Crypto-Protestant Orthodoxy

Perry Robinson Says:

“The point of patriarchal ratification is that those sees have been founded directly by the apostles. This goes back as far as Ireneaus and Tertullian. Acts 15 seems to fit the conceptual criteria since the apostles ratified the council in Acts 15, which is what patriarchial ratification is getting at. So it doesn’t fail to meet the criteria.”

http://energeticprocession.wordpress.com/2009/12/02/against-khomiakov/#more-778

Several glaring problems with that appeal:

i) The 5 sees of the pentarchy are Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. What solid evidence do we have, in distinction to self-serving legends, that sees like Alexandria and Constantinople were “founded directly by apostles?”

ii) Even if, for the sake of argument, we grant that claim, what about other churches, such as some of the Pauline churches, which were directly founded by apostles?

It’s quite arbitrary to narrow down the list to these five, even if (ex hypothesi) they were directly founded by apostles.

The only reason to privilege these five sees is because Orthodox tradition confers that distinction on these and only these. But that begs the very question at issue concerning the locus of authority. Invoking Orthodox tradition to ground or identify Orthodox criteria assumes what it needs to prove. Moreover, there are rival criteria (e.g. receptionism).

iii) Furthermore, even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that these (and only these?) sees were originally founded by apostles, how does pentarchial ratification, centuries after the fact, amount to apostolic ratification? Did the five patriarchs hold a séance to poll the founding apostles? Does Perry think an institution can never stray from its original vision or mandate? Didn’t Jesus teach us that a church can lose its light (Rev 2-3)?

“I don’t think it is viciously circular. First, I focused on the conditions for the council to be ecumencial and not to know it is so. That as I stated is a separate problem. Steve is confusing epistemology and metaphysics.”

i) That’s a false dichotomy. The point of trying to isolate and identify the conditions is to have some criteria by which it’s possible to determine which ecumenical councils are ecumenical and which are not. Unless he can identify the conditions is a way that isn’t viciously circular, he can’t use that as a criterion to determine which church councils are ecumenical and which are not.

ii) Moreover, he needs to know that the council (2nd Nicea) which laid down these conditions is, itself, ecumenical. If he doesn’t know that, then he can’t invoke this council to authorize the conditions.

“Further, if God lays down the criteria for knowing when God is speaking, do I need to know it is God giving those criteria for those criteria to be legitimate? No. Things can be what they are without me knowing about it.”

Yes, things can be what they are without our knowing about it. But the question at issue was how to determine the ecumenicity of a church council. What’s the value of an ecumenical council if no one can know whether or not it’s ecumenical?

“If we say yes, then Steve isn’t in any better position with respect to vicious circularity.”

i) So does Perry’s argument boil down to epistemic parity? The Protestant rule of faith isn’t “any better” than the Orthodox rule of faith?

But the original point of his post was to show that Orthodoxy isn’t vulnerable to the same charge as Protestantism.

ii) My own position would only be viciously circular if I were arguing that we can’t have direct knowledge of anything.

“Second, he speaks of the criteria being reliable, but reliability isn’t sufficient for knowledge and may not be relevant to it either.”

Which misses the point. At a minimum, reliability is a necessary condition of a criteria. The problem with Perry’s criterion is not merely that it’s insufficient. The problem, rather, is that it fails to even meet a necessary condition. If Perry thinks reliability is an insufficient condition, then how much worse off is an unreliable criterion–such as the one he proposes?

“Third, the issue isn’t knowing really at all, but normativity. So it is not that I’d need to know that the criteria are ‘reliable’ but I’d need to know that they are normative. Normativity outpaces reliability. Steve is confusing apples and oranges.”

i) How can they be normative if they aren’t even reliable?

ii) In the first sentence he says “the issue isn’t knowing really at all,” but in the second sentence he says he’d “need to know” that they are normative. So in the first sentence he denies that knowing is the issue, but directly on the heels of that denial he tells us in the second sentence that he’d need to know it they’re normative.

iii) He must also show that Acts 15 was about normativity rather than knowing.

“Fourth, One problem with his formulation is that he says that “while it takes the criteria to ratify a council.” Well criteria don’t ratify anything, persons using the criteria do.”

Yes, persons who apply criteria to ratify a council. They can’t apply what they don’t have. So it takes criteria in hand to do that. What is Perry’s problem, exactly?

“One of the reasons that what I am doing is not what Steve is alleging is that the principle isn’t first articulated at 2nd Nicea. As I mentioned above, the principle is in play for a long time prior, going back as far as Ireneaus. That’s as early as one could reasonably want.”

Now he’s backpedaling from his original argument. He initially said: “So an ecumenical council accepted by East and West teaches that what constitutes the ecumenical nature of the council is pentarchial ratification, rather than papal ratification.”

Now, however, he’s swapped that out and swapped in “The point of patriarchal ratification is that those sees have been founded directly by the apostles. This goes back as far as Ireneaus and Tertullian.”

So he’s ditched the specific criterion of pentarchial ratification for the general criterion of apostolic succession. But even if we accept that principle for the sake of argument, apostolic succession is broader than five (allegedly) apostolic sees. So why would the ratification process be artificially confined to those and only those five?

“I also think that the principle is in play at the Acts 15 council. If it were circular, then it would be circular there, but it isn’t. So the idea of apostolic ratification is part of the doctrine of apostolic succession in principle.”

Notice how far he’s strayed from his original argument. He initially appealed to pentarchical ratification, as promulgated by 2nd Nicea, which is normative because it’s ecumenical, and deemed to be ecumenical because it was (allegedly) accepted by East and West alike (although that was challenged by some commenters).

Now, however, he’s downshifted to the vague principle that a council is ecumenical if it enjoys apostolic ratification via apostolic succession. But how does that solve the problem he originally proposed for himself? Remember what he said:

“When I was first seriously considering becoming Orthodox, how the Orthodox understood church authority was an important area to map out. In discussing the matter with Catholics that I knew, they often objected that Orthodox ecclesiology falls prey to the same problems as Protestantism. There was no locus of authority in the offices of the church, but the source of normativity was ultimately to reside in the judgment of the people.”

So where, according to Perry, do we find the locus of authority? Do we locate that authority (or “normativity”) in the chain of apostolic succession? But is apostolic succession self-locating? Does church history supply a street map for finding that destination? Or does it give us a set of competing street maps with different destinations? Divergent chains of succession, all claiming to be the true chain?

i) Wasn’t the point of invoking 2nd Nicea to narrow down the search parameters? To have a starting-point? A beeline?

To locate apostolic authority in at least one ecumenical council, as well as the conditions for ecumenicity which that council enunciated–so that he can extrapolate from that particular locus of authority in all the other councils which localize the same principle? But unless he already knows that 2nd Nicea is a locus of authority, how can he use that council to get a fix on the principle?

ii) And why is he appealing to Tertullian? He doesn’t regard Tertullian as a church father. Indeed, he views Tertullian as a heretic. So why would Tertullian’s word count for anything?

“In short, the principle is employed previously and hence has normative weight apart from 2nd Nicea and so I reject the first line.”

A principle has normative weight just in case it was previously employed? And how does previous employment ipso facto confer normativity on said principle? If a later Gnostic author employs a principle used by earlier Gnostics, does that make it normative?

On doubting doubters

JD Walters has posted a nice little review of liberal attack on the Resurrection. Here's a comment I left at the CADRE today in connection with his review:

“That cause is the human phenomenon of cognitive dissonance reduction. Basically, this is the human tendency to rationalize a discontinuity between reality and one’s current beliefs in such a way that current beliefs are modified or added to instead of being rejected. Sometimes this results in extremely radical rationalizations. We have solid examples of this from other religious movements in history, such as the Millerite movement, the Sabbatai Zevi movement, and others.”

Komarnitsky observation is true, but highly deceptive:

i) It clearly cuts both ways. We could just as well (or better) apply “cognitive dissonance reduction” to the case of unbelievers who try to explain away evidence for the Resurrection.

ii) Examples of religious movements which reinterpret the terms of a failed prophecy after the fact take for granted that testimonial evidence is sufficiently reliable for us to access both the original words and actual events, so that we can compare the two to discover or confirm a discrepancy. If we didn’t know what a false prophet really said, or if we didn’t know what really happened, we couldn’t tell if his prediction failed.

iii) Komarnitsky has to show that predictions or expectations regarding the Resurrection don’t fit with what actually happened. What’s his evidence? Does he think the NT contains failed prophecies about the Resurrection? If so, where are they? Or does he think the original prophecies were redacted (or else fabricated as vaticina ex eventu) to “rationalize” the disappointing outcome? If so, how could he ever detect a rationalization, since the original evidence was systematically suppressed?

iv) On the face of it, he’s simply assuming the Resurrection didn’t happen, and then jumping to a psychological theory to explain what we find. But, of course, that begs the very question in dispute.

v) In my observation, when religious movements issue false prophecies, the effect is divisive. You have a tiny core of diehard adherents who stand by the false prophet no matter what. But you also have many former adherents who become bitterly disillusioned and leave the movement. And some of them become outspoken opponents.

What evidence do we have of a major split in the nascent Christian movement over the “non-Resurrection” of Jesus?

The Making of the Hebrew Bible

I’m going to quote some passages from a book review. This is one of those situations where the book review is more important than the book under review. Richard Hess is a conservative OT scholar with a strong background in Biblical archeology, and he brings his expertise to bear in his review. And his comments furnish evidence for the OT canon.

[Quote] This all begs the larger question of what constitutes a book. For this van der Toorn uses the definition of von Wilamowitz that it is “a text published by its author through the medium of an organized book trade for the benefit of an expectant public” (p. 25). As van der Toorn notes this would exclude the existence of virtually any book in the ancient Near East. However, it would also exclude the formation of a book by newspaper installments such as the books of Charles Dickens and other well known Victorian and later authors of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They did not publish “a text” by itself but a group of smaller texts, one after the other, similar to the construction suggested by van der Toorn for the biblical books. The definition would also exclude various e-books and other media that are created and “published” on the internet without the use of any sort of “organized book trade.” This is especially true of many written items that are as long as various biblical books in terms of number of words but are posted on blogs and other devices and thereby made available for free to anyone who wishes to access them (such as this review). Rather than reducing or limiting the number of written items, these contexts of “publication” have increased the number of volumes. They call into question what amounts to an overly simplistic definition of the production of books in the modern era and therefore to an overly restrictive definition regarding the production of books in the ancient world.

In discussing authorship, van der Toorn identifies compositions of the ancient world as largely anonymous and limited to occasional colophons that included the name of the scribe who copied the text and perhaps the name of the author. However, his assertion overlooks a wide range of genres that preserved the names of their authors in the opening lines of the work. Letters, prophecies, treaties, and other documents often named their authors at the beginning of the document. These were not pseudepigraphic compositions nor were they honorific authors, as van der Toorn identifies some texts. In fact, the composition of Deuteronomy that he describes as peseudepigraphic has been understood by some scholars as a treaty/covenant document. It, like other ancient Near Eastern treaties, identifies its author at the beginning of the document. This same confusion emerges when van der Toorn discusses the Mesopotamian Catalogue of Texts and Authors. This catalogue describes literary works other than those genres mentioned above. For example, it does not list prophecies. So it is not clear that van der Toorn compares similar items when he relates this catalogue to the Talmudic tradition of ascribing the compilation of Isaiah to Hezekiah. However, a wisdom text such as Proverbs is properly compared to the catalogue. Its “authorship” may indeed refer to editorial arrangement and activity as appears to be described in Proverbs 25:1.

Van der Toorn provides a helpful review of the scribal training and abilities in Mesopotamia and in Egypt. In both cases the scribes in the religious traditions achieved a middle class status somewhere between the menial workers and those of the religious elite. In the Mesopotamian tradition, the more advanced scribes rose beyond the levels of rote memory and copying to discussion and debate concerning the classical works of their profession. When he considers Israel, van der Toorn advances the text of Jeremiah 8:8-9 which is repeated many times in his book. He understands this text as implying that Jeremiah’s prophetic word stood in opposition with the Torah as created by the scribes of Jeremiah’s day. Thus Jeremiah argues that the Torah is a deceitful product of scribes. This may be one interpretation of this text. However, modern translations understand Jeremiah 8:8-9 as an indictment for falsely dealing with the Torah, not a charge of inventing a false torah. The problem is one of interpretation rather than van der Toorn’s concern with production.

One need not follow van der Toorn’s assumptions about the lack of authenticity for the unprovenanced Baruch seal in order to agree that many scribes were associated with the temple. Indeed, his observation of an absence of separation between the secular and the sacred, or more specifically between the palace and the temple, lead one to accept in large measure a sacred provenance for much of the scribal activity surrounding the production and preservation of the Bible. The comparison with Ilimalku of Ugarit is apt: He appears to have been a scribe connected with both the temple and the palace. The deposit of the description of kingship in the Shiloh sanctuary (1 Samuel 10:25), the holy background to the Torah (Hosea 8:12), and the connection of the book of Torah with the temple (2 Kings 22-23) all affirm the scribal connection with the temple. The Levites in Chronicles are involved in Torah instructions as well as in civil and other temple duties. Further, van der Toorn points to the sages as one group of explicitly religious professionals in Jeremiah 18:18. Deuteronomy 17:18-19 demonstrates how the king is to copy the Torah from a scroll “before the Levitical priests.”

It is in this context that van der Toorn makes an important observation concerning literacy (p. 95): “The epigraphic evidence suggests that training in rudimentary scribal skills was available throughout Palestine, but the formation of scribes who were ‘expert and wise’ required a program of study provided only in the temple school.” Indeed, this was my point in the note, "Writing about Writing: Abecedaries and Evidence for Literacy in Ancient Israel," Vetus Testamentum 56 (2006) 342-46. Functional literacy was available widely in Israel. Whether or not the abecedaries from Palestine are to be understood as samples for engravers and potters is another matter. If the Izbet Sartah inscription is an abecedary, it seems difficult to explain the repetition of letter forms on the text as a sample text for an engraver. It seems more natural to understand here some “scribal scriblings,” however elementary the writer may have been. Modeling the Mesopotamian curriculum, van der Toorn suggests that Hebrew scribal training was divided into two parts. In the first phase, the twenty-two Hebrew letters were “easily mastered” and skill was then developed in the speed and clarity of style involved in the formation of each letter. Acrostics such as Psalms 25 and 119 formed the counterpart to the cuneiform acrostic, the Babylonian Theodicy. These were used as copy texts to instruct beginning students. Van der Toorn creatively identifies possible lists in the biblical texts that could have been used for the development of related vocabulary (p. 99): animals in Leviticus 11 and Deuteronomy 14, places in Numbers 33, jewelry in Isaiah 3:18-23, and “revealed things” in the later apocalyptic literature.

Reasonably it may be argued, as van der Toorn does, that the prologue of Ben Sira mentions the use of “the books of the fathers” as a curriculum for scribal instruction. The texts of Deuteronomy, Psalms, and Isaiah dominate at Qumran and in the New Testament’s use of the Old. Therefore, these are reasonably the ones most likely forming the essential books of the scribal curriculum in the Second Temple Period. Scribes would have committed them to memory. Advanced classes would have discussed these texts.

Such a conclusion controverts the view of Deuteronomy as a vassal treaty form where, as least in the second millennium B.C., the historical prologue was common. Thus two beginnings to the work would have been expected. This is clear in the treaty between Suppiluliuma and Niqmaddu II of Ugarit which begins “Thus says his majesty Suppiluliuma,” and then, after the historical prologue begins again, “Now Suppiluliuma, Great King, King of Hatti, has made the following treaty with Niqmaddu, king of the land of Ugarit, saying” (G. Beckman, Hittite Diplomatic Texts [SBLWAWS 7; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996], pp. 30-31). This calls into question the view that the only explanation for all such multiple introductions or colophon summaries must be the result of later scribal additions. Clearly such was not the case with the Hittite vassal treaties and documents that may have been modeled on them.

Could the prophets themselves have applied earlier oracles and phrases in this manner? We know, for example, that the Neo-Assyrian oracles alluded to Mesopotamian literary traditions (see Charles Halton, “Allusions to the Stream of Tradition in Neo-Assyrian Oracles,” Ancient Near Eastern Studies 46 [2009]: 50-61). Since van der Toorn would suggest that these oracles represent texts closer to the original oral pronouncements, as opposed to the larger collections of oracles in a prophetic scroll such as Jeremiah, then this sort of relecture appears to go back as far as we are able to reach to the original oracles. It would therefore not appear to provide prima facie evidence for scribal editing and reworking. For van der Toorn the sermons of Jeremiah represent Deuteronomistic works composed by scribes in that tradition. But it is not impossible that they were composed by the prophet Jeremiah. The demonstration that phrases and ideas were borrowed and reused in prophetic books does not preclude that these were borrowed and reused by the prophets themselves.

Van der Toorn finds evidence for a temple library early in Jerusalem. He cites the texts of 1 Samuel 10:25; 2 Kings 22; and 2 Maccabees 2:13-15. He concludes that around 450 B.C. Ezra identified the Torah as the beginning of the canon (p. 248). Two centuries later the Prophets, Psalms, and Proverbs were added. By the time of Josephus, he and others identified most of the Writings as part of the Prophets. Thus Josephus and most of the New Testament describe the canon as consisting of the Law and the Prophets. The Persian authorities gave Ezra the power to codify the Torah and to enforce it on the community around Jerusalem. Van der Toorn concludes that c. 250 B.C. Malachi was added as an anonymous work to bring the scroll of the Minor Prophets to an ideal number of twelve and to close the canon. He feels that this is signaled when Malachi 3:22 (English 4:4) echoes Joshua 1:7 and forms an inclusio for the entire work of the Prophets; with its emphasis on following the Law of Moses. However, this echo is odd if it is intentional. Other than the general verb “to command,” not a single verbal phrase is repeated in the two verses. “Be strong and courageous” and “be careful to do everything” are key and repeated phrases in Joshua 1. However, they occur nowhere at the end of Malachi. There is no explicit inclusio here.

Van der Toorn’s work is an important contribution to scholarship. It brings an updated model of the development of the Old Testament as a Scriptural canon and bases this model on reasonable and detailed comparative analysis of the better known world of Mesopotamian scribal schools and religious (and other) texts. Van der Toorn joins with other scholars who reject a very late canon formation, posited by some as after the Roman destruction of the Second Temple. The use of comparative evidence from ancient Mesopotamian texts and scribal culture provides a much needed corrective to other approaches. Indeed, some of the concerns expressed in this review come as a result of not going far enough with the comparative evidence.

http://www.denverseminary.edu/article/how-the-bible-became-a-book-a-review-article-of-karel-van-der-toorn-scribal-culture-and-the-making-of-the-hebrew-bible/

"Multiperspectivalism and the Reformed Faith"

An article from Dr. Vern Poythress (PDF).

The Immaculate Love-Interest

Here are some Marian Psalms attributed to St. Bonaventure:

PSALM 17
I will love thee, O Lady of heaven and earth: and I will call upon thy name in the nations. Give praise to her, ye who are troubled in heart: and she will strengthen you against your enemies. Give to us, O Lady, the grace of thy breasts: from the dropping milk of thy sweetness refresh the inmost souls of thy children. Honor her, O all ye religious: for she is your helper and your special advocate. Be thou our refreshment, glorious Mother of Christ: for thou art the admirable foundation of the religious life. Glory be to the Father, etc.

PSALM 18
The heavens declare thy glory: and the fragrance of thine unguents is spread abroad among the nations. Sigh ye unto her, ye lost sinners: and she will lead you to the harbor of pardon. In hymns and canticles knock at her heart: and she will rain down upon you the grace of her sweetness. Glorify her, ye just, before the throne of God: for by the fruit of her womb you have worked justice. Praise ye her, ye heaven of heavens: and the whole earth will glorify her name. Glory be to the Father, etc.

PSALM 23
The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof: but thou, O most holy Mother, reignest with Him forever. Thou art clothed with glory and beauty: every precious stone is thy covering and thy clothing. The brightness of the sun is upon thy head: the beauty of the moon is beneath thy feet. Shining orbs adorn thy throne: the morning stars glorify thee forever. Be mindful of us, O Lady, in thy good pleasure: and make us worthy to glorify thy name. Glory be to the Father, etc.

PSALM 25
Judge me, O Lady, for I have departed from my innocence: but because I have hoped in thee I shall not become weak. Enkindle my heart with the fire of thy love: and with the girdle of chastity bind my reins. For thy mercy and thy clemency are before my eyes: and I was delighted in the voice of thy praise. O Lady, I have loved the beauty of thy face: and I have revered thy sacred majesty. Praise ye her name, for she is holy: let her wonders be declared forever. Glory be to the Father, etc.

PSALM 26
O Lady, may thy light be the splendor of my countenance: and let the serenity of thy grace shine upon my mind. Raise up my head: and I will sing a psalm to thy name. Turn not away thy face from me: for from my youth up I have greatly desired thy beauty and thy grace. I have loved thee and sought after thee, O Queen of Heaven: withdraw not thy mercy and thy grace from thy servant. I will give praise to thee in the nations: and I will honor the throne of thy glory. Glory be to the Father, etc.

PSALM 31
Blessed are they whose hearts love thee, O Virgin Mary: their sins will be mercifully washed away by thee. Holy, chaste, and flowering are thy breasts: which blossomed into the flower of eternal greenness. The beauty of thy grace will never see corruption: and the grace of thy countenance will never fade. Blessed art thou, O sublime Rod of Jesse: for thou hast raised thyself unto Him who sits in the highest. O Virgin Queen, thou thyself art the way by which salvation from on high hath visited us. Glory be to the Father, etc.

PSALM 32
Rejoice, ye just, in the Virgin Mary: and in uprightness of heart praise ye her together. Draw near unto her with reverence and devotion: and let your heart be delighted in her salutation. Give unto her the sacrifice of praise: and be ye inebriated from the breasts of her sweetness. For she sheds upon you the rays of her loving kindness: and she will enlighten you with the splendors of her mercy. Her fruit is most sweet: it grows ever sweeter in the mouth and the heart of the wise. Glory be to the Father, etc.

PSALM 58
Deliver me from mine enemies, O Lady of the world: arise to meet me, O Queen of piety. The purest gold is thy ornament: the sardine stone and the topaz are thy diadem. The jasper and the amethyst are in thy right hand: the beryl and the chrysolite in thy left. The hyacinths are on thy breast: shining carbuncles are the jewels of thy bracelets. Myrrh, frankincense, and balsam are on thy hands: the sapphire and the emerald on thy fingers. Glory be to the Father, etc.

PSALM 75
In Judea God is known: in Israel the honor of His Mother. Sweet is the memory of her above honey and the honeycomb: and her love is above all aromatic perfumes. Health and life are in her house: and in her dwelling are peace and eternal glory. Honor her, ye heavens and earth: because the supreme artificer has wonderfully honored her. Give to her praise, all ye creatures: and joyfully celebrate her astonishing mercy. Glory be to the Father, etc.

PSALM 105
Give praise to Our Lady, for she is good: in all the tribes of the earth relate her mercies. Far from the impious is her conversation: her foot has not declined from the way of the Most High. A fountain of fertilizing grace comes forth from her mouth: and a virginal emanation sanctifying chaste souls. The hope of the glory of Paradise is in her heart: for the devout soul who shall have honored her. Have mercy on us, O resplendent Queen of Heaven: and give consolation from thy glory. Glory be to the Father, etc.

http://www.franciscan-sfo.org/ap/bona/PSALTER.htm

I could quote some more examples, but you get the idea.

This raises the question of what inspired the cult of Mary in the first place. I think there’s more than one motive. As I’ve said before, she plays the role of a patron goddess. The “Mother of God” takes the place of mother gods. But they’re functionally equivalent.

However, as you read through this material, another motivation is unmistakable. I don’t think it’s coincidental that so many of the men–and I do mean men–who contributed to the edifice of Marian devotion (e.g. St. Bernard, St. Bonaventure, St. Louis de Montfort, St. Alphonsus de Liguori) had taken a vow of chastity.

What’s on display here is sublimated sexuality. They’ve transferred their normal masculine yearnings to Mary. It’s the thinly-veiled expression of a frustrated libido.

Mary becomes their surrogate girlfriend or love interest. The unforgettable, but unattainable cheerleader or homecoming queen they long to date. This erotic poetry, dressed up in “chaste” piety, is the monkish equivalent of the pinup girl a teenage boy has hanging on the wall of his bedroom.

The Golden Fleece Award

DAVE ARMSTRONG SAID:

“Then why are works always central in every discussion of the final judgment that I could find in Scripture (50 passages: linked to above)?”

1) Well, if you have to ask, then, presumably, you don’t think Scripture gives us any sort of explicit answer as to “why?” Therefore, we’re left to speculate.

Of course, any speculation must avoid contradicting what Scripture has revealed could not be the basis.

2) What possible functions do rewards serve?

i) To motivate

Rewards give people an incentive to be diligent and persevere.

Does this mean we deserve a reward? Is a reward proportionate to the performance?

If we use an award to motivate a 5-year-old, is the reward necessarily proportionate to the performance? Did he really earn it?

ii) To acknowledge excellence

An award or reward may be bestowed to publicly recognize that one thing is, in some sense, better than another. Take a beauty contest. Some women are prettier than others.

Does that represent something they merit? No. They were born that way.

Same thing with awards given to opera singers. They were born with a great voice.

By the same token, awards can also be handed out to acknowledge mediocrity or incompetence. Hell is the infernal equivalent of the Golden Raspberry Award, Golden Fleece Award, or Golden Turkey Awards.

Instead of the Hollywood Hall of Shame, it’s the Wormwood Hall of Shame.

3) If you think heavenly rewards are meritorious, then that makes you Pelagian.

“Why is this the case if God is supposedly wanting to completely separate any notion of works or acts from salvation itself?”

You’ve been corrected on this more than once. Salvation and justification aren’t synonymous concepts. You’re chronically unable to even accurately state the position you presume to critique.

“I agree with what C. S, Lewis said: asking one to choose between faith and works is as senseless as saying which blade of a pair of scissors is more important.”

That’s a simpleminded caricature of the issue. And it disregards some fundamental distinctions which the Bible treats as all-important:

Romans 4

1What then shall we say was gained by Abraham, our forefather according to the flesh? 2For if Abraham was justified by works, he has something to boast about, but not before God. 3For what does the Scripture say? "Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him as righteousness." 4Now to the one who works, his wages are not counted as a gift but as his due. 5And to the one who does not work but believes in him who justifies the ungodly, his faith is counted as righteousness, 6just as David also speaks of the blessing of the one to whom God counts righteousness apart from works:
7 "Blessed are those whose lawless deeds are forgiven,
and whose sins are covered;
8blessed is the man against whom the Lord will not count his sin."
9Is this blessing then only for the circumcised, or also for the uncircumcised? We say that faith was counted to Abraham as righteousness. 10How then was it counted to him? Was it before or after he had been circumcised? It was not after, but before he was circumcised. 11 He received the sign of circumcision as a seal of the righteousness that he had by faith while he was still uncircumcised. The purpose was to make him the father of all who believe without being circumcised, so that righteousness would be counted to them as well, 12and to make him the father of the circumcised who are not merely circumcised but who also walk in the footsteps of the faith that our father Abraham had before he was circumcised.

13For the promise to Abraham and his offspring that he would be heir of the world did not come through the law but through the righteousness of faith. 14 For if it is the adherents of the law who are to be the heirs, faith is null and the promise is void. 15For the law brings wrath, but where there is no law there is no transgression.
16That is why it depends on faith, in order that the promise may rest on grace and be guaranteed to all his offspring—not only to the adherent of the law but also to the one who shares the faith of Abraham, who is the father of us all, 17as it is written, "I have made you the father of many nations"—in the presence of the God in whom he believed, who gives life to the dead and calls into existence the things that do not exist. 18In hope he believed against hope, that he should become the father of many nations, as he had been told, "So shall your offspring be." 19He did not weaken in faith when he considered his own body, which was as good as dead ( since he was about a hundred years old), or when he considered the barrenness of Sarah’s womb. 20No distrust made him waver concerning the promise of God, but he grew strong in his faith as he gave glory to God, 21fully convinced that God was able to do what he had promised. 22That is why his faith was "counted to him as righteousness." 23But the words "it was counted to him" were not written for his sake alone, 24but for ours also. It will be counted to us who believe in him who raised from the dead Jesus our Lord, 25 who was delivered up for our trespasses and raised for our justification.

Double Dave

DAVE ARMSTRONG SAID:

“But I get the impression that y'all would be shocked to death if you find that I make it, or Beckwith or Scott Hahn, or any number of us apostate converts. If we do, it'll be by the skin of our teeth.”

Well, Gabriel tells me that upper management has commuted the sentence of Gerry Matatics in light of his many unwitting contributions to the Protestant faith once delivered.

As for Armstrong, I do remember reading something about his eternal fate in the Sibylline Oracles. The Greek hexameters are a bit tricky to parse, but making due allowance for the interpretive obscurities, it went something like this:

When he kicks the bucket, Dave will wake up on the other side to find himself in a 6x8 cell. His bunkmate will be Double Dave. Double Dave is a duplicate of Dave. When they’re not bickering over who gets the bottom bunk, Double Dave will recite The Collected Poetry of Dave Armstrong at all hours of the late night and the late late night. (There is no day there, just night…and more night).

Needless to say, that destiny will make Dante’s Inferno look like an episode from Fantasy Island.

Faith, Works, and Justification

Dan McCartney's excursus on "Faith, Works, and Justification in James and Paul," is currently available online. Scroll down to excursus.

HT: Rhology

The only good Catholic is a bad Catholic

"The most predictable thing to observe in the thread (including the comments) is the usual recourse to the mentality (often noted on this blog) of "the only saved Catholic is a bad Catholic." In other words, to be saved and to attain to the sublime heights of being a Christian (like all our Protestant friends are) is to reject those elements of Catholicism that Protestantism particularly rejects. To be a Christian one has to, in effect, be a Protestant (i.e., a bad, pick-and-choose, "cafeteria" Catholic). So if a Catholic is a Protestant in all the key areas (e.g., sola fide and sola Scriptura) then he is a Christian. If he is a consistent Catholic, he cannot be a Christian, because Catholicism is not Christian."

http://socrates58.blogspot.com/2009/12/anti-catholic-protestant-apologist.html

Couldn't put it better myself.

Continuing:

"I thank God that Jason Engwer and other Protestant anti-Catholics are fellow Christians. I think that our Lord will have mercy on their ignorance, and besides, they'll have a lot of time in purgatory to straighten out all their falsehoods and silly caricatures of Catholic teaching, and of Catholics. I truly, eagerly look forward to fellowship in heaven with my anti-Catholic brethren in Christ, when they are at last fully Catholic, and Christians finally start treating each other the way they should: enjoying the unity that God always intended."

On the one hand, Armstrong is offended at our suggestion that the only good Catholic is a bad Catholic. On the other hand, Armstrong takes the position that the only good Protestant is a bad Protestant.

Hide The Decline

A Timeline

Something odd happened this fall. BBC “weather presenter and climate correspondent” Paul Hudson wrote a blog article entitled Whatever happened to global warming? on October 9, 2009. Global Warming “skeptics” were shocked to see such a thing linked to BBC, of all places, and the article even made it to the Drudge Report.

Although it wouldn’t come out until November 23, just three days after posting his blog, Hudson was forwarded what he called a “chain of emails” on October 12 (source). Hudson, however, did not do anything with the files.

So on November 17, a post appeared on the Climate Audit blog stating “A miracle just happened.” It included a link to 61-MB ZIP file (unzipped, it was over 160 MB) containing thousands of “leaked” e-mails from the East Anglia Climate Research Unit (CRU). That post was quickly removed, but then a user going by the handle FOIA (for Freedom of Information Act) using an anonymous Russian FTP account posted the e-mails on the Air Vent blog.

The files sat dormant there until November 19, when another user alerted The Blackboard to its existence. This was quickly followed by a blog commentary by Anthony Watts and stories in The Examiner and in Investigate. In short, the emails had gone viral.

The next day (November 20), Phil Jones, the director of CRU, acknowledged there had been a security breach. In the process, he verified the accuracy of one e-mail in particular—the now infamous “hide the decline” email. Three days later, Paul Hudson (the CNN presenter mentioned above) stated that the leaked e-mails were identical to those he had received on October 12. The accuracy of the emails had been established so well that, to this date, I have found no indication that anyone involved has claimed any are forgeries.

Global Warming proponents have focused on the illegality of the hacking of the emails (although evidence currently points toward a CRU-insider leaking the documents due to a FOI request filed by Steve McIntyre being denied). Global Warming skeptics have focused on the contents of what was leaked. And what they show is not good for science.

Hide the Decline

One leaked e-mail was from Phil Jones, stating the following (note, typographical errors in the original):

From: Phil Jones
To: ray bradley ,mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, mhughes@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
Subject: Diagram for WMO Statement
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 1999 13:31:15 +0000
Cc: k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx,t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx


Dear Ray, Mike and Malcolm,
Once Tim's got a diagram here we'll send that either later today or
first thing tomorrow.
I've just completed Mike's Nature trick of adding in the real temps
to each series for the last 20 years (ie from 1981 onwards) amd from
1961 for Keith's to hide the decline. Mike's series got the annual
land and marine values while the other two got April-Sept for NH land
N of 20N. The latter two are real for 1999, while the estimate for 1999
for NH combined is +0.44C wrt 61-90. The Global estimate for 1999 with
data through Oct is +0.35C cf. 0.57 for 1998.
Thanks for the comments, Ray.

Cheers
Phil



Prof. Phil Jones
Climatic Research Unit Telephone +44 (0) 1603 592090
School of Environmental Sciences Fax +44 (0) 1603 507784
University of East Anglia
Norwich Email p.jones@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
NR4 7TJ
UK

The key sentence is the one that says: “I've just completed Mike's Nature trick of adding in the real temps to each series for the last 20 years (ie from 1981 onwards) amd from 1961 for Keith's to hide the decline.”

There are a couple of things to look at. First, the date of the e-mail is November 16, 1999. Mike is Michael Mann (one of the people the e-mail was addressed to). Keith is Keith Briffa, who was cc’d on the email. The subject was “Diagram for WMO Statement” (WMO = World Meteorological Organization).

In 1999, authors of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) met in Tanzania September 1 – 3 for the “zero-order draft” of the Third Assessment Report. Steve McIntyre got a copy of the diagram using proxy temperatures for the past 1000 years (see here for more background). The graph showed proxy temperatures gathered from Mann, Jones, and Briffa.

There was a problem with Briffa’s series. His is the hard-to-see yellow line in the excerpt below (see the above referenced link for the entire graph):



Not only is Briffa’s reconstruction lower than the others, but it’s also trending down. The IPCC was concerned, with Mann saying that this was “diluting the message” and was a “potential distraction/detraction.” So, as all good scientists do when faced with data they don’t like…

The IPCC deleted it.

That’s right. Since Briffa’s series only became problematic after 1961, they simply ended his graph at 1961. However, they hid where this cut-off occurred by burring it in the other lines from the graph (in the following, it is the green line):



Here we have scientists intentionally excluding data that didn’t fit their theory. They cherry-picked what they wanted to show, and hid that which was detrimental to their cause. Those are the actions of politicians, not scientists.

Two months after the IPCC did this, Phil Jones wrote the above email about using “Mike’s Nature trick.” Mann didn’t do the same thing that the IPCC did; his method was even more insidious. To understand it, you must first understand what is meant by proxy temperatures.

Proxies

Thermometers are a relatively new invention. Temperature scales weren’t even invented until the Eighteenth Century. In geological time, that’s less than a blink-of-the-eye ago. Even after thermometers were invented, it took a while for them to become widespread. As a result, we only have direct access to temperature recordings for roughly the past 150 years.

Scientists still like to know what the temperature was like before temperatures were recorded, but to get those numbers they have to use proxy information. This can be anything from examining ice cores in the arctic to examining tree rings (which is the method Briffa used). These ways of examining temperatures, however, are not as “fine” as a thermometer. While a thermometer can, nowadays, give you up to the second temperature readings, most proxy data has to be understood in chunks of 20-50 year periods.

As I mentioned in my earlier posts on science, precision is important for scientists. Proxy temperatures are obviously not as precise as reading temperatures off the thermometer. And when they are graphed, they need to be “smoothed” over. Yet this smoothing was not as straightforward as you might imagine it to be. As McIntyre notes:

When smoothing these time series, the Team had a problem: actual reconstructions “diverge” from the instrumental series in the last part of 20th century. For instance, in the original hockey stick (ending 1980) the last 30-40 years of data points slightly downwards. In order to smooth those time series one needs to “pad” the series beyond the end time, and no matter what method one uses, this leads to a smoothed graph pointing downwards in the end whereas the smoothed instrumental series is pointing upwards — a divergence.

What Mann did was the pad the graph with instrumental data. Now, you might be thinking that that isn’t a big deal. Mann didn’t use fake numbers; he used real temperatures gathered by instruments. However, we have to keep in mind the fact that proxy data is not as precise as instrumental data, and therefore Mann added apples to oranges to produce his graph.

Still, how important could that be? Well, when you consider that the entire blade of the famous “hockey stick” graph just is that added data, you ought to get suspicious. In fact, McIntyre and McKitrick showed that if you used “red noise” to produce random principal components data in Mann’s model, it produced the same hockey stick pattern 99% of the time. If random data creates your hockey stick, it means your model is creating the hockey stick rather than the data. (BTW, if you want to see how to make your own hockey stick model, Iowahawk has detailed instructions.)

Jones managed to take it one step further. When creating the graph for the WMO, he didn’t even bother to use the same instrument data for each series. Instead, “Mike's series got the annual land and marine values while the other two got April-Sept for NH land N of 20N.” The result was that the graph changed from this:



To this (the actual coversheet used):



Conclusion

Mann’s hockey stick graph was the basis for much of the IPCC’s 2001 report. Mann even wrote the chapter on climate change. But despite Algore’s assurance that “the science is settled,” it is becoming more and more obvious that there is no scientific basis for man-made global warming. On the contrary, all the evidence suggests it is really Mann-made global warming.

There is much, much more to this scandal than what has simply been presented here. And it does not bode well for science in general. Science works only if scientists stick to the method and actually employ it. As soon as they begin to cherry-pick data, to mix apples and oranges, to ignore error bars, to push experiments beyond the level of precision, and to vilify those who would dare to disagree, scientists have abandoned science completely.

And the question left hanging in other people’s minds is simply this: why here? Why is it that this is the arena that scientists have chosen to forgo their scientific training and accept authoritative dictates? And more importantly, if scientists will fudge the science over this issue, what else will they be willing to fudge? If the scientific organizations who preach to us did not catch this, what else are they not catching? What other “settled science” is little more than religious dogma?

The longer scientists take to regain their credibility, the less they will be able to regain when they finally make the attempt.

Speaking Of "Christmas Lies"

John Loftus has linked to a highly misleading article about Christmas from a Jewish web site. The author, Lawrence Kelemen, writes:

Nicholas was among the most senior bishops who convened the Council of Nicaea in 325 CE and created the New Testament. The text they produced portrayed Jews as “the children of the devil” who sentenced Jesus to death....

Christmas celebrates the birth of the Christian god who came to rescue mankind from the “curse of the Torah.” It is a 24-hour declaration that Judaism is no longer valid.

Christmas is a lie. There is no Christian church with a tradition that Jesus was really born on December 25th....

Many who are excitedly preparing for their Christmas celebrations would prefer not knowing about the holiday’s real significance. If they do know the history, they often object that their celebration has nothing to do with the holiday’s monstrous history and meaning. “We are just having fun.”

Imagine that between 1933-45, the Nazi regime celebrated Adolf Hitler’s birthday – April 20 – as a holiday. Imagine that they named the day, “Hitlerday,” and observed the day with feasting, drunkenness, gift-giving, and various pagan practices. Imagine that on that day, Jews were historically subject to perverse tortures and abuse, and that this continued for centuries.

The article covers many periods of history, and I don't know much about some of the subjects discussed. But where the article touches on subjects I'm more familiar with, I can tell that much of what it claims is false or misleading. The Council of Nicaea didn't rule on the canon. John 8:44 only refers to some Jews, not Jews in general, so the implication that it's anti-Jewish in some wrong sense is dubious. The New Testament's references to the Jewish law as a "curse" aren't meant to condemn the law in its entirety or its original intent, but rather are meant to highlight how the law condemns us as sinners. Despite what Kelemen tells us, there are early Christian traditions involving Jesus' birth on December 25. The article says nothing about Julius Africanus, early Christian belief that Jesus was both conceived and crucified on March 25 (making December 25 the birthdate), etc. Kelemen repeatedly refers to the raping, murdering, etc. of Jews in association with Christmas, but the origins of the holiday and the vast majority of its celebrations are far removed from such behavior. The sort of reasoning he applies to Christmas could also be applied to the pagan associations of our system of government, our language, our economic system, etc., including many such things that Jewish people utilize.

The article is really bad. Why does John Loftus link to it in such an unqualified way?

Seeds Of The Reformation

Abbreviations

BOP = Jacques Le Goff, The Birth Of Purgatory (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1986)

COR = Thomas Scheck, Origen: Commentary On The Epistle To The Romans, Books 1-5 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University Of America Press, 2001)

ECD = J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (San Francisco, California: HarperCollins Publishers, 1978)

EVT = D.H. Williams, Evangelicals And Tradition (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2005)

JBF = H. George Anderson, et al., edd., Justification By Faith (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Augsburg Publishing House, 1985)

JIP = Bruce McCormack, ed., Justification In Perspective (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2006)

JPJ = Gerald Bray, ed., Ancient Christian Commentary On Scripture: New Testament XI: James, 1-2 Peter, 1-3 John, Jude (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2000)

RRC = Jaroslav Pelikan, The Riddle Of Roman Catholicism (Nashville, Tennessee: Abingdon Press, 1959)

RTS = Leonard Verduin, The Reformers And Their Stepchildren (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1964)



Catholics often claim that nobody advocated justification through faith alone between the time of the apostles and the Reformation. Recently, a Catholic poster here, by the screen name of Sean and Stephanie, wrote:

Ah, so that is how you define 'Christian.'

Apparently there were no Christians before Luther nor is Christianity taught in the bible.

He made those comments in response to something Gene Bridges had said concerning Calvinist and Arminian agreement about justification through faith alone. Thus, Sean and Stephanie was suggesting that both Calvinist and Arminian understandings of sola fide are absent from pre-Reformation church history and the Bible. Later, Sean and Stephanie added "Lutheran soteriology" to the list. He also criticized the view that one can be "justified, but not sanctified". And he tried to shift the topic of discussion by bringing up the subject of imputed righteousness. He cited a passage from a book by Alister McGrath, a passage frequently mentioned by Catholics, and said:

Alistair McGrath's findings are a big problem for the Protestant position although his findings are not unique.

Notice what we have, then. We have a Catholic suggesting that Calvinist, Arminian, Lutheran, and antinomian understandings of sola fide are absent from the Bible and pre-Reformation church history, accompanied by an appeal to the scholarship of Alister McGrath.

Those of you who have followed Catholic apologetics closely in recent years should recognize Sean and Stephanie's approach. It's common. Some Catholics are knowledgeable enough to avoid some of Sean and Stephanie's missteps, but his approach probably represents the large majority of those who are active in Catholic apologetics today.

Is it true that nobody advocated justification through faith alone between the time of the apostles and the Reformation?


The Bible


This post is primarily about sola fide in sources between the apostles and the Reformation. For those who are interested, we have many posts in our archives addressing the Biblical evidence for justification through faith alone. See, for example, my posts here, here, and here.


My View


Since Sean and Stephanie issued a broad criticism of many different forms of justification through faith alone (Calvinism, Arminianism, Lutheranism, and antinomianism, along with some criticisms of sola fide that were unspecified), I'm going to be addressing evidence for a broad range of views prior to the Reformation. I don't agree with all of these views. I'm not a Lutheran, and I disagree with antinomian views of justification that reject or underestimate the significance of sanctification in this life. I agree with Calvinism (and some Arminians) that justification can't be lost, but I'm going to be citing pre-Reformation sources who held other views as well, since Sean and Stephanie included Arminian notions of sola fide in his criticism. I'm not claiming to agree with every pre-Reformation source I cite.

And while I consider imputed righteousness an important doctrine, it's not the subject I'm primarily addressing here. I don't consider belief in imputed righteousness essential to salvation. Notice that I referred to belief in imputed righteousness. Imputed righteousness itself is essential. Nobody is justified without it. And belief in the concept is important. I think every Christian should be taught it. But belief in something can be important without being essential. Even though imputed righteousness is essential and belief in it is important, the primary subject of this post is justification through faith alone.


Scholarship


Since Sean and Stephanie thinks that Alister McGrath's conclusions are "a big problem for the Protestant position", then let's consider what other scholars have said. (Note, too, the important qualifications McGrath has made, as discussed by James Swan here. Matthew Schultz cited Swan's article in one of the threads linked above, and Sean and Stephanie ignored it. See, also, the many posts in the archives of Swan's blog that address this subject.)

Jaroslav Pelikan wrote:

"Every major tenet of the Reformation had considerable support in the catholic tradition. That was eminently true of the central Reformation teaching of justification by faith alone….That the ground of our salvation is the unearned favor of God in Christ, and that all we need do to obtain it is to trust that favor – this was the confession of great catholic saints and teachers….Rome’s reactions [to the Protestant reformers] were the doctrinal decrees of the Council of Trent and the Roman Catechism based upon those decrees. In these decrees, the Council of Trent selected and elevated to official status the notion of justification by faith plus works, which was only one of the doctrines of justification in the medieval theologians and ancient fathers. When the reformers attacked this notion in the name of the doctrine of justification by faith alone – a doctrine also attested to by some medieval theologians and ancient fathers – Rome reacted by canonizing one trend in preference to all the others. What had previously been permitted also (justification by faith alone), now became forbidden. In condemning the Protestant Reformation, the Council of Trent condemned part of its own catholic tradition.” (RRC, 49, 51-52)

James Swan quotes the following from another book Pelikan wrote, one that I haven't read:

"Existing side by side in pre-Reformation theology were several ways of interpreting the righteousness of God and the act of justification. They ranged from strongly moralistic views that seemed to equate justification with moral renewal to ultra-forensic views, which saw justification as a 'nude imputation' that seemed possible apart from Christ, by an arbitrary decree of God. Between these extremes were many combinations; and though certain views predominated in late nominalism, it is not possible even there to speak of a single doctrine of justification."

Many other scholars have made comments similar to Pelikan's. One of the best brief overviews of this subject that I've seen is Nick Needham's chapter in JIP, 25-53. Needham makes many points relevant to this post, including the following:

"The language of justification occurs reasonably often in the fathers. What does the language mean? Although it does not always have the same precise connotation, it seems clear that there is a very prominent strand of usage in which it has a basically forensic meaning....The forensic framework of this justification language is further illustrated by another strand of patristic teaching that employs the concept of imputation - reckoning or crediting something to someone's account, a synthesis of legal and financial metaphors, where the books that are being kept are 'judgment books.'" (27-28, 32)

Earlier this year, Timothy George had a discussion with Francis Beckwith at Wheaton College, on the topic "Can You Be Catholic And Evangelical?". During the discussion, George appealed to a passage in Augustine for support of the concept of imputed righteousness. Karlfried Froehlich wrote:

"Parallel to a strong use of Augustinian transformation language, Bernard of Clairvaux reflected this forensic tendency. Protestants have often noted Bernardine texts which seemed to emphasize imputative justification." (JBF, 157)

Leonard Verduin wrote:

"In fact, a chorus of protest resounds across the ages, contesting all that feeds the idea of salvation by sacramental manipulation, and sustaining all that which belongs with the formula of salvation by believing response to the preached Word....In the year 1025 some 'heretics' were located in the vicinity of Liege...They said that 'There are no sacraments in the holy Church by which one can attain unto salvation.'" (RTS, 142-143)

Thomas Scheck argues that there were people in Origen's day who believed in some form of justification through faith alone. Though Origen rejected their view, he considered them Christians:

"With believers in mind he [Origen] rejects the view that justification is by faith alone, apparently because certain Christians were denying a future judgment based upon works....In 8.2 Origen again shows awareness of persons who do not seem to be heretics, but who do not understand the inextricable link between faith and good works. He refers to them as he expounds Rom 10.9, where it is evident that Origen rejects their theology, insisting that belief in Christ's resurrection and public confession of his lordship profits one nothing if his resurrection is not realized in the life of the believer....Gnostic and even some Christian exegetes used the 'faith alone' formulation to deny the doctrine of a future judgment according to works, but Origen repudiates this tactic." (COR, 34-35, 38)

D.H. Williams comments:

"The doctrine of justification by faith did not originate in the period of the Reformation, nor is the teaching a unique emblem of Protestantism. Evangelical scholars Timothy George and Thomas Oden have rightly observed that justification by faith was not a new teaching invented by the Reformers. Apart from New Testament documents, justification by faith finds its roots in the early church. Stated positively, the exegesis of justification by faith is a catholic and pre-Reformation teaching, and the Reformers themselves found precedents for this teaching in the early fathers, even as they went in new directions with these ideas." (EVT, 129)

Similar comments have been made by many other scholars.

Sometimes what's being addressed is a particular strand of thought within pre-Reformation sources that was accompanied by other views, sometimes inconsistently. Patristic scholars and others who work in relevant fields often note that these sources were inconsistent or sometimes only partially agreed with the Protestant concepts in question. Karlfried Froehlich refers to "all kinds of combinations between Augustinian, Thomist, Scotist, and nominalist elements" in medieval sources (JBF, 160). Robert Eno refers to how Origen is "not an easy author to interpret" and "less orderly and consistent" (JBF, 112) than other sources. Similar comments are often made in the scholarly literature about other pre-Reformation sources as well. In some cases, these men acknowledged their own inconsistencies. Augustine, for example, often acknowledged that he had changed his position over time on some theological issues. And scholars note his inconsistencies even where he doesn't admit them. Citing an inconsistency with Protestant belief in one portion of a church father's writings doesn't prove that he never agreed with that belief elsewhere.

You might disagree with the judgments of the scholars I've cited above or agree with them, but consider their conclusions insignificant. In some cases, I don't know much about the accuracy of the claims these scholars are making. Most of my research has focused on the earliest centuries of church history, not the later patristic centuries or the medieval era. And I haven't studied the doctrine of imputed righteousness as much as I've studied justification through faith alone. I don't know much about some of the claims made by the scholars I've cited above. The point I'm making here, though, is that scholars can be cited making comments that go in the opposite direction of what Catholics so often cite from Alister McGrath and others.


Some Of The Relevant Sources


One of the earliest patristic sources, Clement of Rome, wrote:

"And we, too, being called by His will in Christ Jesus, are not justified by ourselves, nor by our own wisdom, or understanding, or godliness, or works which we have wrought in holiness of heart; but by that faith through which, from the beginning, Almighty God has justified all men; to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen. What shall we do, then, brethren? Shall we become slothful in well-doing, and cease from the practice of love? God forbid that any such course should be followed by us! But rather let us hasten with all energy and readiness of mind to perform every good work." (First Clement, 32-33)

What must be read into the text in order to reconcile Clement's comments with Catholicism? We have to assume (1) that he only meant to exclude works that are somehow deficient (such as graceless works) when he referred to works "wrought in holiness of heart", (2) that he meant "faith and baptism", "faith and works", or something similar when he referred to "faith" as the means of attaining justification, (3) that the reference to "that faith through which, from the beginning, Almighty God has justified all men" isn't meant to deny that baptism and other requirements have been added to faith since the Old Testament era, and (4) that Clement went on to tell his readers not to use the gospel as an opportunity to avoid good works just after telling them that we're justified through a combination between faith and works. Not a single one of those conclusions is likely, and the combination of all four is even more unlikely. What Clement seems to be communicating is justification through faith alone.

Sometimes Catholics will cite chapter 12, where Clement remarks that "On account of her faith and hospitality, Rahab the harlot was saved." But read the context. Clement is addressing salvation in the sense of safety from the Israeli invasion, not the attaining of eternal life. Clement goes on to quote Rahab saying to the Israeli spies, "keep ye me and the house of my father in safety" (12). Clement then quotes the spies saying, "It shall be as thou hast spoken to us. As soon, therefore, as thou knowest that we are at hand, thou shall gather all thy family under thy roof, and they shall be preserved, but all that are found outside of thy dwelling shall perish." (12) The salvation in question is physical, not spiritual. Rahab wasn't asking the spies to give her eternal life. Clement is addressing the benefits of godly living and the consequences of ungodliness in general, not merely how a person is justified.

Catholics sometimes cite Clement's reference to "being justified by our works, and not our words" in chapter 30 of First Clement, but he's addressing justification in the sense of vindication, such as we see in Luke 7:35, not in the sense of attaining eternal life. He says, "Let testimony to our good deeds be borne by others", which is a reference to vindication, not a reference to the attaining of eternal life.

Clement was no antinomian, as passages like chapter 58 illustrate. But the same could be said of a Presbyterian or Methodist, for example. In light of what Clement says in chapters 32-33, a Catholic reading of First Clement isn't the most likely interpretation.

Another of the earliest patristic sources, The Epistle To Diognetus, refers to the substitutionary nature of Jesus' work and His righteousness in particular (9). He even refers to how His righteousness "covers our sins", in language reminiscent of the dunghill analogy often attributed to Martin Luther.

In the earliest extant treatise on baptism, Tertullian addresses a large variety of views held by various individuals and groups. Among the views he addresses is the belief that "Baptism is not necessary for them to whom faith is sufficient; for withal, Abraham pleased God by a sacrament of no water, but of faith." (On Baptism, 13)

Nick Needham writes about patristic sources who held a view that "effectively makes initial justification itself a twofold process: faith introduces us to salvation, and baptism perfects the introduction" (JIP, 42). He cites Origen, Basil of Caesarea, and Cyril of Jerusalem as examples. He goes on, "Basil's use of 'seal' imagery may indicate that he regarded baptism as the public and official declaration of a justification that until then has been private and unofficial" (42). He notes that their view (the view of Basil and others) is inconsistent with the views of some other fathers (n. 49 on 42), a point that Thomas Scheck also makes (COR, n. 376 on 350, n. 411 on 354).

In the seventh century, Andreas records the comments an earlier Christian author made about faith and baptism:

"Now someone might object to this and say: 'Did Paul not use Abraham as an example of someone who was justified by faith, without works? And here James is using the very same Abraham as an example of someone who was justified, not by faith alone, but also by works which confirm that faith.' How can we answer this? And how can Abraham be an example of faith without works, as well as of faith with works, at the same time? But the solution is ready to hand from the Scriptures. For the same Abraham is at different times an example of both kinds of faith. The first is prebaptismal faith, which does not require works but only confession and the word of salvation, by which those who believe in Christ are justified. The second is postbaptismal faith, which is combined with works. Understood in this way, the two apostles do not contradict one another, but one and the same Spirit is speaking through both of them." (JPJ, 32)

Augustine refers to a large variety of views of justification that existed in his day (The City Of God, 21:17-27). Here are some of his comments:

"But, say they, the catholic Christians have Christ for a foundation, and they have not fallen away from union with Him, no matter how depraved a life they have built on this foundation, as wood, hay, stubble; and accordingly the well-directed faith by which Christ is their foundation will suffice to deliver them some time from the continuance of that fire, though it be with loss, since those things they have built on it shall be burned. Let the Apostle James summarily reply to them: ‘If any man say he has faith, and have not works, can faith save him?’” (The City Of God, 21:26)

Antinomian concepts of justification through faith alone seem to have been common long before the Reformation. After Augustine's day, Bede writes against those who believe "that it does not matter whether they live evil lives or do wicked and terrible things, as long as they believe in Christ, because salvation is through faith" (JPJ, 31).

Sometimes sources who expressed a form of justification through works in some places in their writings advocated a different view elsewhere. For example:

"Jerome develops the same distinction, stating that, while the Devil and the impious who have denied God will be tortured without remission, those who have trusted in Christ, even if they have sinned and fallen away, will eventually be saved. Much the same teaching appears in Ambrose, developed in greater detail." (ECD, 484)

“Saint Jerome, though an enemy of Origen, was, when it came to salvation, more of an Origenist than Ambrose. He believed that all sinners, all mortal beings, with the exception of Satan, atheists, and the ungodly, would be saved: 'Just as we believe that the torments of the Devil, of all the deniers of God, of the ungodly who have said in their hearts, 'there is no God,' will be eternal, so too do we believe that the judgment of Christian sinners, whose works will be tried and purged in fire will be moderate and mixed with clemency.' Furthermore, 'He who with all his spirit has placed his faith in Christ, even if he die in sin, shall by his faith live forever.'" (BOP, 61)

Is Francis Beckwith Saved?

In another thread, Truth Unites... and Divides asked about the salvation of Francis Beckwith. Since the subject of whether individuals are saved comes up a lot, and an Evangelical revert to Catholicism is an example of a case that can be hard to judge, I thought I'd post my response in a new thread. Hopefully, some readers will find my assessment helpful in thinking through these issues. This post isn't meant to be exhaustive, but rather to help people understand some of the issues involved and to help them sort through those issues. Much more could be said than I'll be saying below.

A case like Francis Beckwith's involves multiple lines of evidence pointing in different directions. And I'm ignorant of a lot of the relevant information. I appreciate his material on abortion and other topics and have sometimes read or otherwise used his material, but I haven't studied his writings on Roman Catholicism much. I'm using him as an example here because I was asked about him and because he's an example of a case that seems difficult to judge, not because I'm highly knowledgeable about his circumstances. Other people could make a better judgment than I can.

When somebody has a high degree of exposure to the gospel, as Americans do, and has at some point professed Christian faith in the context of Evangelicalism, as Beckwith did, those are significant factors that increase the plausibility of an individual's salvation.

He seems to live by high moral standards. That reflects well on him and is a relevant factor in evaluating a person's profession of faith.

He clearly accepts the large majority of the most important truths of the gospel (Jesus' Messiahship, the resurrection, etc.). That's significant.

People who are Christians sometimes later become unfaithful to the gospel temporarily, as we see with Peter and the Galatians in the New Testament. (And Paul anticipated such unfaithfulness as a possibility with the Corinthians, as we see in 2 Corinthians 11.) People are often inconsistent. They hold inconsistent beliefs at the same time or change beliefs from one period of their life to another. They contradict themselves knowingly, as they waver between two views, or unknowingly. A person can throw himself entirely on the mercy of God, like the tax collector of Luke 18, without having a high level of knowledge about doctrines like justification through faith alone and imputed righteousness. Even though he's seeking justification through faith alone, he isn't giving that fact and its implications much thought. People can have a mixture of good and bad motives, wanting to defend a bad decision they've made (such as reverting to Catholicism), even though, at the same time, they want to be right with God and understand a doctrine like justification correctly. They have conflicting desires.

John Duncan is said to have remarked, regarding some elements in Charles Wesley's hymns that seemed inconsistent with Wesley's Arminianism, "Where's your Arminianism now, friend?". I think a similar question can be asked of many people who profess to reject justification through faith alone. It's so obvious that we have to approach God like the tax collector in Luke 18, without works, and people are surrounded with reminders of that fact in a nation like the United States, where there's such easy access to Bibles, Evangelical churches and other Evangelical ministries, etc. Many people who profess some form of justification through works at some point in their life are brought to a more realistic view of things by something they experience later in life. The absurdity of justification through works is difficult to live with, and many people who profess belief in such a false gospel could be asked, in a time of difficulty or on their deathbed, "Where's your works righteousness now, friend?". Thankfully, the gospel is, in that sense, easy to understand and appealing. There's reason to think that more people accept justification through faith alone than explicitly say so, especially in a nation like the United States. Where a person lives is under God's sovereignty, and we ought to take it into account when judging the likelihood of a person's salvation and what God has planned for that individual's life.

On the other hand, sin blinds people. Even something that should be easily understood and appealing is often not understood or is rejected. People living in a nation like the United States can be, and often are, ignorant of the gospel or reject it. And Francis Beckwith has a significant level of knowledge about the relevant issues. He's an adult. He's well-educated. He has access to a lot of sources with relevant information. He made a decision to return to Catholicism and has remained Catholic after being reminded of the false nature of the Catholic gospel many times and by many people. His decisions to revert to Catholicism and remain Catholic under such circumstances are evidence against his profession of Christian faith. And his unfaithfulness to the gospel is worse than Peter's and the Galatians' in some ways. (Peter's error seems to have been less explicit, the Galatians apparently accepted Paul's correction, whereas we don't know whether Beckwith will change his position in the future, etc.).

He has some things in his favor that other Catholics don't have, such as a background in Evangelicalism. And he's not just an unnamed Catholic. He's a specific individual about whom I have some significant information. I have a general idea of what his beliefs and moral conduct are, so the situation is somewhat different than asking about the salvation of a Catholic I know less about. He's clearly not in the same category as some other Catholics, such as those who think all non-Catholics are lost or are more hostile to Evangelicalism in some other way.

Then there are the less objective factors. What do you do with a vague impression about somebody's salvation? That sort of impression doesn't give other people much reason to agree with my assessment, but it is part of what I would take into account in forming my own opinion.

What conclusion does the balance of evidence point to? I'm too ignorant of the relevant facts, and have given the subject too little thought, to reach a confident conclusion. I'm not Francis Beckwith's father, spouse, or best friend. I don't know him nearly as well as some other people do or as well as he knows himself. But I think it makes sense for somebody coming from my perspective to at least conclude that his salvation is a reasonable possibility. I hope he's saved or will be in the future, and I would be glad to meet him in Heaven. My sense is that his salvation is probable, though by a small margin, due partly to my limited knowledge. However, his errors are serious, and they deserve criticism and some degree of separation from him, even if one is confident that he's saved. He's in a category similar to that of Peter and the Galatians at best. If he's saved, it's by an Evangelical gospel (the Biblical gospel), in spite of the false gospel he's currently associated with.

Children of a lesser god

Before I respond to Reppert’s latest comments about Calvinism, I think we need to define our terms. Reppert’s objection actually consists of several different objections bundled into one. So we have to disambiguate the objections. And, by way of preliminaries, we need to define what a possible world is, as well as what makes it possible.

In freewill theism, a possible world is frequently indexed to the ability of the human agent. The ability of a human agent to do or choose otherwise. And that forking path is captured by two or more possible worlds or world-segments.

In Calvinism, by contrast, the freedom to do otherwise is indexed to the ability of God to do or choose otherwise.

Both Calvinism and freewill theism make room for possible worlds, but ground them in different agents.

In Calvinism, a possible world is God’s mental narrative of a possible world history. A complete, coherent story.

Put another way, a possible world is a measure of what God can possibly think (omniscience) and possibly do (omnipotence). How many different global stories can an infinite mind coherently imagine?

Not all possibilities are compossible. The same story can’t contain mutually exclusive events. But up to a point, the same story can have alternate endings–after which you have two different stories.

Because not all possibilities are compossible, this gives rise to alternate histories or alternate timelines. An alternate past or future. The only upper limit is what is conceivable for the mind of God.

Predestination involves God’s decision to instantiate a possible world.

However, predestination can also be recast in counterfactual terms. It was possible for Judas to remain faithful to Christ in the sense that it was possible for God conceive of, and therefore, to decree that alternate outcome. Different possible outcomes are both conceivable and decreeable. For God knows what God is capable of doing. And there’s no one thing that God is capable of doing.

You could say that God’s decree selects from a range of possible worlds. But you could also say that God’s decree selects from a range of decreeable worlds. A distinction between the actual decree and unexemplified decrees. For every possible world is a decreeable world.

Now for Reppert:

It is not clear that Calvinists have the motivation to evanglize based on the truth of certain subjunctive-conditional claims concerning what the oucome will be if they do or do not evanglize.The reason is that, given what God has predestined, the future is closed.

True. But we need to explicate that concept:

i) It is closed for the human agent. And, given the decree, it cannot turn out either way.

However, this doesn’t mean the decree was a given. God was free to decree otherwise. In that respect, the future was open for him (God).

ii) Yes, the future is closed, but not in isolation to past and present conditions. What you have, rather, is a system of internal relations. Changing one variable entails corresponding adjustments.

Suppose Smith witnesses to Jones and Jones is saved. Smith, however, has struggled with getting up the courage to witness to Jones. He wonders if it will make a difference as to Jones' salvation whether he preaches or not. He knows that his preaching will not cause Jones to become one of the elect, since the elect were chosen unconditionally before the foundation of the world.

i) True. But this doesn’t mean the outcome is insulated from prior conditions (unless it’s the direct effect of a miracle).

ii) Yes, there’s an asymmetry between divine and human agency. However, to take an illustration, a backlit tree casts a shadow. The sun causes the shadow, not vice versa. But barring a miracle, you can’t eliminate the shadow while you leave the other variables intact.

Can the statement "If I don't witness to Jones, Jones won't be saved" be true if in fact Jones has either been unconditionally elected or unconditionally reprobated.

It is true if God has decreed that Smith’s testimony is instrumental in Jones’ conversion.

Perhaps Reppert is tripped up by the notion of “unconditionality.”

What this means, however, is that there are no autonomous human variables which condition God’s elective act.

By contrast, this doesn’t mean there are no teleological conditions which God himself has decreed as instrumental factors in the realization of his appointed ends.

What would make such a statement true or false? Any world in which Jones doesn't witness is a world which God did not predestine. Asking the counterfactual question is assume that there are other possible worlds, but there are no other possible worlds.

There are other possible, decreeable worlds in which Jones doesn’t witness to Smith, as a result of which Smith goes to hell (in that other possible decreeable world).

A possible world is a set of logical compossibilities. The fact that it’s indeterminate (in the sense that God didn’t decree to instantiate that mental narrative) in no way renders it logically impossible. God can conceive of many things he never decreed.

The statement is false in relation to the actual world (assuming, ex hypothesi, that Jones is instrument in the conversion of Smith in the actual world), but true in relation to one or more possible worlds which encapsulate the alternate outcome.

Ultimately what you are asking if you are asking the counterfactual question of "What would have happened if I had not witnessed" is to ask "What would God have predestined to have happen to Jones if God hadn't predestined that I should witness to him?" I can't see how to make sense of the statement "In the nearest possible world in which I don't witness to Jones, Jones is reprobated." Is there even such a possible world?

Why does Reppert find that puzzling? Does Reppert suppose, on Calvinist assumptions, that God can’t imagine a reprobate counterpart to an elect Jones?

Perhaps the underlying problem is that freewill theism hasn’t given much thought to divine agency. It is too preoccupied with human action theory.

For freewill theism, God exists to grant our wishes. Our personal, customized genie. But we mustn’t pop the bottle too often lest he (or she!) decide that life in a bottle is a bit confining.

The irony of freewill theism is that, by debasing God, it debases man. the creature of a lesser God is a lesser creature. The creature of a greater God is a greater creature.

A painting by da Vinci is a greater painting than a painting by Andy Warhol–because da Vinci is a greater artist. Indeed, there’s a sense in which a da Vinci painting is greater than Warhol himself.

It seems that, when we deliberate and decide, it seems to us, and must seem to us, as if the future is genuinely open, that we can choose one thing or another, and that no particular choice of ours is guaranteed. We envision what the world will look like if we do one thing, and envision what the world will look like when we do another thing. Both possibilities seem open to us when we decide. But if Calvinistic determinism is true (and by the way I once did a post arguing that you could be a five-point Calvinists and a libertarian on free will), then in fact there aren't any possible worlds in which we do anything other than what we do, so long as God's predestinating is determined by his nature.

This is confused on several grounds:

i) Report is shifting from the metaphysics of modality to the psychology of deliberation. Perhaps he assumes the ontological availability of these hypothetical outcomes is what underwrites our deliberations.

But even on its own terms, how can that be the case? In his bedroom, at 10:01 PM, May 18, Brad decides to take Tiffany Hofsteder to the prom. In the bedroom next door, at 10:01 PM, May 18, Chad decides to take Tiffany Hofsteder to the prom.

Well, they can’t both have her as their prom date, now can they? So the psychology of human deliberation severely underwrites the ontology of libertarian freedom.

Does Reppert really think that we can do whatever we can imagine? Wouldn’t that turn the world into a futuristic amusing park where every wish comes true? Sounds like fun, but in my experience, reality is far less adventurous.

ii) Yes, there are possible worlds in which we do something else. That doesn’t make those are live possibilities for us, in this world. Does Reppert think every imaginable choice is a viable option?

Sola Fide Between The Apostles And The Reformation

In case it would be helpful to some readers who aren't following the discussion, here's something I wrote in the comments section of a recent thread:

A collection of some of our articles on pre-Reformation beliefs can be found here. On justification in particular, see here and here, for example.

Given that some of the advocates of justification through works prior to the Reformation expressed their view in opposition to people in their day who were arguing for justification through faith alone, why would you claim that nobody believed in justification through faith alone during that timeframe? When a church father criticizes people who believe in justification through faith alone, who is he addressing if no such people existed? It seems that a lot of people who make the claim you're making either aren't aware of this sort of evidence or haven't given it much thought. You can't have church fathers or other pre-Reformation sources criticizing people who advocated sola fide in their day if nobody was advocating sola fide. At a minimum, then, you ought to acknowledge that there were some such advocates of the concept prior to the Reformation.

A common response at this point is to acknowledge what I've said above, but then dismiss all of the pre-Reformation advocates of sola fide as heretics. But that approach won't work either. First, the mainstream sources who criticize such advocates of sola fide don't claim that all of these people were heretics. The assumption that they were all heretics is dubious. Secondly, some of the people criticizing them acknowledge the orthodoxy of the sola fide advocates, despite their criticism of those people. Third, the pre-Reformation advocacy of sola fide comes from some mainstream sources as well, not just sources who were criticized by the mainstream. It's true that justification through works was a more popular view among professing Christians prior to the Reformation, as it is today and as it is among humans in general. Justification through works is a popular concept. (So are a lot of other errors.) But justification through faith alone was one of the views that existed during the era between the apostles and the Reformation, alongside the many and contradictory forms of justification through works that existed during that timeframe.

We should also keep in mind that while the absence of a doctrine during the patristic era or the medieval era, for example, would be significant, an absence from the Bible would be even more significant. The Bible has more authority than later sources, and its books were written over a period of more than a thousand years. If you (erroneously) think that justification through faith alone was absent during the patristic centuries, for instance, and that fact is significant in your eyes, then the absence of justification through works in a more authoritative source that covers a longer period of time (the Bible) should seem even more significant to you. There's no way to avoid addressing the Evangelical appeal to scripture. While other data, like the patristic evidence, is significant and should be addressed, the Biblical evidence is even more significant. Asserting that nobody believed in sola fide between the apostles and the Reformation doesn't get you far. You need more than an assertion, and you need to address other lines of evidence, such as the Bible.

The Historicity Of The Slaughter Of The Innocents

BK of CADRE Comments recently posted a good article on the Slaughter of the Innocents. I added some points of my own in the comments section of the thread.

Revenge is a dish best served cold

Spider-Man 3 was on TV last night. Due to mixed reviews, I hadn’t bothered to see it on DVD.

For now I’ll bypass what I think of the film overall and focus on one aspect. The central theme of the film is the notion that forgiveness is better than revenge. There’s an undercurrent of moral relativism, bordering on moral equivalence, in the film. And that’s deliberate, as interviews with Sam Raimi make clear.

The treatment of revenge in Spider-Man 3 illustrates the inability of secular ethics to adequately deal with evil. In many Hollywood films and TV shows, the hero is made to feel guilty about his vengeful feelings. The hero is conflicted and apologetic about his vengeful impulses. And Spider-Man 3 is no exception. This is epitomized by Aunt May’s prim, good-as-gold homily at one point in the film.

It’s not that Hollywood can’t revel in revenge. But gleeful, guilt-free revenge is typically assigned to a juicy villain. For the typical film, vengeance, while it may sometimes be excusable on the grounds of some mitigating factor, like extreme provocation, is fundamental wrong.

That’s ironic since, from the viewpoint secular ethics, there’s no reason why vengeance would be always be out-of-bounds. What’s the source of this inhibition? This disapproval?

I chalk it up to a secularized version of Christian ethics. Because vengeance is problematic in Christian ethics, this has influenced the general culture, including Hollywood directors and screenwriters. Yet the secularized version loses some key qualifications.

In Biblical ethics and theology, revenge is double-edged. On the one hand, there was an avenger of blood in the Mosaic law. The imprecatory Psalms call on God to exact judgment on evildoers. This also carries over into the NT (e.g. Rev 6:10).

So, fundamentally, a vengeful impulse is not intrinsically evil. To the contrary, it can be the pious expression of righteous indignation.

On the other hand, vengeance is a morally and spiritually hazardous emotion for fallen men to entertain. Even if the feeling is objectively just and justifiable, it easily plays into our sinful predispositions.

It also reflects an itchy, overrealized eschatology. A premature demand for the Day of Judgment. For God frequently brings good out of evil.

So Christians are ordinarily required to be forgiving and forbearing–with important exceptions–both for their own benefit and the benefit of others.

It’s a delicate balance. For, in a fallen world, acting in the best interests of one party may come at the expense of another. In case of conflict, the interests of the injured party should normally take precedence over the interests of the offender. But if you personally are the injured party, then you have more latitude to be forbearing.