Everything you always wanted to know about Arminianism

FAQ: Doesn’t classical Arminianism really say the same thing as Calvinism when it comes to the sovereignty of God?After all, if God foreknew everything that would happen and created this world anyway, wasn’t he foreordaining everything simply by virtue of creating? A: This is a very good question but one based on a misunderstanding of divine foreknowledge. Classical Arminianism does not imagine that God “previewed” all possible worlds and then chose to create this one. God chose to create a world and include in it creatures created in his own image and likeness with free will to either love and obey him or not. God’s knowledge of what happens in this world “corresponds” (is the best word) to what happens; it does not cause it or even render it certain. Admittedly we cannot fully explain God’s foreknowledge without slipping into determinism. But the mysteries of free will (power of contrary choice) and divine non-determining foreknowledge are mysteries much more easily accepted than any form of divine determinism which, given the shape of this world, would inevitably cast shadows on God’s character. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-5-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/

i) Olson fails to distinguish between foreknowledge and counterfactual knowledge. Is he denying that God has counterfactual knowledge?

Perhaps he associates "God previewing all possible worlds and choosing to create this one" with Molinism, and since he rejects Molinism, he rejects that picture. However, the picture of "God previewing all possible worlds and choosing to create this one" doesn't seem to be unique to Molinism. Rather, possible worlds are the standard way of cashing out the freedom to do otherwise, viz. accessing alternate possibilities. In that respect, Molinism would be a special case of freewill theism in general, and not a Molinist distinctive. 

(I'd add that Calvinism doesn't deny alternate possibilities. Rather, the question at issue is which agent–God or man–has that freedom.)

On the face of it, there's no reason why classical Arminianism would be at odds with "God previewing all possible worlds and choosing to create this one."

ii) By creating the world, doesn't God cause the world? Doesn't God thereby cause, albeit indirectly, the foreseen consequences? Doesn't God effectively foreordain that chain reaction by his initial creative fiat? 

iii) How does God's foreknowledge not render the outcome certain? Unless God's belief in the future can be falsified (in which case it wouldn't be knowledge of the future), foreknowledge ensures the outcome.

In fact, Olson goes on to concede this when he says "Admittedly we cannot fully explain God’s foreknowledge without slipping into determinism."

iv) It's fine to appeal to mystery if, in fact, freewill (power of contrary choice) and divine non-determining foreknowledge are a given. But whether those claims are warranted is the very point in dispute. If, "Admittedly we cannot fully explain God’s foreknowledge without slipping into determinism," then that counts against the claim. That's evidence to the contrary. 

Roger OlsonI did address that question. Did you read the whole series? The "determinitive factor" is not in human beings. Faith is the instrumental cause of salvation while grace is its efficient cause. Receiving a gift is not in any way "determinitive" of the gift. It's still as much a gift when freely received as when not. 

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2014/07/arminianism-faq-1-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/#comment-1486090790

Seems to me that's a deeply confused explanation, even on Arminian grounds. 

i) How can saving grace be resistible if it's the "efficient cause" of salvation?

ii) The question at issue is not whether faith is the decisive factor in determining whether grace is a gift, but whether faith (in the sense of a libertarian exercise of the will) is the decisive factor in accepting or rejecting the gift (i.e. saving grace).