The Christian’s most precious treasure

John Calvin famously began his Institutes of the Christian Religion stating, “Nearly all the wisdom we possess, that is to say, true and sound wisdom, consists of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves.” Before Calvin wrote these words, Martin Luther wrestled with the first of those concepts, “the knowledge of God”.

Then Moses said, “Now show me your glory.”

And the LORD said, “I will cause all my goodness to pass in front of you, and I will proclaim my name, the LORD, in your presence. I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. But,” he said, “you cannot see my face, for no one may see me and live.”

Then the LORD said, “There is a place near me where you may stand on a rock. When my glory passes by, I will put you in a cleft in the rock and cover you with my hand until I have passed by. Then I will remove my hand and you will see my back; but my face must not be seen” (Exodus 33:18-23).

* * *

For Christ did not send me to baptize, but to preach the gospel—not with wisdom and eloquence, lest the cross of Christ be emptied of its power. For the message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God. For it is written:

“I will destroy the wisdom of the wise;
the intelligence of the intelligent I will frustrate.”

Where is the wise person? Where is the teacher of the law? Where is the philosopher of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For since in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom did not know him, God was pleased through the foolishness of what was preached to save those who believe. Jews demand signs and Greeks look for wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified: a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, but to those whom God has called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than human wisdom, and the weakness of God is stronger than human strength (1 Corinthians 1:18-25).

* * *

For I resolved to know nothing while I was with you except Jesus Christ and him crucified. I came to you in weakness with great fear and trembling. My message and my preaching were not with wise and persuasive words, but with a demonstration of the Spirit’s power, so that your faith might not rest on human wisdom, but on God’s power (1 Cor 2:2-5).

Yesterday I noted that while Martin Luther’s posting of his 95 theses is the traditional and probably the best known event as the start of the Protestant Reformation, they didn’t contain the bulk of his theology. Rather, “Luther came gradually to understand the great themes and doctrines of the Reformation between 1513-21, as he taught the Scriptures.” And he introduced the heart of his theology, his theologia crucis, his “Theology of the Cross” at an event known as the Heidelberg Disputation in 1518.

I started looking at this Theology of the Cross because I thought it might have something to say to my wife and me in the light of her current suffering. But I found as I studied it that it was really Luther’s response to the Medieval Church. It contained the heart and soul of his message. I’ve written about it in bits and pieces over the last month or so. Beginning today, and over the next several days, as we get closer to the “anniversary” of the Reformation, I’d like to go into a bit of detail about it more directly:

For Luther, the sole authentic locus of man’s knowledge of God is the cross of Christ, in which God is to be found revealed, and yet paradoxically hidden in that revelation.…

God is revealed in the passions et crucem – and yet he is hidden in this very revelation. In the very things which human wisdom regards as the antithesis of deity – such as weakness, foolishness, and humility, God stands revealed in the ‘humility and shame of the cross’. We may summarise the leading features of the theologia crucis as follows:

(1) The theologia crucis is a theology of revelation, which stands in sharp contrast to speculation. Those who speculate on the created order have, in effect, forfeited their right to be called ‘theologians’. God has revealed himself, and it is the task of the theologian to concern himself with God as he has chosen to reveal himself, instead of constructing preconceived notions of God which ultimately must be destroyed.

(2) This revelation must be regarded as indirect and concealed. This is one of the most difficult aspects of the theologia crucis to grasp: how can one speak of a concealed revelation? Luther’s allusion to Exodus 33:23 in Thesis 20 is the key to understanding this fundamental point: although it is indeed God who is revealed in the passion and the cross of Christ, he is not immediately recognizable as God. Those who expect a direct revelation of the face of God are unable to discern him in his revelation, precisely because it is the posteriora Dei (“back of God”) which [is] made visible in this revelation. In that it is God who is made known in the passion and cross of Christ, it is revelation; in that this revelation can only be discerned by the eye of faith, it is concealed. The ‘friends of the cross’ know that beneath the humility and shame of the cross lie concealed the power and the glory of God – but to others, this insight is denied.

(3) This revelation is to be recognized in the sufferings of the cross of Christ, rather than in human moral activity or the created order. Both the moralist and the rationalist expect to find God through intelligent reflection upon the nature of man’s moral sense or the pattern of the created order: for Luther, ‘true theology and knowledge of God are found in Christ crucified’. The cross shatters human illusions concerning the capacity of human reason to discern God in this manner.

(4) This knowledge of God who is hidden in his revelation is a matter of faith. Revelation of the posteriora Dei is addressed to faith, which alone recognizes it as a revelation of God Luther illustrates this point with reference to John 14:8. Philip here asks Jesus to show him the Father – which, according to Luther, makes him a ‘theologian of glory’, in that he considers that God may be found and known apart from Christ. Jesus then explains to him that there is no knowledge of God other than that which may be found in his own person: ‘Whoever has seen me, has seen the Father’ (John 14:9). For the presence of the hidden God in his revelation in Christ and his passion and cross – and who is thus able to acknowledge the truth of Isaiah’s dictum: ‘Truly you are a hidden God!’ The concept of a hidden God (absconditus Deus) lies at the center of the theology of the cross. For Luther, Philip represents the tendency of the theologia gloriae to seek for God apart from Christ, unaware that God is revealed in him, although concealed in that revelation.

(5) God is particularly known through suffering. Although this is essentially a reference to the passiones Christi, a far deeper spiritual truth is involved: a fundamental contention of the theologia crucis is not merely that God is known through suffering (whether that of Christ or of the individual), but that God makes himself known through suffering. For Luther, God is active in this manner, rather than passive, in that suffering and temptation are seen as means by which man is brought to God. This brings us to the dialectic between the opus proprium Dei [“the proper work of God”] and the opus alienum Dei [“the work alien to God”], which Luther introduces in his explanation of Thesis 16 [from the Heidelberg Disputation].

The basic paradox involved is illustrated with reference to the justification of an individual. In order that a man may be justified, he must first recognise that he is a sinner, and humble himself before God. Before man can be justified, he must be utterly humiliated – and it is God who both humiliates and justifies. ‘Thus an action which is alien to God’s nature (opus alienum Dei) results in an action which belongs to his very nature (opus proprium Dei): God makes a person a sinner in order that he may make him righteous.’ The opus alienum is a means to the end of the opus proprium. The significance of suffering, whether this is understood as passiones Christi or human Anfechtung [“challenge” or “temptation”], is that it represents the opus alienum through which God works out his opus proprium. In his important study on Anfechtung, Beintker demonstrated that Luther regards God himself as the source of Anfechtung: God assaults man in order to break him down and thus to justify him. Similarly, studies on Luther’s understanding of the role of the Devil in the Christian life have demonstrated that he regarded the Devil as God’s instrument, who performs the opus alienum Dei on his behalf in order that the opus proprium may be realized.

Far from regarding suffering or evil as a nonsensical intrusion into the world (which Luther regards as the opinion of a ‘theologian of glory’), the “theologian of the cross’ regards such suffering as his most precious treasure, for revealed and yet hidden in precisely such suffering is none other that the living God working out the salvation of those whom he loves.

Alister E. McGrath, “Luther’s Theology of the Cross,” Oxford, UK: and Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, ©1985, 1990, pgs 149-151 (Italics is in the original; bold face emphasis supplied).

Note this statement, for it shows well the God that I have come to know and love: “Similarly, studies on Luther’s understanding of the role of the Devil in the Christian life have demonstrated that he regarded the Devil as God’s instrument, who performs the opus alienum Dei on his behalf in order that the opus proprium may be realized.”

The Devil works on God’s behalf. God has created a universe such that, the more that the Devil “devils”, the harder he works on God’s behalf. He is caught in his own net. He works his own mischief in a mighty way, [and he certainly has the free will to do this], but this very mischief is turned to God’s service. “And we know that in all things God works for the good of those who love him, who have been called according to his purpose” (Romans 8:28).

“If God is for us, who can be against us? In all these things we are more than conquerors through him who loved us.”

Can God Suffer?

Martin Luther’s “theology of the cross” is not merely a theology that provides great comfort in the midst of suffering. It is, in fact, foundational for his whole understanding of “justification by faith alone”, and I hope to explore this theme further in coming blog posts.

But there’s something that needs to be clarified from the outset. In discussing Luther’s Theology of the Cross, or theologia crucis, Alister McGrath alluded to “Luther’s daring phrase”, “The ‘crucified God’”. This, he says, “is not merely the foundation of the Christian faith, but is also the key to understanding the nature of God.”

While I believe that Luther’s “theology of the cross” is, historically, one of the most important ways to understand “God” and “church” and “salvation” that came out of the Reformation, it is important to understand what Luther is and isn’t talking about. John Frame makes some helpful distinctions in his “The Doctrine of God,”( Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, © 2002).

Recently, a number of theologians have questioned the traditional Christian view that God is unable to suffer. Richard Bauckham summarizes Jurgen Moltmann’s “three reasons for speaking of God’s suffering”. The first is the passion of Christ. Moltmann sees his argument as following the tradition of Luther’s “theology of the cross,” which “makes the cross, for all its stark negativity, the basis and criterion of Christian theology.” Moltmann believes that the doctrine of impassibility in the church fathers was based on Greek philosophy rather than on trying to “understand the being of God from the event of the cross.”

Moltmann’s second reason for attributing suffering to God is the nature of love. In Moltmann’s view, divine love entails “reciprocity” between God and creation. It must be possible for him to be “affected by the objects of his love.” So God must be vulnerable to suffering. This argument is based, not on a mere analogy between divine and human love, but upon the nature of divine love revealed in the Cross.

Thirdly Moltmann appeals to the problem of human suffering. He finds no adequate answer to the problem of evil, except to say that God suffers with suffering human beings. Again, he does not argue merely from human suffering to divine suffering, but rather from God’s suffering with Jesus on the cross. This event has soteriological implications: “all suffering becomes God’s so that he may overcome it” (emphasis in original).

. . .

But is there any sense in which God suffers injury or loss? Certainly Jesus suffered injury and loss on the cross. And I agree with Moltmann that Christ’s sufferings are the sufferings of God. The Council of Chalcedon, which defined orthodox Christology, said that Jesus has two complete natures, divine and human, united in one person. We may say that Jesus suffered and died on the cross “according to his human nature,” but what suffered was not a “nature,” but the person of Jesus. And the person of Jesus is nothing less than the second person of the Trinity, who has taken to himself a human nature. His experiences as a man are truly his experiences, the experiences of God.

. . .

To summarize, let us distinguish … between four modes of divine existence:

1. In his atemporal and nonspatial transcendent existence, God ordains grievous events and evaluates them appropriately. He grieves in that sense, but does not suffer injury or loss.

2. In his temporal and spatial omnipresence, he grieves with his creatures, and he undergoes temporary defeats on his way to the complete victory he has foreordained.

3. In his theophanic presence, he is distressed when his people are distressed (Isa. 63:9), but he promises complete victory and vindication both for himself and for his faithful ones.

4. In the Incarnation, the Son suffers injury and loss: physical pain, deprivation, and death. The Father knows this agony, including the agony of his own separation from his Son. He regards this event as the unique and awful tragedy that it is, but also as his foreordained means of salvation. What precise feelings does he experience? We do not know, and we would be wise not to speculate.

Moltmann is right to find divine suffering in the cross in the in the senses mentioned above. But he is wrong to conclude that the doctrine of God’s impassibility is merely a remnant of Greek philosophy. As we have seen, the doctrine of impassibility should not be used to deny that God has emotions, or to deny that God the Son suffered real injury and death on the cross. But God in his transcendent nature cannot be harmed in any way, nor can he suffer loss to his being. In his eternal existence, “suffering loss” can only mean losing some attribute, being defeated in his war with Satan, or otherwise failing to accomplish his eternal plan. Scripture assures us that none of these things will happen, and so they cannot happen. In this sense, God is impassible.

. . .

As we have seen from Hebrews, Christ was made like us so that he could be a merciful and faithful high priest, empathizing with our infirmities. He takes away sin, the cause of those infirmities, and he hears our prayers with understanding. But this principle should not be magnified into a metaphysical assertion about God’s vulnerability, for, as we have seen, God’s eternal nature is invulnerable, and that invulnerability is also precious to the believer.

God’s suffering love in Christ, therefore, does not cast doubt upon his aseity and unchangeability. It is, however, ground for rejoicing (Frame, 611-616).

Pope Gregory the Great: “(Christ) in the mystery of the holy sacrifice is offered for us again (iterum)”.

While we’re talking about the “Eucharist”, it’s striking that most individuals who turn (or return) to Roman Catholicism say they do so because of the Eucharist. Thinking that Rome somehow teaches what Christ taught and what the earliest church taught, they neglect the convoluted history and practice of this “sacrifice”, which, contra Chris Castaldo, has a long history of being viewed as “Christ is re-sacrificed at the Mass”. 

Chris Castaldo says: “Misnomer Two: Catholics teach that Christ is Re-sacrificed at the Mass”

This is perhaps the most common misconception. If I had a dime for every pastor friend whom I’ve heard say that the Mass is a repetition of the cross, I just might have enough money for a cappuccino at Starbucks. … Catholic doctrine teaches that the Mass “renews” or “re-presents” the cross; but it doesn’t “repeat” it. Catholics assert that in a mystical and sacramental sense, the Mass is the cross, the once and for all offering of God’s Son continued through time. For those of you who enjoy grammar, it’s like an ingressive aorist: an action that has been completed and is also ongoing. It is, if you will, like a golf put [sic]… When I swing my putter at the ball, the initial contact is the “put.” At the same time, the action of the ball rolling toward the pin (and in my case, past the pin) is also the “put.” [sic] The put has happened and it’s happening. So the sacrifice of Jesus is completed (hence informed Catholics know how to explain Jesus’ words “it is finished”) and it is also ongoing. Personally, this is one of two or three tenets of Catholicism that I find most troubling; but it is what it is, and we evangelicals only benefit from getting it right.

Castaldo should stick to “puting” and drinking Starbucks. And as I mentioned in a previous post, he should also approach Rome’s doctrines more critically, and be less willing to chastise Protestants for not understanding things for which Rome itself has been all over the map.

This notion that Christ is re-sacrificed at the Mass is an old one, and it is a western, eventually supremely Roman position. Edward J. Kilmartin The Eucharist in the West (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press ©1998, 2004), describing Ambrose of Milan (c. 340-397 A.D.) notes:

On the question of the sacrificial character of the Eucharist, Ambrose provides an example of the difference of the orientation between the Eastern and Western traditions. The Greek fathers of the fourth-century Antiochene tradition based the sacrificial character of the Eucharist on the concept of anamnesis: the commemorative actual presence of the one and unique sacrifice of Christ on the cross. The third-century bishop of Carthage [Cyprian], as was noted above, did not follow this interpretation. Ambrose also omits the Greek concept of commemorative sacrifice… (18)

Ambrose’s theology of eucharistic sacrifice which stresses the active presence of Christ as High Priest as well as the active co-offering of the liturgical assembly under the leadership of the presiding priest adheres to the Western theological tradition. An individualistic concept of eucharistic sacrifice is discernible not only for the ecclesial aspect [“it is precisely the liturgical assembly that is the subject of the offering of the eucharistic sacrifice”] but also for the Christological dimension of the sacrificial act. The idea that each individual Mass has a value in itself as a kind of new act of Christ performed in and through the sacrificial offering of the Church derives from the experience of the mystery of the Eucharist. It is nourished by the typical Western way of thinking which is focused on the individual and concrete event, and disinclined to speculate about the relationship of the once-for-all historical sacrifice of Christ to the eucharistic sacrifice.

Ambrose’s doctrine of the somatic presence of Christ under forms of bread and wine was borrowed from the fourth-century Antiochene tradition. But, as we have noted above, it was not “received” within the Platonic horizon of thought of the Greek theologians. However, his teaching on this subject, thus separated from its natural Platonic horizon, became the viable—and eventually triumphant—option in the Latin Church of the early Middle Ages over against the “spiritualized” interpretation of the content of the sacraments of the body and blood linked to the Augustinian tradition. Likewise Ambrose’s teaching about the Christological aspect of the eucharistic sacrifice shows no signs of the influence of the Greek notion of commemorative sacrifice. This fact, which proves that Ambrose’s “reception” of Greek eucharistic theology was only partial, is indicative of the difficulty which the Western theological mindset has traditionally experienced in its attempts to grasp the Greek notion of commemorative sacrifice.

By the end of the sixth century this Greek concept, which could have served the interests of a more balanced theology of the eucharistic sacrifice, was no longer present to the Western tradition. At the same time the tendency of the Western theology of eucharistic sacrifice toward postulating a complete disjunction between the historical sacrifice of the cross and the eucharistic sacrifice received additional support from Pope Gregory the Great’s saying that “(Christ) in the mystery of the holy sacrifice is offered for us again (iterum)”. This text is one of the earliest that refers to Christ being “newly” offered. Supported by the authority of Gregory [the Great!] it became an important proof text for the notion that the sacrifice of Christ is repeated in each Mass in an “unbloody way.”

At the same time this perception of the eucharistic sacrifice as first and foremost a liturgical repetition of the once-for-all sacrifice of the cross also had the unfortunate effect of obscuring the notion of the active participation of the faithful in the sacrificial activity. The earlier Latin theology, as noted above, viewed the eucharistic liturgy as a constellation of gestures and prayers in which the liturgical activity of the faithful constituted an essential ingredient for the realization of the eucharistic sacrifice. In the later development, however, the eucharistic sacrifice was more narrowly defined as the offering of the one victim through the ministry of the priest. Therefore the laity were understood to participate, not in their own right, but through the ministerial service of the presiding minister.

This new theology of the eucharistic sacrifice provided a building block for the practice of the private Mass which came about due to a number of pastoral and devotional concerns. The transference of the system of stational churches from Rome to the regions beyond the Alps necessitated the confinement of altars honoring martyrs to just one church. The Eucharist was celebrated on these altars in accord with the axiom: martyrs are honored by being buried under altars; altars are places for celebrating the eucharistic sacrifice. Initially the simultaneous celebration of Masses on these altars together with the Mass at the high altar was practiced. But in view of the eucharistic sacrifice as a new offering of Christ, the celebration of such Masses became more frequent. Also, the practice of Irish missionaries of privately celebrating Mass on their missionary excursions in the Frankish lands exercised considerable influence on the development of the private Mass. It was justified on the ground that where the priest is there Mass can be celebrated. Also, in the Frankish milieu the question of exchange of material goods for spiritual goods, monastery lands and other foundations for spiritual blessing, led to the employment of the Mass as the most favored spiritual good to be involved in the “holy commerce.” (21-23, emphasis added)

So can you deny that this is some sort of “explicit de fide teaching” of the Roman Catholic Church? Probably they can and will deny that. But can you deny that it was the overwhelming practice of the Western (i.e. Roman) church through the vastest portion of church history? Nah.

What should Chris Castaldo’s role be? Chastising Protestants because they don’t care to understand this whole convoluted history? Or explaining how Rome’s preoccupation with itself and its own glories caused corruptions galore through the history of the church? 

The theologia crucis and Luther’s critique of the analogical nature of theological language

It’s interesting that some of the discussions that are going around in theological circles these days, are echoes of the discussions that went round and round in past centuries. I present the following not only as a description of a key aspect of Luther’s developing awareness of how God works in the world, but also as a historical backdrop to some of the discussions you may be seeing even among contemporary theologians:

In the injustice, the shame, the weakness, the folly and the condemnation of the cross are revealed, and yet hidden, the righteousness, the glory, the wisdom, the strength and the salvation of God. As we have already indicated, Luther recognized an intimate relationship between human understandings of iustitia and sapientia [“wisdom”], so that his sustained critique of the role of reason in matters theological, which becomes evident from 1515 onwards, is ultimately a consequence and an expression of his conviction that human reason cannot comprehend the manner in which God has effected the salvation of mankind. In the cross of Christ, this tension reaches breaking point, and a near-permanent divorce between the spheres of faith and reason results. Reason is scandalized by the cross; faith embraces it with joy.

Underlying the theologia crucis and the discovery of the ‘righteousness of God’ is a radical critique of the analogical nature of theological language. Within the earlier medieval period in general, the concept of iustitia Dei had been constructed on the assumption that it was analogous to [human or classical conceptions of] iustitia. While the difficulties encountered in transferring the term iustus from a human context (as in the statement, ‘Socrates is just’) to a divine context (as in the statement, ‘God is just’) were fully appreciated, it was nevertheless assumed that the term bore a related meaning in each of these contexts.

The Alien Righteousness of Christ

“By late 1514 Luther had arrived at the fundamental insight that the proper disposition for justification is humility” – Alister McGrath, Alister E. McGrath, “Luther’s Theology of the Cross,” Oxford, UK: and Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, ©1985, 1990, pg 153.

Martin Luther’s “Theology of the Cross” is not a specialized or “side” theology. It is comprehensive attitude out of which arrives his way of understanding what God is doing in the world. It is the Biblical way of understanding God. (“Let the one who boasts, boast in the Lord…. For I decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ and him crucified.”)

In the decades immediately prior to what became known as “Luther’s breakthrough”, late medieval theology had arrived at the understanding that “the basic condition which man was required to meet in order to be justified was by doing quod in se est” (“doing their best”). “The righteousness of God was understood to refer to the equity within the context of the covenant that God made with man ‘which defines God’s manner of dealing with humanity’”.

McGrath’s work is an effort both to provide an overview of the “backgrounds” of medieval theology, and an effort to understand Luther’s thought at various times, based on his various lecture notes and publications. It is an effort to understand “what he knew and when he knew it”. That’s a complicated effort, but my understanding is that McGrath’s scholarship over the years, on this topic, is both thorough and precise.

The hallmark of “Luther’s breakthrough” is his understanding of the phrase “the righteousness of God”. That phrase had a certain, well-defined meaning during the middle ages, and according to McGrath, Luther had a very secure understanding of it:

It is this understanding of ‘the righteousness of God’ which is represented by Martin Luther in the earlier part of his “Lectures on the Psalms (1513-15), as may be judged from his [marginal comment] on Psalm 9:9):

“Righteousness (iustitia) [“the righteousness of God”] is thus said to be rendering to each what is due to them. Yet equity is prior to righteousness, and is its prerequisite. Equity identifies merit, righteousness renders rewards. Thus the Lord judges the world ‘in equity’ (that is, wishing all to be saved), and judges ‘in righteousness’ (because God renders to each their reward).”

Luther here reproduces key aspects of [a late medieval] understanding of iustitia Dei (“the righteousness of God”): iustitia is understood to be based upon divine equity, which looks solely to the merits of humans in determining their reward within the framework established by the covenant. The doctors of the church rightly teach that, when people do their best (quod in se est), God infallibly gives grace (Alister McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, Third edition, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ©2005, pg 88).

This late medieval teaching on justification (especially Gabriel Biel and the via moderna school of theology) was genuinely a Pelagian teaching that was widely accepted within the Church of the day. No, Trent did not define it this way either, but there was no definition at all, and such teaching was rampant within the Church of that day.

Luther’s theological breakthrough is intimately connected with his discovery of a new meaning of ‘the righteousness of God’, and it is important to appreciate that his earlier works are characterized by the teaching of the via moderna upon this matter. Luther’s later view that anyone attempting to do quod in se est sinned mortally remains notionally within this framework, while ultimately subverting its theological plausibility.

McGrath goes on to say, “the covenant-theology of the via moderna is based upon the presupposition that man is capable of doing quod in se est without the special assistance of grace.”

The origins of Luther’s concept of the ‘alien righteousness of Christ’ must be considered to lie in his holistic understanding of man. In particular, Luther argues that ‘flesh’ (caro) and ‘spirit’ (spiritus) are not to be regarded as man’s lower and higher faculties respectively, but rather as descriptions of the whole person considered under different aspects. Thus caro is not man’s lower nature, but the entire man (totus homo), considered as turned in upon itself (homo incurvatus in se) in its irrepressible egoism and its radical alienation from God. Similarly, spiritus is to be understood as referring to the entire man in his openness to God and the divine promises. For Luther, justification relates to the entire person, both flesh and spirit: although the individual comes to put his trust in the promises of God, he nevertheless remains a sinner. Thus the totus homo is iustus et peccator simul – a sinner inwardly, and yet righteous in the sight of God….The believer is righteous coram Deo [before God], even though this righteousness cannot be detected empirically: indeed, those whose righteousness can be detected empirically are righteous coram homnibus [before man] and yet unrighteousness coram Deo – the hypocrites. The Christian is a sinner in re, and yet righteous in spe: his righteousness is hidden, known only to God.

As the totus homo cannot be partially righteous coram Deo, his righteousness must be alien and extrinsic to him – it is a righteousness which is in no sense part of his person, or which can in any way be said to belong to him. It is this consideration which appears to underlie the concept of iustia Christi aliena…. Extrinsically, the believer is righteous, through the alien righteousness of Christ; intrinsically, he is – and will remain – a sinner. This concept of justifying righteousness is, of course, totally different from that of St. Augustine, as Luther himself fully appreciates. This element of Luther’s thought would be developed by Melanchthon into a doctrine of forensic justification, which would become normative for Protestant understandings of justification.

Thus, McGrath concludes this chapter on “The Righteousness of God”, “Luther’s insight into the true nature of the ‘righteousness of God’ represents far more than a mere terminological clarification: latent within it is a new concept of God. Who is this God who deals thus with man? Luther’s answer to this question, as it developed over the years 1513-1519, can be summarized in one of his most daring phrases: the God who deals with sinful man in this astonishing way is none other than the ‘crudified and hidden God’ (Deus crucifixus et absconditus) – the God of the theologia crucis. How Luther developed his fundamental insight into the true nature of his ‘righteousness of God’ into the theologia crucis, with all that this entails, is the subject of the following chapter (pg 147).

For anyone interested in the development of Luther’s thought, especially regarding Justification and “the alien righteousness of Christ”, Scott Clark of Westminster Seminary, California, has produced an article, Iustitia Imputata Christi, which goes into quite a bit of detail.

Smells & bells, incense & nonsense-2

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that sola scriptura were an insufficient rule of faith? What does the Orthodox tradition propose by way of an alliterative? This is how Florovsky poses the question:
"The ultimate authority—and ability to discern the truth in faith—is vested in the Church which is indeed a "Divine institution"…We may seem to be involved here in a vicious circle. We may be actually involved in it, if we insist on formal guarantees in doctrinal matters. But, obviously, such "guarantees" do not exist and cannot be produced especially in advance. Certain councils were failures…And the verdict of the Church has been highly selective. The Council is not above the Church…Again, the stress is not so much on "canonical" authority, but on the truth. And it leads us to the most intricate and crucial problem—what are the ultimate criteria of the Christian Truth?" Bible, Church, Tradition, 97.

And this is how he answers his own question:
"There is no easy answer to this query. Indeed, there is a very simple answer—Christ is the Truth. The source and criterion of Christian Truth is Divine Revelation…the source of the Truth is the Word of God…Yet, this answer does not solve the problem. In fact, it has been variously assessed and interpreted, to the point of most radical divergence. It only meant that the problem was actually shifted a step further. A new question came to be asked. How was Revelation to be understood?" ibid. 97-98.

So what's the bottom-line? Florovsky replies by a qualified appeal to the consensus of the Fathers:
"The true and authentic consensus was that which reflected the mind of the Catholic and Universal Church…the true consensus is that which manifests and discloses this perennial identity of the Church’s faith— aequaliter perseverans. The teaching authority of the Ecumenical Councils is grounded in the infallibility of the Church…It is a charismatic authority," ibid. 103.

Meyendorff mounts a similar argument:
"Irenaeus had already discovered that the tradition of the apostles, transmitted without interruption by the succession of bishops, was a decisive criterion of truth. To this consensus "in time" is also added a consensus "in space": the same tradition was confessed by all the bishops "everywhere in the church," Living Tradition, 50-51."

Even if we waive aside the question-begging assumptions on which this argument is built (apostolic succession, Patristic consensus), it just relocates the original problem. By what criterion do we identify the true church? By what standard to we isolate the perennial identity of her faith? Even on its own grounds, isn’t Florovsky taking for granted the very thing at issue?

In fairness, Florovsky does offer a definition of the truth Church:
"The Church is the unity of charismatic life. The source of this unity is hidden in the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper…It was created and sealed by the Spirit in the Twelve Apostles, and the Apostolic Succession is a living and mysterious thread binding the whole historical fullness of Church life into one catholic whole…The objective side is the uninterrupted sacramental succession, the continuity of the hierarchy," Bible, Church, Tradition, 45.

"The unity of the Church is effected through the sacraments…the sacraments constitute the Church…Therefore, "the right administration of the sacraments" belongs to the essence of the church," ibid. 61.

But the problem with this definition is twofold:
i) Florovsky is offering a stipulative a definition of the church—a definition which equates the true church with the Orthodox Church. But, of course, this assumes what it needs to prove.
ii) But even if we went along with his definition, the definition not self-applying. By what criterion do we verify a valid sacrament or a valid ordination?

So we seem to be peeling an onion. Every time we peel back one layer we find another layer underneath. Although the onion may be getting very smaller, we don’t appear to be getting any closer to a hard inner core. All we're left with is a pile of onionskins.

The reason for this ought to be obvious. Opposing tradition to the right of private judgment is an illusion. Tradition is just a lofty name for private opinion. That is what tradition does: to codify one man's opinion. Today's tradition was yesterday's innovation. Tradition has to begin somewhere, and it begins with influential, pioneering individuals. Reformed tradition prizes Augustine and Calvin, while Orthodox tradition prizes the Cappadocian Fathers. Orthodox tradition prizes some councils, but not others. Anglicans prize Hooker and Cranmer, Ango-Catholics prize Newman, while Roman Catholics prize Aquinas. And on it goes.

So tradition is only the convergence of like-minded private opinion. At its best, tradition is the independent convergence of private opinions—at worst, the blind convergence of private opinions.

But in any event, tradition is no greater than the sum of the parts. To imagine otherwise is to commit the sin of the idolater, who forgets that the god he bows down to today was firewood a day before (Isa 44).

3. Criteria:

For his own part, Meyendorff comes at this from another angle:
"The entire Western ecclesiological problem since the sixteenth century turned around this opposition of two criteria, two references of doctrinal security, while in Orthodoxy no need for, or necessity of, such security was ever really felt for the simple reason that the living Truth is its own criterion," Living Tradition, 20.

Can Meyendorff really be that naïve? Yes, there’s a sense in which truth is self-warranting. But that appeal ignores the whole issue of how we know the truth when we see it. Not every matter of fact is either evident or self-evident. The Bible says that Jesus was born in Bethlehem. That’s a true statement. Yet apart from the Bible, we wouldn’t know the birthplace of Christ.

How did the 16C debate between Catholic and Protestant ever get off the ground if the truth were so transparent?
Closer to home, how does he account for the Hesychast controversy—the subject of his doctorate—if truth were its own criterion? Or the schism of the Old Believers? Unless the truth is not only self-warranting, but also evident or self-evident, a bare appeal to the criterial character of the truth doesn’t solve a single problem. There are two questions, not one: What is true, and how do I know it?

In fact, Meyendorff defines the truth in such way as makes it positively opaque to human reason. "Precisely because their understanding of the Truth was not conceptual, the theologians could not admit either that Truth was expressed by the New Testament writings in a verbally and conceptually exhaustive manner," ibid. 9; and adds that "the New Testament message" isn’t concerned with "abstract truths, but with a Person," ibid. 10. Florovsky draws a similar dichotomy: "The Truth is not an idea, but a person, even the Incarnate Lord," Bible, Church, Tradition, 20." But there are two or three problems with this definition:
i) How can a non-cognitive definition of truth function as a criterion? If our understanding of the truth is not conceptual, then we can have no concept of what the truth is or where it lies. It’s like a yardstick without markings.
ii) In this life we know Jesus by description rather than acquaintance. To believe in Jesus is to believe a number of revealed propositions about Jesus.
iii) Even in this life, communication is an essential means of getting to know a person. That entails propositional knowledge.

Actually, Meyendorff might take issue with my distinction between truth by description and acquaintance, for he claims that "the true theologian was one who saw and experienced the content of his theology...The experience of the saints would be fundamentally identical with that of the apostles," Byzantine Theology, 9."

But this defense denies the principle of historic revelation. Historic events, of which redemptive events are a subset, are discrete and unrepeatable. These are concrete particulars, not abstract universals. Like Barth and Bultmann, Meyendorff is resorting to an ahistorical definition of dogma. Not only is this contrary to Scripture, it isn't even a traditional definition of tradition—for tradition is a historical process. Meyendorff has dehistorcized Scripture and tradition alike.

B. Ontology:

Both Florovsky and Meyendorff work with a distinctive religious epistemology. And this is, in turn, is grounded in their ontology of divine and human nature, as well as their sacramental causality.

1. Sacramental causality:

Meyendorff speaks of "spiritual senses" that are "made accessible through the sacramental, communal life in the body of Christ," Living Tradition, 77. This presupposes "sacramental realism," Catholicity and the Church (St. Valdimir’s Press, 1983), 75. The "knowledge of God" is given "through Baptism" and "continuous participation in the life of the body of Christ in the Eucharist," Byzantine Theology, 77. Baptism confers "new and immortal life," ibid. 146. The "positive meaning of baptism" is "new birth," ibid. 193. Baptism is the "rite of Christian initiation," Living Tradition, 16. Moreover, "sacramental life, especially the Eucharist, requires the Church to be internally structured and hierarchical," ibid. 33." "The Eucharist required a ‘president,’ someone sitting at the very place of Christ," ibid. 48. Note here the network of epistemology, ecclesiology and sacramentology. They are all of a piece.

We find the same moves made by Florovsky:
"The Church is the unity of charismatic life. The source of this unity is hidden in the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper and in the mystery of Pentecost. And Pentecost is continued and made permanent in the Church by means of the Apostolic Succession…Ministry (or 'hierarchy') itself is primarily a charismatic principle, a "ministry of the sacraments," or a "divine oeconomia," Bible, Church, Tradition, 65.

"The true tradition is only the tradition of truth…grounded in and by, that charisma veritatis certum [secure charisma of truth], which has been 'deposited' in the Church from the very beginning and has been preserved by the uninterrupted succession of episcopal ministry…It is a living tradition…Ultimately, tradition is a continuity of the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit in the Church, a continuity of Divine guidance and illumination," ibid. 106.

One recurring problem with all these grandiose claims is that they consist of barefaced assertions in place of reasoned arguments. I suppose this is a legacy of national churches. If your church has a social monopoly, you never have to make a case for what you believe.

Where is the argument for prelacy, for sacramental realism, and apostolic succession? Florovsky and Meyendorff argue from these assumptions, but there is precious little by way of argument for their assumptions.

Florovsky talks about a Pauline model of the church (ibid. 67), yet he offers nothing by way of a stepwise argument from a Pauline pattern to Orthodox ecclesiology and sacramentology.

Meyendorff talks about sacramental realism, but the most he has to offer is a passing reference to the Bread of Life discourse (Jn 6), the parable of the true Vine (Jn 15), and Jn 7:38, with a gloss by Basil. And that’s it! Yet this is just another case of assuming what needs to be proved. It takes the sacramental reading for granted.

One again we have the specter of mirror-reading. Because liturgical tradition has applied these verses to the sacraments, the worshiper is conditioned to read those verses with sacramental overtones. But that's a direct effect of tradition, and not a foundation for tradition.

The proper context of the NT is not prospective, but retrospective; not historical theology, but OT theology. For the Apostolic church is in dialogue, not with the sub-Apostolic church, but with Israel. Consider, for a moment, how a real Bible scholar approaches the sacraments:
"To understand such feasts, it is necessary to remember the Biblical attitude to meals in general...Meals were...used to inaugurate covenants...the animals to be eaten were first offered in sacrifice to God, with the result that he became the Host, inviting men to his table, and that the sins of men were taken away by the shedding of blood before they approached (Heb 9:16-22)...Those who neglected the annual Passover meal were rejected by God and became liable to the visitation of death (Exod 12:15,19; Num 9:13). Now, in 1 Cor 10:14-22, St. Paul compares such feasts with their pagan counterparts and with the Holy Communion, and he dwells upon the function of all of these in cementing koinonia (communion, fellowship, partnership) not just between worshiper and worshiper, but more especially between the worshippers and the deity (vv. 16f.,20)," R. Beckwith, Priesthood and Sacraments, Latimer Monographs 1
(Marchman Manor, 1964), 91.

"The sin of 'not distinguishing the body,' and the physical judgments which it is liable to bring (1 Cor 11:29-31), can be paralleled from the corresponding judgments incurred by profaning the sacred feasts of the OT, in which no one imagines there to be a bodily presence of the Lord in the elements (Lev 7:20f.; 22:3)," The Service of Holy Communion and its Revision. Latimer Monographs 3 (Marchman Manor, 1972), 33.

One of the pragmatic problems with sacramental realism is that, if true, it should have practical consequences. Baptism effects a state of grace while communion sustains a state of grace.

Yet experience doesn't seem to bear this out. How can we account for the national apostasy of so many countries where nearly every citizen received baptism or communion? Such a massive defection rate is hard to square with the logic of sacramental realism. If the sacraments are a means of grace, then where's the grace?

2. Theosis:

Underlying Orthodox sacramentology is its soteriology, and that, turn, revolves round the category of theosis—which presupposes a very peculiar notion of God, man and their interrelation.

Borrowing a page from Gregory Palamas, Meyendorff draws a distinction between God’s essence and his "energy," Byzantine Theology, 77—although, he’s quick to add, "Palamas does not try to justify the distinction philosophically," ibid. 77. God’s essence is "totally unknown," "unknowable," "undefinable," and "indescribable," Living Tradition, 182-83. But his energy is an object of knowledge, and we can participate in God’s energy by virtue of the Incarnation and sacraments. (Cf. Byzantine Theology, 77; Living Tradition, 77,184.)

He also speaks of "man as being called to overcome constantly his own created limitations," Byzantine Theology, 4; of "a peculiar property of man, which permits him to reach outside the created level...man’s capability of transcending himself," ibid., 13, so that "’Nature,’ therefore, designates that which is, in virtue of creation, distinct from God. But nature can and must be transcended, ibid. 143."

Florovsky moves in the same general orbit. The "ultimate aim and purpose of human life" is defined as "theosis, Bible, Church, Tradition, 114. On the one hand, we should not cast this in "ontological categories," ibid. 115." But, on the other hand,
"The problem remains. How can even this intercourse be compatible with the Divine Transcendence?…The paradox was especially sharp in the Eastern theology, which has been always committed to the belief that God was absolutely "incomprehensible"…and unknowable in his nature or essence.

This mysterious mode of the Divine Presence, in spite of the absolute transcendence of the Divine Essence, passes all understanding," ibid. 115,116.

Florovsky goes on to say that the "source and power" of theosis is not the "divine essence, but the grace of God." Yet this "uncreated grace or energy" is not "just an ‘accident,’ for these divine "energies ‘proceed’ from God and manifest his own being," ibid. 117.
What are we to make of all this?
i) We need to be clear on the place of mystery in the Christian faith. It is valid to end on a note of mystery of that is where revelation leaves us. It is invalid to invoke "mystery" just to prop up a shaky explanation. The Palamite distinction is a rationalization. And there is necessarily nothing wrong with this except that you are not entitled to mystify and rationalize at the same time. To disclaim ontological categories while insisting on the "uncreated" character of God’s gracious action borders on the oxymoronic.
ii) The conception of man as a being poised on the knife-edge of nothingness, of God as essentially unknowable—is taken over from Neoplatonic emanationism and apophatic theology. (Cf. Historical Dictionary of the Orthodox Church, 34,236; The Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern Christianity, K. Parry et al. eds., 36-37,159,384-6.) Now there's nothing intrinsically wrong with philosophical theology, but philosophy is not a substitute for revelation.
iii) The Palamite distinction implies primary and secondary grades of divinity. But to posit degrees of divinity in which we participate is characteristic of Neoplatonic pantheism.
iv) Apophatic theology is incoherent. As Duns Scotus long ago noted, negations presuppose affirmations; for unless some positive knowledge of God supplied the point of contrast, we wouldn’t know if our negation had reference to God. In other words, you cannot disaffirm that something is true of God unless you already know what is true of God.
v) The privative definition of evil redefines sin and salvation. Instead of falling from well-being to ill-will, Adam fell from being into nonbeing. And salvation is not by redemption but participation in the divine being‚whatever that means.

Florovsky's disclaimer notwithstanding, apostasy becomes an ontological rather than ethical category.

Likewise, theosis is ontological and impersonal. In principle, the Incarnation automatically effects a reunion of divinity and humanity—not just with respect to the Hypostatic Union, but with mankind in general. An Incarnational soteriology implies universal salvation. Meyendorff denies this by invoking freewill (Byzantine Theology, 163). But that appeal would require a supporting argument which, true to form, is not forthcoming.

Meyendorff attacks the forensic character of Western theology. "There would be no place, then, in such an anthropology for the concept of inherited guilt," ibid. 143. "Chrysostom...specifically denies the imputation of sin to the descendents of Adam," ibid. 145. Byzantine theology never develops the idea of redemption "in the direction of an Anselmian theory of ‘satisfaction,’" ibid. 160. "In the East, the cross is envisaged not so much as the punishment of the just one, which ‘satisfies’ a transcendent Justice requiring a retribution for man’s sins," ibid. 161. "Salvation" is understood "in terms of theosis or ‘deification,’ rather than as a justification from sin and guilt," ibid. 226."

Meyendorff admits that "Byzantine theology did not produce any significant elaboration of the Pauline doctrine of justification expressed in Romans and Galatians," ibid. 160."

He might have added that we find the same forensic framework in Petrine theology (1 Pet 2:24; 3:18), as well as Johannine theology (Jn 1:17; 1 Jn 2:1-2; 3:4-5; 4:10). Cf. G. B. Caird, The Language and Imagery of the Bible (Westminster, 1980), 159; A. Lincoln: Truth on Trial: The Lawsuit Motif in the Fourth Gospel (Hendrickson, 2000).

Refreshingly, he offers a threefold defense of his position:
i) Latin theology ignored "all the other concepts with which the Bible describes salvation: sanctification, new life, union with God, participation in the divine nature," Catholicity & the Church, 67.
ii) In Rom 5:12, "death" is the antecedent of "because of which," thereby rendering the verse to read "because of death, all men have sinned," Byzantine Theology, 144.
iii) In this same verse, "'sinned' "refers to personal, actual sins of men," ibid. 149."

Is this sufficient to establish Meyendorff’s case? Every step of the argument is a misstep:
i) How does the rejection of some soteric categories by Latin theology justify the rejection of other soteric categories by Byzantine theology? Is Scripture bereft of divine authority?
ii) Appeal to 2 Pet 1:4 commits a semantic anachronism by equating Petrine usage with the dogmatic categories of Byzantine theology.
iii) Although Meyendorff’s rendering of Rom 5:12 is grammatically possible, this construction disregards larger considerations:
a) In 6:23 and 1 Cor 15:56 Paul expressly attributes death to sin, and not vice versa.
b) The forensic focus is front and center in vv.18-19 and 1 Cor 15:56.

As to making the passage refer to the personal and actual sins of the many,
a) It ignores the force v.14,
b) It ignores the fivefold emphasis on the one-to-many relation with reference to the one sin of the one man imputed to the many.
c) It ignores the parallel fivefold emphasis on the one-to-many relation with reference to the merit of Christ imputed to the many.

In place of penal substitution, he proposes an Incarnational soteriology: "The hypostatic union implies also that the Logos made humanity his own in its totality," ibid. 155 "When the Logos became incarnate, the divine stamp matched all its imprints," ibid. 159. "In his divine hypostasis the gulf created by the Fall between God and man has been bridged forever," Catholicity & the Church, 73. This, of course, is the standard Greek Orthodox position.

By way of reply:
i) If the incarnation automatically reconciles humanity with God, then the cross of Christ and work of the Spirit are superfluous.
ii) The very same principle would render the sacraments superfluous.
iii) The NT never develops an Incarnational soteriology. Byzantine theology imports the conceptual content from an alien philosophy.
iv) To assert that humanity is such an organic unit that a divine incarnation would affect the whole is a very ambitious philosophical claim. Where's the supporting argument?
v) Colorful metaphors (stamps & imprints, chasms & bridges) may serve to illustrate an established doctrine, but picture language is no substitute for doctrine or prooftexting. When the NT conceptualizes salvation in such categories as election and reprobation, inability and faith, merit and demerit, collective condemnation and vicarious satisfaction, these aren’t picturesque expressions for some ineffable truth, but are direct and definable ideas.

Meyendorff also mentions the defeat of the devil as an aspect of redemption. (Cf. Byzantine Theology, 146; Catholicity and the Church, 72.). Is this an alternative to the Latin conception?
i) Even if this were a neglected aspect of the atonement, it is a supplement rather than a substitute for blood atonement.
ii) Given the way in which Meyendorff demythologizes the creation account, we wonder if he even believes in a personal devil. Or is this just another of his metaphors?
iii) If we take the devil seriously, then we must take the phenomenon of occult bondage just as seriously (Jn 8:44; 2 Cor 4:4; 2 Tim 2:26; 1 Jn 5:19). But in that event, what becomes of his easy resort to freewill?

Finally, let's consider a few other miscellaneous arguments for theosis. Orthodox theologians sometimes appeal to the "in Christ" formula. By way of reply:
i) The "in Christ" formula is not a separate soteric category but rather a summary expression. Moreover,
ii) It isn’t an ontological category denoting a metaphysical union with God. Instead, it denotes the federal identity of Christ with his people by virtue of eternal election (Eph 1:4-5,9b,11) and its existential realization in the life-history of the elect (10,13). Furthermore,
iii) Its validation is grounded, not in the Incarnation or person of Christ, but in the cross or work of Christ (7). As Martin Hengel observes, "the characteristically Pauline notion of living ‘in Christ’ (en christo) or ‘in the Lord’ (en kyrio), which today is once again being interpreted mystically, was originally formed as a parallel construction to en nomo (‘in the law" or, as the case may be, hypo nomo ('under the law')," Conflicts and Challenges in Early Christianity, D. Hagner, ed. (Trinity, 1999), 27.

Two remaining lines of appeal are to "Paul’s preaching on adoption to sonship and the indwelling Spirit (e.g., Rom (8), [and] in John’s promise of the gift of divine glory (Jn 17:5,22-24)," Historical Dictionary of the Orthodox Church, 321.

Here again we see how Byzantine theology is unable to emancipate itself from ontological patterns of thought. Paul’s teaching on adoption and sonship has its roots in the divine election of Israel (Rom 9:4,26; 2 Cor 6:18; cf. Exod 4:22; Deut 14:1; 32:6; 2 Sam 7:14; Isa 1:2; 43:6; 64:8; Jer 3:19; 31:9; Hos 2:1; 11:1). And in its New Testamental realization it has reference to filial rights and responsibilities (Rom 8:12-17; Gal 3:26-4:7). So it is a judicial and redemptive rather than ontological or existential category, having reference an objective standing rather than a subjective state of being. The very idea of "adoption" removes it from the sphere of "nature."

As to the analogy between the glory of Christ and the glorification of Christians, even a cursory review of the doxological motif in the Fourth Gospel quickly discloses that this is a highly inflected theme. One cannot, therefore, draw a horizontal correspondence between the preincarnate glory of Christ (17:5) and the glorification of his people. (Cf. G. B. Caird, "The Glory of God in the Fourth Gospel: an exercise in biblical semantics," NTS 15 (1969), 265-77.)

The are other possible arguments for Eastern Orthodoxy that I've not addressed here. And that's because there are some generic arguments which are the common coin of every high churchman, whether Roman Catholic, Anglo-Catholic, or Eastern Orthodox. Because I've already disposed of those arguments in my various postings on Roman Catholicism and the sacraments, I've felt free to confine my remarks in this essay to the specifics of the case for the Eastern Orthodox tradition.

Bubble-boy catholicity

I'm going to comment on a review of Frame's systematic theology:

http://theaquilareport.com/an-assessment-of-john-frames-systematic-theology-an-introduction-to-christian-belief/

Doing so is important in pursuing a theology that stands in catholic continuity with our Reformed forefathers in the faith. As we do so, we pursue unity around the teachings of Scripture and are better able to pursue a catholic unity with all who rest on the supreme authority of God’s Word by appealing to and promoting a common understanding of the Bible.Frame’s Systematic Theology is profound and thought provoking. Yet the very features that make his theology innovative make it less clear what relationship he has to the historic Reformed faith. His lack of historical theology makes his work less catholic in character.It is hard to see how this promotes catholicity in relation either to the Reformed community or to the broader Christian world.

i) McGraw makes "catholicity" a chief criterion in his evaluation. However, he never explains why we should treat catholicity as an overriding criterion or priority. 

ii) He doesn't define what he means by "catholicity." Is he using "catholic" as a historically and theologically resonant synonym for "universal"? If so, his overwhelming emphasis on catholicity is highly ironic. McGraw is an OPC pastor. Nothing wrong with that. In general, I think the OPC is a very admirable denomination. But whatever other things the OPC may have going for it, catholicity isn't one of them. Do Anglicans think confessional Presbyterianism represents catholicity? Do Lutherans think confessional Presbyterianism represents catholicity? Do Baptists think confessional Presbyterianism represents catholicity? Do Anabaptists think confessional Presbyterianism represents catholicity? Do charismatics think confessional Presbyterianism represents catholicity? Do Plymouth Brethren think confessional Presbyterianism represents catholicity? Do Dispensationalists think confessional Presbyterianism represents catholicity? McGraw has a comically insular and provincial notion of catholicity. It's only catholic within the snowglobe of his particular theological tradition. 

Fact is, catholicity and confessionalism tug in opposing directions. Confessionaism is sectarian. Confessionalism distances you from everybody else who doesn't subscribe to your own theological tradition. I'm not saying that's a bad thing. I'm just pointing out that McGraw's means (confessionalism) work at cross-purposes with his goal (catholicity). 

iii) Assuming that catholicity ought to be a goal, that leaves open the question of how to pursue that goal. McGraw assumes that catholicity and confessionalism go together. But what if catholicity is something we should achieve indirectly? Instead of aiming at catholicity, what if catholicity is the effect or end-result of something else? For instance, Christians have a duty to understand God's word, believe God's word, and live obey God's word. The more that more Christians live according to God's word, the more they converge. 

Frame unashamedly notes that he includes less historical theology than other comparable works because he wants to be biblical.[41] While this sounds appealing to many Christians, it is impossible to do theology in a historical vacuum. Frame’s situational perspective reflects this fact. Downplaying historical theology in the name of being biblical can be a dangerous way of introducing radical shifts in method with little notice. The question is not whether we are influenced by the historical teachings of the church, but which ones will influence us and whether they are correct.

i) Like any wise man, Frame plays to his strengths. He does what he's good at. He does what he does best. He has an analytical mind. You get things from him that you will never get from more historically-minded, but less acute, writers like Scott Clark and Darryl Hart. 

ii) Given the specialization of knowledge, no theologian can be an expert on everything. Systematic theology involves exegetical theology, philosophical theology, and historical theology.  To a great extent, the emphasis depends on the aptitude and training of the theologian. 

iii) Life is short. We only have 24 hours in a day. The time you devote to mastering historical theology is time you siphon off from mastering exegetical theology or philosophical theology. Something has to give. Should a Protestant theologian skimp on exegetical theology so that he can devote more time to researching nooks and crannies of church history? 

iv) You get different things from different theologians. If you want a greater emphasis on historical theology, read Douglas Kelly. Keep in mind, though, that Kelly's orientation is not above criticism. He's quite ecumenical in his sources of theology. The church fathers. Eastern Orthodox theologians. Thomas Torrance. Is that really more Reformed or more confessional than Frame's orientation? If anything, could it not be argued that that is less anchored in confessional Calvinism. More eclectic. Open to many influences outside the Reformed stable. 

Ignoring historical theology as a conversation partner in the name of producing a theology that is more biblical gives readers a false impression and threatens to confuse Frame’s innovations with a bare reading of Scripture. Without historical theology, systematic theology becomes detached from the church.

Which church? The present church? The church of living Christians?

Historical theology does not tell us what to believe, but it helps us be self-critical. 

So does philosophical theology. Indeed, one could argue that philosophical theologians are self-critical in a way that historian theologians are not. 

Without drawing from the past, we will have the unfortunate circumstance of holding communion with the church at the present day. 

Without drawing from the present or the recent past, we will have the unfortunate circumstance of holding communion with a dead church, a paper church–a church that only exists in history books.

This unavoidably detracts from a biblical catholicity of doctrine, which by definition cannot reinvent itself in every generation.

But you must identify what qualifies as biblical doctrine in the first place. And every Christian generation must confirm that for itself. 

Scripture has ultimate authority beyond which there is no appeal, but unity and trust is not possible without some agreement over what the Bible says. 

But, of course, McGraw is extremely selective about the unity he privileges. Agreement that Scripture teaches confessional Presbyterianism. Unity within a fractional subset of professing Christians in time and place.  

He defines theology as, ‘the application of Scripture, by persons, to every area of life.’…There is a subtle difference between Frame’s definition of theology and historical Reformed reflections on the nature of theology….By equating theology with the application of Scripture (to use Frame’s terms), the normative aspect of theology no longer remains distinct absolutely from its subjective components. 

Keep that criticism in mind as we move to the next claim:

Christ appointed means to promote a catholic unit in sound doctrine. In Ephesians 4:11-16, the apostle Paul lists gifts that the ascended Christ gave to the church. Apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, and teachers were foremost among these gifts (v. 11). Some of these offices were temporary and some of them are permanent. It is not important to show which ones are which here.

i) Notice that McGraw is guilty of the very thing he faults Frame for (allegedly) doing. He's going straight to Scripture. Makes a direct appeal to Scripture. Then applies that to the situation in hand. 

ii) Furthermore, his interpretation is hardly catholic. He assumes the text is referring to "offices." But, of course, that's disputed by exegetes like Gordon Fee, Harold Hoehner, and Walter Liefeld. Likewise, he interjects a cessationist expiration date, although the text itself doesn't say some of these "offices" were temporary–and there are scholars (e.g. Michael L. Brown) who deny that. 

My point is not to debate the merits of his interpretation. But his interpretation is sectarian rather than catholic. It's only catholic within the inwardly looking bubble of his favored theological tradition.

And that's unavoidable. And this stage in church historian, it's a choice between different theological traditions. You can also mix-and-match. But whatever you opt for, it won't be catholic. 

Christ promised to furnish his church with teachers promoting doctrinal unity through sound teaching and loving discipleship. Christ has kept this promise. He has preserved the truth in his church throughout her history. Reformed Christians have believed that the theology embodied in their creeds and confessions represent Christ’s faithfulness in giving Scriptural light to the church to promote unity in sound doctrine. If the church would pursue a theology that is biblical, catholic, and Reformed, she must do so in light of Christ’s promises. She must pursue Christian unity not only in light of the present teaching of the church, but in continuity with the unity that Christ has already blessed the church with. Only a theology that is both biblical and catholic can be unambiguously Reformed – and the character of Reformed theology is unmistakably both biblical and catholic.

The obvious problem with this argument is McGraw's arbitrary cut-off point. Did God stop giving teachers to the church at the end of the 17C? What about an 18C theologian like Jonathan Edwards? Or a 19C theologian like William Cunningham? What about 20-21C theologians like Geerhardus Vos, Benjamin Warfield, John Murray, Roger Nicole, or Paul Helm? What about Bible scholars like Bruce Waltke, D. A. Carson, Thomas Schreiner, John Currid, Gregory Beale, Frank Thielman, Peter O'Brien, and O. Palmer Robertson–to name a few?

Not to put too sharp a point on the question, but why does it not occur to McGraw that John Frame might be one of God's gifts to the church? One fulfillment of Christ's ongoing promise to the church?

For his part, Tom Chantry posted a running commentary on McGraw's review:

https://chantrynotes.wordpress.com/2015/01/12/confessionalism-or-biblicism/

Like McGraw, Chantry is another bubble boy catholic: 

Of all of Frame’s bizarre constructions, the one which seems to have gained favor among the confessional-revisionists of our circles is his claim to adopt an approach that is “something close to biblicism.” This sounds quite admirably sola-scripturish, but ultimately it amounts to readily discarding the confessional formulations of the church anytime that the Christian, alone with his Bible, arrives at a personal interpretation distinct from confessional orthodoxy.

You mean like John Calvin challenging the religious establishment of his own day? 

This is what confessionalism represents – the consensus of the church as opposed to the private interpretation of the individual.

What consensus of the church would that be, exactly? Let's take a satellite view of Chantry's position. Increasing close-ups. Protestants are a subset of professing Christians in general. Baptists are a subset of Protestants in general. Reformed Baptists are a subset of Baptists in general. Adherents of the LBCF are a subset of Reformed Baptists in general. There are, moreover, two theologically distinct editions of the LBCF. Some adhere to one, some to the other. 

So Chantry's appeal to the consensus of the church reduces to a subset of a subset of a subset of a subset of a subset of professing Christians. That's a pretty contracted definition of catholicity, if you ask me.  

As I read this I was struck by how small my approach to these verses has been. I turn to them when we need to appoint officers in the local church, and then I miss the rest of what Paul said. What does this have to do with confessionalism? After all, the guys who edited the Confession in 1677 weren’t my pastors! Paul, though, revealed a broad historical principle of Christ’s rule over His church. He gives officers to promote unity and commands us to hear them. Can we really imagine that Christ stopped doing this after the Apostles died and then resumed when He established my local assembly? 

And did Christ stop doing this after 1677? 

So Christ isn’t only giving gifts to the church in my lifetime; He has done so in every age. I shouldn’t have to just pick up my Bible and figure out what to think on my own, even if I’m a pastor. Instead, I have the benefit of the wisdom of the ages, particularly as it is collected in the consensus documents we call creeds and confessions.

But what is Chantry's frame of reference? Not the Schleitheim Confession. Not the Thirty-Nine Articles. Not the Articles of Remonstrance. Not the Formula of Concord. Not the Lausanne Covenant. Certainly not the Council of Trent or Vatican II. 

So Chantry deceives himself if he imagines that he begins with the "wisdom of the ages" or "consensus documents." For Chantry, resorting to his private interpretation Scripture, has preemptively discounted nearly all the candidates. 

Here is a line of reasoning which demands careful thought.  If there is to be such a thing as Reformed Catholicity, we will need to move beyond personal interpretations. I know this argument won’t be convincing to everyone. For some it is new and disturbing, being at odds with the Bible-study hermeneutic of our age. Others may be motivated to abandon confessionalism for other reasons. It is, however, a cogent argument, and one which ought to be considered carefully.For those (like myself) who need to have these things spelled out, here is my own simplistic outline: 

1. 1. Christ is the Head of the Church. (Ephesians 1:20-23; Colossians 1:18)
2. Christ gave us the Bible so that we might have the truth. (Hebrews 1:1-2)
3. Christ sent us the Holy Spirit so that we might understand the truth. (John 14:26)
4. Christ appointed officers over the church so that we might understand the truth together, thus having unity. (Ephesians 4:11-16)
5. He has done this through every age, which is why – in spite of a history of apostasy and heresy – there is such a thing as a catholic (from the whole church) faith.
6. That unity has taken expression in consensus summaries of Christ’s teaching which we call creeds and confessions. These are not infallible Scripture, but are nevertheless true representations of the unity of Christ’s people.
7. If we wish to maintain that unity, we ought to give precedence to the arguments of those consensus documents – not receiving them as inspired, but searching the Scriptures to see whether these things are so, hearing with humility and grace, not a proud supposition that our own interpretations must be superior.
8. If we do this, we will be slow to reject the teaching found in our Confession, but will seek to be instructed by the pastors and teachers Christ has given the church.
9. If we wished to destroy the unity of the church, the best approach would be to reject the consensus teachings out of hand in favor of our own personal interpretations of Scripture, only aligning with confessions where they happen to align with us.
10. This is precisely what the modern church has too often done, even in its evangelical manifestations. It is also the increasingly obvious practice of the non-confessional, non-subscriptionist forces both in Presbyterianism and among Reformed Baptists.

Does that successfully "move beyond personal interpretations"? Notice how oblivious he is to his own methodology. He begins by attempting to prooftext his position from Scripture. But isn't that, in itself, an exercise in personal interpretation? He then applies his own interpretation to the case in hand. Once again, isn't that an exercise in private judgment? He's blind to his own blinders. 

Why does he align himself with the LBCF rather than a creed from a competing theological tradition? Isn't it obvious that he's aligning with a confession where it happens to align with him? He's not giving precedence to the creeds of rival theological traditions. 

And is it just a coincidence that he's the son of a Reformed Baptist pastor? His theological journey is a round trip inside the theological enclosure of his dad's backyard. Chantry ends exactly where he began. Wonder how that happened. 

Read any good books, lately?-1

Half the time spent on study lies in finding out who's worth reading, and the other half in reading him. This reading list consists of a number of entry-level works, along with some intermediate and advanced works. Most selections fall within the Reformed or Evangelical ambit. I'd like to thank John Frame, Randy Broberg, and Daniel Wright for some helpful input.

I. Periodicals
Banner of Truth
Bibliotheca Sacra
Books & Culture
Bulletin for Biblical Research
Calvin Theological Journal
Chalcedon Report
Christian Renewal
Christian Scholar's Review
Christianity Today
Churchman
Credenda Agenda
Crux
Evangelical Quarterly
Faith & Philosophy
First Things
Founders Journal
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society
Mid-America Journal of Theology
Modern Reformation
New Horizons
New Southern Presbyterian Review
Philosophia Christi
Presbyterian Reformed Magazine
Presbyterion
Protestant Reformed Theological Journal
Southern Baptist Journal of Theology
Themelios
Trinity Journal
Tyndale Bulletin
Westminster Theological Journal
World Magazine

II. Worldview 101

_Jordan, J. Through New Eyes (Wolgemuth, 1988). Quirky and iconoclastic.
_Kuyper, A. Lectures on Calvinism (Eerdmans 1983). Seminal, programmatic.
_Nash, R. The Meaning of History (Broadman 1999). Popular.
_____, Worldviews in Conflict (Zondervan 1992). Popular.
_Rea, M. World Without Design (Clarendon 2002). Exposition and exposé of naturalism.
_Schilder, K., Christ and Culture (Winnipeg: Premier, 1977).
_Schlossberg, H., Idols for Destruction (Regnery, 1990)
_Seerveld, C., A Christian Critique of Art and Literature (Toronto: AACS, 1964)
_Van Til, H. The Calvinistic Concept of Culture (Baker, 1959
_Young, W. Toward a Reformed Philosophy (Piet Hein 1952). Kuperian.

III. Philosophy of Religion

_Davies, B. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford 2004).
_Lewis, H. Philosophy of Religion (London 1969). Popular. Excellent breadth.
_Quinn, P & Taliaferro, C. Companion to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford 1997)
_Stump E. & Murray, M. Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (Oxford 1999).
_Taliaferro, C. Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (Oxford 1998)

IV. God 101

_Frame, J. Doctrine of God (P&R 2002). Best work of its kind. Supersedes Bavinck. Philosophical and exegetical. I demur from his model of divine immanence (in relation to time and space).
_Helm, P. Eternal God (Oxford 1988). Collection of occasional pieces defending God's timeless eternality. Needs updating.
_Leftow, Divine Ideas (Cornell, forthcoming)
_____, Divine Simplicity (Cornell, forthcoming)
_Miller, B. A Most Unlikely God (Notre Dame 1996). Defense of divine simplicity.
_Morris, T. Our Idea of God (IVP 1991). Good orientation to philosophical theology. More speculative than Scriptural.
_Richards, J. The Untamed God (IVP 2003). Better at asking questions than answering them.
_Rogers, K. Perfect Being Theology (Edinburgh 2000). Good introduction to this tradition. Shares its strong and weak points.
_Ware, B. God's Lesser Glory (Crossway 2000). Critique of open theism.
_Wierenga, E. The Nature of God (Cornell 1989). Study of classical theism. Philosophical theology.
_Warfield, B. "The Biblical Doctrine of the Trinity," Works, vol 2.
_Young, E. The Way Everlasting. Study of Ps 139 (Banner of Truth 1997).

V. Theology 101

_Adams, R. The Virtue of Faith (Oxford 1987).
_Barth, K. Protestant Theology in the Nineteeth Century (London 1972). Barth is a 20C liberal critic of 19C liberal theology.
_____, Protestant Thought: From Rosseau to Ritschl (Harper & Row, 1959)
_____, The Theology of John Calvin (Eerdmans, 1995). Fine exposition.
_Bavinck, H. Reformed Dogmatics (in process of translation). Strong on historical theology, weak on exegetical theology.
_Calvin, J. Institutes (Westminster 1977). By turns pastoral, polemical, and systematic.
_Cooper, J. Body, Soul & Life Everlasting (Eerdmans 2000). Standard defense of mind/body dualism
_Cunningham, W. Historical Theology (Banner of Truth 1969). Uses historical theology to do polemical theology. A very exacting thinker.
_Edwards. J. The Works of Jonathan Edwards (Banner of Truth 1984). Edwards was a very versatile theologian.
_____, Treatise on the Trinity (Clarke & Co., 1971), P. Helm, ed.
_Elliot, M. The Surviors of Israel (Eerdmans 2000). Learned critique of the new perspective on Paul.
_Engle, P. ed. Understanding Four Views on Baptism (2007).
_Ferguson, S. John Owen on the Christian Life (Banner of Truth 1987). Introduction to Owen's prolific opus.
_Helm, P. John Calvin's Ideas (Oxford 2004)
_____, The Providence of God (IVP 1994)). Reformed. Strong on philosophical theology, weak on exegetical theology. Good complement to Warfield.
_Hoeksema, H. Reformed Dogmatics (RFPC 1985)). A bit reactionary, but a useful counterbalance.
_Miller, B. The Fulness of Being (Notre Dame 2002).
_Muller, R. Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics. Definitive exposition, but weaker on analytical side than Cunningham.
_Murray, J. Collected Writings of John Murray (Banner of Truth 1973-82). Murray's main contribution was to put Reformed theology on a firmer exegetical footing. Generally successful although Murray is prey to occasional word-study fallacies.
_Nicole, R. Standing Forth (Christian Focus, 2002). Essays by an extremely erudite Reformed Baptist theologian.
_Owen, J. The Works of John Owen (Banner of Trust), Greatest Puritan theologian and English theologian. Discursive style, Latinate prose.
_Packer, J. Concise Theology (Tyndale 1993). Reformed Anglican. Best brief intro to Christian theology.
_Rainbow, J. The Will of God & the Cross (Pickwick 1990). Defense of Calvin on special redemption.
_Ridderbos, H. Paul: An Outline of His Theology (Eerdmans 1992). Standard exposition. Useful, but resorts too often to the already/not yet as a disguised description masquerading as a genuine explanation.
_Schreiner, T. New Testament Theology (2008). Reformed Baptist.
_Turretin, F. Institutes (P&R 1992-97). Exceptionally thorough defense of Reformed theology.
_Vallicella, W. A Paradigm Theory of Existence: Onto-Theology Vindicated (Kluwer 2002). Philosophical theology & metaphysics.
_Vos, G. Biblical Theology (Eerdmans 1959)). Seminal work in redemptive-historical theology.
_____, Redemptive History & Biblical Interpretation (P&R 1980). Essays & reviews.
_____, The Eschatology of the Old Testament (P&R 2001).
_Waltke, B. An Old Testament Theology (2007). Reformed. Touches of liberalism.
_Warfield, B. The Works of Benjamin Warfield (Baker, 2003). Warfield was a man of very versatile brilliance and erudition. His Persian flaw was theistic evolution.

VI. Salvation 101

_Beilby, J. & P. Eddy, eds. The Nature of the Atonement (2006).
_Berkouwer, G. Studies in Dogmatics: Faith & Justification (Eerdmans 1954).
_Coppes, L. Are Five Points Enough? (REF 1980) Reformed, Presbyterian. Breaks out of the 5-point cliché to offer a more well-rounded definition and exposition.
_Engelsma,D. Hyper-Calvinism & the Call of the Gospel (RFPA 1994)
_Frame, J. "Introduction to the Reformed Faith" (Thirdmill.org).
_Helm, P. Calvin & the Calvinists (Banner 1982)
_____, The Beginnings (Banner 1986)
_____, The Callings (Banner 1987)
_____, The Last Things (Banner 1989)
_Hoekema, H. Saved by Grace (Eerdmans/Paternoster 1989)
_Jeffery, S. et al. Pierced for Our Transgressions (2007)
_Jewett, R. Election and Predestination (Eerdmans 1985) .
_Murray, J. Redemption Accomplished and Applied (Eerdmans 1955)
_Nicole, R. Our Sovereign Saviour (Christian Focus 2002)
_Peterson A. & R. Williams, Why I am not an Arminian (IVP 2004)
_Piper, J. Counted Righteous in Christ (Crossway Book 2002).
_____, Let the Nations be Glad (Baker 1993).
_____, The Future of Justification (2007). A critique of N. T. Wrights new perspective on Paul.
_Schreiner, T. Paul: Apostle of God's Glory in Christ (IVP 2001)
_____, Still Sovereign (Baker 2000)
_Warfield, B. The Plan of Salvation (Eerdmans 1984)

VII. Jesus 101

1. Christology

_Berkouwer, G. The Work of Christ (Eerdmans 1965). Berkouwer began as a Calvinist, but took a hard left somewhere along the line. He is, as such, a very uneven author.
Bowman, R. & J. Komoszewski, Putting Jesus in His Place (2007).
_Bruce, F. Jesus: Lord & Savior (IVP 1986).
_Fee, G. Pauline Christology (Henrickson 2007).
_Harris, M. Jesus as God (Baker, 1992). Standard treatment.
_____, Three Crucial Questions About Jesus (Baker 1994)
_Hurtado, L. At the Origins of Christian Worship (Eerdmans 2000)
_____, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Eerdmans, 2003).
_Machen, J. The Virgin Birth of Christ (Baker 1977). Definitive.
_Morris, L. Jesus is the Christ (Eerdmans/IVP 1989)
_Reymond, R. Jesus, Divine Messiah (P&R 1990)
_Vos, G. The Self-Disclosure of Jesus (Eerdmans 1954). Less breadth, more depth, than Warfield.
_Warfield, B. The Lord of Glory (Guardian Press 1907). Definitive overview.
_____, "Christology & Criticism," Works, vol. 3.

2. Messianic Judaism

_Alexander, T. The Servant King (Regent College 2003).
_Brown, M. Answering Jewish Objections to Jesus (Baker 2000-). By a Messianic Jew.
_Clowney, E. The Unfolding Mystery (NavPress 1988). Popular.
_Evans, C & D. Hagner. Anti-Semitism & the Early Church (Fortress 1993).
_France, R. Jesus & the Old Testament (Tyndale, 1971). Standard work on typology.
_Goldberg, L. (ed.), How Jewish is Christianity? (Zondervan 2003)
_Hagner, D. Jewish Reclamation of Jesus (Academie Books 1984)
_Hess, R. et al., eds. Israel's Messiah in the Bible and the Dead Sea Scrolls (Baker, 2003).
_Hurtado, L. One God, One Lord (Fortress 1998)
_Kaiser, W. The Messiah in the Old Testament (Zondervan 1995). Useful for prooftexting.
_Longman/Grove. Immanuel in our Place (P&R 2001)
_Motyer, J. "Messiah," The Illustrated Bible Dictionary, 2:987-95. Better methodology than Kaiser. Thematic progression.
_Poythress, V. The Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses (Wolgemuth 1991). Klinean and theonomic by turns.
_Robertson, O. The Christ of the Prophets (P&R 2004).
_Sailhammer, J. The Pentateuch as Narrative (Zondervan 1992). Thematic progression.
_Satterthwaite, P. et al., eds. The Lord's Anointed: Interpretation of Old Testament Messianic Texts (Baker & Paternoster, 1995).
_Snow, E. A Zeal for God (iUnivese, Inc. 2005).

3. Quest for the Historical Christ

_Barnett, P. Jesus and the Logic of History (Eerdmans 1997)
_____, Jesus & the Rise of Early Christianity (IVP 1999).
__Bauckham, R. Jesus and the Eyewitnesses (Eerdmans 2006).
_Blomberg, C. Jesus and the Gospels (Broadman 1997)
_Bock, D. Breaking the Da Vinci Code (Thomas Nelson, 2004)
_____, Jesus According to Scripture (Baker 2002)
_____, Studying the Historical Jesus (Baker, 2002)
_____, The Missing Gospels (Nelson 2006).
_Bock, D. & D. Wallace, Dethroning Jesus (2007).
_Bockmuehl, M. This Jesus: Martyr, Lord, Messiah (IVP 1994).
_Borg, M. & N. Wright. The Meaning of Jesus (HarperSanFrancisco 1998). Debate between a moderate and a liberal.
_Bruce, F. Jesus & Christian Origins Outside the New Testament (Eerdmans 1974).
_ Catchpole, D. The Trial of Jesus; A Study in the Gospels and Jewish Historiography from 1770 to the Present Day (Brill 1971).
_Chilton B. & C. Evans, eds. Authenticating the Activities of Jesus (Brill 1998).
_____, Authenticating the Words of Jesus (Brill 1998).
_____, Studying the Historical Jesus (Brill 1994).
_Copan, P & R. Tacelli, eds. Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment? (IVP 2000).
_Davis, S. Risen Indeed (Eerdmans, 1993). Supports postmortem evangelism. Otherwise, a fine treatment.
_Evans, C. Fabricating Jesus: How Modern Scholars Distort the Gospels (IVP 2006).
_____, Jesus & His Contemporaries (Leiden: Brill, 1995)
_Guthrie, D. A Shorter Life of Christ (Academie Books 1970).
_ Habermas, G. & M. Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (Kregel 2004).
_Harrison, E. A Short Life of Christ (Eerdmans, 1968)
_Johnson, L. The Real Jesus : The Misguided Quest for the Historical Jesus and the Truth (Harper SanFrancisco1997). Roman Catholic.
_Komoszwski, J, M. Sawyer, & D. Wallace. Reinventing Jesus (Kregel 2006).
_Ladd, G. I Believe in the Resurrection of Jesus (Eerdmans 1975)
_Longenecker, R. Life in the Face of Death (Eerdmans, 1998)
_Moore, P. (ed.), Can A Bishop Be Wrong? The Scholars Challenge John Shelby Spong (Moorehouse, 1998). Evangelical Anglican.
_Porter, S. The Criteria for Authenticity in Historical-Jesus Research (Sheffield 2000).
_Quarles, C. ed. Buried Hope or Risen Savior? (2008).
_Schlatter, A. The History of the Christ (Baker, 1997). Moderate-conservative Lutheran.
_Stein, R. Jesus the Messiah (IVP 1996)
_Stonehouse, N. The Witness of the Synoptic Gospels to Christ (Baker 1979).
_Strimple, R. The Modern Search for the Real Jesus (P&R 1995).
_Strobel, L., ed. The Case for Christ (Zondervan 1998).
_Swinburne, R. The Resurrection of God Incarnate (Oxford 2003).
_Twelftree, G. Jesus the Exorcist (Hendrickson, 1993). Standard work.
_____, Jesus the Miracle Worker (IVP, 1999). Standard work.
_Warfield, B. "The Historical Christ," Christology & Criticism, Works, vol. 3.
_Wenham, D. Paul: Follower of Jesus or Founder of Christianity? (Eerdmans 1995)
_Wilkins/Moreland (eds.). Jesus Under Fire (Zondervan 1995). Reply to Jesus Seminar.
_Witherington, B. The Jesus Quest: The Third Search for the Jew of Nazareth (IVP 1997)
_Wright, N. The Challenge of Jesus: Rediscovering Who Jesus Was and Is (IVP 1999)
_____, The Contemporary Quest for Jesus (Augsburg/Fortress 2002)
_____, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Fortress 2003). Definitive.
_____, Who Was Jesus? (Eerdmans 1993). Lethal book reviews of liberal writers.

VIII. Apologetics 101

_Adams, R. Leibniz (Oxford 1994). Parts are greater than the whole. Although he was no paragon of Evangelical orthodoxy, one can glean some apologetic fodder from the chaff.
_Alston, W. A Sensible Metaphysical Realism (Marquette U 2001).
_Anderson, J. Paradox in Christian Theology (2007). Van Tilian.
_Beauregard, M. & D. O'Leary, The Spiritual Brain (2007). A defense of dualism. Soft on religious pluralism.
_ Beckwith, F. David Hume’s Argument Against Miracles (U Press of America 1989).
_____, Beckwith, F. et al., eds. To Everyone an Answer: A Case for the Christian World View (IVP 2004).
_Berkeley, G. Three Dialogues Between Hylas & Philonous, R. Adams, ed. (Hackett, 1988). Although theistic idealism represents an unorthodox extreme, Berkeley is an acute critic of radical empiricism.
_Boa, K., & Bowman, R. 20 Compelling Evidences That God Exists. Popular.
(Tulsa: River Oak, 2002).
_____, Faith Has Its Reasons (NavPress, 2001. Comparative metapologetics. Gives equal time to Reformed apologetics. Better at exposition than synthesis.
_Boethius, Consolations of Philosophy (Bobbs-Merrill 1962). Classic exposition of Christian platonism.
_Brown, C. Miracles & the Critical Mind (Word 1984)
_Bruce, F. The Defense of the Gospel in the New Testament (Eerdmans 1977). Exegetical study of NT apologetics.
_Byl, J. The Divine Challenge (Banner of Truth 2004).
_Campbell-Jack, C. & G. McGrath, eds. New Dictionary of Christian Apologetics (IVP 2006).
_Carson, D. How Long, O Lord? A pastoral, Bible-based approach to the problem of
Evil (Baker 2006).
_____. The Gagging of God. Critique of post-modernism (Zondervan 1996).
_Clark, G. A Christian View of Men and Things (Baker 1981). Better at tearing down than building up.
_Coady, C. Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford 1994).
_Cooper, J. Body, Soul, & Life Everlasting (Regent College 1995)
_Copan, P. & P. Moser, eds. The Rationality of Theism (Routledge 2003).
_Corduin. W. No Doubt about it (Broadman 1997). Eclectic, good anecdotes.
_Craig. W. Reasonable Faith (Crossway Books 1994). Electic, erudite.
_Davis, R. The Metaphysics of Theism & Modality (Peter Lang 2001)
_Dembski,W. Unapologetic Apologetics (IVP 2001). Useful reflections, but too much time on opening moves and too little on checkmate.
_Dulles, A. A History of Apologetics (Wipf & Stock 1999). Catholic.
_Earman, J. Hume’s Abject Failure (Oxford 2000).
_Fischer, J. The Metaphysics of Free Will (Blackwell 1997). Philosophical defense of compatibilism.
_Fischer, D. Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (Harper & Row 1970).
_Fischer, J. et al. Four Views on Free Will (2007).
_Foster, J. The Immaterial Self (Routledge 1996). Defense of Cartesian dualism.
_Frame, J. Apologetics to the Glory of God (P&R 1994). A model of how to do apologetics. His Reformed theology and perspectivalism supply a unifying principle.
_Fudge, W. & R. Peterson, Two Views of Hell (IVP 2000). Although Peterson has the better of the argument, and even stronger case could be made for the traditional position.
_Gerstner. J. Theology in Dialogue (Soli Del Gloria). Reformed theology, eclectic methodology.
_Goodman, F. How About Demons? (Indiana, 1988). Based on field studies of possession.
_Guinness, O. Long Journey Home (Waterbrook 2001). An exercise in biographical apologetics.
_Gundry, S. (ed.). Show Them No Mercy (Zondervan 2003). Four views on the judicial execution of the Canaanites.
_Habermas, G. & Moreland, J., Beyond Death (Crossway Books 1998). Good defense of dualism, but overly indebted to Aristotelian realism.
_Johnston, P. Shades of Sheol. Death and Afterlife in the Old Testament (IVP, 2002).
_Kane, R. ed. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford 2002).
_Keller, T. The Reason for God (2008). Popular. Reformed. Supports theistic evolution.
_Lewis, C. Screwtape Letters. Insightful satire on the stereotypical strategies deployed by the Enemy.
_Lewis, H. The Elusive Mind (Allen & Unwin, 1969). Standard defense of dualism.
_Machen, J. Christianity & Liberalism (Eerdmans 1983). Classic attack on liberal theology. Although the names have changed, the moves remain the same.
_Martin, G. Does it Matter?: The Unsustainable World of the Materialists (Floris Books 2005).
_Miller, B. From Existence To God (Notre Dame 1992).
_Montgomery, J. W. Tractatus Logico-Theologicus (Bonn 2003).
_Moreland, J. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (IVP 2003). Encyclopedic and eclectic. Well worth reading, but beware of attachment to presentism, Molinism, scientific realism, and Aristotelian realism.
_____, Scaling the Secular City (Baker 1989). Eclectic.
_Morgan. C. & Peterson R. Hell Under Fire (Zondervan 2004).
_Mozley, J. On Miracles (Longmans 1902). Classic Victorian defense.
_Murray, M. (ed). Reason For the Hope Within (Eerdmans, 1999). Uneven.
_Nash. R. Faith & Reason (Academie 1988). Popular, eclectic, Clarkian.
_____, Is Jesus the Only Savior? (Zondervan 1984). Reformed.
_____, The Gospel & the Greeks (P&R 2003).
_Newman, J. Grammar of Assent (Doubleday, 1955). Exposition of what would today be called tacit knowledge.
_Pascal, B. Pensees (Random House, 1941). Existential emphasis by an Augustinian Catholic and polymath. Very influential. His appeal crosses the theological spectrum.
_Peterson, M. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell, 2004)
_Plantinga, A. Analytical Theist (Eerdmans 1998). Classic essays by the leading Christian philosopher of the day.
_____, God & Other Minds (Cornell, 1967). Critique of Hume & Kant.
_____, Warrant & Proper Function (Oxford, 1993). Critique of evolutionary epistemology.
_____, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford 2000). Magnum opus. Plantinga's strength comes from his Dutch-Reformed background; his weakness from his departures.
_Pruss, A. The Existence of God (Ashgate 2003).
_Reppert, V. C. S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason (IVP 2003).
_Samples, K. Without a Doubt (Baker 2004).
_Schleisinger, G. New Perspectives on Old-Time Religion (Oxford 1988).
_Smart, J. & J. Haldane. Atheism & Theism (Blackwell 2003). Stimulating debate between an analytical Thomist and a Quinean atheist.
_Sudduth, M. A Reformed Objection to Natural Theology (Cornell, forthcoming). Actually, a critique of the Neo-Dutch Reformed objection to natural theology by a Reformed Baptist.
_Van Inwagen, P. The Problem of Evil (Oxford 2006).
_Van Til, C. Christianity & Barthianism (P&R 1962). How you react to this book says as much about your own theology as it does about Barth and Van Til's. If you're expecting an exposition, you may not recognize Barth. Van Til's method is to judge a position, by merely by what it says, but what it implies.
_____, Why I Believe in God. Popular, semi-autobiographical.
_Wilson, D. Letter from a Christian Citizen (American Vision 2007).
_Yandell, K. Philosophy of Religion (Routledge 1999). Useful for its coverage of Oriental philosophy.

IX. Science 101

1. Philosophy of Science

_Dooyeweerd, H. The Secularization of Science (CSC, 1954).
_Hapgood, C. Maps of the Ancient Sea Kings (Adventures Unlimited Press 1996).
_____, Path of the Pole (Adventures Unlimited Press 1999). First edition had a forward by Albert Einstein, no less!
_Janet, P. Final Causes (Scriber 1892).
_Kuhn. T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1970). Made a big splash, with continuing ripples. The point of reference for antirealism.
_Laudan, L. Progress and Its Problems (Berkeley 1977).
_, Le Poidevin, R. The Images of Time (2007). Defends the B-theory of time.
___, Travels in Four Dimensions (2003). Defends the B-theory of time.
_Moreland, J. Christianity & the Nature of Science (Baker, 1989). Critical realism.
_Newton-Smith, W, ed. A Companion to the Philosophy of Science (Blackwell 2001).
_Oaklander, L. The Ontology of Time (2004). Defends the B-theory of time.
_Ratzsch, D., Nature, Design, and Science (SUNY 2001).
_____, Science & Its Limits (IVP 2000). Nuanced exposition and analysis.
_Van Fraassen, B. The Scientific Image (Oxford 1980)
_____, Laws & Symmetry (Oxford 1989)
_____, The Empirical Stance (2004). By an astute antirealist. Interesting interaction with religion, but weak on sola scriptura.

2. Creation/Evolution

_Barr, S. Modern Physics and Ancient Faith (Notre Dame 2003). A traditional Jewish perspective.
_Behe, M. Darwin's Black Box (Free Press 1996). Intelligent Design theory. Very influential. Unanswered by the other side.
_____, The Edge of Evolution (Free Press 2007).
_ Brown, M. The Darwin Wars (Simon & Schuster 2001).
_Brown, W. In the Beginning (2001). Young earth creationism.
_Byl, J. God & Cosmos (Banner of Truth 2001). Young earth creationism.
_Copan, P. & W. Craig. Creation Out of Nothing (Baker 2004).
_Dembski, W. Intelligent Design (IVP 1999). Popularization of his doctoral thesis.
_____, No Free Lunch (Rowman & Littlefield 2002). Intelligent design.
_Dembski, W. & J. Wells, The Design of Life (2008). The best current critique of macroevolution.
_Denton, M. Evolution: A Theory in Crisis (Burnett, 1985). Biochemical critic of evolution from a (then) secular scientist.
_____, Nature's Destiny (Free Press, 1998).
_Gee, H. In Search of Deep Time (Cornell 2001).
_Gentry, R. Creation's Tiny Mystery (Knoxville, 1986). Young earth creationism.
_Green, J. Debating Darwin (Regina Booksk 1999).
_____, The Death of Adam: Evolution and Its Impact on Western Thought (Iowa State 1973).
_Hoyle, F. Mathematics of Evolution (Acorn Enterprises (1999).
_McGrath, A. The Dawkins Delusion?: Atheist Fundamentalism and the Denial of the Divine (IVP 2007).
_Menuge, A. Agents Under Fire (Rowman & Littlefield 2004).
_Midgley, M. Evolution as a Religion (Routledge 2006).
_Milton, R. Shattering the Myths of Darwinism (Park Street Press 1997).
_ Morris, R. The Evolutionists (Henry Holt & Co. 2001).
_Poythress, V. Redeeming Science (Crossway 2006).
_Ratzsch, D. The Battle of Beginnings (IVP 1996). Tries to clear away straw man arguments on both sides of creation/evolution debate. Somewhat overtaken by intelligent design debate.
_Ruse, M. The Evolution Wars (Rutgers 2002).
_Sanford, J. Genetic Entropy & The Mystery of the Genome (Elim Press 2005).
_Sarfati, J. Refuting Evolution 2 (Master Books 2003).
_Sermonti, G. Why is a Fly Not a Horse ? (Discovery Institute 2005).
_ Sterelny, K. Dawkins vs. Gould (Totem Books 2001).
_Smolin, L. The Trouble With Physics: The Rise of String Theory, the Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next (Houghton Mifflin ).
_Spetner, L. Not By Chance! (Judaica Press 1998).
_ Stove, D. Darwinian Fairytales: Selfish Genes, Errors of Heredity, & Other Fables of Evolution (Encounter Books 1995).
_Wells, J. Icons of Evolution (Regnery 2002). Exposé of doctored evidence.
_____, The Politically Incorrect Guide to Darwinism and Intelligent Design. (Regnery Publishing 2006)
_Wise, K. Faith, Form, and Time (Broadman 2002). By the golden boy of contemporary creationism.
_Woit, P. Not Even Wrong: The Failure of String Theory & the Continuing Challenge to Unify the Laws of Physics (Jonathan Cape 2006).
_Woodmorappe, J. Noah's Ark (ICR 1996). Defends the feasibility of the flood account against scientific and commonsense objections.
_Young, E. In the Beginning (Banner of Truth 1976). Popular exposition by a top scholar—with an eye on science.