Closing Arguments/Final Thoughts on the "Choose Debate"

Both Steve Hays and I have interacted quite extensively with Dan's "choose argument from the dictionary." I believe we have shown enough potential and actual problems with it that it should not command the assent of any Calvinist. Libertarians may like it, but I suspect that that's because it presupposes libertarianism. A good rule to go by when making a good argument (i.e., a cogent one, one that aims at persuading the opposition) is not to build into your argument the truth of your position, or assume the falsity of the other one. Dan's argument carries zero persuasive force, and so isn't a good (in the above sense) argument. In fact, I take it that both I and Steve have shown the argument to be false, and obviously so. But Dan and some of his readers are impressed with it (though I cited numerous libertarian action theorists, many of them the leading voices today, that disagree with Dan), that's just how these things go. An example might be that I think constructivism (the view that reality is the construct of (a) human mind(s)) is obviously false. I think some of the arguments against it are very good (e.g., those that make the charge of self-referential incoherency), but the anti-realists don't think they are. They make their own arguments, and those in agreement with them laud those arguments. There comes a time when you just have to let the arguments stand and let people decide. At the very least, Steve and I have shown that Dan's argument is far from obvious and makes too many highly questionable empirical assumptions---assumptions hitherto unargued for or proved---for it to count as a good argument. Now, if Dan's only goal was to reaffirm the beliefs of fellow Arminians, that's all fine and good. But to the extent that he wanted to try and give the Calvinist good reasons to drop his Calvinism, he has failed. The Calvinist doesn't find Dan's argument troubling, in the least. Indeed, the Calvinist (like me) doesn't really even know just what Dan is trying to argue. So, since I think the argument has not come close to defeating the defeaters given it, and since I think it is hopelessly flawed (though I grant that Dan and some of his readers may find it the best thing since sliced bread, and be rational in doing so), there's really not much left to say. So in this post I will critique some of the points Dan has raised since my last posts, and I will also offer some more critiques (mostly just putting my previous defeaters differently with the hope of achieving some persuasive force) of his claims and arguments. Most of my comments to his claims and arguments will be fairly short, but I think they are all sufficiently strong to show the (what I take to be) insurmountable problems with his argument; and if not that, they will at least show that he has not met his burden thus far. I realize Dan may advance and clean up his argument, but I do not think it will closely resemble his initial argument. Until he does so, below lists some of the main reasons why Dan's argument is flawed.

Dan's Choose Argument

Dan says that (one of his) his argument for LFW is this:

P1: The bible says people have wills and choose

But,

P2: choosing rules out determinism

Therefore,

C1: the bible rules out determinism.

Okay, so let's grant [P1]. Let's also overlook the use of "wills" as it appears superfluous to the argument and doesn't do any work. Undoubtedly, the questionable premise is [P2]. So, what is Dan's argument for [P2]? Dan writes,

I supported P2 based on the dictionary... Here’s my initial argument: The American Heritage College Dictionary (3rd edition) defines choose as: to select from a number of possible alternatives.

And then,

Hopefully it's clear that the 'dictionary definition' of choose includes at least two possibilities. But determinism prohibits twofold possibilities, so the dictionary rules out determinism.

But what does all this dictionary stuff have to do with the Bible and the Bible's use of the word "choose"? This brings in another premise of Dan's argument. Dan states,

...the common man thinks of choice as libertarian, ... the bible was written by common men and to the common man (i.e. to the people of Israel and the church, not the semi-compatibilist) and it uses the terms choice and choose.

And why think common man thinks of choice (or "choosing") as libertarian? Dan tells us,

the dictionary is better at establishing the laymen, common-sensical understanding of terms

Okay, so far as I've been able to discern, the above quotes constitute the relevant material from all of Dan's posts from which to make the argument for [P2]. So, let's try to construct the dictionary argument in support of [P2], and thus find a complete statement of Dan's argument.

The Complete Statement of the "Choose Argument"

[P1] The dictionary definition of "choose" includes, most importantly, the idea that there be at least two alternative possibilities from which a chooser chooses from, all of which are live possibilities.

[P2] If determinism is true, then no chooser has any live possible alternatives ever.

[C1] Therefore, the dictionary definition of "choose" is inconsistent with determinism.

[P3] If the Bible uses the word "choose", then the Bible means the word the way common man means the word.

[P4] If the Bible means a word the way common man means a word, then the dictionary is the best way to decipher how common man means a word.

[C2] Therefore, If the Bible uses the word "choose", the dictionary is the best way to decipher how common man means a word (and so how the Bible means the word).

[P4] The Bible uses the word "choose".

[P5] Therefore, the Bible means "choose" as the idea that there be at least two alternative possibilities from which a chooser chooses from, all of which are live possibilities.

[C3] Therefore, the Bible is inconsistent with determinism.

[P6] Libertarian Free Will, LFW, teaches that a chooser has alternative possibilities from which to choose from, all of which are live possibilities.

[C4] Therefore, the Bible assumes that choosers have LFW whenever it uses the word "choose".

[P7] Whatever the Bible assumes to be the case is the case.

[C5] Therefore, LFW is the case.

So stated, we have an argument against determinism and for LFW. I hope that Dan and other Arminian readers can grant that I have fairly represented his argument, and presented it forcefully. This argument, though long, also captures what Dan said his initial motive was that brought about his "dictionary argument". Dan said he was initially trying to answer Gene Bridges' request that an Arminian exegete LFW from the Bible. Though I think this can't be done, the best Dan can do is show that the Bible presupposes LFW. So, this argument does justice to Dan all the way back, if you will.

Defeating the "Choose Argument"

Here are three reasons for showing the "Choose Argument" to be unsound.

1. It is false "the dictionary" defines "choose" as, most importantly, including the notion of live alternative possibilities.

I demonstrated this here, by citing eleven dictionaries that do not include any talk of "possibilities" or "alternatives." This shows that [P1] is false.

Dan responds to this counter argument in a few ways:

(i) This is to use the thesaurus approach (using the words "select", "pick," etc., in the definition of choice is tautological).

(ii) Paul provides no argument as to why these arguments reconcile with determinism.

(iii) When you say a person is able to choose you are right back to possibilities.

(iv) My [Dan's] definitions are more clear and revealing than Paul's.

(v) Paul is a semi-compatibilist; semi-compatibilists say that freedom and determinism are not consistent.

(vi) Paul likes Kane's definition, and Kane's definition is philosophical, and we shouldn't impute philosophical definitions onto the Bible, and Paul didn't address my arguments for why Kane's definition of "choice” was philosophical.

I'll now respond to points (i) -> (vi).

Ad (i): This is to miss the point. All I needed to do was to demonstrate that it is false to claim that "the dictionary" defines "choose" by using, as an essential element, the notion of live alternative possibilities. I provides a sufficient amount of quotes by Dan above that all claim that "the dictionary" defines "choose" by including the idea of alternative possibility. So, it is false to claim that "the dictionary" defines "choose" by using the words: alternative, possible, option, etc.

In fact, as Dan argues in this post, we can see that it his argument clearly depends on the idea that the dictionary definitions of "choose" include the words: alternatives, possibilities, options.

And this is why Dan states in that post, "I could go on, but you get the point." That is, he could go on giving definitions of "choose" that state that the "choosing" is among live "possibilities" or "alternatives.

What's more is that in the same post I just linked to, Dan admits that in a previous post of mine, where I provide a few definitions of "choice", that they were consistent with determinism. Note well what Dan says here:

In our debate, I argued that the dictionary definition of choose rules out determinism. In Paul's recent rejoinder he states: “I cited numerous dictionaries that didn’t include a PAP (Principle of Alternate Possibilities) element”. (link) This is true, but misleading. Paul defined choice, but not choose.

See, as Dan makes clear, my definitions of "choice" not including the notion or words "possible alternatives" didn't land because Dan was defining "choose" and not "choice," and "choose" does include those words. See, when I used definitions of "choice" that were almost exactly identical to the definitions of "choose", Dan didn't say to those definitions what he said to my "choose" definitions! Dan allowed that those definitions were consistent with determinism. he then tried to side-step those definitions and claim that they didn't matter because he was defining "choose" and not "choice". The problem is, since those definitions of "choose" are almost identical to my "choice" definitions, then if the latter is allowed to be consistent with determinism, so is the former. Notice that to my claim that those definitions do not include the notion of "alternative possibilities," Dan says, "this is true" (emphasis mine). Thus, if they do not, and since they are virtually identical to my definitions of "choose", then "choose" does not include said idea.

Ad (ii): See answer to (i). I should not that I did make the same argument as the above in the post Dan responded to, just not as lengthy. So, Dan is wrong to say I didn't argue for my view.

However, I should say more. See, actually, neither Dan's dictionary definitions nor mine, at least a great many of them, are good definitions of "choose." For example, take this one of Dan's definitions:

The Wordsmyth English Dictionary: to select from two or more alternatives.

But of course this would include me nonchalantly reaching over and grabbing a Martini off a tray of drinks, without even looking where I was grabbing. It also does not rule out the mentally insane from freely choosing, since they do not have the requisite control needed to make free choices. Therefore, it is obvious that more needs to be said about "choose", and it is far from clear that "possible alternatives" are what is "essential" to "choose" (which I demonstrate above is not even included in numerous well-respected dictionaries, at all).

Now, let me define "choose".

Recall that Dan says to use the word "select," "pick," "take," etc., in your definition of "choose" is "tautological." Well, not obviously so. I would argue that a "choice" happens when you "select" or "pick" in a specific kind of way. If "pick" (say) were tautological, then Dan would have to say that I "choose" the Martin just because I took a random drink off a tray. Here Dan would admit that there were possible alternatives, and "selecting," or "taking" but no "choosing." However, many of his definitions simply say "to select out of possible alternatives." Again, then, the dictionary is just too problematic to make any solid argument on which the Arminian can stand to challenge the Calvinist to move off his position.

Now, my definition might be philosophical, but I'll address this criticism of Dan's when I get to (vi).

Choose = df to select freely out of a greater number of things, where this selecting is a mental action explained in terms of reasons, where a reason is a purpose, end, or goal for choosing one (or more) thing to make a selection out of a group of things, or an intentional object, which is about or directed at the future and opative in mood, i.e., wishing to pick x-thing and that it be good for x-thing to prevail in the world rather than y-thing being picked and prevailing in the world.

This looks good to me (and it is a combination of dictionary and philosophical definitions, taken from Oxford dictionary, Goetz and Talliaferro, and Ishtyaqui Haji), and is consistent with determinism. For it to be inconsistent, there would have to be some talk of "indeterminate" or "absent any antecedent conditions" or "the chooser must have been able to do other than choose x if he chose x, given the exact same history (or decree of God) up to the moment of the choosing," etc. But as it stands, and as was confirmed to me by Taliaferro and Goetz, the above definition is compatible with determinism (and I dare say they know what is and isn't compatible). Another benefit this definition has is that it isn't rigged. It works just as well for a libertarian model as it does a compatibilist model.

Ad (iii): This is only the case if you're assuming libertarianism. If a dictionary says "choose" is "selecting freely out of a great number", it is only problematic if you assume that "free" can only be possible on libertarianism. Yes, at this point we would have to debate whether "freedom" can be had on either determinism or libertarianism (for let us remember, there are many good arguments that attempt to show that indeterminism does not provide us with the kind of control needed for freedom¹⁾ which, of course, takes us far away from any dictionary/common man argument. Now instead of engaging in a look-and-see what the dictionary says discussion, we are engaged in a metaphysical discussion that has raged over two millennia. So, Dan is free to claim that my definitions which define "choose" as "select freely from a greater number" involve a debate over the metaphysics of free will so we can see which views (libertarianism or determinism) allow ascriptions of "free" to be made, but this isn't to "restart" the argument. Rather, it is to show that he can't engage in making an argument just from the dictionaries words. So, when you say "a person is able to choose" you are not "right back to possibilities."

Another thing Dan says is that my definitions, which say, "select from among a greater number of things," means "possibilities" because it says "things." However, this seems obviously strained. Things is just the collection of stuff, if you will, from which you choose something, rather than another thing, out of. The mere presence of the word "thing" in the definition does not imply "actually possible thing" unless you're assuming libertarianism, which is just what we're supposed to be debating.

Ad (iv): See (AD (ii)) above.

Ad (v): This is false. Semi-compatibilists only admit that determinism is incompatible with "could do otherwise" or a freedom that "requires alternative possibilities." Only if "could do otherwise" or "alternative possibilities" is essential to freedom would we say determinism is not compatible with freedom. But, since it is far from clear that a freedom worth having requires the above (as even some libertarians (e.g., narrow source incompatibilists) have admitted), then it is far from clear that semi-compatibilist is inconsistent with freedom.

Ad (vi): I'll say it up front: I have no problem with a philosophical definition being used when trying to understand God's revelation. In fact, I find the denial of that idea extreme. What of all the analytic theologians (e.g., Crisp, Rea, Anderson)? What of the early church and the formulation of Christian doctrine? It seems to me obvious that we use philosophical definitions to make clear certain concepts used in the Bible. If Dan objects to this, I only shrug my shoulders. I guess I can also play the et tu card. See, Dan thinks that his definitions are not "philosophical". Unfortunately, this isn't the case. Let's see how the Harper Collins Dictionary of Philosophy defines "choosing":

Choosing = df A voluntary act preceded by deliberation; conscious selection; the mental act that causes an action to take place which is usually the on preferred from among alternative courses of action. (Peter Angeles, The Harper Collins Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., 1992, 46, emphasis mine).

What do you know, looks like Dan has been trying to impose a philosophical definition on Scripture!

I guess another response here might be that I deny that Kane's definition is a "sophisticated philosophical definition."

2. It is false that however common man defines a term the Bible so defines that term, and we know how common man defines a term by going to the dictionary. In fact, sometimes common man is just wrong.

In response to this Dan wrote,

Then God would either not use the term choose or deny the term or explain what He means by it.

I just find this false. Where does Dan get this idea? God didn't tell him. It looks like an ad hoc constraint conjured up to save Dan's argument. See, let's take two words:

(i) Know

and,

(ii) See

The Bible uses these words. God never explains what he means by it. And, common man has held a wrong or severely deficient view of these words. Take (ii). There are various views of perception. Many common men have held to naive realism. This is probably wrong. At any rate, God never defines the view. And, the dictionary is helpless here. It simply says "to perceive with the eyes." But Dan must not allow this definition for the reasons he didn't allow many of my "choose" ones. The definition is so vague that it could be obviously false, and it hopelessly insufficient as a definition, here's some reasons why. So, I maintain that philosophical analysis can help here. Lastly, take (i). Here's a dictionary definition: "to perceive or understand as fact or truth; to apprehend clearly and with certainty: I know the situation fully." Now, to anyone even remotely aware of the current discussions in epistemology, this is likewise inadequate, and probably false. It very easily could be read to support internalism. Is Dan going to argue that:

[P1*] The Bible uses the word know.

[P2*] Know is inconsistent with externalism [insert dictionary argument].

[C1*] Therefore, the Bible rules out externalism.

I take it that this shows that Dan's argument is invalid via the method of testing for validity by logical counter-example. Is Dan going to argue now against Plantinga et al? If so, does he have an answer for Bergmann?

3. It is not obvious that "the common man" has a default setting for libertarianism.

Dan has assumed many times that common man is a libertarian. I offered empirical evidence denying this assumption. I have also asked than Dan argue for this empirical claim of his, no argument has been forthcoming. In fact, since Dan defined "common man" as all who have been, and are members of the Church of Christ, then he admits that there have been, and are, thousands of compatibilists among the rank of "common men."

But, even if common man did have said setting, this doesn't seem strong enough to make Dan's point. Common man gets a lot of things about how God runs his universe flat out wrong.² Dan has argued (as I cite him above) that God would explain this different use of words to them. I answered that this idea of his seems contrived. I also showed that it was false. And now I will add that it begs the question since the Calvinist argues that we have just such revelations from God from which we can assume some kind of divine determinism. But even if we didn't, who says God must tell us now? Surely he could wait until heaven to tell us that he determines all events and compatibilism is true---explaining how he brings freedom and determinism together; which, if I may speculate, might be easier than explaining, if he does, and if we could understand it, how he brought the divine and human together so that there is one person who is fully human and fully divine!).

Conclusion

These points (along with the dozens of others both Steve and I have made) really seem to undercut Dan's argument. Here I simply try to explain the reasons why Calvinists do not and should not find Dan's argument persuasive at all. As I said above, I think Dan's argument here is about as wrong as you can go, and wrong at many points too, with an argument. But I realize he and his readers like it. Given the amount of energy and time expended on it, I really don't see that any progress will be made. So I simply lay out some reasons to think Dan's argument unpersuasive, some reasons for thinking it unsound, and I leave it to the readers to decide. No doubt many Arminians will be unmoved the the counter arguments made here. That's fine. Besides these counter arguments are the positive Biblical and extra-biblical reasons for thinking compatibilism true and libertarianism unable to square with the Bible, as well as possibly failing to provide enough control for freedom. These arguments would also need to be weighed in considering Dan's argument. Overall I think for all the time and energy defended, and all the lauding of Dan's argument by Arminians, it was nothing but a paper tiger. I know he feels different, we'll have to leave it at that.

___________________________

¹ See further: Lucky Libertarianism, M. Almeida and M. Bernstein, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 113, No. 2 (Mar., 2003), pp. 93-119; Indeterminism, Explanation, and Luck, Ishtiyaque Haji, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Jul., 2000), pp. 211-235; Alternative Possibilities, Luck, and Moral Responsibility, Ishtiyaque Haji, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2003), pp. 253-275; Libertarianism and the Luck Objection (Comments on Robert Kane's Presentation), Ishtiyaque Haji, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 4, Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Three Recent Views (Dec., 2000), pp. 329-337; Alfred R. Mele (1999), Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will, Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):96-104; Alfred R. Mele (2005), Libertarianism, Luck, and Control, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):381-407; Peter van Inwagen, Free Will Remains a Mystery, Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 158-177, esp. 167-175; and Sean Choi, The Libertarian Dilemma: A Study in the Logic and Metaphysics of Indeterminist Free Will, (VDM Verlag, 2008).

² As C.S. Lewis reminds us: "Reality, in fact, is usually something you could not have guessed. That is one of the reasons I believe Christianity. It is a religion you could not have guessed. If it offered us just the kind of universe we had always expected, I should feel we were making it up. But, in fact, it is not the sort of thing anyone would have made up. It has just that queer twist about it that real things have. So let us leave behind all these boys' philosophies--these over simple answers. The problem is not simple and the answer is not going to be simple either."

Dan's Wrong . . . Again

Dan the Arminian still refuses to deal with my citations of numerous dictionaries which define "choose" without containing the "essential element" he says "the" dictionary contains. Again, his argument is kaput and since he doesn't want to deal with the obvious refutations, might there be another Arminian who lauded Dan's argument that wants to try? Anyway, he's still responding to a post I did a while back, and in the meantime I've responded to all of his responses. In his latest post he again shows his unfamiliarity with his own side of the debate as he speculates about PAP, AP, W.L. Craig, and Frankfurt, all from his armchair. For those who are familiar with the literature, his post is simply something of a train wreck. I don't really have much to say, but will comment on just a few things that demonstrate my above claim:

1. Dan thinks there's a problem with Frankfurt counter examples and immaterial souls (but then grudgingly admits that Molinism can deal with this). Well, not just Molinism. That's not the relevant point. God is. But besides this, it is far from obvious that a Frankfurt mechanism could not affect an immaterial soul. Christians (those who believe in souls, and it is indeed ironic that many libertarians are resorting and turning to anthropological physicalism these days) believe in a tight unity between body and soul. A deep interaction. Why does heavy drinking, drug use, and blows to the head affect our "personality"? Affect things that are supposed to aspects of the "immaterial soul"? So it is far from obvious that Molinism or God is needed to deal with the immaterial nature of man and Frankfurt controllers. In fact, my point seems sufficiently strong enough to rebut Dan's repeated claims that mysterious souls somehow rule out Frankfurtian neurological-manipulating mechanisms.

2. Dan writes, "Thus, rejecting PAP harmonizes with my choose arguments." Besides the small defect that his "choose argument" has been shown to be obviously false, Dan seems to think there's some big difference between PAP and AP (alternative possibilities). But it's time to bring in an expert, again. Thus Kane, "Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) were introduced to undermine 'the principle of alternative possibilities' or PAP. They were designed to show that a person could be morally responsible even though the person had no alternative possibilities (APs) or could not have done otherwise." (Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibility: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, eds. Widerker & Mckenna, Ashgate, 2006, Kane, p. 91, emphasis mine).

3. Dan writes, "Further, PAP seems to be interpreted too specifically for my taste. You must be able to vote Democrat or Republican. You must be able to do good or evil. You must be able to eat chocolate or vanilla...For me, it's enough to choose A or not - I don't need to extend things to the ability to choose A or B" (emphasis mine).

So, Dan claims that PAP is set up as, say, needing to be able to choose P or Q or R, but not P or ~P. He says P or ~P is his position, which is not PAP, he says. This is getting old, but time to bring in some more libertarian experts:

"PAP: An agent is morally responsible for performing a given action A only if he could have avoided performing it" (ibid, Widerker, p.53).

"PAP: An agent S is morally responsible for its being the case that p only if S could have made it not the case that p." (ibid, Ginet, 75).

Notice that there's no talk of P or Q or R or n. It's just P or ~P. In other words, what Dan says is the reason he rejects PAP: "because it's enough [for his libertarianism] to choose A or ~A", looks just like he's citing the definition of PAP!

So far in our debate I've got layman Dan to disagree with leading libertarian action theorists: R. Kane, W. L. Craig, C. Ginet, D. Widerker, D. Hunt, A. Plantinga, W. Hasker, Kevin Timpe, &c! What hubris. Dan, an everyman theologian/blogger, who reads a few internet sources on libertarian action theory now and then, knows more about libertarian action theory than all the experts. Forgive me if I find this hard to swallow.

Not to be mean, but Dan just seems ignorant of much of the relevant literature. But I'm sorry to report that this isn't what's bad. Dan is ignorant that he's even ignorant. A dangerous combination indeed.

(P.S. I'd also suggest Dan read Timpe's book Free Will: Sourcehood and its Alternatives, for an argument that libertarianism demands acceptance of the PAP maxim, here's the abstract. It also seems like ought implies can demands acceptance of PAP, and Dan holds to ought implies can).

Choose The Best: More on a failed Arminian argument

Hot on the heals of of me presenting Dan these defeaters:

1. Some of the top libertarian action theorists in the world disagree with him.

2. The empirical evidence suggests that not all "common men" are libertarians.

3. About a dozen of the most respected dictionaries define "choose" in terms wholly compatible (!) with compatibilism.

4. Dan's ad hoc definition of "common men" (i.e., all the members of Israel and the Church from all time) allows some of the world's most uncommon men to be "common men".

5. Dan's position implies that one needs to be a libertarian in order to be saved---so much for the uber love of Arminianism!

I now bring Dan another defeater.

2 Kings 10:

1 Now there were in Samaria seventy sons of the house of Ahab. So Jehu wrote letters and sent them to Samaria: to the officials of Jezreel, [a] to the elders and to the guardians of Ahab's children. He said, 2 "As soon as this letter reaches you, since your master's sons are with you and you have chariots and horses, a fortified city and weapons, 3 choose the best and most worthy of your master's sons and set him on his father's throne. Then fight for your master's house."


Notice the very common conception of "choosing the best." The best, by definition(!), implies no other alternative. So, out of the mass of 70 sons, the guardians were to choose the best and most worthy. Say they lined the group up, 1 - 70, and chose number 10. To the question "was it a live option for you to pick number 22?" is the answer, "No." Why not? Well, he wasn't the best. "The best" implies one out of a group, with the rest not being live options as they are the second, third, fourth, and so on "best." So, 1 - 9 and 11-70 were not live options. But the Bible calls this a choice. In fact, the understanding used here is consistent with the majority of dictionaries out there: select one or more from out of a larger number.

I would also go as far as to say that out of the 70 there was at least one who was obviously not the best or most worthy. Maybe he was ugly, weak, had a bad leg, dumb, and just smelled bad too. So, he was obviously not "the best" yet he was inculded among the choices, or ones to choose from! On Dan's assumptiuons he would have to be a possible "best," but the problem is that he obviously wans't!

Oh, and I also note the Arminian "yes men" at Dan's blog complaining that I have admitted that my arguments defeat Dan (I guess they'd rather have me admit that Dan's arguments beat mine?). They complain about this but have not bothered to defend Dan's argument. If any of them think they can respond to my arguments, let them use this combox. Here's the resolution:

[R] Dan says that "the dictionary" defines "choose" with "possible alternative" as an essential element to it. This point is CRITICAL to Dan's argument going through. I cite numerous well-respected dictionaries which say otherwise. How did I not destroy Dan's (bad) argument?

Got a defense for Dan?

Some Clean Up

Since I rendered Dan the Arminian's argument from the dictionary dead, all that's left is to mop up the mess left by the twitching corpse of an argument. The post Dan is responding to (not my latest, it's this one) commits him to so many radical and ridiculous positions that, even though I have defeated his argument, these moves he's forced to make to answer me are so wild that I couldn't pass up the opportunity to point them out. Here's four points Dan tries to make, along with some responses:

1. Dan's first point is to say that he's appealing to the perspicuity of Scripture. He then intimates that I have some problem with this doctrine, which I don't. However, putting aside the side issues he brings up, here's one ridiculous inference of his argument:

Dan claims that perspicuity applies to the essentials of saving faith. Okay, granted at some level---though it's expressed poorly and vaguely, I understand the general point Dan is struggling to make. But here's a problem: Why are there so many Calvinists and Arminians (or, universalists, &c)!? Though they all agree, at a general level, that we are saved by Christ alone, through faith alone, how this is worked out is very different among the various traditions.

But there's an even bigger problem, Dan says that, "The bible message, especially the essentials of the faith, is understandable by common men using their normal means of understanding terms." Okay, let's say I grant this, how does this translate to the idea that "all common men" will understand the term "choose", in the phrase "choose life", in a libertarian sense? Is Dan imposing a work on salvation? I can't be saved unless I believe that "choose" is to be meant libertarianly, just like I must believe that "Jesus" is to be meant as "the God-man who resurrected for our justification?" Or can I believe in the Mormon Jesus? If I must believe that "choose" commits me to libertarianism, then Dan implies that no Calvinists are saved! If Dan admits that Calvinists can be saved with a different understanding of "choose" than Dan has, but not a different understanding of Jesus, then he fails to make his point.

2. Dan finally tells us what he means by "common man." He writes: "For my purpose, 'common man' is in terms of a whole assembly. The bible was frequently addressed to all of Israel, all of the church.... and that for over a thousand years."

Besides the fact that using an Arminian understanding of "all", Dan thinks the infants in the OT assembly were libertarians(!), this now makes his argument even more ridiculous (miracles are possible!). There are, and have been, thousands of compatibilist "common men" on this understanding. Therefore, Dan's argument can't go through since some "common men" understand "choose" in non-libertarian terms. This is all the empirical evidence Dan needs to debunk his claim that "all common men" are libertarians! Dan knows that there are men in the church (i.e., the collection of common men) who are compatibilits, therefore Dan knows that not all common men are libertarians! So, now we have Dan's implicit admission that he's made empirically false claims, as well as my last post where I show that many respected dictionaries define "choose" in ways congenial to Calvinism. Dan is beating his own argument, I hardly have to do anything.

But it gets worse. Previously Dan wrote, "The Bible was written by and to the common man, not the semi-comnpatibilist." Okay, let's follow Dan's reasoning out: If the Bible was written to common men, and common men are just the members of the church, and common men are all libertarians, then no non-libertarian is a member of the church! Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Edwards, Helm, Hays, Manata, John Smith at the local OPC, are all outside of the church!

3. Dan offers a lengthy quote by Justin Martyr in which he thinks it refutes "fatalism." Three problems:

(i) If true, so what? Martyr isn't God.

(ii) Martyr doesn't talk about the relevant "fatalism" that is appealed to in the literature, i.e., accidental necessity, so his point is totally irrelevant.

(iii) It's not even clear how Martyr "refutes" fatalism and how it applies to Calvinism since I don't see anything of Calvinism being attacked by Martyr (and again, even if Martyr could be cleaned up and made more rigorous and precise by Dan, then see (i)).

4. Dan makes some throw-away comment about Stoics and determinism (ignoring the larger point which is that I argued that some "common men" have understood things deterministically, which undercuts his argument, he chose(!) not to respond to this point), I'd suggest he familiarize himself with the relevant literature, he can start here (and I never made a claim about "all", and I don't defend stoic determinism either, that's not the point).

It just keeps getting more and more weird and sad and embarrassing for Dan.