Before he died, Gordon Clark published an article The Trinity Review in which he summarized his objections to empiricism.
http://www.trinityfoundation.org/PDF/068a-HowDoesManKnowGod.pdf
Let’s examine his objections:
"The theory of knowledge that presumably accords
best with common sense is the theory that we learn
by experience. We learn that bees sting and
rattlesnakes kill through our perceptions of pain.
We learn that roses are red and violets are blue by
the sensations of sight. All our knowledge comes
through sensations.”
That’s a straw man argument insofar as one doesn’t have to believe the senses are the source of all knowledge to believe the senses are the source of some knowledge. While empiricism entails sense-knowledge, sense-knowledge need not entail empiricism.
This distinction is important to keep in mind since Clarkians constantly conflate sense-knowledge with tabula rasa empiricism, then imagine that by disproving tabula rasa empiricism they thereby disprove sense-knowledge.
But it’s quite possible for a thinker to believe that some knowledge is innate while the senses mediate other kinds of knowledge. Indeed, these can be complementary positions.
For example, we can enumerate concrete objects because we enjoy an innate knowledge of math. At the same time, we don’t enjoy an innate knowledge of the concrete objects we enumerate. So you need both types of knowledge to complete the operation.
“However plausible this theory may be, it raises
some exceedingly difficult questions. For the
moment let us set aside the complexities in trying to
rise from fleeting sensations to the knowledge of the
incorporeal and eternal God. Instead, let us first
attend to the most simple parts of empiricism.”
He doesn’t bother to explain why that’s a problem. However, one of the standard theistic proofs treats what is fleeting as evidence for the need of something that isn’t fleeting to ground what is fleeting. So that’s not a problem belief in God. To the contrary, that’s an argument for God. What is fleeting is contingent. What is contingent is ultimately contingent on something that is necessary.
“Let us start with the red of a rose and the blue of a
violet. First, a description of sensation will show
that it does not give knowledge so readily as
common sense imagines. Not everybody sees roses
as red and violets as blue. There are some people
who we say are color blind, and there are degrees of
color blindness. It is difficult to tell what is color
blindness and what are color illusions. The real
color is very hard to settle upon. The condition of
the organ, the eye, a disease, temporary sickness, a
headache or extreme sensitivity change our color
sensations.”
How would a genetic defect like color blindness prevent color from being an object of knowledge? If you’re color-blind, the color of an object is not an object of knowledge for you, but that doesn’t mean it can’t be an object of knowledge for someone with normal vision.
Why would we delimit the scope of knowledge by reference to a genetic defect? By that token, would we also say the past can’t be an object of knowledge because some people suffer from senile dementia?
“Let me give you one little example. If you would
take a course in art, oil painting, you might take a
square of canvas and put some color paint on the
top half of it and another color on the bottom. It
could be red and blue or any two colors you wish
just so long as they’re different. And then after they
have dried, take a brush full of gray paint and just
bring it down vertically over the two parts of the
square and you will see that that one stroke of brush
has put two different colors on the canvas, the color
of the gray at the top is not the color of the gray at
the bottom half of the canvas. So the color that you
see depends on the background against which you
see it. And since there is always a background, you
never see anything as it is all by itself.”
Why does knowledge of color depend on seeing a color as it is “all by itself”? In the nature of the of the case, color perception involves the appearance of an object.
“I could also mention some optical illusions: the
Texas rancher who was sure he was seeing a mirage
and drove his pick-up truck into a lake.”
How could Clark identify an optical illusion in the first place if the senses are totally unreliable? To detect the difference between a mirage and a lake assumes the basic reliability of sensory perception.
“Some of my friendly opponents try to meet my argument against empiricism by claiming that I merely parrot the
ancient skeptics. I’m afraid of two things: The ancient skeptics didn’t know anything about Texas, and, in the second place, if I am parroting the ancient skeptics, that is not a sufficient answer to their arguments.”
i) True, but I just dealt with his example.
ii) To the extent that a Scripturalist is raising objections to sense-knowledge, he needs to limit himself to Scriptural objections. For a Scripturalist to raise extrascriptural objections to sense-knowledge would be self-defeating.
“Take one thing that certainly the ancients didn’t
know. Get a nice piece of bristle-board cardboard
and paint one-half of it with black India ink. Leave
the other half white and then put little swiggles of
black on the white half. Then get something that
will rotate at about 500 revolutions a minute, and
what color will you see? Will you see black? Will
you see gray? Well, if you haven’t done this
experiment I’m pretty sure you just don’t know. I’ll
tell you: You’ll see purple; you’ll see red; you’ll see
green; you’ll see some sort of brown. You will see
all these colors just from a mixture of black and
white, and this gives you considerable difficulty in
trying to say that you see the color of anything at all
or to paraphrase a little bit from Augustine, there is
nothing given (das Gegebenes, if you know the
German technical term), nothing given in sensation
without intellectual interpretation.”
i) Once again, color perception concerns the appearance of objects. Naturally the appearance of an object varies with the empirical conditions under which it’s viewed (e.g. background, lightening). That, however, doesn’t mean the color of an object can’t be known. Rather, an object will appear one way under certain conditions, and another way under different conditions.
For example, the apparent scale of a mountain is observer-relative. Mountains look smaller at a distance. Would we conclude from this fact that mountains have no objective size?
ii) The appearance of the object is still a determinate object of knowledge. The appearance varies with the determinants, but that doesn’t mean it can’t be known. While color perception has a subjective dimension, it also has an objective dimension. For instance, the composition of the surface will reflect or absorb certain wavelengths of the visible spectrum.
iii) Even at a subjective level, human beings are designed to register certain color qualia. Barring genetic defects (e.g. color-blindness) we share common qualia.
“And just to protect myself from these people who
think I’m as old as the Greek skeptics – I am getting
a little ancient, but I’m not quite 2,000 years old, I
guess I’m about 95 or something like that – but I
was traveling along the road from St. Louis to
Indianapolis on one occasion. This was before the
interstate was there, and as I looked ahead, I saw a
small truck standing by a barn. This was
approximately 1,500 or 2,000 feet ahead of me. And
it wasn’t a passenger car, it was a truck because the
front and the back were both vertical. There was the
truck standing by the barn. Now as we drove along
– and going at 75 m.p.h. you cover a few feet pretty
quickly – this truck suddenly became a mailbox on
a post. Now was it a truck or was it a mailbox?
Well, that depends on how far away from it you are.
And time forbids the multiplication of such
examples. Suffice it to say that they soon become
overwhelming. You have trouble with sensation.”
i) Now Clark is equivocating. He fails to distinguish between sensation and perception. He didn’t see a truck. He saw an ambiguous object–ambiguous due to the lack of visual resolution at that distance. He then interpreted what he saw as a truck. Perception involves an element of expectation.
ii) Moreover, Clark’s illustration is self-defeating since it ultimately depends on his ability to distinguish between what the object appeared to be at a distance, and what the object really was when he saw it close up. The comparison only works if he can distinguish between appearance and reality.
iii) Furthermore, as rational agents, human sensory perception was never meant to operate in isolation to human reason. Reason can correct for misperceptions. For example, M.C. Escher was fond of depicting optical illusions. We know these depictions are physically impossible. That’s part of their charm.
iv) Incidentally, isn’t it unethical for a man who denies sense-knowledge to get behind the wheel of a car? Given his denial of sense-knowledge, does Clark think there’s no difference between driving sober and driving drunk? Does Clark think it makes no difference which side of the road you drive on?
“In the second place, this empirical theory, after
making such a poor beginning with sensation,
requires a theory of images to account for the
retention of knowledge after the sensation has
stopped. When you talk about the sensation, when it
is gone, and you have an image that is retained,
there are other difficulties.”
i) Why that’s a difficulty, Clark doesn’t say. Does he mean reliance on memory is a difficulty, or reliance on remembered mental images in particular?
a) If the former, the rationalist has to rely on his own memory as well. For example, logical inference requires a recollection of the premise.
b) If the latter, what’s the problem? As long as my memory of what I saw (or heard or felt or tasted or smelled) corresponds to what I saw at the time, is there some additional problem?
ii) Why does Clark think empiricism or sense-knowledge depends on mental imagery, per se? It’s possible to remember that you saw something even if you don’t remember what you saw (in the sense of retaining a mental image of the event).
iii) Why does Clark restrict recollective mental representations to imagery? We can also have mental representations of auditory, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory sensations.
“If perception is an inference from sensation, and images follow the perception, how can one determine when the
inference is valid?”
This question is so wide-open that it’s hard to tell where he thinks the problem lies. I spot a snakeskin in my backyard. From this I infer the existence of a skin-shedding snake. What’s wrong with that inference?
“At one time, I inferred that I saw a truck. Another
time, a few minutes later, I inferred that I saw a
mailbox. But how do you tell whether either
inference is valid?”
But Clark himself tells us which is which. And he gives the reason. In this case, relative distance between the observer and the object was the differential factor. It also depends on visual acuity.
“And then in the second place, some people, especially scientists, not artists, but especially scientists, don’t have any images. And that’s a difficulty I don’t see how the empirical philosophy can ever overcome. They seem never to have thought of the existence of such people. Thomas Aquinas and David Hume, best known for their theories of images, just seem to believe that all people have images. But that isn’t so. There are some people, and I know one fairly well, who have no images at all.”
i) How is the absence of a particular sensation a difficulty that empiricism is supposed to overcome? Some men are blind. Some men are deaf. How does the inability of some individual to see or hear because they lack functional sense organs amount to an argument against the possibility of sense-knowledge for percipients who do enjoy normal sight or hearing?
Some males suffer from a birth defect known as aphallia or penile agenesis. Does this condition invalidate the science of andrology?
ii) How does deficient sensation in one sensory organ invalidate sense-knowledge generally? If you’re blind or color-blind, that doesn’t mean you can’t hear or touch or smell. And, as we know, different animals vary in their sensory aptitudes and acuities.
“Now, third, even for people who have visual or
auditory images, the formation of concepts by
abstraction, as Aristotle and Locke require, is
impossible for reasons I won’t go into. And if
Bishop Berkeley did nothing else, at least he clearly
showed that empiricism cannot allow or justify
abstract concepts.”
Since he won’t go into it, there’s nothing to refute.
i) Why can’t empiricism justify abstract concepts? Does he mean empiricism can’t justify abstract universals? But even if enumerative induction can’t justify a universal inference, that doesn’t mean you can’t form an abstract concept on the basis of enumerative induction. There’s a difference between an abstract concept and an abstract universal.
If I hear a clock chime four times in a row, I form the abstract concept that it’s four o’clock. Several elements go into the formation of that concept: memory; auditory perception; a concept of numerical relations.
Now, I happen to think that our knowledge of numerical relations is innate. I don’t think empiricism can account for mathematical knowledge.
But, as I’ve said before, belief in sense-knowledge doesn’t commit you to empiricism.
“My fourth objection to empiricism, and if you’ve
been counting them up, it may be the fortieth,
empiricism cannot produce norms of any kind. It
cannot produce moral and religious norms because
at the very best, empiricism can only tell you what
is. I don’t think it tells you even that little, but that
is all that empiricists can legitimately claim to do.
They cannot tell you what ought to be because you
cannot get an ought out of an is. And this applies
not only to moral and religious norms, but to the
very basic logical norms without which speech and
understanding would be impossible.”
That may well be true, but how is that an objection to sense-knowledge? Even if moral norms are either innate, revealed, or both, we must apply moral norms to sensory objects.
Consider the Biblical prohibition against theft. Suppose I own a red Alpha Romeo. Suppose my neighbor owns a yellow Alpha Romeo.
Differentiating the cars by color is one way of differentiating my property from his property. Suppose we both drive to the store. I park my car next to his.
Would Gordon Clark take the position that when I return from the store, I should pay no attention to the color of the car? If my neighbor left his keys in the car, does it make no moral difference whether I drive away with the yellow Alpha Romeo or the red Alpha Romeo?
Or do I have a moral obligation to distinguish my car from his on the basis of visual cues–like color?
“The argument is that every philosophy must have a
first principle, a first principle laid down
dogmatically. Empiricism itself requires a first non-
empirical principle. This is particularly obvious in
that most extreme form of empiricism called logical
positivism. To say that statements are nonsense
unless verifiable by sensation, is itself a statement
that cannot be verified by sensation. Observation
can never prove the reliability of observation. Since,
therefore, every philosophy must have its first
indemonstrable axiom, the secularists cannot deny
the right of Christianity to choose its own axiom.”
But if a Clarkian says you can’t know something unless you can account for something (i.e. give reasons), then an indemonstrable axiom can’t be known to be true.
If, therefore, we treat the Christian faith as an axiomatic system, we can’t know that it’s true. And there’s no reason to prefer it to a rival axiomatic system.
“The principle is sola Scriptura. This is a repudiation
of the notion that theology has several sources such
as the Bible, tradition, philosophy, science, religion,
or psychology. There is but one source, the
Scriptures. This is where truth is to be found. Under
the word truth there is included, in opposition to
irrationalism, logic and the law of contradiction.
Whatever contradicts itself is not truth. Truth must
be consistent, and it is clear that Scripture does not
both affirm and deny an atonement. God is truth.
Christ is the wisdom and Logos of God. And the
words he has spoken to us are spirit and are life.”
Several problems;
i) Given his denial of sense-knowledge, Clark needs to explain how the Bible can even be an object of knowledge.
ii) I don’t deny that truth excludes contradiction. However, notice that Clark made no attempt to exegete the law of contradiction from the Biblical concept of truth. You can’t simply read that off the occurrence of the word “truth” in Biblical usage. What Clark has really done is to begin with preconceived notion of what truth entails, then map that back onto the occurrence of the word in Scripture. He didn’t get that from Scripture alone.
iii) He also has a bad habit of equating the Greek word “logos” with the concept of “logic.” But that’s not what the word “logos” means in Johannine usage.
“The first passage for exegesis is the first passage in
the Bible. God created man after His image and
likeness. This image cannot be man’s body for two
reasons: First, God is spirit and has no body;
second, animals have bodies but they were not
created in God’s image. Therefore, the body cannot
be the image of God.”
That’s a fallacious inference:
i) An image is a physical representation. The fact that what the image represents may be incorporeal doesn’t mean the image itself is incorporeal.
ii) In context, the imago Dei is a finite manifestation of God’s dominion. Man is God’s representative or vice-regent on earth. The exercise of dominion is something he shares in common with his Maker.
iii) Apropos (i)-(ii), the human body is an instrument of dominion. Man can exercise dominion over the sensible world because he has a body. So his body is a necessary expression of that principle.
iv) This is not to deny that we also need certain mental properties to execute the dominion mandate. But Clark’s interpretation is too narrow to do justice to the passage.
“The divine image then must be man’s spirit, for the two elements which compose man are body and spirit. Genesis says that God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and out of these two elements man became a living soul. If the dust or clay is not God’s image, the breath or spirit must be. There is no other possibility.”
Once again, that’s faulty exegesis:
i) In Hebrew usage, man doesn’t have a “soul”; rather, man is a “soul.” A “living being” is not a synonym for “spirit.”
ii) The “breath of life” simply distinguishes a corpse from a living organism.
I myself subscribe to dualism. But you can’t get dualism from these passages. For that you must look elsewhere.
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Ink marks on a page
Sean Gerety did a post a while back entitled “Ink marks on a page.” Normally, when I quote someone, I give the URL. However, an URL would be a sensory object. A string of meaningless numbers and letters. Since Sean denies sense-knowledge, it would be an exercise in futility for me to give the URL.
In his post, Sean attacks the notion that ink marks on a page convey knowledge. To make his case, Sean uses ink marks on a page to prove that ink marks on a page can’t prove anything.
Well, to be more precise, he uses electronically simulated ink marks on a page to prove that ink marks on a page can’t prove anything.
Assuming that Sean’s demonstration is successful, we can safely disregard his entire post, since his entire post consists of ink marks on a page.
Indeed, we can safely disregard his entire blog. Why bother to read his blog when his blog consists of electronically simulated ink marks on a page?
But, for the sake of argument, let’s waive his self-defeating exercise and press ahead.
“Which brings me to what may be the biggest hurdle most people have in coming to grips with Clark’s biblical epistemology and that is his complete rejection of the belief that sensation plays a role in knowledge. Needless to say, the rejection of sensation in the acquisition of knowledge seems counter-intuitive and not at all in accord with so-called ‘common-sense.’ Didn’t God give us sensations and sense organs so that we might come to know Him? Well, not necessarily. After all, and as Clark would say, God gave us stomachs too, but that doesn’t mean that stomachs have an epistemic function…although he was quick to add that it’s hard to study if you don’t eat.”
i) Is that supposed to be an intelligent response? What does that comparison amount to? Is that supposed to be an argument from analogy?
But when the question at issue is sense-knowledge, why think a stomach is analogous to an eye or ear? A stomach is not a sensory organ. It wasn’t designed to perceive the external world.
Gerety might as well say: “Didn’t silversmiths give us steak knives to cut steaks with? Well, not necessarily. After all, and as Clark would say, silversmiths gave us forks and spoons too, but that doesn’t mean you can cut a steak with a spoon.”
Well, suppose you can’t cut a steak with a spoon. Does that also mean you can’t cut a steak with a steak knife? Does that mean a steak knife wasn’t designed to cut steak?
What possesses Gerety to think that Clark’s reply is any sort of counterargument to the issue at hand?
ii) But suppose, for the sake of argument, that we accept the comparison. While a stomach isn’t a sensory organ, per se, a stomach does sense certain things. If you drink a nauseating fluid, the stomach will make you feel nauseous. So even a stomach is a source of sense-knowledge.
“But don’t we have to read the Bible with the eyes in our heads? Clark’s critics routinely argue that even if we accept Clark’s position that knowledge is limited to those things set down in Scripture and their necessary inferences, don’t we first have to read the Bible with our eyes? Or, to put it another way, isn’t knowledge necessarily mediated through the senses? Again, not so fast. Clark would reply, and in good lawyerly fashion, by answering this question with the question: How do you know you even have a Bible in your hands?”
Several problems with that response:
i) Is that a Scriptural objection to sense-knowledge? Does the Bible ever pose that question?
ii) According to the Book of Acts, Paul would go into synagogues and reason with his fellow Jews from the Scriptures. Suppose one of his listeners tried to deflect Paul’s appeal by saying: “Paul, how do you know you even have a scroll of Isaiah in your hands?”
Does Gerety think that would be a sound objection to Paul’s practice? Is Paul begging the question by waiving their own copy of Isaiah in their face? Quoting from the scroll which the synagogue kept in its own library?
Gerety isn’t raising a scriptural objection to sense knowledge. Quite the contrary. Gerety is raising an extrascriptural objection to sense knowledge.
iv) What is more, he’s raising an extrascriptural objection to the scriptures. To the written record of God’s word. When a Christian turns to the Bible to quote a passage of Scripture, Gerety’s response is to say, “How do you know you even have a Bible in your hands?”
How in the world does Gerety think that’s a Christian response to the possibility of sense-knowledge?
v) Answering a question with a question is not an answer: rather, it’s a way of ducking the question.
Clark is trying to shift the burden of proof. But even if his opponent ought to be able to answer Clark’s question, that doesn’t absolve Clark of the corresponding requirement to answer the opponent’s question. And even if his opponent were unable to answer Clark’s question, that doesn’t absolve Clark (or Gerety) of shouldering his own burden of proof.
“To which Clark replied: The substantial question is how do we know the contents of the Bible. If Louis XIV or my wife could be replaced with an imposter twin, then maybe the Bible in my hand is a cunningly devised substitute. Mavrodes lays this on rather heavily, and I am glad that he does. So few people are willing to give the point any serious attention. He also mentions, and I wish he had discussed, solipsism; there are also the skeptical arguments of Carneades and Aenesidemus; and as well Descartes’ omnipotent deceptive demon. In fact, until these arguments are successfully circumvented, no one has a firm basis on which to object to my general position… I must point out that he has not met the issue when he says, ‘Sense experience is required for the derivation of such [Biblical] belief’ and ‘every consistent epistemology which assigns a role to the Bible…must assign a role of equal scope and in precisely the same area to sense perception.’ To make such assertions presupposes satisfactory answers to Aenesidemus and Descartes’ demon. Can it be shown that an imposter twin is impossible? Can we be sure that we have not overlooked a ‘not’ in the sentence? There are even greater empirical scandals than these. How can one prove the reliability of memory? Any test designed to show which memory is true and which is mistaken presupposes that a previous memory is true – and this is the point in question. In large measure the psychological force of my position derives from the impossibility of empiricism.”
Several more problems:
i) Once again, how does citing the objections of Carneades, Aenesidemus, and Descartes to sense-knowledge constitute a Scriptural objection to sense-knowledge? These are secular objections. Extrascriptural objections. Pagan objections!
But, according to Scripturalism, extrascriptural objections wouldn’t be knowledgeable objections. At best they’d be merely opinionated objections, and, at worst, ignorant objections. Moreover, you can’t tell which is which.
So why is a Christian “empiricist” obliged to answer objections to sense-knowledge which, according to Scripturalism, are nothing more than philosophers opining against sense-knowledge? These are merely the opinions of Carneades, Aenesidemus, and Descartes. But unless their arguments are demonstrably true, why is a Christian “empiricist” obligated to refute them?
ii) Suppose a Christian layman can’t circumvent the objections of Carneades and Aenesidemus? So what? Does Scripture require a Christian to be able to refute philosophical objections to sense-knowledge?
iii) Suppose a Christian layman, or even a Christian philosopher, can’t disprove a skeptical thought-experiment? So what? Does Scripture require us to refute skeptical thought-experiments?
For that matter, is it the case that we can’t know anything or justifiably believe anything unless we can refute a skeptical thought-experiment?
Why should we make that artificial demand a precondition of knowledge or warranted belief?
iv) What about solipsism? What about Cartesian demons? These aren’t objections to empiricism, per se. These could just as well be deployed against Scripturalism.
If Scripturalism affirms the existence of the external world while solipsism denies the existence of the external world, then even on Scripturalist assumptions no Christian has a justified true belief in the external world unless he can circumvent solipsism. And a Scripturalist can’t very well invoke the Bible to refute solipsism, for the Bible presupposes the existence of the external world–which is the very thing solipsism denies!
Likewise, Cartesian demons aren’t limited to sensory perception. Cartesian demons can be unleashed to bedevil absolute idealism.
The Scripturalist thinks that Jn 3:16 is a divine promise, but that idea was implanted in his mind by a Cartesian demon. How can Clark or Gerety disprove that hypothetical?
Hypothetically speaking, maybe Jesus had an imposter twin. Maybe his imposter twin was crucified. Maybe his imposter twin rose from the dead. Maybe the apostolic eyewitnesses to the crucifixion and Resurrection were (unbeknownst to them) actually witnessing his imposter twin.
Can Clark or Gerety disprove that hypothetical?
v) What about the possibility of overlooking a negation (“not”) in a sentence? To begin with, Clark expressed his opposition to sense knowledge in the form of sentences.
How can a Scripturalist make a case for Scripturalism without expressing himself in sentences? If you can’t articulate your case for Scripturalism without resorting to linguistic tokens, then the possibility of overlooking a negation vitiates the verbal case for Scripturalism.
vi) What about the reliability of memory? If a Clarkian questions the reliability of memory, that isn’t limited to empiricism. The same skepticism will infect Scripturalism.
Scripturalism equates knowledge with deducing propositions from Scripture. But that involves an act of memory. If you misremember the premise, you don’t know if the conclusion was validly inferred from the premise.
vii) The upshot is that if we take Clark’s skepticism seriously, not only would that prove the impossibility of empiricism, it would also and equally disprove the impossibility of Scripturalism.
Continuing with Gerety:
“For Clark, the acquisition of knowledge is not a sensory process and those who insist on a role for sensation are just begging the question. He argued that it is the Divine Logos ‘which lighteth every man’ and that Christ alone is the sin qua non of knowledge, not sensation.”
i) Clark’s appeal to Jn 1:9 is begging the question unless Clark can account for how he acquired his knowledge of Jn 1:9.
ii) Jn 1:9 was written in Greek. You can’t know Jn 1:9 in the original unless you know Greek. Knowledge of Greek involves a knowledge of comparative Greek usage. That’s inductive.
iii) Clark also misinterprets his prooftext. In context, Jn 1:9 has reference, not to general revelation, but special revelation.
“Clark writes: 'With less literary flourish than Malebranche’s peroration one may summarize by saying that truth concerns Ideas, Ideas are in God, and the mind can perceive them only there. These Ideas are alone the objects of thought. Nor can sensory images in any way be transformed into truth. In the language of antiquity and of modernity, abstract concepts can never be derived from sensory images. Though different human beings may and must have different sensations — for your pain is not mine — there is only one set or world of Ideas. It is the system of God’s mind, and we can see them only there'.”
Several problems:
i) How does Clark access divine ideas? Is Clark divine? If divine ideas inhere in God’s mind, how are they available to Gordon Clark?
He can’t appeal to the scriptures, for these are empirical objects.
ii) How does Clark know that different humans have different sensations? Does he mean that each normal human being has its own set of sense organs? I have a pair of eyes. You have a pair of eyes. Your eyes are different from mine?
If, so, how would Clark know, apart from using his own sensory receptors, that each human has his own set of sensory receptors? And doesn’t that also involve an inductive generalization?
iii) Clark fails to distinguish between raw stimuli and the use of sensory media to encode ideas in the form of sentences. Even if, for the sake of argument, you deny that raw stimuli can’t convey abstract concepts, it doesn’t follow that encoded stimuli can’t convey abstract concepts either.
Indeed, Clark is using encoded stimuli (written words) to transfer abstract concepts from his mind to the mind of the reader.
iv) Furthermore, it isn’t obvious why raw stimuli can’t be a source of abstract concepts. If I count 999 black ravens, then I form an abstract concept on the basis of my observation.
I observe 999 instances. I attach a number to my observations. That’s an abstract concept.
This doesn’t tell me that every raven is black. And I don’t derive my concept of enumeration from seeing a series of black ravens. But as a result of observing 999 ravens, I did form an abstract concept.
Likewise, if I play a game of pool, I observe a correlation between a given action and a given reaction. I don’t observe cause-and-effect. But I do observe a correlation. That’s an abstract concept.
Continuing with Gerety:
“Another way to think of Clark’s view, and one I think most Christians can easily grasp, is found in the Westminster Confession of Faith which states that belief in the truth of Scripture rests ultimately on ‘the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts’.”
This is a bait-and-switch tactic. There’s a fundamental difference between what makes something true or knowable, and what makes something believable. Belief is a relation between the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge. That’s distinct from whether the object of knowledge is true. Or whether a given truth is an object of knowledge (i.e. knowable).
“As Clark would repeat over and over, the Scriptures are not black ink marks on white pages in a black book. They are the eternal thoughts of God. Ink marks may provide an occasion by which we might come to know some of God’s thoughts, even to the saving of our souls, but the ink marks themselves reveal nothing.”
Is that what Scripture says about itself?
“Dr. W. Gary Crampton in his book, The Scripturalism of Gordon Clark, defends Clark’s position this way: God’s Word is eternal; the printed pages of the Bible are not. The letters or words on the printed page are signs or symbols which signify the eternal truth which is the mind of God, and which is communicated by God directly and immediately to the minds of men…Since all knowledge is propositional, and since the senses interacting with creation yield no propositions, knowledge cannot originate, be conveyed by, or be derived from sensation.”
i) Where does Scripture ever tell us that “the senses interacting with creation yield no propositions, knowledge cannot originate, be conveyed by, or be derived from sensation”?
That is not a Scriptural claim. That’s an extrascriptural claim.
ii) If the word of God is “communicated by God directly and immediately to the minds of men,” then the scriptures are superfluous. Clarkian epistemology represents a full-frontal assault on the Bible.
It’s far more radical than Fosdick or Bultmann or Spong. It’s an attack on the credibility of every single clause in the scriptures, from Genesis to Revelation.
iii) Does God upload the content of Scripture directly into the mind of every Christian? When does this occur, actly? Is this given in regeneration? Is every Christian a walking Bible, with every single verse at his cognitive fingertips?
iv) Or is this some form of occasionalism? If so, that has it’s own problems. To name a few:
a) Where does Scripture teach occasionalism?
b) Which version of the Bible does God upload?
c) Suppose a Christian is reading a unisex version of the Bible, like the TNIV. Does my idea of God’s word correspond to that occasional prop?
d) What if one Christian is reading an edition with the short ending of Mark while another Christian is reading an edition with the long ending of Mark. Does occasionalism upload rival editions?
“Ink marks, various pitched sounds, Braille, Morse code, sinographs, and whatever else that might be used to communicate are arbitrary conventions, and, in and of themselves, are meaningless signs signifying nothing. Black marks are neither true or false and cannot be properly the objects of knowledge for the simple reason that only propositions can be either true or false. Ink marks have meaning only insofar as rational minds assign them meaning.”
So what? There’s a reason why language is called symbolic discourse. The relation between word and object is a social convention.
To say these linguistic tokens are meaningless in and of themselves is irrelevant to the issue at hand.
It’s like a game of cards. By common consent, certain values are assigned to certain cards–from the deuce of clubs to the ace of spades. Same thing with chess.
Clark was reputed to be a fine chess-player. That involves the assignment of a distinctive “power” or set of “powers” to each chess piece. That’s a truth: an analytical truth. Truth by definition.
Analytical truths have their limitations. It’s not a good way to do history or science.
But it’s perfectly appropriate for games and sports and linguistic activities.
As a result, you can make truth-valued statements about a game of cards or a game of chess. Unless that’s possible, Gordon Clark could never win a game of chess. To win at chess, he had to form “justified true beliefs” about the various powers of the various chess pieces.
“Clark argued that if someone thinks there are truths embedded in ink scratches or which can somehow be derived by sensing them should provide some sort of argument to show how, starting with any number of black marks, they can arrive at any universal truth such as, ‘all men are sinners.’ Yet, not one of Clark’s critics even tried to overcome his challenge and to this day Clark’s critics merely beg the question when insisting on a role for sensation in the acquisition of knowledge.”
Is this paragraph true or false? Gerety’s statement is a series of linguistic tokens. Do these linguistic tokens embed truth-valued propositions?
He accuses us of “begging the question.” But “begging the question” is a verbal phrase. So Gerety is begging the question when he uses that verbal phrase to deny the truth-value of linguistic propositions.
Poor little Gerety keeps banging his birdbrain against the same window. He never tires of smashing his avian skull into that window.
In his post, Sean attacks the notion that ink marks on a page convey knowledge. To make his case, Sean uses ink marks on a page to prove that ink marks on a page can’t prove anything.
Well, to be more precise, he uses electronically simulated ink marks on a page to prove that ink marks on a page can’t prove anything.
Assuming that Sean’s demonstration is successful, we can safely disregard his entire post, since his entire post consists of ink marks on a page.
Indeed, we can safely disregard his entire blog. Why bother to read his blog when his blog consists of electronically simulated ink marks on a page?
But, for the sake of argument, let’s waive his self-defeating exercise and press ahead.
“Which brings me to what may be the biggest hurdle most people have in coming to grips with Clark’s biblical epistemology and that is his complete rejection of the belief that sensation plays a role in knowledge. Needless to say, the rejection of sensation in the acquisition of knowledge seems counter-intuitive and not at all in accord with so-called ‘common-sense.’ Didn’t God give us sensations and sense organs so that we might come to know Him? Well, not necessarily. After all, and as Clark would say, God gave us stomachs too, but that doesn’t mean that stomachs have an epistemic function…although he was quick to add that it’s hard to study if you don’t eat.”
i) Is that supposed to be an intelligent response? What does that comparison amount to? Is that supposed to be an argument from analogy?
But when the question at issue is sense-knowledge, why think a stomach is analogous to an eye or ear? A stomach is not a sensory organ. It wasn’t designed to perceive the external world.
Gerety might as well say: “Didn’t silversmiths give us steak knives to cut steaks with? Well, not necessarily. After all, and as Clark would say, silversmiths gave us forks and spoons too, but that doesn’t mean you can cut a steak with a spoon.”
Well, suppose you can’t cut a steak with a spoon. Does that also mean you can’t cut a steak with a steak knife? Does that mean a steak knife wasn’t designed to cut steak?
What possesses Gerety to think that Clark’s reply is any sort of counterargument to the issue at hand?
ii) But suppose, for the sake of argument, that we accept the comparison. While a stomach isn’t a sensory organ, per se, a stomach does sense certain things. If you drink a nauseating fluid, the stomach will make you feel nauseous. So even a stomach is a source of sense-knowledge.
“But don’t we have to read the Bible with the eyes in our heads? Clark’s critics routinely argue that even if we accept Clark’s position that knowledge is limited to those things set down in Scripture and their necessary inferences, don’t we first have to read the Bible with our eyes? Or, to put it another way, isn’t knowledge necessarily mediated through the senses? Again, not so fast. Clark would reply, and in good lawyerly fashion, by answering this question with the question: How do you know you even have a Bible in your hands?”
Several problems with that response:
i) Is that a Scriptural objection to sense-knowledge? Does the Bible ever pose that question?
ii) According to the Book of Acts, Paul would go into synagogues and reason with his fellow Jews from the Scriptures. Suppose one of his listeners tried to deflect Paul’s appeal by saying: “Paul, how do you know you even have a scroll of Isaiah in your hands?”
Does Gerety think that would be a sound objection to Paul’s practice? Is Paul begging the question by waiving their own copy of Isaiah in their face? Quoting from the scroll which the synagogue kept in its own library?
Gerety isn’t raising a scriptural objection to sense knowledge. Quite the contrary. Gerety is raising an extrascriptural objection to sense knowledge.
iv) What is more, he’s raising an extrascriptural objection to the scriptures. To the written record of God’s word. When a Christian turns to the Bible to quote a passage of Scripture, Gerety’s response is to say, “How do you know you even have a Bible in your hands?”
How in the world does Gerety think that’s a Christian response to the possibility of sense-knowledge?
v) Answering a question with a question is not an answer: rather, it’s a way of ducking the question.
Clark is trying to shift the burden of proof. But even if his opponent ought to be able to answer Clark’s question, that doesn’t absolve Clark of the corresponding requirement to answer the opponent’s question. And even if his opponent were unable to answer Clark’s question, that doesn’t absolve Clark (or Gerety) of shouldering his own burden of proof.
“To which Clark replied: The substantial question is how do we know the contents of the Bible. If Louis XIV or my wife could be replaced with an imposter twin, then maybe the Bible in my hand is a cunningly devised substitute. Mavrodes lays this on rather heavily, and I am glad that he does. So few people are willing to give the point any serious attention. He also mentions, and I wish he had discussed, solipsism; there are also the skeptical arguments of Carneades and Aenesidemus; and as well Descartes’ omnipotent deceptive demon. In fact, until these arguments are successfully circumvented, no one has a firm basis on which to object to my general position… I must point out that he has not met the issue when he says, ‘Sense experience is required for the derivation of such [Biblical] belief’ and ‘every consistent epistemology which assigns a role to the Bible…must assign a role of equal scope and in precisely the same area to sense perception.’ To make such assertions presupposes satisfactory answers to Aenesidemus and Descartes’ demon. Can it be shown that an imposter twin is impossible? Can we be sure that we have not overlooked a ‘not’ in the sentence? There are even greater empirical scandals than these. How can one prove the reliability of memory? Any test designed to show which memory is true and which is mistaken presupposes that a previous memory is true – and this is the point in question. In large measure the psychological force of my position derives from the impossibility of empiricism.”
Several more problems:
i) Once again, how does citing the objections of Carneades, Aenesidemus, and Descartes to sense-knowledge constitute a Scriptural objection to sense-knowledge? These are secular objections. Extrascriptural objections. Pagan objections!
But, according to Scripturalism, extrascriptural objections wouldn’t be knowledgeable objections. At best they’d be merely opinionated objections, and, at worst, ignorant objections. Moreover, you can’t tell which is which.
So why is a Christian “empiricist” obliged to answer objections to sense-knowledge which, according to Scripturalism, are nothing more than philosophers opining against sense-knowledge? These are merely the opinions of Carneades, Aenesidemus, and Descartes. But unless their arguments are demonstrably true, why is a Christian “empiricist” obligated to refute them?
ii) Suppose a Christian layman can’t circumvent the objections of Carneades and Aenesidemus? So what? Does Scripture require a Christian to be able to refute philosophical objections to sense-knowledge?
iii) Suppose a Christian layman, or even a Christian philosopher, can’t disprove a skeptical thought-experiment? So what? Does Scripture require us to refute skeptical thought-experiments?
For that matter, is it the case that we can’t know anything or justifiably believe anything unless we can refute a skeptical thought-experiment?
Why should we make that artificial demand a precondition of knowledge or warranted belief?
iv) What about solipsism? What about Cartesian demons? These aren’t objections to empiricism, per se. These could just as well be deployed against Scripturalism.
If Scripturalism affirms the existence of the external world while solipsism denies the existence of the external world, then even on Scripturalist assumptions no Christian has a justified true belief in the external world unless he can circumvent solipsism. And a Scripturalist can’t very well invoke the Bible to refute solipsism, for the Bible presupposes the existence of the external world–which is the very thing solipsism denies!
Likewise, Cartesian demons aren’t limited to sensory perception. Cartesian demons can be unleashed to bedevil absolute idealism.
The Scripturalist thinks that Jn 3:16 is a divine promise, but that idea was implanted in his mind by a Cartesian demon. How can Clark or Gerety disprove that hypothetical?
Hypothetically speaking, maybe Jesus had an imposter twin. Maybe his imposter twin was crucified. Maybe his imposter twin rose from the dead. Maybe the apostolic eyewitnesses to the crucifixion and Resurrection were (unbeknownst to them) actually witnessing his imposter twin.
Can Clark or Gerety disprove that hypothetical?
v) What about the possibility of overlooking a negation (“not”) in a sentence? To begin with, Clark expressed his opposition to sense knowledge in the form of sentences.
How can a Scripturalist make a case for Scripturalism without expressing himself in sentences? If you can’t articulate your case for Scripturalism without resorting to linguistic tokens, then the possibility of overlooking a negation vitiates the verbal case for Scripturalism.
vi) What about the reliability of memory? If a Clarkian questions the reliability of memory, that isn’t limited to empiricism. The same skepticism will infect Scripturalism.
Scripturalism equates knowledge with deducing propositions from Scripture. But that involves an act of memory. If you misremember the premise, you don’t know if the conclusion was validly inferred from the premise.
vii) The upshot is that if we take Clark’s skepticism seriously, not only would that prove the impossibility of empiricism, it would also and equally disprove the impossibility of Scripturalism.
Continuing with Gerety:
“For Clark, the acquisition of knowledge is not a sensory process and those who insist on a role for sensation are just begging the question. He argued that it is the Divine Logos ‘which lighteth every man’ and that Christ alone is the sin qua non of knowledge, not sensation.”
i) Clark’s appeal to Jn 1:9 is begging the question unless Clark can account for how he acquired his knowledge of Jn 1:9.
ii) Jn 1:9 was written in Greek. You can’t know Jn 1:9 in the original unless you know Greek. Knowledge of Greek involves a knowledge of comparative Greek usage. That’s inductive.
iii) Clark also misinterprets his prooftext. In context, Jn 1:9 has reference, not to general revelation, but special revelation.
“Clark writes: 'With less literary flourish than Malebranche’s peroration one may summarize by saying that truth concerns Ideas, Ideas are in God, and the mind can perceive them only there. These Ideas are alone the objects of thought. Nor can sensory images in any way be transformed into truth. In the language of antiquity and of modernity, abstract concepts can never be derived from sensory images. Though different human beings may and must have different sensations — for your pain is not mine — there is only one set or world of Ideas. It is the system of God’s mind, and we can see them only there'.”
Several problems:
i) How does Clark access divine ideas? Is Clark divine? If divine ideas inhere in God’s mind, how are they available to Gordon Clark?
He can’t appeal to the scriptures, for these are empirical objects.
ii) How does Clark know that different humans have different sensations? Does he mean that each normal human being has its own set of sense organs? I have a pair of eyes. You have a pair of eyes. Your eyes are different from mine?
If, so, how would Clark know, apart from using his own sensory receptors, that each human has his own set of sensory receptors? And doesn’t that also involve an inductive generalization?
iii) Clark fails to distinguish between raw stimuli and the use of sensory media to encode ideas in the form of sentences. Even if, for the sake of argument, you deny that raw stimuli can’t convey abstract concepts, it doesn’t follow that encoded stimuli can’t convey abstract concepts either.
Indeed, Clark is using encoded stimuli (written words) to transfer abstract concepts from his mind to the mind of the reader.
iv) Furthermore, it isn’t obvious why raw stimuli can’t be a source of abstract concepts. If I count 999 black ravens, then I form an abstract concept on the basis of my observation.
I observe 999 instances. I attach a number to my observations. That’s an abstract concept.
This doesn’t tell me that every raven is black. And I don’t derive my concept of enumeration from seeing a series of black ravens. But as a result of observing 999 ravens, I did form an abstract concept.
Likewise, if I play a game of pool, I observe a correlation between a given action and a given reaction. I don’t observe cause-and-effect. But I do observe a correlation. That’s an abstract concept.
Continuing with Gerety:
“Another way to think of Clark’s view, and one I think most Christians can easily grasp, is found in the Westminster Confession of Faith which states that belief in the truth of Scripture rests ultimately on ‘the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts’.”
This is a bait-and-switch tactic. There’s a fundamental difference between what makes something true or knowable, and what makes something believable. Belief is a relation between the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge. That’s distinct from whether the object of knowledge is true. Or whether a given truth is an object of knowledge (i.e. knowable).
“As Clark would repeat over and over, the Scriptures are not black ink marks on white pages in a black book. They are the eternal thoughts of God. Ink marks may provide an occasion by which we might come to know some of God’s thoughts, even to the saving of our souls, but the ink marks themselves reveal nothing.”
Is that what Scripture says about itself?
“Dr. W. Gary Crampton in his book, The Scripturalism of Gordon Clark, defends Clark’s position this way: God’s Word is eternal; the printed pages of the Bible are not. The letters or words on the printed page are signs or symbols which signify the eternal truth which is the mind of God, and which is communicated by God directly and immediately to the minds of men…Since all knowledge is propositional, and since the senses interacting with creation yield no propositions, knowledge cannot originate, be conveyed by, or be derived from sensation.”
i) Where does Scripture ever tell us that “the senses interacting with creation yield no propositions, knowledge cannot originate, be conveyed by, or be derived from sensation”?
That is not a Scriptural claim. That’s an extrascriptural claim.
ii) If the word of God is “communicated by God directly and immediately to the minds of men,” then the scriptures are superfluous. Clarkian epistemology represents a full-frontal assault on the Bible.
It’s far more radical than Fosdick or Bultmann or Spong. It’s an attack on the credibility of every single clause in the scriptures, from Genesis to Revelation.
iii) Does God upload the content of Scripture directly into the mind of every Christian? When does this occur, actly? Is this given in regeneration? Is every Christian a walking Bible, with every single verse at his cognitive fingertips?
iv) Or is this some form of occasionalism? If so, that has it’s own problems. To name a few:
a) Where does Scripture teach occasionalism?
b) Which version of the Bible does God upload?
c) Suppose a Christian is reading a unisex version of the Bible, like the TNIV. Does my idea of God’s word correspond to that occasional prop?
d) What if one Christian is reading an edition with the short ending of Mark while another Christian is reading an edition with the long ending of Mark. Does occasionalism upload rival editions?
“Ink marks, various pitched sounds, Braille, Morse code, sinographs, and whatever else that might be used to communicate are arbitrary conventions, and, in and of themselves, are meaningless signs signifying nothing. Black marks are neither true or false and cannot be properly the objects of knowledge for the simple reason that only propositions can be either true or false. Ink marks have meaning only insofar as rational minds assign them meaning.”
So what? There’s a reason why language is called symbolic discourse. The relation between word and object is a social convention.
To say these linguistic tokens are meaningless in and of themselves is irrelevant to the issue at hand.
It’s like a game of cards. By common consent, certain values are assigned to certain cards–from the deuce of clubs to the ace of spades. Same thing with chess.
Clark was reputed to be a fine chess-player. That involves the assignment of a distinctive “power” or set of “powers” to each chess piece. That’s a truth: an analytical truth. Truth by definition.
Analytical truths have their limitations. It’s not a good way to do history or science.
But it’s perfectly appropriate for games and sports and linguistic activities.
As a result, you can make truth-valued statements about a game of cards or a game of chess. Unless that’s possible, Gordon Clark could never win a game of chess. To win at chess, he had to form “justified true beliefs” about the various powers of the various chess pieces.
“Clark argued that if someone thinks there are truths embedded in ink scratches or which can somehow be derived by sensing them should provide some sort of argument to show how, starting with any number of black marks, they can arrive at any universal truth such as, ‘all men are sinners.’ Yet, not one of Clark’s critics even tried to overcome his challenge and to this day Clark’s critics merely beg the question when insisting on a role for sensation in the acquisition of knowledge.”
Is this paragraph true or false? Gerety’s statement is a series of linguistic tokens. Do these linguistic tokens embed truth-valued propositions?
He accuses us of “begging the question.” But “begging the question” is a verbal phrase. So Gerety is begging the question when he uses that verbal phrase to deny the truth-value of linguistic propositions.
Poor little Gerety keeps banging his birdbrain against the same window. He never tires of smashing his avian skull into that window.
A quick note on a quick note
Sean Gerety quotes this passage from John Robbins:
Knowledge is always true. One cannot know that 2 + 2 = 5. Opinions may be true or false. Ignorance is neither true nor false. What distinguishes a true opinion from knowledge is an account of that opinion: It is giving reasons. [Michael] Sudduth dared me to provide any passage of Scripture that so defines knowledge. It seems to me that there are many. For example, “Be ready to give a reason….” “To the Law and to the testimony: If they speak not according to that Word, there is no light in them.” “In Christ are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.” All, not some. Hidden, not available to discovery by men. The Scripture is both the content and the account on knowledge.
http://godshammer.wordpress.com/2009/05/18/john-robbins-quick-quote-2/
There are several problems with this argument:
1.Robbins cites a mathematical equation as a paradigm-case of knowledge. However, he didn’t get that example from Scripture. Although Scripture uses some numbers, it contains no formal equations. And even if it did contain a few equations, that would only be a tiny sampling of the infinite number of mathematical equations. Hence:
i) Robbins is using an extra scriptural example to illustrate Scripturalism.
ii) Robbins is using induction to illustrate Scripturalism. It’s not as if Robbins is acquainted with the infinite totality of mathematical equations.
2.Apropos (1), Robbins is also using mathematical truth as a paradigm-case of necessary truths or universal truths. But Scripture doesn’t teach that mathematical truths are necessary truths or unnecessary truths. Scripture is entirely silent on that issue. As far as Scripture is concerned, most mathematical truths might as well be contingent truths.
Although I think you can mount a good argument for the necessity and universality of mathematical truths, that’s not an argument that Robbins derived from Scripture.
3.Robbins also quotes some English translations of the Bible. But that creates a problem for Scripturalism:
i) Did Robbins derive his knowledge of the English language from reading the English Bible?
Didn’t Robbins acquire his basic command of the English language from being raised by English-speaking parents? And wasn’t that supplemented by hearing other English speakers and reading other English writers?
ii) Incidentally, does Gerety think we actually know a language? Given the empirical process involved in learning a language, wouldn’t our fluency rank as opinion or ignorance rather than knowledge?
But, in that case, our mastery of the English Bible (or any other Bible) would rank as opinion or ignorance rather than knowledge.
4.In his attempt to Scripturally define knowledge as opinion with an account, he alludes to 1 Pet 3:15. However,
i) This appeal is equivocal. There is more to the Clarkian definition of knowledge than giving an account or giving a reason for your opinion. It has to be the kind of reason or kind of account that falls within the strictures of a Clarkian epistemology. Not just any account will do. Only a certain type of account is permissible.
ii) Apropos 1 Pet 3:15, how did NT Christians account for their faith?
a) One method was their appeal to eyewitness testimony. Yet Gerety recently assured us that eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable.
b) Another method was their appeal to the OT scriptures.
But that assumes an empirical knowledge of the OT scriptures. For example, hearing them read aloud in the synagogue (Acts 15:21).
iii) Elsewhere, Gerety quotes Gary Crampton’s claim that the word of God “is communicated by God directly and immediately to the minds of men.”
http://godshammer.wordpress.com/2009/01/24/ink-marks-on-a-page/
But in that event, why would a Christian ever need to share his faith with an unbeliever? In that event, it would be up to God, and God alone, to evangelize the unbeliever by uploading his word into the mind of the unbeliever.
5.Robbins also alludes to Isa 8:20. However,
i) Isa 8:20 doesn’t restrict all knowledge to the Bible. In context, this is dealing with knowledge of the future. V20 stands in contrast to necromancy (v19). Isaiah’s point is that whatever is knowable about the future is to be found in God’s revelation regarding the future.
That, however, doesn’t restrict all knowledge to Scripture. In the nature of the case, our senses don’t convey to us a knowledge of the future. Our senses can only sense what is present to the senses. We don’t perceive the future because we don’t occupy the future.
This doesn’t mean, however, that you can’t sense the present or remember the past.
ii) Isa 8:20 is, itself, a sensory object. This is a written record of a little speech which the prophet Isaiah delivered to his audience. It presupposes the ability of a listener to learn a truth by hearing the spoken word. It also presupposes the ability of a reader to learn a truth by consulting the written record of the spoken word.
iii) Moreover, Isa refers his audience to spoken and written words: Isaiah “is attesting that a better alternative is available in the true words of God contained in the testimonies and laws (oral and written instructions) God gave the nation,” G. Smith, Isaiah 1–39 (Broadman 2007), 231.
So Isa 8:20 is a sensory object which, in turn, refers the audience to other sensory objects.
iv) Apropos (iii), in referring his audience to both “testimonies” and “laws,” Isaiah doesn’t limit himself to the Scriptures. The “testimonies” are oral communications.
6.Robbins alludes to Col 2:3.
i) Keep in mind that this verse is contained in a letter which Paul wrote to the Christians of Colossae. His letter was meant to be read aloud in church. This method of teaching presupposes the possibility of sense-knowledge.
ii) It was written in Greek. That presupposes a knowledge of the Greek language. Something his audience picked up by living among among Greek speakers. Apart from the possibility of sense-knowledge, this would not be a reliable means of teaching his audience.
iii) It’s ironic to see a Calvinist (Robbins) resort to Arminian hermeneutics (“all, not some”).
iv) Robbins rips 2:3 out of context. In context, the contrast between what is hidden and what is revealed refers back to 1:26, where it denotes the revelation of the Gospel to the Gentiles (cf. Rom 16:25; Eph 1:9; 3:6; 6:19).
So this is not about knowledge in general. Rather, it’s specific to the knowledge of the Gospel, including the place of the Gentiles in God’s redemptive plan.
Notice how often Clarkians indulge in perfunctory prooftexting without making any effort to exegete their proftexts.
Knowledge is always true. One cannot know that 2 + 2 = 5. Opinions may be true or false. Ignorance is neither true nor false. What distinguishes a true opinion from knowledge is an account of that opinion: It is giving reasons. [Michael] Sudduth dared me to provide any passage of Scripture that so defines knowledge. It seems to me that there are many. For example, “Be ready to give a reason….” “To the Law and to the testimony: If they speak not according to that Word, there is no light in them.” “In Christ are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.” All, not some. Hidden, not available to discovery by men. The Scripture is both the content and the account on knowledge.
http://godshammer.wordpress.com/2009/05/18/john-robbins-quick-quote-2/
There are several problems with this argument:
1.Robbins cites a mathematical equation as a paradigm-case of knowledge. However, he didn’t get that example from Scripture. Although Scripture uses some numbers, it contains no formal equations. And even if it did contain a few equations, that would only be a tiny sampling of the infinite number of mathematical equations. Hence:
i) Robbins is using an extra scriptural example to illustrate Scripturalism.
ii) Robbins is using induction to illustrate Scripturalism. It’s not as if Robbins is acquainted with the infinite totality of mathematical equations.
2.Apropos (1), Robbins is also using mathematical truth as a paradigm-case of necessary truths or universal truths. But Scripture doesn’t teach that mathematical truths are necessary truths or unnecessary truths. Scripture is entirely silent on that issue. As far as Scripture is concerned, most mathematical truths might as well be contingent truths.
Although I think you can mount a good argument for the necessity and universality of mathematical truths, that’s not an argument that Robbins derived from Scripture.
3.Robbins also quotes some English translations of the Bible. But that creates a problem for Scripturalism:
i) Did Robbins derive his knowledge of the English language from reading the English Bible?
Didn’t Robbins acquire his basic command of the English language from being raised by English-speaking parents? And wasn’t that supplemented by hearing other English speakers and reading other English writers?
ii) Incidentally, does Gerety think we actually know a language? Given the empirical process involved in learning a language, wouldn’t our fluency rank as opinion or ignorance rather than knowledge?
But, in that case, our mastery of the English Bible (or any other Bible) would rank as opinion or ignorance rather than knowledge.
4.In his attempt to Scripturally define knowledge as opinion with an account, he alludes to 1 Pet 3:15. However,
i) This appeal is equivocal. There is more to the Clarkian definition of knowledge than giving an account or giving a reason for your opinion. It has to be the kind of reason or kind of account that falls within the strictures of a Clarkian epistemology. Not just any account will do. Only a certain type of account is permissible.
ii) Apropos 1 Pet 3:15, how did NT Christians account for their faith?
a) One method was their appeal to eyewitness testimony. Yet Gerety recently assured us that eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable.
b) Another method was their appeal to the OT scriptures.
But that assumes an empirical knowledge of the OT scriptures. For example, hearing them read aloud in the synagogue (Acts 15:21).
iii) Elsewhere, Gerety quotes Gary Crampton’s claim that the word of God “is communicated by God directly and immediately to the minds of men.”
http://godshammer.wordpress.com/2009/01/24/ink-marks-on-a-page/
But in that event, why would a Christian ever need to share his faith with an unbeliever? In that event, it would be up to God, and God alone, to evangelize the unbeliever by uploading his word into the mind of the unbeliever.
5.Robbins also alludes to Isa 8:20. However,
i) Isa 8:20 doesn’t restrict all knowledge to the Bible. In context, this is dealing with knowledge of the future. V20 stands in contrast to necromancy (v19). Isaiah’s point is that whatever is knowable about the future is to be found in God’s revelation regarding the future.
That, however, doesn’t restrict all knowledge to Scripture. In the nature of the case, our senses don’t convey to us a knowledge of the future. Our senses can only sense what is present to the senses. We don’t perceive the future because we don’t occupy the future.
This doesn’t mean, however, that you can’t sense the present or remember the past.
ii) Isa 8:20 is, itself, a sensory object. This is a written record of a little speech which the prophet Isaiah delivered to his audience. It presupposes the ability of a listener to learn a truth by hearing the spoken word. It also presupposes the ability of a reader to learn a truth by consulting the written record of the spoken word.
iii) Moreover, Isa refers his audience to spoken and written words: Isaiah “is attesting that a better alternative is available in the true words of God contained in the testimonies and laws (oral and written instructions) God gave the nation,” G. Smith, Isaiah 1–39 (Broadman 2007), 231.
So Isa 8:20 is a sensory object which, in turn, refers the audience to other sensory objects.
iv) Apropos (iii), in referring his audience to both “testimonies” and “laws,” Isaiah doesn’t limit himself to the Scriptures. The “testimonies” are oral communications.
6.Robbins alludes to Col 2:3.
i) Keep in mind that this verse is contained in a letter which Paul wrote to the Christians of Colossae. His letter was meant to be read aloud in church. This method of teaching presupposes the possibility of sense-knowledge.
ii) It was written in Greek. That presupposes a knowledge of the Greek language. Something his audience picked up by living among among Greek speakers. Apart from the possibility of sense-knowledge, this would not be a reliable means of teaching his audience.
iii) It’s ironic to see a Calvinist (Robbins) resort to Arminian hermeneutics (“all, not some”).
iv) Robbins rips 2:3 out of context. In context, the contrast between what is hidden and what is revealed refers back to 1:26, where it denotes the revelation of the Gospel to the Gentiles (cf. Rom 16:25; Eph 1:9; 3:6; 6:19).
So this is not about knowledge in general. Rather, it’s specific to the knowledge of the Gospel, including the place of the Gentiles in God’s redemptive plan.
Notice how often Clarkians indulge in perfunctory prooftexting without making any effort to exegete their proftexts.
Gerety to Sudduth via Robbins via the Ouija Board
I'm assuming that Sean Gerety's "quick quote" from Robbins was meant as the "official reply" (cause it's better to say something rather than nothing) to the Sudduth post I posted the other day. I’ll assume that was the best he could muster.
If it would work, I'd triple dog dare Gerety to turn that post into a syllogism (supplying missing premises, etc). That way all the extra-Scriptural assumptions would be plain for all, including Gerety, to see. But, I think this is wishful thinking. Other than that, let's briefly respond to Robbins (oh, BTW, Sudduth had responded to that quote from Robbins on the Clark list numerous times and caught Robbins in some conceptual muddle-headedness):
"Knowledge is always true."
Deduce that from the Bible.
"One cannot know that 2 + 2 = 5."
Ironically, for Scripturalism, one cannot know that 2 + 2 = 4 either!
"Opinions may be true or false."
Deduce this from the Bible.
"Ignorance is neither true nor false."
Deduce that from the Bible.
"What distinguishes a true opinion from knowledge is an account of that opinion: It is giving reasons."
Can you do the deductions or give chapter and verse?
"[Michael] Sudduth dared me to provide any passage of Scripture that so defines knowledge."
Okay, so what comes next are the deductions of the verses.
"It seems to me that there are many."
What is this "it seems to me" business? No, you know that there are many, right? So let's have 'em.
1. "For example, 'Be ready to give a reason….'"
Yikes! Are you serious? This (part of the) verse from I Peter 3 is a "passage of Scripture that so defines knowledge" as "an account of [a true] opinion: It is giving reasons"? That's ridiculous. I mean, for starters, Peter is not even discussing the topic of "knowledge," much less trying to define it! Second, Peter isn't implying that the "hope" that Christians have is not known until the "reason" is given. Third, the "hope that is within you" isn't "every true opinion whatever." So, Robins goes far beyond the premises with his conclusion in this "exegesis." Finally, this verse wouldn't adjudicate between 1st and 2nd order epistemology. One could give a reason for why one doesn't need to give reasons for all knowledge claims.
2. “To the Law and to the testimony: If they speak not according to that Word, there is no light in them.”
Ummmmmmmmmm, yeah. Without even getting into this one, all one would need to do is cite the verse before 20 and it can be seen that Isaiah isn't defining knowledge as "giving an account of a true opinion": "19 When men tell you to consult mediums and spiritists, who whisper and mutter, should not a people inquire of their God? Why consult the dead on behalf of the living? 20 To the law and to the testimony! If they do not speak according to this word, they have no light of dawn.”
3. "In Christ are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.”
Nope, sorry. How in the world can one think this defines 'knowledge' in the way Robbins did, or that is even Paul's intent? This is an incompetent treatment of God's word. But Robbins's isn't done with this verse yet:
"All, not some."
Even if it were all, we haven't been given the exegesis of this passage where it means: Knowledge (in an epistemic sense, i.e., true belief with an extra ingredient that turns that into knowledge) is defined as "giving a account, a reason, for a true opinion." However, who says it's "all?" Where does Robbins get that that idea? Isn't he a Calvinist? Does "all" mean "all" just because it says "all?" I mean, even Gerety knows better. I found this statement on his blog today: "You’re starting to sound like those who cry ALL means ALL while asserting God’s universal desire for the salvation of all in 1Tim 2:4 and the word “world” in John 3:16 is proof of universal atonement."!
"Hidden, not available to discovery by men."
Well, since Robbins discovered this, I guess this is the proof we were looking for that shows he wasn’t a "man." If he didn't believe he was a man, why did he run for church office?
Anyway, as one email correspondent said regarding the above "exegesis":
Right, and that's why Scripturalism is self-referentially incoherent. I mean, sounds nice and pious, but it's definitely an instance of zeal without knowledge.
Oh, and to save Gerety the work, I'll offer his response: "The above is another hate-filled screed by another sub-Vantillian who can't see that Van Tillianism is on the way out. All they have are abusive ad hominems against the first and second greatest theologians of the 20th century. [Then, state the above in about 50 different ways, making what could be a one or two sentence response into a 10 page response.]"
If it would work, I'd triple dog dare Gerety to turn that post into a syllogism (supplying missing premises, etc). That way all the extra-Scriptural assumptions would be plain for all, including Gerety, to see. But, I think this is wishful thinking. Other than that, let's briefly respond to Robbins (oh, BTW, Sudduth had responded to that quote from Robbins on the Clark list numerous times and caught Robbins in some conceptual muddle-headedness):
"Knowledge is always true."
Deduce that from the Bible.
"One cannot know that 2 + 2 = 5."
Ironically, for Scripturalism, one cannot know that 2 + 2 = 4 either!
"Opinions may be true or false."
Deduce this from the Bible.
"Ignorance is neither true nor false."
Deduce that from the Bible.
"What distinguishes a true opinion from knowledge is an account of that opinion: It is giving reasons."
Can you do the deductions or give chapter and verse?
"[Michael] Sudduth dared me to provide any passage of Scripture that so defines knowledge."
Okay, so what comes next are the deductions of the verses.
"It seems to me that there are many."
What is this "it seems to me" business? No, you know that there are many, right? So let's have 'em.
1. "For example, 'Be ready to give a reason….'"
Yikes! Are you serious? This (part of the) verse from I Peter 3 is a "passage of Scripture that so defines knowledge" as "an account of [a true] opinion: It is giving reasons"? That's ridiculous. I mean, for starters, Peter is not even discussing the topic of "knowledge," much less trying to define it! Second, Peter isn't implying that the "hope" that Christians have is not known until the "reason" is given. Third, the "hope that is within you" isn't "every true opinion whatever." So, Robins goes far beyond the premises with his conclusion in this "exegesis." Finally, this verse wouldn't adjudicate between 1st and 2nd order epistemology. One could give a reason for why one doesn't need to give reasons for all knowledge claims.
2. “To the Law and to the testimony: If they speak not according to that Word, there is no light in them.”
Ummmmmmmmmm, yeah. Without even getting into this one, all one would need to do is cite the verse before 20 and it can be seen that Isaiah isn't defining knowledge as "giving an account of a true opinion": "19 When men tell you to consult mediums and spiritists, who whisper and mutter, should not a people inquire of their God? Why consult the dead on behalf of the living? 20 To the law and to the testimony! If they do not speak according to this word, they have no light of dawn.”
3. "In Christ are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.”
Nope, sorry. How in the world can one think this defines 'knowledge' in the way Robbins did, or that is even Paul's intent? This is an incompetent treatment of God's word. But Robbins's isn't done with this verse yet:
"All, not some."
Even if it were all, we haven't been given the exegesis of this passage where it means: Knowledge (in an epistemic sense, i.e., true belief with an extra ingredient that turns that into knowledge) is defined as "giving a account, a reason, for a true opinion." However, who says it's "all?" Where does Robbins get that that idea? Isn't he a Calvinist? Does "all" mean "all" just because it says "all?" I mean, even Gerety knows better. I found this statement on his blog today: "You’re starting to sound like those who cry ALL means ALL while asserting God’s universal desire for the salvation of all in 1Tim 2:4 and the word “world” in John 3:16 is proof of universal atonement."!
"Hidden, not available to discovery by men."
Well, since Robbins discovered this, I guess this is the proof we were looking for that shows he wasn’t a "man." If he didn't believe he was a man, why did he run for church office?
Anyway, as one email correspondent said regarding the above "exegesis":
As for Robbins' defense, it's rather telling that Scripturalists are"The Scripture is both the content and the account on knowledge."
so lazy when it comes to the actual exegesis of Scripture. Their high
view of Scripture seems admirable until you realize that it's only a
matter of form, not content.
Right, and that's why Scripturalism is self-referentially incoherent. I mean, sounds nice and pious, but it's definitely an instance of zeal without knowledge.
Oh, and to save Gerety the work, I'll offer his response: "The above is another hate-filled screed by another sub-Vantillian who can't see that Van Tillianism is on the way out. All they have are abusive ad hominems against the first and second greatest theologians of the 20th century. [Then, state the above in about 50 different ways, making what could be a one or two sentence response into a 10 page response.]"
Another John?
Steve Hays and Evan May recently linked to a good article, by Andreas Kostenberger and Stephen Stout, regarding Richard Bauckham's theory that the fourth gospel was written by another John, not the son of Zebedee, who also was a disciple of Jesus. For those interested in reading more on the subject, I've written some posts about it here, here, and here. I've also written about Ben Witherington's theory that Lazarus wrote the fourth gospel.
I would add a line of evidence that I don't remember including in any of the articles above. The early patristic sources are widely agreed that the apostle John lived to an old age. And both internal evidence and external evidence suggest that the fourth gospel was written by the same person who wrote the three Johannine epistles. Those epistles suggest that the author is old. He sometimes refers to himself as "the elder", for example, which seems to be best explained as at least partially a reference to his age. Some early patristic sources state or suggest that the fourth gospel was written last, which, when combined with the author's eyewitness status and other data we have, would suggest authorship by somebody who was old at the time. It seems, then, that if some other John wrote the fourth gospel, he had yet another unusual similarity with the son of Zebedee:
- Both were named John.
- Both were among Jesus' closest disciples.
- Both were close to Peter.
- Both were involved in fishing.
- Both lived to an old age.
We could add other similarities, such as that both were associated with Asia Minor.
Donald Guthrie had a good line on this subject, commenting on Dionysius of Alexandria, the first source we know of to speculate about a second John:
"In this Dionysius foreshadowed, as a man born before his due time, those modern schools of criticism which have peopled early Christian history with a whole army of unknown writers, whose works attained as great a prominence as their authors obtained obscurity." (The Logos Library System: Deluxe Collection [Oak Harbor, Washington: Logos Research Systems, 1997], New Testament Introduction)
I would add a line of evidence that I don't remember including in any of the articles above. The early patristic sources are widely agreed that the apostle John lived to an old age. And both internal evidence and external evidence suggest that the fourth gospel was written by the same person who wrote the three Johannine epistles. Those epistles suggest that the author is old. He sometimes refers to himself as "the elder", for example, which seems to be best explained as at least partially a reference to his age. Some early patristic sources state or suggest that the fourth gospel was written last, which, when combined with the author's eyewitness status and other data we have, would suggest authorship by somebody who was old at the time. It seems, then, that if some other John wrote the fourth gospel, he had yet another unusual similarity with the son of Zebedee:
- Both were named John.
- Both were among Jesus' closest disciples.
- Both were close to Peter.
- Both were involved in fishing.
- Both lived to an old age.
We could add other similarities, such as that both were associated with Asia Minor.
Donald Guthrie had a good line on this subject, commenting on Dionysius of Alexandria, the first source we know of to speculate about a second John:
"In this Dionysius foreshadowed, as a man born before his due time, those modern schools of criticism which have peopled early Christian history with a whole army of unknown writers, whose works attained as great a prominence as their authors obtained obscurity." (The Logos Library System: Deluxe Collection [Oak Harbor, Washington: Logos Research Systems, 1997], New Testament Introduction)
Monday, May 18, 2009
John Robbins, Empiricist!
“Let me define a couple terms, and then I will turn to the body of my paper, an examination of Scripture. First, I am not using word proposition in any novel fashion, but in its standard sense.”
http://www.trinityfoundation.org/PDF/240-241-BiblicalViewofTruth.pdf
This modest sounding claim is unintentionally revealing:
1.Scripturalists don’t seem to think you can know something unless you can define your terms. So unless Robbins can define “proposition,” that failure vitiates his whole theory of truth.
2.But it’s not enough to him to define a key term. He must define a key term consistent with his Scripturalist epistemology.
3.Apropos (2), he assures the reader that he’s using the “standard” sense of “proposition.”
And how would you determine the standard sense of a word? That would involve an inductive sampling of linguistic usage. Based on the frequency with which “proposition” is used in a certain sense, that would establish the “standard” sense.
But that procedure commits Robbins to the practical validity of induction. Meaning is determined by usage, and standard usage is determined by common usage–which can only be ascertained by examining a comparative sampling of popular or technical usage.
Yet Scripturalism assures us that induction can never yield knowledge.
4.Moreover, appeal to “standard” usage involves a tacit appeal to sense knowledge. Hearing the spoken word or reading the written word.
You can either take a shortcut by looking up the word in some dictionaries, or you can do what a lexicographer does, which is to conduct your own statistical survey of comparative usage.
Either way, this involves the use of the senses. And it’s based on a partial set of instances, such as period usage or usage by certain authors. A selective sampling.
5.As a result, Robbins must rely on empirical methods to make his case against empiricism. But, in that event, he’s disproven his proof. He can’t get started unless he takes, as his point of departure, a starting point which his conclusion denies.
Like a man trapped in a maze of trick mirrors, the Scripturalist keeps bumping into his own reflection. Every “door” is just another reflective wall. Every exit is just another trick mirror.
http://www.trinityfoundation.org/PDF/240-241-BiblicalViewofTruth.pdf
This modest sounding claim is unintentionally revealing:
1.Scripturalists don’t seem to think you can know something unless you can define your terms. So unless Robbins can define “proposition,” that failure vitiates his whole theory of truth.
2.But it’s not enough to him to define a key term. He must define a key term consistent with his Scripturalist epistemology.
3.Apropos (2), he assures the reader that he’s using the “standard” sense of “proposition.”
And how would you determine the standard sense of a word? That would involve an inductive sampling of linguistic usage. Based on the frequency with which “proposition” is used in a certain sense, that would establish the “standard” sense.
But that procedure commits Robbins to the practical validity of induction. Meaning is determined by usage, and standard usage is determined by common usage–which can only be ascertained by examining a comparative sampling of popular or technical usage.
Yet Scripturalism assures us that induction can never yield knowledge.
4.Moreover, appeal to “standard” usage involves a tacit appeal to sense knowledge. Hearing the spoken word or reading the written word.
You can either take a shortcut by looking up the word in some dictionaries, or you can do what a lexicographer does, which is to conduct your own statistical survey of comparative usage.
Either way, this involves the use of the senses. And it’s based on a partial set of instances, such as period usage or usage by certain authors. A selective sampling.
5.As a result, Robbins must rely on empirical methods to make his case against empiricism. But, in that event, he’s disproven his proof. He can’t get started unless he takes, as his point of departure, a starting point which his conclusion denies.
Like a man trapped in a maze of trick mirrors, the Scripturalist keeps bumping into his own reflection. Every “door” is just another reflective wall. Every exit is just another trick mirror.
BBR articles
- "The Use of Tradition-Material in the Epistle of Jude" by J. Daryl Charles
- "Who Needs 'The Historical Jesus'? An Essay-Review" by Jacob Neusner
- "West Semitic Texts and the Book of Joshua" by Richard Hess
- "The Evangelical Contribution to Understanding the (Early) History of Ancient Israel in Recent Scholarship" by James Hoffmeier
- "The Syntax of 1 Peter: Just How Good Is the Greek?" by Karen Jobes
- "The Codex and the Early Collection of Paul's Letters" by E. Randolph Richards
“The Disciple Jesus Loved”
Andreas Köstenberger and Stephen Stout respond to Richard Bauckham's view concerning the authorship of the fourth Gospel.
Monotheism & Trinitarianism
I recently had an email exchange over the Trinity. Since this is a topic of general interest, I’m going to post a slightly edited version of my side of the exchange.
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As Peter Geach pointed out in one of his books (don't ask me which one), when the OT says that God is "one," that is not a statement about a divine attribute, as if oneness is an attribute of God. It's not a statement about God's internal structure (as it were).
Rather, it's an economic statement about God's relation to the world. It stands in contrast to the "gods" of paganism. Pagan idolatry and demonology. "Gods" who can't see or hear or do anything (in Isaiah's stinging parody). That's hardly comparable to the persons of the Trinity.
In addition, even in the OT there are indications of divine complexity. How do we relate the Spirit of God to God himself? The Spirit of God is divine and personal, yet the Spirit of God is distinct from the God who sends it/him. Same thing about the Angel of the Lord.
There's this sent/sender relation involving several personal and evidently divine parties.
It's too "messy" for unitarian monotheism to naturally accommodate.
Finally, if Jesus wasn't the Messiah, who was? We're another 2000 years down the pike. Any better candidates in the docket?
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Just for starters, whatever else the monotheistic verses do or do not exclude, we know they don't exclude the sort of properties and relations which the OT attributes to the Spirit of God and the Angel of the Lord. That already imposes a tremendous strain on unitarian monotheism.
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You could try to explain the Spirit of God and the Angel of the Lord as intermediate buffers who both reveal and conceal the unapproachable God.
However, what's actually attributed to them goes beyond personification or representation. And, indeed, there is no third category between God and the creature.
Neoplatonism glosses this with its series of emanations, but that's pantheistic. Degrees of divinity.
OT monotheism won't tolerate that blurring of the lines.
Consider the scene with Abraham and the three angels. Now, there's a sense in which heavenly angels mediate the presence of God. Heavenly angels are broadly theophanic. God's emissaries on earth. However, two of the angels are creatures, whereas the third is in a different category altogether.
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The term [“God”] doesn't carry highly specified metaphysical baggage. It's just a name. A way of denoting a broad range of entities that are higher up the scale than men, animals, trees, or rocks.
It's used for all sorts of entities in ANE literature, with varying attributes.
You can't infer anything very specific from the term, beyond the fact that this term–like any referential term–is used to identify and differentiate one kind of thing from another kind of thing.
A "god" or "gods" is/are whatever non-gods are not. But the specific content has to be filled in by other sources of info.
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That's the wrong question to ask since the term itself isn't meant to be that metaphysically freighted.
For example, pagans will use the term with pagan referents in mind. So the "god" or "gods" will have whatever attributes that pagan mythology ascribes to them. Lower gods, higher gods, demonic gods, &c.
What makes Yahweh the true God in the OT is not the use of a particular name. The term "god" isn't meant to tell you anything about the psychological makeup of the being so denoted.
The use of a divine name isn't going to answer your question. That's a classic semantic fallacy. Words aren't concepts.
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That's culturebound and varies from one culture to another. It can also vary from one writing to another. What does a Calvinist mean by "God" versus an open theist versus a Hindu versus a Muslim versus a process theologian, &c.?
Divine speakers make first-person statements in the NT, too. So unless you think the NT can be plausibly reinterpreted along unitarian lines, your inference is fallacious.
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Likewise, Trinitarian Christians generally refer to God using singular nouns, pronouns, and verbs. It's only when we're going out of our way to distinguish the persons that we use more qualified expressions.
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In the OT, it stands in contrast to the sorts of "gods" whom Israel's pagan neighbors worshipped. Dagon, Baal, Ishtar, &c. And behind that lies OT demonology (what animates pagan idolatry).
In the NT, Jesus is claiming to be divine, in the same sense that Yahweh is divine.
Again, though, this is ordinary language, not technical language. It's not intended to draw fine nuances or express specialized concepts. That doesn't come from isolated words, but the larger context.
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The OT doesn't come close to making an assertion like that. It has numerous descriptions of God addressing man, or doing things in history. Inevitably these tend to be somewhat anthropomorphic in the way God represents himself–in a "man-to-man" type of dialogue. It also has some monotheistic statements explicitly contextualized in relation to pagan idolatry.
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Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Trinity is true, how else would that truth either be expressed or allowed for in the languages available to OT and/or NT writers?
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You raised the objection that the wording of OT monotheistic passages is in apparent tension with NT Trinitarian theology. You set this in contrast to specified trinitarian technical language. That would also involve an implicit contrast with ordinary language.
Since, for purposes of this discussion, the Trinity is at issue, I stated the question in conditional terms: "assuming, for the sake of argument..."
Given that the OT writers were using ordinary language, rather than technical language (which would be anachronistic), how else would they express themselves?
Wouldn't they express monotheism in much the same way regardless of whether God is unitarian or Trinitarian? We wouldn't expect OT writers to draw person/substance distinctions in their language, even if they were aware of God's Trinitarian nature (and I wouldn't expect them to have full revelation of that fact).
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I'm not talking about the meaning of words. You can't derive that from words alone.
It goes to the fact that just about every writer says less than he means. He takes for granted a cultural preunderstanding which he shares in common with his target audience. They fill in the blanks.
And that's what makes it difficult for a modern reader to understand everything in a book like Dante's Divine Comedy. We lack the common knowledge which a Medieval Italian reader would bring to the work. There are things that even leave Dante scholars scratching their heads.
I don't have any problem with the Trinitarian inferences we draw from the NT. My point is simply that the mere wording of the OT monotheistic passages does not, of itself, denote singular consciousness or personhood. Those don't come from the words alone. Those come from concepts which a reader associates with the OT descriptions of God. This involves a process of subconscious recognition on the part of the reader–involving analogy. A relation between the reader, who stands outside the text, and the text itself.
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True, but a cultural preunderstanding can include cultural universals as well as cultural particulars. Every human reader qua human can recognize from Biblical descriptions of God that God is a personal agent.
My point is that the actual OT usage doesn't distinguish between one person and three, or one center of consciousness and three.
There's a sense in which we project personhood or consciousness into these texts. It's not the bare wording alone. It's the ability of a human reader to recognize analogous traits.
There's nothing wrong with that projection. It's not the same thing as eisegesis. For the Bible is addressed to conscious beings or persons. It takes for granted the reader's ability to fill in the blanks.
But the wording itself doesn't use those categories. So it's neutral on single or multiple centers of consciousness.
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You can't infer personhood or consciousness from grammatical personhood. That's simply a linguistic convention. Even in English usage the third-person includes the neuter pronoun "it."
Moreover, Corporate entities can also use first-person speech along with explicit exclusions.
Furthermore, a fictitious character will also speak in the first-person. That doesn't mean a fictitious person is a conscious agent.
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In science fiction, would that hold true for an AI program? Is HAL one person? Is that even a meaningful question to ask?
What if an AI program had multiple-centers of consciousness. Why would it address a human being in the first-person plural rather than the first-person singular? How would that distinction between relevant to the conversation? The human conversation-partner doesn't have to know whether the AI program has one center of consciousness or several for the AI program to have a meaningful dialogue with its human conversation-partner.
I'd add that in real life, organizations often issue public statements using singular constructions even though the organization is a corporate entity, and the public statement may have been drafted by several different participants. Or them may reflect the collective viewpoint of the board.
There can be several minds behind the public statement, even though the statement assumes the grammatical viewpoint of a single spokesman or representative.
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Unless there's some particular reason why a Trinitarian God would address an audience in Trinitarian terms, there's no expectation to defeat.
And this is more than speculative. In the NT, which is undoubtedly Trinitarian, the Father speaks in the first person, and the Son speaks in the first person.
In NT narratives like the Book of Acts, divine speech is described in the same way as OT narrative. A first-person divine speaker, talking to people. Yet this doesn't mean that Luke was unitarian.
As I've said before, divine speech (i.e. recorded examples thereof) is generally speech between God and man. For purposes of communication or conversation, it's unnecessary for God to identify himself as a Trinitarian being. As a rule, this is not divine speech between one divine speaker and another. This is not about Trinitarian relations.
Rather, this is how the Creator relates to the creature. And he assumes certain anthropomorphic conventions in the process.
At the same time we also have some examples of divine speech between members of the Trinity, viz. the Father addressing Jesus and vice versa.
Yet it's not as if Trinitarian speech ordinarily employs the first-, second-, or third-person plural.
In addition, members of the Trinity use first-person constructions in the NT as well. The Father speaks. The Son speaks. But that is not meant to exclude another or other divine persons. The singular usage of the Father doesn't stand in antithetical contrast to the singular usage of the Son.
But God uses grammatical conventions because he's speaking to humans. As such, he uses idiomatic speech. And, when addressing human beings, he assumes the anthropomorphic viewpoint of "a" speaker addressing an audience.
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1. First of all, I disagree with where you place the burden of proof. There's no expectation that a Trinitarian being would speak in Trinitarian terms when addressing man unless his Trinitarian identity was relevant to the communication. Unless the purpose of the communication was to reveal his Trinitarian identity. And even then, there are various ways to reveal his Trinitarian identity. That doesn't depend on which pronoun is used.
Normally, I'd expect a Trinitarian being to assume the viewpoint of a speaker in a speaker/audience transaction when addressing one or more human beings.
By human standards, there's something a bit artificial about divine speech anyway. By human standards (especially in the ancient world, before the advent of electronic communication technologies), a speaker occupied the same space and timeframe as the audience. The speaker used vocal chords. And so on and so forth.
So, when we identify divine speech, we must make allowance for ontological differences between the divine speaker and the human audience.
2. What viewpoint does a 1st-person singular mode of address normally assume? You're supposing that it presumes a singular personal viewpoint. But I think, in large part, that you're simply getting that from the way we label certain pronouns.
However, to the extent that the choice of a personal pronoun is even intended to express something about the speaker, I wouldn't assume a singular pronoun expresses singularity. Rather, it expresses individuality. The speaker will use a singular pronoun because the speaker is an individual, speaking as an individual.
(Even then, an individual can speak on behalf of others. Act as a spokesman or representative. Other voices stand behind his voice.)
And this is perfectly consistent with Trinitarian theology. There is individuality within the Godhead. The Father is not the same individual as the Son, or the Spirit.
3. In addition, in Trinitarian theology, God is both one of something and three of something. Singularity and plurality are both characteristics of the Trinity. Even if a Trinitarian person were using a singular pronoun to express his singularity, that is not incompatible with the Trinity. Although God is not actually one person, God can speak as one person. The Son is the revelation of the Father.
4. Furthermore, and this is the third time I've made this point, in NT usage, singular pronouns are employed by and for divine speakers. Yet the NT is Trinitarian. So the singular usage is not intended to be exclusive. You're drawing an inference from Biblical usage which Bible writers wouldn't draw.
5. Finally, to reiterate another thing I've said before, the Bible is written in idiomatic language. It employs the conventions of human discourse. Even in the NT, it's not as if NT writers coin Trinitarian circumlocutions to refer to Trinitarian actions.
Presumably, though, you don't think that we can plausibly interpret the NT along unitarian lines, for your questions are based on the apparent contrast (to your own way of thinking) between OT and NT representations of God.
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I'd make an additional point. You're citation of OT prooftexts is lopsided.
For example, there are liberal Bible scholars who don't think the OT teaches consistent monotheism. For example, they think Exod 20:3 teaches monolatry or henotheism rather than monotheism.
Likewise, Margaret Barker takes the position that Israelite religion was ditheistic rather than monotheistic. Ancient Israelites worshipped two deities: a high God (Elohim) and a national God (Yahweh).
Liberal scholars account for this theological diversity (as they see it) by claiming that the OT preserves conflicting traditions. Monotheism eventually won out, but we can see traces of the older polytheism.
My point is not to endorse these aberrant interpretations. My point, rather, is that if the OT were clearly unitarian, these aberrant interpretations would have no foothold.
The OT witness to God is more complex than unitarianism absorb.
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On a final point: On the one hand, it's true that, in one respect, the Pentateuch sets the standard for what qualifies as true (subsequent) prophecy.
On the other hand, that's a rather lopsided way of viewing the issue. For the Pentateuch isn't just a backward-looking document. It's not merely about the past. The standard of the past.
It's also a forward-looking document. It's primarily concerned with a pattern of promise and fulfillment. Divine promises and historical fulfillments. Moreover, as scholars like Sailhamer and T. D. Alexander have documented, the Pentateuch already has a Messianic motif.
And, of course, a document like the book of Isaiah is, if anything, even more future-oriented.
So while the OT is, in some measure, a criterion of the NT, there is also a sense in which the NT is a criterion of the OT. The relation of promise and fulfillment is a two-way street.
On the one hand, the terms of the promise serve as a criterion for the terms of the fulfillment. On the other hand, the fulfillment is a confirmation of the promise.
At some juncture, the promises must come true to be true promises. If God never makes good on his promises, then he broke his promises. Or God never spoke in the first place.
So the OT is not a stand-alone document. There has to be some historical fulfillment which corresponds to the prophecies and promises to validate the prophecies and promises.
And this is one of the problems with modern Judaism. At what point in time do you stop waiting?
It's like a husband who never returns home. He leaves for work one morning, and never comes back. Does his wife spend her entire life waiting for him to walk through the door? Or is there a point at which she files for divorce (on grounds of desertion) and remarries?
The NT represents a balloon downpayment on God’s promises. Without the NT, the OT begins to lose its plausibility.
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As Peter Geach pointed out in one of his books (don't ask me which one), when the OT says that God is "one," that is not a statement about a divine attribute, as if oneness is an attribute of God. It's not a statement about God's internal structure (as it were).
Rather, it's an economic statement about God's relation to the world. It stands in contrast to the "gods" of paganism. Pagan idolatry and demonology. "Gods" who can't see or hear or do anything (in Isaiah's stinging parody). That's hardly comparable to the persons of the Trinity.
In addition, even in the OT there are indications of divine complexity. How do we relate the Spirit of God to God himself? The Spirit of God is divine and personal, yet the Spirit of God is distinct from the God who sends it/him. Same thing about the Angel of the Lord.
There's this sent/sender relation involving several personal and evidently divine parties.
It's too "messy" for unitarian monotheism to naturally accommodate.
Finally, if Jesus wasn't the Messiah, who was? We're another 2000 years down the pike. Any better candidates in the docket?
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Just for starters, whatever else the monotheistic verses do or do not exclude, we know they don't exclude the sort of properties and relations which the OT attributes to the Spirit of God and the Angel of the Lord. That already imposes a tremendous strain on unitarian monotheism.
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You could try to explain the Spirit of God and the Angel of the Lord as intermediate buffers who both reveal and conceal the unapproachable God.
However, what's actually attributed to them goes beyond personification or representation. And, indeed, there is no third category between God and the creature.
Neoplatonism glosses this with its series of emanations, but that's pantheistic. Degrees of divinity.
OT monotheism won't tolerate that blurring of the lines.
Consider the scene with Abraham and the three angels. Now, there's a sense in which heavenly angels mediate the presence of God. Heavenly angels are broadly theophanic. God's emissaries on earth. However, two of the angels are creatures, whereas the third is in a different category altogether.
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The term [“God”] doesn't carry highly specified metaphysical baggage. It's just a name. A way of denoting a broad range of entities that are higher up the scale than men, animals, trees, or rocks.
It's used for all sorts of entities in ANE literature, with varying attributes.
You can't infer anything very specific from the term, beyond the fact that this term–like any referential term–is used to identify and differentiate one kind of thing from another kind of thing.
A "god" or "gods" is/are whatever non-gods are not. But the specific content has to be filled in by other sources of info.
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That's the wrong question to ask since the term itself isn't meant to be that metaphysically freighted.
For example, pagans will use the term with pagan referents in mind. So the "god" or "gods" will have whatever attributes that pagan mythology ascribes to them. Lower gods, higher gods, demonic gods, &c.
What makes Yahweh the true God in the OT is not the use of a particular name. The term "god" isn't meant to tell you anything about the psychological makeup of the being so denoted.
The use of a divine name isn't going to answer your question. That's a classic semantic fallacy. Words aren't concepts.
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That's culturebound and varies from one culture to another. It can also vary from one writing to another. What does a Calvinist mean by "God" versus an open theist versus a Hindu versus a Muslim versus a process theologian, &c.?
Divine speakers make first-person statements in the NT, too. So unless you think the NT can be plausibly reinterpreted along unitarian lines, your inference is fallacious.
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Likewise, Trinitarian Christians generally refer to God using singular nouns, pronouns, and verbs. It's only when we're going out of our way to distinguish the persons that we use more qualified expressions.
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In the OT, it stands in contrast to the sorts of "gods" whom Israel's pagan neighbors worshipped. Dagon, Baal, Ishtar, &c. And behind that lies OT demonology (what animates pagan idolatry).
In the NT, Jesus is claiming to be divine, in the same sense that Yahweh is divine.
Again, though, this is ordinary language, not technical language. It's not intended to draw fine nuances or express specialized concepts. That doesn't come from isolated words, but the larger context.
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The OT doesn't come close to making an assertion like that. It has numerous descriptions of God addressing man, or doing things in history. Inevitably these tend to be somewhat anthropomorphic in the way God represents himself–in a "man-to-man" type of dialogue. It also has some monotheistic statements explicitly contextualized in relation to pagan idolatry.
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Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Trinity is true, how else would that truth either be expressed or allowed for in the languages available to OT and/or NT writers?
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You raised the objection that the wording of OT monotheistic passages is in apparent tension with NT Trinitarian theology. You set this in contrast to specified trinitarian technical language. That would also involve an implicit contrast with ordinary language.
Since, for purposes of this discussion, the Trinity is at issue, I stated the question in conditional terms: "assuming, for the sake of argument..."
Given that the OT writers were using ordinary language, rather than technical language (which would be anachronistic), how else would they express themselves?
Wouldn't they express monotheism in much the same way regardless of whether God is unitarian or Trinitarian? We wouldn't expect OT writers to draw person/substance distinctions in their language, even if they were aware of God's Trinitarian nature (and I wouldn't expect them to have full revelation of that fact).
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I'm not talking about the meaning of words. You can't derive that from words alone.
It goes to the fact that just about every writer says less than he means. He takes for granted a cultural preunderstanding which he shares in common with his target audience. They fill in the blanks.
And that's what makes it difficult for a modern reader to understand everything in a book like Dante's Divine Comedy. We lack the common knowledge which a Medieval Italian reader would bring to the work. There are things that even leave Dante scholars scratching their heads.
I don't have any problem with the Trinitarian inferences we draw from the NT. My point is simply that the mere wording of the OT monotheistic passages does not, of itself, denote singular consciousness or personhood. Those don't come from the words alone. Those come from concepts which a reader associates with the OT descriptions of God. This involves a process of subconscious recognition on the part of the reader–involving analogy. A relation between the reader, who stands outside the text, and the text itself.
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True, but a cultural preunderstanding can include cultural universals as well as cultural particulars. Every human reader qua human can recognize from Biblical descriptions of God that God is a personal agent.
My point is that the actual OT usage doesn't distinguish between one person and three, or one center of consciousness and three.
There's a sense in which we project personhood or consciousness into these texts. It's not the bare wording alone. It's the ability of a human reader to recognize analogous traits.
There's nothing wrong with that projection. It's not the same thing as eisegesis. For the Bible is addressed to conscious beings or persons. It takes for granted the reader's ability to fill in the blanks.
But the wording itself doesn't use those categories. So it's neutral on single or multiple centers of consciousness.
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You can't infer personhood or consciousness from grammatical personhood. That's simply a linguistic convention. Even in English usage the third-person includes the neuter pronoun "it."
Moreover, Corporate entities can also use first-person speech along with explicit exclusions.
Furthermore, a fictitious character will also speak in the first-person. That doesn't mean a fictitious person is a conscious agent.
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In science fiction, would that hold true for an AI program? Is HAL one person? Is that even a meaningful question to ask?
What if an AI program had multiple-centers of consciousness. Why would it address a human being in the first-person plural rather than the first-person singular? How would that distinction between relevant to the conversation? The human conversation-partner doesn't have to know whether the AI program has one center of consciousness or several for the AI program to have a meaningful dialogue with its human conversation-partner.
I'd add that in real life, organizations often issue public statements using singular constructions even though the organization is a corporate entity, and the public statement may have been drafted by several different participants. Or them may reflect the collective viewpoint of the board.
There can be several minds behind the public statement, even though the statement assumes the grammatical viewpoint of a single spokesman or representative.
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Unless there's some particular reason why a Trinitarian God would address an audience in Trinitarian terms, there's no expectation to defeat.
And this is more than speculative. In the NT, which is undoubtedly Trinitarian, the Father speaks in the first person, and the Son speaks in the first person.
In NT narratives like the Book of Acts, divine speech is described in the same way as OT narrative. A first-person divine speaker, talking to people. Yet this doesn't mean that Luke was unitarian.
As I've said before, divine speech (i.e. recorded examples thereof) is generally speech between God and man. For purposes of communication or conversation, it's unnecessary for God to identify himself as a Trinitarian being. As a rule, this is not divine speech between one divine speaker and another. This is not about Trinitarian relations.
Rather, this is how the Creator relates to the creature. And he assumes certain anthropomorphic conventions in the process.
At the same time we also have some examples of divine speech between members of the Trinity, viz. the Father addressing Jesus and vice versa.
Yet it's not as if Trinitarian speech ordinarily employs the first-, second-, or third-person plural.
In addition, members of the Trinity use first-person constructions in the NT as well. The Father speaks. The Son speaks. But that is not meant to exclude another or other divine persons. The singular usage of the Father doesn't stand in antithetical contrast to the singular usage of the Son.
But God uses grammatical conventions because he's speaking to humans. As such, he uses idiomatic speech. And, when addressing human beings, he assumes the anthropomorphic viewpoint of "a" speaker addressing an audience.
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1. First of all, I disagree with where you place the burden of proof. There's no expectation that a Trinitarian being would speak in Trinitarian terms when addressing man unless his Trinitarian identity was relevant to the communication. Unless the purpose of the communication was to reveal his Trinitarian identity. And even then, there are various ways to reveal his Trinitarian identity. That doesn't depend on which pronoun is used.
Normally, I'd expect a Trinitarian being to assume the viewpoint of a speaker in a speaker/audience transaction when addressing one or more human beings.
By human standards, there's something a bit artificial about divine speech anyway. By human standards (especially in the ancient world, before the advent of electronic communication technologies), a speaker occupied the same space and timeframe as the audience. The speaker used vocal chords. And so on and so forth.
So, when we identify divine speech, we must make allowance for ontological differences between the divine speaker and the human audience.
2. What viewpoint does a 1st-person singular mode of address normally assume? You're supposing that it presumes a singular personal viewpoint. But I think, in large part, that you're simply getting that from the way we label certain pronouns.
However, to the extent that the choice of a personal pronoun is even intended to express something about the speaker, I wouldn't assume a singular pronoun expresses singularity. Rather, it expresses individuality. The speaker will use a singular pronoun because the speaker is an individual, speaking as an individual.
(Even then, an individual can speak on behalf of others. Act as a spokesman or representative. Other voices stand behind his voice.)
And this is perfectly consistent with Trinitarian theology. There is individuality within the Godhead. The Father is not the same individual as the Son, or the Spirit.
3. In addition, in Trinitarian theology, God is both one of something and three of something. Singularity and plurality are both characteristics of the Trinity. Even if a Trinitarian person were using a singular pronoun to express his singularity, that is not incompatible with the Trinity. Although God is not actually one person, God can speak as one person. The Son is the revelation of the Father.
4. Furthermore, and this is the third time I've made this point, in NT usage, singular pronouns are employed by and for divine speakers. Yet the NT is Trinitarian. So the singular usage is not intended to be exclusive. You're drawing an inference from Biblical usage which Bible writers wouldn't draw.
5. Finally, to reiterate another thing I've said before, the Bible is written in idiomatic language. It employs the conventions of human discourse. Even in the NT, it's not as if NT writers coin Trinitarian circumlocutions to refer to Trinitarian actions.
Presumably, though, you don't think that we can plausibly interpret the NT along unitarian lines, for your questions are based on the apparent contrast (to your own way of thinking) between OT and NT representations of God.
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I'd make an additional point. You're citation of OT prooftexts is lopsided.
For example, there are liberal Bible scholars who don't think the OT teaches consistent monotheism. For example, they think Exod 20:3 teaches monolatry or henotheism rather than monotheism.
Likewise, Margaret Barker takes the position that Israelite religion was ditheistic rather than monotheistic. Ancient Israelites worshipped two deities: a high God (Elohim) and a national God (Yahweh).
Liberal scholars account for this theological diversity (as they see it) by claiming that the OT preserves conflicting traditions. Monotheism eventually won out, but we can see traces of the older polytheism.
My point is not to endorse these aberrant interpretations. My point, rather, is that if the OT were clearly unitarian, these aberrant interpretations would have no foothold.
The OT witness to God is more complex than unitarianism absorb.
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On a final point: On the one hand, it's true that, in one respect, the Pentateuch sets the standard for what qualifies as true (subsequent) prophecy.
On the other hand, that's a rather lopsided way of viewing the issue. For the Pentateuch isn't just a backward-looking document. It's not merely about the past. The standard of the past.
It's also a forward-looking document. It's primarily concerned with a pattern of promise and fulfillment. Divine promises and historical fulfillments. Moreover, as scholars like Sailhamer and T. D. Alexander have documented, the Pentateuch already has a Messianic motif.
And, of course, a document like the book of Isaiah is, if anything, even more future-oriented.
So while the OT is, in some measure, a criterion of the NT, there is also a sense in which the NT is a criterion of the OT. The relation of promise and fulfillment is a two-way street.
On the one hand, the terms of the promise serve as a criterion for the terms of the fulfillment. On the other hand, the fulfillment is a confirmation of the promise.
At some juncture, the promises must come true to be true promises. If God never makes good on his promises, then he broke his promises. Or God never spoke in the first place.
So the OT is not a stand-alone document. There has to be some historical fulfillment which corresponds to the prophecies and promises to validate the prophecies and promises.
And this is one of the problems with modern Judaism. At what point in time do you stop waiting?
It's like a husband who never returns home. He leaves for work one morning, and never comes back. Does his wife spend her entire life waiting for him to walk through the door? Or is there a point at which she files for divorce (on grounds of desertion) and remarries?
The NT represents a balloon downpayment on God’s promises. Without the NT, the OT begins to lose its plausibility.
On Scripturalism and (some of) its Epistemological Shortcomings
* posted on behalf of Dr. Michael Sudduth
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Scripturalism I: Knowing the Axioms and Giving an Account
According to Scripturalism, we must distinguish between statements that are axioms and statements that are (valid) deductions from axioms. For the Scripturalist, the axioms are the statements of Scripture, or to be more precise, the axioms are those statements of Scripture that cannot be deduced from any of the other statements of Scripture. Furthermore, according to the Scripturalist, knowledge is limited to the explicit statements of Scripture and what may be validly deduced from these statements. Scripturalists also maintain that "knowledge is a true opinion with an account of its truth" (John Robbins, "An Introduction to Gordon Clark", Trinity Review, July, August, 1993, p. 5).
Apart from the fact that I've yet to see any Scripturalist validly deduce the above claims from Scripture, there's another serious problem with the Scripturalist position. The idea that knowledge requires "giving an account" or "citing reasons" does not cohere with this axiomatic-deductive model to which Scripturalists adhere. The conclusion of a deductive argument can only be known if the premises are known. Similarly, theorems can only be items of knowledge if the axioms from which they are deduced are items of knowledge. But it's at best unclear whether the axioms of Scripture are the sort of statements for which "an account" can be given. But even if this is possible (in principle it's possible to offer reasons for any statement) belief in the axioms must constitute knowledge independent of the activity of citing reasons.
The whole point of an axiomatic-deductive system is to terminate the giving of reasons with statements that are basic or foundational, which do not stand in need of any proof or demonstration. But then such statements must constitute knowledge independent of our ability to cite reasons for them or give an account of their truth. Scripturalism needs the category of immediate knowledge, but there can be no immediate knowledge if knowledge requires the activity of giving an account, citing reasons, demonstrating, proving, etc. And without immediate knowledge, we end up with some form of coherentist justification or an infinite regress of justification. It's hard to see how any belief can be justified if we're committed to either of these options. And the Scripturalist needs to show why his position isn't committed to either of these options.
My suspicion is that some Scripturalists have fallen victim to a basic conceptual confusion. For example, on the one hand they say that "knowledge needs to be accounted for." On the other hand, they say that "knowledge requires giving an account." This at least gives the impression that they are confusing what is required for knowledge claims to be justified and what is necessary for a true belief to constitute knowledge. Perhaps they don't see the distinction here at all. It's a fairly common epistemic level confusion to suppose that in order for one's belief to count as knowledge a person must know something about the epistemic status of one's belief. Perhaps Scripturalists can bring greater clarity to their position by specifying what exactly we are supposed to be giving an account of? The truth of the belief that p? S's belief that p constitutes knowledge? And what precisely does it mean to give "an account"?
Historically, the Platonist conception of knowledge as justified true belief refers to providing an account of the truth of some belief that p. "The account" does not consist of an epistemological theory but simply citing reasons or having grounds for the truth of a specific belief, or more precisely, reasons or grounds that rule out a belief's being true by epistemic serendipity. Hence, S knows that p only if S's belief that p is justified in a way that rules out accidentally true belief. Of course, in speaking of knowledge as "true belief with an account" (Meno 97e-98a) Socrates was doing epistemology, but it's a conceptual confusion to conflate this higher-order activity and the conditions of knowledge.
I discuss such confusions in connection with Reformed epistemology in "Alstonian Foundationlism and Higher-Level Theistic Evidentialism" (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (February 1995)).
Scripturalism II: On Being Doxastically Challenged
(1) All men are sinners.
(2) Michael Sudduth is a man.
Therefore
(3) Michael Sudduth is a sinner.
Regarding this syllogism, Scripturalist Sean Gerety recently wrote:
One wonders what epistemic principles, if any, guide the Scripturalist in the adoption or retention of extra-biblical beliefs. The Scripturalist begins with the fairly conservative epistemic notion that we can know only those propositions for which there is a justification from Scripture, that is, that can be deduced from Scripture (or which are explicitly stated in Scripture). But the Scripturalist ends up in practice with what appears to be a fairly liberal view of what we are actually permitted to believe and utilize in syllogistic inferences. At any rate, the Scripturalist concedes that much of what he believes amounts only to an opinion, but there's only so much mileage to be had by saying, "Well, this is just my opinion. I admit it isn't knowledge, but it's my opinion." They must admit that such beliefs are not knowledge because they are unjustified. I fail to see how a person can be epistemically rational in holding beliefs he recognizes have no epistemic merit whatsoever. His recognition gives him a defeater for his belief. Consequently, Gerety is irrational to believe that he weighs less than four hundred pounds. He's irrational to believe that he has a right arm, that his head is not made out of blown glass, and that he does not regularly consult the Ouija board to divine the beliefs of authors he's never read.
_______________________________
Scripturalism I: Knowing the Axioms and Giving an Account
According to Scripturalism, we must distinguish between statements that are axioms and statements that are (valid) deductions from axioms. For the Scripturalist, the axioms are the statements of Scripture, or to be more precise, the axioms are those statements of Scripture that cannot be deduced from any of the other statements of Scripture. Furthermore, according to the Scripturalist, knowledge is limited to the explicit statements of Scripture and what may be validly deduced from these statements. Scripturalists also maintain that "knowledge is a true opinion with an account of its truth" (John Robbins, "An Introduction to Gordon Clark", Trinity Review, July, August, 1993, p. 5).
Apart from the fact that I've yet to see any Scripturalist validly deduce the above claims from Scripture, there's another serious problem with the Scripturalist position. The idea that knowledge requires "giving an account" or "citing reasons" does not cohere with this axiomatic-deductive model to which Scripturalists adhere. The conclusion of a deductive argument can only be known if the premises are known. Similarly, theorems can only be items of knowledge if the axioms from which they are deduced are items of knowledge. But it's at best unclear whether the axioms of Scripture are the sort of statements for which "an account" can be given. But even if this is possible (in principle it's possible to offer reasons for any statement) belief in the axioms must constitute knowledge independent of the activity of citing reasons.
The whole point of an axiomatic-deductive system is to terminate the giving of reasons with statements that are basic or foundational, which do not stand in need of any proof or demonstration. But then such statements must constitute knowledge independent of our ability to cite reasons for them or give an account of their truth. Scripturalism needs the category of immediate knowledge, but there can be no immediate knowledge if knowledge requires the activity of giving an account, citing reasons, demonstrating, proving, etc. And without immediate knowledge, we end up with some form of coherentist justification or an infinite regress of justification. It's hard to see how any belief can be justified if we're committed to either of these options. And the Scripturalist needs to show why his position isn't committed to either of these options.
My suspicion is that some Scripturalists have fallen victim to a basic conceptual confusion. For example, on the one hand they say that "knowledge needs to be accounted for." On the other hand, they say that "knowledge requires giving an account." This at least gives the impression that they are confusing what is required for knowledge claims to be justified and what is necessary for a true belief to constitute knowledge. Perhaps they don't see the distinction here at all. It's a fairly common epistemic level confusion to suppose that in order for one's belief to count as knowledge a person must know something about the epistemic status of one's belief. Perhaps Scripturalists can bring greater clarity to their position by specifying what exactly we are supposed to be giving an account of? The truth of the belief that p? S's belief that p constitutes knowledge? And what precisely does it mean to give "an account"?
Historically, the Platonist conception of knowledge as justified true belief refers to providing an account of the truth of some belief that p. "The account" does not consist of an epistemological theory but simply citing reasons or having grounds for the truth of a specific belief, or more precisely, reasons or grounds that rule out a belief's being true by epistemic serendipity. Hence, S knows that p only if S's belief that p is justified in a way that rules out accidentally true belief. Of course, in speaking of knowledge as "true belief with an account" (Meno 97e-98a) Socrates was doing epistemology, but it's a conceptual confusion to conflate this higher-order activity and the conditions of knowledge.
I discuss such confusions in connection with Reformed epistemology in "Alstonian Foundationlism and Higher-Level Theistic Evidentialism" (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (February 1995)).
Scripturalism II: On Being Doxastically Challenged
(1) All men are sinners.
(2) Michael Sudduth is a man.
Therefore
(3) Michael Sudduth is a sinner.
Regarding this syllogism, Scripturalist Sean Gerety recently wrote:
"Yes. And I believe the minor premise is true, but since I have no idea how to account for the truth of the statement, Sudduth is a man, I have no reason to raise my belief to the level of knowledge. To do that I would have to redefine what I mean by knowledge. It would be more like an opinion. In that case I would probably be a so-called “Reformed Epistemologist.”Gerety says that he believes that "Michael Sudduth is a man", though he is unable to give an account of the truth of the belief. Now it isn't clear what precisely "giving an account" of the truth of the belief amounts to for Gerety, but it's clear that Gerety's belief that "Michael Sudduth is a man" is unjustified by his own epistemic standards. Moreover, this is not an anomaly in Gerety's doxastic life. I suspect that Gerety holds a lot of beliefs that do not rise to the level of knowledge because he can't account for the truth of those beliefs. For example, presumably Gerety believes that he's more than two feet tall, weighs less than four hundred pounds, has two arms, and is neither a Visa card nor the Great Pumpkin that comes to visit every Halloween. Yet he continues to hold these unjustified beliefs while recognizing that they are unjustified. Seeing that Gerety can't provide an account of the truth of these beliefs, why does he continue to hold them? Perhaps he can't rid himself of these epistemically unjustified beliefs. He is doxastically challenged, but he's no less irrational for continuing to hold such beliefs given that he recognizes that they are unjustified.
One wonders what epistemic principles, if any, guide the Scripturalist in the adoption or retention of extra-biblical beliefs. The Scripturalist begins with the fairly conservative epistemic notion that we can know only those propositions for which there is a justification from Scripture, that is, that can be deduced from Scripture (or which are explicitly stated in Scripture). But the Scripturalist ends up in practice with what appears to be a fairly liberal view of what we are actually permitted to believe and utilize in syllogistic inferences. At any rate, the Scripturalist concedes that much of what he believes amounts only to an opinion, but there's only so much mileage to be had by saying, "Well, this is just my opinion. I admit it isn't knowledge, but it's my opinion." They must admit that such beliefs are not knowledge because they are unjustified. I fail to see how a person can be epistemically rational in holding beliefs he recognizes have no epistemic merit whatsoever. His recognition gives him a defeater for his belief. Consequently, Gerety is irrational to believe that he weighs less than four hundred pounds. He's irrational to believe that he has a right arm, that his head is not made out of blown glass, and that he does not regularly consult the Ouija board to divine the beliefs of authors he's never read.
Sunday, May 17, 2009
When the Commanding Officer is AWOL
There’s been a big flap in the news about the fact that Notre Dame invited Barack Obama to be the Commencement speaker this year, as well as awarding him an honorary degree. Various Catholics protested this action.
Out of curiosity, I checked out the Notre Dame website. I see that the president of Notre Dame is Fr. John Jenkins. He’s an ordained Catholic priest.
This raises an obvious question: I assume that as a Catholic priest, he is answerable to one or more prelates in the hierarchy. I presume he took a vow of obedience.
Therefore, I further presume that one of his religious superiors had the authority to order him to either rescind the invitation, rescind plans to award Obama an honorary doctorate, or both. So, assuming that the Magisterium disapproves of what Notre Dame was contemplating, why didn’t anyone in the Magisterium put his foot down and stop it from going forward?
I think it must be very frustrating to be a loyal Catholic layman. You follow your church’s moral teachings. You defend your church’s moral teachings. You protest violations of your church’s moral teachings.
Yet, so often, the titular leaders who issuing these teachings leave you hanging out to dry. They’re like field commanders who order their troops into battle, but when the dutiful foot soldiers look over their shoulders, the field commanders have fled the scene of battle.
This happens over and over again. Zealous Catholic laymen carry the Catholic banner into battle, only to be deserted by their commanders. They volunteer to take up positions on the front lines, but there’s no backup from their commanders. Their commanders sit out the fight. Abandon them to the enemy.
Isn’t there something fundamentally wrong with a religious institution in which the titular leaders of the institution almost never exert meaningful leadership?
In ancient times, a commander would lead his troops into battle. That’s what made him a leader. He didn’t order his men to take a risk which he himself was not prepared to take.
But, time and again, the hierarchy indoctrinates the laity in its solemn duties, only to leave the laity holding the bag whenever effective action needs to be taken. Not only don’t their religious superiors lead them into battle, they don’t even follow them into battle. They absent themselves at the first sign of conflict. From a comfortable distance, they watch you cut down by the enemy.
When will Catholic laymen ever learn? How often to they have to have the ground cut out from under them by their own leadership before they wise up? If you keep marching into battle while your commanders are retreating from the battlefield, isn’t it time to cashier your generals?
Why stand up for Catholic teachings when your teachers refuse to stand behind you? If they don’t stand behind what they teach, by their deeds as well as their words, then what use are they? If, time after time, it’s the laity that has to exert real leadership, then why continue to pay lip-service to a spineless, rudderless hierarchy?
Out of curiosity, I checked out the Notre Dame website. I see that the president of Notre Dame is Fr. John Jenkins. He’s an ordained Catholic priest.
This raises an obvious question: I assume that as a Catholic priest, he is answerable to one or more prelates in the hierarchy. I presume he took a vow of obedience.
Therefore, I further presume that one of his religious superiors had the authority to order him to either rescind the invitation, rescind plans to award Obama an honorary doctorate, or both. So, assuming that the Magisterium disapproves of what Notre Dame was contemplating, why didn’t anyone in the Magisterium put his foot down and stop it from going forward?
I think it must be very frustrating to be a loyal Catholic layman. You follow your church’s moral teachings. You defend your church’s moral teachings. You protest violations of your church’s moral teachings.
Yet, so often, the titular leaders who issuing these teachings leave you hanging out to dry. They’re like field commanders who order their troops into battle, but when the dutiful foot soldiers look over their shoulders, the field commanders have fled the scene of battle.
This happens over and over again. Zealous Catholic laymen carry the Catholic banner into battle, only to be deserted by their commanders. They volunteer to take up positions on the front lines, but there’s no backup from their commanders. Their commanders sit out the fight. Abandon them to the enemy.
Isn’t there something fundamentally wrong with a religious institution in which the titular leaders of the institution almost never exert meaningful leadership?
In ancient times, a commander would lead his troops into battle. That’s what made him a leader. He didn’t order his men to take a risk which he himself was not prepared to take.
But, time and again, the hierarchy indoctrinates the laity in its solemn duties, only to leave the laity holding the bag whenever effective action needs to be taken. Not only don’t their religious superiors lead them into battle, they don’t even follow them into battle. They absent themselves at the first sign of conflict. From a comfortable distance, they watch you cut down by the enemy.
When will Catholic laymen ever learn? How often to they have to have the ground cut out from under them by their own leadership before they wise up? If you keep marching into battle while your commanders are retreating from the battlefield, isn’t it time to cashier your generals?
Why stand up for Catholic teachings when your teachers refuse to stand behind you? If they don’t stand behind what they teach, by their deeds as well as their words, then what use are they? If, time after time, it’s the laity that has to exert real leadership, then why continue to pay lip-service to a spineless, rudderless hierarchy?
Apostolic Authority And The New Testament Canon
Abbreviations
CNT = Bruce Metzger, The Canon Of The New Testament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997)
ECD = J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (San Francisco, California: HarperCollins Publishers, 1978)
TAF = Michael Holmes, ed., The Apostolic Fathers (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 2005)
TCD = Lee McDonald and James Sanders, edd., The Canon Debate (Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002)
In the process of addressing the standards by which the early Christians judged which books should be included in the New Testament canon, J.N.D. Kelly wrote:
"the criterion which ultimately came to prevail was apostolicity. Unless a book could be shown to come from the pen of an apostle, or at least to have the authority of an apostle behind it, it was peremptorily rejected, however edifying or popular with the faithful it might be." (ECD, 60)
How far back can we trace the standard of apostolicity, which "ultimately came to prevail", and is it valid? Lee McDonald and James Sanders write:
"There is little doubt among canon scholars that authorship by an apostle was the most important factor considered by the church leaders of the fourth and following centuries. If it was believed that an apostle produced a particular writing, that writing was accepted and treated as scripture." (TCD, 7)
We can trace the concept back further. Eusebius, who lived in the late third and early fourth centuries, said that he relied on earlier sources for his conclusions about the canon. He refers to the New Testament documents as "the sacred writings which they [the apostles] have left us", and he refers to the standard of "apostolic orthodoxy" (Church History, 3:31). Everett Kalin writes:
"As far as Eusebius is concerned, what is required for canonicity is that a writing come from apostolic times and itself be apostolic, either in the sense that it was written by an apostle or handed down by the apostles." (TCD, 403)
Peter Balla comments:
"It remains plausible that from a very early time, indeed, from the production of apostolic writings claiming high authority, there was a process involving the writings, attributed to Jesus' apostles, that were being read and re-read in the congregations of the mainstream church. These writings guided the early Christian community in their everyday life and in their beliefs just as did the Septuagint ('Old Testament')....The fact that writings attributed to the apostles were copied repeatedly, as per the manuscript evidence, and that they were published in codices, points to their widespread usage in the congregations, probably in worship from an early date, though we do not know exactly when." (TCD, 384-385)
Lee McDonald includes ante-Nicene sources, like Irenaeus, when he writes:
"From early times the church's most important weapon against gnostics and other 'heretics' was its claim to apostolicity, which guaranteed that its oral and written traditions were genuine....The authoritative New Testament literature reflected the 'apostolic deposit.' The church upheld the apostolic witness in its sacred literature as a way of grounding its faith in Jesus, represented by the apostles' teaching...when the apostolic authorship of ancient writings was doubted, typically their canonical status was also questioned....The church excluded from the biblical canon any writings that it believed were written after the period of apostolic ministry." (TCD, 424-426, 431)
Irenaeus refers to:
"the only true and life-giving faith, which the Church has received from the apostles and imparted to her sons. For the Lord of all gave to His apostles the power of the Gospel, through whom also we have known the truth, that is, the doctrine of the Son of God; to whom also did the Lord declare: 'He that heareth you, heareth Me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth Me, and Him that sent Me.' We have learned from none others the plan of our salvation, than from those through whom the Gospel has come down to us, which they did at one time proclaim in public, and, at a later period, by the will of God, handed down to us in the Scriptures, to be the ground and pillar of our faith." (Against Heresies, 3, Preface; 3:1:1)
Elsewhere, he refers to the four gospels as "the Gospels of the Apostles...which have been handed down to us from the apostles" (Against Heresies, 3:11:9). Notice that even the gospels of Mark and Luke, who weren't apostles, are seen as apostolic books. The Christian faith is apostolic, and apostolic documents are scripture.
Francois Bovon notes that the same standard is found in earlier sources:
"In my opinion, the Gospel-Apostle structure, manifest from the first generation of Christians, prepares the way for the formation of a new body of scriptures as a complement or counterpart to the holy scriptures (the Septuagint) inherited by the church. The formation of the New Testament canon was therefore the logical materialization of this theological structure....it [the early church] recognized the importance of these two elements, Gospel and Apostle, Christ and his disciples. The First Epistle of Clement of Rome (ca. 95-98) clearly defines this demarcated structure: 'The apostles received the good news for us from our Savior, Jesus Christ; Jesus, the Christ, was sent by God. Thus Christ comes from God and the apostles come from Christ; the two were sent out in good order by the will of God' (1 Clement 42:1-2). For his part, Ignatius of Antioch (ca. 115) encourages the Magnesians to remain firm 'in the teachings of the Savior and the apostles.' He urges the presbyters and deacons to support the bishop as their invaluable spiritual leader; as leader, the bishop in turn must submit to the apostles of Christ. Some years later, between 110 and 130, Papias of Hierapolis insisted on an apostolic mediation that would bring the Christians of his time into contact with the early manifestation of truth in Jesus....In his Apology, Aristides (ca. 140) inscribes the faith of Christians within the structure of Gospel and Apostle....there is evidence of a parallel track traveled by other Christian communities and movements. What is striking about these other texts, be they gnostic, Jewish-Christian, or apocryphal, is that they are also aware of the bipolar structure of Gospel and Apostle, even if they occasionally order them in different ways." (TCD, 522-525)
As Everett Ferguson observes, the "Gospel and Apostle" structure seems to be another way of referring to apostolicity:
"A shorthand expression of the authorities recognized by Christians was 'prophets and apostles,' it being understood that the Lord's authority stood behind both. This appears already in 2 Pet 3:2, 'Remember the words spoken in the past by the holy prophets, and the commandment of the Lord and Savior spoken through your apostles.' It serves as a summary of the scriptures read in church, according to Justin, 1 Apol. 67.3 (cf. Dial. 119.6). In the Muratorian Fragment, lines 77-78, the Shepherd was excluded from public reading because it did not belong to either of these categories. Compare the 'prophetic and apostolic meadow,' Clement of Alexandria's summary of the sources of knowledge (Strom. 1.1). This terminology may be seen as sketching a theology of the 'pre-Canon' or 'proto-Canon.' The two-part Christian Bible may also be anticipated in the reference to 'the books and the apostles' in 2 Clem. 14.2." (TCD, 306-307)
Why, then, would these early sources, sometimes the same sources, include a reference to "Gospel" along with a reference to the apostles? Perhaps for more than one reason. As Bovon notes, above, the term "Gospel" can be equated with Christ. Jesus was the authority behind the apostles, so there may have been a desire to emphasize that fact by including a reference to the gospels, biographies of Christ, along with the reference to apostles. And the Old Testament was commonly referred to by the bipolar, as Bovon puts it, structure of the Law and the Prophets. The bipolar structure of Gospel and Apostle may have been intended to parallel that Old Testament structure, even though the New Testament structure could be collapsed into one category and sometimes was. Jesus didn't write the gospels. Two of the gospels were written by apostles, and the other two were written by associates of the apostles. Note the passage from Irenaeus quoted above, in which he refers to all four gospels as apostolic. Similarly, Justin Martyr refers to the gospels as "the memoirs of the apostles" (First Apology, 67), even though he knows that some of them were written by "those who followed them" (Dialogue With Trypho, 103). It seems that the Gospel and Apostle structure Bovon refers to isn't different from apostolicity in any way that's significant in this context. Serapion comments that "we, brethren, receive both Peter and the other apostles as Christ" (Eusebius, Church History, 6:12). The word "Gospel" in "Gospel and Apostle" may have been intended to emphasize the fact that the authority of Christ was behind the authority of the apostles.
Everett Ferguson comments on the early acceptance of apostolic documents as scripture:
"Although second-century Christian authors accepted the Old Testament as scripture, they used the New Testament writings, in relation to their quantity, much more than the Old Testament. Citation as 'scripture' appears to be less significant than the overwhelming use and importance attached to the writings that form the core of our New Testament....In terms of the significance of scriptural status, there is no time when Christians did not treat the writings that would become the New Testament as scripture." (TCD, 298)
Clement of Rome refers to Paul's first letter to the Corinthians as having been written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit (First Clement, 47). Though the early Christians would sometimes refer to non-canonical sources as inspired, it's worth noting that Clement's comments are consistent with seeing 1 Corinthians as scripture. Papias and a source he appeals to, probably the apostle John, refer to the accuracy of Mark's gospel, including how Mark wrote without error (Eusebius, Church History, 3:39). Again, though such a view of Mark could be held by somebody who didn't view the book as scripture, the comments of Papias and his source are consistent with the scriptural status of the gospel of Mark. Polycarp refers to Ephesians as scripture (Letter To The Philippians, 12). The Epistle Of Barnabas refers to the gospel of Matthew as scripture (4). Second Clement does the same (2). Justin Martyr comments that Christian churches in general read the gospels along with the Old Testament scriptures in their church services (First Apology, 67).
We can go back further than the earliest patristic sources. Christianity came out of Judaism, a belief system that had a concept of scripture for hundreds of years prior to the time of Christ. The earliest Christians believed that God had become a man, had delivered a new revelation, had established a kingdom, and had commissioned the apostles (Matthew 28:18-20, John 1:1-14, Acts 1:8), who would judge the twelve tribes of Israel (Luke 22:30). The apostles were foundational to the church (1 Corinthians 12:28, Ephesians 2:20, 4:11, 2 Peter 3:2, Revelation 21:14). They were comparable to the prophets of the Old Testament era (2 Peter 3:2), who wrote scripture, among other things. It seems unlikely that the earliest Christians would have believed that the God of Israel had communicated His revelation to His people through scripture for centuries, but would only give His people fallible writings from those who were commissioned to deliver the most significant revelation of all.
In a letter that some would consider the earliest Christian document we have today, the apostle Paul referred to the message of the apostles as "the word of God" (1 Thessalonians 2:13). Elsewhere, Paul refers to what he's writing as "the Lord's commandment" (1 Corinthians 14:37). He expects his teachings, oral and written, to be followed (2 Thessalonians 2:15), and he expects Christians to separate from those who don't follow those teachings (2 Thessalonians 3:6, 3:14). As Lee McDonald notes:
"It is also clear that Paul's letters were intended to be read publicly in churches, and this implies that they were viewed as something like scripture. Notice, for example, the authoritative tone in many passages in his letters that suggests that Paul also viewed his writings as authoritative if not prophetic (1 Cor 5:3-5; 6:1-6; 7:10-11, 17-20, 40; 11:23-34; Gal 5:1-4, passim)." (TCD, n. 9 on 419)
Everett Ferguson writes:
"Moody Smith's 1999 presidential address to the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in Boston carries us back to the very composition of the gospels. Accepting the distinction between scripture and canon, Smith examined the gospels for indications that the authors understood themselves to be writing scripture. He finds appreciable evidence in Matthew and Luke that they were continuing the Old Testament story, were imitating it, and were writing a definitive account of the coming of Jesus and his place in the history of salvation. The intent of Mark and John in this regard was less obvious, but there is evidence that they too were functioning as scripture from quite early. This is implicit, according to Smith, in the commonly accepted view that Matthew and Luke used Mark, and in the way that 1 John presupposes the Fourth Gospel and was engaged in exegetical controversy over its meaning. The continuity of these gospels with the Old Testament story contrasts with the apocryphal gospels, notably the Gospel of Thomas. This finding coincides with the fact that there is no time in Christian history after the writing of the four gospels when one can find evidence of their not being accepted as scripture." (TCD, 303)
John's gospel refers to how the apostles will be guided by the Holy Spirit in "all things" and will remember what Jesus taught them (John 14:26, 15:26-27), the sort of supernatural guidance that would occur if a gospel like John's were written as scripture. Paul seems to cite Luke's gospel as scripture in 1 Timothy 5:18. Paul's letters are referred to as scripture in 2 Peter 3:15-16. John tells us that Christ commanded him to write (Revelation 1:11), and he tells us that Christ approved of the contents of the book (Revelation 22:7).
It seems, judging from both the New Testament and patristic sources, that apostolic documents are scripture. The concept didn't originate in the fourth century or in some earlier post-apostolic generation, but within the apostolic era itself.
The meaning of apostolicity should be clarified further. It wasn't enough for a document to be written during the time of the apostles or by a disciple of an apostle. As Bruce Metzger observed:
"Although both [Clement of Rome and Ignatius] display a certain air of authority, there is no longer any consciousness of apostolic authority. They look back at the venerable figures of the apostles as leaders in an age now past (1 Clem. v. 3-7; xlii. 1 ff.; xlvii. 1 ff.; Ign. Trall. ii. 2; Magn. vi. 1; vii. 2; xiii. 1)....Polycarp's mind is not only saturated with ideas and phrases derived from a considerable number of writings that later came to be regarded as New Testament Scriptures, but he also displays latent respect for these apostolic documents as possessing an authority lacking in other writings. Polycarp, as Grant remarks, 'clearly differentiates the apostolic age from his own time and, presumably for this reason, does not use the letters of Ignatius as authorities - even though they 'contain faith, endurance, and all the edification which pertains to our Lord' (xiii. 2)'." (CNT, 5, 63)
Men like Clement of Rome, Papias, and Polycarp were perceived as disciples of the apostles, yet their writings weren't considered scripture. It should be noted that the apostle John seems to have lived until around the close of the first century, and that First Clement was written in the late first century. Irenaeus refers to the apostle John as having lived until the time of the emperor Trajan (Against Heresies, 2:22:5), who came to power in the year 98. And First Clement has been dated earlier than that. Michael Holmes notes that there "is widespread agreement in dating this letter about A.D. 95-97", and he gives some reasons why (TAF, 23-24). Some people date First Clement even earlier. Yet, First Clement wasn't commonly considered scripture by the early Christians. It seems that it wasn't enough for a document to be written in apostolic times, even by a disciple of the apostles, like Clement. Some people would also date other documents outside of the canon, like The Shepherd Of Hermas, to the late first century.
The best explanation of the data is that apostolicity involved apostolic approval. Clement may have written his letter when John was still alive, but without the approval of John. And Polycarp, for example, didn't write until after the death of the apostles. Not only does defining apostolicity as involving apostolic approval make more sense of the exclusion of a document like First Clement, but it also makes more sense as a concept. Why conclude that a document is scripture just because it was a Christian document written during the time of the apostles? We have good evidence for the authority of the apostles, but not for the authority of all Christian writers in the timeframe in which the apostles lived. The latter doesn't follow from the former.
If apostolicity, defined as apostolic approval, is a canonical criterion, then what are the results of the application of that criterion? Does it justify our twenty-seven-book New Testament? Or something less than that? Should we trust the early Christians' judgments about who wrote the relevant documents and whether the documents are apostolic? I'll address those issues in future posts.
CNT = Bruce Metzger, The Canon Of The New Testament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997)
ECD = J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (San Francisco, California: HarperCollins Publishers, 1978)
TAF = Michael Holmes, ed., The Apostolic Fathers (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 2005)
TCD = Lee McDonald and James Sanders, edd., The Canon Debate (Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2002)
In the process of addressing the standards by which the early Christians judged which books should be included in the New Testament canon, J.N.D. Kelly wrote:
"the criterion which ultimately came to prevail was apostolicity. Unless a book could be shown to come from the pen of an apostle, or at least to have the authority of an apostle behind it, it was peremptorily rejected, however edifying or popular with the faithful it might be." (ECD, 60)
How far back can we trace the standard of apostolicity, which "ultimately came to prevail", and is it valid? Lee McDonald and James Sanders write:
"There is little doubt among canon scholars that authorship by an apostle was the most important factor considered by the church leaders of the fourth and following centuries. If it was believed that an apostle produced a particular writing, that writing was accepted and treated as scripture." (TCD, 7)
We can trace the concept back further. Eusebius, who lived in the late third and early fourth centuries, said that he relied on earlier sources for his conclusions about the canon. He refers to the New Testament documents as "the sacred writings which they [the apostles] have left us", and he refers to the standard of "apostolic orthodoxy" (Church History, 3:31). Everett Kalin writes:
"As far as Eusebius is concerned, what is required for canonicity is that a writing come from apostolic times and itself be apostolic, either in the sense that it was written by an apostle or handed down by the apostles." (TCD, 403)
Peter Balla comments:
"It remains plausible that from a very early time, indeed, from the production of apostolic writings claiming high authority, there was a process involving the writings, attributed to Jesus' apostles, that were being read and re-read in the congregations of the mainstream church. These writings guided the early Christian community in their everyday life and in their beliefs just as did the Septuagint ('Old Testament')....The fact that writings attributed to the apostles were copied repeatedly, as per the manuscript evidence, and that they were published in codices, points to their widespread usage in the congregations, probably in worship from an early date, though we do not know exactly when." (TCD, 384-385)
Lee McDonald includes ante-Nicene sources, like Irenaeus, when he writes:
"From early times the church's most important weapon against gnostics and other 'heretics' was its claim to apostolicity, which guaranteed that its oral and written traditions were genuine....The authoritative New Testament literature reflected the 'apostolic deposit.' The church upheld the apostolic witness in its sacred literature as a way of grounding its faith in Jesus, represented by the apostles' teaching...when the apostolic authorship of ancient writings was doubted, typically their canonical status was also questioned....The church excluded from the biblical canon any writings that it believed were written after the period of apostolic ministry." (TCD, 424-426, 431)
Irenaeus refers to:
"the only true and life-giving faith, which the Church has received from the apostles and imparted to her sons. For the Lord of all gave to His apostles the power of the Gospel, through whom also we have known the truth, that is, the doctrine of the Son of God; to whom also did the Lord declare: 'He that heareth you, heareth Me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth Me, and Him that sent Me.' We have learned from none others the plan of our salvation, than from those through whom the Gospel has come down to us, which they did at one time proclaim in public, and, at a later period, by the will of God, handed down to us in the Scriptures, to be the ground and pillar of our faith." (Against Heresies, 3, Preface; 3:1:1)
Elsewhere, he refers to the four gospels as "the Gospels of the Apostles...which have been handed down to us from the apostles" (Against Heresies, 3:11:9). Notice that even the gospels of Mark and Luke, who weren't apostles, are seen as apostolic books. The Christian faith is apostolic, and apostolic documents are scripture.
Francois Bovon notes that the same standard is found in earlier sources:
"In my opinion, the Gospel-Apostle structure, manifest from the first generation of Christians, prepares the way for the formation of a new body of scriptures as a complement or counterpart to the holy scriptures (the Septuagint) inherited by the church. The formation of the New Testament canon was therefore the logical materialization of this theological structure....it [the early church] recognized the importance of these two elements, Gospel and Apostle, Christ and his disciples. The First Epistle of Clement of Rome (ca. 95-98) clearly defines this demarcated structure: 'The apostles received the good news for us from our Savior, Jesus Christ; Jesus, the Christ, was sent by God. Thus Christ comes from God and the apostles come from Christ; the two were sent out in good order by the will of God' (1 Clement 42:1-2). For his part, Ignatius of Antioch (ca. 115) encourages the Magnesians to remain firm 'in the teachings of the Savior and the apostles.' He urges the presbyters and deacons to support the bishop as their invaluable spiritual leader; as leader, the bishop in turn must submit to the apostles of Christ. Some years later, between 110 and 130, Papias of Hierapolis insisted on an apostolic mediation that would bring the Christians of his time into contact with the early manifestation of truth in Jesus....In his Apology, Aristides (ca. 140) inscribes the faith of Christians within the structure of Gospel and Apostle....there is evidence of a parallel track traveled by other Christian communities and movements. What is striking about these other texts, be they gnostic, Jewish-Christian, or apocryphal, is that they are also aware of the bipolar structure of Gospel and Apostle, even if they occasionally order them in different ways." (TCD, 522-525)
As Everett Ferguson observes, the "Gospel and Apostle" structure seems to be another way of referring to apostolicity:
"A shorthand expression of the authorities recognized by Christians was 'prophets and apostles,' it being understood that the Lord's authority stood behind both. This appears already in 2 Pet 3:2, 'Remember the words spoken in the past by the holy prophets, and the commandment of the Lord and Savior spoken through your apostles.' It serves as a summary of the scriptures read in church, according to Justin, 1 Apol. 67.3 (cf. Dial. 119.6). In the Muratorian Fragment, lines 77-78, the Shepherd was excluded from public reading because it did not belong to either of these categories. Compare the 'prophetic and apostolic meadow,' Clement of Alexandria's summary of the sources of knowledge (Strom. 1.1). This terminology may be seen as sketching a theology of the 'pre-Canon' or 'proto-Canon.' The two-part Christian Bible may also be anticipated in the reference to 'the books and the apostles' in 2 Clem. 14.2." (TCD, 306-307)
Why, then, would these early sources, sometimes the same sources, include a reference to "Gospel" along with a reference to the apostles? Perhaps for more than one reason. As Bovon notes, above, the term "Gospel" can be equated with Christ. Jesus was the authority behind the apostles, so there may have been a desire to emphasize that fact by including a reference to the gospels, biographies of Christ, along with the reference to apostles. And the Old Testament was commonly referred to by the bipolar, as Bovon puts it, structure of the Law and the Prophets. The bipolar structure of Gospel and Apostle may have been intended to parallel that Old Testament structure, even though the New Testament structure could be collapsed into one category and sometimes was. Jesus didn't write the gospels. Two of the gospels were written by apostles, and the other two were written by associates of the apostles. Note the passage from Irenaeus quoted above, in which he refers to all four gospels as apostolic. Similarly, Justin Martyr refers to the gospels as "the memoirs of the apostles" (First Apology, 67), even though he knows that some of them were written by "those who followed them" (Dialogue With Trypho, 103). It seems that the Gospel and Apostle structure Bovon refers to isn't different from apostolicity in any way that's significant in this context. Serapion comments that "we, brethren, receive both Peter and the other apostles as Christ" (Eusebius, Church History, 6:12). The word "Gospel" in "Gospel and Apostle" may have been intended to emphasize the fact that the authority of Christ was behind the authority of the apostles.
Everett Ferguson comments on the early acceptance of apostolic documents as scripture:
"Although second-century Christian authors accepted the Old Testament as scripture, they used the New Testament writings, in relation to their quantity, much more than the Old Testament. Citation as 'scripture' appears to be less significant than the overwhelming use and importance attached to the writings that form the core of our New Testament....In terms of the significance of scriptural status, there is no time when Christians did not treat the writings that would become the New Testament as scripture." (TCD, 298)
Clement of Rome refers to Paul's first letter to the Corinthians as having been written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit (First Clement, 47). Though the early Christians would sometimes refer to non-canonical sources as inspired, it's worth noting that Clement's comments are consistent with seeing 1 Corinthians as scripture. Papias and a source he appeals to, probably the apostle John, refer to the accuracy of Mark's gospel, including how Mark wrote without error (Eusebius, Church History, 3:39). Again, though such a view of Mark could be held by somebody who didn't view the book as scripture, the comments of Papias and his source are consistent with the scriptural status of the gospel of Mark. Polycarp refers to Ephesians as scripture (Letter To The Philippians, 12). The Epistle Of Barnabas refers to the gospel of Matthew as scripture (4). Second Clement does the same (2). Justin Martyr comments that Christian churches in general read the gospels along with the Old Testament scriptures in their church services (First Apology, 67).
We can go back further than the earliest patristic sources. Christianity came out of Judaism, a belief system that had a concept of scripture for hundreds of years prior to the time of Christ. The earliest Christians believed that God had become a man, had delivered a new revelation, had established a kingdom, and had commissioned the apostles (Matthew 28:18-20, John 1:1-14, Acts 1:8), who would judge the twelve tribes of Israel (Luke 22:30). The apostles were foundational to the church (1 Corinthians 12:28, Ephesians 2:20, 4:11, 2 Peter 3:2, Revelation 21:14). They were comparable to the prophets of the Old Testament era (2 Peter 3:2), who wrote scripture, among other things. It seems unlikely that the earliest Christians would have believed that the God of Israel had communicated His revelation to His people through scripture for centuries, but would only give His people fallible writings from those who were commissioned to deliver the most significant revelation of all.
In a letter that some would consider the earliest Christian document we have today, the apostle Paul referred to the message of the apostles as "the word of God" (1 Thessalonians 2:13). Elsewhere, Paul refers to what he's writing as "the Lord's commandment" (1 Corinthians 14:37). He expects his teachings, oral and written, to be followed (2 Thessalonians 2:15), and he expects Christians to separate from those who don't follow those teachings (2 Thessalonians 3:6, 3:14). As Lee McDonald notes:
"It is also clear that Paul's letters were intended to be read publicly in churches, and this implies that they were viewed as something like scripture. Notice, for example, the authoritative tone in many passages in his letters that suggests that Paul also viewed his writings as authoritative if not prophetic (1 Cor 5:3-5; 6:1-6; 7:10-11, 17-20, 40; 11:23-34; Gal 5:1-4, passim)." (TCD, n. 9 on 419)
Everett Ferguson writes:
"Moody Smith's 1999 presidential address to the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in Boston carries us back to the very composition of the gospels. Accepting the distinction between scripture and canon, Smith examined the gospels for indications that the authors understood themselves to be writing scripture. He finds appreciable evidence in Matthew and Luke that they were continuing the Old Testament story, were imitating it, and were writing a definitive account of the coming of Jesus and his place in the history of salvation. The intent of Mark and John in this regard was less obvious, but there is evidence that they too were functioning as scripture from quite early. This is implicit, according to Smith, in the commonly accepted view that Matthew and Luke used Mark, and in the way that 1 John presupposes the Fourth Gospel and was engaged in exegetical controversy over its meaning. The continuity of these gospels with the Old Testament story contrasts with the apocryphal gospels, notably the Gospel of Thomas. This finding coincides with the fact that there is no time in Christian history after the writing of the four gospels when one can find evidence of their not being accepted as scripture." (TCD, 303)
John's gospel refers to how the apostles will be guided by the Holy Spirit in "all things" and will remember what Jesus taught them (John 14:26, 15:26-27), the sort of supernatural guidance that would occur if a gospel like John's were written as scripture. Paul seems to cite Luke's gospel as scripture in 1 Timothy 5:18. Paul's letters are referred to as scripture in 2 Peter 3:15-16. John tells us that Christ commanded him to write (Revelation 1:11), and he tells us that Christ approved of the contents of the book (Revelation 22:7).
It seems, judging from both the New Testament and patristic sources, that apostolic documents are scripture. The concept didn't originate in the fourth century or in some earlier post-apostolic generation, but within the apostolic era itself.
The meaning of apostolicity should be clarified further. It wasn't enough for a document to be written during the time of the apostles or by a disciple of an apostle. As Bruce Metzger observed:
"Although both [Clement of Rome and Ignatius] display a certain air of authority, there is no longer any consciousness of apostolic authority. They look back at the venerable figures of the apostles as leaders in an age now past (1 Clem. v. 3-7; xlii. 1 ff.; xlvii. 1 ff.; Ign. Trall. ii. 2; Magn. vi. 1; vii. 2; xiii. 1)....Polycarp's mind is not only saturated with ideas and phrases derived from a considerable number of writings that later came to be regarded as New Testament Scriptures, but he also displays latent respect for these apostolic documents as possessing an authority lacking in other writings. Polycarp, as Grant remarks, 'clearly differentiates the apostolic age from his own time and, presumably for this reason, does not use the letters of Ignatius as authorities - even though they 'contain faith, endurance, and all the edification which pertains to our Lord' (xiii. 2)'." (CNT, 5, 63)
Men like Clement of Rome, Papias, and Polycarp were perceived as disciples of the apostles, yet their writings weren't considered scripture. It should be noted that the apostle John seems to have lived until around the close of the first century, and that First Clement was written in the late first century. Irenaeus refers to the apostle John as having lived until the time of the emperor Trajan (Against Heresies, 2:22:5), who came to power in the year 98. And First Clement has been dated earlier than that. Michael Holmes notes that there "is widespread agreement in dating this letter about A.D. 95-97", and he gives some reasons why (TAF, 23-24). Some people date First Clement even earlier. Yet, First Clement wasn't commonly considered scripture by the early Christians. It seems that it wasn't enough for a document to be written in apostolic times, even by a disciple of the apostles, like Clement. Some people would also date other documents outside of the canon, like The Shepherd Of Hermas, to the late first century.
The best explanation of the data is that apostolicity involved apostolic approval. Clement may have written his letter when John was still alive, but without the approval of John. And Polycarp, for example, didn't write until after the death of the apostles. Not only does defining apostolicity as involving apostolic approval make more sense of the exclusion of a document like First Clement, but it also makes more sense as a concept. Why conclude that a document is scripture just because it was a Christian document written during the time of the apostles? We have good evidence for the authority of the apostles, but not for the authority of all Christian writers in the timeframe in which the apostles lived. The latter doesn't follow from the former.
If apostolicity, defined as apostolic approval, is a canonical criterion, then what are the results of the application of that criterion? Does it justify our twenty-seven-book New Testament? Or something less than that? Should we trust the early Christians' judgments about who wrote the relevant documents and whether the documents are apostolic? I'll address those issues in future posts.
Beowulf2k8 Has Been Banned
Beowulf2k8 keeps raising objections to Calvinism, objections he doesn't support, in threads that aren't about Calvinism. When his initial off-topic posts are deleted, he posts more. He's now banned.
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