Undercover journalism

I'm going to give a fuller answer to a question I was asked:

Bill Valicella has elsewhere brought up the point that liberals have no compunction about playing politics dirty. They lie, they misrepresent, they bully, and they try to shut down any view that doesn't comport with theirs. They cheat, in other words. He thinks that if conservatives don't follow suit, they will be buried; what do you think?

i) Christians can't merely respond in kind. We can't simply take our tactics from unbelievers, then do the same thing in reverse.

We must have our own standards. The problem is when some believers frame Christian ethics as an otherworldly ideal that can't offer concrete, constructive guidance or solutions in a fallen, real-world situation.

There's the question of what Christian ethics prescribes, proscribes, or permits. That's what I've been exploring.

ii) Undercover journalism is a good illustration. And I think Lila Rose and James O’Keefe are fine examples. For instance:

http://www.nationalreview.com/node/261860/print

http://www.nationalreview.com/node/409178/print

My point is not to issue them a blank check, but to commend the kinds of things they investigate. 

Undercover journalists misrepresent their background or true intentions. Is that unethical? Depends.

a) Is this information that can only be obtained by subterfuge? 

b) Is this information which the public is entitled to have? 

Offhand, I'd say those are two necessary conditions which jointly constituted a sufficient condition. Mind you, I'm not attempting to provide an exhaustive set of criteria. There may be exceptions or other criteria.

iii) Some ethicists treat undercover journalism is a last resort. But that's ambiguous. It's not like you can go to the same shady outfit twice, where the first time you are upfront about your intentions, then failing that, you return with the same questions, only this time you resort to subterfuge. 

You won't have that fallback, because you blew your cover the first time. The shady outfit will be on guard the next time around. So you only get one shot. Better aim well to make it hit the mark. 

iv) Among other things, the ethics of undercover journalism involves the question of reasonable expectations. I just did a general post on that subject:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2015/04/reasonable-expectations.html

Is there a reasonable expectation that the people who question you don't have a hidden agenda? In some cases, yes. For instance, in Beltway journalism you have a cozy relationship involving bureaucrats who leak information to trusted reporters at the Washington Post or NYT. 

This has less to do with the ethics of journalism than the pragmatics of journalism. If a reporter had a reputation for burning anonymous sources, all his sources would dry up overnight. So he must protect the confidentiality of his informations to have informants.

v) However, undercover journalism is known to exist. So there's no automatic presumption that you might not be the target of a journalist who misrepresents his background or intentions. 

vi) Likewise, undercover journalists "trick" the respondent into telling the truth. The respondent thinks that he has a sympathetic audience. It's safe to drop guard down and say what his outfit really does.

But as a rule, you aren't wronging someone by getting them to tell the truth. There's a prima facie duty to tell the truth, absent countervailing duties.

In addition, this is getting them to tell the truth about wrongdoing committed at or by their establishment. It isn't wrong to expose wrongdoing or wrongdoers.

And this isn't confined to interviewing participants. It may involve observing misconduct, by taking a job at the establishment. Infiltrating the organization to become an eyewitness. 

Let's give some examples of undercover journalism: the Walter Reed scandal, elder abuse in nursing homes. Patient abuse at psychiatric facilities. Voter fraud. Medicaid fraud. Welfare queens. The refusal of Planned Parenthood to report statutory rape. The seduction of minors by homosexual predators. Child prostitution. Redating expired meat. Lax airport security. Police corruption. 

These are things which gov't ought to investigate and prosecute, but is frequently negligent because gov't is itself complicit in wrongdoing. 

Reasonable expectations

I'm going to discuss an aspect of deception that I haven't seen discussed in the literature on Christian ethics. Of course, it's quite possible that that's been discussed before, and I just missed it.

i) Deception involves two parties. It often involves the deceiver and the deceived.

There is, however, the phenomenon of self-deception. People can be deceived even when there was no intention to deceive. They misperceive, misremember, or misinterpret what they saw, hear, or read. 

ii) In American law, there's the "reasonable expectation of privacy." That's based on fourth amendment protections. It involves a distinction between public and private space, or public and private communications. For instance, there's a reasonable expectation of privacy in your home, but not in a public park.

Likewise, it's illegal for the police to intercept email, text messages, or cellphone conversations without a warrant. On the other hand, a public or private employee using a gov't computer or company computer doesn't enjoy the same expectation of privacy. 

I'm not a lawyer, so I merely mention this to illustrate a principle. 

iii) This principle has an analogue in the ethics of deception. Is the onus on the speaker or the listener? That depends, in part, on whether there's a reasonable expectation that the speaker's statements will be truthful. Let's take a few examples:

a) TSA agents who ask passengers if they are smuggling a bomb onboard in their luggage. But if a terrorist did have a bomb in his luggage, he'd deny it. 

b) During the Cold War, American employees often had to take loyalty oaths. If, however, you were a KGB spy, you would have no hesitation about taking the oath to maintain your cover.

c) Some jobs involve a security clearance or criminal background check. As such, the application will ask prying questions. But surely there's no presumption that an applicant will truthfully answer self-incriminating questions. 

Now I'm not assessing the moral issue of what you should say in those situations. Right now I'm discussing a separate issue.

Is there a reasonable expectation that if you put people in those situations, they will give honest answers? Clearly not. You'd have to be gullible to believe their answers.

That doesn't mean all or most of them will lie. Rather, only those who have something to hide, something to lose by telling the truth, will be motivated to lie. The point, though, is that the questions themselves fail to sort out who's who. 

There's no presumption that people will give credible answers to questions like that. Indeed, the very people whom the questions are intended to root out will give false or evasive answers. 

To that extent, if you are deceived, that's because you allowed yourself to be deceived. Your credulity left you wide open to deception. It's not so much the deceiver who deceived you, but your willingness to be duped. 

It is foolish to ask certain questions in the first place. Questions like that are not a reliable way to gain information. 

iv) In addition to these special situations, there's no general expectation that you will never be lied to. In a fallen world, some people are chronic liars. Likewise, I suspect most people lie some of the time. Therefore, you have to be on your guard.

This includes high-minded Christians who think it's always wrong to lie. And they take that position as a matter of principle. Some of them have never lied, never will, and never would.

There are, however, some Christians who sincerely take that position, they genuinely mean it at the time they say it, but they only maintain that position because they never found themselves in a situation where the stakes were high enough to reconsider their position. It was something they believed in the abstract. 

Again, my immediate point is not to assess whether this is right or wrong, but whether there's a reasonable expectation that you won't be lied to. You'd have to be naive to think that when you put people to the test, in situations that generate moral dilemmas involving the welfare of loved ones, that you will get truthful answers if those answers conflict with the best interests of their loved ones.

If you take their answers at face value, you were deceived, not so much because they tried to deceive you, but because you had an unreasonable expectation. There's an onus on you not to play the chump. 

v) On a related issue, the ethics of deception is typically framed in terms of the deceiver wronging the deceived. But sometimes it's the deceived, or self-deceived, who wrong the deceiver. By that I mean, it can be wrong to ask questions that put people on the spot. That force them into a moral dilemma. Where there is no good answer.

By "moral dilemma," I don't mean a choice between two wrong actions, but a choice between conflicting prima facie duties. 

a) For instance, suppose a married couple attended the same high school at the same time. Knew all the same classmates.

Suppose the wife asks her husband who he thinks was the prettiest girl in school. Or asks him what he thought of this or that female classmate.

If he gives an honest answer, it may make her resentful or jealous. So don't ask questions like that if you don't want to hear the answer. Don't pose a question where you will resent any reply, whether it's a truthful answer or a diplomatic lie. That's unfair to the respondent. You're putting the respondent in an awkward position where anything he says may get him into trouble through no fault of his own. 

b) I once lived in a house where the next-door-neighbor had a barking dog. A dog that would bark day and night. Finally, another neighbor called animal control. The dog was removed. The neighbor was fined.

Well, the dog-owner went around the neighborhood, knocking on doors, asking who reported the dog. It's a stupid question, since obviously the person who called the animal cops is unlikely to fess up. She had no right to ask that question in the first place.

The neighbor who called animal control was within his (or her) rights to do so. It's not incumbent on the neighbor to defend his actions in that regard. He doesn't owe the irresponsible dog-owner an explanation or justification.

And since he doesn't want the dog-owner to make trouble for him or his family, it's unlikely that he will admit to doing it. When you ask a question like that, under those circumstances,  it's an invitation to be lied to. 

vi) The upshot is that when we evaluate the ethics of deception, we need to take into account whether there's a reasonable expectation that you won't be lied to (or the equivalent). The moral onus isn't invariably and primarily on the would-be deceiver, but sometimes on the would-be deceived. 

Of course, these distinctions are irrelevant to deontologists who think deception is intrinsically evil, but that's not the audience for this post. I'm not attempting to persuade them. 

God and complexity

http://whatswrongwiththeworld.net/2015/04/god_and_complexity.html

Olson on hyper-Calvinism

I will comment on this post:

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2015/04/why-hyper-calvinism-is-consistent-calvinism/

I know, I know. I will be accused of being “uncharitable” simply for deconstructing Calvinism.

I don't accuse him of being uncharitable. I accuse him of being a hack. 

Knowing full well that many Calvinists who visit my blog will wrongly take offense, I forge ahead anyway. 

I don't take offense at Olson's hatchet jobs. To the contrary, he invariably performs an unwitting service to the cause of Calvinism by illustrating the weakness of Arminian objections. 

There are many folks out there who are confused about Calvinism and have not considered it from every angle. Before they commit to it, they should consider it from every angle.

i) Not coincidentally, those are the folks who are predisposed to leave Calvinism for freewill theism. They never understood Calvinism in the first place.

ii) If you want to understand Calvinism, you need to begin with some good Reformed expositors. For instance:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2015/02/select-bibliography-on-reformed-theology.html

iii) After that, it's good to read the critics. 

Some years ago, in one particular episode of intra-Calvinist controversy over this issue, the Christian Reformed Church officially affirmed that the gospel message proclaimed to sinners, including the non-elect (!), is a “well meant offer” of God’s grace unto salvation. The denomination affirmed that even from God’s perspective it is a well meant offer to the non-elect. Most Calvinists agree with this; those that do not and therefore avoid indiscriminate evangelism rightly deserve the label “hyper-Calvinist.” The pastor-theologian at the center of that particular controversy was Herman Hoeksema…Hoeksema left the CRC over this issue, believing that the gospel message cannot be a well meant offer to the non-elect and that therefore indiscriminate evangelism should be avoided, and founded his own Reformed denomination.

i) If Olson were an honest critic, he'd engage the clarifications of David Engelsma in Hyper-Calvinism and the Call of the Gospel and Common Grace Revisited.

ii) Moreover, Olson oversimplifies the issues, and reflects ignorance over the breadth of the historical debate. For a corrective:

http://reformedpresbyterianveritasdocuments.blogspot.com/2009/01/free-offer-of-gospel-dr-william-young.html

http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2009/02/language-and-theology-of-free-offer.html

iii) On the Dutch-Reformed side, the debate was bound up with the theory of common grace. Hoeksema was reacting to Kuyper's formulation of common grace.

I think Hoeksema was wrong to reject common grace. However, that doesn't mean Kuyper's formulation is above criticism. There's arguably tension between Kuyperian common grace and the Kuyperian principle of antithesis. 

The non-elect have no real chance of being saved. God will not extend to them the “inward call” which is the basis for regeneration.

That's not what an evangelist is "offering." He's in no position to extend to them the inward call. He doesn't have the power to regenerate people. 

And we can easily construct a parallel argument for freewill theism. An Arminian evangelist can't make people accept the message. He can't make people believe the Gospel. He can only tell them what they ought to believe.

The results are out of his hands, whether you think divine agency is the decisive factor (Calvinism) or human freewill is the decisive factor (Arminianism).

The issue at the center of the hyper-Calvinism controversy is this: Is the “outward call”only, by itself, without the inward call, a well-meant offer to the non-elect? The answer should be obvious. And yet…non-hyper-Calvinists do not see the obvious. Only hyper-Calvinists see it.

i) Notice how often he uses adjectives ("obvious") as a substitute for arguments. He can't actually show how his conclusion is true. 

ii) Notice, too, how Olson's objection applies to anything whatsoever. Arminians fail to see the obvious problems with Arminianism. Only non-Arminians see it.

The objection is essentially circular, for you always have this insider/outsider dichotom between adherents and non-adherents, whatever the theological, philosophical, ideological position. In the nature of the case, insiders don't view their position the same way outsiders do. Otherwise, outsiders would become insiders and insiders would become outsiders. So Olson's objection is self-refuting. 

The argument that Calvinist belief in unconditional particular election of individuals to salvation leads inexorably, logically, to hyper-Calvinism (a la Hoeksema) should be transparent to any thinking person.

In that event, nothing should be simpler or easier than for Olson to explicate how he arrives at his conclusion. Give us a stepwise argument. 

Imagine any hypothetical but realistic scenario in which I “offer” a great gift to a group of people or an unknown individual indiscriminately all the while knowing that some of them are ineligible from the outset for the gift. There are only a hundred gifts but I offer it to a thousand people. Even if I somehow know that only a hundred will ask to receive the gift, my indiscriminate offer to the thousand cannot be called a well-meant offer. It was deceptive.

That's equivocal. You don't offer it to everyone. Rather, you offer it to everyone who will take it. That's easy to formulate:

If you repent of your sins and trust in Christ for salvation, God will save you. 

Here's a related treatment:

http://www.etsjets.org/files/JETS-PDFs/38/38-3/38-3-pp403-412_JETS.pdf

I suppose now that someone will argue that I have misrepresented hyper-Calvinism. It is an essentially contested concept; there is no “official” definition.

Actually, I think hyper-Calvinism should be retired from the theological lexicon. It's become an umbrella term to cover a number of disparate positions. And it's often defined by critics.

Demon-haunted world

One curious question is why the Synoptic Gospels have so much to say about demons, in contrast to the paucity of references in the OT, or the rest of the NT. 

The short answer is that we don't know the answer. We can only speculate.

i) I suppose the liberal explanation would be evolving belief in demons. However, that's implausible–even on liberal assumptions. Belief in evil spirits is very common in primitive societies. 

At best, what would evolve is an explanation for their existence. A backstory. An organizational chart. 

Moreover, the evolutionary explanation fails to explain the paucity of references outside the Synoptic Gospels. Take John's Gospel–or Acts. 

ii) There's a pattern. Demons are typically mentioned in reference to exorcism. Absent the context of possession and exorcism, there's little occasion, from the viewpoint of Bible writers, to mention demons. That's their basic selection-criterion. The existence and presence of demons is a topic that normally crops up in that particular context. 

iii) That's true in extrabiblical Jewish literature, viz. Tobit, Josephus (i.e. Eleazar), the Genesis Apocryphon, Qumran lit. (hymn 11Q5/11QPs-a). 

We also have the Jewish exorcists in Acts 19:13-19). That's an incidental witness to the practice. Luke happens to mention that only in connection with Paul's ministry. 

So belief in demonic activity was more widespread than the relative silence of Scripture would indicate. The fact that references concentrate in the Synoptic Gospels doesn't mean this is novel or exceptional in the general culture. 

iv) I doubt it's incidental that in all three Synoptic Gospels, Christ's encounter with Satan precedes accounts of exorcism. That's the first skirmish in an ongoing series of spiritual battles. Having lost the first round, Satan delegates subsequent engagements to his lieutenants, although he makes a strategic reappearance to recruit Judas.

v) The fallen angels were expelled from God's abode. Now God enters their abode. His presence behind enemy lines, in the person of the Incarnate Son, naturally draws them out of the shadows. He invades their sphere of influence. 

This, in turn, generates situations of mutual recognition. Both Jesus and demons are outwardly human. Both Jesus and demons can discern what lies within. Hidden divinity and hidden possession.

vi) Jesus had inherent authority to expel demons. And he authorized his disciples to expel demons. Due to his reputation as a powerful, successful exorcist, many people brought possessed friends or relatives to him (or people they deemed to be possessed), to be delivered. 

The reason the OT has so little to say about this may be because, as a rule, OT Jews had no special ability to recognize possession or expel demons. Possession isn't evident unless the demon chooses to manifest itself. 

Moreover, there's no presumption that Jews or Christians have specific authority to command demons. That doesn't mean Christians can't perform exorcisms. But there's no guarantee that their efforts will be successful. So we wouldn't expect the same emphasis outside the Gospels. 

vii) Likewise, the Gospel has a preemptive effect, by  suppressing the occurrence of possession. By driving the dark side back into the shadows. 

What do Christians really think about homosexuals?

http://www.monergism.com/blog/what-do-theologically-conservative-christians-really-think-about-people-same-sex-attraction

“Pope Francis” is Coming to Town

One of the challenges that we face in dealing with the papacy today is the aura of celebrity that accompanies modern popes in the era of mass media. “Pope Francis” may be diminished, but he’ll still get lots of media coverage.

That’s why it’s so important to help out here. When “Pope Francis” visits the US later this year, he’ll be greeted by some true brothers in the “city of brotherly love”, Philadelphia, who will be informing the awe-struck Roman Catholics there of the true nature of the papacy and what the Gospel really is.

Geoff Robinson is coordinating the activities, which he’s named “Operation St. Cyprian”. The idea, of course, is to promote a time in the church when claims of papal authority were rejected in the early church. Cyprian was a bishop of Carthage from 250-258 AD; he rejected the notion of a papacy, or a “bishop of bishops”, or compulsion by “tyrannical terror” (in this he accuses the bishop of the Rome at the time, “Pope Stephen”). This is from The Seventh Council of Carthage under Cyprian:

It remains, that upon this same matter each of us should bring forward what we think, judging no man, nor rejecting any one from the right of communion, if he should think differently from us. For neither does any of us set himself up as a bishop of bishops, nor by tyrannical terror does any compel his colleague to the necessity of obedience; since every bishop, according to the allowance of his liberty and power, has his own proper right of judgment, and can no more be judged by another than he himself can judge another. But let us all wait for the judgment of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the only one that has the power both of preferring us in the government of His Church, and of judging us in our conduct there.

Geoff has set up a “GoFundMe” site to help raise money for incidental expenses related to the event: http://www.gofundme.com/opstcyprian:

We will be stressing the sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice on the cross and the necessity of trusting Jesus alone to be declared righteous before God and to have peace between God and man.

We need to raise funds to cover miscellaneous expenses ranging from the printing of materials to share to t-shirts for our volunteers to fees and SEPTA tokens. We also want to provide some food and drink to our volunteers in their downtime so they can focus on sharing the gospel.

We are [also] attempting to establish a debate between a Roman Catholic and a Protestant apologist. The expenses, including airfare, of the two will need to be paid along with costs for the venue. Any funds above the $2500 will be used to establish a debate or an event to invite contacts to discuss matters pertaining to the gospel.

Any extra funds that are not spent will be given to one or more organizations that engage in evangelism, which will aid us in our efforts.

Let’s help take care of this request: http://www.gofundme.com/opstcyprian. Please donate if you can; if you can’t, please share this link on Twitter or Facebook or other places where you might share things.

If you can help, contact Geoff at: geoff.papaloutreach@gmail.com.

Smearing sexual orientation change

http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2015/04/smearing-sexual-orientation-change

Secular totalitarianism

Brown makes a number of good points in this article:

http://www.charismanews.com/opinion/in-the-line-of-fire/49140-president-obama-s-misguided-war-on-conversion-therapy

However, I'd like to make two additional, related points:

i) This reflects the totalitarian mindset of contemporary Democrats. It represents yet another attack on parental rights. It denies the right of parents to seek professional counseling for an adolescent child who isn't developing a natural, normal sexual psychological makeup. 

ii) But over and above that, it denies the right of adults to seek psychological counseling for their condition. Adult men and women are not permitted to decide for themselves if they need psychological counseling for this particular condition.

The secular totalitarian state reduces adults to the status of perpetual minors. Adult men and women are not allowed to make decisions for themselves. 

Is coercive interrogation ethical?

http://parablemania.ektopos.com/archives/2004/12/ethics_of_tortu.html#more

Counter-cheating

i) Is it cheating to cheat a cheater? Suppose I'm in a poker game. My opponent has bribed the dealer to stack the deck in his favor. If I cheat just enough to compensate for the cardsharp, is that dishonest? 

I'm not cheating to secure unfair advantage. To the contrary, I'm taking countermeasures to restore the balance. Make an unfair situation fair again. Call that counter-cheating, to rectify the disparity. 

Indeed, the very concept of cheating presumes a situation in which most folks play by the rules. If nobody plays by the rules, then there are no de facto rules.  

In fact, even if I cheated more than necessary, there's a sense in which my opponent would have it coming. Like double restitution for theft (cf. Exod 22; Lev 6). If a thief only has to repay what he stole, he has no incentive to refrain from stealing. He's only returning stolen property because he got caught on that occasion. Consider all the other times he got away with it. So unless there's an additional sanction to deter him, he has nothing to lose and everything to gain by continuing to steal.

ii) Many Christians avoid these dicey issues. They cast themselves as "absolutists." They think that simplifies matters. Just do the right thing and let God sort out the results. 

Now, I myself am an absolutist in the sense that I believe in moral absolutes. Some actions are intrinsically right or wrong, obligatory or prohibitory. However, belief in moral absolutes doesn't entail that every action is reducible to absolute duties, without regard to circumstances or consequences. 

Moreover, "absolutism" is deceptively simple. For instance, if I do nothing to offset the actions of an evildoer, doesn't that make me complicit in his evil? If nothing is done to overcome his evil actions, then I'm passively facilitating his evil. So that doesn't ipso facto get me off the hook. 

Now the point of this post is not to assess the ethics of counter-cheating at poker. Poker is just a game. A social convention. I merely use that as a convenient example to illustrate morally serious situations (unlike poker) where prima facie obligations may overridden by higher obligations.

The age of accountability

http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2010/07/age-of-accountability

Vicarious responsibility

i) One of the stock objections to Calvinism is original sin–especially the imputation of Adam's sin. How is it fair for us to be held responsible for the actions of another? We weren't party to his actions. We didn't consent to his actions.  

Strictly speaking, this isn't a problem for Calvinism. Assuming, for argument's sake, that it's problematic, this is a problem for Scripture. It's only a problem for Calvinism inasmuch as Calvinism is one of the few remaining live theological traditions that still takes seriously what Scripture says about original sin. So this is less about Calvinism than the inspiration and authority of Scripture.

ii) That said, let's consider the objection on its own terms. For ease of reference, let's call this the principle of vicarious responsibility 

Certainly there are many situations, or kinds of situations, where vicarious responsibility would be unjust. In fact, the Bible itself regards vicarious responsibility as unjust in some situations (e.g. Deut 24:16). 

iii) But is that a universal principle? Let's consider a hypothetical case. A wife has a child by another man in the course of an illicit affair. There is, however, no immediate reason for her husband to suspect that the child isn't his. 

10 years later, the boy falls ill and undergoes some tests which incidentally disclose the fact that the boy isn't the husband's biological child. 

The wife, realizing that her husband will never view her the same way, leaves her husband for the man the truly loves. And she leaves her son behind in the care and custody of her ex-husband. She never wanted the child. 

Although this is hypothetical, there are real-life examples that correspond to this type of situation. 

What are the responsibilities of the husband in this situation? One option is leave the boy with his biological mother and father. Drive the boy to wherever they are living, and hand him off to them. 

Surely, though, it's too late for that. For 10 years, the husband has been the only father the boy has known. His biological father doesn't know him or care about him. And his mother doesn't care about him. 

So the boy needs the husband to continue to be a father to him. It would be detrimental to his psychological development to rip him out of that relationship and thrust him into the hands of two uncaring adults. 

Here's a case where an individual becomes responsible for the consequences of someone else's misdeed. And this is despite the fact that the individual was wronged. 

We could cite analogous examples. Take a foundling. A desperate mother places her newborn on the doorstep of a well-to-do family, hoping they will care for the child. That shouldn't be their responsibility. But now that it's been thrust upon them, it is their duty to rise to the challenge.

As such, I don't think vicarious responsibility is unjust in principle. It's easy enough to come up with counterexample in which it seems to be a moral obligation.

Of course, these examples appeal to intuition. Some people might reject the intuition. However, that cuts both ways. For the objection to original sin is intuitive too. 

Making fun of Jesus (and of others)

"Making fun of Jesus (and of others)" by Paul Helm.

Freewill theism as Neopaganism

It's striking how freewill theism repristinates pagan principles. Before making comparisons, let's expound what I mean. The pagan worldview oscillated between chance and fate. That's because paganism has no single, omnipotent, omniscient Creator God. No creation ex nihilo. 

In paganism, the world is a patchwork of independent power centers: personified natural forces. Stronger gods and weaker gods. Ancestral spirits. Gods with different spheres of influence. Some gods know more than others. But all the gods are finite in knowledge and power. 

In Greco-Roman mythology, the Fates represented fatalism. The Fates were sisters and goddesses. They were the daughters of night–an ominous pedigree.

They are classically represented as spinning thread, measuring thread, and cutting thread. That represents the lifespan of each individual. That predetermines the time of death. 

The specter of fatalism is also represented by dire oracles (e.g. Croesus, Oedipus). 

Likewise, the development of astrological fatalism. Your destiny was written in the stars. 

This generates a familiar dilemma: if the future is known, it must be settled in advance. But if you know your future, does that not give you an opportunity to change it?

Conversely, chance or luck was represented by the goddess Tyche or Fortuna. 

On the face of it, chance and fate are opposing principles. However, they may consistently coexist if both are less than universal in scope and sway. 

Classicists debate whether the Fates were absolute autonomous powers whom even the gods could not overrule. I have no reason to think Greco-Roman mythology was consistent in this regard. As the mythology evolved, it was natural to unify more phenomena under Zeus, but it didn't start out that way. You had varied traditions which originated independently in place in time. Later, there's an effort at synthesis. Zeus becomes a unifying principle. And you have philosophical conceptions, like Aristotelian theism.

One might ask what it was in pagan experience that gave rise to their beliefs about fate and fortune. For now I will content myself with speculation.

On the one hand, some events, like death, are inevitable. Ultimately inescapable. 

On the other hand, some people seem to be lucky while others seem to be unlucky. There's a certain apparent randomness to weal and woe. 

So even though these principles tug in different directions, they both appear to be true some of the time. 

And we see both principle vying for dominance in freewill theism. For instance, the chance element in open theism is its radical commitment to libertarian freedom. The ultimate contingency of the future. Uncaused events (i.e. free choices). 

But to curtail the destabilizing consequences of this principle, open theists invoke the classic deus ex machina of the cosmic chess master. No matter what move you make, he will beat you every time. Yet that's just like inexorable fate. 

Likewise, in Molinism:

The counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which confront Him are outside His control. He has to play with the hand He has been dealt. 

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/molinism-and-the-soteriological-problem-of-evil-once-more 

Just like the Fates. Even the gods can't overrule them. 

There are feasible and infeasible possible worlds. God can only choose from among the live options. The rest are out of his hands. That's classically fatalistic in positing ultimate autonomous entities to which even God must defer. 

By the same token, Craig says:

This event was the result of an incomprehensible multitude of free human choices which God did not determine. If her parents had decided not to travel on this flight because of a dream, then God’s plan would have taken a different course. His providential planning would have to have taken into account that free choice instead of the choices He did have to work with. God’s providential plan does not override human free. 

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/indonesia-air-asia-qz8501-and-the-problem-of-evil

It's as if once the ill-fated parents board the plane, God must allow the natural consequences of their free choices to run their course unimpeded. Their doom was sealed the moment the cabin was sealed. God mustn't override the results of our free choices. Que sera sera. Once he flicks the first domino, his hands are tied thereafter. He just watches them fall. 

What is religious freedom?

http://www.fpiw.org/blog/2015/04/07/what-is-religious-freedom/

It’s time for Christians to tell the truth about abortion politics

http://erlc.com/article/its-time-for-christians-to-tell-the-truth-about-abortion-politics

From ape to Adam

Tue April 14, 2015

(Christianity Today) - Peter Enns and John Walton recently returned from an expedition to Armenia to find out what really happened in the Garden of Eden. Their archeological excavation unearthed a cuneiform DVD. This records the very moment when Yahweh conferred the imago Dei on a hominid by process of ensoulment. 

After a private viewing, Pope Francis, the Dalai Lama, Darrel Falk, and the Archbishop of Canterbury hailed their discovery as the long-sought reconciliation of science and religion. 

[skip ad]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ML1OZCHixR0

Lecture on miracles at Asbury

http://www.craigkeener.com/miracles-lecture-at-asburys-ministries-conference/

The incredible shrinking papacy

I'm struck by what a small religious and media phenomenon Francis is compared to JP2. I was 19 when JP2 became pope, so I lived through his entire. pontificate. Saw all the coverage as an adult. He was a rock star. Drew vast crowds. Even when he became incapacitated, there were huge Catholic youth gatherings for Masses he celebrated. He was a major player on the international stage. 

Even though Francis has people skills that Benedict lacked, it's striking to see how small the papacy has become in contrast to JP2, in terms of popular excitement which JP2 generated. It's a very shrunken institution in the pop culture as well as Catholic circles these days. And that's just from two popes ago. It's a very diminished institution. (Actually, the bottom began falling out in the late 60s.) 

Make Worshiping God With Your Mind A Higher Priority

"As a result, however, I get to see how many of my Christian brothers and sisters are interested in the evidence supporting their faith. I must tell you, the interest in Christian case making is thin, at best. In a typical church, about ten percent of the congregation is usually concerned enough about 'apologetics' to attend a training session or conference. My fellow speakers and traveling case makers report the same interest wherever they go, and if you are among the few Christians who are actively studying or making the case, you know what I am talking about first-hand. Why are so few Christians willing to be Christian case makers?...if you want to be prepared to defend the truth, you’ll need to work hard and do whatever it takes to succeed. This may sound daunting, but I’m not asking you to do something you don’t already do. I bet there’s some aspect of your life where you are willing to invest time and energy for a much less important cause. How many hours a week do you spend catching up on our favorite television dramas? How much time do you spend watching sports, or reading about your favorite hobby? Few of us are so busy we have absolutely no time to spend studying what we believe about God. It’s really all a matter of priorities. Most of us are willing to spend time on the things that interest us most. Are our metaphysical beliefs about the existence of God important enough for us to invest the time necessary to become successful case makers?... If Christianity is an accurate description of reality, it ought to inspire us to commit our time and effort. It ought to cause us to do whatever necessary to become the best Christian case makers possible. The reason why few of us are willing to become case makers is simply because case making requires work. Hard work. But it’s worth it, because this kind of work is actually a form of worship. When we dedicate ourselves to understanding and defending what we believe, we are worshiping God with our minds." (J. Warner Wallace)

Paul Moser

On Facebook I got into an impromptu debate with Paul Moser, philosophy prof. at Loyola U.

Paul K Moser I had hoped that the Dover decision would change the landscape, but no such luck.http://en.wikipedia.org/.../Kitzmiller_v._Dover_Area...

Paul K Moser I doubt that the apostle Paul would offer himself as a divinely inspired historian of the earliest human times. He even makes a historical mistake in 1 Cor. 1:14 (part of the Bible) and then tries to correct it.

Paul K Moser Wrong, and it isn't about 'gut feeling' for me. Where's the evidence or even the claim that 'Paul got *the* story of redemptive history wrong'? It isn't a matter of all-or-nothing here as the fundamentalists and fundaevangelicals suggest. Those crowds want a pristine book (aka sledgehammer) that God has not given us. We need candor here, not fear that distorts.

Paul K Moser John, Suppose one says that the author(s) of Gen. 1-3 made some mistakes, in the areas you suggest. Why would that be the end of the world? We don't have to subject our theology to what we perceive to be mistakes; nor do we have to ask science to conform to those mistakes. What am I missing? NOMA still seems alive in this case.

Steve Hays Why assume Paul made a mistake in 1 Cor 1:14. Why not view that as a rhetorical device: an underestimate to minimize the significance of baptism, in relation to those (with whom Paul is shadowboxing) who overestimate it's importance? An understatement would fit Paul's rhetorical strategy at this stage of the argument.

Steve Hays Moser fails to appreciate the status of Christianity as a revealed religion. It's about a God who speaks as well as acts. A God who speaks to and through people.

Steve Hays I'm curious as to why a philosopher (Moser) thinks a judicial ruling (the Dover decision), ghostwritten by the ACLU, should "change the landscape" of a scientific, philosophical, and theological debate. Does he think judges should also adjudicate the divine hiddenness argument?

Paul K Moser Well, for starters, Kenneth Miller and other expert witnesses destroyed the case of the Discovery Institute.

Steve Hays Of course, that's a one-sided analysis. The claim is easily reversible:

http://www.evolutionnews.org/2015/01/kenneth_miller_1092771.html?hc_location=ufi

Paul K Moser As for 1 Cor. 1:14, we really don't have to stand on our heads when interpreting Paul. He isn't playing rhetorical games here, despite the demands of some far-fetched theories, such as inerrancy.

Steve Hays 

i) I'm struck by your tactic of attempting to preemptively discredit criticism by dismissing it in advance as the work of "fundamentalists" protecting inerrancy. For a philosophy prof., you resort to anti-intellectual gimmicks and tactics. That sets a poor example for your students. 

ii) If you imagine that ancient letter writers composing public epistles didn't employ rhetorical devices like understatement, I wonder if how much you've bothered to study the genre, if at all. 

iii) Actually, Richard B. Hays offers the very interpretation I'm proposing. He's not a "fundamentalist" or "fundaevanagelical." 

"The 'afterthought' of v. 16 functions rhetorically to emphasize the relative triviality of the issue of who baptized whom: 'Well, all right, so I did baptize the household of Stephanas, but beyond that I don't even know whether I baptized anyone else!'…Perhaps this is merely an elaborate rhetorical flourish on Paul's part, a reductio ad absurdum of the Corinthians' tendency to magnify the messengers and miss the message." 1 Corinthians (WJK, 2011), 23-24.

Paul K Moser Yes, inerrancy is an ideological fiction of fundamentalists and fundaevangelicals -- no doubt about it. It doesn't take much study to see this. Paul included a false statement in the letter that became part of the Bible, in 1 Cor. 1:14. There's no reason to think that he started with the intention to include a false statement -- none whatever. You don't need to go ad hominem here; just focus on evidence to prop up your dubious theory of inerrancy. Good luck.

Steve Hays 

i) It's ironic that you accuse me of going "ad hominem" when your own responses are littered with ad hominem dismissals. You resort to prejudicial labels. Don't you think a philosophy prof. should cultivate a capacity for self-criticism? Isn't that a professional as well as personal responsibility? 

Likewise, taking philosophical shortcuts like prejudicial labeling is not an intellectual virtue. 

ii) Once again, R. B. Hays is not a "fundamentalist" or inerrantist. You've become wedded to a tendentious narrative which you impose on the discussion in spite of the facts. It's not commendable for a philosophy prof. to take intellectual shortcuts and retreat into an unfalsifiable characterization of the opposing side. 

iii) To say an understatement is a "false statement" is a philosophically and literarily crude mischaracterization of a rhetorical device. It's especially ironic when you attack the "literal" interpretation of Genesis. 

What makes you think it wouldn't fit with Paul's rhetorical strategy to use irony and indirection to critique the Corinthians? Raymond Collins, who's certainly no "fundaevangelical" inerrantist, discusses Paul's use of Classical rhetoric in chapter 1 (and 1 Cor generally), and says his omission of Stephanas in v14 may have been "disingenuous." Sacra Pagina: First Corinthians, 75-76,84. 

Paul K Moser Why do I have so little patience with your self-serving epicycles? Your bad ideology of inerrancy turns many people away from Christian faith, and even faith in God. I have seen this firsthand among educated people.

Steve Hays 

i) Because intellectual patience is an intellectual virtue and philosophical prerequisite. Flinging angry epithets around is the way village atheists behave. 

ii) Is it your position that verbal revelation is not a fixture of the Judeo-Christian faith? 

iii) What's wrong with people turning away from something they no longer believe in? If the Christian faith must stand for certain things, and some people cease to believe in what it represents, should they not opt out? 

Isn't that necessarily a part of taking the Christian faith seriously? The intellectual integrity of the Christian faith depends, among other things, on being inconsistent with contrary beliefs. 

Put another way, what about the danger of living in a fool's paradise? If you just keep modifying "Christian faith" to make it amendable to your unquestionable prejudices, didn't you already leave it far behind in principle? If it's not worth losing, it's not worth having.

Paul K Moser Oh please, now you're going to resort to moral scolding? Have a good day. I'm done here.

The Reformation is over. Catholics 0, Protestants 1

I'm going to transcribe an article that Jerry Walls wrote when he was a grad student at Notre Dame:

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I am nearing the end of three very happy (with a brief interlude) years as a graduate student in the philosophy department at Notre Dame. The philosophy department is quite lively and stimulating and I have learned a great deal about my discipline.

Along the way, I have also acquired an education of another sort–namely in the ways of the Roman Catholic Church. My education in this regard has been informal and piecemeal, to be sure. My insights have been gathered from diverse sources: from lectures, from letters to the Observer, from articles in the conservative magazine Fidelity, from interaction with undergraduates I have taught. But most of all, I have learned from numerous conversations with students and faculty in the philosophy and theology departments, many of which have involved a friend who is a former Roman Catholic seminarian. While my informal education in these matters hardly qualifies me to speak as an authority, Roman Catholics may find interesting how one Protestant in their midst has come to perceive them. I can communicate my perceptions most clearly, I think, by briefly describing three types of Catholics I have encountered. 

First, I have met a fair number of conservative Catholics. Those who belong to this group like to characterize themselves as thoroughly Catholic. They stress the teaching authority of the Church and are quick to defend the official Catholic position on all points. For such persons, papal encyclicals are not to be debated; they are to be accepted and obeyed. Many conservative Catholics, I suspect, hold their views out of a sense of loyalty to their upbringing. Others, however, defend their views with learning, intelligence, and at times, intensity.

At the other end of the spectrum of course, are the liberal Catholics. These persons are openly skeptical not only about distinctively Roman doctrines such as papal infallibility, but also about basic Christian doctrine as embodied in the ecumenical creeds. It is not clear in what sense such persons would even be called Christians. Nevertheless, if asked their religious preference, on a college application say, they would identify themselves as Catholics. I have no idea how many Catholics are liberals of this stripe, but I have met only a few here at Notre Dame.

It is the third type of Catholic, I am inclined to think, which represents the majority. Certainly most of the Catholics I have met are of this type. I call this group "functional protestants."

Many Catholics, no doubt, will find this designation offensive, so let me hasten to explain what I mean by it. One of the fundamental lines of difference between Catholics and Protestants, going back to the Reformation, concerns the issue of doctrinal authority. The traditional Roman Catholic view, as I understand it, is that its official teachings are guaranteed to be infallible, particularly when the pope or an ecumenical council exercises "extraordinary magisterium" when making doctrinal or moral pronouncements. Protestants have traditionally rejected this claim in favor of the view that Scripture alone is infallible in matters doctrinal and moral. This was the conviction MartinLuther came to hold after he arrived at the conclusion that both popes and church councils have erred. After this, his excommunication was all but inevitable.

When I say most Catholics are functional Protestants I simply mean that most Catholics do not accept the authority claims of their Church. In actual belief and practice, they are much closer to the Protestant view.

This is apparent from the fact that many Catholics do not accept explicitly defined dogmas of their Church. For example, I have talked with several Catholics who are doubtful, at best, about the Marian dogmas, even though these have the status of infallible doctrine in their church. Such Catholics have often made it clear to me that they believe the basic Christian doctrine as defined in the creeds. But they frankly admit that they think their Church has taken some wrong turns in her recent history. Where this is the case, they do not feel compelled to follow. As one of my functional Protestant friends put it: "I am a Roman Catholic, but I am more concerned about being Catholic than about being Roman."

That many Catholics are functionally Protestant is also evident in their attitude toward the distinctive moral teachings of their Church. The obvious example here is the Roman Catholic teaching that all forms of "artificial" birth control are immoral. The official view was reaffirmed explicitly by Pope Paul VI in his encyclical Humanae Vitae, and has been reiterated again and again by Pope John Paul II. Nevertheless, as the article on Humanae Vitae in the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Religion noted, "the papal ban is simply being ignored," and "a concrete authority crisis has thus emerged."

I attended the recent debate on abortion between Fr. James Burtchaell and Daniel Maguire. It is interesting to me that Fr. Burtchaell who eloquently defended the conservative view on abortion, admitted to a questioner that he rejects his Church's teaching on birth control. I could not help but wonder: is Fr. Burtchaell, Catholic statesman though he is, also among the functional Protestants?

This raises, of course, the deeper issue here: to what extent can a member of the Roman Catholic Church disagree with the official teachings of his Church and still be a faithful Catholic? Can one reject the teaching of a papal encyclical while remaining a faithful Catholic? If so, can he also reject a doctrine which the pope has declared infallible?

I have put these questions to several Catholics. Conservative have assured me that the answer to both the latter questions is no. Others insist the answer is yes.

This brings me to a final point concerning functional Protestants: they do consider themselves faithful Catholics. I have  often pointed out in conversation with such Catholics that their views differ little from mine. Why then remain Catholic I ask. In response, these Catholics make it clear to me that they love their Church and intend to remain loyal to it. More than one has compared the Church to his family. One's family makes mistakes, but one does not therefore choose to join another family.

I am not sure what to make of this response. It is not clear to me that one can line up behind Luther in holding that the Popes and councils have erred in their doctrinal and moral pronouncements, and still be a faithful Catholic.  But on the other hand, things have changed since the 16C. It is no longer the case that a Catholic will be excommunicated for holding what Luther held. Perhaps this is just another sign that the Reformation is–despite the pope's best efforts–finally taking hold within the Roman Church. 

Jerry Walls, "Reformational Theology found in Catholicism," The Observer, Thursday, April 23, 1978, p8.

http://www.archives.nd.edu/Observer/1987-04-23_v21_129.pdf

Persecuting hobbits

https://stream.org/sex-marriage-persecution-hobbits/

Vos on predestination

The question is not whether sin comes into consideration as a factor in the decree of election and of rejection. On this point much misunderstanding reigns. One frequently hears the claim that those who place election above the fall teach that God has ordained men for eternal bliss and eternal miserly only because he willed to do so and without considering their sin. But that is a conclusion that is not present in supralapsarianism and has never been intended by its advocates. 

[Quoting Perkins] insofar as it pertains to the first act, that is, insofar as it refers to the purpose to abandon the creature and in this to demonstrate justice, is absolute…Sin itself occurs after the abandonment and the just permission of God…However, reprobation, insofar as it pertains to the second act, that is the purpose to damn, is not absolute or indefinite but it takes account of sin…God has not created man simply to destroy him, but so that by his just destruction of the sinner he would demonstrate his justice.

The older supralapsarianism [which Vos endorses] at least maintained that in God's decree the permitting of the fall of man together with creation was subordinated to the highest end, the glorification of his justice and mercy.

The supralapsarian taught that in his decree to create God already had in view the elect as his personal beloved.

One will perceive how the question whether in predestination God viewed man as still having to be created and still having to fall (creabilis et labilis), or as created and fallen (creatus et lapsus), is only a short formula for this difference.  It would perhaps be better to say creandus [to be created] et lapsurus [to be fallen] for characterizing supralapsarian sentiments…"Will be created" and "will be falling" gives a sense of how sin was certainly taken into account.

The objection that for the supralapsarian the object of predestination is a non-ens (a nonentity) rests on a misunderstanding. It is not a non-ens concerning the knowing part of God's decree but only concerning the willing act. Also, if this reasoning is extended, God could never have made a decree of creation. 

One should certainly keep in view that this harshness resides in the doctrine of God's decree as such, and supralapsarianism merely brings it out clearly.

[Quoting Calvin] "God has created us in order to redeem us."

According to infralapsarians, reprobation has two parts: (a) praeteritio, "passing by," God's decree not to grant the grace of salvation to certain persons lying in sin; and (b) praedamnatio, "predamnation," God's decree to commit these persons to eternal destruction because of their sin.

According to supralapsarians, reprobation has three parts: (a) the decree to set apart certain persons for the revelation of God's retributive justice in punishment for their sins; (b) permission in God's decree for the fall of man; (c) the decree not to grant grace to these persons, being once fallen, but to condemn them because of their sin.

The supralapsarian says: The legal ground why men perish lies in sin that they deliberately commit within time. Nobody perishes other than because of his own sin. But this sin itself cannot occur apart from the permission of God's decree. Therefore, this permission, that is, God's predestination, is the highest ground for the reality of perishing, although not the legal ground.

a) That generally hardening is the consequence of contact with the revelation or the truth of God against which sinful men rebels (so, for Pharaoh, Exod 7:3; Isaiah's contemporaries, Isa 6; Mt 13:11-16). "An odor of death to death."

b) That hardening is also caused by God simultaneously withdrawing the common grace of the Holy Spirit and permitting sin to break out and spread unhindered. Here, then, is a real act of God, but it is an act of withdrawing. God does not cause sin to arise in man but withdraws all influences that work for good. This is called, "given over to a depraved mind," 'to dishonorable passions," to the desires of their hearts" (Rom 1:28,26,24; Ps 81:13). 

G. Vos, Reformed Dogmatics (Lexam Press 2012-2014)1:144-154

Hillary Clinton, Leader Of The Evil Party

I just watched the video launching Hillary Clinton's 2016 campaign. She's a poor communicator and comes off as disingenuous. That's nothing new. The video's focus on helping the middle class is vague, unconvincing, and dubious coming from the Democratic party. That's nothing new. What is new, relative to presidential politics, is the video's promotion of homosexuality and same-sex marriage. Barack Obama ran in 2008 as an opponent of same-sex marriage, but eventually changed his position, again, in time for the 2012 campaign. By contrast, Clinton's team has chosen to explicitly promote homosexuality and same-sex marriage multiple times from the start, in the video that launches Clinton's campaign.

People often refer to the Republicans as the stupid party and the Democrats as the evil party. There's a lot of truth to that. When you hear somebody making the oft-refuted claim that there's no significant difference between the parties, remember which party has been at the forefront of mainstreaming abortion, homosexuality, same-sex marriage, transgenderism, and other perversions. Which party's candidate do you want choosing future Supreme Court justices?

Tell out, my soul, the greatness of the Lord!