Monism

Daniel Morgan said:

“That was all I was wondering -- is if phil of mind contains within itself arguments convincing enough for you to admit that some persons will be moved towards materialism by those arguments, or if you think that pre-committed materialists develop arguments within the phil of mind to try to keep their worldview consistent.”

I don’t think that philosophy of mind per se moves people to materialism. Rather, it depends on what lines of evidence weigh more heavily with some people.

“Surely you agree that atheism doesn't necessitate monism?”

An atheist can be a materialist, dualist, or idealist. However, materialism is the default position for atheism in the west. Even a secular dualist would rather be a materialist.

Danny’s next series of remarks are directed at Manata, but they are of a piece with what he and I have already talked about. Indeed, he’ll later redirect this question to me.

“The laws of physics are non-rational? That's a new one to me. I've often heard theists argue that the rationality of the natural universe is evidence for God, ie the fine-tuning arguments, which depend upon the uniformity of nature (picking a specific range of cosmological constants, if they don't remain CONSTANT, is a bit idiotic, eh?).”

i) I already drew a distinction between irrational and irrationable, or unreasonable and unreasoning.

As usual, my distinction sailed right over his head, so we’re back to square one. With Danny we so often end up exactly where we began—like sailing a rubber-ducky in a bathtub.

To speak of natural laws as literally rational would be guilty of personifying the laws of nature, unless Danny is an animist!

ii) Danny also trades on an equivocation. The fine-tuning argument is not dependent on the proposition that the laws of nature are literally rational, but rather, that the laws of nature imply a rational creator. A watch is not rational, but it does imply a watchmaker who is.

“Apparently you don't think this is a valid argument? Swinburne and Craig, in their reliance upon God setting up this universe to run rationally upon laws in order to make us [humans], need you as their bodyguard.”

i) I think the fine-tuning argument is basically sound. However, I wouldn’t cast it in terms of natural law, but a providential order of second causes.

ii) Notice that Danny continues to operate with a particular version of natural law although he never bestirs himself to defend that version.

“ I am a monist due to simplicity and lack of studying the necessities of dualism. Basically, you have to start somewhere.”

This may be true in Danny’s case. However, many unbelievers subscribe to materialism because materialism, if true, would automatically knock Christian theology out of the running. If matter is all there is, then there is no God, or devil, or angels, or discarnate souls.

“You presuppose a soul/spirit…”

i) Presuppositional apologetics operates at a higher level of generality. It concerns itself with the global truth-conditions of rationality, not with specific theses like dualism.

ii) It’s possible to be a Christian materialist in one’s anthropology, viz. Lynne Baker, Kevin Corcoran, Peter van Inwagen, Donald MacKay, and Nancey Murphy.

A Christian materialist anchors the afterlife in the resurrection of the just rather than the immortality of the soul.

That’s not my own position, but to suppose that a Christian is fanatically attached to dualism because the Christian faith raises and false on this model of dualism betrays an ignorance of philosophical theology.

“So of course you're never going to listen to the arguments about the logical impossibility of immaterial substances interacting with material ones.”

i) Since this is the stock objection to dualism, it’s not as if a dualist was without a stock reply. I myself have been over this ground several times with Danny as well as Loftus and Exbeliever.

I also quoted a philosophy who made short-work of this objection:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/05/cartesian-dualism.html

Danny, this is how the game is played:

a) You raise an objection.

b) I acknowledge your objection and offer a reply.

c) The next move is yours. You are supposed to acknowledge my reply, and then tell me if my reply is responsive to your objection. If so, you should withdraw your objection. If not, you should explain where the flaw lies in my reply.

Why is it that you so often drop the ball in this regard?

ii) Even if dualistic interactionism were impossible, it would not be “logically” impossible.

“I would say that starting out with materialism is just philosophically simpler than starting out as a dualist…”

As I’ve already pointed out, there is frequently a trade off between a simpler ontology and a simpler theory. This has been discussed elsewhere as well. Cf.:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/

Danny has a habit of making sweeping claims without having acquainted himself with the relevant literature.

Of course, ignorance facilitates the ease with which one can make sweeping claims.

“Esp so long as one allows the weight of evidence to determine whether or not dualism becomes more logical (as a first principle).”

This assumes that the evidence points in a uniform or preponderant direction, as if there were no evidence for dualism.

“One good reason for this is the obvious fact of existence and necessity of one substance.”

How is the obvious fact of existence a good reason for materialism?

And wherein lies the necessity of one substance?

“From there, additional substances ought to have supporting arguments.”

This is, of course, a question-begging way of framing the issue.