A friend of mine, who used to be one of Frame's TAs, and is currently teaching at SEBTS, shared this with me:
In any case of knowledge there is going to be:
-- belief. But this is an existential matter, and subject to various
subjective, psychological realities.
-- truth. But this is a situational matter, involving a correspondence
to reality as it really is.
-- justification, or rationality, or warrant, or reliability, or [fill
in the blank] positive epistemic status of some sort. But this is a
matter of epistemic norms.
So just in terms of an everyday, garden-variety instance of knowledge, there will always be a threefold perspective on what is required for that bit of knowledge to be knowledge.
I always saw Frame's TP not as revolutionary, but as a helpful, pedagogical reminder of the various conditions for knowledge, a reminder that encourages us to be balanced when we comment upon what it takes to have knowledge. What Frame says in TP is at the heart of any basic epistemology of the analysis of knowledge. If you leave one of the perspectives out, you simply don't have knowledge. This is uncontroversial to me. Knowledge isn't 'all about truth' or 'all about belief' or 'all about norm'. It's about all three, at the same time, and it can't be anything less than that.