This is a continuation of an earlier post. Michael Kruger reviewed Peter Enn's new book. He cross-posted his review at TGC. This attracted criticism from Adam Omelianchuk (among others). In this post I'll will do two things: I will comment on Omelianchuk's criticisms, and I will post replies to Omelianchuk by James Anderson and Paul Manata.
Adam Omelianchuk
With respect to Fritz, I think your conclusions are too strong. The sort of scenario you describe with Fritz is a moral tragedy: there can't be right action performed in that case (much like in Sophie's choice). There can be a "less bad" option as the outcomes are relevant provided that both options are bad, and that might be a mitigating factor in our assignment of blame, but I don't think it follows that what Fritz does is okay and that he can't at all be held responsible for doing something evil. His hands are dirty regardless.
He doesn't bother to explain why Fritz's action is morally wrong.
i) What would make it wrong? Is it wrong because it wrongs someone? If so, who would that be? It doesn't plausibly wrong Arnold because he's already hopelessly morally compromised.
If there's a wronged party, presumably that's the Jews.
ii) However, there will be an order to gas the Jews whether or not Fritz issues the order. If, however, Fritz issues the order, it's hard to see how he's wronging them, since Fritz is stalling for time in order to save them.
iii) Even if issuing the order carries the risk that it will be carried out before Fritz has time to implement his plan, the Jews would be gassed by someone else, so they have nothing to lose and everything to gain by that Fritz using the order to buy time. So, once again, it's unclear how they'd be the wronged party–even if the plan fails.
But if no one is wronged by the order, then what makes it wrong? Is it wrong in some other respect?
iv) If "there can't be right action performed in that case," then why is his action blameworthy at all? Especially since he didn't create that situation. Rather, he finds himself in that situation.
This is the same sort of objection that can plausibly be made to dropping the A-bomb on Japan. It probably prevented a worse outcome, but the deliberate targeting of civilians just can't be justified (as Anscombe famously argued).
To begin with, the argument depends on certain planks of Catholic moral theology. Just war theory concerning the immunity of noncombatants. But it's not as if that's an unquestionable given.
Much of this, though, isn't relevant to the topic at hand, because God is not constrained by these sorts of things.
It's relevant because it goes to the question of what's "intrinsically" wrong. Are these things wrong in principle?
James, I frame the issue in those terms, because using euphemisms to cover up the violence of the acts that are constitutive of such events lead us astray.
What about Adam using dysphemisms to poison the well? The question is whether his terminology ("genocide," "bludgeoning babies") is accurate or prejudicial. Does the Bible command "beheading" or "bludgeoning" babies? He resorts to that terminology because it's inflammatory, not because it's accurate.
We live in a world where people decapitate others for not sharing another's religious beliefs. You can watch them online.
Is his objection to the how they are executed or why they are executed?
Canaanite genocide (I used that term because even if herem warfare is what it really is, there is enough morally relevant overlap to call it as such).
So even though it's inaccurate, he will continue to use "genocide" due to "enough morally relevant overlap."
I agree that Christ affirmed the OT, but his affirming it tells me nothing about how to resolve this interpretive problem.
Why not?
I don't know what he thinks about these passages, because he didn't say;
That's evasive.
perhaps he wouldn't agree with my approach, but I doubt that he will condemn my effort to use the text for "training in righteousness" which is what Scripture was given to us for.
That's reminds me of some atheists who say, if there is a God, he won't condemn them for honest doubts.
James Anderson
That genocide is wrong is a "moral datum"? Well, I suppose filicide is just as much of a "moral datum," and yet... Genesis 22. Paging Dr. Kierkegaard!
If your moral theory conflicts with the plain statements of Scripture, which Christ endorsed in toto, then so much the worse for the moral theory. At least, that's how things seem to stand for those who claim to be followers of Christ.
All this to say, the debate here is more complex than will allow us to say that one side's position is simply a 'given'.
James Anderson
"a few Ancient Near Eastern conquest narratives" -- otherwise known as Scripture, as found in the phrase "which Scripture claims".
Perhaps you think Genesis 1 is Scripture but not, say, Genesis 22 and Deuteronomy 20. If so, I'm sure there are plenty who share your position -- but Jesus isn't one of them. It's beyond reasonable dispute that Jesus viewed the entire Torah as Scripture and as the word of God.
The same Jesus who taught us to love our enemies also taught us that some people made in the image of God would be cast into hell. How does that compare to being bludgeoned?
So yes, it's complex -- but pitting Scripture against Scripture and Christ against Christ is no way to resolve the issue.
James Anderson
Adam,
I'd say the more immediate problem is the fact that you're framing the issue in ethically and emotionally loaded terms ("genocide", "bludgeoning babies", "forfeit my soul" -- really?) which owe more to New Atheist polemics than to a sober and submissive consideration of the biblical texts.
I'm unclear on exactly where you think the moral problem arises with respect to the conquest of Canaan. Is it the general claim that God exercises judgment by taking the lives of sinners? Or the claim that God exercises judgment by taking the lives of infants in particular? Or the claim that God sometimes uses human agents to carry out such judgment? Or is the problem the particular means by which those human agents carry out God's judgment? (You think they're insufficiently humane, perhaps?) Where exactly do you think you have to hit the emergency stop button -- and why that point?
I can't help but note that you didn't address my remarks about Christ's view of Scripture. Do you agree that Christ affirmed the entire Old Testament as the word of God? Do you think he favored an allegorical interpretation of the historical narratives?
You follow Origin if you wish, but I think it better to follow Christ and the apostles.
One last point: depending on exactly how one defines 'genocide', it may or may not be "intrinsically wrong." I suggest that on those definitions where it is, the term doesn't properly apply to what God commanded in the Old Testament; and on those definitions that do apply, it's far from self-evident that it is "intrinsically wrong."
Paul
Hi Adam,
Two routes:
1. You claim genocide is intrinsically wrong, and that this is obvious. So obvious, in fact, as to not require a justification. You find solace with many others, like Enns, who take genocide's intrinsic wrongness as a moral datum. So the first route is: I'll grant this. Now, what? Surely you don't think the Bible errs because it reports that some group (Israel) engaged in genocide against another (e.g., Canaanites). Surely we agree that it would be foolish to deny the accuracy of document D if D reports that a genocide occurred. For then you'd apparently have to believe that documents describing what the Nazi's did to the Jews was myth! And I'm sure you don't want to be known as a holocaust denier. You already hold kooky enough beliefs, like libertarian free will! :)
More seriously. You deny the historicity of the account (in which I would include God's command to Israel) not because it reports a case of genocide, but because it would mean God commanded genocide. And that can't be. So the text seems to state something as the case which is not the case. But now notice the subtle shift that occurs. You (and Enns) gain a great deal of traction from this proposition:
GIW: Genocide is intrinsically wrong.
But, GIW is not what is needed to get to the conclusion that the Bible reports something as the case which is not the case. You need this:
GCG: God commanded genocide.
But how does that bear the weight you want it to? It seems you (and Enns) affirm a hidden premise, which is this:
TIWAC: If X is intrinsically wrong, then it's intrinsically wrong to command someone to do X. (transfer of intrinsic wrongness of acts to commands to do those acts)
But TIWAC, I want to suggest, is far from "obvious." Transfer principles, as you know, are very context sensitive and pretty dicey. I don't see how this could be a moral datum, in need of no defense, being simply obvious. So it really does *nothing*, dialectically, to go on and on about the "intrinsic wrongness of genocide." For it's not GIW that underwrites incredulity of the reliability about the passage, but GCG, and *that* depends on something like TIWAC, and TIWAC *isn't*, so it seems to me, palpably obvious and in need of no defense.
At this point, I could rest on the way things appear to me and rest comfortably in the prima facie justification this appears-claim gives me, and wait on you to provide a defeater, but I'll briefly mention just one way a defense of ¬(TIWAC) would go: Fritz is a high-ranking commander in the Nazi party. Any command he gives must be obeyed. Arnold is a lowly private in the Nazi army. Fritz is actually working undercover, against the Nazi party. He has a (near) foolproof plan that will bring down the Nazi party. However, the SS keeps a close eye on everyone, including Fritz. Fritz needs to stay hidden until the right time; if he doesn't, the plan will fail and the death toll in this possible world will look like the one in the actual world. This means that sometimes Fritz has to give certain commands that maintain his cover. In one instance, he orders Arnold to collect a thousand Jews and put them in gas chambers, and start the gassing process. Arnold, racist that he is, complies—and enjoys it. He's clearly blameworthy. He's clearly doing something wrong. I take it that you'd hold that "gathering a thousand persons and attempting to murder them is intrinsically wrong." Now, Fritz needs this extra time. In fact, his plan will go through before Arnold can actually kill any of the Jews, though he's started the process (dropped the gas pellets into the chamber, or whatever). In this case, Fritz commands Arnold to do something intrinsically wrong, but has not done anything intrinsically wrong himself. Thus, TIWAC, as stated, fails.
2. The second route is this: deny your claim that genocide is intrinsically wrong. In doing so I will *not* appeal to divine command theory, so the questions you've asked James to answer, for example, are otiose. Now, to be sure, if you define Genocide as murder, then, yes, clearly it's intrinsically wrong—trivially so! However, as the etymology suggests, the dictionary, and the first person to use the term, it means something like some mass killing, particularly of a racial, ethnic, or national group. But even here, 'killing' could be taken metaphorically. The person who coined the neologism, Raphael Lemkin, suggested that attempting to change a group's identity was a form of genocide. Anyway, I'll not mean it in this latter, metaphorical sense.
So, genocide is a mass killing, especially of a racial, ethnic, or national group. In this sense, it seems obvious to me that genocide is not intrinsically wrong. Finding one case that meets the definition but isn't an intrinsic wrong will suffice to prove my second route. Consider the movie The Hills Have Eyes. Now, make some simple changes that makes this inbred family number in the thousands. At some point, the men became sterile and the women infertile. No children. The group is cannibalistic. In fact, they've murdered and eaten thousands of ordinary civilians. I find nothing wrong whatsoever with wiping out this group. But that's genocide. Hence, genocide isn't intrinsically wrong.
More realistically, perhaps: nation N is at war with N*. N has a bomb that will destroy N*, killing 3/4ths of N*'s population. N* is evil. N's cause is just. N* will not stop. They are inflicting mass casualties on the world's population. N warns N*. N pleads with N*. N tells N* of the weapon they have. N* won't stop. They keep waring and killing and, we'll suppose, no amount of conventional warfare can stop N*. Seems to me we have the pieces needed for just war. After much thought, N—intending to stop the war not kill 3/4ths of N*'s population (DDE stuff)—drops the bomb. This is a case of genocide, and not intrinsically wrong—and obviously so (I say). (Note: we can also do this for the metaphorical understanding. Group G has certain traits that cause them to be very violent, abusive toward women, etc. I see nothing wrong with "reeducating" them, and effectively changing their group identity. This would fit Lemkin's original definition. So again, a case of 'genocide' that isn't intrinsically wrong.
So, then, I'd concur with James that the issue is a tad more complicated than you or Enns seem to want to make it. You'll also note that I didn't need to appeal to any of those DCT premises or other religious premises you seem to take issue with.
Paul
Adam, since we're both busy, this'll be brief.
1. I didn't compare you to Enns in the way you suggest. I claimed that, like Enns, you deny the historicity of the account, where this includes God's commanding what you call genocide. Recall what you said to James about the veracity of the historical account being defended here: "your best evidence for that claim are a few Ancient Near Eastern conquest narratives (for which there is no archaeological backing)." This comports with Enns' view, even if you diverge elsewhere. So, my charge was more nuanced than your response here takes into account.
2. It's fine if you think Fritz did wrong and is blameworthy. I think most philosophers and ordinary folk with disagree. But that aside, I think you'd have to say that your stance here doesn't have the status as "moral datum" or "obvious." It seems to be an inference from some philosophically contentious premises. So I don't think you have the dialectical advantage you (and Enns) think you had at the start.
3. Apropos (2). First, it's confused to say that I need to endorse consequentialISM to support my story about Fritz. To the contrary, the story at most assumes, with the majority of ethicists, that consequences can be morally relevant in deciding the ultima-, as opposed to the prima-facie-, wrongness of an action. Secondly, your response opens the door to a serious problem with deontologism. Apparently, you'd rather genocide obtain than Fritz command Arnold to do what I described above! I find this incredible. This is the "moral catastrophe" objection to deontologism, But perhaps you'd agree with Kant, who said, "Better the whole people should perish" than an injustice be done. That, I think, represents a reductio (in the popular, not formal, sense) of the austere deontological view you seem to be endorsing.
4. Regarding your final question: (1) I'm not sure there are "acts that normally constitute genocide." Perhaps this is one: "Killing members of a group." That's so underdescribed as to be open to obvious counterexamples. (2) But didn't I answer you in my "second route"? Depending on how we define it, I think it's *obvious* that some cases of genocide are not intrinsically wrong. Consider my nation 1 v nation 2 case. In that case, babies die. I don't view that case as intrinsically wrong. And let's note another element to this debate here. You are operating according to a rigidly Western, individualist notion of responsibility. However, the ancient world held to a different conception, collective responsibility. This is thoroughly documented in e.g., Tamler Sommers' Relative Justice. There's a lot of good, recent work being done in this field. So that's another..."complication."
Paul
I think it's worthwhile to begin by noting that Swinburne's position has actually changed. He does not say these passages are allegory. Moreover, he defends God's actions in similar ways to many here.
That said, on to poor Fritz. My "conclusion" was that "it's not wrong for Fritz to command Arnold [in the way described." I don't think that's "too strong." Not only is it, I think, intuitive to many, it's fairly weak. A stronger claim—which I agree with but have not argued for—is that he's praiseworthy. In any case, I can't see how you've argued for the conclusion that Fritz has done wrong. More importantly, the case is designed to show that the principle you need—TIWAC—is far from obvious. I think I've done that as well. I merely meant to undercut your attempt to claim that you could swiftly dispense with the traditional position here by noting that it's obviously wrong if God commanded genocide if genocide is intrinsically wrong. Furthermore, my position here is defending in the literature. Recently Patrick Todd argued in Manipulation and the Standing to Blame (Phil Imprint, 2012), that in Fritz-like cases there's a justifying reason. That's not to name-drop, but to show that the position I'm defending is far from "obviously false." In one sense, I'm defending the positive epistemic status of my and others' position on the traditional account.
As for my example with the bomb. Anscombe famously argued a position, and it's famously controversial. Again, I don't think you're keeping track of the dialectic. I'm intending to undercut the "it's just obvious" claim on your end. I've meant to take issue with this claim of yours:
So Obvi: I wouldn't think he gets a "pass" on the "foundation for ethics"--but one doesn't need that to have a justified belief that genocide is wrong. That much is a moral datum, and if your moral theory can't explain why its wrong, then so much the worse for the moral theory.
I think it's not as obvious as you think. So, is the targeting of civilians "ever" justified? On DDE theory, that depends on whether the good effect is sufficiently desirable for allowing the bad effect. Call this principle COMPENSATE. One case might be Israel's firing on Hamas, who uses human shields. Bill Vallicella who, as we know, is no slouch himself, recently argued that COMPENSATE could be consistent with deliberate targeting of civilians (see his post Israel, Hamas, and the Doctrine of Double Effect):
Regarding your remarks about the historicity. First, I don't take historicity to depend on getting all the details meticulously right. I think inerrancy is compatible with generalizations, etc. But now you'd say that the text isn't depicting 'genocide'.
Regarding Relative Justice. Yes, relativism about 'responsibility' is Sommers' conclusion. But two things to note: (1) relativism about responsibility doesn't entail *moral* relativism, and (2) I don't think Sommers' conclusion follows. Here's a position I want to develop (but haven't) based on his findings (and other things): pluralism about responsibility is true. I mean 'pluralism' here similar to 'logical pluralism'. As you know, logical pluralism says that there's more than one correct logic. If that's right, then here's an analogy to what I want to propose:
(Background: Recently, Jonathan Schechter proved soundness and completeness for weakly classical logic. Among other things, weakly classical logic changes Leibniz's law from a conditional to a rule of entailment. In this system, it's valid to conclude that identity is contingent. I don't want to get into a tangent over what the problems here are, there's other examples I could use, such as from three-valued systems. I just find Schechter's results fun, so go with me to get the larger point)
Suppose S argued for this conclusion: (CI): X=Y & <> X≠Y. Now, S* says, "That's invalid!" If logical pluralism is true, S*'s claim is elliptical. What it means is that (CI) isn't valid in strongly classical logic. But so what? That's not the correct logic in which to evaluate it. So, I'd say something like this about pluralism about responsibility. If something like this is right, you're evaluating the case from within the wrong framework. And, as with logical pluralism, there'll be some overlap between systems, which accounts for the points of convergence in the various responsibility systems. Also, this was just an analogy to pluralism about logic. Pluralism about responsibility doesn't require it. In fact, I think pluralism about responsibility is more plausible than pluralism about logic. In fact, given some reasonable assumptions about the nature of moral responsibility + the nature of God, I think all orthodox Christians will need to embrace some sort of pluralism about responsibility, though I (we!) don't have the time for me to go into my argument for this.
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