Sunday, May 01, 2011
Theological Definitions # 247
Arminianism = The theological belief that God can produce an inerrant Bible, preserving and protecting said Bible throughout the ages, ensuring that exactly what man needs to know as pertaining to salvation, how to live before God and man, and all else necessary for life and godliness is set forth in Scripture, all the while not violating man's libertarian free will in bringing about this incredibly amazing state of affairs; but, this same God cannot prevent (or severely diminish) the evil we see around us without violating man's libertarian free will. (Odd, that.)
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Does Arminianism maintain that God cannot or will never violate human free will in any instance?
ReplyDeleteI did once hear a pastor say that even though man has free will, God's will is bigger...
ReplyDeleteLayman,
ReplyDeleteArminianism maintains that God could, but does not, override man's choices. Naturally, they believe that God has the power to do so, it's just a question of intent. If God designed them to make choices, why would He go against His own design? It wouldn't make sense that way.
However, Arminianism also teaches that God has no problem influences men's decisions by even such overwhelming means as appearing to them in a blinding light, tossing them into giant fish, or otherwise giving them visions involving coals on their tongue.
As an added comment about the original post's mention that "his same God cannot prevent (or severely diminish) the evil we see around us without violating man's libertarian free will," I would have to disagree with. I mean, Arminians think that God could just paralyze, for instance, every person who is able to hurt another person -- that wouldn't override their mental choices, just their physical capacity (which they agree God does).
Rather, Arminianism teaches that God brings good out of evil. In the story of Joseph, for instance, God purposed good to come out of that evil. See also God working ALL things together for good for those who love Him and are the called according to His purpose. The evil in the world is not beyond God's control, even without Him choosing to override the will of man.
Laymen, it maintains God cannot *if* God wants them to remain free and responsible.
ReplyDeleteSkarlet,
"I would have to disagree with. I mean, Arminians think that God could just paralyze, for instance, every person who is able to hurt another person -- that wouldn't override their mental choices, just their physical capacity (which they agree God does)."
Then I suggest you're not reading what the scholarly Arminians are saying on the subject. Indeed, if you've checked the recent posts here, you'd see the quotes by Arminians to the effect that God doesn't want, plan, or intend the evil that occurs. They've brought these same situations up and have argued that this would undermine libertarian freedom. If people knew that, say, every time they were going to punch someone they went limp, they'd soon stop trying. Just multiply this for all evils. This would create a world where people wouldn't make morally significant choices, and it would severely diminish their libertarian freedom. These are the moves the top and most respected Arminians are making. I'm responding to them.
Your claim that God could stop the evil but doesn't and so plans and allows and intends it, but plans, allows, and intends it for good, is precisely what the Calvinist says. The Arminian does not allow this move for the Calvinist. Without knowing it, you've effectively undermined the scholarly consensus against Calvinism and argued that all the the major Arminian theologians and philosophers are wide of the mark in their criticism against the Calvinist.
Lastly, a sub-set of the problems in this post is that if God could get men to write what he wanted them to and preserve the Bible over the ages (which is a massive task involving hundreds of thousands of libertarian free acts), and all without taking away man's libertarian freedom, then why couldn't he do this with salvation? If God could get Paul to write Romans in exactly the way God wanted it written and without violating Paul's libertarian freedom, then why couldn't he get John Smith to believe in Jesus without violating Smith's libertarian freedom (and then just move inductively from Smith to all unbelievers). So I see no reason why God couldn't stop all the evils, save all humans, and all without violating man's libertarian freedom. He did it with the writing of the Bible, the preserving of the Bible, the stopping of Abimelek's having sex with Sarah,why can't he do it will all evils and salvific choices?
Case in point: After two pages discussing exactly the objection Skarlet raises (which I think is a good objection, since I think it undermines the Arminian argument against the Calvinist!), Daniel Howard-Snyder concludes: "It simply is not possible, therefore, for us to be in a relationship of love without (at some time) having it within our power to harm and be harmed in some serious fashion" ("God, Evil, and Suffering" in Reason for the Hope Within, p.90). The page before, he writes "If God systematically prevents us from harming others yet permits us to have a significant say about the sorts of person we become, then it will have to look to us as though we can harm others even though we can't." He goes on to claim this deception on God's part would be wrong. Our lives would be a charade. I don't buy his argument here and don't think he's being creative enough in getting God to stop all evils while maintaining LFW. Indeed, it's an odd situation given that he's a major proponent of skeptical theism and our epistemic limitations vis-a-vis God' knowledge, but yet he seems to think that the ways he's aware of God being able to stop evils while maintaining LFW exhaust the possible ways God knows about. Indeed, it looks like he did it in the case of Abimelek (Gen. 20:6). I'm just pointing this out to show that Arminians don't agree with Skarlet that God's interfering with our choice to do evil wouldn't interfere with LFW or the things it supposedly brings us (e.g., character formation, genuine relationships, etc).
ReplyDeleteWho do you think has made the best case for Arminianism and what resources have they been made in (i.e. books, articles, etc...)?
ReplyDeleteI don't think any of the "cases" for Arminianism are good. When hand is set to pen with the intention to make a case for Arminianism, which usually involves criticizing Calvinism, the results have been atrocious. Perhaps Walls is the best, or maybe Cottrell, though Arminians would part ways with them at several significant junctures. Olson's presentation is off both theologically and philosophically, and so wouldn't be wise for an Arminian to glob onto. Moreover, his take on Arminius is even disputed---by scholars like Muller, and Arminians like Thomas McCall. Speaking of the latter, he has a book coming out on Arminius and Arminianism. Given his talents---both theological and philosophical---this may be the book to keep an eye on.
ReplyDeleteNon-Calvinist-Christians think that God could restrain the actions of men without violating the man's internal free will through resistible grace(hence the will is still free) and external action; they believe that God occasionally does this, but does not constantly do it, since that would defeat the very purposes of God for which He set up free will. You write “So I see no reason why God couldn't stop all the evils, save all humans, and all without violating man's libertarian freedom.” But the Arminian asks “Why does God not stop all the evils, save all humans, though He could without violating man's internal free will?” The answer lies in the question: “What was the purpose of giving them free will to begin with?”
ReplyDeleteNow, you are quite right that Arminians claim that God doesn't want, plan, or intend the evil that occurs insomuch as they hold that God does not desire evil – it's abominable to Him – God does not plan the evil, but rather chooses to allow it for a reasons and creates His plans for bringing good from it (there is a difference between planning something and planning for something), and does not intend evil but intends the good that comes from it. To clarify, the Non-Calvinist-Christian view that I am familiar with is that God could stop the evil, but doesn't for a reason, and so plans for it, allows it, and intends good to come from it. This is somewhat different from the Calvinist claim that God wants evil, causes evil, and indeed inspires evil – for the intended end goal.
Oh! One last thought. You mention God getting men to write the Bible without taking away their freedom, and the question of why God wouldn't do the same with salvation or preventing sin. Here's the difference: God led WILLING people to write His word. God also saves those who are willing, and gives us Christians the strength through Christ to resist temptation. Therefore, God does also save and prevent sin in willing men, just as He wrote the Bible through willing men.
P.S. I think that Norm Geisler makes a great case for Arminianism (inadvertently) in his book "Chosen but Free," where he identifies himself as a "Moderate Calvinist."
(Drat! It reversed the order of my last two comments. The one posted second should come first.)
ReplyDeleteGod could restrain the actions of men without violating the man's internal free will through resistible grace(hence the will is still free) and external action; they believe that God occasionally does this, but does not constantly do it, since that would defeat the very purposes of God for which He set up free will.
ReplyDeleteIf it doesn't violate free will, how could it defeat God's purpose in giving free will?
Skarlet, you're not tracking with what Arminians are writing. Almost all of them, to a man, argue that it is *impossible* for God to stop all evils and save all men without violating man's libertarian free will. If God could (a) in the case of Abimelek, stop him from sleeping with Sarah without violating his LFW, and (b) get men not only to write an inerrant Bible, but also preserve it through the ages, without violating any of their LFW, then I don't see why it would be *impossible* for God to stop all evil and save all without violating man's libertarian freedom. Do you have an argument for the *impossibility* of this? I mean, I understand the usual argument, but how wouldn't it apply to Abimelek and the writing and preserving of the Bible. Your claim that God led "willing" people in (a) and (b) isn't relevant since it is a consequence of my position that all those who God works within or without to refrain or fail to commit an evil, or save, are also likewise "willing" to do so. That's rather the definition of their doing it while maintaining LFW.
ReplyDeleteTo clarify, the Non-Calvinist-Christian view that I am familiar with is that God could stop the evil, but doesn't for a reason, and so plans for it, allows it, and intends good to come from it.
The view is that God cold not stop it if man is to have LFW, and LFW is the good worth the evil. As many Arminians have stated, there are evils that are simply consequences of LFW and don't have goods that come *out of* them.
This is somewhat different from the Calvinist claim that God wants evil, causes evil, and indeed inspires evil – for the intended end goal.
Of course, the Calvinist view is that God allows the evil, permits the evil, and does so for some good reason. As far as "causes" evil, that's ambiguous and ultimately unhelpful. Does he directly cause evil, as in is the actor who commits evils? No Calvinists say that. Is he the "ultimate" cause, well so is the Arminian god. Is he the counterfactual cause? Well so is the Arminian's. Indeed, Calvinism posits a determinism but needs not posit a mechanistic, *causal* determinism.
So, to tie it back together with your question, if the whole point of giving man free will is so that man can relate to God and to others, then prevent him from expressing hostility toward another would only mask the nature of the relationship, and without consequence for sins (if the sin was not permitting), how would people be chastened and learn to ask God for forgiveness for the sin in their hearts? The expression of free will, which usually is physical means, allows the reason for which free will is permitted (even the glorification of God through the judgment of sin!) to happen.
ReplyDeleteSuppose that God gave free will partly so that people COULD relate to each other.
C.S. Lewis again in his book, The Problem of Pain, outlines in a very long and painstaking manner (which is quite necessary for the topic) explains how a common environment is necessary in order for created beings to interact, and goes on to explain how the nature of allowing people to relate to each other opens the door for negative interactions. “Yet again, if the fixed nature of matter prevents it from being always, and in all its dispositions, equally agreeable even to a single soul, much less is it possible for the matter of the universe at any moment to be distributed so that it is equally convenient and pleasurable to each member of a society. If a man travelling in one direction is having a journey down hill, a man going in the opposite direction must be going up hill. If even a pebble lies where I want it to lie, it cannot, except by a coincidence, be where you want it to lie. And this is very far from being an evil: on the contrary, it furnishes occasion for all those acts of courtesy, respect, and unselfishness by which love and good humour and modesty express themselves. But it certainly leaves the way open to a great evil, that of competition and hostility.”
Paul,
ReplyDeleteFirst of all, let me address what you said at the end of the post. You wrote: “As far as "causes" evil, that's ambiguous and ultimately unhelpful... Indeed, Calvinism posits a determinism but needs not posit a mechanistic, *causal* determinism.”
Well, I just based my statement off of the sayings of recognized, Calvinist authors, such as John Calvin or Arthur Pink.
"Nothing has ever come to pass, or ever will, merely because God knew it. The cause of all things is the will of God." - Arthur Pink
“But where it is a matter of men’s counsels, wills, endeavours, and exertions, there is greater difficulty in seeing how the providence of God rules here too, so that nothing happens but by His assent and that men can deliberately do nothing unless He inspire it.” - John Calvin
Now, admittedly, many different calvinists have different ideas of to what extent God intervenes to “cause” evil, whether He simply be the “first cause” of everything, as even Arminians attest to, or whether He masterminds evil and then has the devil put it in someone's mind to do the act.
Moving on to your other points, you said that “The view is that God could not stop [the evil] if man is to have LFW, and LFW is the good worth the evil.” As I said, though, given the actual, Arminian, agreed-upon understanding of LFW, which boils down to “he could have chosen otherwise,” God could certainly restrain the expression of that evil physically without taking away someone's choice. For instance, I recall a missionary story of someone raising a knife to strike the missionary, and God paralyzed his arm. No non-calvinist I knew ever took that to mean that God had overridden the man's free will, but only restrained his action.
Why does God not always do that? I like Lewis' chess analogy. Letting someone take back his move is one thing, but throwing out all the rules defeats the purpose of the game. If God muted all the expression of evil, which comes of free will, why would God have given free will to begin with? The argument, as I understand it, is that God could not stop the evil if man is not only to have LFW, but also to use it for it's intended purposes, and that use is good worth the evil. (The intended purposes may include relationships with humans, relating to God, morality, learning, the glorification of God through judgment and through redemption, etc).
You wrote “Almost all of them, to a man, argue that it is *impossible* for God to stop all evils and save all men without violating man's libertarian free will.”
ReplyDeleteWell, I do agree that Arminians say that it's impossible for the God to save all men without violating their will. That's more than just physical restraint of the expression of their will. As for stopping all evil, I've never read that it would be a violation of free will to do that, only that it would undermine the whole point of giving free will to men in the first place.
However, you may be right. As I said, I know much more about the general doctrines held by Non-Calvinist-Christians, and the doctrines spoken of by Arminians. I don't read many Arminian books.
As for (a) and (b), I agree with you that God could (and did) stop Abimelek from sleeping with Sarah without violating his will – He restrained Abimelek through circumstance and through perhaps through grace, since Abimelek was not desirous to sleep with another man's wife and willing accepting the internal prompting of God. I also agree that God wrote the scripture through the hand of willing men. I also agree that you that it is possible for God to stop the physical expression of all evil, without overriding man's will: God would only be overriding their physical capacity. (Will is internal, physical motion is external).
You wrote “all those who God works within or without to refrain or fail to commit an evil, or save, are also likewise 'willing' to do so.” Ahh, but you see, you have a different definition of “willing” than they do. They mean that man, having the ability to choose either way, accepts a certain action. You mean that God changes their heart to make them willing (and unable to choose the other way). That WOULD be a “violation,” as you like to put it, of the hypothetical free will.
Does anyone have at hand Arminian theologians that say that God will never violate human free will in any instance? I get it that they believe that Man's freed will can choose whether to embrace the Gospel message. But do they really say that God will never violate their free will in any other context?
ReplyDeleteI see the difference that Skarlet points to examples of God being able to force people to do things without violating free will, so I'm looking for something more. For example, could an Arminian theologican believe that God literally hardened Pharoah's heart so that he would bring down God's judgment and still believe that in matter's of salvation God grants freed will?
Layman,
ReplyDeleteI do not know if my imput is desired or not, but I do have a couple thoughts. I believe that Arminians do not think that God *ever* overrides man's free will, even outside of salvation. I can't immediately think of any quotes to back this up, but Arminians generally hold that man has free will (and is therefore responsible for his actions) in all circumstances.
With that said, no Arminian denies that God hardened the heart of Pharaoh. They just don't think that giving grace or hardening hearts take away free will.
One Arminian wrote: "It does not seem that God hardened Pharaoh to do something against his own will. God only emboldened him to carry through with what he had already intended from the beginning.
On the Society of Evangelical Arminians, I found this blog: http://evangelicalarminians.org/jackson.the-hardening-of-pharaohs-heart. the Article reads "The same is true of God in his dealings with Pharaoh. God did not change Pharaoh's heart to make him want to kill the Hebrews. Pharaoh already wanted to kill them. What God did was give Pharaoh the courage to follow through with what he already desired to do. Pharaoh was an evil man, but he was also timid and fearful of the Hebrews and their God. God simply gave Pharaoh the tenacity to follow through with the desires of his evil heart."
Galatians 6:7 "Do not be deceived, God is not mocked; for whatever a man sows, that he will also reap." In this way, God giving someone the harvest of the hardness of heart that He has sown is divine consequence, it's not an overriding of free will from the Arminian perspective.
Paul:
ReplyDeleteI have been warned by a friend that to comment in one of your Calvinist-Arminian threads was tantamount to suicide, but here goes anyway.
You have attacked on several occations the arguments raised by Skarlet that they are not "tracking with what Arminians are writing." At the risk of coming off a smart-*** - so what? The question is not whether Arminian theologians have it right or not; frankly, I don't read Arminian theologians either, because they all seem blindly determined to defend what you refer to as LFW, which I consider to be a secondary concept far removed from the key issue of sovereignty that ultimately defines the differences between the two sides.
And Skarlet has is very right here. You deny that Calvinism posits a "mechanistic 'causal' determinism" - but I would be interested in knowing what kind of determinism it DOES posit. The quotes presented by Skarlet suggest precisely a mechanistic, causal determinism, as does this one from a Southern Baptist preacher I sat under some years ago: "If there is now or ever has been or ever will be one, single atom in all of the universe not directly under the immediate, direct and manipulative control of God, then He is not sovereign."
Perhaps you have done this elsewhere, but I have yet to find your definition of the kind of determinism Calvinism DOES posit for God. I would appreciate hearing what that would be.
I am sorry if this comes off as combative - it is truly not meant to be. But I believe you have been dismissive of Skarlet's arguments in a way that seems flippant and condescending to me. Perhaps that is the style of argument on this site, but it's not one I like very much.
And just to be fair, here is my view, and I would be happy to have your critique of it. I believe that the Calvinist views of sovereignty and determinism, as I understand them, actually lower God rather than raising Him up. It takes comparable little effort to get one's way when one has total control of all the actors in the drama. If we just give them a character sketch and an opening line of two, it's much harder for the play to come out the way the author intends. Yet that's exactly what God managed to to - with the Sctiptures and with Abimalech and with all the rest of us. It's the one who can let the players write all the lines and stage directions themselves and STILL get the play to end as He wants that is truly in control!
At the risk of sounding glib, let's use this illustration instead. I am a "creator" looking for a companion, and I decide upon the dog as the ultimate choice. So I make myself a nice little dog, and to make sure my experience is always pleasant, I make it do that it never does it's business on the carpet, never barks when there is company in the house, never humps anyone's leg - it only does what I want the way I want whenever I want it. Unfortunately, I can't program anything remotely like affection into it either - affectionate reactions, perhaps, but I know it's not "choosing" to lick my face because it loves me - it's just licking my face because that is part of its programming. Eventually I throw it away and just get myself a regular old puppy. Cleaning up the poop off my rug isn't any fun, but when it jumps into my lap and chews on my fingers I know it's doing so because that is what it WANTS to do, which is kind of what the whole concept of love and companionship is about any way.
For what other purpose than that could He possibly have created us in the first place? It's the only thing He couldn't get anywhere else in all the universe.
Sorry - that's emotional, not theological, But my God happens to be emotional too.
Jeff,
ReplyDeleteYes, I guess your friend was right. Given your response, I'll treat you as you don't exist, which I guess is tantamount to suicide.
Laymen,
Arminians do say God at times violates man's free will to get certain things accomplished. Open theists like Greg Boyd have said this too. They all agree, though, then when/if God does this, freedom and responsibility is removed from the agent.
Skarlet,
Arminians have said the same thing as Pink and Calvin, so quoting them was unhelpful. Olson writes, “God is the first cause of whatever happens; even a sinful act cannot occur without God as its first cause" (Arminian Theology, 122). Second, appealing to them is anachronistic since they're writing before what is commonly viewed as "causal determinism" today. Third, you can find in Calvin and in Westminster divines the denial of physical determinism. At any rate, the point of of my response was to point out the ambiguity in referring to Calvinism as "causal."
You also make claims about what people were willing or desirous to do or not do, but you offer not a shred of evidence. How in the world can you know Abimelek's intentions and desires from what we see in the text? Anyway, it makes no sense for God to point out that he did not let Abimelek tough Sarah if Abimelek already desired not to touch her. That's an odd way to read the text. You also claim that Arminianism demands ability to choose otherwise, but this is false. Dave Hunt is case in point, same with all the other Arminian Frankfurt-Libertarians, as they're known.
This is really beside the point, though. The argument here is that God got humans to write an inerrant Word, got humans to preserve the Word (a monumental task if you study the history of how we got our text today and consider how little we have surviving from the ancient world), stopped men like Abimelek from touching his prize---and odd thing for ANE royalty to not do---and did all of this without violating their LFW. If God could do this, why can't he not stop all the evil we see and bring all men to heaven without violating their LFW? I haven't seen an answer to this question. The objections you've raised apply equally to the Bible and Abimelek, and thus don't work. You said I was using a different view of willing. No, I wasn't I'm using it in the same way you are.
Perhaps you can lay out the argument and include the salient features which show that God could bring about inerrancy and preserve the word through the ages, and all without violating man's LFW, but God couldn't stop all evil without violating man's LFW. If you say he can, but has a good reason not to, then you've made my case. That response undercuts the arguments against Calvinism we're getting from the sophisticated Arminians. The arguments that appear in the books and journals.
Paul -
ReplyDeleteSorry you feel that way. Is it only theologians, or people who can talk like them, who have a right to ask their questions?
Paul,
ReplyDeleteYou decided to ignore what Jeff wrote, but I did think that one comment was especially interesting. “The question is not whether Arminian theologians have it right or not; frankly, I don't read Arminian theologians either, because they all seem blindly determined to defend what you refer to as LFW, which I consider to be a secondary concept far removed from the key issue of sovereignty that ultimately defines the differences between the two sides.” You do seem more concerned with book Arminians than everyday Arminians. Is this the case? Do everyday Arminians not count for purposes of this discussion?
I have a request for a couple citations. You said that “Arminians do say God at times violates man's free will to get certain things accomplished.” Also, you said “You also claim that Arminianism demands ability to choose otherwise, but this is false. Dave Hunt is case in point, same with all the other Arminian Frankfurt-Libertarians, as they're known.” I did not know that any Arminians would claim those two things. Can you point me to some quotes? It sounds very enlightening.
For the time being, though, I will stick with the definition found on the Society of Evangelical Arminian's webpage: “Libertarian Free Will (LFW) is the idea that man is able to choose otherwise than he will choose.”
To briefly touch on the Abimelek point, you asked “How in the world can you know Abimelek's intentions and desires from what we see in the text?” Well, the verses says “But Abimelech had not come near her; and he said, 'Lord, will You slay a righteous nation also? Did he not say to me, “She is my sister”? And she, even she herself said, “He is my brother.” In the integrity of my heart and innocence of my hands I have done this.' And God said to him in a dream, 'Yes, I know that you did this in the integrity of your heart.'” So, that's how I know his motives. He did not desire to take another man's wife, and God preventing him from taking Sarah to himself in accordance with that motive.
But, you say that it is beside the point. Your main point is that if God can could bring about inerrancy and preserve the word through the ages – without violating man's LFW – then there is NO REASON that God couldn't stop all evil without violating man's LFW.
ReplyDeleteYou write: “If you say he can, but has a good reason not to, then you've made my case.”
I personally say that God can. But, I do think He has good reason not to, IE it would undercut the reason for which He gave LFW (the idea that man is able to choose otherwise than he will choose) to begin with.
Your conclusion does not at all show Arminianism to be wrong, though, according to the SEA definition of LFW. Even paralyzed people can make choices, so they also believe that God could stop physically stop all evil on earth without overriding LFW, but they also believe that He doesn't do that because it would defeat the effect of LFW, the purpose of LFW. God doesn't want to skirt around LFW, since He set it up for a reason.
Jeff,
ReplyDeleteI don't mind questions. It's how you began and some of your further comment that indicated I should stay away. Seems your mind was made up from the start, and you nevertheless were going to play the martyr in daring to interact with the big meany Calvinist your friends and parents warned you about.
Skarlet,
Due to some medical reasons, I'm going to bow out for the time being. As far as Frankfurt Libertarians, documented some of their quotes here:
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2009/06/divided-front-libertarians-at-odds-with.html
Lastly, I'm not trying to show Arminianism is wrong, I'm pointing to aan internal problem I see vis-avis their attacks on Calvinism re: the problem of evil it has, i.e., that since God determinism all, and comptatibilism is the case, then God could avoid all evil acts while also maintaining (compatibilist) freedom. They say the Arminian God cannot do this. I point to inerrancy, the preservation of God's word throughout the ages, instances like Abimelek, etc., to argue against this claim to impossibility.
Paul,
ReplyDeleteFirst of all, I am sorry to hear about the medical difficulties, and will certain keep you in my prayers. I don't expect you to respond, then, to my (hopefully very brief) comments on what you just wrote.
Thank you for the quotes about LFW and PAP. It certainly is a tricky topic to discuss. I tend to agree with the Dave Hunt quote, actually. I also believe that “man is able to choose otherwise than he will choose.” I just don't believe that there is the realistic possibility that a man, who is still able, will choose other than he will. But that's an off-topic comment.
The clarification of your basic point is helpful here. However, ultimately I think that your argument falls short in two ways. First, while I agree that “God could avoid all evil acts while also maintaining” LFW, through physical restraint, but I would say that God CANNOT avoid all evil acts while also maintaining His reason/goal/intended outcome of giving people free will. I hope that you can see the distinction there.
Secondly, I do not think that God working through (LFW) willing men who did not resist His grace, such as in the cases of the writers of the Scripture or Abimelek shows that God would work through (LFW) unwilling men who would resist His grace. As I understand it, compatablism maintains that God makes men willing by changing them internally in a way they have no opportunity to effectively resist, but that would not be LFW. Those who believe in LFW see a huge difference between God working through willing men (writers of Scripture, etc) and hypothetically restraining the internal drives of unwilling men (like those who would rather resist God's grace and sin.)