Showing posts with label linguistics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label linguistics. Show all posts

Thursday, July 11, 2019

Translating the Bible

There are different Bible translation philosophies. These go by different labels. For instance:

Major Bible translations typically reflect one of three general philosophies: formal equivalence, functional equivalence, and optimal equivalence. Formal equivalence is called a word-for-word translation and attempts to translate the Bible as literally as possible, keeping the sentence structure and idioms intact if possible. The NASB and KJV are representatives of this camp. Functional equivalence is typically referred to as a thought-for-thought translation. This is an attempt to translate the text so it has the same effect on the current reader as it had on the ancient reader. The NLT exemplifies this theory. Optimal equivalence falls between the former approaches by balancing the tension between accuracy and ease of reading. While striving for precision in translation, it also seeks clarity to the modern day reader. The ESV leans toward the formal equivalent translation philosophy. The NIV tries to balance these approaches and may lean toward a functional equivalence theory. The HCSB is an optimal equivalence translation.


Here's an approach I haven't seen discussed (which doesn't mean it hasn't been discussed). Suppose I'm translating the Bible into English. (I'm using English as an illustration because that's my mother tongue, but the approach I'm suggesting is applicable to receptor languages in general.) I'd ask myself, if Ezekiel, Jeremiah, St. Paul, or a Psalmist was a native English speaker, how would he express himself in idiomatic English? If he wasn't speaking or writing in Greek or Hebrew, if English was the original language, how would he speak or write in English? Instead of treating Greek or Hebrew as the original, and rendering that into a receptor language, suppose we imaginatively put Bible writers in a time machine and transport them to our own time and place. What words would they use? Rather than viewing the process in terms of translation from one language to another, we might switch that around by viewing the process as if the Bible writer was, in fact, speaking in our own language. If, say, he was a 20C American. Put yourself in that mindset. 

Now, what I just said is deceptively simple. There are complications to that hypothetical. There are different periods in English usage, so the answer would vary depending on whether we recast the Bible writer as a 17C English speaker, or 18C, 19C, 20C, 21C English speaker. Likewise, if even I confine myself to American examples, there's literary English, working-class English, Black English, Southern English, colloquial English, and so on. So the choice of English might depend on the target reader instead of a generic English translation.

If I was translating Ecclesiastes, the Psalter, or poetic sections in Isaiah, I'd use literary English. At the opposite extreme, if I was translating Ezk 18 & 23, I'd use street English or slang. Because that's how Ezekiel would talk if he was speaking English.  

Keep in mind that Bible translations never replace the original. We always have the Greek and Hebrew text to refer back to, as the theological benchmark. 

Sunday, August 23, 2015

Crosslinguistic influence


Yet this is not the whole truth of the matter. We do assert that God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person…. In other words, we are bound to maintain the identity of the attributes of God with the being of God in order to avoid the specter of brute fact.” 
…Over against all other beings, that is over against created beings, we must therefore hold that God’s being presents an absolute numerical identity. And even within the the ontological Trinity we must maintain that God is numerically one. He is one person. We we say that we believe in a personal God we do not merely mean that we believe in a God to whom the adjective “personality” may be attached. God is not an essence that has personality; He is absolute personality. Yet, within the being of the one person we are permitted and compelled by Scripture to make the distinction between a specific or generic type of being, and three personal subsistences.

—Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology (1971).

i) This wasn't Van Til's finest hour. It's a bad way of making a good point. The basic point, I take it, is that the Triune God isn't three persons stuck onto an impersonal essence. Rather, God is personal through-and-through. 

However, Van Til's formulation, as it stands, is contradictory and unorthodox. 

ii) So what was Van Til thinking? What did he put it that way? And is it possible to gives his statement a coherent, orthodox sense?

This may be a case of crosslinguistic influence. To begin with, English was not Van Til's first language. 

An example of crosslinguistic influence is the fact that the sense of some NT words is based, not on secular Greek, but on OT Hebrew filtered through the LXX. What David Hill calls Greek words with Hebrew meanings.

By the same token, it's possible that Van Til is using "person" in the sense of "hypostasis. That's a standard term in Trinitarian usage. And it's a flexible term, because it can mean both "person" and "substance." 

Suppose we were to substitute "hypostasis" for "person" in Van Til's statement. Suppose Van Til said "God is one hypostasis and three hypostases."

That could mean "God is one substance and three persons." That's both coherent and orthodox. 

If he's using the same word with the same intended sense throughout, then the statement is contradictory and unorthodox. If, however, he's using the same word with alternating senses, then the statement could be logically consistent and theologically orthodox.

It doesn't really work in idiomatic English. It only succeeds on the assumption that he's using "person" as a synonym for "hypostasis." 

Thursday, June 25, 2015

My advice to young pastors

Give a pastor a commentary and you feed him for a day; teach a pastor linguistics and you feed him for a lifetime.

Saturday, June 06, 2015

The virgin birth prophecy


I'm going to comment on Richard Carrier's discussion of the virgin birth prophecy:


i) It's striking that an unbeliever would imagine that Carrier a good person to ask about Isaiah 7:14. To begin with, since Carrier is an atheist, his naturalistic interpretation is a foregone conclusion. 

ii) In addition, Carrier is a Classicist, not a Hebraist or OT scholar. He has no expertise on Isa 7:14.

iii) One problem with a naturalistic interpretation of Isa 7:14 is that, even though an atheist denies inspired foresight, Bible writers, and ancient Near Easterners generally, did believe the future could be foreknown by supernatural means. When secular interpreters come to a passage like this, they confuse what they think is possible with what Isaiah believed. But when you interpret Isaiah, even if you don't believe Isaiah, you need to interpret his oracles as he understood them, consistent with his worldview. Even if you don't think his oracle could be genuinely prophetic, you must respect what he intended. That's what exegesis is all about. Ascertaining what the original author had in mind. 

I'll bet we have dozens if not hundreds of occasions where almah is used, in and out of the OT, where we can't know if the denoted girl was a virgin or not.

In other words, he hasn't actually studied the frequency of OT occurrences. This is just his seat-of-the-pants hunch. 

Moreover, the fact that the Hebrews saw a need to coin a word more definitely meaning 'virgin' (bethulah) implies that almah did not definitely mean virgin.

i) Carrier offers no evidence for that claim. Even a liberal scholar like Brevard Childs, in his commentary on Isaiah, says "it is very unlikely that a married woman would still be referred to as an almah…the preferred modern translation of 'young woman' (NRSV) is too broad a rendering since it wrongly includes young wives" (66). 

ii) Moreover, the exact rendering of almah is something of a red herring, for that fails to draw a rudimentary distinction between sense and reference. Even if almah doesn't mean "virgin," a virgin can be the referent.

For instance, Secretariat doesn't mean "horse," yet Secretariat refers to a horse. A horse is the designatum or denotatum of Secretariat. By the same token, a virgin can be the denotatum of almah even if that's not what the word means. 

iii) In addition, we need to distinguish between denotation and connotation. Even if almah isn't a synonym for "virgin," it can have presumptive virginal connotations in a culture where premarital sex was punishable. 

iv) Moreover, Carrier fails to take the larger context into account. The oracle is introduced as a "sign" or prodigy (v11). Compare that to the healing of Hezekiah–a promise attested by the prodigy of the sundial (Isa 38). A miraculous sign to portend a miraculous healing. That's the thought-world in which Isa 7 is moving.

v) Furthermore, it doesn't end with Isa 7. The career of this mysterious child continues to be charted in chaps 8-9, & 11. This is no ordinary child. His career extends generations beyond the exigent circumstances of Isa 7. 

…since Isaiah can be interpreted non-supernaturally even if he did mean virgin. After all, is it really unusual for a virgin to conceive? Say, on her wedding night? True, then she isn't a virgin anymore. But she was until she conceived (literally, not at that very moment, but the Bible is rarely so precise). Since conception does not always occur the first time it would still be significant to say that a virgin conceived, meaning only that she conceived the first time she was with a man.

In reference to the virgin birth of Christ, which is Carrier's real target, that's confused:

i) In principle, there's an asymmetrical relation between the virginity of the mother and the virginal conception of the child: 

The virginity of the mother entails the virginal conception of the child;

However, the virginal conception of the child does not entail the virginity of the mother. 

Even if the mother was not a virgin at the time, you could still have a virginal conception so long as that took place apart from sexual reproduction. 

A virginal conception doesn't require a virginal mother. It only requires that in that particular instance, the conception was not the natural result of a man impregnating a woman. In principle, you could have a virginal conception even if Mary was not a virgin. These are not mutual entailments.

ii) The primary function of Mary's virginity is to safeguard the fact that Jesus was conceived without a father. Although that's metaphysically possible even if Mary had had previous children by sexual reproduction, her virginity ensures that Christ's conception was virginal. Even though her virginity isn't a necessary precondition for the virgin birth, it renders certain the fact that Christ had a mother, but no (human) father.

In the providence of God, these separable elements (virgin mother, virginal conception) were combined to remove any ambiguity regarding the virginal conception of Christ. 

iii) In context, the virginity of Mary refers, not simply to the fact that she hadn't had sexual relations before then, but that she didn't conceive by means of sexual relations. 

Friday, February 13, 2015

Naos


i) This is a postscript to my previous reply to Alan. Both in his post ("Yes, There is a Corpus Fallacy, and It is Committed Frequently") and his podcast ("Why the Bible Teaches a Literal, Physical Temple (Naos) in 2 Thessalonians 2:4, Not a Figurative, Spiritual Temple – Ep. 23) he oscillates between what naos means and what it refers to, as if these are interchangeable categories. I find that a bit odd inasmuch as he talks about Bible scholars trained in linguistics, yet–to my knowledge–sense and reference are not equivalent. 
ii) From what I've read, "naos" doesn't mean or denote a "physical temple." That's not the definition or intension of the word. Consulting three standard reference works, it is not defined in those terms by BDAG, L&N, or EDNT.
At best, that's one of the word's extensions. And even that's inaccurate (see below).  
Perhaps "physical temple" represents Alan's interpretive summary. If so, that's apparently based on concrete examples. Problem is, that conflates sense and reference. 
iii) Apropos (ii), Alan seems to be reducing the sense of naos to a generic abstraction. Since the word often refers to physical temples, he generalizes from that fact to the conclusion that naos means a physical temple.
However, the extension of the word doesn't refer to a generic physical temple, but to many particular temples (or shrines). The concrete referent has greater specificity. It can refer to a pagan shrine (e.g. the temple of Artemis), or Solomon's temple, or the inner sanctum of Solomon's temple, or the Second Temple, or the Herodian temple, &c. 
On the one  hand, it's a semantic fallacy to suggest that it means a "physical temple." 
On the other hand, the vast number of documented (and undocumented) referents would be contrary to Alan's particular identification. In the nature of the case, specific examples select, not for a generic physical temple, but a shrine or temple at a particular place and time. 
I think his procedure–no doubt unintentionally–puts a thumb on the scales. Since he's stressing lexical semantics and semantic fallacies, it is not inappropriate, I think, to bring greater linguistic precision to the analysis. 

The "corpus fallacy" redux


I'm going to reply to Alan's post, as well as his podcast:

Imagine if someone took a three-page high school history paper of yours and claimed, "Your entire vocabulary is contained in that paper." Out of the millions of words in your written and oral discourse over the course of your lifetime, your entire terminology is limited to that high school paper.
That sort of application happens with many interpreters of the Bible. Have you read statements such as: "Matthew tends to have X vocabulary, therefore his theology is Y." Or, worse, "Paul does not use the term X in Y sense, therefore he was not aware of another commonly used sense." Or "Matthew uses X in Y sense, but Mark does not, therefore, Mark is not aware or would use its sense." You get the picture.

I don't know whose windmills Alan is tilting at. That wasn't my argument. But I guess Rocinante can use the exercise.

I have heard this type of reasoning for many years. And no linguistic Bible scholar (actually trained in linguistics) would ever use such a naive argument, at least these days.

So long as Alan is attacking a caricature. But that's irrelevant to my stated argument.

However, since he brought it up, let's consider some illustrations:

i) Protestant Pauline scholars typically include word-studies of the dikaioo word-group when attempting to ascertain Paul's usage. And although they don't confine themselves to Pauline usage, they center their discussion on Pauline usage. That's a starting-point. The primary frame of reference. How does Paul use that word-group? 

Catholics, by contrast, appeal to James. Now, is Alan taking the position that it commits the "corpus fallacy" to begin with Pauline usage in determining what Paul means by his own terminology vis-a-vis "justification"? Should we take into account all the thousands of times Paul may have used that word-group without that particular nuance? 

ii) Calvinists say proegno in some NT passages means "to choose beforehand." Arminians counter that the word usually means "to know beforehand."

Moreover, they could appeal to the thousands of times that Peter and Paul may have used that word in the sense of foreknowledge or prescience rather than prior choice. Does Alan think that's a valid tactic?

lii) Arminians appeal to cosmos in Jn 3:16 to prooftext unlimited atonement. Some Calvinists (and even some non-Calvinists) counter by pointing out that in Johannine usage, cosmos often has a qualitative rather than quantitative connotation. Moreover, they note that John often uses cosmos in contrast to Christians. 

But is that a "corpus" fallacy? Should we appeal to all the thousands of times that John may have used cosmos as a synonym for "everyone"? 

I agree, but I am addressing the claim (or the implication) by some who reject that Paul intends a literal sense of naos (temple) in 2 Thess 2:4, and some who think that Paul never would had used (or even been aware!) of the sense of a literal temple with the term naos. To claim that Paul uses the term in a spiritual sense in other contexts therefore it must mean this in 2 Thess 2:4 is ridiculous and sloppy linguistics (not saying this is Steve's position, but others make this deduction). I demonstrated that absurdity in my program in the link in the blog post.

Once again, Alan is shadowboxing with nameless opponents rather than responding to my own argument. 

In addition, yes, we should start with the target context, but I have seen not a few times from historicists to begin outside of Thessalonians and then import a spiritual meaning to naos in 2 Thess 2:4.

Alan also says that in his podcast. I find the oft-repeated accusation that "historicists" have to go outside the text to derive their interpretation ironic considering the fact that in his podcast, Alan said the naos is a makeshift shrine which Orthodox Jews will build, without divine sanction, before the midpoint of the 7-year period, to reinstate Levitical sacrifices, &c. Where did he get any of those crucial details from 2 Thes 2? 

Beale strains the text when his point is grasping at some connection between the apostasy and the temple representing the "covenant community." The exegetical connection is not there. 

Unfortunately, Alan fails to explain, either here or in the podcast, why that's the case. He simply asserts that these are unrelated.

i) Now, I can't speak for Beale, but if I were fleshing out the connection, I think the argument would go like this:

Beale is offering a unified interpretation. These are aspects of the same event. 

Alan himself admits that the apostasy concerns the professing church. He also admits that it will be instigated by the Antichrist. So the apostasy centers on the church, while the action of the Antichrist is directed at the church. 

In that context, it's logical to see the naos as a figurative synonym for the church. 

ii) Moreover, that meaning has linguistic precedent in Pauline usage. 

iii) Furthermore, this has historical precedent in the Antiochean crisis, where the same religious community and same religious institutions lie in view throughout. Antiochus was persecuting faithful Jews as well as desecrating the Jewish temple. 

By contrast, Alan separates the naos from the church–both in time and place. He treats that as something which happens in Jerusalem. Something that's undertaken by Orthodox Jews. And the action of the Antichrist has reference to that.

On the face of it, Alan is the one who's isolating these elements to produce a compartmentalized interpretation of each, resulting in a disjointed interpretation of the passage as a whole. 

It would be incorrect to claim that therefore he would not be able to draw from a literal sense of naos in the 101 instance, just as any Greek-speaking Jew in the first century would have had in his or her semantic range of this term.

I don't know why Alan is fixated on attacking an argument I never used. 

The linguistic skepticism is not warranted, and would reduce us to only make linguistic observations on single authors! and not on the body of Greek language. 
We have an abundance of documentation in the NT and outside of it. We cannot assume that Greek semantic ranges of words are dependent upon not only a single author, but on a very small sampling of that author. The NT has frequent instances of naos in a literal sense. Paul certainly was aware of this sense and easily could draw from it—which bring us back to the contextual question of 2 Thess 2:4

For some odd reason, Alan is absolutely obsessed with refuting an argument I never made. It's like trying to correct a computerized misbilling. No matter how often you call the company and patiently explain to them that the bill is wrong, they never purge the system. The computer keeps spitting out the same erroneous bill. 

Thats not an intellectual virtue. You need to update the objection (or else withdraw the objection) to take into account the actual state of the argument.

If there were another instance in his letters where he clearly talks about a temple in a spiritual-church sense associated with the Antichrist figure that is a different matter.

Does Alan think the sense of a word depends on carrying over the entire context? Isn't that a semantic fallacy? It confuses the meaning of a particular word with the meaning of a sentence, pericope, or argument. 

I'll end with saying that I gave about seven reasons why the context in 2 Thess 2:4 indicates a literal temple, not a spiritual temple. These are arguments that historicists need to contend with. 

Let's run through these:

1. The action of the Antichrist would be a conspicuous, concrete, observable event, to correct the false eschatology of 2:2c.

i) Given the parallel with the other precursive sign, we shouldn't expect that to be more or less conspicuous than the apostasy. The apostasy of the professing church is a bit vague. Throughout church history we have examples of that. The apostasy of the professing church is a matter of degree–unless you deny anything faithful remnant.

ii) Moreover, Alan seems to treat these as independent events. The apostasy of the professing church is clearly different from Ultraorthodox Jews erecting a shrine on the Temple Mount. 

If, by contrast, these are conjoined, then the sign is less ambiguous. 

2. "Taking his seat" suggests a literal physical temple.

That simply begs the question. Where's the supporting argument?

If the naos is figurative, then "taking his seat" is part of the same picturesque metaphor. A consistent word-picture. 

3. The definite article implies a particular temple of the true God.

i) But Alan doesn't think the construction of this shrine is authorized by God. At least he's noncommittal. But absent divine sanction, how is that any different than schismatic or sectarian "Jewish" shrines like the rival shrine in Samaria? 

ii) Furthermore, this overlooks the "heavenly temple" interpretation. 

4. The "object of worship" (2:4) implies a material temple rather than a church.

I find that argument peculiar. Isn't a sanctuary a place of worship rather than an object of worship? And in that respect, a church is a place of worship. 

5. Alan cites an article by Dan Wallace:
My Accordance/Gramcord search revealed altogether ten places in which ναὸς θεοῦ occurred (Matt 26:61; 1 Cor 3:16, 17 [bis]; 2 Cor 6:16 [bis]; 2 Thess 2:4; Rev 3:12; 11:1, 19).As well, there are another six instances of οἶκος θεοῦ, and here again a similar development occurs: The gospels refer to the literal temple (Mark 2:26 and pars. in Matt 12:4 and Luke 6:4), while the referential value of the expression has been transferred to the church by the 60s (1 Tim 3:15;5 Heb 6:21; 1 Pet 4:17).6What are we to make of these data? It seems that by 63 CE (the date I would assign to 1 Timothy),7 the idiom had shifted in Christian usage sufficiently that a metaphorical nuance had become the norm. However, it is equally significant that all of the references in the Corinthian correspondence seem to require an explanation (readily supplied by Paul) in order to make the metaphorical sense clear.

But doesn't that commit the "corpus" fallacy which Alan spends so much time attacking? Why does this little sampling suddenly become representative when Alan says no scholar trained in linguistics would use such a naive argument? 

6. Quoting Green:
The orientation of the divine claims of the "man of lawlessness" is toward the world at large and not the church."

Unfortunately, Green doesn't bother to defend his contention.  

i) What is it about the orientation of the divine claims in 2 Thes 2 that's directed at the world rather than the church? Where's the supporting argument?

ii) If, as Alan admits, the apostasy has reference to the professing church, and the Antichrist is the instigator of the apostasy, then isn't that oriented at the church rather than the world?

iii) What does it mean for the Antichrist to proclaim himself to be God? Hard to say for sure, but here's one possibility:

What if the Antichrist claims to be the Second Coming of Christ? That would make him God Incarnate. 

Moreover, it makes sense that the Antichrist might have a Messiah complex. He's a pretender. A usurper. 

And if he gained a sizable following in the professing church, that would certainly qualify as mass apostasy. His claim to be the Second Coming of Christ would be "a conspicuous, concrete, observable event." So would having a huge entourage in the professing church. 

Monday, May 26, 2014

Jesus Spoke and Taught in Greek


JERUSALEM (Reuters) - Pope Francis and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traded words on Monday over the language spoken by Jesus two millennia ago.
"Jesus was here, in this land. He spoke Hebrew," Netanyahu told Francis, at a public meeting in Jerusalem in which the Israeli leader cited a strong connection between Judaism and Christianity. 

"Aramaic," the pope interjected. 
"He spoke Aramaic, but he knew Hebrew," Netanyahu shot back.

What is often not given enough attention is that Jesus would had also been competent in Greek and likely taught in Greek in certain contexts. See Stanley Porter's argumentation on these two points: