"Faith is believing what you know ain't so"

There are theists who define faith as "pretending to know things you don't know" and "belief without evidence". They contend that this is how Christians understand faith. Sometimes they appeal to dictionaries. Sometimes they appeal to what lay Christians tell them.

1. Randomly polling lay Christians on the definition of faith proves nothing. That's the wrong sample-group. When defining Christian terms and categories, it's necessary to consult representatives with the relevant qualifications (e.g. theologians, Christian philosophers). 

2. Wikipedia is a hack source.

3. Dictionaries aren't defining Christian faith, but just a generic notion of faith. So that's irrelevant and misleading. The real question at issue isn't the meaning of "faith," simpliciter, but Christian faith in particular. 

4. Apropos (3), atheists commit an amateurish semantic fallacy by failing to distinguish between the meaning of words and the meaning of concepts. The question at issue is what the idea of faith means in Christian theology, not the dictionary definition of a word. Concepts are more complex than the meaning of individual words. 

5. I don't deny that you can quote some Christian philosophers, apologists, and theologians who make fideistic statements. The fact is that there's no single concept of faith in Christian tradition. There's no one model of the relationship between faith and reason in Christian tradition. For instance, Paul Helm delineates three different concepts of faith:

One prominent view of faith is that it is an evidential gap-bridger or makeweight. On this account, there is some evidence for the truth of what is believed…so faith makes up for any evidential deficiency. 

A second view of faith is that the certainty of faith is proportional to the evidence for the belief which is a component part of faith. 

A third conception of faith…as it is sometimes expressed, faith is inherently and necessarily risky. Paul Helm, Faith & Understanding (Eerdmans, 1997), 12-14.

In addition,

There is, to begin with, the distinction between evidence-sensitive and evidence-insensitive views of faith. In much of the mainstream tradition we are concerned with, personal faith involves belief, and for faith to be reasonable it must be well-grounded. So faith is sensitive to evidence, and to the status of that evidence. If evidence is called into question, then faith will, other things being equal, be weakened, unless a rebuttal can be found. P. Helm, ed. Faith & Reason (Oxford, 1999), 8.

In a recent debate, Timothy McGrew defined faith as "venturing on something you care about where the outcome is outside you're direct control".

6. I'm going to begin by quoting some representative Christian philosophers and theologians. My immediate objective is to provide documentation that belies the village atheist definition of faith, or the relation between faith and reason. I will then circle back and comment on their views.

Faith is not "belief in the absence of evidence"; rather, it is a trust which rests on sufficient evidence (John Frame, Five Views on Apologetics).

We should make some distinction between (1) the objective data given us in the created world and (2) our use of these data to construct arguments for the truth of Christianity…I prefer to use the term 'evidence' to refer to (1) and 'argument' for (2). In this sense, evidence is required for all human knowledge; argument is not (John Frame, Five Views on Apologetics).

For me, it is more congenial to my own judgment to attempt to prove Christianity in the same informal way in which I can prove for certain that I have been born into this world, and that I shall die out of it (John Henry Newman, Grammar of Assent). 

Faith is, in all its exercises alike, a form of conviction, and is, therefore, necessarily grounded in evidence (Selected Shorter Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield II).

The difference between faith and knowledge is not that knowledge rests on evidence and faith does not…The difference is only that they rest on different kinds of evidence–knowledge on "sight" and faith on "testimony" (Selected Shorter Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield II). 

Let reason be kept to: and if any part of the Scripture account of the redemption of the world by Christ can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up (Joseph Butler, Analogy of Religion).

There are some doctrines revealed in the Scripture, and those of the most importance that are so revealed, which concern and contain things so above our reason that, without some previous supernatural disposition of mind, they carry in them no evidence of truth unto mere reason, nor of suitableness unto our constitution and end. There is required unto such an apprehension both the spiritual elevation of the mind by supernatural illumination, and a divine assent unto the authority of the revelation thereon, before reason can be so much as satisfied in the truth and excellency of such doctrines. Such are those concerning the holy Trinity, or the subsistence of one singular essence in three distinct persons, the incarnation of the Son of God, the resurrection of the dead, and sundry others, that are the most proper subjects of divine revelation. There is a heavenly glory in some of these things, which as reason can never thoroughly apprehend, because it is finite and limited...

The foundation of the whole, as of all the actings of our souls, is in the inbred principles of natural light, or first necessary dictates of our intellectual, rational nature. This, so far as it extends, is a rule unto our apprehension in all that follows. Wherefore, if any pretend, in the exercise of reason, to conclude unto any thing concerning the nature, being, or will of God, that is directly contradictory unto those principles and dictates, it is no divine revelation unto our reason, but a paralogism from the defect of reason in its exercise. This is that which the apostle chargeth on and vehemently urgeth against the heathen philosophers. Inbred notions they had in themselves of the being and eternal power of God; and these were so manifest in them thereby that they could not but own them. Hereon they set their rational, discursive faculty at work in the consideration of God and his being; but herein were they so vain and foolish as to draw conclusions directly contrary unto the first principles of natural light, and the unavoidable notions which they had of the eternal being of God, Rom 1:21-25. And many, upon their pretended rational consideration of the promiscuous event of things in the world, have foolishly concluded that all things had a fortuitous beginning, and have fortuitous events, or such as, from a concatenation of antecedent causes, are fatally necessary, and are not disposed by an infinitely wise, unerring, holy providence. And this also is directly contradictory unto the first principles and notions of natural light; whereby it openly proclaims itself not to be an effect of reason in its due exercise, but a mere delusion. 

So if any pretend unto revelations by faith which are contradictory unto the first principles of natural light or reason, in its proper exercise about its proper objects, it is a delusion. On this ground the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation is justly rejected; for it proposeth that as a revelation by faith which is expressly contradictory unto our sense and reason, in their proper exercise about their proper objects. And a supposition of the possibility of any such thing would make the ways whereby God reveals and makes known himself to cross and interfere one with another; which would leave us no certainty in any thing, divine or human (John Owen, The Reason of Faith). 

I find every sect, as far as reason will help them, make use of it gladly: and where it fails them, they cry out, It is matter of faith, and above reason. And I do not see how they can argue with anyone, or ever convince a gainsayer who makes use of the same plea, without setting down strict boundaries between faith and reason; which ought to be the first point established in all questions where faith has anything to do.

Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to faith, I take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz. by sensation or reflection.

Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men, we call revelation.

For whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always be certainer to us than those which are conveyed to us by traditional revelation. 

The like holds in matter of fact knowable by our senses; v.g. the history of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings which had their original from revelation: and yet nobody, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood as Noah, that saw it; or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive and seen it. For he has no greater an assurance than that of his senses, that it is writ in the book supposed writ by Moses inspired: but he has not so great an assurance that Moses wrote that book as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the assurance of its being a revelation is less still than the assurance of his senses.

We can never assent to a proposition that affirms the same body to be in two distant places at once, however it should pretend to the authority of a divine revelation: since the evidence, first, that we deceive not ourselves, in ascribing it to God...And therefore no proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge. Because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever: and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident; and what we certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In propositions therefore contrary to the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith. They cannot move our assent under that or any other title whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of anything that contradicts our knowledge. 

But to all those who pretend not to immediate revelation, but are required to pay obedience, and to receive the truths revealed to others, which, by the tradition of writings, or word of mouth, are conveyed down to them, reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive them...Without such a revelation, the believing, or not believing, that proposition, or book, to be of divine authority, can never be matter of faith, but matter of reason; and such as I must come to an assent to only by the use of my reason, which can never require or enable me to believe that which is contrary to itself: it being impossible for reason ever to procure any assent to that which to itself appears unreasonable (John Locke, "Of Faith and Reason, and their Distinct Provinces," An Essay Concerning Human Understanding).

 If you take faith to be only what rests on rational grounds for belief, and separate it from the inward grace which immediately endows the mind with faith, everything you say, sir, is beyond dispute. For it must be acknowledge that many judgments are more evident than the ones which depend on these rational grounds. Some people have advanced further towards the latter than others have; and indeed, plenty of people, far from having weighed up such reasons, have never known them and consequently do not even have what could count as grounds for probability. But the inward grace of the Holy Spirit makes up for this immediately and supernaturally, and it is this that creates what theologians strictly call "divine faith". God, it is true, never bestows this faith unless what he is making one believe in grounded in reason–otherwise he would subvert our capacity to recognize truth, and open the door to enthusiasm–but it is not necessary that all who possess this divine faith should know those reasons, and still less that they should have them perpetually before their eyes. Otherwise none of the unsophisticated or of the feeble-minded–now at least–would have the true faith, and the most enlightened people might not have it when they most needed it, since no one can always remember his reasons for believing. G. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding (Cambridge, 2nd ed., 1996), 498.

7. One thing all these positions share in common is that none of them defines faith as "pretending to know things you don't know" or "belief without evidence".

8. I like Frame's definitions and distinctions. To say faith rests on evidence can be misleading if that's taken to mean you must be able to present the evidence for your faith. Now, it's important that some Christians be able to make a case. However, someone can have good evidence for their beliefs even when they can't produce the evidence. When they don't have the evidence at our mental fingertips. Or when they lack the philosophical sophistication to marshall the evidence into a logical syllogism. 

9. For Newman, the way to prove Christianity isn't categorically different from proving anything else. By that logic, he doesn't dichotomize faith and reason or faith and knowledge. 

10. I generally like Warfield's two statements. However, I disagree with his terminology. He seems to suggest that belief based on firsthand experience amounts to knowledge whereas belief based on testimony evidence amounts to faith. But are the only things we know things we personally experience? Does belief based on secondhand information never rise to the level of knowledge? That strikes me as a pretty artificial definition of knowledge. 

Perhaps he'd say belief based on testimonial evidence is fallible. If so, belief based on firsthand experience is often fallible. Memory is fallible. Sensory perception is fallible. Direct observation is subject to fallible interpretation. It would be preferable to say these are different sources of knowledge, rather than to say one is knowledge while the other is something less than knowledge. 

11. Butler's statement has some merit when applied to various revelatory claimants, viz. Muhammad, Swedenborg, Joseph Smith, Sun Myung Moon. 

However, a potential problem with Butler's statement is the assumption that unaided reason is self-sufficient. But can reason be justified apart from revelation? For instance, does the reliability of reason depend on the quality of the source? 

Likewise, reason requires criteria. But where to the standards come from? 

We need to take a more holistic approach to the relationship between reason and revelation. They supplement each other. 

12. Owen's position is complex:

i) In reference to pagan fortuity, perhaps the idea is that some positions can be preemptively discounted because they lead to global skepticism. If everything is ultimately the byproduct of blind happenstance, then reason seems to be entirely untrustworthy. If that's his point, I agree.

ii) It's unclear how he draws a distinction between what's above reason and what's contrary to reason. If, to use his own examples, he considers the Trinity, Incarnation, and resurrection of the body to be merely mysterious, then a distinction is tenable. If, however, he considers these articles of faith to be paradoxical, then what's the discernible difference between apparent and actual contradiction in practice?

iii) One differential factor might be the quality of the evidence. If we have good evidence for the constituent elements comprising a paradox, then that proposition is merely above reason rather than contrary reason. The distinction lies, not in the nature of the proposition, but the evidence, or lack thereof. 

iv) He seems to be using his distinction as a shortcut to dismiss transubstantiation. But in what respect is transubstantiation contrary to reason rather than above reason? If true, transubstantiation requires a mass hallucination. Every communicant perceives things that aren't there while failing to perceive things that are there. A visual, tactile, gustatory, and olfactory hallucination. That, however, is not impossible–although it demands a good argument to warrant such a drastic claim.

In addition, transubstantiation makes the claim that "the body and blood, together with the soul and divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ, and therefore the whole Christ, is truly, really and substantially contained in the sacrament of the Holy Eucharist" (Trent).

That seems to be physically impossible. How can a human body be the size of a wafer? How can a body fit into a chalice? How is it possible to swallow whole? It's like saying something is bigger on the inside than the outside. That's physically impossible. 

That's different from a miracle. Although a miracle may be naturally impossible, even a miracle can't be physically impossible. A physical medium has built-in constraints. A miracle with sometimes bypass the medium, but if it utilizes the medium, then that imposes a limit on what is miraculously possible. 

Moreover, you can't miniaturize a human body below certain scales of magnitude. It won't be a human body anymore. What makes it a human body is, in part, an interactive relationship with its physical environment. It belongs to the same spatiotemporal system. 

Furthermore, deity is not a physical property. As such, deity is illocal. I'd say the same thing about the soul. 

13. Locke's position is similar to Owen's:

i) I believe Locke is shadowboxing with Roman Catholicism–as well as the "charismatics" of his day and age. 

ii) His contrast between personal observation and historical testimony is overdrawn. Sometimes secondhand information is more reliable than firsthand information. Suppose I'm an eyewitness to an accident. It's unlikely that I'd be mistaken about the occurrence of the accident. However, I can misremember details. I can misremember the date. I can misremember the weather. I can misinterpret the cause.

Multiple secondhand accounts might be more accurate. Might correct errors in my recollection and judgment. 

iii) Furthermore, some events are on a scale that surpass any one man's observation. He can only be in one place at a time. He can only see things from one angle. 

Take a complex event like the Civil War. That has multiple fronts. And that's spread out over time. If I'm a Civil War vet, I know a lot about a little. Suppose I was conscripted after the war began. Supposed I deserted before the war ended. My experience is just a chronological sample of the whole. Likewise, my experience is just a geographical sample of the whole. 

iv) Furthermore, Locke fails to take inspiration into account. 

v) In addition, tradition is not all of a piece. Some traditions are better attested than others. On the face of it, some traditions are legends. 

vi) Finally, our belief-structure is not all of a kind. Some beliefs are more fundamental than others. Some beliefs function as the standard of comparison in relation to other beliefs or candidates for belief. Counterevidence may force us to relinquish a belief, but that may not necessitate any adjustment in our fundamental belief-structure, because many beliefs were always provisional and dispensable. 

14. Surprisingly, Leibniz strikes a fine balance between implicit and explicit reason.