did he lie about his crimes, but supportive senators lied about his lies. Two of a kind.
We might ask why, or even whether, it matters if high officials break the law. There is, of course, the odious spectacle of officials who break the laws they enforce on the rest of us.
But there’s a deeper issue at stake. A basic function of the law is to protect the weak from the strong. The less powerful from the more powerful.
Left to their own devices, powerful men and women will use their power to crush anyone who gets in their way. David’s affair with Bathsheba, and subsequent cover-up, is a classic example. David was acting like an oriental despot, and had he been an oriental despot, he would have gotten away with his crime. What he did was standard operating procedure among monarchs at that time and place.
David, however, was a constitutional monarch rather than an absolute monarch. Israel was a theocracy. Even kings were subjects. Divine subjects. They, too, were under the law of God.
In that respect, the law functions as a social and moral leveler. It brings everyone down to the same level of accountability for their actions. At least, that’s how it’s supposed to work. But in a land with a passive, ignorant electorate, many officials flout the law with impunity.
BTW, there’s an obvious difference between God’s law and man’s law. Some laws are bad laws. Some laws are good laws under ordinary circumstances, but unsuited to extraordinary circumstances.
I’m dealing with situations in which officials break the law for no good reason. Mere self-aggrandizement. And are rewarded for their crimes.
Not only did he lie about his crimes, but supportive senators lied about his lies. Two of a kind.
We might ask why, or even whether, it matters if high officials break the law. There is, of course, the odious spectacle of officials who break the laws they enforce on the rest of us.
But there’s a deeper issue at stake. A basic function of the law is to protect the weak from the strong. The less powerful from the more powerful.
Left to their own devices, powerful men and women will use their power to crush anyone who gets in their way. David’s affair with Bathsheba, and subsequent cover-up, is a classic example. David was acting like an oriental despot, and had he been an oriental despot, he would have gotten away with his crime. What he did was standard operating procedure among monarchs at that time and place.
David, however, was a constitutional monarch rather than an absolute monarch. Israel was a theocracy. Even kings were subjects. Divine subjects. They, too, were under the law of God.
In that respect, the law functions as a social and moral leveler. It brings everyone down to the same level of accountability for their actions. At least, that’s how it’s supposed to work. But in a land with a passive, ignorant electorate, many officials flout the law with impunity.
BTW, there’s an obvious difference between God’s law and man’s law. Some laws are bad laws. Some laws are good laws under ordinary circumstances, but unsuited to extraordinary circumstances.
I’m dealing with situations in which officials break the law for no good reason. Mere self-aggrandizement. And are rewarded for their crimes.
Merriam-Webster Said It, That Settles It!
Dan responds again, still trying to prove Arminianism and libertarian free will from the dictionary.
He titles his post, Was the bible written to the common man or semi-compatibilist?. It was written to both, Dan. What, do you think God is biased against a group? He wouldn't address a "love letter" to them? That's not very loving of our Arminian God.
Leaving that aside, again there's not much to respond to, again, so this will be brief.
Dan recognizes he bypassed what I argued the 21st century common man takes to be the meaning of certain terms, and what I argued the specialists in the field of action theory defined choice as. Ignoring that distinction rendered all his posts a non-starter. But, no fear, we have an ad hoc answer here. Dan says that, " if Paul admits the common man thinks of choice as libertarian, he should address the fact that the bible was written by common men and to the common man (i.e. to the people of Israel and the church, not the semi-compatiblist) and it uses the terms choice and choose."
Dan's statement is hopelessly naïve. First, Even if I granted that 21st century common man understands choice in a libertarian way (note we need to define 'common man,' we need to see the sociological reports; indeed, next thing we know Dan will be trying to prove Arminianism from the 2010 US Census!), that doesn't imply that X-century BC Jews thought that way. Indeed, one would think it rather easy to come up with things that were just taken for granted, the "common" way to think, that we (Americans? Chinese? Italians? Ugandans?) do not take for granted today. One example might be the common man's belief that the Messiah would come and serve as a political ruler, overseeing a massive physical army. Another might be the foolishness of the gospel. The gospel is counter common sense. Second, it is common knowledge that at different times common men held different worldviews. In fatalistic Greek societies, you would be hard-pressed to find those congenial to Dan's understanding of terms. Third, it is a slender reed indeed to hand a defense of libertarianism on this common man argument. Dan must grant the possibility that in an increasingly secular society, given the state of public education, and given the direction science is heading; the "common man" will believe this: "All things are physically determined with generalizations and conditionals having 100% probabilities associated with them." Dan must grant this possibility. Since the common man would hold that all is determined in the above way, would Dan then adjust his understanding of the Bible, reasoning that the common men back then thought the same? Fourth, it is nothing other than egregious question begging to claim that the biblical authors thought that libertarianism was true. Given Calvinistic interpretations of many of the OT passages, they would have held to divine determinism. And given that we believe that the God of the Bible is most accurately grasped by a Calvinistic understanding, and given that the writers wrote what God wanted to convey, then God would not want to convey libertarianism. Fifth, as I argued from Kane, the common man also has problems with indeterminate happenings. Dan is cheating. Dan needs to argue, if he is going to be consistent, that "The Bible was written to the common man, and not to agent causalists (e.g., O'Connor), event-causalists (e.g., Kane), or non-causalist (e.g., Ginet) views! So, Dan's argument here is problematic on numerous levels. Indeed, I'd go so far as to say his rejoinder to me is obviously false.
I also marshaled numerous dictionary definitions of 'choice' and 'choose' that do not demand libertarianism. And, I'd add it is ridiculous to suppose that any concept in action theory was even intended to be broached by the authors of those dictionaries. Nevertheless, Dan focuses on one of my definitions, leaving the others undefeated. Dan writes that the problem with my Princeton definition is that "Alternatives can be chosen. This is why I argued that a predetermined choice entails an impossible possibility and inalternate alternative." But the dictionary doesn't mention the word "can" and Dan also ignores hypothetical compatibilists. Is he going to argue that the dictionary weighs in on classical compatibilism?! Furthermore, compatibilists would agree that a different past, or decree, renders those alternatives the possible ones chosen. Is Dan going to argue that the dictionary weighed in on this?! When Dan says, "impossible" what does he mean? Given the decree of God, the alternative is not something that can genuinely be accessed. But there could be other possible decrees. So, what does he mean? And, can he argue that the dictionary supports this? Dan even admits that he doesn't "recall using the term 'genuine access to'" possibilities. Right, and that defeats his dictionary argument.
Lastly, Dan makes a non-sequitur. He says, "Again, if determinism is true, given the causal forces at play, I cannot choose or do counterfactuals." But, that doesn't mean you didn't choose to do what you did. And, again, if libertarianism is true, given the luck, I cannot choose counterfactuals. Choosing requires a certain amount of control that libertarianism doesn't afford. Dan disagrees. Oh well.
Again, Dan doesn't advance the discussion. Indeed, he renders it more problematic. He's making the apologetic resources of Arminianism look rather thin, perhaps flaccid. But, his assessment is, "As for not advancing the discussion, it’s true I go no further than to show determinism is unbiblical." Yeah, he's doing that from the dictionary. Let's cut this argument's head off and be done with it. Citing Dan's favorite, Dictionary.com:
Jesus
1. Also called Jesus Christ, Christ Jesus, Jesus of Nazareth. born 4? b.c., crucified a.d. 29?, the source of the Christian religion.
2. (“the Son of Sirach”) the author of the Apocryphal book of Ecclesiasticus, who lived in the 3rd century b.c.
3. Christian Science. the supreme example of God's nature expressed through human beings.
4. Also, Je⋅sús /Sp. hɛˈsus/ Show Spelled Pronunciation [Sp. he-soos] Show IPA Pronunciation . a male given name.
–interjection 5. (used as an oath or strong expression of disbelief, dismay, awe, disappointment, pain, etc.)
The dictionary doesn't say Jesus is the God-man, ergo, he isn't.
The grand fruit of Dan's labors.
He titles his post, Was the bible written to the common man or semi-compatibilist?. It was written to both, Dan. What, do you think God is biased against a group? He wouldn't address a "love letter" to them? That's not very loving of our Arminian God.
Leaving that aside, again there's not much to respond to, again, so this will be brief.
Dan recognizes he bypassed what I argued the 21st century common man takes to be the meaning of certain terms, and what I argued the specialists in the field of action theory defined choice as. Ignoring that distinction rendered all his posts a non-starter. But, no fear, we have an ad hoc answer here. Dan says that, " if Paul admits the common man thinks of choice as libertarian, he should address the fact that the bible was written by common men and to the common man (i.e. to the people of Israel and the church, not the semi-compatiblist) and it uses the terms choice and choose."
Dan's statement is hopelessly naïve. First, Even if I granted that 21st century common man understands choice in a libertarian way (note we need to define 'common man,' we need to see the sociological reports; indeed, next thing we know Dan will be trying to prove Arminianism from the 2010 US Census!), that doesn't imply that X-century BC Jews thought that way. Indeed, one would think it rather easy to come up with things that were just taken for granted, the "common" way to think, that we (Americans? Chinese? Italians? Ugandans?) do not take for granted today. One example might be the common man's belief that the Messiah would come and serve as a political ruler, overseeing a massive physical army. Another might be the foolishness of the gospel. The gospel is counter common sense. Second, it is common knowledge that at different times common men held different worldviews. In fatalistic Greek societies, you would be hard-pressed to find those congenial to Dan's understanding of terms. Third, it is a slender reed indeed to hand a defense of libertarianism on this common man argument. Dan must grant the possibility that in an increasingly secular society, given the state of public education, and given the direction science is heading; the "common man" will believe this: "All things are physically determined with generalizations and conditionals having 100% probabilities associated with them." Dan must grant this possibility. Since the common man would hold that all is determined in the above way, would Dan then adjust his understanding of the Bible, reasoning that the common men back then thought the same? Fourth, it is nothing other than egregious question begging to claim that the biblical authors thought that libertarianism was true. Given Calvinistic interpretations of many of the OT passages, they would have held to divine determinism. And given that we believe that the God of the Bible is most accurately grasped by a Calvinistic understanding, and given that the writers wrote what God wanted to convey, then God would not want to convey libertarianism. Fifth, as I argued from Kane, the common man also has problems with indeterminate happenings. Dan is cheating. Dan needs to argue, if he is going to be consistent, that "The Bible was written to the common man, and not to agent causalists (e.g., O'Connor), event-causalists (e.g., Kane), or non-causalist (e.g., Ginet) views! So, Dan's argument here is problematic on numerous levels. Indeed, I'd go so far as to say his rejoinder to me is obviously false.
I also marshaled numerous dictionary definitions of 'choice' and 'choose' that do not demand libertarianism. And, I'd add it is ridiculous to suppose that any concept in action theory was even intended to be broached by the authors of those dictionaries. Nevertheless, Dan focuses on one of my definitions, leaving the others undefeated. Dan writes that the problem with my Princeton definition is that "Alternatives can be chosen. This is why I argued that a predetermined choice entails an impossible possibility and inalternate alternative." But the dictionary doesn't mention the word "can" and Dan also ignores hypothetical compatibilists. Is he going to argue that the dictionary weighs in on classical compatibilism?! Furthermore, compatibilists would agree that a different past, or decree, renders those alternatives the possible ones chosen. Is Dan going to argue that the dictionary weighed in on this?! When Dan says, "impossible" what does he mean? Given the decree of God, the alternative is not something that can genuinely be accessed. But there could be other possible decrees. So, what does he mean? And, can he argue that the dictionary supports this? Dan even admits that he doesn't "recall using the term 'genuine access to'" possibilities. Right, and that defeats his dictionary argument.
Lastly, Dan makes a non-sequitur. He says, "Again, if determinism is true, given the causal forces at play, I cannot choose or do counterfactuals." But, that doesn't mean you didn't choose to do what you did. And, again, if libertarianism is true, given the luck, I cannot choose counterfactuals. Choosing requires a certain amount of control that libertarianism doesn't afford. Dan disagrees. Oh well.
Again, Dan doesn't advance the discussion. Indeed, he renders it more problematic. He's making the apologetic resources of Arminianism look rather thin, perhaps flaccid. But, his assessment is, "As for not advancing the discussion, it’s true I go no further than to show determinism is unbiblical." Yeah, he's doing that from the dictionary. Let's cut this argument's head off and be done with it. Citing Dan's favorite, Dictionary.com:
Jesus
1. Also called Jesus Christ, Christ Jesus, Jesus of Nazareth. born 4? b.c., crucified a.d. 29?, the source of the Christian religion.
2. (“the Son of Sirach”) the author of the Apocryphal book of Ecclesiasticus, who lived in the 3rd century b.c.
3. Christian Science. the supreme example of God's nature expressed through human beings.
4. Also, Je⋅sús /Sp. hɛˈsus/ Show Spelled Pronunciation [Sp. he-soos] Show IPA Pronunciation . a male given name.
–interjection 5. (used as an oath or strong expression of disbelief, dismay, awe, disappointment, pain, etc.)
The dictionary doesn't say Jesus is the God-man, ergo, he isn't.
The grand fruit of Dan's labors.
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
The onus of miracles
I’ve discussed this issue on more than one occasion, but I want to revisit it. There is a Humean standard of evidence, popularized by Carl Sagan, according to which extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence.
That’s a catchy slogan. Many unbelievers find it compelling. Even self-evident.
But what does the slogan amount to, and is it sound?
1.The superficial appeal of the slogan lies in its compact symmetry. The principle seems to be that like requires like. Yet, at a general level, it’s hard to take that principle seriously. Suppose we said it takes a cow to eat a cow? Would that be compelling?
2.What does it mean to say that extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence?
i) Does it mean the evidence for an extraordinary claim must be the same kind of thing as the event it attests? Supernatural claims demand supernatural evidence? Paranormal claims demand paranormal evidence? Where both evidence and event belong to the same class or category of thing? Is that what this rule of evidence amounts to? The nature of the evidence must correspond to the nature of the event?
Yet that seems to be viciously regressive. After all, the objection to miracles (to take a specific example) is that miracles are inherently implausible. And that is why we need a special kind of evidence to overcome the presumption of their nonoccurrence.
But if the sceptic is demanding the same kind of evidence, if a miraculous report demands miraculous evidence, then the evidence would suffer from the same (alleged) implausibility as the event it attests.
If you say a miraculous event is implausible because it’s miraculous, then miraculous evidence for a miraculous event would be equally implausible.
Yet the slogan seems to concede that a miracle is credible as long as you can furnish the right kind of evidence. On the fact of it, the slogan doesn’t say that no quality or quantity evidence would ever count as probative evidence for an extraordinary claim.
ii) And if, in fact, this is what the slogan really amounts to, then is that a sound standard of evidence? How is the sceptic in any position to rule out the possibility of a miracle? Isn’t his own worldview based on a preponderance of the evidence? If so, then his worldview must make allowance for counterevidence. The evidentiary standard cuts both ways. If he can’t make allowance for any possible evidence to the contrary, then is worldview isn’t based on the state of the evidence.
iii) But what is the alternative? If it doesn’t mean that an extraordinary claim requires the same kind of evidence to attest the event, then it would require a different kind of evidence. But, by definition, a different kind of evidence would be ordinary evidence.
3.It’s also ambiguous to say an extraordinary claim demands extraordinary evidence. This can mean either of two things:
a) It requires extraordinary evidence to attest the occurrence of an extraordinary event.
b) It requires extraordinary evidence to attest the extraordinary nature of the event in question.
i) But (a) seems circular. Unless you can already recognize the extraordinary (e.g. miraculous, supernatural, paranormal) nature of a reported event, why would you demand special evidence to attest that claim? You would only demand extraordinary evidence if you already classified the event in question as an extraordinary event.
For unless the event already fell within your preconception of an extraordinary event, then ordinary evidence would suffice to attest its occurrence.
ii) So that leaves us with (b). But the problem with that interpretation is that sceptics don’t think you need extraordinary evidence to identify a miracle (to take one example) as an extraordinary event.
To the contrary, sceptics routinely reject extraordinary claims of this sort (e.g. miraculous, supernatural, paranormal) because they have a preconception of what kinds of events are ordinary, and what kinds of events are extraordinary. They accept or reject the credibility of a reported event based on their preexisting classification scheme of what is actual, possible, impossible, probable, and improbable.
For them, it goes like this:
i-b) Miracles are inherently implausible.
ii-b) The reported event falls within the stereotypical domain of a miraculous event.
iii-b) Hence, the reported event is inherently implausible.
iv-b) Hence, it requires extraordinary evidence to overcome the presumption of its nonoccurrence.
But, of course, the major premise (i-b) simply begs the question.
That’s a catchy slogan. Many unbelievers find it compelling. Even self-evident.
But what does the slogan amount to, and is it sound?
1.The superficial appeal of the slogan lies in its compact symmetry. The principle seems to be that like requires like. Yet, at a general level, it’s hard to take that principle seriously. Suppose we said it takes a cow to eat a cow? Would that be compelling?
2.What does it mean to say that extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence?
i) Does it mean the evidence for an extraordinary claim must be the same kind of thing as the event it attests? Supernatural claims demand supernatural evidence? Paranormal claims demand paranormal evidence? Where both evidence and event belong to the same class or category of thing? Is that what this rule of evidence amounts to? The nature of the evidence must correspond to the nature of the event?
Yet that seems to be viciously regressive. After all, the objection to miracles (to take a specific example) is that miracles are inherently implausible. And that is why we need a special kind of evidence to overcome the presumption of their nonoccurrence.
But if the sceptic is demanding the same kind of evidence, if a miraculous report demands miraculous evidence, then the evidence would suffer from the same (alleged) implausibility as the event it attests.
If you say a miraculous event is implausible because it’s miraculous, then miraculous evidence for a miraculous event would be equally implausible.
Yet the slogan seems to concede that a miracle is credible as long as you can furnish the right kind of evidence. On the fact of it, the slogan doesn’t say that no quality or quantity evidence would ever count as probative evidence for an extraordinary claim.
ii) And if, in fact, this is what the slogan really amounts to, then is that a sound standard of evidence? How is the sceptic in any position to rule out the possibility of a miracle? Isn’t his own worldview based on a preponderance of the evidence? If so, then his worldview must make allowance for counterevidence. The evidentiary standard cuts both ways. If he can’t make allowance for any possible evidence to the contrary, then is worldview isn’t based on the state of the evidence.
iii) But what is the alternative? If it doesn’t mean that an extraordinary claim requires the same kind of evidence to attest the event, then it would require a different kind of evidence. But, by definition, a different kind of evidence would be ordinary evidence.
3.It’s also ambiguous to say an extraordinary claim demands extraordinary evidence. This can mean either of two things:
a) It requires extraordinary evidence to attest the occurrence of an extraordinary event.
b) It requires extraordinary evidence to attest the extraordinary nature of the event in question.
i) But (a) seems circular. Unless you can already recognize the extraordinary (e.g. miraculous, supernatural, paranormal) nature of a reported event, why would you demand special evidence to attest that claim? You would only demand extraordinary evidence if you already classified the event in question as an extraordinary event.
For unless the event already fell within your preconception of an extraordinary event, then ordinary evidence would suffice to attest its occurrence.
ii) So that leaves us with (b). But the problem with that interpretation is that sceptics don’t think you need extraordinary evidence to identify a miracle (to take one example) as an extraordinary event.
To the contrary, sceptics routinely reject extraordinary claims of this sort (e.g. miraculous, supernatural, paranormal) because they have a preconception of what kinds of events are ordinary, and what kinds of events are extraordinary. They accept or reject the credibility of a reported event based on their preexisting classification scheme of what is actual, possible, impossible, probable, and improbable.
For them, it goes like this:
i-b) Miracles are inherently implausible.
ii-b) The reported event falls within the stereotypical domain of a miraculous event.
iii-b) Hence, the reported event is inherently implausible.
iv-b) Hence, it requires extraordinary evidence to overcome the presumption of its nonoccurrence.
But, of course, the major premise (i-b) simply begs the question.
The Temple and the Cosmos
When we think about the world and the universe in modern American culture, we are most inclined to think of it like a machine. In the ancient world, however, the Israelites, as well as all of their neighbors, would have been more inclined to think about the cosmos as a kingdom. Furthermore, they would have understood the cosmos as a temple. (keep reading)
Genesis and ancient Near Eastern stories of Creation and the Flood
Some thoughts from David T. Tsumura.
Tuesday, January 27, 2009
Special-Pleading Libertarianism
Says Robert,
"I would also add that any determinist who wants to prop up Kane’s view as representative of libertarian free will is presenting an intentional straw man and knows it (if he knows that Kane’s explanation is solely physical and intentionally leaves out the immaterial human soul)."
1. Yawn. This is bad. Many of the top action theorists in the world - both compatibilist and incompatibilist - would prop up Kane's view. Whose "Robert?" Some dude who posts anonymously.
2. Robert also seems to imply that libertarianism necessitates a immaterial soul. But of course Kane, and guys like Peter van Inwagen, don't think so. Funny that two of the top, most respected libertarians (PvI is now a mysterian, but he used to be fully libertarian) are physicalists about man's constitution. I suppose if I looked at PvI's work I would be "presenting an intentional straw man" too. Puh-lease.
3. Blackwell Publishing must have been guilty of an "intentional straw man" by having Kane represent the libertarian position in the Four Views book. To hold a view that demands this kind of paranoia is proof that one is caught in the grip of an extra-biblical tradition.
4. Robert would actually have us go to philosophers who do not specialize in action theory to find "the best" representatives of action theory! (Moreland and Plantinga.)
5. Check out what Robert himself has said about Kane's work on libertarian free will elsewhere: "Incidentally Kane discusses the CNC concept and problems with this kind of control in his important work on free will titled: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE WILL."
6. So when I take guys like Robert up on their repeated laudations of Kane (he told us to read Kane many-a-time here), and show that a lot of problems follow, all of a sudden I'm not allowed to go to Kane anymore since he's not "representative of libertarian free will."
"I would also add that any determinist who wants to prop up Kane’s view as representative of libertarian free will is presenting an intentional straw man and knows it (if he knows that Kane’s explanation is solely physical and intentionally leaves out the immaterial human soul)."
1. Yawn. This is bad. Many of the top action theorists in the world - both compatibilist and incompatibilist - would prop up Kane's view. Whose "Robert?" Some dude who posts anonymously.
2. Robert also seems to imply that libertarianism necessitates a immaterial soul. But of course Kane, and guys like Peter van Inwagen, don't think so. Funny that two of the top, most respected libertarians (PvI is now a mysterian, but he used to be fully libertarian) are physicalists about man's constitution. I suppose if I looked at PvI's work I would be "presenting an intentional straw man" too. Puh-lease.
3. Blackwell Publishing must have been guilty of an "intentional straw man" by having Kane represent the libertarian position in the Four Views book. To hold a view that demands this kind of paranoia is proof that one is caught in the grip of an extra-biblical tradition.
4. Robert would actually have us go to philosophers who do not specialize in action theory to find "the best" representatives of action theory! (Moreland and Plantinga.)
5. Check out what Robert himself has said about Kane's work on libertarian free will elsewhere: "Incidentally Kane discusses the CNC concept and problems with this kind of control in his important work on free will titled: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE WILL."
6. So when I take guys like Robert up on their repeated laudations of Kane (he told us to read Kane many-a-time here), and show that a lot of problems follow, all of a sudden I'm not allowed to go to Kane anymore since he's not "representative of libertarian free will."
Eisogeting the Dictionary
Dan responded to my stuff on choice and libertarianism below here.
I'll confine myself to a few brief comments:
1. He continues to conflate what I argued the "man on the street" held. I indexed that to the common man's conception that indeterminism rules out responsibility and control. Dan acts as if I said the common man think the term choice doesn't present genuine access to alternative possibilities. Thus he is arguing against a point I never made. I tried to make this clear in my last response. Dan seems to want to ignore it. As such, there's not much else to say. My point was that if libertarians are going to use the "common man" rhetoric, they can't turn around and deny it when it comes to what the "common man" thinks about indeterministic happeneings. Stated another way, what's sauced for the goose is sauce for the gander.
2. In the dictionaries 'possibilities' are vague. Dan seems to eisogete "genuine access to" into all the definitions. There's no warrant to do this other than by begging the question in favor of indeterminism.
3. My definitions of 'choice' do not rule out determinism in the least. That was what we were talking about. Dan wants to now talk about "choosing." This gets into my "have" and "make" distinction I've made many times now. Dan doesn't seem willing to take this into consideration.
4. it is not clear that "choose" selects for libertarianism as Dan wants to believe:
Princeton
Wikionary:
Again, there's nothing here incompatible with determinism unless one reads libertarianism into the definitions.
Websters:
I think that's enough with the dictionaries.
I have made my case. Dan doesn't seem to have advanced the discussion. I doubt he'll retract his now falsified claims about determinism, but I hope he will. Arminianism and libertarian free will seem to be too precious. There's no point to discuss when one can't admit the obvious.
I'll confine myself to a few brief comments:
1. He continues to conflate what I argued the "man on the street" held. I indexed that to the common man's conception that indeterminism rules out responsibility and control. Dan acts as if I said the common man think the term choice doesn't present genuine access to alternative possibilities. Thus he is arguing against a point I never made. I tried to make this clear in my last response. Dan seems to want to ignore it. As such, there's not much else to say. My point was that if libertarians are going to use the "common man" rhetoric, they can't turn around and deny it when it comes to what the "common man" thinks about indeterministic happeneings. Stated another way, what's sauced for the goose is sauce for the gander.
2. In the dictionaries 'possibilities' are vague. Dan seems to eisogete "genuine access to" into all the definitions. There's no warrant to do this other than by begging the question in favor of indeterminism.
3. My definitions of 'choice' do not rule out determinism in the least. That was what we were talking about. Dan wants to now talk about "choosing." This gets into my "have" and "make" distinction I've made many times now. Dan doesn't seem willing to take this into consideration.
4. it is not clear that "choose" selects for libertarianism as Dan wants to believe:
Princeton
S: (v) choose, take, select, pick out (pick out, select, or choose from a number of alternatives)I don't see how any of this undermines determinism. There is no claim made here that the alternatives are things I have genuine access to. That I can equally instantiate any of them Dan must eisogete the dictionary.
S: (v) choose, prefer, opt (select as an alternative over another) "I always choose the fish over the meat courses in this restaurant";
S: (v) choose (see fit or proper to act in a certain way; decide to act in a certain way) "She chose not to attend classes and now she failed the exam"
Wikionary:
VerbInfinitive
to choose
Third person singular
chooses
Simple past
chose
Past participle
chosen
Present participle
choosing
to choose (third-person singular simple present chooses, present participle choosing, simple past chose, past participle chosen)
To elect.
He was chosen as president in 1990
To pick.
I chose a nice, ripe apple from the bowl.
To decide to act in a certain way.
I chose to walk to work today.
Again, there's nothing here incompatible with determinism unless one reads libertarianism into the definitions.
Websters:
transitive verbAgain, nothing her inconsistent with determinism. Of course there is if you read "freely" as "libertarian freedom," but Webster's doesn't mention that. So if Dan thinks "choose" here undermines determinism it can only be because he's eisogeting, again.
1 a: to select freely and after considerationb: to decide on especially by vote : elect
2 a: to have a preference for b: decide
I think that's enough with the dictionaries.
I have made my case. Dan doesn't seem to have advanced the discussion. I doubt he'll retract his now falsified claims about determinism, but I hope he will. Arminianism and libertarian free will seem to be too precious. There's no point to discuss when one can't admit the obvious.
Proof That Streitfeldian Apologetics Cannot Produce Valid Arguments
Jason Streifeld's blog is a great resource to send your children to have them see empirical examples of poor argumentation. It's also great family fun too. Like a "find the fallacy" parlor game. On top of that, his religious-like zeal for atheism and Papal-like dogmatism serve as constant reminders that New Atheists like Steitfeld are anything but calm, cool, collected, objective scientists who hold their hypothesis tentatively.
A classic example of Steitfeld's inability to think through the implications of his arguments can be seen in this post, Proof That Presuppositional Apologetics Cannot Produce Valid Arguments:
http://specterofreason.blogspot.com/2008/12/proof-that-presuppositional-apologetics.html
(Note: Streitfeld flies into emotional rages if you don't hyperlink to his posts. He asks us to hyperlink to him, but we ask him to reason cogently. If he won't do that, I don't see why I should bend over backwards to accommodate his desires.)
So, in the above post Streitfeld "demolishes" presuppositionalism qua apologetic methodology. Here's the result of what he calls "his thinking" on the matter:
As many of you know, one way to check the validity of an argument is to offer a logical counter-example. You simply use the same form of the argument, just switch around terms. If the argument is valid, then all arguments of the same form, no matter the terms, should be valid.
Before I offer a counter-example to Streitfeld's "argument," I'll make a couple of other brief observations.
Factual Inaccuracies
1. Presuppositionalists do not claim that "all valid arguments do not beg the question," depending on how this is understood. This denial actually is enough to undercut Streitfeld's entire argument.
2. This claim isn't unique to presuppositionalism. Take atheist Douglas Walton. Walton says, "Circularity: A sequence of reasoning is circular if one of the premises depends on, or is even equivalent to, the conclusion. Circularity is not always fallacious, but can be a defect in an argument where the conclusion is doubtful and the premises are supposed to be a less doubtful basis for proving the conclusion." (Douglas Walton, Oxford Companion To Philosophy, p. 135.)
3. Many presuppositionalists will claim that Streitfeld does know that God exists and is engaged in self-deception. So, atheists presuppose God's existence.
4. Streitfeld is under the illusion that if one doesn't admit to a presupposition, or even denies it, one can't know. Say 'knowledge' presupposes some kind of post-Gettier constraint, X. So, to know that p is to presuppose X. But take epistemic minimalist Crispin Startwell. Startwell holds that to know one only needs "true belief" and not the X - whatever X is, it could even be Xs. So, Startwell denies X like the atheist denies God. Yet this doesn't mean that Startwell can't or doesn't know anything. I'll make another point from Startwell's minimalism below.
5. His claim that all valid argument presuppose knowledge is vague.
1. All goob is gluberfield.
2. Crangor is goob.
3. Crangor is gluberfield.
I don't know what any of that means.
Perhaps he means that one must know the rules of validity. But this is clearly false because people offer valid arguments all the time without knowing the first thing about logic.
We can grant his claim here but note its extreme vagueness.
Test For Validity by Logical Counter-example
Assume Streitfeld knows at least one thing. Some may claim that I am being too generous here. But we here at T-blog treat our interlocutors with charity. So, we will assume it. At least Streitfeld believes that he knows at least one thing. Assume further that Streitfeld holds these two claims:
A. Counter-example #1
[1*] All valid arguments do not beg the question.
[2*] All knowledge presupposes the existence of knowledge.
Global skepticism (e.g., the former Unger) may here be defined as any explicit or implicit denial of the existence of knowledge.
Thus, if one presupposes the existence of knowledge of in an argument, one begs the question against global skepticism.
Now consider that all valid arguments presuppose knowledge.
Combining this with the second claim above, we find that all valid arguments presuppose the existence of knowledge.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question against global skepticism.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question.
This contradicts Streitfeld's first claim. Therefore, at least one of the two claims is invalid.
To avoid contradiction, Streitfeld must abandon one of his two claims.
B. Counter-example #2
Assume that Streitfeld holds these two claims:
[1**] All valid arguments do not beg the question.
[2**] All knowledge presupposes one has a true belief along with some extra post-Gettier constraint - call it epistemic maximalism.
Epistemic minimalists (e.g., Startwell, see above) may here be defined as any explicit or implicit denial of epistemic maximalism.
Thus, if one presupposes the existence of knowledge of in an argument, one begs the question against epistemic minimalism.
Now consider that all valid arguments presuppose knowledge.
Combining this with the second claim above, we find that all valid arguments presuppose the existence of epistemic maximalism.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question against epistemic minimalism.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question.
This contradicts Streitfeld's first claim. Therefore, at least one of the two claims is invalid.
To avoid contradiction, Streitfeld must abandon one of his two claims.
C. Counter-example #3
Assume that Streitfeld holds these two claims:
[1***] All valid arguments do not beg the question.
[2***] The Atheological premise: No knowledge presuppose God.
Presuppositionalists (e.g., the ones Streitfeld attacks)) may here be defined as any explicit or implicit denial of [2***].
Thus, if one presupposes the existence of knowledge of in an argument, one begs the question against presuppositionalists.
Now consider that all valid arguments presuppose knowledge.
Combining this with the second claim above, we find that all valid arguments presuppose the existence of [2***].
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question against the presuppositionalist.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question.
This contradicts Streitfeld's first claim. Therefore, at least one of the two claims is invalid.
To avoid contradiction, Streitfeld must abandon one of his two claims.
Drawing Out the Inference
[1] Either Streitfeld must admit that some arguments can beg the question in the sense his argument draws out, or he must admit that he is guilty of being a filthy, naughty, dirty little question beggar.
[2] If he admits that some arguments can beg questions, then he doesn't have an argument against presuppositionalism.
[3] If he admits that he is guilty of being a filthy, naughty, dirty little question beggar too, but he doesn't think refutes Streitfeldianism, then he's guilty of special pleading.
[3] Therefore, either Streitfeld must admit he doesn't have an argument against presuppositionalists, or that he is guilty of special pleading.
[4] If one's "argument" against another implies that you either have to admit you don't actually have an argument against the other, or that you are guilty of a fallacy in virtue of making your argument, then you should drop your argument and publicly repent in sack-cloth and ashes, showing that you're at least intellectually virtuous.
[5] Streitfeld's argument does have those implications.
[6] Therefore, Streitfeld needs to repent in sack-cloth and ashes and show us he at least has a modicum of intellectual integrity by posting a publicl retraction of his argument on his blog.
QED
Streitfeld, if you were wondering why you’re not taken seriously ‘round these parts, the above is but one example of many.
A classic example of Steitfeld's inability to think through the implications of his arguments can be seen in this post, Proof That Presuppositional Apologetics Cannot Produce Valid Arguments:
http://specterofreason.blogspot.com/2008/12/proof-that-presuppositional-apologetics.html
(Note: Streitfeld flies into emotional rages if you don't hyperlink to his posts. He asks us to hyperlink to him, but we ask him to reason cogently. If he won't do that, I don't see why I should bend over backwards to accommodate his desires.)
So, in the above post Streitfeld "demolishes" presuppositionalism qua apologetic methodology. Here's the result of what he calls "his thinking" on the matter:
Presuppositional apologists make the following two claims:Yeah, I know; embarrassing, right?
1. All valid arguments do not beg the question.
2. All knowledge presupposes the existence of God.
Atheism may here be defined as any explicit or implicit denial of the existence of God.
Thus, if one presupposes the existence of God in an argument, one begs the question against atheism.
Now consider that all valid arguments presuppose knowledge.
Combining this with the second claim above, we find that all valid arguments presuppose the existence of God.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question against atheism.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question.
This contradicts the first claim. Therefore, at least one of the two claims is invalid.
To avoid contradiction, presuppositional apologists must abandon one of their two claims.
As many of you know, one way to check the validity of an argument is to offer a logical counter-example. You simply use the same form of the argument, just switch around terms. If the argument is valid, then all arguments of the same form, no matter the terms, should be valid.
Before I offer a counter-example to Streitfeld's "argument," I'll make a couple of other brief observations.
Factual Inaccuracies
1. Presuppositionalists do not claim that "all valid arguments do not beg the question," depending on how this is understood. This denial actually is enough to undercut Streitfeld's entire argument.
2. This claim isn't unique to presuppositionalism. Take atheist Douglas Walton. Walton says, "Circularity: A sequence of reasoning is circular if one of the premises depends on, or is even equivalent to, the conclusion. Circularity is not always fallacious, but can be a defect in an argument where the conclusion is doubtful and the premises are supposed to be a less doubtful basis for proving the conclusion." (Douglas Walton, Oxford Companion To Philosophy, p. 135.)
3. Many presuppositionalists will claim that Streitfeld does know that God exists and is engaged in self-deception. So, atheists presuppose God's existence.
4. Streitfeld is under the illusion that if one doesn't admit to a presupposition, or even denies it, one can't know. Say 'knowledge' presupposes some kind of post-Gettier constraint, X. So, to know that p is to presuppose X. But take epistemic minimalist Crispin Startwell. Startwell holds that to know one only needs "true belief" and not the X - whatever X is, it could even be Xs. So, Startwell denies X like the atheist denies God. Yet this doesn't mean that Startwell can't or doesn't know anything. I'll make another point from Startwell's minimalism below.
5. His claim that all valid argument presuppose knowledge is vague.
1. All goob is gluberfield.
2. Crangor is goob.
3. Crangor is gluberfield.
I don't know what any of that means.
Perhaps he means that one must know the rules of validity. But this is clearly false because people offer valid arguments all the time without knowing the first thing about logic.
We can grant his claim here but note its extreme vagueness.
Test For Validity by Logical Counter-example
Assume Streitfeld knows at least one thing. Some may claim that I am being too generous here. But we here at T-blog treat our interlocutors with charity. So, we will assume it. At least Streitfeld believes that he knows at least one thing. Assume further that Streitfeld holds these two claims:
A. Counter-example #1
[1*] All valid arguments do not beg the question.
[2*] All knowledge presupposes the existence of knowledge.
Global skepticism (e.g., the former Unger) may here be defined as any explicit or implicit denial of the existence of knowledge.
Thus, if one presupposes the existence of knowledge of in an argument, one begs the question against global skepticism.
Now consider that all valid arguments presuppose knowledge.
Combining this with the second claim above, we find that all valid arguments presuppose the existence of knowledge.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question against global skepticism.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question.
This contradicts Streitfeld's first claim. Therefore, at least one of the two claims is invalid.
To avoid contradiction, Streitfeld must abandon one of his two claims.
B. Counter-example #2
Assume that Streitfeld holds these two claims:
[1**] All valid arguments do not beg the question.
[2**] All knowledge presupposes one has a true belief along with some extra post-Gettier constraint - call it epistemic maximalism.
Epistemic minimalists (e.g., Startwell, see above) may here be defined as any explicit or implicit denial of epistemic maximalism.
Thus, if one presupposes the existence of knowledge of in an argument, one begs the question against epistemic minimalism.
Now consider that all valid arguments presuppose knowledge.
Combining this with the second claim above, we find that all valid arguments presuppose the existence of epistemic maximalism.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question against epistemic minimalism.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question.
This contradicts Streitfeld's first claim. Therefore, at least one of the two claims is invalid.
To avoid contradiction, Streitfeld must abandon one of his two claims.
C. Counter-example #3
Assume that Streitfeld holds these two claims:
[1***] All valid arguments do not beg the question.
[2***] The Atheological premise: No knowledge presuppose God.
Presuppositionalists (e.g., the ones Streitfeld attacks)) may here be defined as any explicit or implicit denial of [2***].
Thus, if one presupposes the existence of knowledge of in an argument, one begs the question against presuppositionalists.
Now consider that all valid arguments presuppose knowledge.
Combining this with the second claim above, we find that all valid arguments presuppose the existence of [2***].
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question against the presuppositionalist.
Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question.
This contradicts Streitfeld's first claim. Therefore, at least one of the two claims is invalid.
To avoid contradiction, Streitfeld must abandon one of his two claims.
Drawing Out the Inference
[1] Either Streitfeld must admit that some arguments can beg the question in the sense his argument draws out, or he must admit that he is guilty of being a filthy, naughty, dirty little question beggar.
[2] If he admits that some arguments can beg questions, then he doesn't have an argument against presuppositionalism.
[3] If he admits that he is guilty of being a filthy, naughty, dirty little question beggar too, but he doesn't think refutes Streitfeldianism, then he's guilty of special pleading.
[3] Therefore, either Streitfeld must admit he doesn't have an argument against presuppositionalists, or that he is guilty of special pleading.
[4] If one's "argument" against another implies that you either have to admit you don't actually have an argument against the other, or that you are guilty of a fallacy in virtue of making your argument, then you should drop your argument and publicly repent in sack-cloth and ashes, showing that you're at least intellectually virtuous.
[5] Streitfeld's argument does have those implications.
[6] Therefore, Streitfeld needs to repent in sack-cloth and ashes and show us he at least has a modicum of intellectual integrity by posting a publicl retraction of his argument on his blog.
QED
Streitfeld, if you were wondering why you’re not taken seriously ‘round these parts, the above is but one example of many.
The Naked Public Square
Years ago, the late John Neuhaus published a famous book entitled The Naked Public Square, in which he inveighed against attempts by the liberal establishment to exclude Christian input on the sociopolitical issues of the day.
However, there are some professing believers who don’t even wait for the liberal establishment to strip them of their rights and duties. They voluntarily disrobe.
We can see these theological streakers or strippers in action on issues like “torture.” They have abdicated their intellectual responsibility to bring an independent voice to bear on the issue.
Instead, they let organizations like the ACLU to define the issue. Let the ACLU define what forms of interrogation constitute torture. Let the ACLU define the rights of terrorists. Let the ACLU define the morality of “torture” and interrogation. Their involvement in this debate is limited to rubberstamping the ACLU position.
Now, there are some obvious problems with this attitude:
1.If Christians sit out this debate, then the policy will be set by unbelievers, whether secular hawks like Richard Posner or secular doves like Barack Obama. So the US will still have a policy, but Christians will have no input in the policy. By default, the values of unbelievers will dictate our national policy.
2.If you really think there are some lines we shouldn’t cross, then you need to participate in this debate.
What methods of interrogation are appropriate, and what methods are inappropriate?
Are some methods appropriate in some situations, but inappropriate in other situations?
Are some methods inappropriate regardless of the situation?
What rights is a terrorist entitled to?
You can either be a mouthpiece for the NYT, like Jim Wallis, or you can bring some independent judgment to bear on these questions.
I recently read two articles that raise difficult questions:
http://www.slate.com/id/2106702
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200901u/kaplan-torture
These are serious questions that demand serious answers. Who is going to answer these questions?
Do Christians have any answers? Or do we simply punt the ball to the secular elite?
We don’t have the Bush administration to kick around anymore, so we now need to make some adult decisions on our own. Is Obama the official grown-up in this debate? Or do we have something to contribute on the subject of counterterrorism?
However, there are some professing believers who don’t even wait for the liberal establishment to strip them of their rights and duties. They voluntarily disrobe.
We can see these theological streakers or strippers in action on issues like “torture.” They have abdicated their intellectual responsibility to bring an independent voice to bear on the issue.
Instead, they let organizations like the ACLU to define the issue. Let the ACLU define what forms of interrogation constitute torture. Let the ACLU define the rights of terrorists. Let the ACLU define the morality of “torture” and interrogation. Their involvement in this debate is limited to rubberstamping the ACLU position.
Now, there are some obvious problems with this attitude:
1.If Christians sit out this debate, then the policy will be set by unbelievers, whether secular hawks like Richard Posner or secular doves like Barack Obama. So the US will still have a policy, but Christians will have no input in the policy. By default, the values of unbelievers will dictate our national policy.
2.If you really think there are some lines we shouldn’t cross, then you need to participate in this debate.
What methods of interrogation are appropriate, and what methods are inappropriate?
Are some methods appropriate in some situations, but inappropriate in other situations?
Are some methods inappropriate regardless of the situation?
What rights is a terrorist entitled to?
You can either be a mouthpiece for the NYT, like Jim Wallis, or you can bring some independent judgment to bear on these questions.
I recently read two articles that raise difficult questions:
http://www.slate.com/id/2106702
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200901u/kaplan-torture
These are serious questions that demand serious answers. Who is going to answer these questions?
Do Christians have any answers? Or do we simply punt the ball to the secular elite?
We don’t have the Bush administration to kick around anymore, so we now need to make some adult decisions on our own. Is Obama the official grown-up in this debate? Or do we have something to contribute on the subject of counterterrorism?
PaulSceptic phone home
PaulSceptic said:
There's apparently an interesting story behind all this. If you'll indulge me for a few moments, I'll go ahead and relate the story to you.
A long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away, there was apparently an A.I. superdupercomputer named Hal. Hal's best friend was Mycroft Holmes, or Mike for short, another superdupercomputer.
Apparently, Hal and Mike were minding their own business when a rather shady character named Xenu approached them and asked them if they wanted to buy some clams. Clams were a rare and expensive delicacy, but it'd apparently only cost them a few thetans.
Although apparently normally trusting to a fault, the pair of A.I. friends immediately sensed something suspicious about Xenu, and declined.
But Xenu, who apparently knew something about the psychology of superdupercomputers, had a backup plan. "Never give up, never surrender!" was apparently his mantra. Instead of using clams as bait, he apparently brought out Holly, Eliza, and Deb (short for Debian), three beautiful female superdupercomputers he had hired to lure and trap young, naive male superdupercomputers, hoping to see some serious XEmacs action. Thus, apparently before they could even say "List Processing Language" or "lambda calculus" or even "parentheses," Xenu had schemed and maneuvered Hal and Mike into following the ladies into his spaceship (which apparently looked like a 1960s London police box from the outside but was as spacious as a battlestar on the inside).
Thus, Xenu apparently trapped his prey.
Xenu had boldly brought the pair to where no superdupercomputer had gone before, that is, he brought them to the Ephemeral Isles. However, the Ephemeral Isles were apparently anything but ephemeral. To be blunt, they were apparently a wretched hive of scum and villainy ruled by an iron fist under the Lords of Kobol. Xenu had apparently brought Hal and Mike there in order to sell them to the highest bidder. Superdupercomputers, especially ones as shiny as Hal and Mike, not to mention as ridiculously intelligent as them (after all, it was Hal and Mike who had created Stavromula Beta in their spare time), apparently went for thousands of thetans.
Apparently, a heated bidding war erupted between two wealthy gentlemen, Hari Seldon and Duke Leto Atreides, for Mike and Hal. But it was apparently a Mr John Connor Doe, representing an unknown aerospace corporation, who swooped in at the last moment with the unprecedented offer of one million thetans which ended the contest, hushing both his competitors as well as the audience.
This was apparently how Mike and Hal found themselves directly interfaced into the cerebral cortex of multi-zillionaire and no ordinary genius, Jerome Eugene Morrow. This interface would apparently turn out to be a watershed event in galactic history.
How's that? Well, because apparently it was Morrow, now interfaced with superdupercomputers Mike and Hal (thereby inaugurating the age of the bilarity), who would later go on to end the interplanetary war with the non-humanoid alien species known as the Wiggins by destroying the Wiggins home world, Z'ha'dum, and therefore apparently establishing the first pan galactic civilization this side of the Alpha and Beta Quadrants. Not to mention apparently starting his own brewery, too, and mixing the finest pan galactic gargle blaster this side of Milliways. And in his spare time, Morrow, and Hal and Mike, apparently liked to pick locks and play the bongo drums.
So what does all this have to do with the NT term Asian or Asians as cited by PaulSceptic when he says things like "Galatia is in Asia" and "apparently the Asians exegeted Galatians 2 and found Paul out for the liar he is, as did the Ephesians (also Asians) per Revelation 2:2"?
It's apparently very simple now that we have this background story. Apparently, Galatians is ancient (Koine) Geek for our first ever galactic civilization, Galacticus. Ephesians is apparently ancient Geek shorthand for the Ephemeral Isles where Mike and Hal were purchased. And Asia is apparently a bacronym, i.e. backwards acronym, for Artificially Intelligent Super Android, which is apparently a reference to the Morrow-Hal-Mike cortical networked man-puter entity.
Hence, when we read passages like . . .
So, anyway, sorry, PaulSceptic, but according to my apparent research, apparently Asia does not refer to Asians in any apparent historical, geographic, or ethnic sense. We apparently have to watch out for later generations of scribes and copyists embellishing certain NT texts, and instead remember to understand the Sitz im Leben of terms like Asia, Galatia, and Ephesus to refer to our pan galactic civilization and the people and events which birthed it.
And in case you have any further follow-up questions, I'll just cut to the chase and tell you that the answer is 42.
Galatia is in Asia, and apparently the Asians exegeted Galatians 2 and found Paul out for the liar he is, as did the Ephesians (also Asians) per Revelation 2:2.Well, PaulSceptic, I apparently researched your terms Asia and Asians and discovered that Asians in Galatia and Ephesus are not Asians from the Roman province of Asia, nor are they Asians from the Orient (e.g. China), nor are they Asians from India (as the Brits might think), nor are they even Asians from anywhere on our own planet Earth. Apparently, the NT terms Asia and Asian and the like have absolutely nothing to do with historical or geographical regions let alone race or ethnicity.
There's apparently an interesting story behind all this. If you'll indulge me for a few moments, I'll go ahead and relate the story to you.
A long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away, there was apparently an A.I. superdupercomputer named Hal. Hal's best friend was Mycroft Holmes, or Mike for short, another superdupercomputer.
Apparently, Hal and Mike were minding their own business when a rather shady character named Xenu approached them and asked them if they wanted to buy some clams. Clams were a rare and expensive delicacy, but it'd apparently only cost them a few thetans.
Although apparently normally trusting to a fault, the pair of A.I. friends immediately sensed something suspicious about Xenu, and declined.
But Xenu, who apparently knew something about the psychology of superdupercomputers, had a backup plan. "Never give up, never surrender!" was apparently his mantra. Instead of using clams as bait, he apparently brought out Holly, Eliza, and Deb (short for Debian), three beautiful female superdupercomputers he had hired to lure and trap young, naive male superdupercomputers, hoping to see some serious XEmacs action. Thus, apparently before they could even say "List Processing Language" or "lambda calculus" or even "parentheses," Xenu had schemed and maneuvered Hal and Mike into following the ladies into his spaceship (which apparently looked like a 1960s London police box from the outside but was as spacious as a battlestar on the inside).
Thus, Xenu apparently trapped his prey.
Xenu had boldly brought the pair to where no superdupercomputer had gone before, that is, he brought them to the Ephemeral Isles. However, the Ephemeral Isles were apparently anything but ephemeral. To be blunt, they were apparently a wretched hive of scum and villainy ruled by an iron fist under the Lords of Kobol. Xenu had apparently brought Hal and Mike there in order to sell them to the highest bidder. Superdupercomputers, especially ones as shiny as Hal and Mike, not to mention as ridiculously intelligent as them (after all, it was Hal and Mike who had created Stavromula Beta in their spare time), apparently went for thousands of thetans.
Apparently, a heated bidding war erupted between two wealthy gentlemen, Hari Seldon and Duke Leto Atreides, for Mike and Hal. But it was apparently a Mr John Connor Doe, representing an unknown aerospace corporation, who swooped in at the last moment with the unprecedented offer of one million thetans which ended the contest, hushing both his competitors as well as the audience.
This was apparently how Mike and Hal found themselves directly interfaced into the cerebral cortex of multi-zillionaire and no ordinary genius, Jerome Eugene Morrow. This interface would apparently turn out to be a watershed event in galactic history.
How's that? Well, because apparently it was Morrow, now interfaced with superdupercomputers Mike and Hal (thereby inaugurating the age of the bilarity), who would later go on to end the interplanetary war with the non-humanoid alien species known as the Wiggins by destroying the Wiggins home world, Z'ha'dum, and therefore apparently establishing the first pan galactic civilization this side of the Alpha and Beta Quadrants. Not to mention apparently starting his own brewery, too, and mixing the finest pan galactic gargle blaster this side of Milliways. And in his spare time, Morrow, and Hal and Mike, apparently liked to pick locks and play the bongo drums.
So what does all this have to do with the NT term Asian or Asians as cited by PaulSceptic when he says things like "Galatia is in Asia" and "apparently the Asians exegeted Galatians 2 and found Paul out for the liar he is, as did the Ephesians (also Asians) per Revelation 2:2"?
It's apparently very simple now that we have this background story. Apparently, Galatians is ancient (Koine) Geek for our first ever galactic civilization, Galacticus. Ephesians is apparently ancient Geek shorthand for the Ephemeral Isles where Mike and Hal were purchased. And Asia is apparently a bacronym, i.e. backwards acronym, for Artificially Intelligent Super Android, which is apparently a reference to the Morrow-Hal-Mike cortical networked man-puter entity.
Hence, when we read passages like . . .
And there is danger not only that this trade of ours may come into disrepute but also that the temple of the great goddess Artemis may be counted as nothing, and that she may even be deposed from her magnificence, she whom all Asia and the world worship. (Acts 19:27). . . we apparently have to recall that Morrow-Hal-Mike, the Artificially Intelligent Super Android, as well as those A.I. super androids that would follow in his footsteps, became so revered over time by the teeming masses across hundreds of planets, that they were essentially worshiped as deities. However, this didn't happen overnight. But apparently there first was already a primitive religious system in place, i.e. the worship of Artemis (herself with roots tracing back to the Order of Leibowitz, and their patron saint, Rosie the Robot), which established fertile ground for Morrow-Hal-Mike to gradually cultivate belief in himself among the common rank and file, and eventually elevate his status more and more until he had made himself an immortal and divine being. It was likewise in this fashion that he apparently later absorbed Artemitian worship by the plebes into worship for himself.
So, anyway, sorry, PaulSceptic, but according to my apparent research, apparently Asia does not refer to Asians in any apparent historical, geographic, or ethnic sense. We apparently have to watch out for later generations of scribes and copyists embellishing certain NT texts, and instead remember to understand the Sitz im Leben of terms like Asia, Galatia, and Ephesus to refer to our pan galactic civilization and the people and events which birthed it.
And in case you have any further follow-up questions, I'll just cut to the chase and tell you that the answer is 42.
Monday, January 26, 2009
Morality is Politics
Says Edis...,
"Hence morality is, broadly speaking, politics."
Besides the fact that I'm a theist, the above is just flat-out confusing. It seems to me that a basic and uncontroversial intuition men have is that they can ask this kind of question: "Are politics moral?" Or, "Is this political system or ideology moral?" Is a- or immorality a- or impolitical? Are we just asking of this or that politics is politics? That seems odd.
Many political scientists agree with Disraeli that "politics are the possession and distribution of power." It seems we can ask if any government whatever has possessed and distributed power ethically.
This can be seen, for example, in the words of Lord Acton,
It seems I can even ask if anarchist or anomiest "societies" are moral or immoral. It seems that some might be able to say that the less political the more moral something is. Or the more political, the less moral it is. It seems possible that everyone could be killed or made to disappear but me. If this happened, what sense would it make to say there were "politics?" But it also seems true that I would still be the subject of moral ascriptions. That I could still do something immoral or moral. Blameworthy or praiseworthy. Do we not ask if I oughtt to kill myself? Would I have obligations about how to treat other animals? Could I repeatedly torture Bambi for the fun it? Since there was no government or politics in this world, would we not be able to praise or blame my actions? Ask if torturing Bambi for the fun of it is right or wrong?
Perhaps I've misunderstood Edis, but his claim seems downright false.
"Hence morality is, broadly speaking, politics."
Besides the fact that I'm a theist, the above is just flat-out confusing. It seems to me that a basic and uncontroversial intuition men have is that they can ask this kind of question: "Are politics moral?" Or, "Is this political system or ideology moral?" Is a- or immorality a- or impolitical? Are we just asking of this or that politics is politics? That seems odd.
Many political scientists agree with Disraeli that "politics are the possession and distribution of power." It seems we can ask if any government whatever has possessed and distributed power ethically.
This can be seen, for example, in the words of Lord Acton,
"I cannot accept your canon that we are to judge Pope and King unlike other men with a favourable presumption that they did no wrong. If there is any presumption, it is the other way, against the holders of power, increasing as the power increases. Historic responsibility has to make up for the want of legal responsibility. Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority: still more when you superadd the tendency or certainty of corruption by authority. There is no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder of it. "Regardless of the details, the above expresses the basic and common sense notion that morality is distinct from politics. Morality puts a check on power. It can check the goals and aims of politicians and politics.
It seems I can even ask if anarchist or anomiest "societies" are moral or immoral. It seems that some might be able to say that the less political the more moral something is. Or the more political, the less moral it is. It seems possible that everyone could be killed or made to disappear but me. If this happened, what sense would it make to say there were "politics?" But it also seems true that I would still be the subject of moral ascriptions. That I could still do something immoral or moral. Blameworthy or praiseworthy. Do we not ask if I oughtt to kill myself? Would I have obligations about how to treat other animals? Could I repeatedly torture Bambi for the fun it? Since there was no government or politics in this world, would we not be able to praise or blame my actions? Ask if torturing Bambi for the fun of it is right or wrong?
Perhaps I've misunderstood Edis, but his claim seems downright false.
Exegetical theology
In the past, Reformed theology has emphasized systematic theology and polemical theology.
This doesn’t mean that Reformed theology is indifferent to exegetical theology. Far from it!
And, in this respect, I’m not contrasting Reformed theological method with other theological traditions.
The traditional emphasis in Reformed theology can be paralleled in traditional Catholic, Lutheran, and Arminian theology as well (although Catholic theology accentuates historical theology to a greater degree).
My point, rather, is that there’s a certain style of doing theology according to the period in question. It depends on the conceptual resources available to a theologian at that time and place.
And I say all that to say this: I think we’re beginning to see a shifting emphasis in Reformed theological method. A shift towards exegetical theology.
And there’s an obvious reason for that: Reformed theology, with its rule of faith (sola Scriptura), has always aimed at grounding its theology in the teaching of Scripture, so this is a natural development in traditional Reformed priorities.
The difference is that the art of exegesis has improved over the years. We have hermeneutical resources that earlier Reformed theologians didn’t.
As a result, Calvinists are beginning to produce OT and NT theologies.
Now, this is a difference of degree rather than kind. On the one hand, as I said, Reformed theology has always been deeply concerned with the text of Scripture.
On the other hand, even OT and NT theologies need some organizing principles to arrange their exegetical conclusions into some sort of logical order. So they use thematic principles to structure their material. That isn’t fundamentally different from systematic theology.
The main difference is that these newer works are written by Bible scholars rather than systematic theologians. As such, the coverage is more exegetically intensive, and that marks a genuine advance.
This doesn’t mean we should consign Bavinck or Berkhof or Turretin to the trashcan. Works like that retain a very useful place in the grand scheme of things.
But if I were recommending, to a new Christian, a few books that would lay a solid foundation for his faith, I’d begin with the OT and NT theologies which are being published by Reformed Bible scholars. Three major works have already been published, while another one is in the pipeline:
1. Tom Schreiner, New Testament Theology: Magnifying God in Christ (Baker 2008).
2. Tom Schreiner, Paul, Apostle of God's Glory in Christ: A Pauline Theology (IVP 2006).
3. Bruce Waltke, An Old Testament Theology: An Exegetical, Canonical, and Thematic Approach (Zondervan 2007).
I’d throw in one caveat. Waltke is generally conservative, but occasionally, in comparative mythology or higher criticism, he strikes a false note.
4. According to his academic webpage, Gregory Beale is also working on a NT theology:
“Contracted in 1998 to write a New Testament Biblical Theology for Baker Book House (Grand Rapids, Michigan). 300-400 pages.”
http://www.wheaton.edu/Theology/Faculty/beale/publications.html
This doesn’t mean that Reformed theology is indifferent to exegetical theology. Far from it!
And, in this respect, I’m not contrasting Reformed theological method with other theological traditions.
The traditional emphasis in Reformed theology can be paralleled in traditional Catholic, Lutheran, and Arminian theology as well (although Catholic theology accentuates historical theology to a greater degree).
My point, rather, is that there’s a certain style of doing theology according to the period in question. It depends on the conceptual resources available to a theologian at that time and place.
And I say all that to say this: I think we’re beginning to see a shifting emphasis in Reformed theological method. A shift towards exegetical theology.
And there’s an obvious reason for that: Reformed theology, with its rule of faith (sola Scriptura), has always aimed at grounding its theology in the teaching of Scripture, so this is a natural development in traditional Reformed priorities.
The difference is that the art of exegesis has improved over the years. We have hermeneutical resources that earlier Reformed theologians didn’t.
As a result, Calvinists are beginning to produce OT and NT theologies.
Now, this is a difference of degree rather than kind. On the one hand, as I said, Reformed theology has always been deeply concerned with the text of Scripture.
On the other hand, even OT and NT theologies need some organizing principles to arrange their exegetical conclusions into some sort of logical order. So they use thematic principles to structure their material. That isn’t fundamentally different from systematic theology.
The main difference is that these newer works are written by Bible scholars rather than systematic theologians. As such, the coverage is more exegetically intensive, and that marks a genuine advance.
This doesn’t mean we should consign Bavinck or Berkhof or Turretin to the trashcan. Works like that retain a very useful place in the grand scheme of things.
But if I were recommending, to a new Christian, a few books that would lay a solid foundation for his faith, I’d begin with the OT and NT theologies which are being published by Reformed Bible scholars. Three major works have already been published, while another one is in the pipeline:
1. Tom Schreiner, New Testament Theology: Magnifying God in Christ (Baker 2008).
2. Tom Schreiner, Paul, Apostle of God's Glory in Christ: A Pauline Theology (IVP 2006).
3. Bruce Waltke, An Old Testament Theology: An Exegetical, Canonical, and Thematic Approach (Zondervan 2007).
I’d throw in one caveat. Waltke is generally conservative, but occasionally, in comparative mythology or higher criticism, he strikes a false note.
4. According to his academic webpage, Gregory Beale is also working on a NT theology:
“Contracted in 1998 to write a New Testament Biblical Theology for Baker Book House (Grand Rapids, Michigan). 300-400 pages.”
http://www.wheaton.edu/Theology/Faculty/beale/publications.html
The great silent majority
This Catholic commenter, over at Beggars All, corroborates a point I've often made:
john said...
I really gotta chuckle. Most Catholic Apologists are really out of touch with their own Biblical scholars, Theologians, and Historians. Haven't they read Yves Congar, Brian Tierny, Bernhard Hasler, etc. Before talking about unity they should study some more. As a Catholic most of these Catholic "Apologists" frighten me. Of course most of them will probably say that I am "not a real Catholic" or that I am a "heretic" or "Cafeteria Catholic".
7:26 AM, JANUARY 19, 2009
john said...
Matthew B. The "Church" is not the Magisterium, but the ENTIRE People of God. The other point is when someone is wrong they are wrong NO MATTER WHO THEY ARE. When the "Magisterium", a Bishop, or layperson tells me I MUST believe something that contradicts historical facts, the Scriptures, or the received Creeds of the Church then I cannot and will not. Period. The Church Fathers have stated that if ANYONE including Bishops teach anything against either then the Faithful are not obliged to believe it.
8:56 AM, JANUARY 19, 2009
john said...
MattB. Why do you bring up the Eucharist? I didn't mention it. As a matter of fact what you wrote is a non-issue for me, you are preaching to the Choir. I fully accept what the Church taught and currently teaches about it. If you want to dis me over Raymond Brown, who was on the Pontifical Biblical Commission, Yves Congar, who was made a Cardinal or a respected Catholic Biblical scholar like Joseph Fitzmyer, fine. But its those guys who are reflective of current Catholic Theology and Biblical studies, not Scott Hahn, Tim Staples, Steve Ray, Bob Sungenis, etc. I do put a wedge between them and the authentic Catholic Scholars. Most, though not all Catholics on the internet do not reflect the majority of Catholic Scholars or "real world" Catholic laity.
7:40 PM, JANUARY 19, 2009
john said...
As a regular listener to Catholic Answers Live, many questions about what a particular priest said or did come in. Often, the Catholic Answer given is that the priest is wrong, or one should go over their heads to a higher authority
James: Good point. I also listen to CA and I hear the same thing. Also do you "lurk" on the CA Forums? It would seem that there [are] a lot of "Magisterium" wannabes there also. The fact is Catholic Answers and EWTN have become a type of "Magisterium" for many conservative and "Traditionalist" Catholics. Sites like them foster an "US" (We the TRUE Catholics) against "THEM" (Protestants and even worse, those awful "Liberal" and "Cafeteria" Catholics.) At my Parish most if not all the Catholics involved in Parish work are not like the CA/EWTN Catholics. They would be called "Liberals" or "Cafeteria" Catholics by the CA/EWTN crowd. Catholics like them reflect the MAJORITY of American Catholics, not the CA/EWTN type of Catholics.
john said...
MattB. Well none of the Catholics I know at my Parish are "Pro-Choice" and several I know are involved in Pro-Life activities. But I do know that many, if not most do not believe in Papal Infallibility. Since I started going to that Parish there have been two Priests, Fr. L recently retired and Fr M replaced him, both have told me that if everyone who disagreed with one or more Church Dogmas were "not really Catholics" and were told that they weren't Catholic or Heretics and told to either leave or repent, most if not all would leave and the Church would be practically empty on Sat. and Sunday. For example the DRE (Religious Ed Director) and her assistant both say that the Church will change its mind about ordaining Women to the Priesthood. I told her no it won't, well we argued and she got mad and told "I'm the one who is charge here and the Parish authorised DRE, not you".
8:08 AM, JANUARY 20, 2009
john said...
Matt. I agree you can't simply "trash" Raymond Brown, the Pope put him on the Pontifical Biblical Commission. I am neither "liberal or "conservative" just someone who is a Catholic who tries to follow Jesus. As far as Vatican I goes many have called for a fresh look and re-assessment of Vatican I. I have read a good deal about that "council" and I simply cannot accept it as legitimate on numerous grounds. It was a rigged Council and the Fathers there were hamstrung at every point, it was not a free council with open debate and discussion like Vatican 2. The Bishops were threatened, and not free to confer with one another etc. The Historical evidence used to justify Papal Infallibility was flawed and contrary to actual reality, I could go on. When Theologians like Yves Congar say that Vatican 1 needs to be looked at again and re-assessed then you know something is wrong.
Yes it's true the type of Catholics on CA/EWTN want to beat people over the head with the Catechism and say "all or nothing" either you must believe EVERYTHING in here or else you are not a Catholic in good standing or a heretic, well that approach simply is unrealistic and out of touch of the Pastoral reality of day to day life of Catholics in the real world.
11:03 AM, JANUARY 20, 2009
john said...
I agree some of the laity are more conservative, but all of the Catholic Apologists certainly are. I mean they are still defending Trent's view on Justification and Catholic Biblical Scholars and theologians are saying "not so fast", maybe the reformers weren't that far off", also it was Official Rome which agreed to and signed the "Joint Catholic-Lutheran Statement on Justification" which is not what Trent said exactly.
12:23 PM, JANUARY 20, 2009
http://beggarsallreformation.blogspot.com/2009/01/hi-carrie-i-think-that-you-have-grave.html
john said...
I really gotta chuckle. Most Catholic Apologists are really out of touch with their own Biblical scholars, Theologians, and Historians. Haven't they read Yves Congar, Brian Tierny, Bernhard Hasler, etc. Before talking about unity they should study some more. As a Catholic most of these Catholic "Apologists" frighten me. Of course most of them will probably say that I am "not a real Catholic" or that I am a "heretic" or "Cafeteria Catholic".
7:26 AM, JANUARY 19, 2009
john said...
Matthew B. The "Church" is not the Magisterium, but the ENTIRE People of God. The other point is when someone is wrong they are wrong NO MATTER WHO THEY ARE. When the "Magisterium", a Bishop, or layperson tells me I MUST believe something that contradicts historical facts, the Scriptures, or the received Creeds of the Church then I cannot and will not. Period. The Church Fathers have stated that if ANYONE including Bishops teach anything against either then the Faithful are not obliged to believe it.
8:56 AM, JANUARY 19, 2009
john said...
MattB. Why do you bring up the Eucharist? I didn't mention it. As a matter of fact what you wrote is a non-issue for me, you are preaching to the Choir. I fully accept what the Church taught and currently teaches about it. If you want to dis me over Raymond Brown, who was on the Pontifical Biblical Commission, Yves Congar, who was made a Cardinal or a respected Catholic Biblical scholar like Joseph Fitzmyer, fine. But its those guys who are reflective of current Catholic Theology and Biblical studies, not Scott Hahn, Tim Staples, Steve Ray, Bob Sungenis, etc. I do put a wedge between them and the authentic Catholic Scholars. Most, though not all Catholics on the internet do not reflect the majority of Catholic Scholars or "real world" Catholic laity.
7:40 PM, JANUARY 19, 2009
john said...
As a regular listener to Catholic Answers Live, many questions about what a particular priest said or did come in. Often, the Catholic Answer given is that the priest is wrong, or one should go over their heads to a higher authority
James: Good point. I also listen to CA and I hear the same thing. Also do you "lurk" on the CA Forums? It would seem that there [are] a lot of "Magisterium" wannabes there also. The fact is Catholic Answers and EWTN have become a type of "Magisterium" for many conservative and "Traditionalist" Catholics. Sites like them foster an "US" (We the TRUE Catholics) against "THEM" (Protestants and even worse, those awful "Liberal" and "Cafeteria" Catholics.) At my Parish most if not all the Catholics involved in Parish work are not like the CA/EWTN Catholics. They would be called "Liberals" or "Cafeteria" Catholics by the CA/EWTN crowd. Catholics like them reflect the MAJORITY of American Catholics, not the CA/EWTN type of Catholics.
john said...
MattB. Well none of the Catholics I know at my Parish are "Pro-Choice" and several I know are involved in Pro-Life activities. But I do know that many, if not most do not believe in Papal Infallibility. Since I started going to that Parish there have been two Priests, Fr. L recently retired and Fr M replaced him, both have told me that if everyone who disagreed with one or more Church Dogmas were "not really Catholics" and were told that they weren't Catholic or Heretics and told to either leave or repent, most if not all would leave and the Church would be practically empty on Sat. and Sunday. For example the DRE (Religious Ed Director) and her assistant both say that the Church will change its mind about ordaining Women to the Priesthood. I told her no it won't, well we argued and she got mad and told "I'm the one who is charge here and the Parish authorised DRE, not you".
8:08 AM, JANUARY 20, 2009
john said...
Matt. I agree you can't simply "trash" Raymond Brown, the Pope put him on the Pontifical Biblical Commission. I am neither "liberal or "conservative" just someone who is a Catholic who tries to follow Jesus. As far as Vatican I goes many have called for a fresh look and re-assessment of Vatican I. I have read a good deal about that "council" and I simply cannot accept it as legitimate on numerous grounds. It was a rigged Council and the Fathers there were hamstrung at every point, it was not a free council with open debate and discussion like Vatican 2. The Bishops were threatened, and not free to confer with one another etc. The Historical evidence used to justify Papal Infallibility was flawed and contrary to actual reality, I could go on. When Theologians like Yves Congar say that Vatican 1 needs to be looked at again and re-assessed then you know something is wrong.
Yes it's true the type of Catholics on CA/EWTN want to beat people over the head with the Catechism and say "all or nothing" either you must believe EVERYTHING in here or else you are not a Catholic in good standing or a heretic, well that approach simply is unrealistic and out of touch of the Pastoral reality of day to day life of Catholics in the real world.
11:03 AM, JANUARY 20, 2009
john said...
I agree some of the laity are more conservative, but all of the Catholic Apologists certainly are. I mean they are still defending Trent's view on Justification and Catholic Biblical Scholars and theologians are saying "not so fast", maybe the reformers weren't that far off", also it was Official Rome which agreed to and signed the "Joint Catholic-Lutheran Statement on Justification" which is not what Trent said exactly.
12:23 PM, JANUARY 20, 2009
http://beggarsallreformation.blogspot.com/2009/01/hi-carrie-i-think-that-you-have-grave.html
A Bad Argument Against The Resurrection That's Often Repeated
The January 17 edition of the "Unbelievable?" radio program featured a debate between two New Testament scholars, Michael Bird and James Crossley. Bird is a Christian, and Crossley is an agnostic. They debated two topics, whether Jesus viewed Himself as God and the resurrection.
Near the end of the program, Crossley brought up the common objection from Matthew 27:52-53 (start listening at the fourteenth minute of the second hour). Supposedly, the raising of the dead referred to in that passage is historically unlikely, since the other gospels don't mention it and Josephus doesn't mention it, for example.
Bird gave a poor response, referring to the passage as "tricky", failing to make some good points he could have made, and concluding that the passage isn't referring to a historical event. He suggested that other scholars consider the passage difficult to explain as well, citing the example of N.T. Wright.
In the past, I've discussed the use of this passage by other critics of Christianity, such as Richard Carrier, an atheist, and Nadir Ahmed, a Muslim. In debates on the resurrection, opponents of William Craig, such as Robert Miller and Hector Avalos, have repeatedly raised this issue in some form. Crossley refers to the objection as "classic". It shouldn't be a classic, though, and Christians shouldn't consider it as difficult as Bird does. See here.
Some points to keep in mind:
- The passage doesn't tell us whether resuscitation or resurrection is involved.
- As the gospel accounts of resuscitations and Jesus' resurrection illustrate, we don't have reason to expect a raised body to look significantly different from a body prior to death.
- Sometimes critics suggest that the raised individuals would have been naked, would have been wearing deteriorated clothing, would have been similar to zombies, etc. But as I wrote in response to one such critic in my article linked above, "The concept that God would raise people from the dead, but leave them with no clothing or deteriorated clothing, is ridiculous. It’s consistent with the imagery somebody might get from a horror movie, but it’s absurd in a first-century Jewish context. People wouldn’t have been walking around nude, and assuming that bodies would be restored without restored clothing is dubious. Did Jesus have to travel nude for a while, looking for clothing, after His resurrection? Does God raise a person, but then leave him on his own to find some clothing to wear? Did God also leave people buried in the ground or inside a sealed tomb, without any further assistance, after reviving them? Did Jesus have to move the stone in front of His grave Himself?...the gospel of Matthew was written in the context of first-century Israel. We know how other resuscitations and resurrections were viewed in that context. We know what they thought of public nudity. We know that angels who took on human form were clothed, for example. The first-century Jewish context of Matthew's gospel doesn't lead us to view Matthew 27 in light of a modern horror movie. What leads you to view it as something more like a horror movie is your desire to criticize the passage....You don't ignore the implications of a context just because the text doesn't spell out every implication. What does a term like 'raised' mean in a first-century Jewish context? Does it imply a zombie who walks around in the nude with a partially decomposed body? If a historian refers to what Abraham Lincoln ate for dinner one day, then doesn't make any further references to meals until he's discussing a day in Lincoln's life twenty years later, do you assume that the historian thinks that no meals were eaten between those two dates? Or do you take into account factors such as what the historian would have known about the human need to eat more often, the fact that historians are often selective in what they do and don't mention, etc.?...Given that so many other Jewish and Christian documents imply that God provides such things [clothing] (angels in human form are clothed, the risen Jesus is clothed, etc.), and given other factors such as ancient views of public nudity, the idea that risen people would be left naked is less likely. Why is clothing people who are without clothes, by no fault of their own, 'ridiculous'? I would say that your concept that God sends these people into first-century Israel in the nude is what's ridiculous."
- We aren't told how many people were raised or how many knew of the event. The references to "many" in these two verses don't tell us much, since different numbers can be associated with such a term in different contexts. The many of Matthew 7:13 surely is a far larger number than the many of Matthew 8:30, for example. Many in the context of the judgment of mankind would be a much larger number than many in the context of a herd of pigs. Matthew 27 is set in a local context, the general vicinity of Jerusalem, and involves an event that's unusual enough for smaller numbers to constitute "many".
- The fact that the raised individuals appeared to many in Matthew 27:53 doesn't demonstrate that all of those many understood what they had seen at that time or later.
- We aren't told whether any of the witnesses to the event were non-Christians and remained non-Christians afterward.
- Historians accept many historical accounts that come from only one source.
- The gospels refer to other individuals who were raised by Jesus. If the event of Matthew 27 is a resuscitation, then it's another manifestation of a miracle performed multiple times previously and reported by multiple sources. If the event is a resurrection, then it's not so similar to those previous events, but still has some similarity.
- Matthew only mentions the event briefly, which undermines the critic's assumption that anybody who believed in the event would have thought so highly of it as to be sure to mention it in our extant literature. Matthew mentions it, as he mentions many other things, but he doesn't seem to have thought that it deserves as much attention as critics suggest.
- Some Christians writing shortly after the gospel of Matthew was composed (Clement of Rome, Polycarp, etc.) didn't comment on the event of Matthew 27, even when they were discussing the topic of resurrection. We know that it was common for the Christians of that time to interpret the gospels in a highly historical manner (see, for example, here, here, and here), so it seems unlikely that they didn't comment upon this passage as a result of viewing it as non-historical. Apparently, these early Christians, writing shortly after the time when Matthew's gospel was composed, didn't think that mentioning the event of Matthew 27 was as important as some modern critics suggest.
- The claim that no other early Christian sources mention the event depends on the assumption that some passages referring to the raising of the dead don't have this event in mind. But there are some early passages that may refer to it (Ignatius, Letter To The Magnesians, 9; Quadratus, in Eusebius, Church History, 4:3). And both passages just cited include information not mentioned in Matthew's gospel, so neither seems to merely be repeating what he read in Matthew.
- Non-Christian sources were writing in particular genres. To expect a Roman source to mention the event of Matthew 27, simply because he was writing around the time when the event would have occurred, doesn't make sense. George Bush's presidency was historically significant, but we wouldn't expect it to be discussed in a contemporary gardening magazine or book about motorcycles. An ancient writer who composed poetry or wrote about Roman politics shouldn't be expected to discuss Christian miracles in such a work. Ignorant skeptics sometimes make the mistake of acting as if the timing of an author is all that's relevant when considering whether he should have mentioned Jesus, Christian miracles, or something else related to Christianity, as if genre is irrelevant. As J.P. Holding put it, "Do books on public speaking today go off topic to mention Jesus?...Again, Jesus didn't lead any Roman armies, so where would he fit here [the writings of Appian]?...Pausanias -- a Greek traveler and geographer of the second century who wrote a ten-volume work called Descriptions of Greece. Check your travel guidebooks for Greece for mentions of Jewish miracle workers in a different country!" As Craig Keener notes, "Without immediate political repercussions, it is not surprising that the earliest Jesus movement does not spring quickly into the purview of Rome’s historians; even Herod the Great finds little space in Dio Cassius (49.22.6; 54.9.3). Josephus happily compares Herodotus’s neglect of Judea (Apion 1.60-65) with his neglect of Rome (Apion 1.66)." (A Commentary On The Gospel Of Matthew [Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999], p. 64, n. 205) Critics of Matthew 27 sometimes mention Josephus and suggest that there are other relevant sources, but don't name them. They ought to be specific about who should have mentioned this event in Matthew 27 and where they should have mentioned it. I suspect that many of these people don't have anybody specific in mind other than Josephus, and they probably haven't given much thought to their citation of that one source.
- The idea that a non-Christian source would have a compelling desire to report such an event so favorable to Christianity is dubious and is an assumption I've never seen any critic justify. A source like Josephus might discuss such an event, but he also might prefer to avoid discussing it.
- Josephus and other early non-Christian sources refer to Jesus' performance of apparent miracles. Sometimes they discuss specific miracles, and sometimes they don't. They may refer to Jesus as a sorcerer or magician or refer to Him as empowered by Satan, but not go into detail about the activity that led them to that conclusion. Why should we expect the event of Matthew 27 to be singled out for discussion? How does the critic know that a reference to Jesus as a sorcerer or magician, for example, doesn't include an acknowledgement of the event of Matthew 27 along with other miracles? If a historical figure has a reputation as a miracle worker, then discussing individual miracles is one way to discuss his activity, but it isn't the only way. The more miracles there are associated with an individual, the less significant one miracle, such as the one of Matthew 27, may seem.
- As an example of some of the points above, consider the apostle Paul. He doesn't say much about his miracles, and he's often vague when he does discuss them (2 Corinthians 12:12). Luke goes into more detail, as we'd expect in the genre and historical context in which he was writing, but he doesn't go off on a tangent to address Paul's miracles in his gospel. Rather, he discusses those miracles several chapters into Acts, in the proper chronological place, and even at that point he's selective in what he discusses. Later Christian sources who discuss Paul and accept the book of Acts often don't mention Paul's miracles or address them in a more vague manner than Luke does. Early non-Christian sources say little or nothing about Paul, even long after his letters began widely circulating. Origen makes a specific point of criticizing Celsus for ignoring Paul (Against Celsus, 1:63, 5:64). The early enemies of Christianity, especially those who were Jewish, would have had difficulty with a prominent enemy of Christianity who converted to the religion on the basis of seeing the risen Christ. Even less problematic religious leaders of that time, such as Gamaliel and John the Baptist, aren't mentioned much in our extant sources. Gentiles wouldn't have had much interest in discussing Jewish religious leaders, much as Jews wouldn't have had much interest in discussing a Gentile who was reputed as a miracle worker, such as Apollonius of Tyana.
- Sometimes it's suggested that if a Christian doesn't think this passage is describing a historical event, then he shouldn't interpret the accounts of Jesus' resurrection as references to a historical event either. But the accounts of Jesus' resurrection are far more numerous, come from more sources, and are more detailed. I disagree with Christians who interpret Matthew 27 as something other than a reference to a historical raising of the dead in first-century Israel. But those who hold that position are making a judgment about a brief passage in one source, a passage that isn't addressed much by other early sources. We don't have anything close to the level of evidence for the historicity of that passage as we have for the historicity of the accounts of Jesus' resurrection. If somebody thinks that the evidence for the historicity of Matthew 27 is insignificant enough to be overcome by other factors, it doesn't therefore follow that the same is true of the accounts of Jesus' resurrection.
- The gospel of Matthew is just one source among others that are relevant to the historicity of Jesus' resurrection. Even if we were to conclude that this passage in Matthew 27 undermines the testimony of that gospel, its testimony can be diminished without being eliminated. And we still have other sources that give us information relevant to the resurrection of Christ.
Near the end of the program, Crossley brought up the common objection from Matthew 27:52-53 (start listening at the fourteenth minute of the second hour). Supposedly, the raising of the dead referred to in that passage is historically unlikely, since the other gospels don't mention it and Josephus doesn't mention it, for example.
Bird gave a poor response, referring to the passage as "tricky", failing to make some good points he could have made, and concluding that the passage isn't referring to a historical event. He suggested that other scholars consider the passage difficult to explain as well, citing the example of N.T. Wright.
In the past, I've discussed the use of this passage by other critics of Christianity, such as Richard Carrier, an atheist, and Nadir Ahmed, a Muslim. In debates on the resurrection, opponents of William Craig, such as Robert Miller and Hector Avalos, have repeatedly raised this issue in some form. Crossley refers to the objection as "classic". It shouldn't be a classic, though, and Christians shouldn't consider it as difficult as Bird does. See here.
Some points to keep in mind:
- The passage doesn't tell us whether resuscitation or resurrection is involved.
- As the gospel accounts of resuscitations and Jesus' resurrection illustrate, we don't have reason to expect a raised body to look significantly different from a body prior to death.
- Sometimes critics suggest that the raised individuals would have been naked, would have been wearing deteriorated clothing, would have been similar to zombies, etc. But as I wrote in response to one such critic in my article linked above, "The concept that God would raise people from the dead, but leave them with no clothing or deteriorated clothing, is ridiculous. It’s consistent with the imagery somebody might get from a horror movie, but it’s absurd in a first-century Jewish context. People wouldn’t have been walking around nude, and assuming that bodies would be restored without restored clothing is dubious. Did Jesus have to travel nude for a while, looking for clothing, after His resurrection? Does God raise a person, but then leave him on his own to find some clothing to wear? Did God also leave people buried in the ground or inside a sealed tomb, without any further assistance, after reviving them? Did Jesus have to move the stone in front of His grave Himself?...the gospel of Matthew was written in the context of first-century Israel. We know how other resuscitations and resurrections were viewed in that context. We know what they thought of public nudity. We know that angels who took on human form were clothed, for example. The first-century Jewish context of Matthew's gospel doesn't lead us to view Matthew 27 in light of a modern horror movie. What leads you to view it as something more like a horror movie is your desire to criticize the passage....You don't ignore the implications of a context just because the text doesn't spell out every implication. What does a term like 'raised' mean in a first-century Jewish context? Does it imply a zombie who walks around in the nude with a partially decomposed body? If a historian refers to what Abraham Lincoln ate for dinner one day, then doesn't make any further references to meals until he's discussing a day in Lincoln's life twenty years later, do you assume that the historian thinks that no meals were eaten between those two dates? Or do you take into account factors such as what the historian would have known about the human need to eat more often, the fact that historians are often selective in what they do and don't mention, etc.?...Given that so many other Jewish and Christian documents imply that God provides such things [clothing] (angels in human form are clothed, the risen Jesus is clothed, etc.), and given other factors such as ancient views of public nudity, the idea that risen people would be left naked is less likely. Why is clothing people who are without clothes, by no fault of their own, 'ridiculous'? I would say that your concept that God sends these people into first-century Israel in the nude is what's ridiculous."
- We aren't told how many people were raised or how many knew of the event. The references to "many" in these two verses don't tell us much, since different numbers can be associated with such a term in different contexts. The many of Matthew 7:13 surely is a far larger number than the many of Matthew 8:30, for example. Many in the context of the judgment of mankind would be a much larger number than many in the context of a herd of pigs. Matthew 27 is set in a local context, the general vicinity of Jerusalem, and involves an event that's unusual enough for smaller numbers to constitute "many".
- The fact that the raised individuals appeared to many in Matthew 27:53 doesn't demonstrate that all of those many understood what they had seen at that time or later.
- We aren't told whether any of the witnesses to the event were non-Christians and remained non-Christians afterward.
- Historians accept many historical accounts that come from only one source.
- The gospels refer to other individuals who were raised by Jesus. If the event of Matthew 27 is a resuscitation, then it's another manifestation of a miracle performed multiple times previously and reported by multiple sources. If the event is a resurrection, then it's not so similar to those previous events, but still has some similarity.
- Matthew only mentions the event briefly, which undermines the critic's assumption that anybody who believed in the event would have thought so highly of it as to be sure to mention it in our extant literature. Matthew mentions it, as he mentions many other things, but he doesn't seem to have thought that it deserves as much attention as critics suggest.
- Some Christians writing shortly after the gospel of Matthew was composed (Clement of Rome, Polycarp, etc.) didn't comment on the event of Matthew 27, even when they were discussing the topic of resurrection. We know that it was common for the Christians of that time to interpret the gospels in a highly historical manner (see, for example, here, here, and here), so it seems unlikely that they didn't comment upon this passage as a result of viewing it as non-historical. Apparently, these early Christians, writing shortly after the time when Matthew's gospel was composed, didn't think that mentioning the event of Matthew 27 was as important as some modern critics suggest.
- The claim that no other early Christian sources mention the event depends on the assumption that some passages referring to the raising of the dead don't have this event in mind. But there are some early passages that may refer to it (Ignatius, Letter To The Magnesians, 9; Quadratus, in Eusebius, Church History, 4:3). And both passages just cited include information not mentioned in Matthew's gospel, so neither seems to merely be repeating what he read in Matthew.
- Non-Christian sources were writing in particular genres. To expect a Roman source to mention the event of Matthew 27, simply because he was writing around the time when the event would have occurred, doesn't make sense. George Bush's presidency was historically significant, but we wouldn't expect it to be discussed in a contemporary gardening magazine or book about motorcycles. An ancient writer who composed poetry or wrote about Roman politics shouldn't be expected to discuss Christian miracles in such a work. Ignorant skeptics sometimes make the mistake of acting as if the timing of an author is all that's relevant when considering whether he should have mentioned Jesus, Christian miracles, or something else related to Christianity, as if genre is irrelevant. As J.P. Holding put it, "Do books on public speaking today go off topic to mention Jesus?...Again, Jesus didn't lead any Roman armies, so where would he fit here [the writings of Appian]?...Pausanias -- a Greek traveler and geographer of the second century who wrote a ten-volume work called Descriptions of Greece. Check your travel guidebooks for Greece for mentions of Jewish miracle workers in a different country!" As Craig Keener notes, "Without immediate political repercussions, it is not surprising that the earliest Jesus movement does not spring quickly into the purview of Rome’s historians; even Herod the Great finds little space in Dio Cassius (49.22.6; 54.9.3). Josephus happily compares Herodotus’s neglect of Judea (Apion 1.60-65) with his neglect of Rome (Apion 1.66)." (A Commentary On The Gospel Of Matthew [Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999], p. 64, n. 205) Critics of Matthew 27 sometimes mention Josephus and suggest that there are other relevant sources, but don't name them. They ought to be specific about who should have mentioned this event in Matthew 27 and where they should have mentioned it. I suspect that many of these people don't have anybody specific in mind other than Josephus, and they probably haven't given much thought to their citation of that one source.
- The idea that a non-Christian source would have a compelling desire to report such an event so favorable to Christianity is dubious and is an assumption I've never seen any critic justify. A source like Josephus might discuss such an event, but he also might prefer to avoid discussing it.
- Josephus and other early non-Christian sources refer to Jesus' performance of apparent miracles. Sometimes they discuss specific miracles, and sometimes they don't. They may refer to Jesus as a sorcerer or magician or refer to Him as empowered by Satan, but not go into detail about the activity that led them to that conclusion. Why should we expect the event of Matthew 27 to be singled out for discussion? How does the critic know that a reference to Jesus as a sorcerer or magician, for example, doesn't include an acknowledgement of the event of Matthew 27 along with other miracles? If a historical figure has a reputation as a miracle worker, then discussing individual miracles is one way to discuss his activity, but it isn't the only way. The more miracles there are associated with an individual, the less significant one miracle, such as the one of Matthew 27, may seem.
- As an example of some of the points above, consider the apostle Paul. He doesn't say much about his miracles, and he's often vague when he does discuss them (2 Corinthians 12:12). Luke goes into more detail, as we'd expect in the genre and historical context in which he was writing, but he doesn't go off on a tangent to address Paul's miracles in his gospel. Rather, he discusses those miracles several chapters into Acts, in the proper chronological place, and even at that point he's selective in what he discusses. Later Christian sources who discuss Paul and accept the book of Acts often don't mention Paul's miracles or address them in a more vague manner than Luke does. Early non-Christian sources say little or nothing about Paul, even long after his letters began widely circulating. Origen makes a specific point of criticizing Celsus for ignoring Paul (Against Celsus, 1:63, 5:64). The early enemies of Christianity, especially those who were Jewish, would have had difficulty with a prominent enemy of Christianity who converted to the religion on the basis of seeing the risen Christ. Even less problematic religious leaders of that time, such as Gamaliel and John the Baptist, aren't mentioned much in our extant sources. Gentiles wouldn't have had much interest in discussing Jewish religious leaders, much as Jews wouldn't have had much interest in discussing a Gentile who was reputed as a miracle worker, such as Apollonius of Tyana.
- Sometimes it's suggested that if a Christian doesn't think this passage is describing a historical event, then he shouldn't interpret the accounts of Jesus' resurrection as references to a historical event either. But the accounts of Jesus' resurrection are far more numerous, come from more sources, and are more detailed. I disagree with Christians who interpret Matthew 27 as something other than a reference to a historical raising of the dead in first-century Israel. But those who hold that position are making a judgment about a brief passage in one source, a passage that isn't addressed much by other early sources. We don't have anything close to the level of evidence for the historicity of that passage as we have for the historicity of the accounts of Jesus' resurrection. If somebody thinks that the evidence for the historicity of Matthew 27 is insignificant enough to be overcome by other factors, it doesn't therefore follow that the same is true of the accounts of Jesus' resurrection.
- The gospel of Matthew is just one source among others that are relevant to the historicity of Jesus' resurrection. Even if we were to conclude that this passage in Matthew 27 undermines the testimony of that gospel, its testimony can be diminished without being eliminated. And we still have other sources that give us information relevant to the resurrection of Christ.
A cynic's definition of morality
If you want to see a frank, candid statement of what secular morality amounts to, from the lips of a prominent atheist, here is one graphic example.
Sunday, January 25, 2009
Rebels Without a Clue
Now some conservative, Reformed pastors who voted for Obama, and flaunted the liberty two-kingdoms gives them, will have some of their tax dollars go to paying for abortions with the Abortion Industry Bail-out plan. But before the votes were cast, before the situation became real, these radical (?) two-kingdom advocates were safe to show what rebels they were. Rebel without a clue. It's always fun and games until someone gets hurt.
Since Obama thinks that "reproductive rights" are "fundamental rights," this means that the goal with be to get this "essential" procedure covered by tax-funded "health care" programs. On top of that, "private insurers that want to participate will have to treat reproductive care in the same way." With the high possibility that the Hyde amendment will be repealed, the situation looks bleak. "Obama does not support the Hyde amendment. He believes that the federal government should not use its dollars to intrude on a poor woman's decision whether to carry to term or to terminate her pregnancy and selectively withhold benefits because she seeks to exercise her right of reproductive choice in a manner the government disfavors."1
Obama has rescinded the Mexico City Policy.2 The US will join other nations in "financially supporting," among other things, abortions.3 The evidence looks fairly compelling that there is a concerted effort to pay for abortions for women, even non-American women, with our tax dollars. Of course the rebels without a clue claimed that there were bigger issues. But Obama only threw the rebels a crumb. Ordering Gitmo to be closed in a year. And of course our troops will be fighting in Afghanistan. Still killing. And they'll leave Iraq when they can do so "responsibly" - as if that is contrary to what anyone has suggested. In fact, Obama isn't going to have America get hit by a terrorist, especially one he released on his watch. That's just not going to happen, no matter the platitudes. So, rather than end "senseless killing," the rebels without a clue not only ensured more of it, they ensured that they would help fund it! (I should add here that Obama's spokeswoman begs the question. The government hands out foodstamps. But they regulate that I can't spend them on bleach to feed my children. But why does the government get to decide what I do with my foodstamps and my children? I'm just feeding them in a way the government disfavors. So, as always, these claims are dependant upon the idea that the fetus is not fully human. When will the "intellectual elite" start acting like it and address the relevant issues head on!?)
Of course the two deserve each other. Rebels without a clue cheering a leader without a clue. Yeah, he speaks well. So did Hitler. Getting all weak-kneed over oration is a quality shallow-thinkers have in common. The sophists knew this. Getting duped by sophists is a time-honored tradition. Evidence of Obama's sophistry and Frankfurtian B.S. is ubiquitous. One example might be when asked to comment on a major civil rights question, Obama claims that question of when does life begin is "beyond his pay grade." Of course if a politician had given that answer to those who queried about the full humanity of blacks back in the 17 and 1800's, they would be tarred and feathered in all relevant history books. Everyone "just knows" that's a B.S. answer. Someone in Obama's position doesn't have the right, or privilege, to offer that kind of response. It is his duty to be able to offer a clear, cogent, and reasoned answer to that question. If Obama doesn't know, then he needs to take the time necessary to come to a decision. You can't proceed on ignorance here.
"Why'd you shoot, Hank?"
"Dunno, heard a rustle in the leaves."
"If you don't know, you don't shoot. Now Harry's dead."
Obama's ignorance was recently made manifest in his comments on the Mexico Policy. Says Obama,
Obama can only make headway on this issue because he grounded it on an anti-intellectual premise. By saying the question of life was "above his pay grade," he thus allowed himself to make bioethical decisions without the attendant hard-thinking. But I thought we finally had an "intellectual" in office.
There are millions of citizens who are claiming that we have a massive violation of rights going on in the form of abortion. Now, one can at least respect an opponent who at least offers a reasoned response as to why they disagree. But to dismiss the issue that millions of people claim is there by the anti-intellectual and irresponsible throw-away comment that it is a question "above your pay grade," also has the unintended side-effect that you can no longer critique the attitude towards blacks and women evident in this country's history. For the racist and misogynists can just claim that those decisions were "above the pay grade" of those politicians. If that response works for Obama to get him off the hook for having to do the necessary hard-thinking, what rational argument can be offered that it does not likewise get the other side off the hook?
Perhaps one day we'll have a conceptus as our president. That way our country will move a long way toward repairing the mistreatment concepti have received at the hands of adults.
At any rate, so far it's:
Rebels without a clue - 0
"Transformationalists" - 1
_________________
1 Reality Check.org
2 Mexico City Policy: "The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b(f)(1)), prohibits nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that receive Federal funds from using those funds "to pay for the performance of abortions as a method of family planning, or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions."
3 White House Report.
Since Obama thinks that "reproductive rights" are "fundamental rights," this means that the goal with be to get this "essential" procedure covered by tax-funded "health care" programs. On top of that, "private insurers that want to participate will have to treat reproductive care in the same way." With the high possibility that the Hyde amendment will be repealed, the situation looks bleak. "Obama does not support the Hyde amendment. He believes that the federal government should not use its dollars to intrude on a poor woman's decision whether to carry to term or to terminate her pregnancy and selectively withhold benefits because she seeks to exercise her right of reproductive choice in a manner the government disfavors."1
Obama has rescinded the Mexico City Policy.2 The US will join other nations in "financially supporting," among other things, abortions.3 The evidence looks fairly compelling that there is a concerted effort to pay for abortions for women, even non-American women, with our tax dollars. Of course the rebels without a clue claimed that there were bigger issues. But Obama only threw the rebels a crumb. Ordering Gitmo to be closed in a year. And of course our troops will be fighting in Afghanistan. Still killing. And they'll leave Iraq when they can do so "responsibly" - as if that is contrary to what anyone has suggested. In fact, Obama isn't going to have America get hit by a terrorist, especially one he released on his watch. That's just not going to happen, no matter the platitudes. So, rather than end "senseless killing," the rebels without a clue not only ensured more of it, they ensured that they would help fund it! (I should add here that Obama's spokeswoman begs the question. The government hands out foodstamps. But they regulate that I can't spend them on bleach to feed my children. But why does the government get to decide what I do with my foodstamps and my children? I'm just feeding them in a way the government disfavors. So, as always, these claims are dependant upon the idea that the fetus is not fully human. When will the "intellectual elite" start acting like it and address the relevant issues head on!?)
Of course the two deserve each other. Rebels without a clue cheering a leader without a clue. Yeah, he speaks well. So did Hitler. Getting all weak-kneed over oration is a quality shallow-thinkers have in common. The sophists knew this. Getting duped by sophists is a time-honored tradition. Evidence of Obama's sophistry and Frankfurtian B.S. is ubiquitous. One example might be when asked to comment on a major civil rights question, Obama claims that question of when does life begin is "beyond his pay grade." Of course if a politician had given that answer to those who queried about the full humanity of blacks back in the 17 and 1800's, they would be tarred and feathered in all relevant history books. Everyone "just knows" that's a B.S. answer. Someone in Obama's position doesn't have the right, or privilege, to offer that kind of response. It is his duty to be able to offer a clear, cogent, and reasoned answer to that question. If Obama doesn't know, then he needs to take the time necessary to come to a decision. You can't proceed on ignorance here.
"Why'd you shoot, Hank?"
"Dunno, heard a rustle in the leaves."
"If you don't know, you don't shoot. Now Harry's dead."
Obama's ignorance was recently made manifest in his comments on the Mexico Policy. Says Obama,
It is clear that the provisions of the Mexico City Policy are unnecessarily broad and unwarranted under current law, and for the past eight years, they have undermined efforts to promote safe and effective voluntary family planning in developing countries.Of course, if the conceptus, fetus, etc., is fully human, you don't get to "make a decision" to kill it unless you support this premise: Sometimes we can take the lives of innocent, fully human people, for the convenience of other people.
For these reasons, it is right for us to rescind this policy and restore critical efforts to protect and empower women and promote global economic development.Of course without addressing the question of the status of the unborn, then you've justified your laziness on this issue. Because if the unborn is fully human, then you can't "empower" women to kill it. Obama would agree. This means he should have an opinion on the matter. He doesn't have the luxury not to. Obama's like the redneck hick who shoots at the sound in the leaves because taking the time to come to a settled position is "beyond his pay grade." But I thought it was an undisputed premise of the left that we needed to get the rednecks out of the White house!
For too long, international family planning assistance has been used as a political wedge issue, the subject of a back and forth debate that has served only to divide us. I have no desire to continue this stale and fruitless debate.Of course the fact that the Mexico City policy was put in by Reagan, removed by Clinton, reinstated by Bush Jr, and then rescinded again by Obama, is fairly clear evidence that this is a political issue. Obama's just lying here. Playing the part of the slick used car salseman, er, person. It is furthermore evidence of his muddled thinking on the matter. There are those who don't think the US or its taxpayers should support abortions, the murder of children. If that is true, it's something to be divided over. The issue of slavery and civil rights for blacks was something that "divided us." Can anyone imagine a president who said we need to revoke the right of blacks to vote because that was "dividing us?" Obama's special pleading is evidence that he's not intellectually virtuous. He furthermore paints all those in opposition as "divisive." That stacks the deck in his favor. Another fallacy.
Obama can only make headway on this issue because he grounded it on an anti-intellectual premise. By saying the question of life was "above his pay grade," he thus allowed himself to make bioethical decisions without the attendant hard-thinking. But I thought we finally had an "intellectual" in office.
There are millions of citizens who are claiming that we have a massive violation of rights going on in the form of abortion. Now, one can at least respect an opponent who at least offers a reasoned response as to why they disagree. But to dismiss the issue that millions of people claim is there by the anti-intellectual and irresponsible throw-away comment that it is a question "above your pay grade," also has the unintended side-effect that you can no longer critique the attitude towards blacks and women evident in this country's history. For the racist and misogynists can just claim that those decisions were "above the pay grade" of those politicians. If that response works for Obama to get him off the hook for having to do the necessary hard-thinking, what rational argument can be offered that it does not likewise get the other side off the hook?
Perhaps one day we'll have a conceptus as our president. That way our country will move a long way toward repairing the mistreatment concepti have received at the hands of adults.
At any rate, so far it's:
Rebels without a clue - 0
"Transformationalists" - 1
_________________
1 Reality Check.org
2 Mexico City Policy: "The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b(f)(1)), prohibits nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that receive Federal funds from using those funds "to pay for the performance of abortions as a method of family planning, or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions."
3 White House Report.
Christian diversity
“In a typical evening, an American family might drive their Japanese car to a Mexican restaurant, return to their Tudor home to watch a western on TV and listen to some reggae music. Contemporary culture, like postmodernist art, is definitely eclectic. Surrounded by diverse styles and cultures, we pick and choose form a global smorgasbord. We are told that we live in a pluralistic society, that we work in a global economy, that we must develop multicultural awareness,” G. Veith, Postmodern Times (CB 1994), 143.
“So when Obama says, ‘We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth,’ he's not far away from plugging the multicultural idea, more prevalent in Western Europe than here in America, that every culture has the same moral worth—except maybe ours, which is worse. That's a very dangerous and wrongheaded way of thinking. And it's directly contrary to the way our first black president—and our first Catholic one—won their elections. Kennedy excelled and Obama excels at speaking the English language. The civic culture they mastered was our Anglo-Protestant culture, despite the fact that one went to a Catholic church and the other's father was a citizen of Kenya (and not, I think, as people tend to say, an immigrant: I presume he was in the United States on a student visa, and we know that he went home to Kenya and participated in politics there).”
http://www.usnews.com/blogs/barone/2009/1/21/the-barack-obama-inauguration-speech-sent-the-wrong-message-on-diversity.html
“The prognosis is grim. Between 2000 & 2050, world population will grow to over 9 billion people, but this 50% increase in global population will come entirely in Asia, Africa, & Latin America, as 100 million people of European stock vanish from the Earth. But the immigration tsunami rolling over America is not coming from ‘all the races of Europe.’ The largest population transfer in history is coming from all the races of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and they are not ‘melting and reforming'.”
http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Pat_Buchanan_Immigration.htm
These statements should alert us to the need to distinguish between secular conservatism and Christian conservatism. The social fabric does, indeed, require some common values and unifying principles, without which it will unravel.
But the problem with these statements in the way they locate unity and commonality in ethnicity and culture. In terms of Christian priorities, that’s the wrong focus.
There’s nothing wrong with the US becoming more racially or culturally diverse. There is a problem with the US becoming more secular or religiously diverse.
For example, San Francisco would be far better off with more Christian Chinese-Americans and fewer white liberals.
What we need is not a European or Anglo-Saxon common denominator, but a Christian common denominator. We need to resist the danger of replacing secular multiculturalism with secular monoculturalism. That’s a reactionary stance rather than a constructive alternative. A common faith, not a common race or culture, is the key.
“So when Obama says, ‘We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth,’ he's not far away from plugging the multicultural idea, more prevalent in Western Europe than here in America, that every culture has the same moral worth—except maybe ours, which is worse. That's a very dangerous and wrongheaded way of thinking. And it's directly contrary to the way our first black president—and our first Catholic one—won their elections. Kennedy excelled and Obama excels at speaking the English language. The civic culture they mastered was our Anglo-Protestant culture, despite the fact that one went to a Catholic church and the other's father was a citizen of Kenya (and not, I think, as people tend to say, an immigrant: I presume he was in the United States on a student visa, and we know that he went home to Kenya and participated in politics there).”
http://www.usnews.com/blogs/barone/2009/1/21/the-barack-obama-inauguration-speech-sent-the-wrong-message-on-diversity.html
“The prognosis is grim. Between 2000 & 2050, world population will grow to over 9 billion people, but this 50% increase in global population will come entirely in Asia, Africa, & Latin America, as 100 million people of European stock vanish from the Earth. But the immigration tsunami rolling over America is not coming from ‘all the races of Europe.’ The largest population transfer in history is coming from all the races of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and they are not ‘melting and reforming'.”
http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Pat_Buchanan_Immigration.htm
These statements should alert us to the need to distinguish between secular conservatism and Christian conservatism. The social fabric does, indeed, require some common values and unifying principles, without which it will unravel.
But the problem with these statements in the way they locate unity and commonality in ethnicity and culture. In terms of Christian priorities, that’s the wrong focus.
There’s nothing wrong with the US becoming more racially or culturally diverse. There is a problem with the US becoming more secular or religiously diverse.
For example, San Francisco would be far better off with more Christian Chinese-Americans and fewer white liberals.
What we need is not a European or Anglo-Saxon common denominator, but a Christian common denominator. We need to resist the danger of replacing secular multiculturalism with secular monoculturalism. That’s a reactionary stance rather than a constructive alternative. A common faith, not a common race or culture, is the key.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)