“The early Christian Church, which began within the bosom of Palestinian Judaism, received her first Scriptures (the books of the Old Testament) from the Jewish synagogue. Since, however, the Gentile converts to Christianity could not read Hebrew, the Greek translation of the Old Testament (called the Septuagint), which many Jews had also come to use, was widely employed by the Church. Because of the antagonism which developed between the Synagogue and the Church, the Jews abandoned the use of the Greek Septuagint, and this circulated henceforth solely among the Christians. Almost the only manuscript copies of the Septuagint which have come down to us today were written by Christian scribes,” B. Metzger, An Introduction to the Apocrypha (Oxford 1977), 175.
“In the first place, the number of Apocryphal books is not identical in all copies of the Septuagint. This circumstance suggests that there was no fixed canon at Alexandria which included all of these peripheral books. In the second place, the manuscripts of the Septuagint which contain these disputed books were all copied by Christian scribes, and therefore cannot be used as indisputable proof that the *Jewish* canon included all the books in question. In the third place, though Philo, the greatest of the Jewish Hellenists in Alexandria, knew of the existence of the Apocrypha, he never once quoted from them, much less used them for the proof of doctrine, as he habitually uses most of the books of the Hebrew canon. It is extremely difficult, therefore, to believe that the Alexandrian Jews received these books as authoritative in the same sense as they received the Law and the Prophets,” ibid. 176-77.
“The question remains, however, how such books came to stand so closely associated with the canonical books as they do in the manuscripts of the Septuagint. In attempting to find at least a partial answer to this problem, it should not be overlooked that the change in production of manuscripts from the scroll-form to the codex or leaf-form must have had an important part to play in the ascription of authority to certain books on the periphery of the canon,” ibid. 177.
“The prevailing custom among the Jews was the production of separate volumes for each part of the Hebrew canon…When the codex or leaf-form of book production was adopted, however, it became possible for the first time to include a great number of separate books within the same two covers…For whatever reason the change was instituted, it now became possible for canonical and Apocryphal books to be brought into close physical juxtaposition. Books which heretofore had never been regarded by the Jews as having any more than a certain edifying significance were now placed by Christian scribes in one codex side by side with the acknowledged books of the Hebrew canon. Thus it would happen that what was first a matter of convenience in making such books of secondary status available among Christians became a factor in giving the impression that all of the books within such a codex were to be regarded as authoritative. Furthermore, as the number of Gentile Christians grew, almost none of whom had exact knowledge of the extent of the original Hebrew canon, it became more and more natural for quotations to be made indiscriminately from all the books included with the one Greek codex,” ibid. 177-78.
“From the Greek Septuagint translation of the Old Testament an Old Latin Version was made, which of course also contained the Apocryphal books among the canonical books. It is not strange, therefore, that Greek and Latin Church Fathers of the second and third centuries, such as Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and Cyprian (none of whom knew any Hebrew), quote the Apocrypha with the same formulas of citation as they use when referring to the books of the Old Testament. The small number of Fathers, however, who either had some personal knowledge of Hebrew (e.g. Origen and Jerome) or had made an effort to learn what the limits of the Jewish canon were (e.g. Melito of Sardis) were usually careful not to attribute canonicity to the Apocrypha books, though recognizing that they contain edifying material suitable for Christians to read,” ibid. 178.
“Whether it was owing to the influence of Origen or for some other reason, from the fourth century onward the Greek Fathers made fewer and fewer references to the Apocrypha as inspired. Theologians of the Eastern Church, such as Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Amphilochius, drew up formal lists of the Old Treatment Scriptures in which the Apocrypha do not appear,” ibid. 178-79.
“Subsequent to Jerome’s time and down to the period of the Reformation a continuous succession of the more learned Fathers and theologians in the West maintained the distinctive and unique authority of the books of the Hebrew canon. Such a judgment, for example, was reiterated on the very eve of the Reformation by Cardinal Ximenes in the preface of the magnificent Complutensian Polyglot edition of the Bible which he edited (1514-17). Moreover, the earliest Latin version of the Bible in modern times, made from the original languages by the scholarly Dominican, Sanctes Pagnini, and published at Lyons in 1528, with commendatory letters from Pope Adrian VI and Pope Clement VII, sharply separates the text of the canonical books from the text of the Apocryphal books…Even Cardinal Cajetan, Luther’s opponent, at Augsburg in 1518, gave unhesitating approval to the Hebrew canon in his Commentary on All the Authentic Historical Books of the Old Testament, which he dedicated in 1532 to Pope Clement VII. He expressly called attention to Jerome’s separation of the canonical from the uncanonical books, and maintained that the latter must not be relied upon to establish points of faith, but used only for the edification of the faithful,” 180.
“It was not easy for all Roman Catholic scholars to acquiesce to the unequivocal pronouncement of full canonicity which the Council of Trent made regarding books which, for so long a time and by such high authorities even in the Roman Church (see above, p180), had been pronounced inferior. Yet, despite more than one attempt by noted Catholic scholars to reopen the question, this expanded form of the Bible has remained the Scriptural authority of the Roman Church,” ibid. 190).
“The position of Eastern Orthodox Churches regarding the canon of the Old Testament is not at all clear. On the one hand, since the Septuagint version of the Old Testament was used throughout the Byzantine period, it is natural that Greek theologians such as Andrew of Crete, Germanus, Theodore the Studite, and Theophylact of Bulgaria, should refer indiscriminately to Apocrypha and canonical books alike. Furthermore, certain Apocrypha are quoted as authoritative at the Seventh Ecumenical Council held at Nicaea in 787 and at the Council convened by Basil at Constantinople in 869. On the other hand, writers who raise the issue regarding the limits of the canon, such as John of Damascus and Nicephorus, express views which coincide with those of the great Athanasius, who adhered to the Hebrew canon,” ibid. 192-93.
“What was perhaps the most important synod in the history of the Eastern Church was convened at Jerusalem in 1672…The Synod expressly designated the books of Wisdom, Judith, Tobit, Bel and the Dragon, Maccabees (four books), and Ecclesiasticus as canonical,” ibid. 193-94.
“The position of the Russian Orthodox Church as regards the Apocrypha appears to have changed during the centuries. During the Middle Ages Apocryphal books of both the Old and the New Testament exerted a widespread influence in Slavic lands. In subsequent centuries Constantinople’s leadershp gave way to the Holy Synod ruling from St. Petersburg, whose members were in sympathy with the position of the Reformers. Through a similar influence emanating from the great universities of Kiev, Moscow, Petersburg, and Kazan, the Russian Church became united in its rejection of the Apocrypha. For example, the Longer Catechism drawn up by the Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow and approved by the Most Holy Governing Synod (Moscow, 1839) expressly omits the Apocrypha from the enumeration of the books of the Old Testament on the ground that ‘they do not exist in Hebrew’,” ibid. 194.
“As a result, there appears to be no unanimity on this subject of the canon in the Greek Orthodox Church today. Catechisms directly at variance with each other on this subject have received the Imprimatur of Greek Ecclesiastical authorities, and the Greek clergy may hold and teach what they please about it,” ibid. 195.
Friday, March 07, 2008
The presence of the past
Here's a slightly edited answer I gave to an email correspondent:
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1.For the record, I'm an amil and modified idealist, a la Beale, Poythress.
2.I agree with you that typology, with its multiple "teasers" or cameo appearances, is one key element in the interpretation of Biblical prophecy (or, more broadly, the promise/fulfillment scheme in Scripture).
3.As to the "worldwide" scale of the catastrophe (in OT prophecy), we might simply chalk that up to poetic hyperbole.
At the same time, though, there's a danger of retrojecting *our* very modern, mental picture of the globe onto OT prophecy. We have a different sense of scale.
4.By the same token, I think the "foreshortened" perspective is, to some extent, an unconscious artifact of modern scholars who anachronistically fill in the gaps with their retrospective knowledge of history. They don't see the events the way the seer saw them. The seer is seeing isolated visions of the future—not a dense, historical continuum of dated events, week-by-week and year-by-year.
It's the modern scholar who is collapsing "now" and "then." Because the modern scholar, with the benefit of hindsight, sees spaces between these events, when he reads these prophecies, where the spacing is absent, he assumes that the seer is leaving out the intervening events.
In a sense, that's true, but the seer was never asserting that one thing follows right after another. Rather, the seer is simply an observer and scrivener of divine visions. He's describing and transcribing what the Lord revealed to his imagination. Glimpses of the future.
It isn't meant to be either continuous or discontinuous. The seer doesn't generally know when these events will happen along a timeline. He just knows that they are future to him.
We read OT prophecy very differently because our reading is backward-looking rather than forward-looking. So we put dates on these events, as well as dates on the intervening events. What the seer sees as future, the historian sees as past.
Hence, when a modern scholar reads OT prophecy, he unconsciously reads it through his own eyes rather than the eyes of, say, an 8C BC prophet. So, for him, this is all scrunched together.
But it's not as if the seer was affirming that this is all that's going to happen between now and then. He's just jotting down what he sees in his visions, without any awareness, one way or the other, of how much time lies in-between. That’s not his intention. His intention is to faithfully say what he saw.
5.The seer experiences the future as present in the sense that visionary revelation involves an alternate state of consciousness. To be in that mental state is to be oblivious to the actual present.
All the seer is aware of, at that point, are the visions impinging on his consciousness. So, for him, the future is momentarily present—psychologically speaking.
In that respect, his prophecy is historically accurate, but accurate in the sense that it’s an accurate description of his inner state of mind. Of how he was processing these visions.
And, of course, the visions do refer to extramental events to come. They are truly predictive. But while the one corresponds to the other, we need to distinguish between the psychological process and the historical process. Between the visionary sequence and the historical sequence.
The vision is psychologically present, but historically future. Yet, in recording the vision, that distinction is not going to be drawn—because that is not how he experienced the event, and he’s recording his experience rather than reporting an event. A series of futuristic visions was never meant to be isometric with the future. Prophecy isn’t chronology.
6.Finally, OT prophecy forms a body of stock imagery, like a literary tradition, which is picked up in the NT. This is a second-level application or adaptation of OT prophecy to current or future events.
So we need to make allowance for its idiomatic and derivative character. This is the dialect in which NT speakers and NT writers express the future. It isn’t meant to be strictly representational. For it’s allusive of the past (e.g. OT prophecy) as well as oriented towards the future. It holds both past and future in balance. Not literal, but literary.
Of course, it’s pointing to literal events, but not like a photograph of the future. Rather, the futuristic descriptions are meant to evoke past events as well as future events, using traditional imagery to trigger associations with God’s providential guidance of his people in the days of yore. Thus, we should trust the promise of the future due to the provision of the past.
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1.For the record, I'm an amil and modified idealist, a la Beale, Poythress.
2.I agree with you that typology, with its multiple "teasers" or cameo appearances, is one key element in the interpretation of Biblical prophecy (or, more broadly, the promise/fulfillment scheme in Scripture).
3.As to the "worldwide" scale of the catastrophe (in OT prophecy), we might simply chalk that up to poetic hyperbole.
At the same time, though, there's a danger of retrojecting *our* very modern, mental picture of the globe onto OT prophecy. We have a different sense of scale.
4.By the same token, I think the "foreshortened" perspective is, to some extent, an unconscious artifact of modern scholars who anachronistically fill in the gaps with their retrospective knowledge of history. They don't see the events the way the seer saw them. The seer is seeing isolated visions of the future—not a dense, historical continuum of dated events, week-by-week and year-by-year.
It's the modern scholar who is collapsing "now" and "then." Because the modern scholar, with the benefit of hindsight, sees spaces between these events, when he reads these prophecies, where the spacing is absent, he assumes that the seer is leaving out the intervening events.
In a sense, that's true, but the seer was never asserting that one thing follows right after another. Rather, the seer is simply an observer and scrivener of divine visions. He's describing and transcribing what the Lord revealed to his imagination. Glimpses of the future.
It isn't meant to be either continuous or discontinuous. The seer doesn't generally know when these events will happen along a timeline. He just knows that they are future to him.
We read OT prophecy very differently because our reading is backward-looking rather than forward-looking. So we put dates on these events, as well as dates on the intervening events. What the seer sees as future, the historian sees as past.
Hence, when a modern scholar reads OT prophecy, he unconsciously reads it through his own eyes rather than the eyes of, say, an 8C BC prophet. So, for him, this is all scrunched together.
But it's not as if the seer was affirming that this is all that's going to happen between now and then. He's just jotting down what he sees in his visions, without any awareness, one way or the other, of how much time lies in-between. That’s not his intention. His intention is to faithfully say what he saw.
5.The seer experiences the future as present in the sense that visionary revelation involves an alternate state of consciousness. To be in that mental state is to be oblivious to the actual present.
All the seer is aware of, at that point, are the visions impinging on his consciousness. So, for him, the future is momentarily present—psychologically speaking.
In that respect, his prophecy is historically accurate, but accurate in the sense that it’s an accurate description of his inner state of mind. Of how he was processing these visions.
And, of course, the visions do refer to extramental events to come. They are truly predictive. But while the one corresponds to the other, we need to distinguish between the psychological process and the historical process. Between the visionary sequence and the historical sequence.
The vision is psychologically present, but historically future. Yet, in recording the vision, that distinction is not going to be drawn—because that is not how he experienced the event, and he’s recording his experience rather than reporting an event. A series of futuristic visions was never meant to be isometric with the future. Prophecy isn’t chronology.
6.Finally, OT prophecy forms a body of stock imagery, like a literary tradition, which is picked up in the NT. This is a second-level application or adaptation of OT prophecy to current or future events.
So we need to make allowance for its idiomatic and derivative character. This is the dialect in which NT speakers and NT writers express the future. It isn’t meant to be strictly representational. For it’s allusive of the past (e.g. OT prophecy) as well as oriented towards the future. It holds both past and future in balance. Not literal, but literary.
Of course, it’s pointing to literal events, but not like a photograph of the future. Rather, the futuristic descriptions are meant to evoke past events as well as future events, using traditional imagery to trigger associations with God’s providential guidance of his people in the days of yore. Thus, we should trust the promise of the future due to the provision of the past.
Thibaloney
J.C. has attempted to respond to my critique:
http://indeathorlife.org/debate/triabologna1.php
Let’s see how successful he is:
“Hays runs off to crazy town right off the bat. Of course I never specified that I could instantiate any alternative I wanted to, which moves Hays' argument firmly into the usual category of 'ridiculous’.”
i) Under pressure, J.C. is now introducing a face-saving qualification which was conspicuously absent from his original claim.
ii) Notice that J. C. doesn’t attempt to explain why, given libertarian assumptions, he can’t instantiate any alternative he wanted to. So he’s invoking ad hoc restrictions on his governing principle.
iii) My conclusion was meant to be ridiculous inasmuch as I was performing as reductio ad absurdum on J.C’s claim. Nice to see that J.C. confirms the success of my argument.
“*Yawn* Before the event occurs from our perspective, genius.”
Once again, J.C. has to add a qualification which he didn’t include in his original formulation. It’s not my problem if J.C. has to keep doing a patch-up job on his flawed formulations.
“The old causal foreknowledge canard. The order is not ‘God believes it -> it will happen,’ but ‘it will happen -> God knows it’.”
That’s not responsive to my objection. If, *for whatever reason*, God knows it, then it cannot turn out otherwise.
So even if, for the sake of argument, we accept J.C.’s causal order, God’s knowledge of the outcome renders the outcome certain. Hence, the human agent isn’t free to do otherwise.
“Because He sees the future even more clearly than we do the present, next superficial objection please.”
i) I wasn’t asking how God, in particular, can know a temporal fact. Rather, I was asking in general, how any agent can know a temporal fact. Under what conditions can that be known?
ii) To say that God clearly sees the future begs the question. For the very question at issue is whether Arminianism is justified in preserving divine foreknowledge.
iii) Waiving (ii), if God can clearly see the future, then the future cannot be otherwise. For if the future could be otherwise, due to the freedom of billions of human agents (who can instantiate alternate possibilities), then what God would see is not the actual future (i.e. what *will* happen), but a multitude of possible futures (i.e. what *might* happen).
“I deal with the usual Calvie objections to foreknowledge in the articles on my site.”
i) So J.C. wants me to go on a fishing expedition. Fine. I’ll save that for later (see below).
ii) I would note, however, that these aren’t merely “Calvinist” objections. Even Ben Witherington admits that “OT references to God knowing someone or his people, that is, to his inclination toward or love for them, sometimes refer to a concept of election (Amos 3:2; Deut 9:24; Exod 33:12,17; Gen 18:19; Deut 34:10), and such passages lie in the background here,” Paul’s Letter to the Romans (Eerdmans 2004), 247-48.
So Witherington, who’s penned the standard Arminian commentary on Romans, doesn’t challenge the Reformed interpretation of proegno on linguistic grounds. Rather, he tries to get around it another way.
iii) Apropos (i), the tension between divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom isn’t just a Calvinistic observation. This tension has been perceived for many centuries, and various thinkers from the past, like Boethius, Occam, and de Molina have offered different strategies for resolving the problem.
Furthermore, many modern philosophers, like Lucas, Morris, Creel, Swinburne, Hasker, and Zagzebski continue to recognize the tension, and continue to propose different solutions—sometimes sacrificing divine omniscience to relieve the tension.
J.C. tries to dismiss this objection by assuming his best condescending tone, but that merely betrays his own superficiality.
“I would actually say that Hays doesn't recognize a simple expression that God never gave them such a command, nor did He in any way desire them to do such a thing. It doesn't indicate that He didn't know about it…”
Except that that’s not what the text actually says. Remember, this was one of J.C’s prooftexts for his own position. He volunteered this text to prove his point. Now, however, he’s running away from the actual wording of the text by paraphrasing it to eliminate the offending clause. This is what I quoted:
“They built high places for Baal in the Valley of Ben Hinnom to sacrifice their sons and daughters to Molech, though I never commanded, nor did it enter my mind, that they should do such a detestable thing and so make Judah sin (Jer 32:35)."
J.C. only wanted to use the preceding clause about how God didn’t command them to do this. But the text says more than that. It goes on to say “nor did it enter my mind.”
That’s why this is a favorite prooftext for open theism. Since, however, J.C. is an Arminian rather than an open theist, he believes in divine omniscience, including divine foreknowledge.
So he has to construe this clause anthropomorphically. And once he admits the legitimacy of this move, then that, in turn, undercuts the appeal of his sidekick (Kangaroodort) to other Arminian prooftexts like Jonah 3:10—which, not coincidentally, is another prooftext for open theism.
“But rather that He didn't ordain it, which would necessitate libertarian free will by the fact that they commited such sin anyway.”
Two problems:
i) J.C. is equivocating. The insinuation is that if God didn’t “command” something, then he didn’t “ordain” it, in which case he didn’t “foreordain” it.
But in Reformed usage, foreordination has reference to God’s decretive will, while a command or ordinance has reference to his preceptive will.
ii) Apropos (i), it’s perfectly consistent for God to decree something he didn’t command. Indeed, he decreed their sin.
“Is he not catching that Christ was in time while saying this?”
In what respect was Christ in time? Remember, Christ has two natures, and what is true of one nature may not be true of the other.
The viewpoint which Christ is assuming in Lk 13:34 is not the viewpoint of a thirty-year-old man. Rather, it’s the viewpoint of Yahweh. The whole history of God’s dealings with stiff-necked Israel lies before his mind. And he personally identifies with that God’s-eye perspective.
So this statement reflects the divine viewpoint. And J. C. said that God is atemporal. I’m merely answering him on his own grounds.
“Also, I never said that God was strictly atemporal.”
I quoted him verbatim.
“I simply indicated that His omniscience transcends time, He can appear in time as well if He chooses (see Genesis 18 for example).”
i) To say that a theophany appears in time doesn’t mean that God qua God appears in time. A theophany is a manifestation of God, not God in himself. Notice the distancing formula in Ezekiel: “The appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord.”
So a theophany is three steps removed from God himself.
ii) Moreover, J.C. original invoked divine timelessness to escape the limitations of a timebound perspective.
If, however, he’s now going to say that God is both temporal and atemporal, then he merely multiplies the difficulties for Arminian theology, since I already pointed out that each position undercuts Arminian theology. Their combination would redouble the difficulties.
a) If, on the one hand, God is temporal, then that undermines divine foreknowledge (for reasons already given).
b) If, on the other hand, God is atemporal, then that undermines libertarian freedom (for reasons already given).
c) And it also undermines divine foreknowledge (for reasons already given).
J.C. doesn’t even attempt to address my specific, targeted counterarguments—in which I canvass the options for an Arminian, and show the deficiencies of each.
“Nowhere does scripture indicate that God unconditionally decreed their disobedience, which was the point in citing Jeremiah 32, which plainly indicates that He didn't.”
Predestination doesn’t need to be stated in every verse of Scripture for predestination to be applicable to a verse like Jer 32. If the Bible teaches predestination, then that general truth is also true of various passages which are silent on the issue. Silence is not equivalent to counterevidence.
By J.C’s logic, if every verse of the Gospels fails to mention the deity of Christ, then it’s appropriate to interpret some verses contrary to the deity of Christ.
“Duh. Thank you Hays, I was starting to think they were literal bands God was talking about. It's obviously a metaphor for wooing them, which is also shown as Him drawing Israel. Try raising an actual objection next time.”
i) I would note in passing that J.C. has the habit of adopting a tone of intellectual superiority which isn’t justified by the actual level of his performance. If you’re going to act smarter than your opponents, then try not to be so maladroit so much of the time. Otherwise, you end up being a poor man’s impersonation of Inspector Clouseau.
ii)”Bands” are not a metaphor for wooing—unless J.C. learned about dating from a Dominatrix.
In 11:4, Hosea has employed the metaphor of an animal trainer who uses ropes (or a yoke) to control his livestock or wild animals.
It’s obvious that J.C. never bothered to exegete his prooftext. He could have learned about the imagery by consulting the standard commentators on Hosea (e.g. David Hubbard, Thomas McComiskey, Gary Smith, Douglas Stuart).
iii) Then J.C. only quotes the first sentence of my follow-up argument. This is what I actually said:
“And even if it did, that’s a metaphor. Hosea is full of marital metaphors about the love of God. But Arminians don’t take that literally, although Mormons might!”
I was responding to J.C. on his own grounds. Even if we concede his (mis-) interpretation of 11:4 as metaphor for “wooing,” this doesn’t mean that God literally “woos” his people the way a suitor woos his girlfriend.
Rather, what we have in Hosea is an extended metaphor in which God assume the role of the faithful husband to a faithless wife. And we must make due allowance for the anthropomorphic touches which such a characterization entails.
I wasn’t referring to the “bands of love.” I was referring more generally, as I explicitly pointed out, to the marital imagery in Hosea. So J.C. got it wrong on both points.
Once again, if J. C. equates wooing with the use of ropes and bands, then he’s spending way too much time at S&M clubs.
“Heh, if libertarian free will gave me the kind of miraculous super powers Hays thinks it should, I'd instantiate a reality in which he actually presented coherent arguments. Sadly, its limitations become quite obvious in light of such unfulfilled wishes.”
J.C. has yet to explain how the metaphysics of libertarian freedom is consistent with so many unfulfilled wishes. What, in his view, is limiting his ability to access alternate possibilities?
It can’t be the actual world since the actual world is, ex hypothesi, the sum total of exemplified possibilities which free agents instantiate. But only impediment would be incompossible alternatives, where one agent’s choice negates another agent’s choice. But that would attenuate the libertarian claim to insignificance.
From the combox:
“Just as soon as you explain how God creates matter from nothing. The fact that we as finite beings can't understand exactly how God does a thing does not preclude Him from doing so.”
A fallacious analogy on several grounds:
i) It’s sufficient to believe in creation ex nihilo if that’s what the Bible teaches. The analogy with LFW would only work if that is also taught in Scripture. So J.C’s comparison begs the question.
ii) There’s a big difference between not knowing how something can be the case and having evidence to the contrary. The claim that libertarian freedom is consistent with divine foreknowledge is profoundly counterintuitive. And it’s not just the Calvinists who perceive that tension.
This tension is internal to the libertarian position. It’s generated by the relation between libertarianism and a theological belief about divine omniscience. They don’t go together because they were developed for different reasons, and the reasons for one fail to mesh with the reasons for the other.
That’s why there’s been an ongoing debate in historical and philosophical theology about how, if at all, they are mutually consistent.
iii) The Bible grounds divine foreknowledge in God’s knowledge of his own plan for the world (e.g. Isa 46:10-11). Cf. J. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40-66 (Eerdmans 1998), 236-37.
“And I think it a pretty sticky position to call something unknowable for a completely omniscient God.”
Of course, that’s patently sophistical. It begs the question of whether Arminian theology is entitled to make that claim in the first place. J.C. couldn’t be more tendentious if he tried.
“If He can foreknow something that did not enter into His heart that Israel should do, then He can foreknow any libertarian decision.”
That’s incoherent. An agent can’t very well know something which isn’t even present in his mind. If J.C. is now conceding the literal reading of Jer 32:35, then this would commit him to open theism.
If, however, he construes this clause anthropomorphically, then it’s literally false to say that this eventuality never entered God’s mind.
Now let’s circle back to J.C’s contention that he’s already dealt with Reformed objections to Arminian foreknowledge.
“God can, thanks to His divine omniscience, know perfectly what will happen regardless of the possibilities, so our beliefs, actions, decisions, etc. are inevitable in the sense that they will occur, they are not inevitable in the sense that they must occur (no other possibilities, or by 'fatal necessity' as it were).”
http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/election/inevitable.php
i) That’s an assertion of the Arminian position, not a counterargument to the Reformed objection. It takes for granted the very thing it needs to prove.
ii) His distinction won’t salvage his position. It doesn’t matter if they merely will occur, rather than if they must occur. The problem lies with God’s knowledge of their future occurrence. If he “knows perfectly well what will happen regardless of the possibilities,” then the possibilities aren’t live possibilities. Only one possibility is actually in play.
Moving along:
“Consider the Lord's words to Judah in Jeremiah 13:15-17, __Hear and pay attention, do not be arrogant, for the LORD has spoken. Give glory to the LORD your God before he brings the darkness…But if you do not listen, I will weep in secret because of your pride; my eyes will weep bitterly, overflowing with tears, because the LORD's flock will be taken captive."
http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/freewill/calvin_matthew23_37.php
i) Does Henshaw think that Yahweh literally wept over the fate of Judah? Remember, this is before the Incarnation. Unless he’s a Mormon, he must interpret this expression as anthropopathetic.
ii) Henshaw also fails to distinguish between the Yahweh’s statement (15-16), and Jeremiah’s editorial aside (17). V17 is a statement of the prophet’s sorrowful reaction. It doesn’t impute sorrow to God.
“Remember, according to Calvinism, God is sovereign over his creatures to such an extent that they have nothing to do with their own salvation (monergism).”
This is simply ignorant. For instance, consider the Reformed doctrine of sanctification: “The soul after regeneration continues dependent upon the constant gracious operations of the Holy Spirit, but is, through grace, able to cooperate with them,” B. B. Warfield, Shorter Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield (P&R 1980), 2:327.
“It should be obvious by this point that trying to apply Granville-Sharp's rule to Acts 2:23 in an effort to force synonymity on 'foreknowledge' (impersonal noun) and 'determinate counsel' (impersonal noun) is errant at best.”
http://indeathorlife.org/soteriology/election/foreordination/granville-sharp.php
The material I cited from Welty doesn’t invoke the Granville-Sharp rule to make his case. Hence, J.C’s counterargument, even if valid, is irrelevant.
And other scholars like Fitzmyer (on Romans), agree with the Reformed construction on proegno.
“God's foreknowledge of the future also encompasses His doings as well as man's: What He knows will occur is who will receive Him when they hear His word and the voice of His Son, not what we would do if He were to never show any grace at all to us. This argument takes God's foreknowledge completely out of context, for if God were to foreknow us only by ourselves without His mercy, then we could not even exist.”
http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/election/nothing-to-foreknow.php
To the contrary, it’s J.C. who takes the usage completely out of its immediate context in order to give the word a meaning in lacks in context, and then interpolates a number of acontextual conditions.
“Yet another case of simply begging the question. To argue that man could change his mind at the last second and produce an outcome that God did not foreknow is to simply assume that God could not foreknow the last-second change.”
http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/election/impossible-for-God.php
Once again, this fails to salvage the Arminian position. Suppose that God could, indeed, foreknow the last-minute change of heart. By knowing what will happen, the outcome is unchangeable. A last-minute change doesn’t change the outcome. For the outcome is whatever will be.
If an agent earlier intended to do A, but changed his mind at the last minute and did B instead, God foreknew B all along, so the agent isn’t free to do A instead of B. If the occurrence of B is an object of knowledge, then it cannot fail to be other than B. B must obtain.
“The words that make up Prognosis are 'pro,' a primary preposition that is used as a suffix to mean 'before,' and 'gnosis,' which simply means 'knowledge' (intelligence, advanced understanding, wisdom, etc.). Prognosis even survives today in the English language, carrying an identical definition. So it is then rather a futile effort to attempt to re-interpret election according to the prognosis of God into election according to the forelove of God.”
http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/election/forelove/word-usage.php
I see. So pineapples are apples that come from pine trees. A hippopotamus is a horse that favors an aquatic habitat. The gospel is “dynamite,” and God loves a “hilarious” giver.
It’s obvious that J.C. has no grasp of lexical semantics. Usage, not etymology, determines the meaning of a word. In covenantal settings, yada is an idiomatic synonym for choice.
Due to the influence to Septuagintal usage on NT usage, this carries over into the NT. The addition of the prefix makes it mean “to choose beforehand” in covenantal settings.
“If 'foreknow' in relation to election actually means 'foreordain' in every case, then what in the world does 'predestinate' mean?”
http://indeathorlife.org/soteriology/election/foreordination.php
John Murray answered that question a long time ago. “’Foreknew’ focuses attention upon the distinguishing love of God whereby the sons of God ere elected. But it does not inform us of the destination to which those thus chosen are appointed. It is precisely that information that the ‘he also foreordained’ supplies, and it is by no means superfluous…’to be conformed to the image of his Son’,” J. Murray, The Epistle to the Romans (Eerdmans 1982), 318.
http://indeathorlife.org/debate/triabologna1.php
Let’s see how successful he is:
“Hays runs off to crazy town right off the bat. Of course I never specified that I could instantiate any alternative I wanted to, which moves Hays' argument firmly into the usual category of 'ridiculous’.”
i) Under pressure, J.C. is now introducing a face-saving qualification which was conspicuously absent from his original claim.
ii) Notice that J. C. doesn’t attempt to explain why, given libertarian assumptions, he can’t instantiate any alternative he wanted to. So he’s invoking ad hoc restrictions on his governing principle.
iii) My conclusion was meant to be ridiculous inasmuch as I was performing as reductio ad absurdum on J.C’s claim. Nice to see that J.C. confirms the success of my argument.
“*Yawn* Before the event occurs from our perspective, genius.”
Once again, J.C. has to add a qualification which he didn’t include in his original formulation. It’s not my problem if J.C. has to keep doing a patch-up job on his flawed formulations.
“The old causal foreknowledge canard. The order is not ‘God believes it -> it will happen,’ but ‘it will happen -> God knows it’.”
That’s not responsive to my objection. If, *for whatever reason*, God knows it, then it cannot turn out otherwise.
So even if, for the sake of argument, we accept J.C.’s causal order, God’s knowledge of the outcome renders the outcome certain. Hence, the human agent isn’t free to do otherwise.
“Because He sees the future even more clearly than we do the present, next superficial objection please.”
i) I wasn’t asking how God, in particular, can know a temporal fact. Rather, I was asking in general, how any agent can know a temporal fact. Under what conditions can that be known?
ii) To say that God clearly sees the future begs the question. For the very question at issue is whether Arminianism is justified in preserving divine foreknowledge.
iii) Waiving (ii), if God can clearly see the future, then the future cannot be otherwise. For if the future could be otherwise, due to the freedom of billions of human agents (who can instantiate alternate possibilities), then what God would see is not the actual future (i.e. what *will* happen), but a multitude of possible futures (i.e. what *might* happen).
“I deal with the usual Calvie objections to foreknowledge in the articles on my site.”
i) So J.C. wants me to go on a fishing expedition. Fine. I’ll save that for later (see below).
ii) I would note, however, that these aren’t merely “Calvinist” objections. Even Ben Witherington admits that “OT references to God knowing someone or his people, that is, to his inclination toward or love for them, sometimes refer to a concept of election (Amos 3:2; Deut 9:24; Exod 33:12,17; Gen 18:19; Deut 34:10), and such passages lie in the background here,” Paul’s Letter to the Romans (Eerdmans 2004), 247-48.
So Witherington, who’s penned the standard Arminian commentary on Romans, doesn’t challenge the Reformed interpretation of proegno on linguistic grounds. Rather, he tries to get around it another way.
iii) Apropos (i), the tension between divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom isn’t just a Calvinistic observation. This tension has been perceived for many centuries, and various thinkers from the past, like Boethius, Occam, and de Molina have offered different strategies for resolving the problem.
Furthermore, many modern philosophers, like Lucas, Morris, Creel, Swinburne, Hasker, and Zagzebski continue to recognize the tension, and continue to propose different solutions—sometimes sacrificing divine omniscience to relieve the tension.
J.C. tries to dismiss this objection by assuming his best condescending tone, but that merely betrays his own superficiality.
“I would actually say that Hays doesn't recognize a simple expression that God never gave them such a command, nor did He in any way desire them to do such a thing. It doesn't indicate that He didn't know about it…”
Except that that’s not what the text actually says. Remember, this was one of J.C’s prooftexts for his own position. He volunteered this text to prove his point. Now, however, he’s running away from the actual wording of the text by paraphrasing it to eliminate the offending clause. This is what I quoted:
“They built high places for Baal in the Valley of Ben Hinnom to sacrifice their sons and daughters to Molech, though I never commanded, nor did it enter my mind, that they should do such a detestable thing and so make Judah sin (Jer 32:35)."
J.C. only wanted to use the preceding clause about how God didn’t command them to do this. But the text says more than that. It goes on to say “nor did it enter my mind.”
That’s why this is a favorite prooftext for open theism. Since, however, J.C. is an Arminian rather than an open theist, he believes in divine omniscience, including divine foreknowledge.
So he has to construe this clause anthropomorphically. And once he admits the legitimacy of this move, then that, in turn, undercuts the appeal of his sidekick (Kangaroodort) to other Arminian prooftexts like Jonah 3:10—which, not coincidentally, is another prooftext for open theism.
“But rather that He didn't ordain it, which would necessitate libertarian free will by the fact that they commited such sin anyway.”
Two problems:
i) J.C. is equivocating. The insinuation is that if God didn’t “command” something, then he didn’t “ordain” it, in which case he didn’t “foreordain” it.
But in Reformed usage, foreordination has reference to God’s decretive will, while a command or ordinance has reference to his preceptive will.
ii) Apropos (i), it’s perfectly consistent for God to decree something he didn’t command. Indeed, he decreed their sin.
“Is he not catching that Christ was in time while saying this?”
In what respect was Christ in time? Remember, Christ has two natures, and what is true of one nature may not be true of the other.
The viewpoint which Christ is assuming in Lk 13:34 is not the viewpoint of a thirty-year-old man. Rather, it’s the viewpoint of Yahweh. The whole history of God’s dealings with stiff-necked Israel lies before his mind. And he personally identifies with that God’s-eye perspective.
So this statement reflects the divine viewpoint. And J. C. said that God is atemporal. I’m merely answering him on his own grounds.
“Also, I never said that God was strictly atemporal.”
I quoted him verbatim.
“I simply indicated that His omniscience transcends time, He can appear in time as well if He chooses (see Genesis 18 for example).”
i) To say that a theophany appears in time doesn’t mean that God qua God appears in time. A theophany is a manifestation of God, not God in himself. Notice the distancing formula in Ezekiel: “The appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord.”
So a theophany is three steps removed from God himself.
ii) Moreover, J.C. original invoked divine timelessness to escape the limitations of a timebound perspective.
If, however, he’s now going to say that God is both temporal and atemporal, then he merely multiplies the difficulties for Arminian theology, since I already pointed out that each position undercuts Arminian theology. Their combination would redouble the difficulties.
a) If, on the one hand, God is temporal, then that undermines divine foreknowledge (for reasons already given).
b) If, on the other hand, God is atemporal, then that undermines libertarian freedom (for reasons already given).
c) And it also undermines divine foreknowledge (for reasons already given).
J.C. doesn’t even attempt to address my specific, targeted counterarguments—in which I canvass the options for an Arminian, and show the deficiencies of each.
“Nowhere does scripture indicate that God unconditionally decreed their disobedience, which was the point in citing Jeremiah 32, which plainly indicates that He didn't.”
Predestination doesn’t need to be stated in every verse of Scripture for predestination to be applicable to a verse like Jer 32. If the Bible teaches predestination, then that general truth is also true of various passages which are silent on the issue. Silence is not equivalent to counterevidence.
By J.C’s logic, if every verse of the Gospels fails to mention the deity of Christ, then it’s appropriate to interpret some verses contrary to the deity of Christ.
“Duh. Thank you Hays, I was starting to think they were literal bands God was talking about. It's obviously a metaphor for wooing them, which is also shown as Him drawing Israel. Try raising an actual objection next time.”
i) I would note in passing that J.C. has the habit of adopting a tone of intellectual superiority which isn’t justified by the actual level of his performance. If you’re going to act smarter than your opponents, then try not to be so maladroit so much of the time. Otherwise, you end up being a poor man’s impersonation of Inspector Clouseau.
ii)”Bands” are not a metaphor for wooing—unless J.C. learned about dating from a Dominatrix.
In 11:4, Hosea has employed the metaphor of an animal trainer who uses ropes (or a yoke) to control his livestock or wild animals.
It’s obvious that J.C. never bothered to exegete his prooftext. He could have learned about the imagery by consulting the standard commentators on Hosea (e.g. David Hubbard, Thomas McComiskey, Gary Smith, Douglas Stuart).
iii) Then J.C. only quotes the first sentence of my follow-up argument. This is what I actually said:
“And even if it did, that’s a metaphor. Hosea is full of marital metaphors about the love of God. But Arminians don’t take that literally, although Mormons might!”
I was responding to J.C. on his own grounds. Even if we concede his (mis-) interpretation of 11:4 as metaphor for “wooing,” this doesn’t mean that God literally “woos” his people the way a suitor woos his girlfriend.
Rather, what we have in Hosea is an extended metaphor in which God assume the role of the faithful husband to a faithless wife. And we must make due allowance for the anthropomorphic touches which such a characterization entails.
I wasn’t referring to the “bands of love.” I was referring more generally, as I explicitly pointed out, to the marital imagery in Hosea. So J.C. got it wrong on both points.
Once again, if J. C. equates wooing with the use of ropes and bands, then he’s spending way too much time at S&M clubs.
“Heh, if libertarian free will gave me the kind of miraculous super powers Hays thinks it should, I'd instantiate a reality in which he actually presented coherent arguments. Sadly, its limitations become quite obvious in light of such unfulfilled wishes.”
J.C. has yet to explain how the metaphysics of libertarian freedom is consistent with so many unfulfilled wishes. What, in his view, is limiting his ability to access alternate possibilities?
It can’t be the actual world since the actual world is, ex hypothesi, the sum total of exemplified possibilities which free agents instantiate. But only impediment would be incompossible alternatives, where one agent’s choice negates another agent’s choice. But that would attenuate the libertarian claim to insignificance.
From the combox:
“Just as soon as you explain how God creates matter from nothing. The fact that we as finite beings can't understand exactly how God does a thing does not preclude Him from doing so.”
A fallacious analogy on several grounds:
i) It’s sufficient to believe in creation ex nihilo if that’s what the Bible teaches. The analogy with LFW would only work if that is also taught in Scripture. So J.C’s comparison begs the question.
ii) There’s a big difference between not knowing how something can be the case and having evidence to the contrary. The claim that libertarian freedom is consistent with divine foreknowledge is profoundly counterintuitive. And it’s not just the Calvinists who perceive that tension.
This tension is internal to the libertarian position. It’s generated by the relation between libertarianism and a theological belief about divine omniscience. They don’t go together because they were developed for different reasons, and the reasons for one fail to mesh with the reasons for the other.
That’s why there’s been an ongoing debate in historical and philosophical theology about how, if at all, they are mutually consistent.
iii) The Bible grounds divine foreknowledge in God’s knowledge of his own plan for the world (e.g. Isa 46:10-11). Cf. J. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40-66 (Eerdmans 1998), 236-37.
“And I think it a pretty sticky position to call something unknowable for a completely omniscient God.”
Of course, that’s patently sophistical. It begs the question of whether Arminian theology is entitled to make that claim in the first place. J.C. couldn’t be more tendentious if he tried.
“If He can foreknow something that did not enter into His heart that Israel should do, then He can foreknow any libertarian decision.”
That’s incoherent. An agent can’t very well know something which isn’t even present in his mind. If J.C. is now conceding the literal reading of Jer 32:35, then this would commit him to open theism.
If, however, he construes this clause anthropomorphically, then it’s literally false to say that this eventuality never entered God’s mind.
Now let’s circle back to J.C’s contention that he’s already dealt with Reformed objections to Arminian foreknowledge.
“God can, thanks to His divine omniscience, know perfectly what will happen regardless of the possibilities, so our beliefs, actions, decisions, etc. are inevitable in the sense that they will occur, they are not inevitable in the sense that they must occur (no other possibilities, or by 'fatal necessity' as it were).”
http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/election/inevitable.php
i) That’s an assertion of the Arminian position, not a counterargument to the Reformed objection. It takes for granted the very thing it needs to prove.
ii) His distinction won’t salvage his position. It doesn’t matter if they merely will occur, rather than if they must occur. The problem lies with God’s knowledge of their future occurrence. If he “knows perfectly well what will happen regardless of the possibilities,” then the possibilities aren’t live possibilities. Only one possibility is actually in play.
Moving along:
“Consider the Lord's words to Judah in Jeremiah 13:15-17, __Hear and pay attention, do not be arrogant, for the LORD has spoken. Give glory to the LORD your God before he brings the darkness…But if you do not listen, I will weep in secret because of your pride; my eyes will weep bitterly, overflowing with tears, because the LORD's flock will be taken captive."
http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/freewill/calvin_matthew23_37.php
i) Does Henshaw think that Yahweh literally wept over the fate of Judah? Remember, this is before the Incarnation. Unless he’s a Mormon, he must interpret this expression as anthropopathetic.
ii) Henshaw also fails to distinguish between the Yahweh’s statement (15-16), and Jeremiah’s editorial aside (17). V17 is a statement of the prophet’s sorrowful reaction. It doesn’t impute sorrow to God.
“Remember, according to Calvinism, God is sovereign over his creatures to such an extent that they have nothing to do with their own salvation (monergism).”
This is simply ignorant. For instance, consider the Reformed doctrine of sanctification: “The soul after regeneration continues dependent upon the constant gracious operations of the Holy Spirit, but is, through grace, able to cooperate with them,” B. B. Warfield, Shorter Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield (P&R 1980), 2:327.
“It should be obvious by this point that trying to apply Granville-Sharp's rule to Acts 2:23 in an effort to force synonymity on 'foreknowledge' (impersonal noun) and 'determinate counsel' (impersonal noun) is errant at best.”
http://indeathorlife.org/soteriology/election/foreordination/granville-sharp.php
The material I cited from Welty doesn’t invoke the Granville-Sharp rule to make his case. Hence, J.C’s counterargument, even if valid, is irrelevant.
And other scholars like Fitzmyer (on Romans), agree with the Reformed construction on proegno.
“God's foreknowledge of the future also encompasses His doings as well as man's: What He knows will occur is who will receive Him when they hear His word and the voice of His Son, not what we would do if He were to never show any grace at all to us. This argument takes God's foreknowledge completely out of context, for if God were to foreknow us only by ourselves without His mercy, then we could not even exist.”
http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/election/nothing-to-foreknow.php
To the contrary, it’s J.C. who takes the usage completely out of its immediate context in order to give the word a meaning in lacks in context, and then interpolates a number of acontextual conditions.
“Yet another case of simply begging the question. To argue that man could change his mind at the last second and produce an outcome that God did not foreknow is to simply assume that God could not foreknow the last-second change.”
http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/election/impossible-for-God.php
Once again, this fails to salvage the Arminian position. Suppose that God could, indeed, foreknow the last-minute change of heart. By knowing what will happen, the outcome is unchangeable. A last-minute change doesn’t change the outcome. For the outcome is whatever will be.
If an agent earlier intended to do A, but changed his mind at the last minute and did B instead, God foreknew B all along, so the agent isn’t free to do A instead of B. If the occurrence of B is an object of knowledge, then it cannot fail to be other than B. B must obtain.
“The words that make up Prognosis are 'pro,' a primary preposition that is used as a suffix to mean 'before,' and 'gnosis,' which simply means 'knowledge' (intelligence, advanced understanding, wisdom, etc.). Prognosis even survives today in the English language, carrying an identical definition. So it is then rather a futile effort to attempt to re-interpret election according to the prognosis of God into election according to the forelove of God.”
http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/election/forelove/word-usage.php
I see. So pineapples are apples that come from pine trees. A hippopotamus is a horse that favors an aquatic habitat. The gospel is “dynamite,” and God loves a “hilarious” giver.
It’s obvious that J.C. has no grasp of lexical semantics. Usage, not etymology, determines the meaning of a word. In covenantal settings, yada is an idiomatic synonym for choice.
Due to the influence to Septuagintal usage on NT usage, this carries over into the NT. The addition of the prefix makes it mean “to choose beforehand” in covenantal settings.
“If 'foreknow' in relation to election actually means 'foreordain' in every case, then what in the world does 'predestinate' mean?”
http://indeathorlife.org/soteriology/election/foreordination.php
John Murray answered that question a long time ago. “’Foreknew’ focuses attention upon the distinguishing love of God whereby the sons of God ere elected. But it does not inform us of the destination to which those thus chosen are appointed. It is precisely that information that the ‘he also foreordained’ supplies, and it is by no means superfluous…’to be conformed to the image of his Son’,” J. Murray, The Epistle to the Romans (Eerdmans 1982), 318.
Thursday, March 06, 2008
J.C. Thibodaux's Chasez's Boy Band Theology
He's got the right stuff, baby.The Score
i) Arminians made an argument that prayer for the Calvinist, on Calvinist assumptions, was 'pointless,' and a 'waste of time.'
ii) I rebutted.
iii) They offered a rebuttal to (ii) my rebutting.
iv) I rebutted that.
v) (iv) has not been rebutted.
vi) I went on the offensive, showing that on their system, and given the way they used terms in an undefined, ambiguous, vague, and sloppy way, they have the problem of God doing pointless things, wasting his time, or, at best, they waste their time and when engaging in pointless prayers.
The Argument in a nutshell
God knows who will be saved and who will be unsaved. Call the first group S and the last U.
If an Arminian prays for God to save a member of U, then when he does whatever it is that he does to answer the prayer, he is involved in a futile activity. Goes through the motions. Wastes his time. Does something he knows will not come to fruition. If God could save U, then the number of elect, the fixed number that he knew, would grow, and God wouldn't be omniscient. He would have been wrong about the set of S as consisting of n number of people. Rather it, contrary to his claim to knowledge, now consists n + 1. Or, if it doesn't add to God's knowledge then we don't have a real member of U.
If the Arminian says that God doesn't actively engage in going through the motions to 'save' those he knows will not be saved, then the Arminian's prayers are a waste of time, and pointless (again, these terms are used in their vague, ambiguous, sloppy, and undefined way that they were used on me. No complaining now.)
The argument is in the form of a dilemma:
Let S = God does something to save who he knows will not be saved.
Let W = God wastes his time.
Let A = Arminian wastes his time.
1. S-->W
2. ~S-->A
3. S v ~S
4. :. W v A
vii) So, I have not had (iv) rebutted, and (vi) serves as an argument which puts the burden on them, reverses their argument. Basically, if they disagree with (vi) then they must disagree with their argument against me. More on this below.
viii) I had wrote: "When you pray for someone in U, either God does something or he does not. If he does not, then your prayer was pointless. If he does, then he does something he knows is futile. So, dilemma remains. Back to the drawing board."
J.C responded with an off-topic response:
"God doesn't HAVE to do anything when we pray, for we make our requests known to Him; since we cannot know who is included in set S, then it behooves us to pray for all men. It never says that God has to answer every prayer. For your futility argument, you can refer back to the prophets."
i) I never said God 'had' to do anything. I simply said that if he knows that U is unsaved, then to try to 'save him' is a futile effort. If he succeeded, he would prove he is not omniscient. If people know their goals are unattainable, they cease from having them as a goal.
ii) I never said you can't pray for all men. But, if you pray for man U, and God does something to save him, he wastes his time. If he does nothing, you waste your time. If you say that you don't waste your time because God commands you to pray for all men, that's one of the (many) responses I gave to your buddy Ben. So, if this response worlds for you it works for me. Are you ready to admit I answered Ben?
iii) I never said God has to answer it. (But, in fact, on your scheme God can't answer it since he can't force anyone to get saved. All he can do is 'take away obstacles,' as Ben said. So, he takes away 'obstacles' to help 'save' someone who he knows won't be saved. Whether he takes the obstacles away, or builds more, it doesn't matter! It's all pointless.
iv) I answer your prophet point below.
J.C.'s Boy Band Theology
J.C. and the boys of N Synergy doing Bye, Bye, Bye to their argumentsix) J.C.
All his attempted rebuttals were shot down, and he was forced to go back to the drawing board. So, his latest was to say to God trying to 'save' someone he knew he could not save, would not be saved, was not futile just like it was "no more 'futile' than sending prophets to people that God knew would not receive them."
x) I responded that for those people, sending the prophets wasn't futile since if they didn't listen, they prophets words served as a basis for judgment.
xi) J.C.
"Really now?
Nevertheless they were disobedient And rebelled against You, Cast Your law behind their backs And killed Your prophets, who testified against them To turn them to Yourself; And they worked great provocations. (Nehemiah 9:26)"
xii) Yup, that was it. Citing a verse as if it were a brute fact that interpreted itself. He offers no commentary, exegesis, or familiarity with the context of the Ezra-Nehemiah text. This is Boy Band Theology (BBT). BBT is all talk, flash, and no substance. Makes the teeny boppers cheer, and that's about it. Let's analyze his claim:
a) I had claimed that if the things God did had no positive effect, they could still have a negative one. This verse does not tell us that for those who did not listen, the prophets words served as evidence against them and their hard hearts. Let's read Jesus words:
Matt 23:29 "Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For you build the tombs of the prophets and decorate the monuments of the righteous, 30 saying, 'If we had lived in the days of our fathers, we would not have taken part with them in shedding the blood of the prophets.' 31 Thus you witness against yourselves that you are sons of those who murdered the prophets. 32 Fill up, then, the measure of your fathers. 33You serpents, you brood of vipers, how are you to escape being sentenced to hell? 34 Therefore I send you prophets and wise men and scribes, some of whom you will kill and crucify, and some you will flog in your synagogues and persecute from town to town, 35 so that on you may come all the righteous blood shed on earth, from the blood of innocent Abel to the blood of Zechariah the son of Barachiah, whom you murdered between the sanctuary and the altar. 36 Truly, I say to you, all these things will come upon this generation."
37 "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, the city that kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to it! How often would I have gathered your children together as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you would not! 38See, your house is left to you desolate.
Thus we see that Jesus uses the rejection and murder of the prophets as a basis for indictment. Let's turn to Luke 16:
19 "There was a rich man who was clothed in purple and fine linen and who feasted sumptuously every day. 20 And at his gate was laid a poor man named Lazarus, covered with sores, 21 who desired to be fed with what fell from the rich man’s table. Moreover, even the dogs came and licked his sores. 22 The poor man died and was carried by the angels to Abraham’s side. The rich man also died and was buried, 23 and in Hades, being in torment, he lifted up his eyes and saw Abraham far off and Lazarus at his side. 24 And he called out, 'Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send Lazarus to dip the end of his finger in water and cool my tongue, for I am in anguish in this flame.' 25 But Abraham said, 'Child, remember that you in your lifetime received your good things, and Lazarus in like manner bad things; but now he is comforted here, and you are in anguish. 26 And besides all this, between us and you a great chasm has been fixed, in order that those who would pass from here to you may not be able, and none may cross from there to us.' 27 And he said, 'Then I beg you, father, to send him to my father’s house— 28 for I have five brothers—so that he may warn them, lest they also come into this place of torment.' 29 But Abraham said, 'They have( Moses and the Prophets; let them hear them.' 30 And he said, 'No, father Abraham, but if someone goes to them from the dead, they will repent.' 31 He said to him, 'If they do not hear Moses and the Prophets, neither will they be convinced if someone should rise from the dead.'"
We can see that the rejection of Moses and the prophets was enough to justify the judgment of hell. This should be easy enough to see. The prophets were mouthpieces for God. To reject them was to reject God himself. Rejecting God himself is a basis for judgment. Therefore, to reject the prophets was a basis for judgment.
The reason this is argued is simply. God doesn't do anything that he knows is pointless. God knows who will listen and who will not. God has reasons for both sides of the coin.
So, that God sent prophet P to 'turn back' S, and S does not turn back, it does not follow that God does not appeal to P's testimony as a basis to judge S. J.C.
b) The history of Israel is replete with the prophets calling the people back to covenant faithfulness and so to avoid the judgment of God. If they did not heed the prophets, God would turn them over to their enemies.
Nehemiah 30: "30 For many years you were patient with them. By your Spirit you admonished them through your prophets. Yet they paid no attention, so you handed them over to the neighboring peoples."
Thus again we see that the prophetic words served as bases for divine judgment.
c) The prophets served to show that the people of God could not fulfill the conditions on their own. They were faithless, disobedient, and idolatrous. God would call on them to turn back, they would remain stiff necked, he would then punish them, they would return, and then it would happen all over again. So, Christ came. Christ's life and death fulfilled those covenantal meritorious conditions. He also purchased all the benefits his people would need, e.g., faith.
d) J.C. thinks the 'turning back' part is opposed to the judgment motif I appealed to. In fact, it isn't:
2 Chron. 24:19 Yet he sent prophets among them to bring them back to the LORD. These testified against them, but they would not pay attention.
Jer. 25:4 You have neither listened nor inclined your ears to hear, although the LORD persistently sent to you all his servants the prophets, 5 saying, 'Turn now, every one of you, from his evil way and evil deeds, an dwell upon the land that the LORD has given to you and your fathers from of old and forever. 6 Do not go after other gods to serve and worship them, or provoke me to anger with the work of your hands. Then I will do you no harm.' 7 Yet you have not listened to me, declares the LORD, that you might provoke me to anger with the work of your hands to your own harm. 8 "Therefore thus says the LORD of hosts: Because you have not obeyed my words, 9 behold, I will send for all the tribes of the north, declares the LORD, and for Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon, my servant, and I will bring them against this land and its inhabitants, and against all these surrounding nations. I will devote them to destruction, and make them a horror, a hissing, and an everlasting desolation.
Jer. 35: 15 Again and again I sent all my servants the prophets to you. They said, "Each of you must turn from your wicked ways and reform your actions; do not follow other gods to serve them. Then you will live in the land I have given to you and your fathers." But you have not paid attention or listened to me. 16 The descendants of Jonadab son of Recab have carried out the command their forefather gave them, but these people have not obeyed me.' 17 "Therefore, this is what the LORD God Almighty, the God of Israel, says: 'Listen! I am going to bring on Judah and on everyone living in Jerusalem every disaster I pronounced against them. I spoke to them, but they did not listen; I called to them, but they did not answer.' "
Zech 1:4 Do not be like your forefathers, to whom the earlier prophets proclaimed: This is what the LORD Almighty says: 'Turn from your evil ways and your evil practices.' But they would not listen or pay attention to me, declares the LORD. 5 Where are your forefathers now? And the prophets, do they live forever? 6 But did not my words and my decrees, which I commanded my servants the prophets, overtake your forefathers? "Then they repented and said, 'The LORD Almighty has done to us what our ways and practices deserve, just as he determined to do.'"
The consistent testimony of Scripture, both Old and New, testify against J.C.'s Boy Band Theology.
Tying Up Loose Ends
xiii) I wrote: "But John 6:44 does not state that all who are drawn are saved, simply that no one can come to Christ unless drawn by God the Father."
The statement is in the form of a conjunction. Logically, it can be translated thus:
(~p --> ~q) & r
You cannot accept the first part of the conjunction and not the second (r = raise him up on the last day). Or, did you skip that part in your logic readings?
J.C. responded: "No one can come unless the Father draws him does not imply that everyone drawn will come, simply that they can come. Speaking in relation to those who come is what the raising refers to, not all who are drawn."
i) Wow, no one has the power to instantiate alternative possibilities? So, all men are unable to come unless the Father draw him, got it.
ii) The text says: No one is able to come unless the father draws him and I will raise him up on the last day. Are those hims the same him or not? If they are the same, all drawn are raised. It's really rather simple.
iii) Jesus disagrees with your claim: John6:37 All that the Father gives me will come to me, and whoever comes to me I will never drive away.
iv) And, I never said that John 6:44 alone teaches that the Father's drawing is sufficient for someone to come, only that it is necessary. You're not even engaging my point. Again, the point is in the conjunction. John 6:44 is saying (~p --> ~q) & r. This is logically equivalent to (q-->p) & r. Thus,
[1] If he is able to come, then the father drew him, and Jesus will raise him up on the last day.
[2] He is able to come (notice, I never said he did. We just sticking with what the verse says).
[3] Therefore the father drew him and Jesus will raise him up on the last day.
Premise [2] for you is 'all men.' The logic of the case forces you to accept the conclusion of universalism. That is, all men whoever will be saved.
For more see "A Logical Analysis of John 6:44, by Brian Bosse."
Closing Comment
J.C. sings about his secret desireIn his closing comment is his 'response' to Steve Hays, J.C. writes,
Heh, if libertarian free will gave me the kind of miraculous super powers Hays thinks it should, I'd instantiate a reality in which he actually presented coherent arguments. Sadly, its limitations become quite obvious in light of such unfulfilled wishes.
I don't know what he means by 'coherent.' It's not as if Steve wrote: “Grubnarks schnubbles in the flubnart.”!
I think he means he would instantiate a a world where Steve gives a good, cogent argument (right now we're playing along, pretending Steve didn't already present said argument).
You see, J.C. secretly wants Calvinism to be true. He would instantiate a world where our arguments worked. Where Calvinism was proved true.
J.C. is a self-hating Arminian. He desires our position to be true.
Bye bye bye.
"Fanboys"
JAGIS SAID:
“I don't even know where to begin. I have been reading your posts and can not believe how it seems that your desire above all else seems to be to degrate another brother in Christ.”
I’ve been over this ground before, but I have to repeat myself every so often. This is my motto:
If you want to be treated like a Christian, then act like one!
I do not equate a profession of faith with a consular passport which confers diplomatic immunity on the holder of so that whenever he begins to misbehave, he can wave his “Christian” passport in our face to escape accountability for his misconduct.
There’s a pattern to how these debates generally progress—or perhaps I should say, regress.
A critic of Calvinism gives his putative reasons for rejecting Reformed theology. We (at Tblog) respond to him on his own grounds.
Now, if the reasons he gives were his real reasons, then he should either show where our counterargument is defective or else withdraw his original objection.
But what usually happens is that our opponent then becomes evasive and/or abusive. At that point I change my tone. He is no longer dealing in good faith.
“This is so baffling to me. refering to the person that you are discussing Christ centered things with as a ‘little girl’ is so out of the realm of seeking to be of one achord that it saddens me.”
i) I’m simply following the precedent of Scripture. For example, when Jeremiah compares warriors to women (48:41; 49:22; 50:37; 51:30), that isn’t meant to be a compliment.
Likewise, when God tells Job to gird up his loins like a man (38:3; 40:7), God is using a macho-man simile drawn from the ancient world of wrestling.
So, yes, it’s possible for a grown man to act like a girly-girl. Scripture itself employs these comparisons. And I’m not saddened by the usage of Scripture.
I did a very dry, dispassionate post in which I distinguished between affecting an outcome and changing an outcome. Instead of addressing the substance of the post, Kangaroodort launched into very hand-wringing post which was, by turns, accusatory and larded with self-pity.
That’s frankly effeminate. And I said so. There are times when it’s perfectly appropriate to tell a grown man to act like a man.
The Bible isn’t Emily Post. Too many Christians have a very dainty and decidedly unscriptural notion of Christian etiquette. Not only is this false to Biblical manhood, but it’s not as if the Scriptural heroines of the faith were far from fainting violets either.
ii) In addition, there’s something a bit hypocritical about how saddened you are. You’re very lopsided in what offends you. This is the sort of thing I was responding to:
“The gentlemen at Triablogue are apparently hurting for material…Why do they feel like they need to addrsss my arguments if they are not a threat to their position…Just what has gotten these gentlemen so freaked out and rattled?…The games continue as Steve Hays chimed in with his own post…It makes me wonder. Why are they still so insecure about their position?I am amazed that I have somehow managed to get them so riled up…They have already convinced their fanboys…For now I am leaving the playground so Paul and Steve will have to figure out some new ways to entertain each other.”
Ben’s characterizing of his own opponents is littered with denigrating asides. I don’t see you expressing the same anguish where the other party is concerned.
Remember, this is your yardstick, not mine. Why aren’t you more equitable in the application of your own yardstick?
iii) Finally, comments like yours, while well-meaning, simply contribute to the very problem you say you deplore—for instead of discussing the substantive issues, you shift the question to subjective, touchy-feely matters of tone and style and body language.
“This does nothing but discourage me into thinking that we as christians will never be able to unite under the cross.”
I don’t know what that’s supposed to mean. Were you expecting all Christians to agree with each other? If so, then I suppose you have good reason to be discouraged inasmuch as that will never happen in this life.
“I guess I would ask you if you and Ben were sitting in a room discussing this with Christ would you be willing to say these same things to Ben or me for that matter?”
This comment wasn’t directed at me, but it’s worth addressing:
i) If Christ were in the room, I’d let him do all the talking. I’d be there to listen and learn.
ii) If I were speaking face-to-face with someone, I might well take a different approach—but it’s not as easy for your opponent to be evasive in a live, face-to-face encounter than it is on the Internet.
iii) Finally, there’s nothing inherently wrong with treating someone we know rather differently than a perfect stranger. That’s the basis of friendship.
“I don't even know where to begin. I have been reading your posts and can not believe how it seems that your desire above all else seems to be to degrate another brother in Christ.”
I’ve been over this ground before, but I have to repeat myself every so often. This is my motto:
If you want to be treated like a Christian, then act like one!
I do not equate a profession of faith with a consular passport which confers diplomatic immunity on the holder of so that whenever he begins to misbehave, he can wave his “Christian” passport in our face to escape accountability for his misconduct.
There’s a pattern to how these debates generally progress—or perhaps I should say, regress.
A critic of Calvinism gives his putative reasons for rejecting Reformed theology. We (at Tblog) respond to him on his own grounds.
Now, if the reasons he gives were his real reasons, then he should either show where our counterargument is defective or else withdraw his original objection.
But what usually happens is that our opponent then becomes evasive and/or abusive. At that point I change my tone. He is no longer dealing in good faith.
“This is so baffling to me. refering to the person that you are discussing Christ centered things with as a ‘little girl’ is so out of the realm of seeking to be of one achord that it saddens me.”
i) I’m simply following the precedent of Scripture. For example, when Jeremiah compares warriors to women (48:41; 49:22; 50:37; 51:30), that isn’t meant to be a compliment.
Likewise, when God tells Job to gird up his loins like a man (38:3; 40:7), God is using a macho-man simile drawn from the ancient world of wrestling.
So, yes, it’s possible for a grown man to act like a girly-girl. Scripture itself employs these comparisons. And I’m not saddened by the usage of Scripture.
I did a very dry, dispassionate post in which I distinguished between affecting an outcome and changing an outcome. Instead of addressing the substance of the post, Kangaroodort launched into very hand-wringing post which was, by turns, accusatory and larded with self-pity.
That’s frankly effeminate. And I said so. There are times when it’s perfectly appropriate to tell a grown man to act like a man.
The Bible isn’t Emily Post. Too many Christians have a very dainty and decidedly unscriptural notion of Christian etiquette. Not only is this false to Biblical manhood, but it’s not as if the Scriptural heroines of the faith were far from fainting violets either.
ii) In addition, there’s something a bit hypocritical about how saddened you are. You’re very lopsided in what offends you. This is the sort of thing I was responding to:
“The gentlemen at Triablogue are apparently hurting for material…Why do they feel like they need to addrsss my arguments if they are not a threat to their position…Just what has gotten these gentlemen so freaked out and rattled?…The games continue as Steve Hays chimed in with his own post…It makes me wonder. Why are they still so insecure about their position?I am amazed that I have somehow managed to get them so riled up…They have already convinced their fanboys…For now I am leaving the playground so Paul and Steve will have to figure out some new ways to entertain each other.”
Ben’s characterizing of his own opponents is littered with denigrating asides. I don’t see you expressing the same anguish where the other party is concerned.
Remember, this is your yardstick, not mine. Why aren’t you more equitable in the application of your own yardstick?
iii) Finally, comments like yours, while well-meaning, simply contribute to the very problem you say you deplore—for instead of discussing the substantive issues, you shift the question to subjective, touchy-feely matters of tone and style and body language.
“This does nothing but discourage me into thinking that we as christians will never be able to unite under the cross.”
I don’t know what that’s supposed to mean. Were you expecting all Christians to agree with each other? If so, then I suppose you have good reason to be discouraged inasmuch as that will never happen in this life.
“I guess I would ask you if you and Ben were sitting in a room discussing this with Christ would you be willing to say these same things to Ben or me for that matter?”
This comment wasn’t directed at me, but it’s worth addressing:
i) If Christ were in the room, I’d let him do all the talking. I’d be there to listen and learn.
ii) If I were speaking face-to-face with someone, I might well take a different approach—but it’s not as easy for your opponent to be evasive in a live, face-to-face encounter than it is on the Internet.
iii) Finally, there’s nothing inherently wrong with treating someone we know rather differently than a perfect stranger. That’s the basis of friendship.
Dialogue Concerning the 10 Chief Theological Systems (An Allegory in 10 Scenes)
Scene 1 – A coffee shop. SIMPLICIO is ordering a decaf nonfat latte when his friends SALVIATI and SAGREDO arrive.
SIMPLICIO: Salviati, I challenge you on a mathematical point!
SALVIATI: (to SAGREDO) This will be interesting.
SIMPLICIO: The other night I read in the Oxford Annotated Book of Math Theorems that the + sign indicates addition.
SALVIATI: Yes, that is correct.
SIMPLICIO: Therefore, proper exegesis of the OABMT shows us that 1 + 1 = 11 after all.
SALVIATI: (with a sigh) That’s not how you do addition.
SIMPLICIO: You only say that because you’re importing Reformed Mathedology into the text. But if you don’t start with your philosophy, you’ll see that I’m correct.
SAGREDO: Simplicio seems to have a point. I mean, what’s to keep 1 + 1 from being 11? God could certainly make 1 + 1 into 11.
SALVIATI: No He can’t. Addition isn’t the combining of symbols; it’s combining of numbers represented by those symbols.
SIMPLICIO: Aha! See, you import your Reformed Mathedology even now! Eisegesis!
SALVIATI: No, it’s exegesis straight out of the OABMT, chapter 1. It states: “Addition came about from the counting of items. Items in one pile were combined with items of another pile, and the total of both piles was the sum.”
SIMPLICIO: But we’re not talking about addition, we’re talking about the + sign.
SALVIATI: Which you agreed indicates addition.
SIMPLICIO: That’s not true! Besides, 1 + 1 = 11. Just look at it. The common sense reading shows you I’m right.
SAGREDO: Indeed, it does appear that 1 + 1 could form 11. Couldn’t this be an indication of looking at it from the wrong angle? Perhaps you need to read it in binary.
SIMPLICIO: Yes! Binary, exactly right!
SALVIATI: 1 + 1 = 10 in binary.
SIMPLICIO: No, it’s 11.
SALVIATI: Look, there are rules for math and you’re violating them. One and one is two regardless of the base you use. Two is represented by the numeral 2 in base 10, and by the number 10 in binary.
SIMPLICIO: Oh, so now 2 = 10! I told you those Reformed Mathedologies are incoherent!
SALVIATI: You’re not listening to what I’m saying.
SIMPLICIO: Sure I am. You’re spouting a lot of gibberish.
BARISTA: Your coffee is ready, sir.
Scene 10 – Outside the coffee shop ten minutes later.
SAGREDO: Salviati, I must confess that Simplicio has brought up some interesting points. I think he is right.
SIMPLICIO: Thank you, Sagredo. This is how true mathematicians behave, you see. We are unified.
SALVIATI: Whether you’re unified or not, you’re violating the rules of math. You say that 1 + 1 = 11. How is this possible?
SIMPLICIO: I’ve already explained it.
SALVIATI: No, you’ve stated it.
SIMPLICIO: Common sense shows us. I already told you this.
SALVIATI: But you haven’t shown how it works from the rules of math.
SIMPLICIO: Everything is rules to you. Why can’t you just let go and let God?
SALVIATI: That doesn’t even make sense.
SIMPLICIO: You need to understand binary. God is binary.
SALVIATI: I thought he was a Trinity.
SIMPLICIO: That too. But that’s beside the point, because 1 + 1 = 11.
SALVIATI: Repeating yourself is no substitute for proof.
SIMPLICIO: Why are you so demanding of proof? Have faith.
SALVIATI: The OABMT itself gives us the rules. It’s not God-honoring faith to ignore what He has given us. And you’re ignoring the rules here.
SIMPLICIO: Look, would you agree that 2 + 2 = 22?
SALVIATI: No, it equals 4.
SIMPLICIO: In binary, I mean.
SALVIATI: Binary doesn’t have the numeral 2. It’s only 1s and 0s. The binary four is represented by 100.
SIMPLICIO: Sheesh, do you have to correct EVERY LITTLE THING?
SALVIATI: When it’s wrong, yes.
SIMPLICIO: This is why I’ve argued that Reformed Mathedology divides!
SALVIATI: Well, yes that how fractions came about.
SIMPLICIO: What?
SALVIATI: A little joke.
SIMPLICIO: So now you mock me. You’re showing real character there.
SALVIATI: Actually I’ve given up on trying to convince you reality is real. Jokes are all that you deserve now.
SAGREDO: Don’t you think that’s a little harsh, Salviati?
SALVIATI: What’s harsh is his lack of exegetical skills and the inability to reason. There are only 10 kinds of people in the world. Those who understand binary, and Simplicio.
SIMPLICIO: What’s that supposed to mean? Here I’ve presented my evidence and all you do is challenge little things. Why can’t I just make simple comments without having to defend every little thing?
SALVIATI: Um, you were the one who challenged me, remember?
SIMPLICIO: No I didn’t! I just made a simple comment and you have to pick it all apart. That’s so loving of you.
SALVIATI: Does your memory extend back further than 11 seconds?
SIMPLICIO: 1 + 1 = 11!
SALVIATI: Never mind.
SAGREDO: Salviati, I must object. You’re being overly mean here. This is completely uncalled for. In fact, I think the only thing you’re good for now is to be a contributor at Triablogue. As for me and Simplicio, farewell you Reformed meanie!
SIMPLICIO: Salviati, I challenge you on a mathematical point!
SALVIATI: (to SAGREDO) This will be interesting.
SIMPLICIO: The other night I read in the Oxford Annotated Book of Math Theorems that the + sign indicates addition.
SALVIATI: Yes, that is correct.
SIMPLICIO: Therefore, proper exegesis of the OABMT shows us that 1 + 1 = 11 after all.
SALVIATI: (with a sigh) That’s not how you do addition.
SIMPLICIO: You only say that because you’re importing Reformed Mathedology into the text. But if you don’t start with your philosophy, you’ll see that I’m correct.
SAGREDO: Simplicio seems to have a point. I mean, what’s to keep 1 + 1 from being 11? God could certainly make 1 + 1 into 11.
SALVIATI: No He can’t. Addition isn’t the combining of symbols; it’s combining of numbers represented by those symbols.
SIMPLICIO: Aha! See, you import your Reformed Mathedology even now! Eisegesis!
SALVIATI: No, it’s exegesis straight out of the OABMT, chapter 1. It states: “Addition came about from the counting of items. Items in one pile were combined with items of another pile, and the total of both piles was the sum.”
SIMPLICIO: But we’re not talking about addition, we’re talking about the + sign.
SALVIATI: Which you agreed indicates addition.
SIMPLICIO: That’s not true! Besides, 1 + 1 = 11. Just look at it. The common sense reading shows you I’m right.
SAGREDO: Indeed, it does appear that 1 + 1 could form 11. Couldn’t this be an indication of looking at it from the wrong angle? Perhaps you need to read it in binary.
SIMPLICIO: Yes! Binary, exactly right!
SALVIATI: 1 + 1 = 10 in binary.
SIMPLICIO: No, it’s 11.
SALVIATI: Look, there are rules for math and you’re violating them. One and one is two regardless of the base you use. Two is represented by the numeral 2 in base 10, and by the number 10 in binary.
SIMPLICIO: Oh, so now 2 = 10! I told you those Reformed Mathedologies are incoherent!
SALVIATI: You’re not listening to what I’m saying.
SIMPLICIO: Sure I am. You’re spouting a lot of gibberish.
BARISTA: Your coffee is ready, sir.
Scene 10 – Outside the coffee shop ten minutes later.
SAGREDO: Salviati, I must confess that Simplicio has brought up some interesting points. I think he is right.
SIMPLICIO: Thank you, Sagredo. This is how true mathematicians behave, you see. We are unified.
SALVIATI: Whether you’re unified or not, you’re violating the rules of math. You say that 1 + 1 = 11. How is this possible?
SIMPLICIO: I’ve already explained it.
SALVIATI: No, you’ve stated it.
SIMPLICIO: Common sense shows us. I already told you this.
SALVIATI: But you haven’t shown how it works from the rules of math.
SIMPLICIO: Everything is rules to you. Why can’t you just let go and let God?
SALVIATI: That doesn’t even make sense.
SIMPLICIO: You need to understand binary. God is binary.
SALVIATI: I thought he was a Trinity.
SIMPLICIO: That too. But that’s beside the point, because 1 + 1 = 11.
SALVIATI: Repeating yourself is no substitute for proof.
SIMPLICIO: Why are you so demanding of proof? Have faith.
SALVIATI: The OABMT itself gives us the rules. It’s not God-honoring faith to ignore what He has given us. And you’re ignoring the rules here.
SIMPLICIO: Look, would you agree that 2 + 2 = 22?
SALVIATI: No, it equals 4.
SIMPLICIO: In binary, I mean.
SALVIATI: Binary doesn’t have the numeral 2. It’s only 1s and 0s. The binary four is represented by 100.
SIMPLICIO: Sheesh, do you have to correct EVERY LITTLE THING?
SALVIATI: When it’s wrong, yes.
SIMPLICIO: This is why I’ve argued that Reformed Mathedology divides!
SALVIATI: Well, yes that how fractions came about.
SIMPLICIO: What?
SALVIATI: A little joke.
SIMPLICIO: So now you mock me. You’re showing real character there.
SALVIATI: Actually I’ve given up on trying to convince you reality is real. Jokes are all that you deserve now.
SAGREDO: Don’t you think that’s a little harsh, Salviati?
SALVIATI: What’s harsh is his lack of exegetical skills and the inability to reason. There are only 10 kinds of people in the world. Those who understand binary, and Simplicio.
SIMPLICIO: What’s that supposed to mean? Here I’ve presented my evidence and all you do is challenge little things. Why can’t I just make simple comments without having to defend every little thing?
SALVIATI: Um, you were the one who challenged me, remember?
SIMPLICIO: No I didn’t! I just made a simple comment and you have to pick it all apart. That’s so loving of you.
SALVIATI: Does your memory extend back further than 11 seconds?
SIMPLICIO: 1 + 1 = 11!
SALVIATI: Never mind.
SAGREDO: Salviati, I must object. You’re being overly mean here. This is completely uncalled for. In fact, I think the only thing you’re good for now is to be a contributor at Triablogue. As for me and Simplicio, farewell you Reformed meanie!
Aladdin's Arminian lamp
J.C. THIBODAUX SAID:
“Incorrect, I have the power to instantiate alternative possibilities, God simply knows how I will employ it.”
Is that a fact? There’s a possible world in which I take Catherine Deneuve on a date. And back when I was a teenager, I used to dream about taking Catherine Deneuve on a date. But no matter how vividly I imagined that alternative scenario, I was never able to turn my fantasy into reality.
The simplest way for Arminians and other libertarians to make their case is not through arguments. Instead, if what they say is true, then why don’t they put on a public demonstration of their libertarian prowess?
For example, suppose I buy a big, vacant lot. It has a nice view. I’d like to build a house there. But it would save a lot of money if I could simply will a house into existence. However, I’ve never had much success with that strategy.
Now, there’s a possible world in which the Breakers is sitting on my plot of land. So why doesn’t J.C. employ his libertarian power to instantiate that alternate possibility? We can even invite a TV news crew to film the event.
And, while he’s at it, perhaps J.C. could do me the favor of making Catherine Deneuve materialized by my side. Maybe a younger version since she’s getting up in years.
Once you get the hang of it, the power to instantiate alternative possibilities should come in pretty handy. I really need to draw up a shopping list.
There’s a possible world in which I live in the Breakers. There’s a possible world in which Catherine Deneuve is my wife. And there’s a possible world in which I drive a Duisenberg.
Okay, let’s start with those three possibilities. That should be sufficient for a convincing promo.
Why doesn’t J.C. stipulate a time and place of his own choosing. If it’s at some exotic location, then I’d also ask him to instantiate a Lear jet so that we can get there more easily.
Then let’s see him twitch his nose or rub his lamp to instantiate these alternate possibilities.
I hope he’s not going to tell us that the actual world imposes severe limitations on what alternate possibilities he can instantiate. For, if libertarianism is true, then the actual world simply is the sum total of what alternate possibilities are instantiated by free agents like J.C.
And if he says that one libertarian agent can act as a check on what another agent can instantiate, thereby canceling out his freedom of choice, then can agent can’t do otherwise in many situations.
Perhaps, though, he’d say that not all possibilities are compossible. But if that’s a problem for him, then I’m flexible.
Instead of the package deal containing the Breakers, Catherine Deneuve, and the Duisenberg, I’ll settle for a different package: say, the Getty Villa, Sophia Loren, and a silver Aston Martin—or the Hearst Castle, Greta Garbo, and a Lamborghini—or the Getty Villa, Greta Garbo, and a Duisenberg, &c.
I’m not finicky. Any of these combinations would meet with my satisfaction.
Moving along:
“Because He is atemporal, and can know choices before they are instantiated.”
There are several problems with that move:
i) If God is atemporal, then he cannot know choices *before* they are made, for that would introduce a chronological sequence into God’s knowledge vis-à-vis the object of knowledge which J.C’s stipulation of divine timelessness disallows.
ii) If God timelessly knows an outcome, then the outcome cannot be otherwise since that would falsify his foreknowledge.
Put another way, if God is atemporal, then whatever he believes is immutable—and if his belief about the future is true, then the future cannot be otherwise.
iii) How can an agent know a temporal fact?
a) He can know it directly, by experiencing the temporal fact. But if God is timeless, then he doesn’t experience time.
b) And even if he did experience time, pace J.C’s postulate, we can only experience the present, not the future.
c) He can know about it indirectly, by reading a newspaper or watching cable news, &c. But this would also involve a temporal experience of a temporal fact—albeit it at one or more moves from the event.
d) He could also know about it indirectly if he planned the future, and the future occurs according to his plan. He would know the future by knowing his plan for the future.
That explanation is readily available to the Calvinist, but not to the Arminian.
iv) J.C’s marsupial sidekick has argued for Arminianism on the grounds that “Arminianism is rather simple and takes the Bible at face value.”
But if God is atemporal, then we would interpret certain passages of Scripture anthropomorphically rather than literally. So Thibodaux and Kangaroodort are presenting two mutually exclusive justifications for Arminianism.
Moving along:
“Rather like being chosen according to the foreknowledge of God the Father (1 Peter 1:2).”
There are several problems with that facile appeal. As Greg Welty recently explained:
***QUOTE***
Well, not so fast. The proposed interpretation is neither necessary nor plausible. It’s certainly not necessary, because neither text says that God elects us on the basis of foreseen faith. In fact, neither text even mentions faith as something foreseen at all, much less that election is based upon it.12 Rather, in the “foreknew passages” (Ro 8:29; 1Pe 1:2), what is said to be foreknown are people, not faith or works. What Ro 8:29 says is: “those whom He foreknew, He also predestined...” It is persons who are said to be foreknown, not their acts of faith specifically. 1Pe 1:1-2 is even more ambiguous; it just mentions “foreknowledge” without clarifying whether the object of that foreknowledge is persons, or their faith, or their works, or anything else about them.
Not only is the ‘foreseen faith’ interpretation unnecessary (from a textual point of view), it’s also implausible, for it would cut against the grain of everything we’ve already seen in Ephesians 1 and Romans 9. Instead of responding to the imaginary objector, “Who are you, O man, who answers back to God?” (Ro 9:20), Paul could have said, “What’s the matter, didn’t you read Ro 8:29? I already told you: all of this is based on foreseen faith. Human choices ultimately determine salvation, not God’s will.” But of course Paul does not say this, though that reply would be ready at hand in Romans 9 if in fact Ro 8:29 is speaking of foreseen acts of faith. In addition, there seems little reason for Paul to say in Ro 9:16, “So then it does not depend on the man who wills or the man who runs, but on God who has mercy,” if in Ro 8:29 he had just taught that election does depend on the man who wills. I think a principle of hermeneutical charity is relevant here: it is not only implausible but uncharitable to interpret Paul in a way that introduces palpable contradiction into his thought – and that in the space of two chapters – especially if said interpretation is textually unnecessary in the first place.
Those familiar with the Calvinist debate at this point are probably well aware of how Calvinists take these two texts. ‘Knowledge’ in Scripture often denotes a personal relationship entered into by choice, rather than bare cognition or awareness. For instance, God says through the prophet Amos, “1 Hear this word which the LORD has spoken against you, sons of Israel, against the entire family which He brought up from the land of Egypt: 2 ‘You only have I chosen [known; yada’] among all the families of the earth; Therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities’” (Amos 3:1-2). Clearly when God says that Israel is the only family on earth he has known, he doesn’t mean he’s unaware of all the other nations. What he means is that Israel is the only nation with whom he has entered into a specific covenant relationship (which is why the New American Standard Bible translates yada’ in this text as “chosen”).
Likewise when Jesus warns religious hypocrites that on the last day, “I will declare to them, ‘I never knew you; depart from me, you who practice lawlessness’” (Mt 7:23). In saying he never ‘knew’ them Jesus is not saying he was cognitively unaware of them (as though afflicted with a case of divine amnesia). What is he saying is that he never had a saving relationship with them, despite their many words and outward deeds. It is this kind of intimate, personal, committed relationship that Calvinists suggest is being spoken of in these and other biblical texts (cf. Ge 4:1, Ex 2:25, Hos 13:4-5), and in Ro 8:29 and 1Pe 1:2 as well. God foreknows individuals, which is to say he foreloves them, and in virtue of that special, distinguishing love he marks them out for a peculiar destiny: conformity to the image of his Son (Ro 8:29), and obedience to Jesus Christ and sprinkling by his blood (1Pe 1:2).13 14
In the end, the Calvinistic interpretation of the ‘foreknowledge’ texts is much more plausible because the background to the New Testament doctrine of election is surely God’s election of Israel in the Old Testament, and there it is clear that God’s election is according to foreloving. That is, the Lord chose them because “the LORD loved you” (Dt 7:6-8, 10:15-16). Ask an Old Testament Jew or a New Testament Christian why he was elected by God, and the answer is going to be the same: ‘Not because of anything in ourselves, but because God chose to set his love upon us.’15
http://blogs.lifeway.com/blog/edstetzer/Welton%20Election%20and%20Effectual%20Calling.pdf
***END-QUOTE***
Moving along:
“Jeremiah 32:35 and Luke 13:34 for starters.”
Well, let’s look at Jer 32:35 for starters:
“They built high places for Baal in the Valley of Ben Hinnom to sacrifice their sons and daughters to Molech, though I never commanded, nor did it enter my mind, that they should do such a detestable thing and so make Judah sin.”
i) That man can defy God’s preceptive will is not at odds with Calvinism.
ii) When the text says this outcome “never entered God’s mind,” how does J. C. or Ben construe that claim?
a) Ben says that Arminians take the Bible at face value. Well, if we take this verse literally, then God is ignorant of the future, or at least this particular outcome.
Yet Ben denies that he’s an open theist. So, to be true to his Arminian belief in God’s foreknowledge, Ben must treat the description as anthropomorphic. But, in that case, Ben must revert the same hermeneutical approach as the Calvinist.
b) J.C. presumably denies that God is ignorant. So he would also revert to the Reformed interpretation.
c) In addition, J. C. is committed to the proposition that God is atemporal. In that case, it’s literally nonsensical to say that something never entered God’s mind.
As to Lk 13:34:
i) If J.C. and Ben are forced to interpret the sentiments in Jer 32:35 as anthropopathetic, then shouldn’t they be consistent and construe the sentiment expressed in Lk 13:34 the same way?
ii) Since J.C. believes that God is atemporal, then he can’t believe that God “often” desired the repentance of apostate Israel, for frequency is a temporal category.
iii) As commentators point out, v35 alludes to God’s covenant with Israel. Calvinism doesn’t deny that human beings can defy God’s preceptive will. Human begins can be covenant-breakers. Indeed, God decreed their disobedience.
Moving along:
“Drawing is not mutually exclusive to wooing, take Hosea 11:4 for instance.”
i) Hos 11:4 doesn’t say that God “wooed” his people.
ii) And even if it did, that’s a metaphor. Hosea is full of marital metaphors about the love of God. But Arminians don’t take that literally, although Mormons might!
Moving along
“Here are some passages that you might need to reflect on some (Ex. 32:10-14; 2 Kings 20:1-11; 2 Chron. 33:10-13; Jonah 3:6-10).”
Two problems:
i) Ben has yet to explain how our prayers can have an affect on God consistent with his commitment to divine foreknowledge. So there’s a tension between his prooftexting and his theology.
ii) In Scripture, most divine threats are implicitly conditional. So God didn’t change his mind. Richard Pratt has explained this at length:
http://www.thirdmill.org/newfiles/ric_pratt/TH.Pratt.Historical_Contingencies.pdf
iii) And conditionality is not at odds with Calvinism, for conditions are means by which God realizes his will. Calvinism affirms the use of various means to facilitate his appointed ends.
“Incorrect, I have the power to instantiate alternative possibilities, God simply knows how I will employ it.”
Is that a fact? There’s a possible world in which I take Catherine Deneuve on a date. And back when I was a teenager, I used to dream about taking Catherine Deneuve on a date. But no matter how vividly I imagined that alternative scenario, I was never able to turn my fantasy into reality.
The simplest way for Arminians and other libertarians to make their case is not through arguments. Instead, if what they say is true, then why don’t they put on a public demonstration of their libertarian prowess?
For example, suppose I buy a big, vacant lot. It has a nice view. I’d like to build a house there. But it would save a lot of money if I could simply will a house into existence. However, I’ve never had much success with that strategy.
Now, there’s a possible world in which the Breakers is sitting on my plot of land. So why doesn’t J.C. employ his libertarian power to instantiate that alternate possibility? We can even invite a TV news crew to film the event.
And, while he’s at it, perhaps J.C. could do me the favor of making Catherine Deneuve materialized by my side. Maybe a younger version since she’s getting up in years.
Once you get the hang of it, the power to instantiate alternative possibilities should come in pretty handy. I really need to draw up a shopping list.
There’s a possible world in which I live in the Breakers. There’s a possible world in which Catherine Deneuve is my wife. And there’s a possible world in which I drive a Duisenberg.
Okay, let’s start with those three possibilities. That should be sufficient for a convincing promo.
Why doesn’t J.C. stipulate a time and place of his own choosing. If it’s at some exotic location, then I’d also ask him to instantiate a Lear jet so that we can get there more easily.
Then let’s see him twitch his nose or rub his lamp to instantiate these alternate possibilities.
I hope he’s not going to tell us that the actual world imposes severe limitations on what alternate possibilities he can instantiate. For, if libertarianism is true, then the actual world simply is the sum total of what alternate possibilities are instantiated by free agents like J.C.
And if he says that one libertarian agent can act as a check on what another agent can instantiate, thereby canceling out his freedom of choice, then can agent can’t do otherwise in many situations.
Perhaps, though, he’d say that not all possibilities are compossible. But if that’s a problem for him, then I’m flexible.
Instead of the package deal containing the Breakers, Catherine Deneuve, and the Duisenberg, I’ll settle for a different package: say, the Getty Villa, Sophia Loren, and a silver Aston Martin—or the Hearst Castle, Greta Garbo, and a Lamborghini—or the Getty Villa, Greta Garbo, and a Duisenberg, &c.
I’m not finicky. Any of these combinations would meet with my satisfaction.
Moving along:
“Because He is atemporal, and can know choices before they are instantiated.”
There are several problems with that move:
i) If God is atemporal, then he cannot know choices *before* they are made, for that would introduce a chronological sequence into God’s knowledge vis-à-vis the object of knowledge which J.C’s stipulation of divine timelessness disallows.
ii) If God timelessly knows an outcome, then the outcome cannot be otherwise since that would falsify his foreknowledge.
Put another way, if God is atemporal, then whatever he believes is immutable—and if his belief about the future is true, then the future cannot be otherwise.
iii) How can an agent know a temporal fact?
a) He can know it directly, by experiencing the temporal fact. But if God is timeless, then he doesn’t experience time.
b) And even if he did experience time, pace J.C’s postulate, we can only experience the present, not the future.
c) He can know about it indirectly, by reading a newspaper or watching cable news, &c. But this would also involve a temporal experience of a temporal fact—albeit it at one or more moves from the event.
d) He could also know about it indirectly if he planned the future, and the future occurs according to his plan. He would know the future by knowing his plan for the future.
That explanation is readily available to the Calvinist, but not to the Arminian.
iv) J.C’s marsupial sidekick has argued for Arminianism on the grounds that “Arminianism is rather simple and takes the Bible at face value.”
But if God is atemporal, then we would interpret certain passages of Scripture anthropomorphically rather than literally. So Thibodaux and Kangaroodort are presenting two mutually exclusive justifications for Arminianism.
Moving along:
“Rather like being chosen according to the foreknowledge of God the Father (1 Peter 1:2).”
There are several problems with that facile appeal. As Greg Welty recently explained:
***QUOTE***
Well, not so fast. The proposed interpretation is neither necessary nor plausible. It’s certainly not necessary, because neither text says that God elects us on the basis of foreseen faith. In fact, neither text even mentions faith as something foreseen at all, much less that election is based upon it.12 Rather, in the “foreknew passages” (Ro 8:29; 1Pe 1:2), what is said to be foreknown are people, not faith or works. What Ro 8:29 says is: “those whom He foreknew, He also predestined...” It is persons who are said to be foreknown, not their acts of faith specifically. 1Pe 1:1-2 is even more ambiguous; it just mentions “foreknowledge” without clarifying whether the object of that foreknowledge is persons, or their faith, or their works, or anything else about them.
Not only is the ‘foreseen faith’ interpretation unnecessary (from a textual point of view), it’s also implausible, for it would cut against the grain of everything we’ve already seen in Ephesians 1 and Romans 9. Instead of responding to the imaginary objector, “Who are you, O man, who answers back to God?” (Ro 9:20), Paul could have said, “What’s the matter, didn’t you read Ro 8:29? I already told you: all of this is based on foreseen faith. Human choices ultimately determine salvation, not God’s will.” But of course Paul does not say this, though that reply would be ready at hand in Romans 9 if in fact Ro 8:29 is speaking of foreseen acts of faith. In addition, there seems little reason for Paul to say in Ro 9:16, “So then it does not depend on the man who wills or the man who runs, but on God who has mercy,” if in Ro 8:29 he had just taught that election does depend on the man who wills. I think a principle of hermeneutical charity is relevant here: it is not only implausible but uncharitable to interpret Paul in a way that introduces palpable contradiction into his thought – and that in the space of two chapters – especially if said interpretation is textually unnecessary in the first place.
Those familiar with the Calvinist debate at this point are probably well aware of how Calvinists take these two texts. ‘Knowledge’ in Scripture often denotes a personal relationship entered into by choice, rather than bare cognition or awareness. For instance, God says through the prophet Amos, “1 Hear this word which the LORD has spoken against you, sons of Israel, against the entire family which He brought up from the land of Egypt: 2 ‘You only have I chosen [known; yada’] among all the families of the earth; Therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities’” (Amos 3:1-2). Clearly when God says that Israel is the only family on earth he has known, he doesn’t mean he’s unaware of all the other nations. What he means is that Israel is the only nation with whom he has entered into a specific covenant relationship (which is why the New American Standard Bible translates yada’ in this text as “chosen”).
Likewise when Jesus warns religious hypocrites that on the last day, “I will declare to them, ‘I never knew you; depart from me, you who practice lawlessness’” (Mt 7:23). In saying he never ‘knew’ them Jesus is not saying he was cognitively unaware of them (as though afflicted with a case of divine amnesia). What is he saying is that he never had a saving relationship with them, despite their many words and outward deeds. It is this kind of intimate, personal, committed relationship that Calvinists suggest is being spoken of in these and other biblical texts (cf. Ge 4:1, Ex 2:25, Hos 13:4-5), and in Ro 8:29 and 1Pe 1:2 as well. God foreknows individuals, which is to say he foreloves them, and in virtue of that special, distinguishing love he marks them out for a peculiar destiny: conformity to the image of his Son (Ro 8:29), and obedience to Jesus Christ and sprinkling by his blood (1Pe 1:2).13 14
In the end, the Calvinistic interpretation of the ‘foreknowledge’ texts is much more plausible because the background to the New Testament doctrine of election is surely God’s election of Israel in the Old Testament, and there it is clear that God’s election is according to foreloving. That is, the Lord chose them because “the LORD loved you” (Dt 7:6-8, 10:15-16). Ask an Old Testament Jew or a New Testament Christian why he was elected by God, and the answer is going to be the same: ‘Not because of anything in ourselves, but because God chose to set his love upon us.’15
http://blogs.lifeway.com/blog/edstetzer/Welton%20Election%20and%20Effectual%20Calling.pdf
***END-QUOTE***
Moving along:
“Jeremiah 32:35 and Luke 13:34 for starters.”
Well, let’s look at Jer 32:35 for starters:
“They built high places for Baal in the Valley of Ben Hinnom to sacrifice their sons and daughters to Molech, though I never commanded, nor did it enter my mind, that they should do such a detestable thing and so make Judah sin.”
i) That man can defy God’s preceptive will is not at odds with Calvinism.
ii) When the text says this outcome “never entered God’s mind,” how does J. C. or Ben construe that claim?
a) Ben says that Arminians take the Bible at face value. Well, if we take this verse literally, then God is ignorant of the future, or at least this particular outcome.
Yet Ben denies that he’s an open theist. So, to be true to his Arminian belief in God’s foreknowledge, Ben must treat the description as anthropomorphic. But, in that case, Ben must revert the same hermeneutical approach as the Calvinist.
b) J.C. presumably denies that God is ignorant. So he would also revert to the Reformed interpretation.
c) In addition, J. C. is committed to the proposition that God is atemporal. In that case, it’s literally nonsensical to say that something never entered God’s mind.
As to Lk 13:34:
i) If J.C. and Ben are forced to interpret the sentiments in Jer 32:35 as anthropopathetic, then shouldn’t they be consistent and construe the sentiment expressed in Lk 13:34 the same way?
ii) Since J.C. believes that God is atemporal, then he can’t believe that God “often” desired the repentance of apostate Israel, for frequency is a temporal category.
iii) As commentators point out, v35 alludes to God’s covenant with Israel. Calvinism doesn’t deny that human beings can defy God’s preceptive will. Human begins can be covenant-breakers. Indeed, God decreed their disobedience.
Moving along:
“Drawing is not mutually exclusive to wooing, take Hosea 11:4 for instance.”
i) Hos 11:4 doesn’t say that God “wooed” his people.
ii) And even if it did, that’s a metaphor. Hosea is full of marital metaphors about the love of God. But Arminians don’t take that literally, although Mormons might!
Moving along
“Here are some passages that you might need to reflect on some (Ex. 32:10-14; 2 Kings 20:1-11; 2 Chron. 33:10-13; Jonah 3:6-10).”
Two problems:
i) Ben has yet to explain how our prayers can have an affect on God consistent with his commitment to divine foreknowledge. So there’s a tension between his prooftexting and his theology.
ii) In Scripture, most divine threats are implicitly conditional. So God didn’t change his mind. Richard Pratt has explained this at length:
http://www.thirdmill.org/newfiles/ric_pratt/TH.Pratt.Historical_Contingencies.pdf
iii) And conditionality is not at odds with Calvinism, for conditions are means by which God realizes his will. Calvinism affirms the use of various means to facilitate his appointed ends.
Wednesday, March 05, 2008
Compare and Contrast
Ben wrote:
“As far as sticking to exegesis you have apparently not read much from Triablogue as they are often all about philosophy.”
This is is funny considering the number of times I have asked Arminians who frequent our comboxes to provide an exegetical foundation for LFW and we've gotten so little in the way of replies.
Indeed, I discharged my own burden of proof here.
But let's play with this for a bit, shall we? Let's try to see what sort of answers we get when we look at the concept of "Free Will."
Calvinism
1. Second London Baptist Confession of 1689
http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/2005Determinism.htm
See also Chapter 4 of The Doctrine of God, pp. 47-79, and Responsibility and Ability and his critique of Libertarianism on pp. 126-145.
Also James Boyce, Abstract of Systematic Theology, Chapter 13:
Walls and Dongell, speaking for Arminianism in Why I'm not a Calvinist:
William Lane Craig, Arminian, speaking for the Molinist perspective:
These are just small samples. I am a Calvinist, because I believe the Bible. I don't come to the Bible with a set of "philosophical presuppositions" about Providence and Free Will that are my fundamentums. Arminianism's "exegetical arguments" aren't really exegetical at all. They are simply ethical and philosophical objections that masquerade as exegetical arguments. Please don't accuse Calvinists, particularly those on this blog, for not offering exegetical answers and arguments, when we've been doing it all along. Now, if you'd like to present an exegetical argument for LFW, then by all means do so, rather than gracing us with yet another emotional jeremiad.
“As far as sticking to exegesis you have apparently not read much from Triablogue as they are often all about philosophy.”
This is is funny considering the number of times I have asked Arminians who frequent our comboxes to provide an exegetical foundation for LFW and we've gotten so little in the way of replies.
Indeed, I discharged my own burden of proof here.
But let's play with this for a bit, shall we? Let's try to see what sort of answers we get when we look at the concept of "Free Will."
Calvinism
1. Second London Baptist Confession of 1689
CHAPTER 9; OF FREE WILLParagraph 1. God has endued the will of man with that natural liberty and power of acting upon choice, that it is neither forced, nor by any necessity of nature determined to do good or evil.1
1 Matt. 17:12; James 1:14; Deut. 30:19Paragraph 2. Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom and power to will and to do that which was good and well-pleasing to God,2 but yet was unstable, so that he might fall from it.3
2 Eccles. 7:29
3 Gen. 3:6Paragraph 3. Man, by his fall into a state of sin, has wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation;4 so as a natural man, being altogether averse from that good, and dead in sin,5 is not able by his own strength to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto.6
4 Rom. 5:6, 8:7
5 Eph. 2:1,5
6 Titus 3:3-5; John 6:44Paragraph 4. When God converts a sinner, and translates him into the state of grace, He frees him from his natural bondage under sin,7 and by His grace alone enables him freely to will and to do that which is spiritually good;8 yet so as that by reason of his remaining corruptions, he does not perfectly, nor only will, that which is good, but does also will that which is evil.9
7 Col. 1:13; John 8:36
8 Phil. 2:13
9 Rom. 7:15,18,19,21,23Paragraph 5. This will of man is made perfectly and immutably free to good alone in
the state of glory only.10
10 Eph. 4:13
Arminianism:
Treatise on the Faith and Practice of The Free Will Baptists (emphasis mine)
CHAPTER III
Divine Government and Providence
1. God exercises a providential care and superintendence over all His creatures, and governs the world in wisdom and mercy, according to the testimony of His Word.
2. God has endowed man with power of free choice, and governs him by moral laws and motives; and this power of free choice is the exact measure of man's responsibility.
3. All events are present with God from everlasting to everlasting; but His knowledge of them does not in any sense cause them, nor does He decree all events which He knows will occur.
Hmmm, let's see if representative theologians fare any better:
John Frame, speaking for Calvinism:http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/2005Determinism.htm
See also Chapter 4 of The Doctrine of God, pp. 47-79, and Responsibility and Ability and his critique of Libertarianism on pp. 126-145.
Also James Boyce, Abstract of Systematic Theology, Chapter 13:
The Scriptural authority for the doctrine of decrees will appear from the following statements and references, gathered with slight modifications from Hodge's Outlines, pp, 205-213:
You can find the detailed exegesis in a standard Reformed commentary. (That's what the references presume the reader will do).1. God's decrees are eternal. Acts 15:18; Eph. 1:4; 3:11; 1 Pet. 1:20; 2 Thess. 2:13; 2 Tim. 1:9; 1 Cor. 2:7.
2. They are immutable. Ps. 33:11; Isa. 46:9.
3. They comprehend all events.
(1.) The Scriptures assert this of the whole system in general embraced in the divine decrees. Dan. 4:34, 35; Acts 17:26; Eph 1:11.
(2.) They affirm the same of fortuitous events. Prov. 16:33; Matt. 10:29, 30.
(3.) Also of the free actions of men. Eph. 2:10, 11; Phil. 2:13.
(4.) Even the wicked actions of men. Acts 2:23; 4:27, 28; 13:29; 1 Pet. 2:8; Jude 4; Rev. 17:17. As to the history of Joseph, compare Gen. 37:28, with Gen. 45:7, 8, and Gen. 50:20. See also Ps. 17:13, 14; Isa. 10:5, 15.
4. The decrees of God are not conditional. Ps. 33:11; Prov. 19:21; Isa. 14:24, 27 ; 46:10; Rom. 9:11.
5. They are sovereign. Isa. 40:13, 14; Dan. 4:35; Matt. 11:25, 26; Rom. 9:11, 15-18; Eph. 1:5, 11.
6. They include the means. Eph. 1:4; 2 Thess. 2:13; 1 Pet. 1:2.
7. They determine the free actions of men. Acts 4:27, 28 ; Eph. 2:10.
8. God himself works in his people that faith and obedience which are called the conditions of salvation. Eph. 2:8 ; Phil. 2:13; 2 Tim. 2:25.
9. The decree renders the event certain. Matt. 16:21; Luke 18:31-33; 24:46; Acts 2:23; 13:29; 1 Cor. 11:19.
10. While God has decreed the free acts of men, the actors have been none the less responsible. Gen. 50:20; Acts 2:23; 3:18; 4:27, 28.
Walls and Dongell, speaking for Arminianism in Why I'm not a Calvinist:
1) “The essence of this view is that a free action is one that does not have a sufficient condition or cause prior to its occurrence…the common experience of deliberation assumes that our choices are undetermined.”
(2) “…It seems intuitively and immediately evident that many of our actions are up to us in the sense that when faced with a decision, both (or more) options are within our power to choose…Libertarians argue that our immediate sense of power to choose between alternative courses of action is more certain and trustworthy than any theory that denies we have power.
(3) “Libertarians take very seriously the widespread judgment that we are morally responsible for our actions and that moral responsibility requires freedom” That is, a person cannot be held morally responsible for an act unless he or she was free to perform that act and free to refrain from it. This is basic moral intuition.
William Lane Craig, Arminian, speaking for the Molinist perspective:
Since Scripture does not reflect upon this question, no amount of proof-texting can prove thatJohn Miley (Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, 275)
God’s counterfactual knowledge is possessed logically prior to his creative decree. This is a
matter for theological-philosophical reflection, not biblical exegesis. Thus, while it is clearly
unbiblical to deny that God has simple foreknowledge and even counterfactual knowledge, those
who deny middle knowledge cannot be accused of being unbiblical. (Craig, “Middle-Knowledge View,” 4 Vi Divine Foreknowledge Four Views, 125).
"freedom is fundamental in Arminianism," therefore, "the [Arminian] system holds accordingly the universality of the atonement and provisory nature of the atonement, and the conditionality of salvation.
These are just small samples. I am a Calvinist, because I believe the Bible. I don't come to the Bible with a set of "philosophical presuppositions" about Providence and Free Will that are my fundamentums. Arminianism's "exegetical arguments" aren't really exegetical at all. They are simply ethical and philosophical objections that masquerade as exegetical arguments. Please don't accuse Calvinists, particularly those on this blog, for not offering exegetical answers and arguments, when we've been doing it all along. Now, if you'd like to present an exegetical argument for LFW, then by all means do so, rather than gracing us with yet another emotional jeremiad.
If at first you don't succeed, lose, lose again!
KANGAROODORT SAID:
“So now we are on to lifting other comments from my combox.”
And why does that bother you, exactly? Do you think your own comments are indefensible?
“And trying to say that I need to back them up as if the whole world needs to answer to Triablogue.”
To the contrary, it’s fine with me if you’re not up to the task you set for yourself.
“You guys are very predictable.”
That’s a funny accusation coming from a libertarian. Apparently, you don’t believe in the freedom to do otherwise.
Well, that’s progress. Now that you’ve shown yourself to be a closet determinist, I’d encourage you to come out of the closet.
“Just keep making posts and issuing challenges until your opponent is overwelmed and unable to respond to it all.”
I don’t recall issuing a challenge. I guess we have to acquaint you with the dynamics of a public debate.
If you comment on something I say, especially in the form of a criticism, then that’s an open invitation for me to respond. If you can’t take it when people reply to your public criticism of their position, then don’t criticize their position.
You evidently think that criticism is a one-way street. You should be free to criticize Calvinism, but a Calvinist has no right to criticize Arminianism.
Wherever did you get the idea that you can attack someone’s theological position with impunity? I guess you led a very sheltered existence.
“As far as your above claim I have written several posts on the subjects of free will and determinism so your claim that I haven't presented anything is simply false (and some of them are even exegetically derived).”
“Exegetically derived” once you load the dice with your Arminian presuppositions.
“I am not here to please you or cater to your needs.”
Do you ever listen to yourself as you carry on this way? Instead of dealing with the issues, you emote like a schoolgirl who was snubbed at the prom.
I did a high and dry post on the difference between *affecting* and *changing* an outcome. You responded with a me-centered pity-party.
I then did a follow-up post in which I questioned whether, given your Arminian commitment to divine foreknowledge, it was consistent for you to say that prayer has an affect on God. And you respond to that with another round of self-pity.
“I regret having anything to do with you guys.”
Yes, losing the argument can have that affect on a person.
“(And regrets are a strange thing indeed if we do not have the power of contrary choice as you claim).”
What do you think you accomplish when you trot out this schoolboy objection to determinism? Do you think you’ve said something original? Something your Reformed opponent has never thought of before? Do you think this halts us in our tracks?
This sort of objection would be acceptable if you were just a kid who had never taken a course in philosophy. Never read a book on the debate between freewill and determinism.
But there are well-trodden replies to this sort of objection. You don’t help your own position by operating at such a retrograde level.
Let’s take an example: one function of regret, in Reformed theology, is that God uses regret about the past as a means of changing our outlook with a view to the future.
It isn’t about “if only I could do it all over again”—which is backward-looking—but about, “having screwed up my life, I now see my need to turn my life over to Christ”—which is forward-looking. Regret is perfectly consistent with Calvinism.
God decrees that certain people have certain motives, since motives function as an incentive or disincentive to a particular course of action. Regret can be an inducement to evangelical repentance.
“Then why do you guys keep going on and on about it?”
Why does Toto pull the curtain back?
“And this isn't an arbitray statement? I could come up with all kinds of arbitray definitions for what Calvinism is, as could anyone.”
You *say* it’s arbitrary, but you don’t *show* it’s arbitrary.
Moreover, you’re quoting my conclusion without quoting my supporting argument.
“Which is philosophical assertion based on a Biblically unfounded correlation between physical death and spiritual death. It is far from exegetically derived.”
It’s Scripture that uses the metaphor of spiritual death. I didn’t invent that correlation. And it’s Scripture that distinguishes between spiritual death and the new birth.
“You guys feel like you are defending Biblical truth by trying to make a fool out me.”
You’re the one who keeps casting the issue in terms of making you look foolish. Does this reflect a Freudian guilt-complex on your part?
I’ve been endeavoring to discuss the theological issues. But you keep responding by talking about yourself, and how you feel about us, and how you feel we feel about you, and how you feel we feel about how you feel about our feelings…
It’s like a parody of adolescent girl-talk.
“Strangely, it would seem that God has decreed from eternity that I would reject Calvinism and defend Arminianism. If that is the case then I don't know why you are battling me. I am just doing what God wanst me to do. God apparently wants us to disagree and is apparently to blame for all the confusion that this debate generates, which is strange for a God of whom the Bible declares is not the author of confusion.”
That’s a lovely example of ripping a passage out of context. Paul is making the practical point that in a church service, everyone shouldn’t speak at once.
If you want to cite something relevant in 1 Corinthians, try 1:18-3:23, where God is responsible for setting up a number of theological pawns who function as a foil to the gospel. God does that, as Paul explains, to highlight the ironic wisdom of the gospel in contrast to the folly of the worldly-wise.
“But that is just me expecting things to make sense again and you have already pointed out how foolish that expectation is.”
If you were sincere about wanting things to make sense, you’d attempt to explain how, by your own lights, prayer has an “affect on God” even though God foreknows your prayer, foreknows how or whether he will answer your prayer, as well as foreknowing how the answer, assuming it’s answered, will figure in the outcome.
Do you think your prayer can change a foreknown future? How is that possible?
And, if it doesn’t change the future, then how does your position differ from mine—except that I’m able to ground divine foreknowledge in divine foreordination, whereas divine foreknowledge is groundless in Arminian theology.
“I wish I had the luxury of defending an unfalsifiable dogma like you guys.”
Meaning what, exactly? Do you think Christian beliefs should be falsifiable? In what sense?
Do you think Jesus may have been a fraud? Is that the kind of thing you have in mind?
“So now we are on to lifting other comments from my combox.”
And why does that bother you, exactly? Do you think your own comments are indefensible?
“And trying to say that I need to back them up as if the whole world needs to answer to Triablogue.”
To the contrary, it’s fine with me if you’re not up to the task you set for yourself.
“You guys are very predictable.”
That’s a funny accusation coming from a libertarian. Apparently, you don’t believe in the freedom to do otherwise.
Well, that’s progress. Now that you’ve shown yourself to be a closet determinist, I’d encourage you to come out of the closet.
“Just keep making posts and issuing challenges until your opponent is overwelmed and unable to respond to it all.”
I don’t recall issuing a challenge. I guess we have to acquaint you with the dynamics of a public debate.
If you comment on something I say, especially in the form of a criticism, then that’s an open invitation for me to respond. If you can’t take it when people reply to your public criticism of their position, then don’t criticize their position.
You evidently think that criticism is a one-way street. You should be free to criticize Calvinism, but a Calvinist has no right to criticize Arminianism.
Wherever did you get the idea that you can attack someone’s theological position with impunity? I guess you led a very sheltered existence.
“As far as your above claim I have written several posts on the subjects of free will and determinism so your claim that I haven't presented anything is simply false (and some of them are even exegetically derived).”
“Exegetically derived” once you load the dice with your Arminian presuppositions.
“I am not here to please you or cater to your needs.”
Do you ever listen to yourself as you carry on this way? Instead of dealing with the issues, you emote like a schoolgirl who was snubbed at the prom.
I did a high and dry post on the difference between *affecting* and *changing* an outcome. You responded with a me-centered pity-party.
I then did a follow-up post in which I questioned whether, given your Arminian commitment to divine foreknowledge, it was consistent for you to say that prayer has an affect on God. And you respond to that with another round of self-pity.
“I regret having anything to do with you guys.”
Yes, losing the argument can have that affect on a person.
“(And regrets are a strange thing indeed if we do not have the power of contrary choice as you claim).”
What do you think you accomplish when you trot out this schoolboy objection to determinism? Do you think you’ve said something original? Something your Reformed opponent has never thought of before? Do you think this halts us in our tracks?
This sort of objection would be acceptable if you were just a kid who had never taken a course in philosophy. Never read a book on the debate between freewill and determinism.
But there are well-trodden replies to this sort of objection. You don’t help your own position by operating at such a retrograde level.
Let’s take an example: one function of regret, in Reformed theology, is that God uses regret about the past as a means of changing our outlook with a view to the future.
It isn’t about “if only I could do it all over again”—which is backward-looking—but about, “having screwed up my life, I now see my need to turn my life over to Christ”—which is forward-looking. Regret is perfectly consistent with Calvinism.
God decrees that certain people have certain motives, since motives function as an incentive or disincentive to a particular course of action. Regret can be an inducement to evangelical repentance.
“Then why do you guys keep going on and on about it?”
Why does Toto pull the curtain back?
“And this isn't an arbitray statement? I could come up with all kinds of arbitray definitions for what Calvinism is, as could anyone.”
You *say* it’s arbitrary, but you don’t *show* it’s arbitrary.
Moreover, you’re quoting my conclusion without quoting my supporting argument.
“Which is philosophical assertion based on a Biblically unfounded correlation between physical death and spiritual death. It is far from exegetically derived.”
It’s Scripture that uses the metaphor of spiritual death. I didn’t invent that correlation. And it’s Scripture that distinguishes between spiritual death and the new birth.
“You guys feel like you are defending Biblical truth by trying to make a fool out me.”
You’re the one who keeps casting the issue in terms of making you look foolish. Does this reflect a Freudian guilt-complex on your part?
I’ve been endeavoring to discuss the theological issues. But you keep responding by talking about yourself, and how you feel about us, and how you feel we feel about you, and how you feel we feel about how you feel about our feelings…
It’s like a parody of adolescent girl-talk.
“Strangely, it would seem that God has decreed from eternity that I would reject Calvinism and defend Arminianism. If that is the case then I don't know why you are battling me. I am just doing what God wanst me to do. God apparently wants us to disagree and is apparently to blame for all the confusion that this debate generates, which is strange for a God of whom the Bible declares is not the author of confusion.”
That’s a lovely example of ripping a passage out of context. Paul is making the practical point that in a church service, everyone shouldn’t speak at once.
If you want to cite something relevant in 1 Corinthians, try 1:18-3:23, where God is responsible for setting up a number of theological pawns who function as a foil to the gospel. God does that, as Paul explains, to highlight the ironic wisdom of the gospel in contrast to the folly of the worldly-wise.
“But that is just me expecting things to make sense again and you have already pointed out how foolish that expectation is.”
If you were sincere about wanting things to make sense, you’d attempt to explain how, by your own lights, prayer has an “affect on God” even though God foreknows your prayer, foreknows how or whether he will answer your prayer, as well as foreknowing how the answer, assuming it’s answered, will figure in the outcome.
Do you think your prayer can change a foreknown future? How is that possible?
And, if it doesn’t change the future, then how does your position differ from mine—except that I’m able to ground divine foreknowledge in divine foreordination, whereas divine foreknowledge is groundless in Arminian theology.
“I wish I had the luxury of defending an unfalsifiable dogma like you guys.”
Meaning what, exactly? Do you think Christian beliefs should be falsifiable? In what sense?
Do you think Jesus may have been a fraud? Is that the kind of thing you have in mind?
What's The Point?
So, the Calvinist's prayer is 'pointless' and 'a waste of time.'
Okay, let's ignore that for now, as its been answered ad nauseum recently.
Now, Arminians admit God knows everything. He foreknew all who would be saved.
Take the set of all people who God knew would be saved, call it S.
Take the set of all people God knew would be unsaved, call it U.
Now, for every person, God knows whether they are a member of S or U.
Take Sarah, a member of S. Sarah has an Arminian friend, Bill. Bill prays for Sarah. This, as has been recently told, has an effect of God. God moves obsticles, etc. Sarah eventually goes down for an 'alter call', says 'the prayer,' and 'gets saved.' This wasn't a waste of time, or pointless, for God. Or Bill, our Arminian friend. Fine and dandy.
Take Frank, a meber of U. Bill, our friendly Arminian, is also Frank's friend. Bill prays for Frank. Then God does all sorts of things, removes obsticles, whatever, all the while knowing that Frank will not get saved. Seems pointless. Seems a waste of time.
Now, Fank has another Arminian friend, Jim. Jim prays for Frank. God does all sorts of things, yet again, to 'get Frank saved,' and yet knows none of it will come to fruition.
We can multiply Arminian friends, and the above situations. Say that Frank has 150 Arminian friends who all pray for him. God does all sorts of things to get Frank saved. He does the same thing over and over again. Albert Einstein once quipped that, "insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." Does God expect different results? Then he's insane according to Einstein. Does he not expect anything to happen yet goes through the motions of a futile endeavor? Then what he does is pointless. It's a waste of time.
Now, I suppose it could be countered that God doesn't do anything. He knows Frank will not get saved, and so doesn't waste his time. Okay, then the Arminian wastes his time. His prayers, in light of his very critiques against us, are pointless. Wasted time.
Okay, let's ignore that for now, as its been answered ad nauseum recently.
Now, Arminians admit God knows everything. He foreknew all who would be saved.
Take the set of all people who God knew would be saved, call it S.
Take the set of all people God knew would be unsaved, call it U.
Now, for every person, God knows whether they are a member of S or U.
Take Sarah, a member of S. Sarah has an Arminian friend, Bill. Bill prays for Sarah. This, as has been recently told, has an effect of God. God moves obsticles, etc. Sarah eventually goes down for an 'alter call', says 'the prayer,' and 'gets saved.' This wasn't a waste of time, or pointless, for God. Or Bill, our Arminian friend. Fine and dandy.
Take Frank, a meber of U. Bill, our friendly Arminian, is also Frank's friend. Bill prays for Frank. Then God does all sorts of things, removes obsticles, whatever, all the while knowing that Frank will not get saved. Seems pointless. Seems a waste of time.
Now, Fank has another Arminian friend, Jim. Jim prays for Frank. God does all sorts of things, yet again, to 'get Frank saved,' and yet knows none of it will come to fruition.
We can multiply Arminian friends, and the above situations. Say that Frank has 150 Arminian friends who all pray for him. God does all sorts of things to get Frank saved. He does the same thing over and over again. Albert Einstein once quipped that, "insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." Does God expect different results? Then he's insane according to Einstein. Does he not expect anything to happen yet goes through the motions of a futile endeavor? Then what he does is pointless. It's a waste of time.
Now, I suppose it could be countered that God doesn't do anything. He knows Frank will not get saved, and so doesn't waste his time. Okay, then the Arminian wastes his time. His prayers, in light of his very critiques against us, are pointless. Wasted time.
The Reason For God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism
This is my review of Keller's book:
******************
"Tim Keller's The Reason for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism (TRG, hereafter) is the result of the many questions about God and Christianity pastor Keller has received over the years during his time at Redeemer Presbyterian Church in Manhattan, New York. Keller writes in a smooth, conversational tone. He addresses in clear language, 'real' questions from those who have crossed his path over the years, using every day examples to illustrate his points, and he does so with a pastoral heart (which is nevertheless well-reasoned rather that overly subjective or emotional in its appeal to the reader). Pastor Keller is clearly well read, and marshals a number of useful quotes from all sides (e.g., from atheists, agnostics, capitalists, communists, Arminian theologians, Calvinist theologians, authors of the classics, and, of course, lots and lots of C.S. Lewis). The quotes alone may well be worth the price of the book for those pastors who like to use a "As some of your own poets have said..." (Acts 17:28) approach to apologetic preaching (cf. "How does the Gospel Preach in a Culture of Paganism?" by Ted Hamilton, CWIPP lecture, Feb 21, 2007, www.cwipp.org). TRG can be read in a couple of sittings.
TRG comes in two parts. Part one is called: The Leap of Doubt. Keller asks both believers and unbelievers to doubt. Believers should not be afraid to wrestle with their doubts. To find answers rather than ignore them. Struggling with your doubts will make your faith "your own," rather than something you inherit. Believers should look for reasons behind their faith. To the unbeliever, Keller asks them to look into, and then treat with "doubt," the (what he calls) "faith assumptions" which under gird their objections, or doubts, to Christianity. "You cannot doubt belief A except from a position of faith in belief B." Keller doesn't really define what he means by "faith," and I think he's a bit simplistic here. Of course, it is true that beliefs are like potato chips, no one can have just one. So, all beliefs are connected to other beliefs. We should examine all those other beliefs. If this is all he means, fine. One major problem, though, is that he calls these underwriting beliefs "leaps of faith" because you cannot "prove them empirically, nor are they truths of reason" (xvii). But, later he claims that the "clues for God" are not "proofs" for Christianity, they have not been proven empirically, and they are not truths of reason, yet he doesn't want to call them "leaps of faith" (cf. 117-121; 127-28). On the one hand, he calls these unrpovable (in the above sense) "leaps of faith," on the other, he calls them "reasons for God." He seems to hold the unbeliever to a higher standard than he later holds himself to.
Part one proceeds by examining the various doubts people have brought to Keller over the years. The strategy here is to point out that all the doubts rested upon claims that the unbeliever had not thought out thoroughly, or were dubious assumptions, or were self-refuting, or they required an argument otherwise lest deck of cards collapse. This is a fine strategy to be sure. Nothing inherently wrong with it in the least. And, Keller does make some insightful observations, helpfully shinning the light on unexamined presuppositions and unargued biases. This is helpful. The draw back, as I see it, is that he often leaves the debate after pointing out one of these assumptions. He gives the impression of a shallow unbeliever who is stopped dead in his tracks after his assumptions are exposed. Many unbelievers, not just university professors, have thought through their implications more deeply than Keller seems to let on. Therefore, readers will need to do their homework in preparation for dealing with unbelievers. Not all of them will not stop dead in their tracks once you've pointed out their assumptions in the manner Keller does. Thus, Keller provides a good model for dealing with doubts, but you will need some more material to fill in the form.
Keller also takes some positions that will not sit well with many Christians, especially those in his own denomination! For example, he seems to lean socialist in many areas, and he holds to theistic evolution. He also seems to be too hard on Christian throughout history. No doubt we have had our embarrassing moments, but in many cases we can offer sufficient justification for some of the charges. It seems to me that Keller gives to much to the critic in this area, but this isn't to say that his responses are bad, in general. They are useful for generalities, but some specific cases may not warrant his apologetic (not as in a defense, but as in saying sorry) attitude. Keller has also made claims elsewhere about church planting to the effect that he, "doesn't believe you can reach New York with the gospel if you only plant Presbyterian churches. There are all kinds of people who’ll never be Presbyterians. It just doesn’t appeal to them. Some people are going to be Pentecostals, some people are going to be Catholics." Now, I do actually agree with some of this. But, do we really want to say that Rome teaches the Gospel? I guess that depends on how you define the "Gospel." They certainly don't teach that we are saved by grace alone, thtough faith alone, in the person and meritorious work of Christ alone imputed to the believer.
Part two presents positive reasons for belief (I said reasons (plural), perhaps the book should have been called "The ReasonS for God."?!), and is called: Reasons For Faith. Keller presents some good arguments here... well, he actually doesn't do much arguing so much as to point you to others who have made the arguments. Nevertheless, he appeals to some good arguuments and some pretty good contemporary philosophers, ones I wish more Reformed Christians would read. Besides C.S. Lewis (who is not contemporary but is seen on almost every page, and was nevertheless a asset to our faith), he cites Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, Robin Collins' design arguments, makes reference to Victor Reppert (author of C.S. Lewis' Dangerous Idea, and excellent book in its own rite), Darryl Bock, Ben Witherington, Richard Bauckham (for purposes of Gospel reliability), and N.T. Wright (for purposes of the resurrection). He also appeals to Francis Collins in many areas as well, especially his anthropic arguments.
His approach here he calls "critical rationalism." This basically means that though there is no knock down, silver bullet argument for Christianity, we shouldn't be skeptics about the possibility of knowing that Christianity is true, or rationally believing its claims. He admits that rational people can avoid all the arguments. Nothing rationally compels a rational person to be forced to assent to the argument's conclusions. They can be resisted. All this is fine and good. My major problem with this section is that he gives off the wrong impression. I don't think he's too fair with the opposing side. He will frequently say that an argument can be rejected, and then gives some of the weakest reasons unbelievers have marshaled in support of their denial of that particular argument. This gives the impression that unbelievers only have weak responses. That they hang by a shoe string in order to deny the arguments. For example, he has his unbeliever denying his argument (again, nothing like a robust argument was presented here, but that's not his purpose) from the uniformity of nature by saying, "We don't know why things are the way they are." But, non-Christians have given much more cogent reasons for their belief in the Uniformity of Nature than that! So, the impression is: on the one hand you have these excellent reasons the Christian can give, on the other, puerile, sophomoric responses by the unbeliever. Now, I personally believe the unbeliever is in a bad situation here, and I try to show that given their best responses to the various problems.
I have other problems with this section, but only have time for one more. His treatment on morality is entirely too basic. He seems to have no familiarity with the best of atheistic moral realists arguments, relativists, or non-cognitivists. Or, if he does, he's misleading about the state of the debate. He also makes some blunders which lead me to believer he has not read many non-Christian approaches to ethics. Some mistakes he makes are, he says: (i) no relativist can believe in moral absolutes. Wrong. Subjectivists can. They simply say, since their beliefs on the matter make the moral truths: "I say it is absolutely wrong for me to rape." As long as this belief expresses their beliefs, then it is true. (The downside for the subjectivist is that they reduce ethics to psychology, and can't account for moral disagreement either. They actually imply that we are infallible about our ethical beliefs. A highly counter-intuitive position indeed!) Or, (ii) no relativists can believe in an ethic outside themselves. Wrong again. Maybe the subjectivist can't, but the cultural relativist can---the culture exists outside himself and is the objective standard for his moral beliefs. Now, it is true that no relativist can account for universal, absolute, objective ethics (not all ethical principles are absolute, though). He also claims that no atheists can believe in a moral law that exists. Well tell that to sophisticated moral realists (Russ Shafer-Landau, for example). They believe, for example, that moral obligations are necessary truths that come in the form of hypotheticals and thus can have a true truth condition regardless if people exist to instantiate them or not. They believe these are immaterial and eternally existent, just like, say, laws of logic are. And, they don't think they need a "law giver" just like, say, laws of gravity don't need a "law giver" (I happen to think they do, cf. John Foster's The Divine Law Maker, Oxford, 2004)
Despite these problems, which should set constraints on who you give the book to, or who you use its arguments on, it is still a good book. Keller definitely has a heart for the lost, and I think he succeeds in showing people that Christianity has the best answers to some of life's most practical problems and questions. I would recommend his book with the above qualifications taken into consideration.
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