Freewill theists quote 1 Cor 10:13 as a prooftext for libertarian freedom (i.e. freedom to do otherwise). Cashing this out in PAP terms, there are possible worlds in which Christians resist said temptations and possible worlds in which Christians succumb to said temptations. And Christians have the metaphysical ability to access either alternative.
Moreover, in my experience, freewill theists say this refers, not to especially grievous sins, like apostasy or transgressions conducive to apostasy, but sinning in general.
Assuming that's an accurate exposition of their position, here's the rub:
According to Molinism, not all possible worlds are feasible worlds. Feasible worlds are a subset of possible worlds. God can only instantiate feasible worlds. And which possible worlds are feasible is beyond his control.
In that event, how can God make good on the universal promise to Christians in 1 Cor 10:13 to always provide an alternative to sinning? How can God ensure that for every temptation, a feasible world is always available where a Christian resists that particular temptation?
We're talking about all the daily temptations that every Christian past and future faces. There has to be a supply of feasible worlds to match that situation in each and every case, where the Christian does not give in to temptation.
Also, isn't this a general problem for the Molinist take on conditional and counterfactual statements in Scripture?
Perhaps a Molinist would stipulate that God got very lucky. But isn't that ad hoc?
When defending God's omnibenevolence, they say feasible worlds constrain what God is able to do.
When defending 1 Cor 10:13, are they allowed to make a U-turn?
Does the supply of feasible worlds expand or contract depending on the exigent needs of the Molinist theory at any given time?