JJ SAID:
“Which doesn't actually help you, because Christianity is not Judaism.”
i) Irrelevant unless you’re a Catholic Marcionite. The OT is part of the Christian canon. Christians were never bereft of Scripture.
ii) I’d add that Christianity is the true Judaism. Jesus was Jewish. The apostles were Jewish. All the NT writers were Jewish (Luke was probably a proselyte.)
However, your anti-Semitism is characteristic of traditional Catholicism (as well as Orthodoxy). Consider yourself a true son of Rome.
“Once again, you're unable to follow the bouncing ball. If the Magisterium isn't subject to scripture because it decides what it is and what it means, then neither is Steve subject to it for the same reasons. Try to pay attention. You're so used to trotting out your favourite one liners that you can't seem to think clearly anymore about the issues.”
i) Once again, you’re unable to follow the bouncing ball. You fail to distinguish between a cognitive starting point and a criterional starting point. In Catholicism, the Magisterium performs a criterional function. Hence, there is no higher court of appeal.
In Protestantism, by contrast, the individual is not his own criterion. Scripture is the criterion.
ii) In both Catholicism and Protestantism, the individual is the cognitive starting point.
iii) Apropos (i)-(ii), the multiplication tables illustrate the criterional starting point while a mathematician, in using the multiplication tables, illustrates the cognitive starting point. When a mathematician applies the multiplication tables to a particular problem, the application depends on his subjective interpretation, but that doesn’t make him his own criterion of what 2x2 equals. He is answerable to the multiplication tables, not vice versa.
iv) Catholics must also apply their subjective judgment in the choice of a criterion.
Try to pay attention next time. You're so used to trotting out your Catholic one-liners that you can't seem to think clearly anymore about the issues.
“1. Your "parallel arguments" attack your own position as was demonstrated. Steve defines what scripture is and what it means.”
Your parallel arguments attack your own position as was just demonstrated. You keep failing to distinguish between a cognitive starting point and a criterional starting point.
“2. Your parallel arguments attack the Christian position in general, by making all revelation subjective by way of the individual's position in the process.”
i) You continue to repeat the same mistake (see above).
ii) You, as an individual, have applied your subjective judgment in judging Christian revelation to be true, rather than, say, the Koran or the Vedas or the Book of Mormon.
“3. A church needs a rule of faith as a principle of unity.”
i) You assert what you need to prove.
ii) The Catholic rule of faith has failed to achieve unity. There is no unity on the interpretation of Vatican II. There is no unity on Humanae Vitae. You didn’t prevent the Reformation. Or the rise of Modernism. So, if we measure your own church by your own yardstick, it comes up short.
“The Catholic method is to continually subject oneself to the catholic understanding.”
Your subjective understanding of the Catholic understanding. Your alternative does nothing to escape your own subjectivity.
“It's a principle which puts the overall direction of one's understanding in a continual movement towards commonality.”
Groupthink is no index of truth. If Muslims think alike, does that make Islam true?
“The limitations of the individual's understanding do not impede this fact, because his understanding is not bound to interpret what he finds in any old direction, but rather in the direction of catholicity.”
i) You subjectively interpret what you find in the direction of catholicity.
ii) The fact that you make catholicity your goal is, itself, a subjective value judgment.
“Thus it is a workable rule of faith.”
i) You haven’t begun to show that a rule of faith is supposed to be “workable” as you define it. Did 2nd temple Jews have a “workable” rule of faith? Were 2nd temple Jews unified?
The first condition for a rule of faith is that it be true, not that it be “workable” (as you define it).
ii) The Catholic rule of faith isn’t “workable.” Look at disputes over Vatican II or Humanae Vitae.
iii) Achieving unity is not the only possible function for a rule of faith. Truth is divisive as well as unitive.
“Protestants of the 21st century are further away from agreeing about anything than they were 500 years ago.”
Traditionalist Catholics would say the Vatican has moved away from what it agreed on 500 years ago.
“Individual protestants are just as likely to have their understand move away from that of their church than towards it, leading to continual dispute, confusion and church hopping.”
There are Catholic critics of modern Catholicism on both the left (e.g. Kung) and the right (e.g. Lefebvre).
“Who said the only access to Scripture is via the Magisterium?”
You make the Magisterium the official interpreter and gatekeeper. You can’t get past that checkpoint without Magisterial permission.
“That's like saying that because Paul makes an infallible interpretation of Genesis, the only access anybody has had to Genesis is via Paul.”
Now you’re comparing one Bible writer with another Bible writer. That’s disanalogous to an extrascriptural Magisterium. One Bible writer isn’t accountable to another Bible writer. Both are directly accountable to God.
“And it's quite relevant to point out that your definition of perspicuity makes sola scripture unworkable. It's the old bait and switch.”
i) You’re the one who’s playing the bait-and-switch. Bryan presumed to attack the Protestant doctrine of perspicuity. But he misrepresented the position attacking.
Before Bryan (or you) can attack the doctrine as “unworkable,” he must begin with an accurate definition of the doctrine he’s attacking. This he failed to do.
You are now changing the subject. Classic bait-and-switch.
ii) You also beg the question by saying that perspicuity is unworkable according to the Catholic definition of what a rule of faith is supposed to accomplish.
“First you claim scripture is perspicuous, and then you define perspicuous so that it makes sola scripture unworkable.”
i) It was never first…then.” That’s how perspicuity was defined all along. Read classic definitions in Turretin or the WCF.
ii) It’s only unworkable as you tendentiously define feasibility. And you have yet to defend your utilitarian definition in the first place.
“1. This is a different statement to saying we need to "trap Jesus in a piece of bread".”
I wouldn’t expect you to be that candid. It would expose the crudity of Catholic piety.
“2. Lutherans apparently need to "trap Jesus in, on or under a piece of bread", but apparently escape the same accusation.”
Since I’m not a Lutheran, that’s a dumb charge for you to make. Lutheranism doesn’t escape the same accusation. I’ve criticized Lutheran sacramentology in the past. Spare me your ignorant imputations of what I do and do not censure.
“3. Please document any Catholic saying "God can't damn you with a piece of Jesus inside you".”
Once again, I wouldn’t expect a Catholic to be that candid. I’m merely pointing out the implications of his faith and practice.
“4. Since you can only receive Eucharist if you are in a state of grace, it hardly seems rational to talk about the Eucharist as primary means for remaining in a state of grace and avoiding dying in mortal sin.”
i) A priest only administers the sacrament to communicants he knows to be in a state of grace? I don’t think so.
ii) Naturally a communicant will think he’s in a state of grace, and view the Mass as a maintenance program which is instrumental in preserving him in a state of grace. Why do Catholics go to Mass? To receive the means of grace. Grace channeled through the Eucharist.
“On paper, STEVE honors the authority of Scripture, but in practice STEVE's authority supplants and subverts Biblical authority.”
You need to prove that this is an issue of “authority” in both cases. You’ve given us an argument from analogy minus the argument.
“And I was responding to the claim that Catholicism is reducible to me and my Magisterium.”
If that was your objective, then you fell short.
“1) The laity doesn't always have to know the how and why of something to benefit from it. If the Magisterium keeps good order in the church through a correct understanding of scripture, the laity benefits without knowing the details.”
So the Magisterial interpretation of “the whole Bible” is classified? Only available on a need-to-know basis?
“2) Even without linking dogma to specific verses, the laity benefits from the correct understanding. For example, the laity benefits from the knowledge that it is correct to baptise infants without needing be told what texts might be relevant to that.”
Beneficial if true. Where is the supporting argument for the conditional?
“Pointing out the nonsense of your arguments about the Magisterium not being subject to scripture does not lead to parity. It just defeats your arguments.”
You keep ducking your distinctive burden of proof: the superiority of the Magisterium to sola Scriptura.
“There is no parity between the Church of God defining what scripture is, compared to STEVE defining what scripture is. That should be obvious to anyone.”
i) You haven’t given us any good reason to believe that God has conferred that prerogative on “the Church.”
ii) And even if he had, it comes down to your subjective interpretation of Magisterial teaching. So you’re stuck with parity.
“Having a central authority make judgement can't have epistemological equivalence to every man and his dog making their own judgement.”
There was no “central authority” in the OT. And there’s no “central authority” in the NT.
“Again, the old bait and switch. I refuted your argument that the Magisterium is not subject to scripture, now you're using that as bait and switch to pretend epistemological equivalence. That won't wash.”
You failed to refute my argument (see above). And my argument wasn’t a fallback argument. I’ve been using that all along. Try again.
“But I do note that your argument gives epistemological equivalence to atheists.”
Mistaken on a couple of counts:
i) Atheists use the wrong criterional starting point.
ii) Atheists also use the wrong cognitive starting point since the reprobate and unregenerate are disqualified by the noetic effects of sin from.
“That's like saying that the Supreme court's interpretation is equivalent to my own, because both must be filtered through my brain. But you'll find it aint so if you try and disregard a Supreme court order.__The fact is, institutions are needed to interpret texts. It's a fact of life and can't be refuted through some philosophical infinitely reductionist argument. Otherwise you could make the courts disappear in a puff of logic.”
That’s a very damaging analogy to draw in relation to Catholicism. A judicial ruling is binding, not because it’s true, but because it enjoys the coercive force of law.
Both lower and higher courts are quite capable of misinterpreting the law as well as mistaking the facts of the case. They are both fallible and authoritative.
Nazi judges were a fact of life under the Third Reich. And to judge by your totalitarian appeal, you would have made a good German.
By contrast, the Bible authorizes civil disobedience under certain circumstances.
“If Paul couldn't override other bible writers then clearly he WAS subject to them, since it wasn't within his authority to override them. Case closed.”
Are you playing dumb, or are you just plain dumb? This is what I originally said: "As a matter of fact, Paul was not subject to a higher, OT court of appeal. One Bible writer can't overrule another Bible writer. "
I made a claim about the symmetrical authority of Bible writers which you turn into a claim about the asymmetrical authority of Bible writers. You deduce a conclusion which follows, not from what I said, but from your misrepresentation of what I said.
Paul can’t override Isaiah, and Isaiah can’t override Paul. One isn’t subject to the other, or vice versa. Bible writers are equally inspired, infallible, and authoritative.
“No, my private judgement is with the aim of subjecting myself to a unifying principle which is the Spirit led Church.”
The choice of what authority to submit yourself to is a subjective value-judgment. And your interpretation of Magisterial teaching is equally subjective.
“Protestant private judgement is merely private judgement that doesn't care whether it leads you into or out of unity.
i) Unity doesn’t select for truth. Many cults are far more unified than Catholicism.
ii) Protestant private judgment cares about a correspondence between what I believe and God reveals.
“If it leads you to found a new church with you as the only one in it, so be it. That is not an equivalent position.”
You’re equivocating. The point at issue is not whether the Catholic rule of faith and the Protestant rule of faith have equivalent consequences. That was never the argument.
The point, rather, is that individual interpretation is an unavoidable and irreducible condition of both positions.
“Yes, scripture is so perspicuous that you need commentaries, sermons, and internal light to understand it.”
You’re simply acting petulant because the actual formulation of perspicuity in Protestant theology doesn’t give you an easy target.
The contrast is not between teaching and non-teaching. The contrast is between teaching which appeals to reason and evidence to justify its interpretation, and teaching which appeals to its own authority because its interpretation is unreasonable and counterevidential.
“But if someone else interprets differently and claims internal light, you're left with nothing objective. If someone is led astray by a bad commentary, cest la vie.”
I’m not responsible for someone who willfully misinterprets the Bible. And that also serves the purpose of God. For example, God knew that the message of the OT prophets would generally fall on deaf ears. Yet he sent them to preach anyway. Jesus knew that many Jews would reject his message. Yet he proclaimed himself to the Jews anyway. God knew that the message of the Apostles would be rejected by many Jewish listeners. Yet the Apostles were supposed to preach to Jew and Gentile alike.
Do you think the word of God failed in all these cases? Did it fail to achieve God’s appointed purpose?
Like all high churchmen, you disregard the actual purpose of God’s word, and substitute the purpose you think it should serve.
“So perspicuity becomes a meaningless catchphrase that proves nothing and helps no-one.”
It’s only “meaningless” according to your Catholic assignment, which you assert rather than defend.
“The Catholic faith itself is an infallible commentary on the bible.”
i) You’re being mendacious. Where is the Magisterial commentary on Chronicles, to take one example?
ii) And what residual of Catholic theology even claims to be infallible?
“Great. So prove to me which of those books are infallible.”
Does this mean you deny the plenary inspiration of Scripture?
Evangelical apologetics has presented many lines of evidence for the inspiration of Scripture. I don’t need to reinvent the wheel in response to you.
“Neatly avoiding the point that the apostles did not limit their teaching to the written Torah.”
You’re behind the curve. I’ve already addressed that appeal in response to Jay Dyer, among others.
“Nonsense. Prove to me that I wouldn't know to baptise infants unless it was written down.”
Which Apostle personally told JJ to baptize infants? Did you hold a séance recently?
“It's not an evasion to point out that radical skepticism cuts both ways.”
To say that it cuts both ways does nothing to salvage your own position. Since you’ve surrendered you own position, you have spared me the effort.
“How do you trace every link in every chain in every book back to the apostles or prophets, and then do the same for every book which you don't think came from the apostles or prophets?”
i) I’ve made my case for the Bible on many occasions. I don’t have to repeat myself for your benefit.
ii) You, by contrast, haven’t begun to make a case for your alternative.
iii) And, once again, you’re resorting to the tu quoque tactic, which fails to establish the superiority of the Magisterium over sola Scriptura.
“Obtusely equivocating between having teachings and having a list of teachings.”
You don’t have what you can’t point to.
“It's all there in the tradition.”
“Tradition” isn’t neatly catalogued and indexed. You need to specify what particular traditions (plural) count as Sacred Tradition (singular).
“What silliness. The Magisterium is in continuous contact with the rest of the church.”
Now you’ve abandoned your prooftext for a very different argument. You back down very quickly. Unfortunately, you don’t learn from your mistakes. You simply make different mistakes.
“And there is no reason to believe Philip was infallible in his dealings with the Eunuch.”
So even if your analogy between the teaching of Philip and the teaching of the Magisterium held, that would only illustrate fallible ecclesial teaching. And how is fallible Catholic teaching any improvement over fallible Protestant teaching?
“It seems to me it is you who is obsessed with infallibility.”
The Catholic argument for the Magisterium is that the perpetuity of the church is grounded in the indefectibility of the church, which is, in turn, grounded in the infallibility of the church insofar as is immune to heresy. For example, Cardinal Dulles uses that precise argument as the Catholic rationale for the Magisterium—in his recent book on the subject (64-65).
You’re either ignorant of basic Catholic theology or else you don’t believe it.
“The point is, someone in communion with the church could give him a correct interpretation.”
One doesn’t need to be in communion with the church to correctly interpret a passage of Scripture. A secular Hebraist can correctly interpret a passage from the OT. A secular Classicist can correctly interpret a passage from the NT.
“Pointing out your hypocrisy is very relevant here.”
Pointing out “hypocrisy,” even if the charge were true, does nothing to salvage your own position. When you keep resorting to this tu quoque tactic you tacitly admit that your own position is indefensible. You can try to attack my position, but you can’t defend your own. Disproving mine, even if successful, wouldn’t begin to prove your own.
“Again the obsession with infallibility.”
That’s a Catholic obsession.
“But the court process IS authoritative.”
So is Fascism. And Maoism. And Stalinism. Sharia courts are authoritative for Muslims.
“So is the protestant notion that they have the authority to interpret as individuals.”
i) Once again, you can’t keep track of the argument. In my reply to Bryan Cross, I denied that interpretation presupposes authority. And I argued for my position. Where’s your counterargument?
ii) I’d add that it’s self-refuting for you to play the authority card since you yourself are not an authority-figure. You don’t belong to Magisterium. You have no authority card to play. If interpretation is contingent on authority, then you’ve disqualified yourself from having anything worthwhile to say on the subject.
“And when exactly did they have the right to set up a new Levitical priesthood?”
i) Once again, you’re changing the subject. Every time you do that it’s a backdoor admission that you lost the argument.
You had argued for the antecedent probability of the Magisterium. But the force of that argument would apply retroactively to the old covenant community as well as the new covenant community. However, the old covenant community had no infallible teaching office.
ii) When you shift grounds to the issue of schism, you abandon your original argument. If you have so little faith in your argument, why should anyone else?
iii) In order for your analogy to work, which you’re substituting for the your failed, opening move, you would need to show that the Church of Rome is the NT counterpart to the OT priesthood. I’m waiting for you to present your argument, although I don’t harbor high expectations that you’ll rise to the challenge which you posed for yourself.
“Who would have interpreted the scriptures on how, where and when to carry out temple sacrifices? (a) Every man and his dog. (b) the Levitical priesthood.”
Once again, I already addressed that objection in my review of Dulles’ book. You’re behind the curve.
You’re doing another bait-and-switch. The question at issue is not whether OT priests would have occasion to interpret OT law. Rather, the question is whether there was an infallible teaching office in the OT.
“People followed the tradition as best as they could grasp it.”
“As best as they could grasp”? You think that’s an improvement over the right of private judgment?
“Notice that the catholic principle of unity did pretty well even without a dogmatic proclamation.”
In which case unity doesn’t depend on ecumenical councils or infallible papal pronouncements. Congratulations! You just torpedoed your case for the necessity of the Magisterium. The only remaining question is whether you’d rather become a Baptist or Plymouth Brethren.
“As do you, but I have the higher view of providence.”
No, you have a lower view of providence since you think that God can only guide his people by telling them what to do.
“Again the obsession with infallibility.”
Look, you nitwit, infallibility is a *Catholic* obsession. Pius IX is a case in point.
“It's antecedently absurd as a method for identifying truth, since people claiming inspiration disagree.”
Another obtuse comment. The fact that people disagree doesn’t make it *antecedently* absurd. Try to screw your head on straight.
That outcome would only make it ex post facto absurd. You don’t even grasp the concepts you deploy.
People claiming inspiration disagree because everyone is not, in fact, inspired. Remember, an argument for the Magisterium based on antecedent probabilities is, in the first instance, an *a priori* argument based on the *hypothetical* advantages of the Magisterium.
Universal private inspiration is a counterfactual scenario. So, of course, in the real world, people claiming inspiration disagree.
But that doesn’t render the proposition *antecedently* improbable. And if your argument for the antecedent probability of the Magisterium is that Magisterial guidance is a means of achieving the aim of Christian unity, then there are antecedently more probable mechanisms of achieving that goal since there are more efficient hypothetical means of achieving Christian unity.
I’m responding to you on your own grounds. Have the grace to remember your own argument, pitiful as that may be.
“The aim isn't to prevent dissension, but provide an identifiable source of unity for resolving it.”
Once again you’re too dense to follow your own argument. A way of achieving unity is to prevent dissension. If the aim is to achieve unity, then preventing dissention is a necessary means to that end.
Instead, you’ve abandoned the *practicality* of the goal, and are now taking refuge in a rule of faith which can, in *principle*, resolve conflict even though, in a real world situation, it fails to *effect* unity by the resolution of conflict. So your rule of faith is a paper theory which doesn’t “work” in real life. An abstract and purely formalisic principle of unity that doesn’t effect unity fails to actually solve the problem (disunity) which you posed for yourself.
“What these supposedly more probably methods are we are not told.”
I told you quite specifically. Were you drunk at the time?
Innate knowledge would accomplish that aim. So would universal private inspiration.
“Having the canon is worthless without understanding the canon. To go half way with this argument is absurd. We must believe that the Church both has the canon and understands it.”
i) Which begs the question of whether we need a Magisterium to interpret the Bible.
ii) And you yourself have undermined your own case by belittling the issue of infallible guidance. If the Magisterium offers us fallible interpretations of Scripture, then how is that supposed to confer any advantage over fallible individual interpretations?
“If God wants us to know the canon, why don't all Christians know the canon?”
i) As usual, you’re impotent to defend your own position. All you can do is to throw the question back into the lap of your Protestant opponent.
ii) I don’t think it’s God’s will that every professing believer know the canon. It’s God’s will to leave some people in error. Just as he consigns liberal members of apostate denominations to damnable heresies.
It’s not essential to my position that John Spong know the canon. Or Swedenborg. Or Marcion. Or Pope Benedict XVI.
“If you want to nit pick around this kind of argument, then suddenly you don't have a canon. Suddenly, maybe your canon is just completely wrong.”
Based on what? Cartesian demons? Cartesian demons are more than happy to bedevil whatever Catholic alternative you propose. Floating purely hypothetical defeaters is not a rational basis for doubting anything. You need some concrete evidence that the hypothetical true. Otherwise, you’re like moviegoers who make themselves psychotic by taking The Matrix too seriously.
“You need at some level to identify with the argument of what God is likely to do. God is likely to make his word known.”
Such a generic argument (which you haven’t even furnished) doesn’t begin to yield the Catholic Magisterium.
“God is likely to make true scriptures clearly distinguishable from false ones.”
I don’t deny that God has made true scriptures clearly distinguishable from false ones.
“Perhaps. But the scriptures themselves have been occasion for both unity and division. I don't think you would therefore reject scripture as a point of unity.”
i) I’m not the one whose treating unity as a criterion.
ii) The scriptures have been more than an “occasion” for division. That’s one of the purposes of Scripture. It’s meant to have a winnowing effect on the audience.
“Again, if you have no epistemic advantage in having Paul's infallible interpretation of Genesis, then throw out Paul. You won't, because you know it aint so.”
Did I say there’s no epistemic advantage in having *Paul’s* infallible interpretation of Genesis? No.
“How this helps your case that people can get things right but without a valid reason to do so, I can't see.”
Did I say people can get things right without a valid reason? No.
“Luke doesn't say he received all his information directly from exclusively eyewitnesses, he says his story is "handed down to us" by eyewitnesses and servants of the word. Clearly there weren't eyewitnesses alive for everything Luke wrote. Clearly he didn't have eyewitnesses for all the facts in Ch 3 for example.”
There were no living witnesses to the ministry of John the Baptist?
And what makes you think he clearly didn’t get his genealogy of Jesus from a member of Jesus’ family (e.g. James, Jude)?
“Reference please.”
a) All scripture is inspired (2 Tim 3:16)
b) Luke is Scripture (1 Tim 5:18; cf. Lk 10:7).
c) Therefore, Luke is inspired.
And spare me the objection that 2 Tim 3:16 is referring to the OT. 2 Tim 3:16 is making a categorical statement about Scripture qua Scripture.
“In that case, apostolic succession is an historical fact.”
No, in that case, apostolic succession is a historical *claim*. Present your evidence.
You can’t fall back on the authority of your church since the authority of your church is contingent on apostolic succession. You must verify the institution before the institution can verify anything else.
“It renders the claim as verifiable or unverifiable as many other theological claims.”
So verify it. It’s your dogma. The onus lies on you to verify your own dogma.
“Epistemologically however, the Magisterium is an entity created by the apostles, and you aren't, so you don't get to claim epistemological equality.”
i) You don’t get to claim the Magisterium is an entity created by the apostles. Give us something resembling an actual argument to bolster your contention.
ii) And, I, for one, have argued for the alternative (sola scriptura, private judgment).
“What's your definition of sola scripture? That scripture is the sole infallible rule of faith for the church? But hang on, now you're claiming the church doesn't need a rule of faith for its unity and good governance. Oops, there goes sola scriptura out the window.”
JJ is blind to his own Catholic presuppositions. He begins with a definition. Then he says sola Scripture would go out the widow if sola Scriptura is not a unifying principle. But that doesn’t follow from his own definition. Rather, he has assigned that function to a rule of faith based on his Catholic priorities.
“We agree enough to remain one church.”
That begs the question of how much discontinuity with the past is permissible and still call yourself the same church.
“Sorry, you need to document your ramblings. Claiming stuff doesn't cut it.”
You might begin by applying that yardstick to your own assertions, for which you offer no supporting arguments.
“Since Paul is your infallible interpretive authority, then the only real access you have to Genesis is via the Paul. Thanks for confirming what I've been saying.”
i) To begin with, Paul is not the only Bible writer or inspired speaker within a Biblical narrative who interprets Genesis.
ii) One of the problems with the Magisterium is that it does, indeed, presume to speak with the same interpretive authority as an Apostle. So there is, in fact, a putative parallel, and that’s the problem. The Magisterium is not entitled to claim the same interpretive authority.
You have this mindless, mechanical tu quoque response to everything we say without bothering to consider that parity or equivalence doesn’t vindicate your own position.
“How does having an infallible Bible, alleviate the problem of subjectivity of the fallible individual's intepretation?”
Once again, JJ falls back on his brainless tu quoque response as if that salvages his own position.
i) He begs the question by assuming that subjectivity is a problem for Protestant theology. That is not a problem for Calvinism. Human subjectivity is not autonomous. God is the Lord of our subjectivity. He made it.
ii) And even if, ex hypothesi, this were a problem for the Protestant rule of faith, to say we suffer from the same problem is no way of defending the Catholic rule of faith.
Notice that JJ can never defend his own position. He can only attack the opposing position. He leaves objections to his own position intact. He’s giving the reader reasons to reject Protestantism, but he’s not giving the reader reasons to accept Catholicism. To say that Protestantism is wrong doesn’t make Catholicism is right.
Yet this is JJ’s modus operandi, as if that were an adequate apologetic for Catholicism.
“But we don't allow it to be shaken to the ground, because we believe in God leading his people, such that we believe the testimony about the prophets, we believe the testimony about Paul, and we believe the testimony about the magisterium.”
All he’s done here is to assert his belief. A Muslim or Mormon or Hindu or Scientologist could do the same.
“We are just consistent in who we believe.”
Even if you were consistent, you can be consistently wrong.
“Once we start making up for ourselves which bits we believe, we shake our epistemological foundation with our personal opinions so that the church itself topples over.”
i) This sidesteps the crucial question of whether you laid a firm foundation to begin with. You can also lay a firm foundation in the wrong location. You need to lay the correct foundation.
ii) And, of course, JJ is very selective about what he’s prepared to believe. He’s not a Gnostic or an Arian or a Bogomile or a Mormon.
iii) As a matter of fact, Christians are supposed to exercise discernment. The NT frequently warns us to be on guard against false teachers.
“1) Because the Magisterium can react to the ongoing situation to clarify enough to retain unity in the church. So it works as a rule of faith. Are you going to claim the church doesn't need a workable rule of faith?”
i) As usual, he merely stipulates what a rule of faith is supposed to accomplish. He never presents an argument for his crucial claim.
ii) Assuming, for the same of argument, that he is correct, then the Magisterium has failed to retain unity. Is there a unified interpretation of Vatican II? Is Catholic opinion united behind Humane Vitae?
In fact, these are two examples where the Magisterium generated disunity. It achieved the very opposite of what JJ says a rule of faith is supposed to achieve.
“2) The magisterium has an historical (and thus objective) link with the scriptures via apostolic succession.”
Notice how he constantly assumes what he needs to prove. He substitutes his make-believe for evidence and reason.
Not only does he fail to furnish any evidence for apostolic succession, but he also fails to address the counterevidence. What about the Great Schism (1378-1417)? What about ecclesiastical impediments to valid ordination? What about rigged papal elections?
“Thus STEVE's claims about what scripture is and what it means are purely subjective. in relational to someone else's claims.”
How does he define “subjectivity”? The mere fact that two men may disagree? But Catholics disagree with each other. Protestants disagree with Catholics. Eastern Orthodox disagree with Catholics. Oriental Orthodox disagree with Catholics. Marxists disagree with Catholics.
If two people disagree, we should listen to their arguments. Which side has the best argument?
If JJ is going to object that this evaluation is subjective, then he can’t argue for Catholicism.
“That's compounded with the problem that we don't have access to all the circumstances both immediate and cultural that give the text its full meaning.__Grammatical-historical exegesis at best comes up with a range of possible interpretations, and the most likely one on a grammatical-historical basis, even if one could decide such a thing objectively (which is itself a doubtful claim), is not necessarily the true one.”
i) JJ, like Catholics generally, simply stipulates what he thinks should be the case, then picks a theological just-so story to illustrate his stipulation.
The proper question we should ask ourselves is what does God require of us? Does God demand that we come up with a necessarily correct interpretation? Does God hold us to apodictic proof? No.
Because JJ thinks in armchair terms rather than historical terms, he doesn’t bother to look at the actual record. Consider 1C Jews in relation to the Torah. Did 1C Jews have “access to all the circumstances both immediate and cultural that give the text its full meaning”?
No, the Torah was written over a millennium before their time. Despite that epistemic limitation, were 1C Jews responsible for their adherence to the Torah? Yes.
Did God expect them to come up with a “necessarily true” interpretation of every Mosaic injunction? No.
Were OT judges infallible? No. Many OT judges were worse than fallible—they were corrupt. They deliberately misapplied the law.
ii) BTW, notice that JJ, on the one hand, says that I’m “obsessed with infallibility” while, on the other hand, he sets the bar at a “necessarily true” interpretation. Isn’t that synonymous with infallibility?
iii) Can JJ point us to his “necessarily true” interpretation of Magisterial teachings?
“If we had the examples of the apostles doing gramatical/historical exegesis on a consistent basis, or even once for that matter, then maybe you'd have the kernel of an argument.”
JJ exhibits his self-reinforcing ignorance. There’s a whole book on that subject: Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament, G. Beale and D. A. Carson, eds.
“There is no objective link between the bible and STEVE.”
You don’t need a “link” to correctly interpret a statement. When Jesus and the Apostles debate the Jews, they don’t appeal to a “link.”
If I read the Tale of Genji, I can correctly interpret many statements without my having a “link” to the imperial court of 11C Japan.
“No, the Magisterium couldn't override scripture because the Magisterium and those writers were both writing under the power/inspiration of the Holy Spirit Himself and they had the same authority.”
i) All assertion, no argument.
ii) Even on its own grounds, it fails to distinguish between the ordinary and extraordinary Magisterium.
iii) Why is JJ appealing to the inspiration of the Magisterium? Doesn’t that betray an “obsession” with infallibility?
“1) Notice that GENEMBRIDGES has a canon because of the principle he repudiates.”
This assumes that we cannot argue for the canon apart from the Magisterium. I, for one, have done that in detail.
“2) Notice that the early church only had an existence and a correct canon because of the same principle.”
JJ’s church didn’t have an official canon until the 16C. And there was intense debate among the Tridentine Fathers over the identity of the canon. It simply came down to a vote. Which side had more votes. Is that any way to settle a factual question.
“3) Notice that for all the talk by protestants about "rule of faith", that term isn't in the bible.”
Now he’s talking like a Jehovah’s Witness.
“What is in the bible is 1Cor. 1:10 I urge you, brothers, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that all of you agree in what you say, and that there be no divisions among you, but that you be united in the same mind and in the same purpose. __Whether you want to link it to "rule of faith" which isn't in the bible, the fact is we are commanded to take this approach to unity.”
i) How is that supposed to help JJ’s case? The Corinthians had a living, infallible teacher in the person of the Apostle Paul. He was their “pope,” speaking ex cathedra. So Paul embodied the rule of faith.
Did that Pauline rule of faith effect unity among the Corinthians? No. They were fragmented into various factions. And some of them openly challenged his authority.
So, by JJ’s yardstick, the Pauline rule of faith was a failure. It didn’t work. It wasn’t workable since it failed to “retain unity.”
ii) Evangelicals don’t deny that we ought to agree with the Apostles. Unity with apostolic doctrine.
But as the church of Corinth vividly illustrates, a rule of faith is not a recipe for ecclesiastical unity. A rule of faith sets the standard. Whether individuals comply with the standard is irrelevant to the rule of faith. If they defy the standard, they will incur divine judgment. That’s one function of a rule of faith.
JJ’s prooftext undercuts his thesis.
iii) Point us to the infallible Magisterial interpretation of 1 Cor 1:10.
“If it's not, then dozens of heretical groups with and without their own scriptures have equal claims to the truth.”
Truth-claims are only equal if they’re equally true—or equally false.
“What is unique about Catholicism is historical continuity and objective link with Jesus and the apostles.”
Of course, that’s just another truth-claim. Unless we’re permitted to “subjectively” evaluate competing truth-claims, JJ’s radical scepticism vitiates his own position.
“But Catholics also have the trump card of being objectively the apostolic church.”
Notice that JJ never gets beyond the bare assertion of his belief. Like a two-year old who affirms his faith in Santa.
“So you don't know if you're influenced by instruments of reprobation or of salvation. Quite a conundrum. I hope you luck out in the end.”
JJ’s the one who’s trapped in the conundrum since he never evaluates his tradition.
“There are over 3500 articles on the internet. Search them.”
So the Internet is JJ’s magisterium. Pope Wikipedia I?
“Do you believe Philip was infallible in everything he said?”
i) Does JJ think Philip was fallible in what he taught the eunuch? If so, how would his fallible interpretation of Isaiah guide the eunuch into the truth? How would it point him to Christ?
ii) Why does JJ fault the right of private interpretation because it fails to yield a “necessarily true” interpretation when he also denies the necessary truth (or even incidental truth) of Philip’s interpretation?
iii) And how is the analogy between Philip and the Magisterium advantageous if, according to this comparison, the Magisterium is fallible? Even if we accept the parallel for the sake of argument, then that would be a prooftext for a fallible Magisterium (since JJ denies the infallibility of Philip).
“If not, then his claim to authority with the Eunuch was his valid ordination.”
How is fallible authority an improvement over sola scriptura or private judgment?
“2) There is no reason to say he was living under any covenant. He wasn't a Jew or a Christian.”
A good example of JJ’s self-reinforcing ignorance. As a Catholic, he doesn’t bother to study the Bible. Yes, the eunuch was a Jew. That’s why he was making a pilgrimage to Jerusalem (Acts 8:27). That’s why he had a copy of Isaiah.
He wasn’t an ethnic Jew. But he was a convert to the Jewish faith. A worshipper of the true God. A “God-fearer” from the Diaspora.
JJ trotted out this text as his prooftext for the Magisterium. Yet he lacks an elementary grasp of his own prooftext.
“Whatever veil he may have had about interpretation was lifted by oral communication with someone from the true church.”
*Fallible* oral communication (according to JJ).
“Not by someone with more scriptures, not by someone who had read more scriptures, but by someone with oral teachings.”
That’s because he only had the OT. He didn’t have one of the Synoptic Gospels, or John, or Romans, or Hebrews, &c.
Does JJ think that if the eunuch read Matthew, he still wouldn’t know who the Messiah was?
“As in all these early church situations, the apostles didn't practice sola scriptura. They could hardly be teaching what they didn't practice.”
A dumb statement. No one is arguing that sola Scriptura is the rule of faith during the age of public revelation. And the Apostles did practice writing down what they said.
“In other words, all those cases of Israel going astray did not invalidate the Levitical priesthood's authority right up until a special intervention of the Messiah.”
i) The Levitical priesthood was dynastic. That’s why it’s called “Levitical.” Church office is not dynastic.
ii) You’re also assuming what you need to prove, i.e. the church of Rome is a divine institution on par with the Levitical priesthood. If the church of Rome is just another denomination, then we don’t have to overcome some presumptive ecclesiastical authority to break with Rome.
“That puts in a very high standard of intervention before we should accept the existing authority over the people of God has been invalidated.”
No, the Pastoral Epistles supply the qualifications for church office and—by implication—the conditions which would disqualify a church officer or ordinand. Have you ever attempted to apply those qualifications to the papacy or the episcopate?
“First step is first, which is acknowledging an authoritative magisterium, just like you first have to acknowledge an authoritative Levitical priesthood.”
An argument from analogy minus the argument.
“Again the obsession with infallibility. Let's start with authoritative and work our way to infallibility.”
Is a falsehood authoritative? It can be authoritative in the coercive sense that it might force you to do something at gunpoint, but isn’t Christian theology supposed to be true? Does falsehood bind the conscience?
Tuesday, August 19, 2008
Thus saith the Evan Part 2
Evan has graced me with a reply. Let's take a look:
I agreed with 2, let one slide, and disagreed with the rest.
"Large numbers" is an argument by popularity. Well, in that case larger numbers of believing Christians have believed it is from the First Century, Evan. That's the majority opinion. There are those who date it prior to or near 62 AD, those who date it btw. 70 and 80/90ish, and those who date it in the 2nd century. Tyson, your own source indicates that the majority think it is to be dated in the First Century. Pay attention to what he actually writes.
To say that Evan is likely to have taken a graduate level course in Luke or Intro to New Testament at the graduate level is likely to be as accurate as saying Evan is a Christian.
Notice that Evan treats Iranaeus, etc. as giving accurate information, but not Luke. Why is that? Why are these sources more accurate compared to Luke? More on that below.
In other words, this is an assertion, not an argument. Once again, if Evan thinks that the text I quoted is inaccurate, he needs to argue it, not assert it.
1. This merely begs the question.
2. It's an argument from authority. Okay, two can play at that. I refer Evan to New Testament Introduction by Donald Guthrie. Guthrie argues for a First Century date. Alternatively, he can email my old NT professor at SEBTS, Dr. Maurice Robinson and get a personal response. Let's let Evan deal face to face with him.
3. Tyson sees Luke as a response to the Marcionite challenge.
a. Guthrie deals with Knox, whom Tyson is basically reproducing, on pages 120-121 of his text.
b. Here's what the Society of Biblical Literature's review says:
Steve has already dealt with this here:
I'll quote. Just sub "Luke" for "Pauline corpus"
An assertion, not an argument. Notice that now, Evan is trying to back up a bad theory with another bad theory. In addition, the Nazarenes accepted Paul but they used Matthew's Gospel. So now Evan needs to explain how Matthew is representative of "the Pauline Jesus Christ" and a "Greek Gospel." Matthew and "Greek Gospel" don't exactly go hand-in-hand. It would be easier, one would think, to link Luke with Paul and therefore "the Pauline Jesus Christ." ...but the Nazarenes are connected to Matthew, not Luke. Evan is theorizing himself into a web from which it will be ever more difficult to extricate himself. Jesus didn't exist, but there were (see below) Christians who called themselves Nazarenes before, so the Fathers and Apologists (because, as we all know in the Subapostolic period, they were all colluding together and trying to rise to power like the Mafia today), colluded together to do this:
Evan's theorizing grows ever more absurd. Where's the documentation for this theory?
In addition, "Nazoraean" could not be derived from the word for "Nazareth." Attempting to derive Nazoraean from Nazareth isn't linguistically defensible. Indeed, Evan's "theory" doesn't stack up to modern scholarship on the origin of this term, including those who hold to the view that Jesus was a Gnostic teacher:
http://books.google.com/books?id=GoWhptP_up0C&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=Nazarenes+Nazareth&source=web&ots=A1U26ZrPXn&sig=u4XAaR_ssAnKgrONjnVhngSjmtc&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=6&ct=result#PPA135,M1
Indeed, even Wikipedia (and you know how much we think of Wiki's here notes this by quoting Baur's lexicon:
Thanks, Evan, for proving, yet again, you don't do your research. It's this sort of namby pamby theorizing that makes DC such an easy target for us here at Tblog. If you want to say this term is derived from Nazareth and a name that they took themselves, you need to actually argue for it linguistically and historically, and only then can you begin to argue for your "theory."
Further, Evan simply dismisses Luke by dating it late (without argument). In so doing, he affords himself the privlege of dodging my questions:
If by "the Trinity" you mean something as fully orbed as the Nicene Creed, that can't be produced. That would be anachronistic. If by the Trinity you mean the divinity of Christ, that can be produced.
Further, it is fallacious to conclude a lack of evidence, if there is one, selects for them not believing in these things. Indeed, the lack of evidence cuts both ways, yet you assert your theory. Do you even think about this sort of thing, Evan?
The evidence shows that the Nazarenes were considered orthodox and worthy of fellowship in the Subapostolic age, whereas the Ebionites were not. The evidence also shows that, over time, the Ebionites came to dominate the landscape whereas the Nazarenes of old faded away, and that it's these Ebionities that the later Fathers discussed. Evan is building a "theory" on a set of fallacious assumptions.
And notice, In his right hand: Evan is employing the Fathers, many of whom are writing in the late 2nd and into the next century for his theory. Let's stipulate that these Ebionites they describe are, indeed, the First Century version. Okay.
Yet in his left hand, he denies the historicity of the Gospels by theories of legends and accretions and late dates and legends growing up, etc. This would, then mean that all those histories from which he quotes get worse, more legendary, etc. the further from the First Century they get. Yet he treats these as accurate descriptions/histories. At the same time, he denies Luke is accurate history, even though the upper limit given in his own source is 120 AD, and the majority of NT scholars date it much earlier. Evan suffers from epistemological schizophrenia. He desperately wants to avoid Luke, because if Luke is true, at least in Acts 24, he has a huge problem (namely interacting with and explaining Paul's writings against the Judaizers while being called a Nazarene himself), but on the other he needs something to bolster his paper theory, so he takes the Fathers accurately and without argument.
Moving on...
Ephipanius describes the Ebionites of his age, and draws a distinction between them and the Nazarenes. Ephiphanius was an orthodox Christian. So, when he says that the Nazarenes were just "complete Jews," the reasonable conclusion is that they believed in the Virgin Birth, the divinity of Christ, the bodily resurrection of Christ. Ephipanius was one of those Fathers who mentioned a groups heretical beliefs. If they had denied these, it is reasonable to believe he would say so.
Justin writes earlier. Justin distinguished two sorts of Jewish Christians, those who observed the Mosaic Law but did not require its' observance of all others, and those who maintained that this observance was necessary for salvation. This fits with Luke, it also fits with Paul's letters.
Justin, in Dialogue and First Apology, defends the Virgin Birth. So, Evan, tell us if the Nazarenes denied the Virgin Birth, the Trinity, the bodily resurrection of Christ, then, pray tell, Evan, why did Justin fellowship with them at all?
But just for tickles and grins, let's take a look further:
Orr in his book on the Virgin Birth says that the Nazarenes believed in the Virgin Birth of Christ. So does Schaff. So does Origen. Indeed Origen specifically draws a distinction between those who affirmed the VB and those who didn't. In fact, the Fathers who speak of them do not indict them for not believing in the bodily resurrection or denying the Trinity-even those writing after the time of the Nicene Symbol. Jerome (Epistle 79, to Augustine) says that though the Nazarenes believed in Christ the Son of God, born of the Virgin Mary, who suffered under Pontius Pilate, and rose again, desiring to be both Jews and Christians, they are neither the one nor the other.
If we take Justin, Origin, Ephiphanius, etc. together, then we see that, yes, the Nazarenes did, in fact, affirm the VB, the divinity of Christ, and the bodily resurrection, or else they would have been indicted for their rejection of it, for the Ebionites are so indicted.
It would do Evan well to simply try and put this information together, but because he's either too stupid or too blind (or both) he doesn't bother.
The triablogger who got this assignment was some dude named Genembridges, (I'll call him Gene).Sorry, Steve doesn't hand out assignments. I chose you because yours was begging to be rebutted.
He quotes my points and agrees with them mostly.Wrong. Evan suffers from a chronic case of reading incomprehension.
I agreed with 2, let one slide, and disagreed with the rest.
As to my research, I believe I've given evidence for most of my assertions. I looked and looked for Gene's but couldn't find once where he showed the 1st century Palestinian Christians believed in:
1. The virgin birth.
2. The trinity.
3. The bodily resurrection of Christ.
Then he makes a huge digression that asserts that somehow the Acts of the Apostles is accurate history.I quoted Acts itself. If you think that this text is inaccurate, then you need to argue it, not assert it.
In my opinion and in the opinion of large numbers of believing Christians, Acts is a second century document.
"Large numbers" is an argument by popularity. Well, in that case larger numbers of believing Christians have believed it is from the First Century, Evan. That's the majority opinion. There are those who date it prior to or near 62 AD, those who date it btw. 70 and 80/90ish, and those who date it in the 2nd century. Tyson, your own source indicates that the majority think it is to be dated in the First Century. Pay attention to what he actually writes.
Acts records something about "the Nazarenes." It is up to Evan to argue it is to be dismissed, not merely assert it.
To say what Paul/Saul did or did not do on the basis of Acts is as likely to be accurate as saying what Jesus did or did not do on the basis of Luke alone.
To say that Evan is likely to have taken a graduate level course in Luke or Intro to New Testament at the graduate level is likely to be as accurate as saying Evan is a Christian.
Notice that Evan treats Iranaeus, etc. as giving accurate information, but not Luke. Why is that? Why are these sources more accurate compared to Luke? More on that below.
In other words, this is an assertion, not an argument. Once again, if Evan thinks that the text I quoted is inaccurate, he needs to argue it, not assert it.
I refer Gene to a book by Joseph B. Tyson, "Marcion and Luke-Acts" where the date of Luke-Acts is given as 120-125 CE.I am aware of Tyson's position. I am also aware that he's resuscitating Knox.
1. This merely begs the question.
2. It's an argument from authority. Okay, two can play at that. I refer Evan to New Testament Introduction by Donald Guthrie. Guthrie argues for a First Century date. Alternatively, he can email my old NT professor at SEBTS, Dr. Maurice Robinson and get a personal response. Let's let Evan deal face to face with him.
3. Tyson sees Luke as a response to the Marcionite challenge.
a. Guthrie deals with Knox, whom Tyson is basically reproducing, on pages 120-121 of his text.
b. Here's what the Society of Biblical Literature's review says:
Despite this work’s welcome invitation to revisit a debate that has significant implications for our understanding of second-century Christianity, several weaknesses should be noted. First, the attempt to reach back to the nineteenth century in order to invoke a purported German consensus concerning the relationship between Marcion’s Gospel and Luke is ill-fated because no such consensus actually existed (see my forthcoming JBLC. Building on this I might add that now Evan has generated a new set of problems for himself by advocating Tyson's theory. Tyson's theory involves some redating. Well, Evan, when you start redating:
article, “Marcion’s Gospel and Luke: The History of Research in Current Debate”). Of
course, this fact does not speak to the validity of Tyson’s arguments, yet it does indicate that this view may not claim all the “formidable scholars” to which Tyson appeals for support. Second, since Luke 1–2 and 24 contain more than half of the Lukan Sondergut absent from Marcion’s Gospel, on one level Tyson’s statistical analysis simply reveals that, if one assumes that a large amount of distinctively Lukan material was absent in Marcion’s source, then it will be seen that Marcion omitted significantly less of this material. Furthermore, the difficulty of precisely defining Marcion’s “editorial concept” is well-known, yet if the content of Luke 1–2 and 24 was added to the Gospel particularly to combat Marcionism, surely it is obvious that the chapters would also contain a tremendous amount of material offensive to Marcion. Therefore, if Marcion’s use of and omissions in Luke 3–23 are not difficult to understand and Luke 1–2 and 24, consisting almost exclusively of Lukan Sondergut, were offensive to Marcion and, as “bookends,” would be quite simple to omit, it is not entirely clear that the statistics Tyson invokes are
really able to advance the argument. Finally, and most problematically, although Tyson has avoided dating Luke-Acts to around 150 (as Knox did), he has only been able to do so by redating Marcion’s movement to early in the second century. It should be noted, however, that Hoffmann’s previous attempt to do so was subjected to devastating criticism (see especially the reviews by C. P. Bammel, JTS [1988]: 227–32; Gerhard May, TRu 51 [1986]: 405–13). Therefore, even if Tyson is right about the dating of Luke-Acts, significant doubt may still exist as to whether texts written around 120–125 could possibly already be confronted with a Marcionite threat justifying such significant literary creations.
Steve has already dealt with this here:
I'll quote. Just sub "Luke" for "Pauline corpus"
I’d like to point out a rather obvious obstacle in the way of this redating scheme. Marcion died around 160.So much for dating Luke in the 2nd century.
So the implication is that we redate the Pauline corpus from the mid-1C to the mid-2C, give or take.
And the scheme isn’t limited to the Pauline epistles. By dating Acts to the same period, one inevitably implicates the synoptic gospels.
And that, in turn, raise the question of where to put the Fourth Gospel and 1 John. Surely one wouldn’t date the Johannine corpus to the 1C while dating the synoptic gospels to the 2C.
Now, one of the logistical problems which this redating scheme overlooks is that you can’t move most of the NT forward by a century or so while leaving all of the other dates in early church history in place. For many other individuals, movements, writings, and events are historically and/or literarily dependent on the prior existence and influence of the NT.
Therefore, if you push the NT forward by a hundred years, that is going to have a domino effect on any number of other dates. It affects the dating of everyone and everything that quotes or cites or alludes to the NT. Manuscripts. Church fathers. Heretics. NT apocrypha. Local synods. And so on and so forth.
Relative chronology is a web of synchronies involving younger and older contemporaries, as well as diachronic relations involving predecessors and successors. It also involves a sequential chain of prior, simultaneous, and posterior events.
So the chronology of the NT is not a self-contained question. It spills over into the chronology of the early church. And that, in turn, spills over into the chronology of the Roman Empire. You can’t make a radical, but discrete change in the dating of most all of the NT while leaving all the other dates intact.
To upwardly revise the date of the NT by a hundred years or so would necessitate a corresponding and complete readjustment in all of the other dates in early church history and Roman history which are impacted by that revision.
And at the risk of stating the obvious, these dates were not arrived at on dogmatic grounds. Modern scholars of Roman history are not dating events to accommodate a theological agenda.
So, Evan can make claims about the late dating of Luke all he wants, but now he has a bigger problem on his hands.
Except, of course, that's not what Evan said. Evan is now changing his argument. This is an admission that his first one failed. What Epiphanius actually does is draw a distinction between the Nazarenes of old and the Ebionites of his own day.
He then quotes from Epiphanius to state that at one point all Christians were called Nazarenes. This seems perfect for my theory.
If there was no real Jesus, then the way to retroject the Greek gospels onto Palestine would be to take the Pauline Jesus Christ and turn him into the quasi-historical Jesus of history.
An assertion, not an argument. Notice that now, Evan is trying to back up a bad theory with another bad theory. In addition, the Nazarenes accepted Paul but they used Matthew's Gospel. So now Evan needs to explain how Matthew is representative of "the Pauline Jesus Christ" and a "Greek Gospel." Matthew and "Greek Gospel" don't exactly go hand-in-hand. It would be easier, one would think, to link Luke with Paul and therefore "the Pauline Jesus Christ." ...but the Nazarenes are connected to Matthew, not Luke. Evan is theorizing himself into a web from which it will be ever more difficult to extricate himself. Jesus didn't exist, but there were (see below) Christians who called themselves Nazarenes before, so the Fathers and Apologists (because, as we all know in the Subapostolic period, they were all colluding together and trying to rise to power like the Mafia today), colluded together to do this:
But then you're left with a problem. What about all those Christians who called themselves Nazarenes before. What do you do about them?
Perfect solution. Name your quasi-historical Jesus "Jesus of NAZARETH". Thus you explain the odd name that used to describe all Christians but now is only applied to Jewish Christians.Or Jesus really existed, as the majority of scholars affirm. Those who later followed him were called that name, because Jesus was called a Nazarene. Which of these actually fits the available evidence?
Evan's theorizing grows ever more absurd. Where's the documentation for this theory?
In addition, "Nazoraean" could not be derived from the word for "Nazareth." Attempting to derive Nazoraean from Nazareth isn't linguistically defensible. Indeed, Evan's "theory" doesn't stack up to modern scholarship on the origin of this term, including those who hold to the view that Jesus was a Gnostic teacher:
http://books.google.com/books?id=GoWhptP_up0C&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=Nazarenes+Nazareth&source=web&ots=A1U26ZrPXn&sig=u4XAaR_ssAnKgrONjnVhngSjmtc&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=6&ct=result#PPA135,M1
Indeed, even Wikipedia (and you know how much we think of Wiki's here notes this by quoting Baur's lexicon:
Nazoraean, Nazarene, quite predominantly a designation of Jesus, in Mt, J, Ac and Lk 18:37, while Mk has Ναζαρηνός ("coming from Nazareth"). Of the two places where the later form occurs in Lk, the one, Lk 4:34, apparently comes from Mk (1:24), the other, 24:19, perhaps from a special source. Where the author of Lk-Ac writes without influence from another source he uses Ναζωραῖος. Mt says expressly 2:23 that Jesus was so called because he grew up in Nazareth. In addition, the other NT writers who call Jesus Ναζωραῖος know Nazareth as his home. But linguistically the transition from Ναζαρέτ (Nazareth) to Ναζωραῖος is difficult ... and it is to be borne in mind that Ναζωραῖος meant something different before it was connected with Nazareth ... According to Ac 24:5 the Christians were so called;"In addition to that, the term was a term of contempt given to them by the Jews of that day (Schaff), not a term that they took for themselves.
Thanks, Evan, for proving, yet again, you don't do your research. It's this sort of namby pamby theorizing that makes DC such an easy target for us here at Tblog. If you want to say this term is derived from Nazareth and a name that they took themselves, you need to actually argue for it linguistically and historically, and only then can you begin to argue for your "theory."
Further, Evan simply dismisses Luke by dating it late (without argument). In so doing, he affords himself the privlege of dodging my questions:
Evan, are you going to seriously argue that Paul would have been put on trial for not believing the doctrines that he articulates in his letters? The Ebionites of the Subapostolic period (the period from which you are getting your information on them) were a version of the Judaizers. Paul wrote against them, not in favor of them. So, if you're going to equate Nazarenes and Ebionites in the period prior to 70 AD, you've got a problem. This must be quite the conundrum for you. Was Paul put on trial for not believing that Jesus was divine, for not believing in the virgin birth, etc? Why would the Jewish leaders have a problem with Paul and say he was a leader of a sect that rejected the very things that they themselves rejected and that adhered to the same sorts of Jewish practices they accepted? Do you actually think about what you write or are your fingers autonomous with respect to your higher cortical functions?
Or, will you argue that the text is simply in error? Where is the supporting argument?
Or, will you argue that the designation "Nazarenes" at that time had come to denote what we call "orthodoxy" today and the Ebionites (as you portray them) were first? If so, then where's the documentation?
Asserted with no evidence whatsoever. I dismiss it with the same evidence....We simply have no evidence for his assertions and Gene isn't giving us any. I suppose it's possible that things are the way he describes.Evan is a chronic liar. I quoted more than one source, including one of his own. If Evan believes the Ebionites of the 2nd century believed the same thing as those of the first, when at least one of his own sources expressly says otherwise, he needs to argue that to be the case. I engaged Evan on his own grounds. He quoted Epiphanius, Panarion 30. I quoted the same work 29. This what his very own source says. I also quoted Schaff and Berkhof and Justin. Evan never bothers to interact with them. Has Evan ever taken a Church History course? No.
As to my research, I believe I've given evidence for most of my assertions.No, you asserted your theory and then read your sources in that light. You didn't exegete your sources, drew fallacious inferences from your sources as well. Key word: assertions.
I looked and looked for Gene's but couldn't find once where he showed the 1st century Palestinian Christians believed in:I guess it's too difficult for Evan to follow an argument given his dinosaur brain. I was merely going for his root assumption that Nazarenes in the First Century = Ebionites later on. However, I further made some statements that I had hoped Evan, who loves to tell us what an astounding thinker he is, would be able to put together.
1. The virgin birth.
2. The trinity.
3. The bodily resurrection of Christ.
If by "the Trinity" you mean something as fully orbed as the Nicene Creed, that can't be produced. That would be anachronistic. If by the Trinity you mean the divinity of Christ, that can be produced.
Further, it is fallacious to conclude a lack of evidence, if there is one, selects for them not believing in these things. Indeed, the lack of evidence cuts both ways, yet you assert your theory. Do you even think about this sort of thing, Evan?
The evidence shows that the Nazarenes were considered orthodox and worthy of fellowship in the Subapostolic age, whereas the Ebionites were not. The evidence also shows that, over time, the Ebionites came to dominate the landscape whereas the Nazarenes of old faded away, and that it's these Ebionities that the later Fathers discussed. Evan is building a "theory" on a set of fallacious assumptions.
And notice, In his right hand: Evan is employing the Fathers, many of whom are writing in the late 2nd and into the next century for his theory. Let's stipulate that these Ebionites they describe are, indeed, the First Century version. Okay.
Yet in his left hand, he denies the historicity of the Gospels by theories of legends and accretions and late dates and legends growing up, etc. This would, then mean that all those histories from which he quotes get worse, more legendary, etc. the further from the First Century they get. Yet he treats these as accurate descriptions/histories. At the same time, he denies Luke is accurate history, even though the upper limit given in his own source is 120 AD, and the majority of NT scholars date it much earlier. Evan suffers from epistemological schizophrenia. He desperately wants to avoid Luke, because if Luke is true, at least in Acts 24, he has a huge problem (namely interacting with and explaining Paul's writings against the Judaizers while being called a Nazarene himself), but on the other he needs something to bolster his paper theory, so he takes the Fathers accurately and without argument.
Moving on...
Ephipanius describes the Ebionites of his age, and draws a distinction between them and the Nazarenes. Ephiphanius was an orthodox Christian. So, when he says that the Nazarenes were just "complete Jews," the reasonable conclusion is that they believed in the Virgin Birth, the divinity of Christ, the bodily resurrection of Christ. Ephipanius was one of those Fathers who mentioned a groups heretical beliefs. If they had denied these, it is reasonable to believe he would say so.
Justin writes earlier. Justin distinguished two sorts of Jewish Christians, those who observed the Mosaic Law but did not require its' observance of all others, and those who maintained that this observance was necessary for salvation. This fits with Luke, it also fits with Paul's letters.
Justin, in Dialogue and First Apology, defends the Virgin Birth. So, Evan, tell us if the Nazarenes denied the Virgin Birth, the Trinity, the bodily resurrection of Christ, then, pray tell, Evan, why did Justin fellowship with them at all?
But just for tickles and grins, let's take a look further:
Orr in his book on the Virgin Birth says that the Nazarenes believed in the Virgin Birth of Christ. So does Schaff. So does Origen. Indeed Origen specifically draws a distinction between those who affirmed the VB and those who didn't. In fact, the Fathers who speak of them do not indict them for not believing in the bodily resurrection or denying the Trinity-even those writing after the time of the Nicene Symbol. Jerome (Epistle 79, to Augustine) says that though the Nazarenes believed in Christ the Son of God, born of the Virgin Mary, who suffered under Pontius Pilate, and rose again, desiring to be both Jews and Christians, they are neither the one nor the other.
If we take Justin, Origin, Ephiphanius, etc. together, then we see that, yes, the Nazarenes did, in fact, affirm the VB, the divinity of Christ, and the bodily resurrection, or else they would have been indicted for their rejection of it, for the Ebionites are so indicted.
It would do Evan well to simply try and put this information together, but because he's either too stupid or too blind (or both) he doesn't bother.
Gene's a nice guy and mostly he has an easygoing manner, but it wouldn't be a Triablogue post without a little ad hominem, this is probably something the bigwigs at Triablogue demand of all posts, so I think he is just checking off a box here.No, Evan, we don't "check off boxes" here. I don't post on assignment. I genuinely believe you are incompetent, second or third rate, and have absolutely no idea what you are talking about. I also think Loftus should drop you from DC for his own good, and I think you are way, way out of your league. Indeed, I think you don't think much at all. I assure you, Evan, my opinion of you is quite low, and this is my fully independent opinion, shaped by nothing more than the utter and complete ineptitude of what you write. You'll find I'm as thoroughly disagreeable and irascible as Steve. I play for keeps. I'm just a Southerner. I therefore write in the Southern dialect. We can tell you off and seduce you in the same sentence and you'll never know the difference.
Gene reminds me of a lot of my Christian friends and I'm hoping he keeps doing his research, since he'll figure this all out at some point.Evan reminds me of a lot of my atheist friends, unthinking, irrational, and willing to assert and theorize to fit his pet theories. I'm hoping he keeps doing his reseach, but it will only be by the grace of God that he figures it out.
On the “Appropriate” Apologetic Method
One of the things I enjoy most about Triablogue is that we’re not monolithic. Each of us is a separate individual who has his own perspective on various issues. While there is great overlap amongst us, there is also quite a bit of diversity.
I bring that up because I’ve recently been reading over some essays penned by a presuppositionalist who argued that presuppositionalism is the only valid apologetic method. Now, as a presuppositionalist myself, I believe this statement is true in a very limited sense. That is, I believe that those who would use evidentialist approaches to apologetics also rely on presuppositions that they just don’t express. As a result, you cannot escape the fact that at the ultimate level you will need to deal with presuppositions.
However, that is not what this individual meant (note: this is a person I know locally and what I read is not posted anywhere online, so I’m not going to use his name). What he meant was that those who would use an approach different from the presuppositional approach were, in fact, sinning by doing so.
This view saddens me, much like the hypercalvinist view does. In fact, I think that this may be just an example of what James White termed the “cage stage” (only here it applies to someone who just read Bahnsen for the first time rather than a new convert to Calvinism).
This strikes at the heart of apologetics. Apologetics requires us to make a defense for any who should ask. And the fact is that while presuppositionalism is philosophically sound, it probably only works well at converting INTP personalities (a personality type of which I should note only about 2% of Americans are, at least according to the random website I just Googled…). Regardless of the actual percentage, it’s quite apparent that most people couldn’t care less about philosophy.
However, they are drawn toward evidentialist arguments. And while these arguments will never be as “air tight” (as far as the presuppositionalist is concerned) they are often more convincing precisely because they are easier to understand and follow. Jason Engwer does an excellent job at expounding on the evidence for Christianity in such a manner.
But that would just mean that evidentialism is pragmatic, not necessarily that it is not sinful. I would point out, however, that the Bible does use evidential arguments from time to time too. For instance, when Scripture says in Psalm 19:1 that the heavens declare the glory of God, David is referring to how God’s glory is manifested in nature. It is evidenced by nature itself. And Paul echoes that in Romans 1 as well, saying that God’s attributes are seen in what has been made.
Romans 1, by the way, is a beautiful illustration of the wedding of presuppositional thought to evidentialism. That is, we have the fact that the unbelievers refuse to accept what is plainly seen, and what is plainly seen is the evidence found in creation.
That evidence is there. If you offer an evidential claim, you have a reason to do so. Likewise, we know that no amount of evidence is sufficient in and of itself to convince a non-believer of the truth of God. Both must be taken into account.
In my experience, presuppositionalism works best at demonstrating that atheists have no philosophical standing (although see my caveat below). But when dealing with non-atheist, those who accept supernatural concepts and are not limited to materialism, then presuppositionalism is nowhere near as strong as evidentialism. This isn’t to say that presuppositionalism is impotent; just that it is more difficult to employ. To give an example, one could argue philosophically why it is impossible that Tom murdered Fred because of Tom’s nature; but it’s simpler to show the photograph of Tom on vacation in England at the exact same moment that Fred was murdered in Detroit. In the same way, one could argue that the plurality of gods in Mormonism would render the world senseless, but it’s easier to demonstrate historically that Joseph Smith was a conman.
Now for my caveat. When I said that presuppositionalism works best at demonstrating atheists have no philosophical background, it’s not strictly precise. That’s because in reality, presuppositionalism works best when it’s looking at the worldview level. This is most often expressed when dealing with atheists because their worldview is so diametrically opposed to Christianity on all fronts; however, if we got to the level of a worldview (i.e., determining what was appropriate evidence in the first place), then presuppositionalism would flourish against any religious view too. That is, once the unbeliever sees that the evidence is against his position, he will have to retreat to redefine what evidence is or jettison his view. At this point, the presuppositional argument must come into play.
When it comes to apologetics, therefore, I have observed the following (whether it is universal I know not, although it’s certainly widespread here in America). The average person does not care for philosophy, and therefore will be more impacted by an evidentialist apologetic. Those who are most vocal in opposition to Christianity, however, do focus more on philosophy because they’ve moved to the point where the very definition of “evidence” is determined, and those people will be more impacted by a presuppositional argument. In the apologetic setting that T-Blog is usually engaged in (that is, actively engaged with non-believers who are openly hostile to Christianity), presuppositionalism is probably the more effective tool. However, when you’re talking to the average person off the street and evangelizing, evidentialism is probably the more effective tool. (These are generalizations, and not everyone we deal with is a die-hard anti-Christian; T-Blog also provides pastoral posts from time to time.)
One final note. God draws His elect through both methods. There are countless saved by evidential arguments, and there are likewise countless saved by presuppositional arguments (although probably not as many in the latter group). It is not a sin to use an evidential argument. But it is a sin to think that it would be a sin to use an evidential argument. Apologetics must be person-relative. What God uses to convince one sheep to return to the fold is not necessarily what He will use to convince another sheep to return to the fold. God made each of us, and to cite the above (albeit questionable) statistic about the percentage of INTPs in America, God created both INTPs and ESFJs.
I bring that up because I’ve recently been reading over some essays penned by a presuppositionalist who argued that presuppositionalism is the only valid apologetic method. Now, as a presuppositionalist myself, I believe this statement is true in a very limited sense. That is, I believe that those who would use evidentialist approaches to apologetics also rely on presuppositions that they just don’t express. As a result, you cannot escape the fact that at the ultimate level you will need to deal with presuppositions.
However, that is not what this individual meant (note: this is a person I know locally and what I read is not posted anywhere online, so I’m not going to use his name). What he meant was that those who would use an approach different from the presuppositional approach were, in fact, sinning by doing so.
This view saddens me, much like the hypercalvinist view does. In fact, I think that this may be just an example of what James White termed the “cage stage” (only here it applies to someone who just read Bahnsen for the first time rather than a new convert to Calvinism).
This strikes at the heart of apologetics. Apologetics requires us to make a defense for any who should ask. And the fact is that while presuppositionalism is philosophically sound, it probably only works well at converting INTP personalities (a personality type of which I should note only about 2% of Americans are, at least according to the random website I just Googled…). Regardless of the actual percentage, it’s quite apparent that most people couldn’t care less about philosophy.
However, they are drawn toward evidentialist arguments. And while these arguments will never be as “air tight” (as far as the presuppositionalist is concerned) they are often more convincing precisely because they are easier to understand and follow. Jason Engwer does an excellent job at expounding on the evidence for Christianity in such a manner.
But that would just mean that evidentialism is pragmatic, not necessarily that it is not sinful. I would point out, however, that the Bible does use evidential arguments from time to time too. For instance, when Scripture says in Psalm 19:1 that the heavens declare the glory of God, David is referring to how God’s glory is manifested in nature. It is evidenced by nature itself. And Paul echoes that in Romans 1 as well, saying that God’s attributes are seen in what has been made.
Romans 1, by the way, is a beautiful illustration of the wedding of presuppositional thought to evidentialism. That is, we have the fact that the unbelievers refuse to accept what is plainly seen, and what is plainly seen is the evidence found in creation.
That evidence is there. If you offer an evidential claim, you have a reason to do so. Likewise, we know that no amount of evidence is sufficient in and of itself to convince a non-believer of the truth of God. Both must be taken into account.
In my experience, presuppositionalism works best at demonstrating that atheists have no philosophical standing (although see my caveat below). But when dealing with non-atheist, those who accept supernatural concepts and are not limited to materialism, then presuppositionalism is nowhere near as strong as evidentialism. This isn’t to say that presuppositionalism is impotent; just that it is more difficult to employ. To give an example, one could argue philosophically why it is impossible that Tom murdered Fred because of Tom’s nature; but it’s simpler to show the photograph of Tom on vacation in England at the exact same moment that Fred was murdered in Detroit. In the same way, one could argue that the plurality of gods in Mormonism would render the world senseless, but it’s easier to demonstrate historically that Joseph Smith was a conman.
Now for my caveat. When I said that presuppositionalism works best at demonstrating atheists have no philosophical background, it’s not strictly precise. That’s because in reality, presuppositionalism works best when it’s looking at the worldview level. This is most often expressed when dealing with atheists because their worldview is so diametrically opposed to Christianity on all fronts; however, if we got to the level of a worldview (i.e., determining what was appropriate evidence in the first place), then presuppositionalism would flourish against any religious view too. That is, once the unbeliever sees that the evidence is against his position, he will have to retreat to redefine what evidence is or jettison his view. At this point, the presuppositional argument must come into play.
When it comes to apologetics, therefore, I have observed the following (whether it is universal I know not, although it’s certainly widespread here in America). The average person does not care for philosophy, and therefore will be more impacted by an evidentialist apologetic. Those who are most vocal in opposition to Christianity, however, do focus more on philosophy because they’ve moved to the point where the very definition of “evidence” is determined, and those people will be more impacted by a presuppositional argument. In the apologetic setting that T-Blog is usually engaged in (that is, actively engaged with non-believers who are openly hostile to Christianity), presuppositionalism is probably the more effective tool. However, when you’re talking to the average person off the street and evangelizing, evidentialism is probably the more effective tool. (These are generalizations, and not everyone we deal with is a die-hard anti-Christian; T-Blog also provides pastoral posts from time to time.)
One final note. God draws His elect through both methods. There are countless saved by evidential arguments, and there are likewise countless saved by presuppositional arguments (although probably not as many in the latter group). It is not a sin to use an evidential argument. But it is a sin to think that it would be a sin to use an evidential argument. Apologetics must be person-relative. What God uses to convince one sheep to return to the fold is not necessarily what He will use to convince another sheep to return to the fold. God made each of us, and to cite the above (albeit questionable) statistic about the percentage of INTPs in America, God created both INTPs and ESFJs.
Monday, August 18, 2008
Randolph is mentally incompetent
Lee Randolph, resident genius over at DC, has done a post on the Fall:
http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2008/08/gen-216-324-adam-and-eve-were-mentally.html
“This an article to show that Adam and eve did not know the difference between good and evil before they ate the fruit of the tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil therefore could not understand the consequences of what they were doing.”
Here he’s arguing on the basis of what the tree is called. On that interpretation, the tree would be the source of their moral discernment.
However, he then makes the following admission:
“Another interprtation of "Fall of Man" story is that the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil is really the tree of all knowledge where the terms Good and Evil are used as a merism ("bookends" or "upper and lower limits") to express a range, in the same manner as the term "young and old". This is considered a common usage in Biblical Poetry. I don't use this interpretation for this document but it wouldn't change the conclusion anyway.”
But it would change the conclusion since he could no longer infer the innocence of Adam and Eve from the name of the tree. The fact that Adam and Eve don't know everything doesn't mean they know nothing. Lee will have to argue for their innocence on some other ground.
BTW, that's not the only way to interpret the phrase. Hamilton takes it to denote moral autonomy.
“Here is where people become accountable for knowing about the tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. At this point they still do not know the difference between good and evil.”
That’s an inference from the name of the tree. But if the name of the tree is an idiomatic merism, then the inference is invalid.
“God was being ambiguous and therefore deceptive by saying "you will surely die".”
Lee doesn’t explain how God was deceptive. He simply makes a bare assertion.
Perhaps Lee is alluding to the timeframe: “on the day.” But that’s a Hebrew idiom for "when." And, in fact, Adam and Eve did die. They lost the hope of immortality.
“Eve is now introduced to her first experience with someone whose intent may be to decieve her and possibly manipulate her, and she doesn't know the difference between Good and Evil.”
Why doesn’t she know the difference between good and evil? Is this an inference from the name of the tree? If so, the inference is invalid.
“There was evidently no warning about the snake. There are several default reasoning schemes that people commonly use and seem to present naturally. It takes education and experience to be able to overcome these. Presumably, since Eve and Adam were human, uneducated and with no life experience to speak of, they were susceptible to most if not all of these.”
i) Adam and Eve weren’t ordinary human beings. They were human prototypes of ordinary human beings.
They didn’t grow up. They were created as adults, with a certain amount of innate knowledge which would ordinarily be the result of the maturation process, but was, in their case, a natural endowment. For example, they could use language from the moment they were made. They didn’t acquire that knowledge although that knowledge is ordinarily acquired.
ii) Moreover, even if you’re an ordinary human being, you can’t acquire a knowledge of good and evil from experience. Experience doesn’t distinguish between a good experience and an evil experience. At most, experience gives you a knowledge of certain consequences. But experience doesn’t tell you if those consequences are good or evil. So the knowledge of good and evil must either be innate, revealed, or both (to one degree or another).
“People like stories and are willing to give the teller of the story the benefit of the doubt about the truth of it.”
i) The Serpent didn’t tell Eve a “story.” He wasn’t a storyteller. He wasn’t some Homeric bard.
ii) I like lots of fictitious stories. The fact that I like the story doesn’t incline me to believe it.
But Lee may be an exception. That would explain why he’s an atheist. He likes the just-so stories of Richard Dawkins.
“People are more likely to believe a story if it comes from someone they like.”
Gen 3 doesn’t say that Eve had a liking for the Serpent. Rather, she had a liking for the fruit, and what the fruit would confer.
“People are more likely to believe a story if it fits with what they already believe or want to believe.
i) It didn’t fit with what she already believed. It contradicted what she already believed. It contradicted the divine prohibition.
ii) It may have fit what she wanted to believe. A temptation naturally appeals to what a person wants. So what?
“People look for confirmation of what they already believe and disregard things that contradict.”
Yes, we can see that in the willful gullibility of Lee and other credulous unbelievers like John Loftus.
“People are more likely to believe a story if it comes from an authority.”
i) The prohibition came from an authority-figure—God.
ii) There’s no evidence that Eve regarded the Serpent as an authority-figure.
“The snake told the truth.”
No, he told a half-truth. That's more deceptive than a lie because it's more plausible. But Adam and Eve did suffer the death penalty for their sin.
“And Eve did not have any experience with "Bad people" or know the difference between "good and evil" people.”
Actually, if a person contradicts what God told you, that makes him a bad person.
“Eve gave the snake the benefit of the the doubt, she evidently did not dislike him”
i) To like someone and not to dislike someone are not the same thing.
ii) Moreover, you don’t have to like someone to succumb to temptation. The relevant consideration is not whether you like the person, but whether you like what he offers you.
“What he said fit what she wanted to believe.”
True, that’s how temptation works. And it works on people with a lot of experience. Indeed, the experience of evil can predispose someone to give into temptation.
When dealing with a truly innocent person, there is no predisposition to evil. No preexisting hook.
“And she undoubtedly took it to be authoritative about the Tree.”
How does that follow? Temptations can work with possibilities or probabilities rather than certainties. That’s why people gamble. They will take a big risk for a big potential payoff.
They don’t know their bet will pay off. Indeed, the risk factor is, itself, part of what may make a temptation appealing.
“Neither Eve or Adam had any wisdom or knowledge of good and evil at this point.”
Notice that Lee only has one argument, which he repeats ad nauseum.
“She trusted the snake because she did not have any reason not to.”
She had a perfect reason to distrust him: he contradicted God.
“There is no indication that they had any idea about lying.”
i) They had a lot of innate knowledge.
ii) And even if they had no prior idea about lying, if God says one thing, and the Serpent says the opposite, that, of itself, would acquaint them with the idea of lying.
“Adam and Eve both had built in cognitive biases that come into play here, such as trusting what others say.”
The account doesn’t say that Adam and Eve had a built-in bias to believe whatever someone told them. And temptation doesn’t depend on trust. For example, a criminal syndicate doesn’t depend on trust. It relies on greed and fear.
“Desire was apparently built into Eve as described in Gen. 3:6.”
Desire is a necessary condition for temptation, but hardly a sufficient condition.
“They were following the natural cognitive processes that they were born with (untempered by education).”
Adam and Eve weren’t “born.”
“The snake could not have known the difference between good and evil unless it had acquired it from somewhere.”
It says something about Lee that he thinks you must acquire a knowledge of good and evil through personal experience. That’s a rather revealing and damning admission, don’t you think?
According to Lee, I don’t know that murdering someone is evil until I have that experience. If that is Lee’s philosophy of life, then the police might consider him a person of interest.
Speaking for myself, I wouldn’t be eager to go under the knife of a surgeon with who shared Lee’s philosophy—especially under general anesthetic. I might wake up in his basement with various parts of me floating in vials of formaldehyde.
“In any case It was smarter than Eve because it knew that she would not literally die.”
She did literally die. Does Lee think that Eve is still alive? Where is she hanging out these days? Stockholm? Madrid? Barcelona?
“Eve…didn't know that dying was bad.”
How does that follow? Most of us only die once. Our personal experience of death is uniquely limited. Yet most of us try to avoid premature death.
You see, God endowed man with a faculty for abstract reasoning. You can understand many things without having to experience them.
Lee began his post by talking about stories. You don’t have to experience a fictitious story to understand it. That’s the whole point of using your imagination. You can conceive of possibilities that fall outside your personal experience. Indeed, you can conceive of possibilities that fall outside human experience.
“Or that disobeying god was bad.”
Once again, how does that follow? Does Lee mean you can’t know something is bad unless you experience the consequences?
i) Even this wouldn’t tell you that something is morally wrong, but merely unpleasant—sooner or later.
ii) Once again, this raises disturbing questions about the scope of Lee’s experience. He doesn’t know that molesting a child is wrong unless he engages in child molestation.
“The desire was built into her and Humans have or acquire cognitive biases that must be unlearned.”
Why would a Darwinian say that we must unlearn our cognitive biases? What is Lee’s frame of comparison?
In his post, Lee has done a wonderful job of proving that Lee is mentally incompetent. Was he mentally incompetent before he became an apostate? That would explain his apostasy. Or does apostasy induce mental incompetence? There’s empirical evidence to support both explanations. One aggravates the other.
http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2008/08/gen-216-324-adam-and-eve-were-mentally.html
“This an article to show that Adam and eve did not know the difference between good and evil before they ate the fruit of the tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil therefore could not understand the consequences of what they were doing.”
Here he’s arguing on the basis of what the tree is called. On that interpretation, the tree would be the source of their moral discernment.
However, he then makes the following admission:
“Another interprtation of "Fall of Man" story is that the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil is really the tree of all knowledge where the terms Good and Evil are used as a merism ("bookends" or "upper and lower limits") to express a range, in the same manner as the term "young and old". This is considered a common usage in Biblical Poetry. I don't use this interpretation for this document but it wouldn't change the conclusion anyway.”
But it would change the conclusion since he could no longer infer the innocence of Adam and Eve from the name of the tree. The fact that Adam and Eve don't know everything doesn't mean they know nothing. Lee will have to argue for their innocence on some other ground.
BTW, that's not the only way to interpret the phrase. Hamilton takes it to denote moral autonomy.
“Here is where people become accountable for knowing about the tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. At this point they still do not know the difference between good and evil.”
That’s an inference from the name of the tree. But if the name of the tree is an idiomatic merism, then the inference is invalid.
“God was being ambiguous and therefore deceptive by saying "you will surely die".”
Lee doesn’t explain how God was deceptive. He simply makes a bare assertion.
Perhaps Lee is alluding to the timeframe: “on the day.” But that’s a Hebrew idiom for "when." And, in fact, Adam and Eve did die. They lost the hope of immortality.
“Eve is now introduced to her first experience with someone whose intent may be to decieve her and possibly manipulate her, and she doesn't know the difference between Good and Evil.”
Why doesn’t she know the difference between good and evil? Is this an inference from the name of the tree? If so, the inference is invalid.
“There was evidently no warning about the snake. There are several default reasoning schemes that people commonly use and seem to present naturally. It takes education and experience to be able to overcome these. Presumably, since Eve and Adam were human, uneducated and with no life experience to speak of, they were susceptible to most if not all of these.”
i) Adam and Eve weren’t ordinary human beings. They were human prototypes of ordinary human beings.
They didn’t grow up. They were created as adults, with a certain amount of innate knowledge which would ordinarily be the result of the maturation process, but was, in their case, a natural endowment. For example, they could use language from the moment they were made. They didn’t acquire that knowledge although that knowledge is ordinarily acquired.
ii) Moreover, even if you’re an ordinary human being, you can’t acquire a knowledge of good and evil from experience. Experience doesn’t distinguish between a good experience and an evil experience. At most, experience gives you a knowledge of certain consequences. But experience doesn’t tell you if those consequences are good or evil. So the knowledge of good and evil must either be innate, revealed, or both (to one degree or another).
“People like stories and are willing to give the teller of the story the benefit of the doubt about the truth of it.”
i) The Serpent didn’t tell Eve a “story.” He wasn’t a storyteller. He wasn’t some Homeric bard.
ii) I like lots of fictitious stories. The fact that I like the story doesn’t incline me to believe it.
But Lee may be an exception. That would explain why he’s an atheist. He likes the just-so stories of Richard Dawkins.
“People are more likely to believe a story if it comes from someone they like.”
Gen 3 doesn’t say that Eve had a liking for the Serpent. Rather, she had a liking for the fruit, and what the fruit would confer.
“People are more likely to believe a story if it fits with what they already believe or want to believe.
i) It didn’t fit with what she already believed. It contradicted what she already believed. It contradicted the divine prohibition.
ii) It may have fit what she wanted to believe. A temptation naturally appeals to what a person wants. So what?
“People look for confirmation of what they already believe and disregard things that contradict.”
Yes, we can see that in the willful gullibility of Lee and other credulous unbelievers like John Loftus.
“People are more likely to believe a story if it comes from an authority.”
i) The prohibition came from an authority-figure—God.
ii) There’s no evidence that Eve regarded the Serpent as an authority-figure.
“The snake told the truth.”
No, he told a half-truth. That's more deceptive than a lie because it's more plausible. But Adam and Eve did suffer the death penalty for their sin.
“And Eve did not have any experience with "Bad people" or know the difference between "good and evil" people.”
Actually, if a person contradicts what God told you, that makes him a bad person.
“Eve gave the snake the benefit of the the doubt, she evidently did not dislike him”
i) To like someone and not to dislike someone are not the same thing.
ii) Moreover, you don’t have to like someone to succumb to temptation. The relevant consideration is not whether you like the person, but whether you like what he offers you.
“What he said fit what she wanted to believe.”
True, that’s how temptation works. And it works on people with a lot of experience. Indeed, the experience of evil can predispose someone to give into temptation.
When dealing with a truly innocent person, there is no predisposition to evil. No preexisting hook.
“And she undoubtedly took it to be authoritative about the Tree.”
How does that follow? Temptations can work with possibilities or probabilities rather than certainties. That’s why people gamble. They will take a big risk for a big potential payoff.
They don’t know their bet will pay off. Indeed, the risk factor is, itself, part of what may make a temptation appealing.
“Neither Eve or Adam had any wisdom or knowledge of good and evil at this point.”
Notice that Lee only has one argument, which he repeats ad nauseum.
“She trusted the snake because she did not have any reason not to.”
She had a perfect reason to distrust him: he contradicted God.
“There is no indication that they had any idea about lying.”
i) They had a lot of innate knowledge.
ii) And even if they had no prior idea about lying, if God says one thing, and the Serpent says the opposite, that, of itself, would acquaint them with the idea of lying.
“Adam and Eve both had built in cognitive biases that come into play here, such as trusting what others say.”
The account doesn’t say that Adam and Eve had a built-in bias to believe whatever someone told them. And temptation doesn’t depend on trust. For example, a criminal syndicate doesn’t depend on trust. It relies on greed and fear.
“Desire was apparently built into Eve as described in Gen. 3:6.”
Desire is a necessary condition for temptation, but hardly a sufficient condition.
“They were following the natural cognitive processes that they were born with (untempered by education).”
Adam and Eve weren’t “born.”
“The snake could not have known the difference between good and evil unless it had acquired it from somewhere.”
It says something about Lee that he thinks you must acquire a knowledge of good and evil through personal experience. That’s a rather revealing and damning admission, don’t you think?
According to Lee, I don’t know that murdering someone is evil until I have that experience. If that is Lee’s philosophy of life, then the police might consider him a person of interest.
Speaking for myself, I wouldn’t be eager to go under the knife of a surgeon with who shared Lee’s philosophy—especially under general anesthetic. I might wake up in his basement with various parts of me floating in vials of formaldehyde.
“In any case It was smarter than Eve because it knew that she would not literally die.”
She did literally die. Does Lee think that Eve is still alive? Where is she hanging out these days? Stockholm? Madrid? Barcelona?
“Eve…didn't know that dying was bad.”
How does that follow? Most of us only die once. Our personal experience of death is uniquely limited. Yet most of us try to avoid premature death.
You see, God endowed man with a faculty for abstract reasoning. You can understand many things without having to experience them.
Lee began his post by talking about stories. You don’t have to experience a fictitious story to understand it. That’s the whole point of using your imagination. You can conceive of possibilities that fall outside your personal experience. Indeed, you can conceive of possibilities that fall outside human experience.
“Or that disobeying god was bad.”
Once again, how does that follow? Does Lee mean you can’t know something is bad unless you experience the consequences?
i) Even this wouldn’t tell you that something is morally wrong, but merely unpleasant—sooner or later.
ii) Once again, this raises disturbing questions about the scope of Lee’s experience. He doesn’t know that molesting a child is wrong unless he engages in child molestation.
“The desire was built into her and Humans have or acquire cognitive biases that must be unlearned.”
Why would a Darwinian say that we must unlearn our cognitive biases? What is Lee’s frame of comparison?
In his post, Lee has done a wonderful job of proving that Lee is mentally incompetent. Was he mentally incompetent before he became an apostate? That would explain his apostasy. Or does apostasy induce mental incompetence? There’s empirical evidence to support both explanations. One aggravates the other.
The Death Of Pets And The Afterlife
I've experienced the death of some pets, and I've been speaking with some people who recently lost a pet. In order to be better prepared for any discussions that might arise with those individuals, and for the benefit of our readers, I want to discuss some issues related to the death of pets. I haven't studied these issues much, and the sources I've consulted seem to agree that there isn't much Biblical data available. But I want to discuss the evidence I'm aware of for the benefit of the readers, and perhaps some readers will be able to correct or expand upon my observations.
- Though animals are less valuable than humans, God is concerned about animals and expects humans to be concerned about them (Psalm 36:6, Proverbs 12:10, Jonah 4:11, Matthew 6:26).
- A strong relationship between a human and an animal is acceptable (2 Samuel 12:1-4), and the death of an animal in such a relationship is something that's expected to be perceived as a significant loss (2 Samuel 12:5-7). It seems that grieving the loss of such a pet is acceptable and to be expected. The desire to see a dead pet again is understandable and reasonable.
- There will be animals in Heaven (Heaven defined as the entirety of the afterlife of the righteous, including a restored earth), in a different condition than they experience in this life, and passages describing the afterlife sometimes either refer to animals there or use references to animals to convey a point (Isaiah 66:20, Romans 8:19-23, Revelation 19:11-14).
- There isn't any passage of scripture that directly refers to pets in Heaven, nor is there any passage that directly contradicts the concept.
- One of the strongest arguments for universal infant salvation is its widespread acceptance among the earliest patristic Christians. I'm not aware of anything comparable on the issue of the restoration of pets in the afterlife. Though I've seen passages addressing the future transformation of animals considered as a class of creatures (for example, Theophilus of Antioch, To Autolycus, 2:17), I don't remember ever seeing any patristic source address the subject of the restoration of pets. I suspect that it's addressed somewhere in the patristic sources, given how many thousands of pages and hundreds of years are covered by the patristic literature, but I don't remember seeing such passages myself. If anybody is aware of any, I'd be interested in knowing about them. Some more recent Christians, such as C.S. Lewis and John Piper, have referred to the restoration of pets as at least a reasonable possibility.
- There could be a restoration of some animals and pets without a restoration of all of them. As Joni Eareckson Tada puts it, "If God brings our pets back to life, it wouldn't surprise me. It would be just like him. It would be totally in keeping with his generous character…Exorbitant. Excessive. Extravagant in grace after grace. Of all the dazzling discoveries and ecstatic pleasures heaven will hold for us, the potential of seeing Scrappy would be pure whimsy—utterly, joyfully, surprisingly superfluous.…Heaven is going to be a place that will refract and reflect in as many ways as possible the goodness of joy of our great God, who delights in lavishing love on his children." Such a scenario wouldn't require that people in Hell have a similar blessing, nor does it require that every pet involved in the life of believers will be restored.
- There's much we don't know about Heaven, but the large majority of passages on the subject encourage us to think of it as something "far better" than this life (Philippians 1:23), even though some passages might seem disappointing to some people in a sense (Matthew 22:30). A lot of what people think about Heaven isn't directly stated by scripture. It's either an apparent implication of what scripture teaches or a possibility that scripture doesn't comment upon. People sometimes refer to humans ruling over and exploring the rest of the universe in the afterlife, for example. I'm not aware of any passage of scripture that directly discusses the subject, but it doesn't contradict scripture, it's a reasonable possibility, and it could be argued that it's an implication of what some passages teach. As long as people are responsibly distinguishing between certainties and probabilities, and are responsibly distinguishing between probabilities and possibilities, I think this sort of discussion of the afterlife is acceptable. The idea that we should think only in terms of certainties or only in terms of what scripture directly addresses doesn't make sense. To somebody grieving over the death of a pet, a reasonable possibility of seeing that pet again is preferable to no possibility.
- Though animals are less valuable than humans, God is concerned about animals and expects humans to be concerned about them (Psalm 36:6, Proverbs 12:10, Jonah 4:11, Matthew 6:26).
- A strong relationship between a human and an animal is acceptable (2 Samuel 12:1-4), and the death of an animal in such a relationship is something that's expected to be perceived as a significant loss (2 Samuel 12:5-7). It seems that grieving the loss of such a pet is acceptable and to be expected. The desire to see a dead pet again is understandable and reasonable.
- There will be animals in Heaven (Heaven defined as the entirety of the afterlife of the righteous, including a restored earth), in a different condition than they experience in this life, and passages describing the afterlife sometimes either refer to animals there or use references to animals to convey a point (Isaiah 66:20, Romans 8:19-23, Revelation 19:11-14).
- There isn't any passage of scripture that directly refers to pets in Heaven, nor is there any passage that directly contradicts the concept.
- One of the strongest arguments for universal infant salvation is its widespread acceptance among the earliest patristic Christians. I'm not aware of anything comparable on the issue of the restoration of pets in the afterlife. Though I've seen passages addressing the future transformation of animals considered as a class of creatures (for example, Theophilus of Antioch, To Autolycus, 2:17), I don't remember ever seeing any patristic source address the subject of the restoration of pets. I suspect that it's addressed somewhere in the patristic sources, given how many thousands of pages and hundreds of years are covered by the patristic literature, but I don't remember seeing such passages myself. If anybody is aware of any, I'd be interested in knowing about them. Some more recent Christians, such as C.S. Lewis and John Piper, have referred to the restoration of pets as at least a reasonable possibility.
- There could be a restoration of some animals and pets without a restoration of all of them. As Joni Eareckson Tada puts it, "If God brings our pets back to life, it wouldn't surprise me. It would be just like him. It would be totally in keeping with his generous character…Exorbitant. Excessive. Extravagant in grace after grace. Of all the dazzling discoveries and ecstatic pleasures heaven will hold for us, the potential of seeing Scrappy would be pure whimsy—utterly, joyfully, surprisingly superfluous.…Heaven is going to be a place that will refract and reflect in as many ways as possible the goodness of joy of our great God, who delights in lavishing love on his children." Such a scenario wouldn't require that people in Hell have a similar blessing, nor does it require that every pet involved in the life of believers will be restored.
- There's much we don't know about Heaven, but the large majority of passages on the subject encourage us to think of it as something "far better" than this life (Philippians 1:23), even though some passages might seem disappointing to some people in a sense (Matthew 22:30). A lot of what people think about Heaven isn't directly stated by scripture. It's either an apparent implication of what scripture teaches or a possibility that scripture doesn't comment upon. People sometimes refer to humans ruling over and exploring the rest of the universe in the afterlife, for example. I'm not aware of any passage of scripture that directly discusses the subject, but it doesn't contradict scripture, it's a reasonable possibility, and it could be argued that it's an implication of what some passages teach. As long as people are responsibly distinguishing between certainties and probabilities, and are responsibly distinguishing between probabilities and possibilities, I think this sort of discussion of the afterlife is acceptable. The idea that we should think only in terms of certainties or only in terms of what scripture directly addresses doesn't make sense. To somebody grieving over the death of a pet, a reasonable possibility of seeing that pet again is preferable to no possibility.
Sunday, August 17, 2008
Thinking Biblically: A Basic Introduction to Presuppositionalism
INTRODUCTION Paul the apostle was no stranger to dealing with controversy; especially when that controversy was caused by mixing God’s wisdom with man’s wisdom. In 1st Corinthians 1-3, Paul essentially tells the Corinthians three things:
- Mixing autonomous human wisdom/philosophy with the Christian gospel destroys the gospel because the two are completely opposed to each other (1:18-21).
- The one doctrinal rock-bottom, foundational fact that the church must be built upon theologically is the scandalous message of Christ crucified; which is the very gospel itself (3:11). The church cannot be built upon any other presupposition[1], for any other presupposition results in eventual apostasy.
- The doctrine that is used to “build” on the foundation of Christ-crucified must consist of “quality materials”; meaning that solid, high-quality doctrinal truth must be taught to the church so that the church may grow and mature into a healthy body and she must continue to receive this type of healthy spiritual nourishment so as to avoid spiritual disease and death. This means that any human philosophy, ideology[2], or religious dogma that undermines the gospel must be rejected a priori (3:10, 12-15, 18-20).
APPLICATION/TEACHING
We will consider each of these three points in some detail, look at some historical examples of what ignoring them has done to the church, and think about how we can avoid these same traps. But before we do so, we need to talk about what exactly “presuppositionalism” is. Presuppositionalism is a method of Christian apologetics developed by the late Dr. Cornelius Van Til (1895-1987) and popularized through the public debates and lectures of one of his former students, the late Dr. Greg Bahnsen (1948-1995). Van Til was Professor of Apologetics at Westminster Theological Seminary in
“. . . Van Til's distinctive approach is ‘presuppositionalism’, which may be defined as insistence on an ultimate category of thought or a conceptual framework which one must assume in order to make a sensible interpretation of reality: ‘The issue between believers and non-believers in Christian theism cannot be settled by a direct appeal to “facts” or “laws” whose nature and significance is already agreed upon by both parties to the debate. The question is rather as to what is the final reference-point required to make the “facts” and the “laws” intelligible. The question is as to what the “facts” and “laws” really are. Are they what the non-Christian methodology assumes they are? Are they what the Christian theistic methodology presupposes they are?” (Defense of the Faith, Philadelphia, 1967).
“Not only to ‘prove’ biblical Christianity but to make sense of any fact in the world Van Til holds that one must presuppose the reality of the ‘self-contained’ triune God and the self-attesting revelation of the Scriptures. From this basis, the redeemed person then reasons ‘analogically’, attempting ‘to think God’s thoughts after him’. This means humans may know reality truly (for God, in whose image they are created, knows it truly), but not exhaustively (for God is infinite and they are finite).
“The presuppositionalist endeavors to convince the unregenerate first by demonstrating that, on unregenerate presuppositions of chance occurrence in an impersonal universe, one cannot account for any sort of order and rationality. Next, he tries to show that life and reality make sense only on the basis of Christian presuppositions.
“Van Til vigorously criticized the traditional apologetic approach of both Catholics and Protestants as failing to challenge the non-Christian view of knowledge, as allowing sinners to be judges of ultimate reality, and of arguing merely for the probability of Christianity.”[3]
With that definition in mind, we will now look at point one.
I. Autonomy versus Theonomy (1 Corinthians 1:18-21).
Because the intellect, emotions, and will of man are corrupted thoroughly by sin, the natural man is characterized by a desire for self-sufficiency and independence from God. This desire can be best characterized by being a law unto one’s self, and he shows this by continually creating philosophies and religions that allow him to live and exist independently of the True and Living God. This means that sinful man will seek to be the judge of what constitutes ultimate reality without reference to what God says about it in His word. This is what it means to be autonomous. Here is a fine example of a sinner who glories in his autonomy:
We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is an absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.”[4]
I appreciate this type of candor because many unbelievers consistently refuse to admit this type of presuppositional bias or ultimate “faith” commitment.[5] Instead, they will say things like, “Christians have faith whereas we have reason”; as if the two are mutually exclusive.[6] In 1 Corinthians 1:18-21, Paul was deriding the Corinthians for doing the same thing modern naturalists are doing; undermining God’s wisdom as revealed in apostolic doctrine by determining that the basic principles for determining what is true and false about wisdom can be found in themselves instead of solely within God’s revelation. They showed their sinful autonomy by undermining the gospel by mixing it with the prevailing philosophy of their day. The Corinthians wanted to take the prevailing autonomous philosophical beliefs and synthesize them with the apostolic message of Christ crucified; a move that would not only cost them their intellects but also their souls should they continue down that road (1:17, 21; 3:19, 17). Paul was calling them back to God’s standards of wisdom as displayed in the cross; he was calling to be theonomic[7] in their thinking; meaning, he wanted them to follow Christ’s Law and standards instead of man’s sinful standards for determining what constitutes ultimate spiritual truth and reality.
In our modern context, the confusion created by starting with man’s autonomous sinful standards for determining what truth is manifests itself in a plethora of ways, especially when it comes to the debate regarding what constitutes ultimate reality: material things only, or material and immaterial things. When one begins with the fundamental presupposition that God has spoken in the Scriptures in Christ’s Law-word, you are left with the only worldview that can consistently allow for immaterial, universal, and abstract things like laws of science, laws of logic, and abstract concepts. For example, when you reject God’s wisdom about creation as revealed in Scripture in favor of the prevailing secular paradigm of our day (i.e., philosophical materialism), you end up holding to a worldview that cannot account for the very things that it uses to argue against Christianity, things like immaterial laws of logic. I’ve reduced several philosophical materialists to absurdity via arguments like these;
Argument One:
1. Material things are extended in space.
2. Logical laws are not extended in space.
3. Therefore, logical laws are non-material.
4. Materialism posits that non-material entities do not exist.
5. Therefore, logical laws do not exist.
Argument Two:
1. Laws of logic are objective, universal entities that apply to all people, places, and times.
2. Materialism holds that only particular entities have ontological existence.
3. No material thing is a universal entity.
4. Logical laws are not material things.
5. Therefore, logical laws do not exist.
The purpose of both arguments is to show that upon the assumptions of the materialist (i.e., all is matter), they refute themselves. This is because if immaterial logical laws cannot exist upon their own standards, then the materialists cannot use logic to argue against Christianity or else they have to give up their materialism and become Christians in order to be intellectually honest. But they are not going to give up their unbelief so easily. We must continue to press the antithesis between their own assumptions about reality versus how they really behave in the world. Again, materialists must use the immaterial laws of logic every day, especially when attacking Christianity. Therefore, things like immaterial logical laws exist and consequently, materialism is false. Worse, when materialists use the immaterial laws of logic everyday, yet their worldview doesn’t formally recognize immaterial things, they show that they are irrational; the very thing they accuse Christians of being. Usually, they ignore this inconsistency, or modify their original position post hoc without doing what they really need to do: repent of their sins and embrace Christ as Lord and Savior since Christians have the only worldview that can provide the sufficient preconditions for the intelligibility of reality. This brings us to our next point, a discussion of the fundamental presupposition of Christianity: the gospel of Christ crucified.
II. The Fundamental Presupposition of Christianity: The Gospel (1 Corinthians 3:11).
Paul calls the Corinthians to ditch any move towards mixing man’s autonomous wisdom with the wisdom of God as displayed in the cross; for to do so not only nullifies the power of the gospel and the wisdom of God as displayed in the gospel but also brings spiritual disaster (cf. 1:17, 3:11). It is no different today. Consider the fact that if one rejects a literal Genesis in favor of Neo-Darwinian philosophy then this can put them on a slippery slide into unbelief. If we re-interpret God’s Word in Genesis to fit man’s fallible opinion, then ultimately, it would only be consistent to apply this same method of interpretation to Christ’s Resurrection; an absolutely essential part of the gospel (cf. 1st Corinthians 15:3-4, 14, 17-19). A newspaper report confirmed that indeed this is indeed happening: “A growing number of liberal Christians and scholars do not believe that Jesus rose bodily from the dead.”[8] But what could be the ultimate cause of such a slide into unbelief in an area that is so vital and central to the Gospel, as the Resurrection of Christ? I suggest that one of the major reasons is that as people have compromised the book of Genesis with evolutionary humanism and as a result, increasing numbers have started to consistently apply the same method of interpretation to the rest of the Bible. If this is carried out consistently, it will eventually lead to atheism. Listen to what the apostate Episcopal Bishop John Shelby Spong stated regarding the gospel,
I live on the other side of Charles Darwin. And Charles Darwin not only made us Christians face the fact that the literal creation story cannot be quite so literal, but he also destroyed the primary myth by which we had told the Jesus story for centuries. That myth suggested that there was a finished creation from which we human beings had fallen into sin, and therefore needed a rescuing divine presence to lift us back to what God had originally created us to be. But Charles Darwin says that there was no perfect creation because it is not yet finished. It is still unfolding. And there was no perfect human life which then corrupted itself and fell into sin, there was rather a single cell that emerged slowly over 4½ to 5 billion years, into increasing complexity, into increasing consciousness.
And so the story of Jesus who comes to rescue us from the Fall becomes a nonsensical story. So how can we tell the Jesus story with integrity and with power, against the background of a humanity that is not fallen but is simply unfinished?[9]
And so, if the Bible is not accepted as true in its history, the Gospel story also comes to be rejected. Atheist Richard G. Bozarth also reflects this same attitude,
Christianity has fought, still fights, and will fight science to the desperate end over evolution, because evolution destroys utterly and finally the very reason Jesus’ earthly life was supposedly made necessary. Destroy Adam and Eve and the original sin, and in the rubble you will find the sorry remains of the son of god. Take away the meaning of his death. If Jesus was not the redeemer that died for our sins, and this is what evolution means, then Christianity is nothing.[10]
If Christ is not raised from the dead, then listen to what atheist biologist William Provine says logically follows,
Let me summarize my views on what modern evolutionary biology tells us loud and clear . . . . There are no gods, no purposes, no goal-directed forces of any kind. There is no life after death. When I die, I am absolutely certain that I am going to be dead. That’s the end for me. There is no ultimate foundation for ethics, no ultimate meaning to life, and no free will for humans, either.[11]
If the gospel is not true, then indeed we are above all men the most pitiful; for then the only other option is to embrace man as the supreme authority. If that is the case, then each person can determine what is right and wrong in his or her own eyes (Judges 17:6). This is exactly what mass murderer Jeffrey Dahmer did. He lived his life acting consistently with his presuppositions, believing that Neo-Darwinian evolution was the true explanation of history, and therefore, it affected how he lived his life and caused him to have no regard for other people’s lives. He said:
If a person doesn’t think there is a God to be accountable to, then—then what’s the point of trying to modify your behavior to keep it within acceptable ranges? That’s how I thought anyway. I always believed the theory of evolution as truth, that we all just came from the slime. When we, when we died, you know, that was it, there is nothing . . .[12]
Paul knew full well why the gospel had to be defended against efforts at combining it with the world’s autonomous philosophy: to do so consistently results in apostasy and spiritual death. This brings us to a common error made by good brothers in the Lord: giving up Jesus in order to defend Jesus.
III. Giving Up Jesus In Order to Defend Jesus: Autonomy in Practice versus Conviction in Mind (3:10, 12-15, 18-20).
The search for certainty has lead philosophers into various ways of answering the questions, “How do we find certainty? Do we need certainty?” and other questions like that. Christians apologists have done two things; the vast majority have done the one and I’m in the small minority that does the other. The vast majority say (1) we let the secular world determine the standards for obtaining epistemic certainty and then we as Christians come along and say “we can meet those standards.” So, we pass the test of those standards, therefore, you can say Christianity is certain. Now, it doesn’t take any sophisticated work in epistemology or logic to see that if that is your general approach, even if you can get to the conclusion that Christianity is certain (and I don’t believe anybody has done that, I mean there’s a whole lot more in-house talking amongst Christians about the certainty of our faith than there is conviction outside), but even if you get to that, you get to it at a very high price because Christianity becomes certain at the cost of what? Something being more certain that it; namely, those standards set by the secular world!
So whenever you have an apologetic system that argues, “You tell me what the standards of truth and certainty are and I’ll meet those standards and then you’ll see Christianity is true” - even if you get to that conclusion, you have to grant to your opponent that there is something of higher epistemic authority; namely, those very standards that have been delivered to you and by which you measured the truthfulness of Christianity.
Now there’s another fatal defect that goes beyond this; which is if you use this approach for defending Christianity, you will also end up saying (if you are consistent) “you don’t need Christianity for your standards.” Christianity at best becomes the conclusion of the system, not the heart of the system. You not only say that Christianity is less certain that those secular standards, you’ll end up indirectly saying that those secular standards make sense on their own. Again, this is another display of autonomy. Remember, something is autonomous when it’s independent, when it’s self-sufficient, when it’s a law unto itself. So, if we prove Christianity is certain by this method, we do so at the cost of granting that secular standards are more certain and that secular standards are autonomous. And, if I were an unbeliever that had some knowledge of philosophy and I realized that these were the implications of the approach I’d say “Even though you’ve proven the resurrection to me, I don’t need Christianity because my standards are sufficient as far as they go. And consequently, Christianity is at best an appendix to my system and not the heart of it. That’s one approach that is taken.
Another approach from a Christian standpoint, is to say, “There can be no certainty regarding anything without first assuming the truthfulness of Christianity.” Now, on that approach, instead of taking one standard that somebody else gives you, showing that you pass that standard, then concluding that Christianity is true, instead you say, “We can take anything in the world that anybody claims to know (i.e., “I know that that’s my car.” “I know that gasoline is combustible at 70 degrees” “I know that rape is wrong.”), anything that a person knows and challenge them to show how they could possibly know it if the Christian worldview were not true. This is really a turning of the tables – we’re saying that there can be no standards without Christianity. There can be no absolute standards, nothing can be known with certainty without the Christian worldview. Of course, that’s a much bolder claim and you can understand why people would shy away from it because it would seem to lead to the conclusion that unbelievers don’t know anything. But that isn’t what it leads to at all, it leads to the conclusion that unbelievers can know a lot of things, they just can’t account for what they know. Again, they can still know many things, but they can’t give an account of what they know. As Cornelius Van Til used to say, “Unbelievers can count, but they can’t account for their accounting.” So, unbelievers know plenty. My unbelieving physical therapy co-workers know a lot about anatomy, exercise physiology and so forth. But, if the Christian worldview were not true, my unbelieving co-workers couldn’t know anything about bones and muscles and couldn’t do their job. So, my unbelieving co-workers have a job in physical therapy not because their worldview is right, but because my worldview is right. Even though they are taking the measurements of joint angles, strength, and cardiac output, it’s only on the basis of a Christian outlook on life that anything makes sense. Science, math, morals, human dignity, or whatever else you can think of has its epistemological root in Christian theism. So, that should give you a heads up as to what Paul is getting at in the first three chapters of 1st Corinthians.
CONCLUSION
Interestingly in Matthew the 7th Chapter, Jesus our Lord teaches a story about the wise man who built his house upon the rock and the foolish man who built his house upon the sand. We are all familiar with that story, but we often forget that Jesus concluded the parable by saying, “and My word is that rock.” Christ says that those who are wise build their lives, their outlook, their perspectives, and their worldviews on the rock of Jesus’ word. And those who don’t build their lives on His word are fools! Is it any surprise therefore that in 1 Corinthians 1:25 when Paul goes over his apologetic he says, “Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?” (1 Cor. 1:25) For in its own wisdom the world rejects what it takes to be foolish (the preaching of the cross), but Paul says that this is the very wisdom of God; and to reject that wisdom in favor of the world’s wisdom is to end up becoming an intellectual and spiritual fool. So, there are worldviews in collision. That’s the situation right now and it was the situation in the church at
The best proof of the Christian God’s existence is that without Him you can’t prove anything.
That’s just a real pointed way of saying that the Christian worldview is indubitable because it provides the preconditions of knowledge and that I take to be the certainty of the Christian faith. Paul and the rest of the apostles knew of no other line of reasoning, for to them, the apostolic revelatory truth of Christianity as found in Scripture was more certain, more sure, and infallible than their own eyewitness experiences (2 Peter 1:16-19).
[1] A “presupposition” is an elementary assumption, foundational commitment, or basic perspective that is used in one’s reasoning that informs the process by which all other opinions are formed.
[2] An “ideology” is “a: a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or culture b: a manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture.” See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ideology
[3] Sinclair B. Ferguson, ed., et al. THE NEW DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGY, (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 1998), 704-705.
[4] R. Lewontin, Billions and Billions of Demons,
[5] Also, take note of scientist S. C. Todd’s presuppositional “faith” commitment to naturalism with this comment, “Even if all the data point to an intelligent designer, such an hypothesis is excluded from science because it is not naturalistic.” S.C. Todd, correspondence to Nature 410 (6752):423 (30 September 1999).
[6] The false dichotomy of “faith versus reason” is a post-Enlightment formula that has no basis in Scripture. All people, regardless of their beliefs, have faith in order to be able to reason. The difference is the ultimate, foundational starting points for their faith: the infallible wisdom of God as revealed in Scripture versus man’s fallible and contradictory opinions as displayed in the history of Western philosophy. See also “Culture Wars: Bacon vs. Ham” at http://creationontheweb.com/content/view/181
[7] By using the word “theonomic”, I am not referring here to the school of thought known as Theonomic Reconstructionism, but instead I am making a general reference to the guidance that all believers enjoy by submitting to Christ’s commands as summarized in the New Testament epistles and some parts of the gospels.
[8]
[9] Australian Broadcasting Corporation TV Compass interview with Bishop John Shelby Spong, by Geraldine Doogue, in front of a live audience at the Eugene Groosen Hall, ABC Studios, Ultimo,
[10] G. Richard Bozarth, “The Meaning of Evolution,” American Atheist, 20 Sept. 1979, p. 30.
[11] William B. Provine, Origins Research 16.1 (1994), 9.
[12] Jeffrey Dahmer, interview with Stone Phillips, Dateline NBC, Nov. 29, 1994.
A Present Help for Prayer
I find tonight that I am needing to pray and in need of prayer. This post points to an old but recently rediscovered resource from my heritage as a Missouri Synod Lutheran that has helped with both.
I want to express my gratitude for you T-Bloggers from one who is not worthy to be counted among your number. I'm constantly encouraged and inspired by your love for Jesus and the Gospel of his Kingdom. Your labor is not in vain. I look forward to meeting each of you someday, face to face.
Update:
Am I correct in my reading of this, that this is in the public domain?
I want to express my gratitude for you T-Bloggers from one who is not worthy to be counted among your number. I'm constantly encouraged and inspired by your love for Jesus and the Gospel of his Kingdom. Your labor is not in vain. I look forward to meeting each of you someday, face to face.
Update:
Am I correct in my reading of this, that this is in the public domain?
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