Liberal schizophrenia

According to the Documentary Hypothesis, Gen 1 goes back to the Priestly source (P). And why is Gen 1 assigned to P?

One reason is the Sabbatarian numerology. A liberal critics is assuming that the redactor of Gen 1 modeled the chronology of creation on the religious calendar of Israel.

In a way, a conservative can agree—only he’d reason in reverse, trading the premise for the conclusion and vice versa.

He’d reason that the religious calendar of Israel was modeled on the chronology of creation, recorded by Moses.

Now, I’ve quoted or cited a number of scholars who argue that the Bible uses certain architectural metaphors for the world to depict the world as a cosmic temple, along the lines of the tabernacle and the Solomonic Temple. The tabernacle or temple is a microcosm of the macrocosm. To take another example of this argument:

***QUOTE***

There has been a great deal of scholarly attention paid to the correspondences between the creation accounts in Gen 1-4 and the tabernacle construction account in Exodus. With regard to Gen 1:1-2:3 the pattern of sevens is most significant (see Balentine, 138-41; Levenson, 78-90, and other literature cited there).

Finally, based on the above intertextual literary patterns within the Pentateuch and comparisons with cosmologies and temple-building texts of the ANE, J. Levenson has argued persuasively that to build a sanctuary was to create a “microcosm” a small, properly ordered world within the larger “cosmos” (Levenson, 53-127). A sanctuary is the cosmos in miniature, and the cosmos is a sanctuary, depending on which way you look at it…the cosmos and the Tabernacle were reflective of each other as the literary and thematic parallels between creation and the build of the tabernacle show.

T. Alexander & D. Baker, eds. Dictionary of the Old Testament: Pentateuch (IVP 2003), 816-17.

***END-QUOTE***

There’s no inherent reason a liberal would disagree with this analysis. Indeed, he could fit that into the preexisting slot of the P.

That would afford a consistently liberal interpretation of the cosmic imagery.

Likewise, this is not a problem for the conservative. He’d just say that the temple and tabernacle, as well as the other architectural metaphors, exemplify the principle of sacred space as well as sacred time.

So why don’t infidels like Loftus interpret the architectural imagery employed in Biblical cosmology consistent with the Documentary Hypothesis?

Several reasons suggest themselves:

i) Ignorance of contemporary scholarship.

ii) Dependence on a preexisting polemical strategy. Because it’s a stock feature of atheology write to attribute a flat-earth or three-decker cosmology to the Bible writers, infidels like Loftus thoughtlessly inherit this antiquated polemical tradition.

iii) Finally, and most importantly, a consistently liberal interpretation would at this juncture fail to undercut the record of Scripture.

What an unbeliever needs to show is that its architectural imagery was literal and prescientific rather than literary and cultic.

If you treat either the spatial or temporal markers as metaphorical, then you can’t make a scientific case against the Bible.

Not only does Loftus disregard conservative scholarship. He abandons liberal scholarship whenever it fails to deliver a liberal defeater for Scripture.

Review: The Story of Joseph and Judah

When I received The Story of Joseph and Judah by Warren Austin Gage and Christopher Barber in the mail, I immediately recognized something unique about it. No, I’m not talking about the fact that it is wider than most books and thus sticks out on my bookshelf (something which is very annoying but very understandable, given that it is a study-guide). Rather, browsing the chapter titles, I noticed something “fresh” about it.

The book had one advantage: I already had a soft spot for Genesis, especially the story of Joseph. I love searching for the Christocentric treasures that lie not-so-hidden in this particular portion of Scripture. And Gage and Barber have aided the church well in portraying for us the unfolding of this section of redemptive history.

The first chapter begins with an illustration: the “story of two visitors.” The metaphor contrasts the difference in how a scientist who specializes in the analysis of old paintings would examine Leonardo da Vinci’s The Last Supper with how an art lover would examine the same painting. The first visitor would move along the painting, noticing all of the small and intricate details, and inspecting it closely. But this observer misses something that the second one recognizes; the second observer (the art lover) takes a step back and sees something he hadn’t noticed before: all the lines in the painting carry his eyes toward Jesus.

It is with the framework of this metaphor that the authors explain to their readers their different approach in this book: “Our portrayal of the differences between the scientist and the art lover allows us to more easily explain the difference between the book you’re now reading and almost any other study of Scripture. Most books examining Genesis (or any other book of the Bible) follow, for the most part, the style of the scientist who stayed very close to the painting.” These type of studies start with chapter one, verse one, and move along examining each part. But while the authors recognize the good and benefit of this type of study, the approach of this book is different. First of all, the authors begin their study of Genesis with the story of Joseph. “Joseph’s story stands out most prominently in Genesis. It is the grand climax of the book of Genesis and also the transition to the account of Moses and the Exodus from Egypt.” Thus, this book focuses on the story of Joseph, but not just the story of Joseph. It is the “Story of Joseph and Judah.” This work recognizes Judah’s unique role in this account, as well as his significant position in the whole of redemptive history (c.f., Gen 49:10, Matt 1:3, Rev 5:5). Indeed, through a comparison of Judah and Joseph, the authors successfully establish that God’s redemptive purposes are accomplished on the sole basis of sovereign, elective, and unmerited grace:

At this point, we should pause to think back on our original question as to which of these two brothers–Judah or Joseph–would seem the more appropriate selection by God for the direct descendant of Christ. Joseph exhibits a level or righteousness that is remarkable for a young man, especially one who has endured what he has to this point. Judah, on the other hand, appears to be the most wicked of the brothers; yet Christ ultimately carries his name as one of his great royal titles (”The Lion of the Tribe of Judah,” Rev 5:5). Could it be that God is showing us how bad Judah is in order to point out how gracious his ultimate choosing of Judah is? In other words, God’s selection does not appear to be based on anything Joseph or Judah does, but on his grace alone (see also Rom 9:11). This is a recurrent theme in Genesis (and throughout Scripture). We will continue to draw it out in later lessons.

The book is written as a study-guide. There is an assigned reading at the beginning, followed by a short summary, and concluded with contemplative and appropriate study questions. All in all, I thoroughly enjoyed this book, and many of the questions (as well as the provided answers) allowed me to learn much about this story that I had simply overlooked in times past. I highly recommend that all Christians with a love for God’s Word and a desire to know him more purchase this study guide. Even if you do not agree with all of the authors’ perspectives on the story, you will very much enjoy this read.

Theophany

John W. Loftus said:

“Where is the word ‘anthropomorphism’ in the Bible such that we'll know how to interpret a passage properly when it is ‘red flagged’ with that word? I don't have such a Bible, do you? The only reason you call these things anthropomorphic (and phenomenal) is because you are misreading the texts in their original setting based upon later or hindsight understandings (i.e.,you're doing eisegesis, not exegesis).”

1. The linguistic objection is puerile and disingenuous. Loftus doesn’t hesitate to employ extrabiblical terminology to characterize the Bible. Consider his recent reference to “the Anchor Bible Dictionary entry ‘Cosmogony, Cosmology.”

Suppose we are to ask him “Where is the word ‘cosmology’ [or ‘cosmogony’] in the Bible such that we'll know how to interpret a passage properly when it is ‘red flagged’ with that word? I don't have such a Bible, do you?”

2.He continues to confound distinct categories even after he’s been corrected. We aren’t using “phenomenal” language to explain Exod 33. Phenomenal language is relevant to Joshua’s Long Day, not to Exod 33.

3.Jason, Gene, and I have now given many examples in which we interpret the passages in question in light of comparative Semitics. So we have answered Loftus on his own grounds.

“Tell me this. Start reading the canonical Bible from the beginning. Tell me where you read the first statement that clearly specifies that God is a spirit, with no possible meaning oherwise. That should clear this whole thing up.”

1.Notice that Loftus is now moving the goal-post. His original argument was that Scripture clearly depicts God as corporeal. Now he’s shifting the burden of proof: Does the Bible clearly depict God as incorporeal?

He is also attempting to impose on us a duplicitous standard: we must offer an interpretation which disallows any other possible meaning.

Needless to say, Loftus would not like us to hold him to the same apodictic standard of proof.

2.But, by all means, let us start reading the canonical Bible from the beginning. Suppose, for the time being, we confine ourselves to the Pentateuch.

If you read the Pentateuch you encounter a number of theological motifs. As it bears on the immediate issue at hand, we have, on the one hand, the theme of the deus absconditus.

God is a hidden, invisible God—a God who conceals himself. This reflected in the aniconic prohibitions against idolatry.

This is also reflected in the fact that direct contact with God is fatal because God is holy and we are sinners.

On the other hand, we have the theme of the deus revelatus. The God who reveals himself by word, sign, and deed.

A bridging device between the deus absconditus and the deus revelatus is a theophany. A theophany mediates between the ethical and metaphysical transcendence of God, on the one hand, and the covenantal presence or immanence of God, on the other hand.

A theophany both reveals and conceals. It isn’t God in himself, but rather, a visible manifestation of God. In Ezekiel’s classic insulating formula, a theophany is the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord (Ezk 1:18).

In the Pentateuch, theophanies are metamorphic. That is to say, they take a variety of forms.

One common form is the angelophany. There are many angelic apparitions in the Pentateuch. Not every angelophany is a theophany, or vice versa, but many are.

Angels often take the form of men, although they can also project a numinous aura. Or they can present a tetramorphic aspect, in the case of the cherubim and seraphim.

The Angel of the Lord is both an angelophany and a theophany. We could call it a theophanic angelophany. Indeed, many interpreters view it as a Christophany.

A theophany can also take the form of an inanimate force of nature like fire and lightning, clouds, whirlwinds, and earthquakes.

An attentive reader (or hearer) of the Pentateuch would pick up on these dialectical motifs.

Of course, Loftus doesn’t believe in angels. He regards an angelophany as mythological. And he interprets the Bible as mythological.

But in so doing he’s guilty of the very thing he accuses us of doing. He is reinterpreting the Bible through an anachronistic hermeneutical lens.

The Mosaic author (or post-Mosaic “redactor,” if he prefers) of the Pentateuch didn’t regard angels as mythological beings.

An ancient Jewish reader didn’t regard angels as mythological beings.

So when Loftus reinterprets the Bible as mythology, he is “misreading the texts in their original setting based upon later or hindsight understandings (i.e., doing eisegesis, not exegesis).”

He’s coming to the text from the perspective of 19C comparative mythology, higher criticism, modern philosophy, science, psychology, sociology, &c. This does not reflect the original narrative viewpoint. Just the opposite.

Exegete That

John W. Loftus said:

From Exodus 33:
18 Then Moses said, “Now show me your glory.”
19 And the Lord said, “I will cause all my goodness to pass in front of you, and I will proclaim my name, the Lord, in your presence. I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. 20 But,” he said, “you cannot see my face, for no one may see me and live.”
21 Then the Lord said, “There is a place near me where you may stand on a rock. 22 When my glory passes by, I will put you in a cleft in the rock and cover you with my hand until I have passed by. 23 Then I will remove my hand and you will see my back; but my face must not be seen.”

The Holy Bible : New International Version. 1996, c1984 (Ex 33:12-23). Grand Rapids: Zondervan.

No problem. I'm vacationing, but this is just too good an opportunity to pass up.

Ex. 33:18.

Moses was emboldened by this, and now prayed to the Lord, “Let me see Thy glory.”What Moses desired to see, as the answer of God clearly shows, must have been something surpassing all former revelations of the glory of Jehovah (Ex. 16:7, 10; 24:16, 17), and even going beyond Jehovah’s talking with him face to face (v. 11). When God talked with him face to face, or mouth to mouth, he merely saw a “similitude of Jehovah” (Num. 12:8), a form which rendered the invisible being of God visible to the human eye, i.e., a manifestation of the divine glory in a certain form, and not the direct or essential glory of Jehovah, whilst the people saw this glory under the veil of a dark cloud, rendered luminous by fire, that is to say, they only saw its splendour as it shone through the cloud; and even the elders, at the time when the covenant was made, only saw the God of Israel in a certain form which hid from their eyes the essential being of God (Ex. 24:10, 11). What Moses desired, therefore, was a sight of the glory or essential being of God, without any figure, and without a veil.

Moses was urged to offer this prayer, as Calvin truly says, not by “stulta curiositas, quae ut plurimum titillat hominum mentes, ut audacter penetrare tentent usque ad ultima caelorum arcana,”but by “a desire to cross the chasm which had been made by the apostasy of the nation, that for the future he might have a firmer footing than the previous history had given him. As so great a stress had been laid upon his own person in his present task of mediation between the offended Jehovah and the apostate nation, he felt that the separation, which existed between himself and Jehovah, introduced a disturbing element into his office. For if his own personal fellowship with Jehovah was not fully established, and raised above all possibility of disturbance, there could be no eternal foundation for the perpetuity of his mediation” (Baumgarten).As a man called by God to be His servant, he was not yet the perfect mediator; but although he was faithful in all his house, it was only as a servant, called eis martyrion tôn lalêthêsomenôn (Heb. 3:5), i.e., as a herald of the saving revelations of God, preparing the way for the coming of the perfect Mediator. Jehovah therefore granted his request, but only so far as the limit existing between the infinite and holy God and finite and sinful man allowed. “I will make all My goodness pass before thy face, and proclaim the name of Jehovah before thee(b'sheimqara see at Gen. 4:26), and will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy. Thou canst not see My face, for man cannot see Me and live.”The words vgv'v'khannotee , although only connected with the previous clause by the cop.v, are to be understood in a causative sense, as expressing the reason why Moses’ request was granted, viz., that it was an act of unconditional grace and compassion on the part of God, to which no man, not even Moses, could lay any just claim. The apostle Paul uses the words in the same sense in Rom. 9:15, for the purpose of overthrowing the claims of self-righteous Jews to participate in the Messianic salvation.—No mortal man can see the face of God and remain alive; for not only is the holy God a consuming fire to unholy man, but a limit has been set, in and with the sôma choikon and psychikon (the earthly and psychical body) of man, between the infinite God, the absolute Spirit, and the human spirit clothed in an earthly body, which will only be removed by the “redemption of our body,” and our being clothed in a “spiritual body,” and which, so long as it lasts, renders a direct sight of the glory of God impossible. As our bodily eye is dazzled, and its power of vision destroyed, by looking directly at the brightness of the sun, so would our whole nature be destroyed by an unveiled sight of the brilliancy of the glory of God. So long as we are clothed with this body, which was destined, indeed, from the very first to be transformed into the glorified state of the immortality of the spirit, but has become through the fall a prey to the corruption of death, we can only walk in faith, and only see God with the eye of faith, so far as He has revealed His glory to us in His works and His word. When we have become like God, and have been transformed into the “divine nature” (2 Pet. 1:4), then, and not till then, shall we see Him as He is; then we shall see His glory without a veil, and live before Him for ever. For this reason Moses had to content himself with the passing by of the glory of God before his face, and with the revelation of the name of Jehovah through the medium of the word, in which God discloses His inmost being, and, so to speak, His whole heart to faith. In v. 22“My glory” is used for “all My goodness,” and in Ex. 34:6it is stated that Jehovahpassed by before the face of Moses. tuv is not to be understood in the sense of beautiful, or beauty, but signifies goodness; not the brilliancy which strikes the senses, but the spiritual and ethical nature of the Divine Being. For the manifestation of Jehovah, which passed before Moses, was intended unquestionably to reveal nothing else than what Jehovah expressed in the proclamation of His name.

The manifested glory of the Lord would so surely be followed by the destruction of man, that even Moses needed to be protected before it (vv. 21, 22). Whilst Jehovah, therefore, allowed him to come to a place upon the rock near Him, i.e., upon the summit of Sinai (Ex. 34:2), He said that He would put him in a cleft of the rock whilst He was passing by, and cover him with His hand when He had gone by, that he might see His back, because His face could not be seen. The back, as contrasted with the face, signifies the reflection of the glory of God that had just passed by. The words are transferred anthropomorphically from man to God, because human language and human thought can only conceive of the nature of the absolute Spirit according to the analogy of the human form. As the inward nature of man manifests itself in his face, and the sight of his back gives only an imperfect and outward view of him, so Moses saw only the back and not the face of Jehovah. It is impossible to put more into human words concerning this unparalleled vision, which far surpasses all human thought and comprehension. According to Ex. 34:2, the place where Moses stood by the Lord was at the top (the head) of Sinai, and no more can be determined with certainty concerning it. The cleft in the rock (v. 22) has been supposed by some to be the same place as the “cave” in which Elijah lodged at Horeb, and where the Lord appeared to him in the still small voice (1 Kings 19:9ff.). The real summit of the Jebel Musa consists of “a small area of huge rocks, about 80 feet in diameter,” upon which there is now a chapel that has almost fallen down, and about 40 feet to the south-west a dilapidated mosque (Robinson,Palestine, vol. i. p. 153). Below this mosque, according to Seetzen (Reiseiii. pp. 83, 84), there is a very small grotto, into which you descend by several steps, and to which a large block of granite, about a fathom and a half long and six spans in height, serves as a roof. According to the Mussulman tradition, which the Greek monks also accept, it was in this small grotto that Moses received the law; though other monks point out a “hole, just large enough for a man,” near the altar of the Elijah chapel, on the small plain upon the ridge of Sinai, above which the loftier peak rises about 700 feet, as the cave in which Elijah lodged on Horeb (Robinson,Pal. ut supra).

Keil and Delitzch, Vol. 1, 475 - 476.

Also:

Verse 20. And he said, thou canst not see my face,.... Meaning not his form, his essence, his very nature, and the glory of it, that Moses must know he could never see; but the brightest displays of his grace and goodness in Christ, the fullest discoveries of it, which are too much for man, in the present state of things, to have, who sees in part, and but through a glass darkly, not face to face, or in the most complete and perfect manner; it is but a small part and portion of God, and of his ways and works, as of creation and providence, so more especially of grace, salvation, and redemption by Jesus Christ, that is known of him; the things of the Gospel in their full perfection are what eye has not seen; and particularly were more hidden and unseen under the legal dispensation; this face was covered with types and shadows, and dark representations of things; though, in comparison of that state, we now, with open face, behold the glory of the Lord, yet still it is through a glass darkly, and we have not the clear and full view of things as will be hereafter:

for there shall no man see me and live: if there was to be such a revelation made of the grace and goodness, and glory of God in Christ, as it really is in itself, it would be too much for mortals in the present state to bear; it would break their earthen vessels in pieces; the full discovery therefore is reserved to a future state, when these things will be seen as they are, and men will be in a condition to receive them; otherwise we find that men have, in a sense, seen the face of God in this life, and have lived; though many, and even good men, have been possessed with such a notion, that if a man saw God he must die, see Genesis 32:30.

Verse 21. And the Lord said, behold, [there is] a place by me,.... Near him, not in or by the tabernacle, where it may be the pillar of cloud now was, as it had been, Exodus 33:9 but upon the rock, where it had been for many days, and near to which there was a fit place for Moses to be in, and have that view of the goodness and glory of God he would favour him with:

and thou shall stand upon a rock; in Horeb, typical of Christ the rock, the rock of Israel, and the rock of ages, the rock of refuge, salvation, and strength; comparable to one for shelter, solidity, firmness, strength, and duration; and happy are they who stand upon this rock; they are safe and secure, they stand on high, and have noble prospects of the perfections of God, and of the riches of his grace and goodness, see Psalm 50:2.

Verse 22. And it shall come to pass, while my glory passeth by,.... The displays of his grace and goodness are made:

that I will put thee in a clift of the rock; in one of the clefts, made by smiting it, through which the waters gushed out for the relief of the Israelites, and their flocks: and we are told {c}, that to this day, on the summit of Mount Sinai, by the Arabians called Gibel el Mousa, or the mountain of Moses, is perceived a large chasm in the rock, said to be the cave where Moses hid himself from God, when the glory of the Lord passed before him. Now this cleft may be an emblem of Christ, as crucified, smitten, wounded and slain; who was smitten by the law and justice of God, as this rock was smitten by the rod of Moses: and had gashes and wounds made in him like the clefts of a rock, being pierced with the nails and spear: and in these clefts of the rock saints dwell by faith, Song of Solomon 2:14:

and will cover thee with my hand; with his cloud, as Ben Melech, and so may denote the cloudiness, obscurity, and darkness of the legal dispensation: but here it seems to denote imperfection, not being able to bear the full sight of the divine glory, and which angels themselves cannot bear, but cover their faces; and also the danger of being consumed, were it not that saints are in Christ, and covered and secured in him, otherwise God is a consuming fire:

while I pass by thee; or his glory, the glory of all his perfections, wisdom, holiness, justice, power, and faithfulness, and especially of his grace, mercy, and goodness in Christ.

{c} Egmont and Heyman's Travels, vol. 2. p. 167. see a Journal from Cairo, &c. p. 28, 29. Ed. 2.

Verse 23. And I will take away mine hand,.... As being covered with the hand may signify the obscurity of the former dispensation, the taking of it away may denote a more clear revelation of the grace and goodness of God in Christ, and so of the glory of it under the Gospel dispensation; and yet what is seen in this, in comparison of the reality of things as they are, or of the heavenly state, are but as next expressed:

and thou shalt see my back parts; which some understand of the humanity of Christ, and his sufferings in it, sometimes expressed by his heel, and the bruising of it, Genesis 3:15 or else the works of God in creation, by which the invisible things of God are seen, and which give a knowledge of him "a posteriori"; and so Maimonides {d} interprets the phrase, which follow me, flow from my will, i.e. all my creatures: or rather it denotes the imperfect knowledge of God in the present state, even as revealed in Christ, in whom there are the clearest and brightest displays of his glory; yet this, in comparison of the beatific sight of him, is but like seeing a man that is gone by, whose back is only to be seen:

but my face shall not be seen; in the present state, the face of God, that is, his favour, communion with him, and the light of his countenance, are to be sought for, and may be enjoyed; the glory of himself is to be seen in the face or person of Christ, and the glory of that face or person is to be seen in the glass of the Gospel, but at present imperfectly; God in Christ as he is, the fullest and brightest displays of his glory, grace, and goodness, are reserved to another state, see 1 Corinthians 13:9 or it may regard the divine nature of Christ, which could not be seen by Moses, but his back parts, or human; Christ as clothed with flesh might, and would be seen by him, as he was seen by him on the mount, Matthew 17:3.

John Gill's Exposition of Exodus 33.

Come now, John, we thought you went to seminary. It's an anthropomorphism, possibly and angelophany/theophany or OT Christophany. It no more means God has a body than Jesus is a gate in the New Testament.

Oh, and, yes, it is rather telling how weak your hand is when, instead of responding to the exegesis given to you by Steve in the previous entry that you immediately go jonesing for another text. Surely you didn't learn this in seminary. If you think you can offer a real counter exegesis, then by all means present one. You did take basic exegesis/hermeneutics didn't you?

Next Question

The imago Dei

John W. Loftus said:

“I argued that the burden of proof is upon the conservative so-called Bible believing Christian, given the nature of the Biblical statements themselves as interpreted within their particular Zeigeist.”

Of course, Loftus is coming to the text with his own agenda. His Zeitgeist (did he misspell the word because he doesn’t know German?) is secular humanism. So let us not labor under the illusion that Loftus is offering the reader disinterested exegesis.

“You have the burden of proof here, to show that ancient Hebrews did not take these verses literally. God walked in the garden of Eden in the cool of the day? Come on. tell me more. Exegete thees passages properly in their cultural setting.”

As you wish. What we have in Gen 3:8 is an angelophany or theophany of judgment.

***QUOTE***

The judgment scene opens with the “sound” (qol) of the Lord’s coming…the expression “the sound of the Lord God” (qol yhwh elohim) is common in the Pentateuch, especially Deuteronomy (5:25; 8:20; 13:18; 13:18; 15:5; 18:16; 26:14; 27:10; 28:1-2,15,45,62; 30:8,10). Where—along with the verb “to hear/obey” and the preposition…it is the common form of expression for the Lord’s call to obedience. It can hardly be without purpose that the author opens the scene of the curse with a subtle but painful reminder of the single requirement for obtaining God’s blessing: “to hear/obey the voice of the Lord God” (cf. v8).

Also, the coming of the Lord at the mountain of Sinai is foreshadowed in this scene of the Lord God’s coming to the first disobedient couple. In Deut 5:25 & 16:16 (cf. Exod 20:18021), when the Lord came to Sinai, the people “heard the sound of the Lord our God”. The response of Adam in the garden was much the same as that of Israel at the foot of Sinai. When the people heard the sound of the Lord at Sinai, they were afraid “and stayed at a distance and said…’Do not have God speak to use or we will die;’” (Exod 20:18-19). So also Adam and his wife fled at the first sound of the Lord in the garden.

In light of the general context of the picture of God’s coming in judgment and power, the “wind” (ruach) that the author envisioned resembles that “great and powerful wind that blew on the mountain…of the Lord” in 1 Kgs 19:11. Thus the viewpoint of the narrative would be much the same as that in Job 38:1, where the Lord answered Job “out of the storm,” J. Sailhamer, EBC 2:52.

***END-QUOTE***

For a more detailed defense of this interpretation, making use of comparative linguistics (Akkadian, Ugaritic), as well as intertextual data, cf. J. Niehaus, God at Sinai (Zondervan 1995), 155-59.

Continuing:

“The ‘image of God’ in Adam & Eve was also a physical image! To them God had a physical body just like the other gods.”

Is that a fact? Hmm.

Actually, it denotes the role of man as God’s viceregent on earth:

***QUOTE***

The nonphysical resemblance of image and object represented should be kept in mind. ANE modes of representation are highly metaphorpic and symbolic. Thus, the same Egyptian god can appear as a human figure, in the form of a hieroglyph, or as an animal, and queen Hatsepsut can be the image of a male deity (Clines, 72-73). Thus, the image of the god is not a matter of physical resemblance, but of power and prerogative, often connected with expressions like “under the feet” (Lichthim, AEL 2:36-37; cf. Ps 8:6b).

According to Clines…since God has no form, humankind is not made in God’s image, but rather as God’s image; thus, humanity is his representative and agent here on earth. The expression “likeness” guarantees that humans will be a faithful and adequate representative of God on earth. Humans, thus, embody “God’s lordship over the lower orders of creation” (Clines, 101).

The meaning of image, thus, does not lie in the mere terms used, but in…the priestly tradition’s understanding of representative kingship.

Humans are forbidden to make solid or graphic representations of God (Exod 20:4; Deut 5:8) or of pagan gods. These representations would inevitably be based on some creature (Exod 20:4; Deut 4:15-19,23,24; cf. Rom 1:23) and, thus, misrepresent the invisible Creator. For on Mt. Sinai Israel heard God speak but saw no form (Deut 4:12).

New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology & Exegesis 4:643-47.

***END-QUOTE***

As well as:

***QUOTE***

Thus in Ps 39:7 (Eng. 6), selem parallels hebel, “vanity”: surely man “moves like a phantom [selem]; the riches he piles up are no more than vapour [hebel]” (NEB. In 73:20 selem parallels “dream” (halom): “Like a dream [halom] when a man rouses himself, O Lord, like images [selem] in sleep which are dismissed on waking” (NEB)…[selem] may be used for purposes other than describing the physical imitation of something. Here image would be something conveying the idea of emptiness, unreality, unsubstantiality.

V. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis (Eerdmans 1991), 134-35.

***END-QUOTE***

“Exegete. Exegete. Exegete.”

Be careful what you ask for, Loftus!

Monism

Daniel Morgan said:

“That was all I was wondering -- is if phil of mind contains within itself arguments convincing enough for you to admit that some persons will be moved towards materialism by those arguments, or if you think that pre-committed materialists develop arguments within the phil of mind to try to keep their worldview consistent.”

I don’t think that philosophy of mind per se moves people to materialism. Rather, it depends on what lines of evidence weigh more heavily with some people.

“Surely you agree that atheism doesn't necessitate monism?”

An atheist can be a materialist, dualist, or idealist. However, materialism is the default position for atheism in the west. Even a secular dualist would rather be a materialist.

Danny’s next series of remarks are directed at Manata, but they are of a piece with what he and I have already talked about. Indeed, he’ll later redirect this question to me.

“The laws of physics are non-rational? That's a new one to me. I've often heard theists argue that the rationality of the natural universe is evidence for God, ie the fine-tuning arguments, which depend upon the uniformity of nature (picking a specific range of cosmological constants, if they don't remain CONSTANT, is a bit idiotic, eh?).”

i) I already drew a distinction between irrational and irrationable, or unreasonable and unreasoning.

As usual, my distinction sailed right over his head, so we’re back to square one. With Danny we so often end up exactly where we began—like sailing a rubber-ducky in a bathtub.

To speak of natural laws as literally rational would be guilty of personifying the laws of nature, unless Danny is an animist!

ii) Danny also trades on an equivocation. The fine-tuning argument is not dependent on the proposition that the laws of nature are literally rational, but rather, that the laws of nature imply a rational creator. A watch is not rational, but it does imply a watchmaker who is.

“Apparently you don't think this is a valid argument? Swinburne and Craig, in their reliance upon God setting up this universe to run rationally upon laws in order to make us [humans], need you as their bodyguard.”

i) I think the fine-tuning argument is basically sound. However, I wouldn’t cast it in terms of natural law, but a providential order of second causes.

ii) Notice that Danny continues to operate with a particular version of natural law although he never bestirs himself to defend that version.

“ I am a monist due to simplicity and lack of studying the necessities of dualism. Basically, you have to start somewhere.”

This may be true in Danny’s case. However, many unbelievers subscribe to materialism because materialism, if true, would automatically knock Christian theology out of the running. If matter is all there is, then there is no God, or devil, or angels, or discarnate souls.

“You presuppose a soul/spirit…”

i) Presuppositional apologetics operates at a higher level of generality. It concerns itself with the global truth-conditions of rationality, not with specific theses like dualism.

ii) It’s possible to be a Christian materialist in one’s anthropology, viz. Lynne Baker, Kevin Corcoran, Peter van Inwagen, Donald MacKay, and Nancey Murphy.

A Christian materialist anchors the afterlife in the resurrection of the just rather than the immortality of the soul.

That’s not my own position, but to suppose that a Christian is fanatically attached to dualism because the Christian faith raises and false on this model of dualism betrays an ignorance of philosophical theology.

“So of course you're never going to listen to the arguments about the logical impossibility of immaterial substances interacting with material ones.”

i) Since this is the stock objection to dualism, it’s not as if a dualist was without a stock reply. I myself have been over this ground several times with Danny as well as Loftus and Exbeliever.

I also quoted a philosophy who made short-work of this objection:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/05/cartesian-dualism.html

Danny, this is how the game is played:

a) You raise an objection.

b) I acknowledge your objection and offer a reply.

c) The next move is yours. You are supposed to acknowledge my reply, and then tell me if my reply is responsive to your objection. If so, you should withdraw your objection. If not, you should explain where the flaw lies in my reply.

Why is it that you so often drop the ball in this regard?

ii) Even if dualistic interactionism were impossible, it would not be “logically” impossible.

“I would say that starting out with materialism is just philosophically simpler than starting out as a dualist…”

As I’ve already pointed out, there is frequently a trade off between a simpler ontology and a simpler theory. This has been discussed elsewhere as well. Cf.:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/

Danny has a habit of making sweeping claims without having acquainted himself with the relevant literature.

Of course, ignorance facilitates the ease with which one can make sweeping claims.

“Esp so long as one allows the weight of evidence to determine whether or not dualism becomes more logical (as a first principle).”

This assumes that the evidence points in a uniform or preponderant direction, as if there were no evidence for dualism.

“One good reason for this is the obvious fact of existence and necessity of one substance.”

How is the obvious fact of existence a good reason for materialism?

And wherein lies the necessity of one substance?

“From there, additional substances ought to have supporting arguments.”

This is, of course, a question-begging way of framing the issue.

John Loftus Contradicts Himself Again

John Loftus is now arguing that he doesn't deny that the later Old Testament and the New Testament refer to God the Father as not having a body. He claims that his argument is about the oldest books of the Old Testament. But click here to see Loftus' original article. Notice that he repeatedly mentions the New Testament. Notice that he includes later Old Testament passages and New Testament passages in his lists of Biblical passages that refer to the body parts of God. Will Loftus retract his original argument? Will he post a correction at his blog?

See the comment section of the thread here for an explanation of why even Loftus' revised argument is problematic. Even if we were to limit ourselves to the oldest books of the Old Testament, we have no reason to think that Loftus is correct on this issue.

A Flat Earth, A Mormon View Of God, And Other Skeptical Readings Of Scripture

In recent days, John Loftus of Debunking Christianity has been arguing that we should interpret passages like 2 Samuel 22 and Job 26 much more literally than Christians usually do. He's argued that the ancient Jews probably believed in a flat earth, a God who has a physical body, etc. I had a discussion, last year, with another critic of Christianity who raised similar objections, though he was more reasonable than John Loftus. He acknowledged that some ancient people did believe in a spherical earth, but he argued that the Biblical authors probably didn't. He cited Matthew 4:8 as evidence that the author of that gospel believed in a flat earth. Other passages in the New Testament are sometimes cited as well, such as the references to the four corners of the earth in Revelation.

There are a few things we should keep in mind as we consider this issue:

1. Just as we today surely have some misconceptions about the universe, ancient people surely did as well. In a discussion about Biblical inerrancy or a related subject, the issue of primary importance is what the Bible teaches, not what some people or most people at that time believed. If the apostle Paul was ignorant or incorrect about some elements of how the brain functions, he could discuss subjects like Christ as the head of the church or how a Christian should think without thereby teaching a false view of the brain. You don't have to understand every element of how the brain functions in order to make some references to the head or the process of thinking.

2. There's much we don't know about what ancient people believed on these subjects.

3. Agnosticism was always an option. Earlier, I cited Theophilus of Antioch as an example. He suggested that people who argue that the earth is spherical or a cube have no way of knowing. We shouldn't assume that every ancient person took a confident position on every conceivable issue. Demanding that a Christian document the cosmology of the author of Job, for example, doesn't make sense. It's a highly poetic book that sometimes uses different images to refer to the same object. There's no way for us to know the author's cosmology in detail. He may have been agnostic on some of the relevant issues. We don't know.

4. The fact that other ancient cultures held a particular view doesn't prove that the ancient Jews held that view. As we'll see below in my citations of Basil of Caesarea, ancient cultures held a wide variety of views and were sometimes inconsistent with themselves and with each other. People would have known that human fallibility and a lot of speculation were involved, and they would have been able to notice inconsistencies from one culture to another.

Commenting on the references to the corners of the earth in the book of Revelation, Grant Osborne writes:

"The angels [in Revelation 7:1] stand 'at the four corners of the earth,' another ancient idiom for every part of the world (Ezek. 7:2). Some have thought this meant the ancients viewed the world as a square surface, but there are just as many passages in the Bible using a circle as a model (Ps. 19:6; Isa. 40:22). This is simply an idiom and no more." (Revelation [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2002], p. 305)

Pliny the Elder, writing in the first century A.D., comments that belief in a spherical earth was the common view of his day (The Natural History, 2:2). He explains why anybody should be able to discern the spherical shape of the earth without difficulty. Old Testament passages like Job 26:10 and Proverbs 8:27 may refer to the circular shape of the horizon, and Christian authors living just after the time of the apostles either refer to the earth as spherical or suggest agnosticism on the shape of the earth. Some church fathers did refer to the earth as flat, but the spherical view and agnosticism on the subject seem to predate the flat earth position among extant Christian sources.

Given how widely a spherical earth was accepted in ancient times, and given the willingness of the earliest New Testament interpreters to accept a spherical earth or take no position on the issue, it seems unlikely that passages like Matthew 4:8 and Revelation 7:1 were intended to refer to a flat earth. Matthew would have known that there was no mountain from which a person could physically see every kingdom of the earth, including whatever details of those kingdoms would be involved in showing their "glory". The parallel passage in Luke 4:5 refers to how Satan showed Jesus the kingdoms "in a moment of time". Jesus is shown the kingdoms. He doesn't move around to look at them. And it happens in an instant. Apparently, Satan is supernaturally bringing images before Jesus. The mountain backdrop isn't meant to convey the concept that there was some mountain high enough to allow people to see everything on a flat earth. Rather, the mountain backdrop is being used to convey the concept of elevation, without regard to whether that elevation allows a person to physically see the entire earth. This incident has nothing to do with normal eyesight or a flat earth.

The phrase "corners of the earth", which is used in the book of Revelation, is a common figure of speech that we still use today. Tertullian, who lived from the middle of the second century into the third century, can refer to a "corner of the world" in one place, yet refer elsewhere to the earth as spherical:

"For if such multitudes of men were to break away from you, and betake themselves to some remote corner of the world, why, the very loss of so many citizens, whatever sort they were, would cover the empire with shame; nay, in the very forsaking, vengeance would be inflicted." (Apology, 37)

"There was a time when her whole orb, withal, underwent mutation, overrun by all waters." (On The Pallium, 2)

Victorinus, who wrote the earliest extant commentary on the book of Revelation, didn't think that a flat earth was in view:

"By the corners of the earth, or the four winds across the river Euphrates, are meant four nations, because to every nation is sent an angel" (Commentary On The Apocalypse Of The Blessed John, 9)

Victorinus, like many other ante-Nicene fathers, was a premillennialist who interpreted Biblical prophecy in a highly literal manner. Yet, he interpreted the "four corners of the earth" as a figure of speech.

Similarly, Commodianus, another early premillennialist, refers to the earth as a globe:

"He [the Antichrist] himself shall divide the globe into three ruling powers" (The Instructions Of Commodianus In Favor Of Christian Discipline, Against The Gods Of The Heathens, 41)

In the fourth century, Basil of Caesarea criticized those who are too allegorical in their scripture interpretation:

"I know the laws of allegory, though less by myself than from the works of others. There are those truly, who do not admit the common sense of the Scriptures, for whom water is not water, but some other nature, who see in a plant, in a fish, what their fancy wishes, who change the nature of reptiles and of wild beasts to suit their allegories, like the interpreters of dreams who explain visions in sleep to make them serve their own ends. For me grass is grass; plant, fish, wild beast, domestic animal, I take all in the literal sense. 'For I am not ashamed of the gospel.'" (The Hexaemeron, 9:1)

Yet, just after the comments above, he goes on to comment on the shape of the earth:

"Those who have written about the nature of the universe have discussed at length the shape of the earth. If it be spherical or cylindrical, if it resemble a disc and is equally rounded in all parts, or if it has the forth of a winnowing basket and is hollow in the middle; all these conjectures have been suggested by cosmographers, each one upsetting that of his predecessor. It will not lead me to give less importance to the creation of the universe, that the servant of God, Moses, is silent as to shapes; he has not said that the earth is a hundred and eighty thousand furlongs in circumference; he has not measured into what extent of air its shadow projects itself whilst the sun revolves around it, nor stated how this shadow, casting itself upon the moon, produces eclipses. He has passed over in silence, as useless, all that is unimportant for us." (The Hexaemeron, 9:1)

Notice a few things here. Basil refers to how ancient people had a wide variety of views of the shape of the earth, not just one or two views. He also refers to how these theories are "conjectures", he notes that some issues are more important than others, and he doesn't think that anything in the writings of Moses compels us to one conclusion over another. Basil did hold some incorrect views of the physical universe, as people do today, but he acknowledged that his own views and those of other people were largely speculative, and he allowed for a hierarchy of importance in the issues of life. An issue such as the shape of the earth isn't as significant as an issue like the salvation of the soul. In another passage, he writes:

"We are asked how, if the firmament is a spherical body, as it appears to the eye, its convex circumference can contain the water which flows and circulates in higher regions?" (The Hexaemeron, 3:4)

Notice, again, that questions were being asked and that qualifying phrases are used ("if", "as it appears to the eye"). Whatever errors men like Basil promoted in their writings, we ought to acknowledge that they did recognize their own fallibility, they did often qualify their comments, and they did recognize a hierarchy of importance in the issues they discussed.

There isn't anything in scripture like the sort of detailed cosmology we find in other places. To construct a Biblical cosmology out of passages of scripture as highly poetic as 2 Samuel 22 and Job 26, and to ignore the many qualifying factors that men like John Loftus repeatedly ignore, is unreasonable.

Similarly, it's unreasonable to take Biblical references to an arm of God or an eye of God as references to a physical body that God possesses. I addressed this subject in a post yesterday, mostly discussing the Old Testament, and here I'll mention some New Testament examples.

The apostle Paul repeatedly refers to the right hand of God the Father (Romans 8:34, Ephesians 1:20). Yet, within the same book, he can both refer to the right hand of God (Colossians 3:1) and refer to God as invisible (Colossians 1:15). Similarly, John refers to the Father as having a hand (John 10:29), yet he also refers to God as a spirit in a context that emphasizes non-physicality (John 4:24).

As I documented in the post linked above, we find widespread references to the fact that God the Father doesn't have a body in the earliest church fathers. If they were misunderstanding scripture, then the misunderstanding must have begun early and on a large scale. But we don't have to rely on post-Biblical interpreters to tell us what the Bible teaches on this subject. Passages like 2 Samuel 22 and Job 26 are far too poetic to lead us to the conclusion that God the Father has a body, and there are widespread Biblical references to the invisibility of God, the change brought about by the incarnation, etc. Critics like John Loftus aren't attempting to arrive at a reasonable understanding of the text. They're looking for something to criticize.

Vengeance is mine

I’ve been asked to expand on this post.

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/06/dancing-on-his-grave.html

One the one hand we have taunt-songs in Scripture. On the other hand, we have passages like Prov 24:17-18 or the Beatitudes.

So what should be the Christian attitude towards one’s enemies? A few distinctions are in order:

1.Enemies are not all of a kind. There’s the personal enemy who’s a royal pain in the neck. He tries to make your life a living hell. These are people in power, people with power over you, who abuse their power in petty and vindictive ways. Paradigm cases are the tyrannical drill sergeant and the obnoxious boss.

In this case, we’re supposed to return good for evil.

2.Then there’s the personal enemy who’s out to harm you in a more tangible and irreparable fashion. To do you violence. He is a threat to life, limb, and livelihood.

Here the principle of self-defense kicks in. You don’t fight back because you hate him. You fight back to protect yourself or your family from bodily harm or financial ruin.

3.Then there are powerful enemies of the faith like Jezebel, Athalia, and Julian the Apostate.

They are attempting to extirpate both the faith and the faithful. Once again, the principle of self-defense kicks in. The institution of the church is worth defending. Both the family and the church are essential in the economy of God.

4.There’s also an obvious difference between the living and the dead. Although a person’s eternal fate is sealed from eternity, only God knows for a fact who is elect or reprobate. So, from our perspective, where there’s life there’s hope.

But once an enemy is dead, he’s beyond the reach of prayer or evangelization. He’s squandered all his opportunities. All hope of repentance is gone.

5.For some odd reason, certain Christians infer that if private vengeance is forbidden in Scripture, then we should not rejoice over the demise of a notorious adversary.

But it’s precisely because vengeance is the Lord’s that we are entitled to rejoice in the Lord’s vengeance.

This is not directed at our enemies, but at our Lord. We praise God for his justice.

6.Equally illogical is when certain Christians infer that since we’re all sinners, none of us has the right to be judgmental.

But that’s fallacious. The truth is not that my enemy didn’t get his just deserts, but that I deserve the same fate.

We should not be self-righteous as we take satisfaction in the judgment of the ungodly. But that ought not hinder us from celebrating the fact that an evil man got his comeuppance.

We should rejoice in the wisdom of God’s mercy and God’s justice alike.

What about theistic evolution?

Daniel Morgan said:

“Note that both Swinburne and Craig are theistic evolutionists, so I know there are Christians who would disagree with you. What would you say to them?”

There are a number of different issues here:

i) Is Craig a theistic evolutionist? Or are you defining that very broadly in terms of cosmic evolution (i.e. the Big Bang) rather than biological evolution?

ii) There is a continuum of hypothetical options:

flat earth>geocentrism>YEC>OEC>theistic evolution>process theology> deism>naturalistic evolution.

iii) There’s a difference between saying that a Christian can believe x and saying that x is a Christian belief.

iv) Apropos (iii), there’s a difference between what is psychologically consistent with a credible profession of faith, and what is theologically consistent with a credible profession of faith.

v) Apropos (ii), professing Christians relate to each other as well as unbelievers at various social levels.

We break down into various opposing or intersecting subsets. Not every theological disagreement rises to the level of an excommunicable offense.

A Christian might subscribe to YEC, and belong to an organization which promotes that view. Subscription to YEC would be a condition of membership.

Yet that same Christian might well attend the same church as another Christian who subscribes to OEC.

A Presbyterian seminary might include the works of Warfield in the core curriculum, but refuse to hire a theistic evolutionist.

The criteria might be higher for ordination than church membership.

vi) There are differences of natural character. In addition, liberal, moderate, and conservative are relative terms.

The US is the headquarters of the creationist movement. It doesn’t have the same foothold in the UK, much less the Continent.

In addition, a man like Swinburne or McGrath would be considered a conservative by Oxford standards, yet be too liberal to belong to certain Evangelical denominations is the US.

This issue is no different than other disagreements between professing believers (e.g. inerrancy, abortion, just-war theory, environmentalism, the spiritual gifts, theonomy, dispensationalism, ecumenism, hell, the sacraments, the doctrines of grace, the millennium, the ordination of women and/or homosexuals), and where we draw the line is an individual and institutional matter that varies from one individual or institution to another. These are policy questions as well as personal questions.

Likewise, a position can be out of bounds at one level of social affiliation, but not another.

If my brother is an atheist, he is still my brother. I will relate to him as a blood brother, but not as a spiritual brother.

Dog-pile

My two co-horts have responded to John Loftus' latest post pontificating about God having a body (yes, I said pontificating rather than arguing). For a more intellectual response to Loftus I refer you to Jason's and Steve's responses.

Basically, Loftus' ammo for this argument is to treat anthropomorphic passages as literal. Furthermore, he psychologizes the Christian when he gives the reasons why we would not interpret certain passages literally. He writes,

"Modern Christians try to avoid the conclusions of the literal Biblical statements because they read the Bible after the rise of science."

Unfortunately for Loftus, the reason why we believe God does not have literal physical hands and feet is *not* because anything modern science tells us! Since when has modern science determines that gods must not be physical?

Loftus explains,

"The so-called Bible believing Christians have argued that this is merely the language of appearances, that is, it’s merely figurative language, just like heaven is described as a city in Revelation 21-22, but neither of which are to be taken literally by educated Christians today."

Anyway, let's apply Loftus' technique to himself:

"With what we read in the Bible, the burden of proof is squarely on them."

The burden of proof is abstract and not square in nature, furthermore it isn't "on" anyone. Unlike bird droppings, burdens of proof cannot be on John's shoulder.

"We must step back in time before the rise of modern astronomy to see the universe as they did."

Time is not something that can be "stepped" into, contrary to Loftus’ imagination, time is not like poop. Furthermore, modern astronomy, like the sun, does not "rise."

"About this listen to the Anchor Bible Dictionary (“Image of God’) which tells us:"

Sorry, the dictionary does not have a voice mechanism and so does not "tell" us anything.

"Mormons today take these statements literally"

Statements are immaterial and, therefore, no one can "take" them, maybe their instantiation in a physical sentence, but not the statement qua statement.

"so if modern people like Mormons think this way, then it’s even more likely that ancient Hebrews did."

LOL, that's a fallacious inference, but I thank John for doing it to himself again. Check it out: "If modern people like John can use language in a non-literal, poetic, metaphorical, allegorical, way then it's even more likely that ancient Hebrews did." He gave us the entire debate with this one! QED.


Questions for consideration:

1) In 4 thousand years when our more civilized great-great... grandchildren read Loftus will they think that we thought "burdens of proof" were "square" and could be "on" people?

2) When someone tells them that they're not translating it properly will our future Loftuses tell them that they refuse to read it how ignorant past Loftuses meant it?

3) Can refuting atheists get any easier?

The Exegetical Carelessness Of John Loftus

John Loftus has written an article arguing that the ancient Jews believed that God had a body. He suggests that Christians should hold the same belief. Steve Hays has already written a response, which I saw just as I was finishing my response. I'll add the following to Steve's comments.

John Loftus writes:

"The gods of surrounding cultures had human and physical characteristics. There is no reason to suppose the Hebrews thought differently about their God from what we read in the OT....The burden of proof is upon the Christian to show why they don’t think of God in a human form. Mormons today take these statements literally and believe God has the shape of a human being, so if modern people like Mormons think this way, then it’s even more likely that ancient Hebrews did."

Commenting on 2 Samuel 22, Loftus writes:

"Can you picture this? Sounds like Zeus to me, and he was envisioned in a physical body."

As I explained to Loftus in a recent thread here, 2 Samuel 22 is a passage about past events in David's life. It's a passage that uses highly poetic language, and nothing like Loftus' literal interpretation of the passage is mentioned in 1 Samuel, 2 Samuel, and other portions of the Bible that give us accounts of David's life. In other words, 2 Samuel 22 is evidence against Loftus' line of reasoning, not evidence for it.

Loftus is also ignoring other information he's been given. As we've explained to him in previous threads, another way we can demonstrate the non-literal nature of the passages he's citing is by comparing passages that describe the same object, yet use differing images. For example, one passage in Job will refer to the earth having pillars, and another will refer to the earth hanging on nothing. The Biblical authors will sometimes refer to God being in a particular place, yet the ancient Jews knew that even the entire universe couldn't contain God (1 Kings 8:27, 2 Chronicles 2:6, Isaiah 66:1). Isaiah 66:1 refers to the earth as God's footstool. If He had physical feet large enough to need a footstool of that size, then how can He be referred to as walking in one location on earth in other passages? How could God appear to Moses or anybody else without everybody on earth seeing Him, if He was as large as a John Loftus reading of Isaiah 66 would suggest? How was such a large physical body ever able to get inside a tent, temple, and other such objects?

We've also explained to Loftus that some of the views he's ascribing to the Biblical authors would have easily been falsified. It's unlikely that the Biblical authors held such views. For example, passages like Exodus 15:6 refer to God saving people or doing other things with His arm. Yet, like 2 Samuel 22, these passages are referring to historical events. The people who were there would have known that there wasn't any physical arm that came down from the heavens, and the accounts of these events in other passages don't mention any physical arm.

Loftus is misleadingly selective in the passages he cites. He cites passages about hands, eyes, etc., but what about other passages that use non-human imagery? 2 Samuel 22, a passage Loftus keeps citing, begins with references to God as a rock (2 Samuel 22:2-3). The passage goes on to refer to God with human imagery, but why does Loftus ignore the rock references while mentioning the human references? Apparently, when Loftus reads 2 Samuel 22:29 he thinks that the ancient Jews must have viewed God as a lighting device. We can only imagine what "by my God I can leap over a wall" (2 Samuel 22:30) means in John Loftus' mind. What about the wings of God mentioned in Psalm 17:8, 36:7, etc.? Since passages like the ones in these Psalms refer to people resting under God's wings, should we conclude that the authors thought that they had literally rested under physical wings on a physical body of God? Does Isaiah 40:31 prove that the author thought that people who trust in God will grow physical wings?

Loftus tells us that the ancient Jews might have held beliefs like those of the Mormons, but even the Mormons don't interpret scripture as literally as John Loftus suggests we should. On the issue of whether God has a physical body, where Mormonism has supported Loftus' argument to some extent, why should we think that the Mormons are a reflection of what the ancient Jews probably believed? If the large majority of interpreters of scripture have disagreed with the Mormon view, including interpreters who lived much closer to Biblical times, why should we look to the Mormons while rejecting the conclusions of a much larger and earlier group of people?

In a previous thread, I cited Athenagoras and Theophilus of Antioch as examples of people who lived close to Biblical times, yet didn't interpret the Bible as John Loftus suggests we should. Why does he ignore such sources while repeatedly mentioning the Mormons, a nineteenth century group? On this issue of whether God had a body, we have many sources who predate the Mormons and who contradict the Mormon claim: Aristides (Apology, 1), Tatian (Address To The Greeks, 4), Athenagoras (A Plea For The Christians, 10), etc. And though Loftus often tells us that the ancient Jews must have held beliefs similar to those of other cultures, we know that the ancient Jews were different in some ways, and they wanted to be different. Besides, "Many Gentiles also recognized that the supreme god was a spirit" (Craig Keener, The Gospel of John: A Commentary, Vol. 1 [Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003], p. 618).

If Loftus wants to argue that only Jews of the Old Testament era thought God the Father had a body, but that Jews of the New Testament era held a different view, then why does the New Testament continue to use the sort of language that Loftus cites from the Old Testament? Peter refers to Jesus being at God's right hand (Acts 2:33), John refers to the Father sitting on a throne (Revelation 5:13), etc. We know that the early Christians didn't think that the Father had a body, yet we also know that they refer to the Father with the sort of language John Loftus is citing.

God is a spirit (John 4:24), and a spirit doesn't have flesh and bones (Luke 24:39). God is invisible (Colossians 1:15, 1 Timothy 1:17). As John tells us in the opening of his gospel, the Word became flesh. Philippians 2 describes the taking on of human form as something that distinguishes God the Son from God the Father. God could take on a human body or be associated with physical objects in some way, but nothing in scripture (Old Testament or New Testament) suggests that God was limited to a body or always had a body. If Loftus wants to argue that scripture refers to God sometimes having a physical body, such as in the incarnation, or sometimes being associated with a physical object, then he would be making an observation that nobody disputes. But why would he present such an undisputed observation as an argument against what Christians believe? He's obviously arguing for more than that, but citing poetic passages like 2 Samuel 22 won't get him there.

What's a law of nature?

Daniel Morgan continues to invoke the laws of nature. As I pointed out to him in the past, the definition or even the existence of natural laws is a highly controverted issue in the philosophy of science. Yet he continues his appeal—none the wiser.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/l/lawofnat.htm

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/laws-of-nature/

Figurative or phenomenal?

“In an earlier post I described the Hebrew Universe. The so-called Bible believing Christians have argued that this is merely the language of appearances, that is, it’s merely figurative language, just like heaven is described as a city in Revelation 21-22, but neither of which are to be taken literally by educated Christians today. [Although, many Christians still believe heaven is exactly as described in Revelation, as is hell.] Are they correct?”

http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2006/07/does-god-look-like-this.html

Loftus manages to pack an exceptional number of conceptual confusions into the space of a single sentence:

1.If you go back and read what we actually wrote, Jason and I did not appeal to phenomenal language when dealing with the triple-decker universe.

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/07/cultic-imagery.html

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/07/firmament.html

2.Phenomenal and figurative are not synonymous (see below).

3.What John experienced were a series of visions. By definition, visions consist of appearances.

There’s also a distinction between objective and subjective visionary appearances. Which is in view is context-dependent.

John literally had visions of heaven. Whether his visions were literally descriptive of heaven is a separate question.

“The question for me is this one: How do Christians know that the Hebrews didn’t take these verses literally? With what we read in the Bible, the burden of proof is squarely on them.”

The burden is squarely on us only if we were as muddle-headed as Loftus, which would be a difficult feat to duplicate.

“What did early Christians think about heaven (remember, Jesus supposedly bodily ascended to sit at the right hand of God on a throne and to rule in a heavenly city, with mansions [John 14:1-4])? We must step back in time before the rise of modern astronomy to see the universe as they did. That’s all. Modern Christians try to avoid the conclusions of the literal Biblical statements because they read the Bible after the rise of science. It’s that simple, and it’s bad exegesis. Jesus could only have bodily ascended into heaven if heaven is in the sky, as the ancients believed.”

Loftus continues to trade in his conceptual confusions:

1.The description of the Ascension is, indeed, phenomenal. It is both phenomenal and literal.

It’s related in observational language because it’s an eyewitness account. This is what the observer actually saw. Being a ground-based observer rather than a Martian, he took the earth as his frame of reference.

Thit’s exactly the perspective you’d expect if he were describing a real, spatiotemporal event which he had seen.

His viewpoint has nothing to do with pre-Copernican astronomy. If we were to witness the Ascension today, that’s exactly how we would see it.

This is a literal description of what the observer saw.

2.In addition, Acts 1 doesn’t say that Jesus ascended straight to heaven. Rather, it says that Jesus levitated to a certain altitude, and was then enveloped by a cloud (1:9). As commentators like Bruce and Fitzmyer point out, this likely has reference to the Shekinah.

Here the controlling paradigm isn’t ancient astronomy, but OT theophany.

“The gods of surrounding cultures had human and physical characteristics. There is no reason to suppose the Hebrews thought differently about their God from what we read in the OT. The burden of proof is upon the conservative Christian to show why they don’t think of God in a human form. Mormons today take these statements literally and believe God has the shape of a human being, so if modern people like Mormons think this way, then it’s even more likely that ancient Hebrews did.”

This disregards the aniconic character of Hebrew piety, which was, in turn, predicated on the essential invisibility of God.

God could manifest himself in a theophany, but was otherwise invisible and intangible.

“What are some of the implications of these things? 1) The Bible reflects ancient views of God, the universe, and heaven/hell, which slowly evolved into the views Christians have today. 2) The Bible is misinterpreted by conservative Christians today because they do not understand the Bible as it was originally understood. 3) The Bible has nothing to say about how God created the universe (if he exists), and it makes no claim about creation that we should believe today merely because the Bible states it, since it's based upon ancient myths. 4) Christians cannot take every statement in the Bible about God, the universe, heaven/hell as the truth, if properly understood in its context, since those conceptions evolved inside the Bible itself. There are other implications.”

The only implication of Loftus’ analysis is that he doesn’t pay attention to the actual wording of Scripture or its OT allusions.

Epiphenomena

***QUOTE***

Daniel Morgan said:

Certainly, the brain and mind are one and the same in my worldview. One does not exist without the other. However, supervenience and epiphenomena and many other ideas do not make my stance necessarily reductionist (to show thought A = molecule B doing C). Think of fire for a moment. Knowing all that there is to know about hydrocarbons, and knowing all that there is to know about oxygen, we still cannot experience combustion except through the perception of fire as a visual and thermal phenomenon. Experiencing the heat on your face is quite different than calculating the energy of C=O and O-H bond formation against the energy of C-H and O=O bond formation. Being inside our own minds, we are experiencing, I am sure, nothing but biochemical interactions, not qualitatively different than combustion. However, we perceive these biochemical phenoemna first-hand, since they constitute our brains, and we're not viewing them objectively (as with fMRI or CT scans) -- we're feeling the heat and seeing the light of these phenomena.

I'm just trying to point out here that I don't necessarily disagree with the comment on watching neurons fire and correlating it to mental activity.

Doing that (observation) is like doing the calculation for the enthalpy of combustion (the heat that will be given off). The reality of fire, however, can include a completely different perception, to which you would be completely ignorant of, and without the ability to describe, unless you are close enough to the phenomenon to experience it firsthand -- heat and light.

***END-QUOTE***

Weasel words like supervenience and epiphenomena bake no bread.

You can say that a set of properties at a higher plane of organization are not equipollent with a set of properties at a lower level of organization. There is more to a Bach fugue than the diatonic scale.

But if you’re a physicalist, then you still have to treat thought, consciousness, qualia, and the like as something physical in itself, and not merely the byproduct of a physical process.

Thus, the effect, and not merely the underlying cause, needs to be detectable by physical means and subject to physical analysis, viz. what is the chemical position of thought?

***QUOTE***

I don't think that, because of the fundamental disconnect between experience/perception and objective observation, we can ever run wires to your brain and put up on a screen what you're seeing, or "feel what you're feeling". Possibly we never will be able to. Part of mental processes, I agree, is in the subjective experience/perception and cannot be observed. But, does this cause me to invoke some unknown, immaterial substance? Why would it?

***END-QUOTE***

Several problems:

i) Scientifically speaking, you don’t know what you can’t show. Even if physicalism were true, if it cannot be known to be true because it cannot be shown to be true, then it’s just an unverifiable hypothesis. The fundamental disconnect renders physicalism unprovable.

ii) The aim of science is to explain every phenomenon according to a public, third-person description.

Due to the privacy of mental events, this cannot be done—which is why some physicalists deny mental states altogether.

iii) There is also the fundamental issue of our starting-point. Mine is Cartesian, yours is not.

You operate with a presumptive materialism. I regard this as a flawed methodology.

From an epistemic standpoint, the external world is a secondary phenomenon, for we experience the external world via the mind. Therefore, the mind enjoys epistemic primacy.

We enjoy an immediate experience of our own mental states, and only a mediated experience of material states.

No physical experiment can overturn the primacy of the mind because any physical experiment will, itself, be a mediate object of knowledge, filtered through the mind.
iv) In our experience, mental properties differ from material properties. A thought of blue is not a blue thought.

Thoughts lack primary qualities, viz. size, shape, solidity.

This is a direct deliverance of consciousness. A primitive datum.

And since this is an immediate, self-presenting state, there can be no hiatus between appearance and reality. We don’t appear to feel pain. We either feel pain or we don’t.

v) Now, a physicalist will say that this subjective impression is illusory. That, in fact, this impression is explainable by a physical process.

He can say that, but he can never show that. There is no presumption in favor of physicalism. To the contrary, the presumption is always in favor of mind over matter.

And this is more than a prima facie presumption. We begin with the mind because that’s the only place we can ever begin. And the incorporeal character of the mind is given in the very act of consciousness.

vi) We are not invoking an unknown substance. To the contrary, we are invoking something we know much better than any material substance.

***QUOTE***

The ability to describe experience and perception using Na/K potentials across your neurons in terms of intensity and frequency is real. In other words, intense pain correlates to higher frequency neural processes as well as a greater concentration of ions released at synapses. I can thus "see" your pain, but seeing it and feeling it are two completely different things. I can make a graph of the flux of ions across your neurons and show the valleys and troughs correlating to your experience of pain. I cannot show your pain itself on a screen for others to view. Your pain is indeed "reducible" to Na/K potentials, but can I say that I can "describe" the experience/perception of pain unless I have felt it? No.

***END-QUOTE***

A dualist isn’t going to deny that pain has a physical aspect. If I stick a needle in your arm, the pain will travel to the brain via a nerve impulse.

Obviously the pain has a physical source of origin (the pin prick) and well as physical mode of transmission. So the fact that to some extent we can map that process is hardly at odds with dualism.

***QUOTE***

How can creatures who experience mental processes first hand, and are even using them in trying to observe others', ever hope to have some sort of understanding of their own experience from an objective standpoint? They can't. So?

***END-QUOTE***

Except that science is all about achieving an objective (public, third-person) description of reality. And a materialist will generally regard the scientific method as the royal road to knowledge. Empirical science is the source and standard of knowledge.

***QUOTE***

How is skeptically and tentatively accepting the rationality of any particular conclusion undercut by the origin of the brain? This is what we've yet to clarify. I pointed out in the beginning that I was willing to lay aside the question of soul/spirit and consider only whether or not human brains are the product of evolution (with or without divine guidance) or a special act of creation, which I dubbed "poof", but you cannot dispute the accuracy of the description. Something which doesn't exist, suddenly does = poof.

***END-QUOTE***

It’s precisely the accuracy of the description that I can dispute. For one thing, it leaves the agent out of view (God). It also confuses the origin of the world (creation ex nihilo) with the origin of the soul (creationism or traducianism).

You have a bad habit of repeating the same mistakes after the error has been called to your attention. I’ve corrected you on this, but you respond like a continuous loop-tape.

***QUOTE***

What evolution depends upon is, by the naturalistic framework, the laws of physics. Even the most "chance" of processes are not what we would call "unbounded". That is, the energy distribution of a bunch of particles at a given temperature (ie with a particular average kinetic energy) can be represented with a Gaussian distribution. Why do I mention this? Well, even the most indeterminable outcomes of physical states still obey the laws of physics (in the naturalistic worldview). Therefore, when we speak of a brain being created by naturalistic processes, and humans inheriting a "monkey mind", I still have yet to see why this necessarily entails irrationality. The "monkey mind" itself must obey the laws of physics, in a naturalist's worldview, and no known natural processes can be considered completely beyond understanding or description (even if the states fall under a distribution of probabilistic outcomes, as with quantum mechanics).

The laws of physics themselves are hardly "irrational", even if indeterminable due to the number of variables involved. When considering all natural processes, chance/random or no, "any" outcome is not possible, just "many". This provides us with a sort of foundation to counter some sort of presumed connection between irrationality and natural processes.

***END-QUOTE***

You’re committing several category mistakes:

i) While the laws of nature are not irrational, they are irrationable. They may not be unreasonable, but they are unreasoning.

ii) There is, in addition, a big difference between the significance of natural law in a Christian worldview and a secular worldview.

In a Christian worldview, there is a mind behind the mindless laws of nature; but in a secular worldview, there is no mind behind the mindless laws of nature.

So secularism upholds the primacy of matter over mind. Matter is primary, mind is secondary.

iii) Moreover, determinism and rationality are two different things. For example, you can have a deterministic randomizing program, such as a computerized slot machine.

So even if we were to subscribe to a hidden variables version of quantum mechanics, which left the laws of nature deterministic from top to bottom, that would not underwrite the rationality of our cognitive faculties.

iv) Furthermore, natural laws are not truth-conducive. Natural laws are impersonal. They do not select for true beliefs.

Why Don't We Have Earlier References To Jesus In The Historical Record?

I recently heard Gary Habermas, in response to a question somebody asked him, comment about the contrast between online skeptics and mainstream scholarship. He commented that while the concept that Christianity was largely derived from ancient pagan mythology is commonly accepted in online skeptical circles, it's far less popular in mainstream scholarship. The same can be said of many other arguments popular among online skeptics. We're often told that Jesus probably didn't exist or that it's a major problem for Christianity that no sources refer to Jesus during His lifetime, for example. Yet, mainstream scholarship doesn't doubt Jesus' existence, and mainstream scholarship recognizes that the absence of earlier references to Jesus isn't of much significance.

Last night, Christopher Price posted an article about the common skeptical claim that the absence of earlier references to Jesus is a major problem for Christianity. I recommend reading the article. He gives many examples of other historical figures who aren't mentioned by any sources until decades after their death. Those historical figures include people who were contemporaries of Jesus and the apostles.

The evidence we have for Jesus is good. It's significantly better than what we have for many other significant figures of ancient history. Gary Habermas and Michael Licona comment:

"New Testament scholar Craig Blomberg, who served as an editor for and contributor to a large scholarly work on the Gospels, provides four reasons why more was not written on Jesus in his time: 'the humble beginnings of Christianity, the remote location of Palestine on the eastern frontiers of the Roman empire, the small percentage of the works of ancient Graeco-Roman historians which have survived, and the lack of attention paid by those which are extant to Jewish figures in general.'...What we have concerning Jesus actually is impressive....let's take a look at Julius Caesar, one of Rome's most prominent figures....Only five sources report his military conquests....If Julius Caesar really made a profound impact on Roman society, why didn't more writers of antiquity mention his great military accomplishments? No one questions whether Julius did make a tremendous impact on the Roman Empire....Tiberius Caesar was the Roman emperor at the time of Jesus' ministry and execution. Tiberius is mentioned by ten sources within 150 years of his death: Tacitus, Suetonius, Velleius Paterculus, Plutarch, Pliny the Elder, Strabo, Seneca, Valerius Maximus, Josephus, and Luke. Compare that to Jesus' forty-two total sources in the same length of time. That's more than four times the number of total sources who mention the Roman emperor during roughly the same period. If we only considered the number of secular non-Christian sources who mention Jesus and Tiberius within 150 years of their lives, we arrive at a tie of nine each." (The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Kregel Publications, 2004], pp. 127-128)

There are many possible motives for a source to not mention a particular historical figure, even if he was aware of that figure's existence and his significance. A Roman historian might have a low view of the importance of Jewish history, a contemporary of Jesus may refrain from discussing Him because he's unsure of what to make of Jesus, etc. Craig Keener writes:

"Without immediate political repercussions, it is not surprising that the earliest Jesus movement does not spring quickly into the purview of Rome’s historians; even Herod the Great finds little space in Dio Cassius (49.22.6; 54.9.3). Josephus happily compares Herodotus’s neglect of Judea (Apion 1.60-65) with his neglect of Rome (Apion 1.66)." (A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew [Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999], p. 64, n. 205)

One example Christopher Price cites in his article is John the Baptist, who isn't mentioned by anybody until after his death. John the Baptist is also significant in another context that skeptics often mention. If it was as common and as easy as skeptics sometimes suggest it was for ancient people to fabricate miracle accounts for their religious leaders, then why don't we see it with John the Baptist? Ethelbert Stauffer noted:

"This evidence in the sources [for Jesus' miracles] cannot be discounted psychologically on the ground that in those days all stories of miracles were credulously accepted and uncritically spread about. For the Jews of antiquity were extremely realistic in regard to miracles, and at least the opponents of Jesus among them were highly critical. Had that not been so, the miracles of Jesus would not have been so vehemently discussed and so gravely misinterpreted. Neither can we dismiss the matter of Jesus’ miracles by contending that in those days miracles were ascribed to every prominent historical or religious personality. For that was not the case. The men of the New Testament considered John the Baptist, for example, as the greatest human being before Christ, and yet he was not regarded as a miracle-worker. Josephus, too, attributes no miracles to the Baptist. The Mandaeans hail the Baptist as a mythological savior and attack Jesus as his satanic adversary. But they, too, say a great deal about the (demon-inspired) miracles of Jesus, and not a word about any miracle wrought by John the Baptist. Islam has high regard for Jesus, still higher for Mohammed. But although many miracles are attributed to Jesus, none are ascribed to Mohammed….Jesus’ miracle-working is historically unassailable" (Jesus and His Story [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960], pp. 10-11)

Much of what skeptics claim about Jesus can be seen to be absurd if we apply the same standards to other historical figures. Part of the problem with online skeptics is that they're not only ignorant of early Christianity, but also are ignorant of ancient history and the standards of historical research in general.

Evolutionary epistemology

“And poor little Steve should note that I laid aside the question of soul/spirit (and thus whether or not God was involved) to make this simpler. The point is -- what part of "poof" is more reason-conferring than descent with modification (if telic)?”

i) Baby-talk questions (“poof”) don’t call for grown-up answers. If and when you’re prepared to pose an adult question, I’ll be happy to provide and answer.

As it stands, your question is meaningless.

ii) And your exercise in simplification leaves out the key ingredient to an answer.

“The origin of our mind is not the same thing as a philosophy of mind.”

Which misses the point. If a philosophy of mind includes a theory of origins (evolutionary epistemology), then the question is whether that theory is self-defeating.

“Fine. So now, it is time to present a ‘philosophy of mind’ which undermines rationality as an example, rather than simply leaving an open and presumed connection between evolution and some reason-nullifying philosophy of mind that necessarily follows.”

i) It isn’t essential to draw a necessary connection. A probable connection will do.

ii) Plantinga, for one, has already laid out such an argument.

iii) I also discuss the connection below.

“But if Darwin's mind, and all of ours, are rendered by their creative process irrational, then it does prove that every ‘conviction’ / theory we have developed with our minds are indeed irrational as well. No product of a completely irrational mind can be rational, can it? You seem to be looking into the barrel of the gun when you consider the converse.”

What position are you referring to—yours or mine? On my position, the human mind was designed by an intelligent Creator, while on yours it was the adventitous byproduct of a blind watchmaker.

“Is it? The trainability of dogs and other mammals is quite reliable. Their minds are the result of solely natural processes (versus a soul, or spirit, right?). If their minds perform reliably, how is that a red herring to insist that evolution need not produce unreliable minds?”

i) Once again, what position does your statement stand in contrast to? How are you defining a “solely natural process”? Are you defining that naturalistically as both a purely materialistic as well as undirected process?

If so, Christians do not regard animal behavior as the result of a solely natural process.

ii) Another problem is with your starting point. You assume that organisms are bits of organized matter, and so you further assume a reductive explanation of their behavior consistent with physicalism.

I, on the other hand, would begin with their behavior, and then leave myself ontologically open to whatever metaphysical machinery is necessary to account for their behavior.

I would not rule out animal souls or remote signaling or whatever cause is required to yield the effect.

“How can a process which solely confers selective advantage for survival be considered ‘unreliable’? The mechanism of random mutation isn't ‘reliable’ in the sense that ‘you never know what you'll get’, but natural selection certainly is -- you'll always get populations of organisms which confer survival-advantageous traits to their offspring.”

i) Reliable in what respect? Reliable as survivable or reliable as rational? These are two very different things.

ii) In addition, from a Christian standpoint an animal is adaptable because it was designed to be adaptable.

“You're taking this a bit far. The ‘convictions’ in the quote only refer to a degree of reliability in their perceptions. I admitted ‘degree’ when I said skepticism is warranted.”

Reliable perception and reliable conception are two different things. A robot may be designed with a reliable pattern-recognition program. So it has a reliable perceptual mechanism. But it doesn’t think. The issue is rationality. The ability to conceive, not to perceive. Do our human concepts correspond to reality? Bare sensation has no truth-value.

“Part of how this ties into survival is in whether or not our sense perception, and how our minds interpret our senses, function in a ‘trustworthy’ manner or not. We develop convictions from these most basic of mental functions. Survival certainly depends upon them. So it really isn't a question of whether or not we can trust our minds...but ‘how far?’"

For a monist, you are very free with the word “mind.” From your perspective, what is the mind of a cockroach? Does the “mind” of a cockroach “interpret” sensory input?

“I didn't say that survival depends on intelligence in all organisms, but certainly in those which have little or no natural defense capability, and whose offspring are extremely fragile, and who only reproduce at about 1/1000th the rate of cockroaches, must develop some offsetting survival mechanisms. Ours were tool-making and socialization, just like the other apes.”

And how did the naturally defenseless naked ape survive for hundreds of thousands of years before its brain evolved to the point where it could design weaponry?

“The rest of this is bunk. I simply meant that we know the brain, and we know that [in this universe] without a brain, there is no mind. Even you don't disagree with that as a dualist. “

Actually, I, as a Cartesian dualist would, indeed, disagree with this. The mind is not brain-dependent.

“We can point to neurons and watch them fire off and correlate that to mental activity. I'm not saying that this is ‘all there is to mind’. I made it clear that I was trying to ignore the question of the existence of the soul/spirit, and focus on the process by which mind exists -- whether by divine fiat / poof, or by evolutionary processes. You have expended a lot of energy in ignoring this.”

i) You’re trying to drive the car after removing the engine.

ii) There is no detailed correlation between the firing of neurons and mental activity. That is, at most, only a temporal correlation. It may tell you when a person is thinking, but it doesn’t tell you what he is thinking—or even how he is thinking.

You cannot reconstruct what a person is thinking from a brain scan. You can get inside his brain, but you can’t get inside his mind. You can see his brain in action, but you can’t see what he is seeing as he sees it. You can see if he is dreaming, but you can’t see the dream.

What you need, Danny, is to show—not to say, but to show—how mental properties are reducible to material properties.

You also need to capture the interiority of the experience—the conceptual or imaginative content of the mental state.

“Poor Steve. He's like a man who thinks he's lost his glasses, but has them on top of his head. It need not rule out a Creator to conclude that apes are our ancestors.”

Since neither you nor I subscribe to theistic evolution, this is a stalling tactic.

“Poor little Steve only sees things his way -- God ‘poofed’ or God is not. Minds are ‘only matter’ and evolved, or minds are ‘poofed’ and divinely created in an instant. “

Poor little Danny doesn’t know his way around traditional Christian theology.

Instantaneous primary causality has reference to creation ex nihilo. The creation of the world.

It doesn’t have reference to secondary causality, such as the propagation of the species. In that regard one can either be a creationist or a traducian. I incline to the latter.

“The creation myth may be leveled, but you must never take your eyes off of the big picture, Steve -- your God is not a creation myth...right?”

Since you’ve done nothing to level the creation “myth,” your contention is a nonstarter.